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Central Concerns of American Foreign Policy - Chapel Hill, North Carolina

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

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REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

THE KOBLITZ MEMORIAL LECTURE

The Temple
Sunday Morning, April 30, 1967
Cleveland, Ohio

CRITICAL COMPONENTS OF CURRENT U. S. FOREIGN POLICY

Along with rabbis, ministers and priests, a member of the Senate is among those most acutely aware of the great range of problems which face the nation and give rise to its principal anxieties. Both in domestic and international matters, Senators are compelled by their responsibilities to chart a course through a maze of disturbing public issues.

A Senator's guide in this process is a kind of triangle. At the base is the United States Constitution. One of the sides is his constituency, the other his conscience. For each Senator, the three angles are adjusted differently. During any session of Congress, however, all Senators are confronted with the need to make decisions which, in the end, are enclosed in this triangle.

A Senator's duties also have a tripartite character. They involve a contribution to a responsive Congress in a government which is responsive to domestic needs and which governs our relationship with the rest of the world by means of a responsive foreign policy. Three of the Senate's actions during this session of the Congress are illustrative.
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1967, which recently passed
the Senate, points the way to the first major updating of Congressional
procedures in two decades. The revision and extension of the Appalachian
Act which the Senate approved a few days ago is a response to the current
needs of a multi-state region left stranded by the shifting tides of economic
development. Senate consent to ratification of a Consular Treaty with the
Soviet Union is a response to the President's effort to bring about better
relations not only with that nation but with all of Eastern Europe.

These three measures share a common characteristic. In their
intent, all seek to keep pace with change. It is to the factor of change--
to changes in the international situation--that I would first address your
attention. In the two decades since World War II, we have seen a drastic
revision in the political composition of continents. We have witnessed
the emergence and growth of the United Nations and other international
groupings of nations. We have been almost overwhelmed by a mass outpouring
of developments in science and technology. We have been present at the
addition of the nth power of nuclear weapons to the already complicated
equations upon which rest world peace and civilized survival. We have been
compelled to face the frightful gaps in the material well-being of the
world's peoples and to confront the dilemmas which the rapid growth of
population poses to efforts to close these gaps.
The extent of change over the past two decades is also suggested in the contrast of the haunted, war-ravaged Europe of 1946 and the glittering, assertive Europe of 1967. It is sensed in the strivings for human betterment throughout Latin America and Africa and in other underdeveloped regions. In Asia, the force of change is illuminated by the extraordinary recovery and the technological advance of Japan. It is felt in the vast tremors in Chinese society.

It used to be that we were so immersed in change within our own nation that our concern for change beyond our borders was minimal. Some speak of that not so distant time as an age of isolationism. Actually, we were not so much isolated as we were insulated in a much less complicated world by an exhilarating national experience and by a fortuitous geography. Our energies, fortunately, could be directed largely to the inner development of a nation which was as sparsely settled as it was plentifully endowed. There was little need for us to look elsewhere for our challenges. The changing American frontier--physical, scientific and economic--was as stimulating and as promising of personal fulfillment as any in the world. Except to indulge a limited curiosity and to cater to a few exotic wants, we were inclined to avoid an extensive overseas projection of American power.

We did not seek our present involvement in world affairs. Even on the eve of Pearl Harbor, as a nation, we were reluctant to accept it. Yet, as a sequel to World War II, we became deeply and irrevocably immersed in the affairs of the rest of the world.
During the past two decades, we have directed tremendous resources, human energy and national power into a multitude of activities abroad. The cost of aid programs of one kind or another, for example, has run to tens of billions of dollars over these years and tens of thousands of Americans have gone abroad at one time or another to carry out those programs. We have established widespread intelligence networks and international information services. We have a military structure which costs around $70 billion each year; under it, since the end of World War II, millions of Americans have been sent abroad.

The strategic air force is on a minutes-alert. Intercontinental and other missiles are fused for almost instantaneous reprisals. Our navy is based in scattered parts of the globe and is on constant patrol of the Seven Seas. American forces are stationed in innumerable nations. In Europe as well as in Viet Nam, the level of this deployment, today, reaches to hundreds of thousands.

In the two decades since World War II, our armed forces have fought in Korea and now fight in Viet Nam and they have incurred tens of thousands of casualties in the process. We have skirted other grave conflicts elsewhere in Asia and elsewhere in the world. In the Cuban confrontation, the nuclear clock was stopped at one minute to midnight by a stroke of wise and restrained diplomacy.
We have entered into so many mutual security agreements—some forty pacts—that we are committed to military action in every part of the globe except, perhaps, Antarctica. The wisdom of these far-flung commitments has been questioned from time to time, and in my judgment, properly so. Defense obligations are now so enormous and so dispersed that were the operative provisions of a number of these commitments to come into play simultaneously, our ability to discharge them, short of nuclear conflagration, would be most doubtful.

In my judgment, all outstanding military commitments and activities ought to be subject to continuous scrutiny as to their current validity. From time to time we close surplus military bases at home. We ought not to be reluctant, in any sense, to reduce costly commitments abroad just as rapidly as their utility becomes questionable and their foreign policy purposes obsolete.

In this connection, I would note the large U. S. military deployment in Europe. For a number of years, six U. S. divisions have been stationed in Western Europe under NATO. These forces plus dependents add up to a quasi-permanent military establishment in Europe of over half a million Americans.

The annual outlay for this commitment amounts to billions of dollars. Many have urged a reduction of the deployment on the basis of cost or the gold drain and balance of payments difficulties or because of the competing needs of Viet Nam. The costs of the European deployment,
to be sure, are a pressure on the domestic economy and the international position of the dollar. The expanding war in Viet Nam, to be sure, is an open pit in terms of its ever-growing requirements for men, skills, and matériel.

However, the critical issue with respect to the U. S. deployment on European soil is not, in my judgment, a financial one; nor is it the competing needs of Viet Nam. If we require the present level of forces in Europe, the nation can find a way to deal with the financial and other difficulties which may be involved. The issue is whether our security, the security of the North Atlantic region and the security of Western Europe--twenty years after World War II--continue to compel the concentration of six American divisions on the other side of the Atlantic.

What is involved here is the accuracy of our current estimates of one of the critical components of our foreign policy. We need to ask ourselves whether conditions in Europe have changed since NATO was established. We need to ask ourselves whether the present level of the American commitment is out of step with that change.

Let us not delude ourselves; while our military deployment under NATO has not changed for many years, circumstances in Europe have changed greatly in recent years. They have changed in Russia and Eastern Europe. They have changed in Germany and Western Europe. When the troop commitment to NATO was assumed, the keynote of relations between the Soviet East and Western Europe was one of mutual suspicion and hostility. That is not the case now. Today, the tone of intra-European relations has the ring of a reasonableness that borders on cordiality.
Vice President Humphrey, on returning from his recent trip to Western Europe, was quoted as predicting that in 20 years the Iron Curtain would be replaced with an open door. Whatever the situation may be two decades hence, I venture to suggest, today, two decades after World War II, that the door is already much more than slightly ajar, as between Eastern and Western Europe.

The change in the general climate in Europe is reflected in the attitudes of the Western Europeans toward NATO. At one time, the European allies joined with us in a willing pledge of manpower and resources to the buildup of NATO. Today, the actions of the Western Europeans speak far louder than words. The actions suggest that they have long since abandoned earlier common concepts of NATO force goals, at least insofar as providing their share of manpower and materiel may be involved.

The French reaction in this respect has been abrupt and to the point. Although still adhering to the North Atlantic Treaty, France has withdrawn all divisions and other detachments from NATO. Moreover, President de Gaulle has required the removal of NATO headquarters from French territory. Great Britain has decreased its commitment of men and resources to NATO and is contemplating a further cutback of its army of the Rhine. Indeed, all of the European NATO members, to one extent or another, have lowered the priority they attach to their military consignments to the NATO command.
It can hardly be financial difficulties that have caused the European allies to veer sharply from earlier military pledges; in an economic sense Western Europe is far more capable of meeting these pledges today than when they were made. The retrenchment, instead, appears to be grounded in the conviction that the style in which NATO was originally tailored is no longer the mode for Europe.

In these circumstances, it seems a paradox that we-alone and apart from our Western European allies-have felt some compelling need to maintain at full strength the pledged deployment of forces in Western Europe. The fears for the safety of that region against Soviet aggression are obviously far greater in the Executive Branch of the United States government than they are in the European chanceries.

This variance of view emphasizes the cataleptic nature of our policy on troop deployment in Europe over the past few years. Of late, there have been indications of a relaxation in this rigidity. Even though the reductions in the deployment which are being discussed would appear wholly inadequate, it is to be hoped that there is at least a better appreciation of the realities of change in Europe.

Early this year, I joined with 43 other Senators in introducing a resolution which recommends to the President that the Executive Branch make a substantial reduction in the U. S. military deployment in Europe. In my judgment, the actual size of the U. S. establishment in Europe ought to bear some relationship to what other NATO members are prepared to do with regard to the common defense. On this basis, I have believed for
some time that two or three U. S. divisions would be more in accord with current realities than the six which are stationed in Europe. The lower figure would be no less effective in emphasizing that we regard the pledge of mutual defense of the North Atlantic Treaty as binding and that we hold our national security as inseparable from that of Western Europe and the North Atlantic region.

In all candor, I believe there have been strong tendencies to inertia in foreign policy, under Democratic no less than Republican administrations. The NATO situation, as I have just discussed it, is but one case in point. A lag is also reflected in policies toward Eastern Europe. Only in recent years have these policies begun to take cognizance of the changes in that region.

It is true that President Eisenhower sought in his administration to reverse some of the excesses of cold war recrimination. He tried to restore at least some civility to the conduct of U.S.-Soviet affairs, for example, by his personal association with Mr. Khrushchev and other leaders of the Soviet Union. It is true, too, that during President Kennedy’s administration, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty removed a rigidity which for years had decreed that no agreements, regardless of how useful, should be concluded with the Soviet Union. It has only been in the last year or two, however, that as a nation we have opened our eyes to the extent of change in Eastern Europe and have begun to explore vigorously its potentialities. We tend no longer to react with an automatic “nyet” when opportunities for understanding and mutual advantage appear. Rather, there is a new sense of discernment which weighs opportunities in terms of our national interest and implications for a more durable peace.
The fact is that such opportunities have been manifest for some time as a result not only of changes in Eastern Europe but also in the attitudes of that region towards Western Europe. After World War II, the schism in the continent was a severe one. It was compounded of ancient rivalries, war-born vendettas, ideological parochialisms, reciprocal fears and the inner absorption of human energy in order to meet the great demands of survival and reconstruction which existed in each war-shattered region.

After the death of Stalin, however, there was a general loosening of straitjackets throughout Eastern Europe. This development was manifested in various ways and notably in the growing response to consumer needs on the part of the Communist governments. The satisfaction of these needs, in turn, involved expanded commerce with the non-Communist world and Western Europe was quick to welcome it.

The rise of trade levels between the two regions in the past decade has been very pronounced. It should be noted, moreover, that--Berlin Wall notwithstanding--West Germany leads all other non-Communist nations in commerce with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. There has also been a rapid growth of communications, travel, cultural exchange and other contacts between Eastern and Western Europe in the last few years. How far this process has gone is indicated by a recent Yugoslav announcement that visas would no longer be required of visitors from the West!

These facts of change in Europe speak for themselves. The talk of war subsides; the sounds of intra-European cooperation are heard more clearly on all sides. In short, a European détente has not only begun, it is already well advanced.
Our reaction to change in Europe includes the initial achievements of President Eisenhower and President Kennedy to which I have already alluded, as well as the international bridge building upon which President Johnson has embarked. What is involved in the latter case is a sustained effort in the direction of restoring normalcy to our relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European nations. At the same time, the President is seeking a significant reduction in the military-technological rivalry which, wittingly or unwittingly, could lead the world into a catastrophic conflict.

A number of significant agreements with the Soviet Union are already associated with this effort. They deal with cultural exchanges, consular questions, commercial aviation, and the peaceful use of outer space. Negotiations have been initiated to try to limit the incredibly costly arms competition of adding successive and reciprocal “antis” to the ballistic missile systems of each nation. Most recently, as I have noted, a Consular Treaty with the Soviet Union has been ratified and just a few days ago by a vote of 88 to 0 the Senate consented to the ratification of a treaty on the peaceful use of outer space.

Emotions run deep on any question of U. S. relations with the Communist nations, especially in the light of the bloody conflict in Viet Nam. I am frank to say that I have my own reticences in this connection. The pursuit of agreements with nations of Eastern Europe seems incongruous with the war that is being waged against us with their help on the other side of the globe. The best judgments we can obtain, however, tell us that
the rejection of the kinds of agreements which have been made or are projected with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries will not make the slightest difference in the military situation in Viet Nam, that it will, in no way, diminish our casualties or hasten the conclusion of the conflict.

In those circumstances, I do not see that it serves our purpose to turn our backs on agreements which would otherwise be in the interests of this nation. I do not see that we advance the general cause of peace by refusing to build more stable relations whenever and wherever an opportunity to do so is presented.

If the changes in Europe constitute one of the critical components of the situation with which United States foreign policy must concern itself, a second is to be found in Asia. Along the littoral of the Western Pacific, there looms the unspoken but no less profound confrontation with China across the states of Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Viet Nam.

In that region, we have yet to resolve the dilemmas of policy which were posed by the overthrow of the national government on the Chinese mainland almost two decades ago. That cataclysmic event compelled the complete recasting of our relations with China. In the space of a few postwar years, the framework of our relations with the Chinese central government altered from one of great intimacy to one of great hostility. The Russians replaced us in the role of friend and mentor in the formulations of policy which were undertaken by the Peking People's Republic.
Cast in the role of foreign devil by the new government in Peking, our policy towards the mainland became a non-policy. Of necessity, we settled back to "wait and see." And through the administrations of three Presidents, we have continued to look for the happening which has not happened. We have yet to see clearly either a way to put together the pieces of the policy which collapsed years ago or a way to begin afresh in our relations with the Chinese mainland.

Contacts between ourselves and the Chinese mainland have dwindled almost to the point of non-existence. Americans do not go there; mainland Chinese do not come to the United States. At intervals, U. S. diplomats have had significant encounters with Peking spokesmen on various issues. In 1950, for example, we faced Chinese Communists at the United Nations, on the issues of the Korean conflict. We sat down with the Chinese again at the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962, on the issues of Indo-China.

One channel of continuing diplomatic contact with the Peking government has been maintained for many years. It has consisted of regular meetings, first in Geneva and then in Warsaw between the United States and Chinese Ambassadors accredited to Poland. These conversations--brief encounters, perhaps, would be a better term--have occurred with great regularity but not, to my knowledge, with results of any real import.

The absence of travel and diplomatic exchange between China and the United States has been accompanied by a mutual abstention from other customary international relationships, notably those of trade. The fact
is that as a matter of official policy, we have wanted no part of trade with
China. That is a policy which did not begin with the new bitterness generated
by Viet Nam. It is more than a decade old. We are the only nation in the
world, so far as I am aware, which has sought for years to enforce not only
a primary boycott on Chinese exports but also a secondary boycott on re-
exported Chinese products.

If the original seeds of hostility were sown, as noted, in China's
great revolutionary upheaval, they came to fruition in the Korean conflict
in which thousands of casualties were inflicted on each side. That bloody
clash was followed by a near conflict over the Chinese islands of Quemoy
and Matsu in the Taiwan Straits. Now, once again, in Viet Nam the unresolved
hostility with China threatens to bring about another bloody military engage-
ment between ourselves and the Chinese.

In the light of this succession of clashes and near clashes in the
Western Pacific it is not surprising that we are still pursuing a policy of
"wait and see." Moreover, events inside China have supplied additional
blocks to the formulation of positive policies on China. We see these events
not firsthand, of course, but second and third-hand. However incomplete this
view may be, it is still sufficient to tell us that the Chinese have entered
the ranks of those nations with the capability of inflicting nuclear devasta-
tion. It is evident, moreover, that there is in progress even now a great
ideological strife which gnaws at the inner core of Chinese Communism. The
epithets and the accusations and the protest-marches and the inflammatory slogans tell us that political introspection in China is very deep and widespread at this moment. Its impact is being felt particularly in the coastal cities which historically have housed strong Western influences and in the provinces along the inner borders which have long felt the pull of the Russian presence.

Ironically, the Soviet Union has now joined the United States as anathema in the policies of the Peking government. The origin of Sino-Soviet difficulties can be traced historically to the imperial projection which carried Russian influence under the Czars across the Asian mainland into Alaska and as far as California and Hawaii before it began to retract. Over the centuries there have been Sino-Soviet clashes in the border regions of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang. Indeed, wherever there is a convergence of the interests of China and Russia across the expanses of the tribal lands of Central Asia, ancient antagonisms have periodically been reactivated. In my judgment these historic antagonisms have been a factor second not even to ideological differences in contributing to the bitterness and estrangement in Chinese-Soviet relations over the past several years.

However serious the current difficulties, we ought not to indulge ourselves with the expectation that they will solve our problems in Viet Nam or Asia. Recent developments concerning the supply of materiel to North Viet Nam underscore this point. In spite of the bitter antagonism, the Soviet Union and China have managed to work out an agreement which insures
the transshipment of Soviet supplies by way of China to North Viet Nam. The prospect would appear to be, moreover, for a diminution rather than an intensification of Sino-Soviet antipathies at this time. Indeed, in the absence of basic changes in the situation, the level of interdependence between Russia and China is likely to continue to rise the longer the Vietnamese conflict persists.

In any event, we are restrained by the "wait and see" approach from making adjustments of policy which would take cognizance of changes in the Sino-Soviet situation. I might add that we have waited for years, but it is doubtful that we see our way any more clearly today with respect to China than we did a decade and a half ago. China remains a puzzlement, compounded of its immense complexity and our profound bewilderment. It is not likely that events in China will ever fall, like Chinese checkers, into some simple pattern which will make it easy for us to develop a new policy with respect to the Chinese mainland and its three-quarters of a billion people. Whatever course we follow will involve a great measure of uncertainty and a high degree of risk.

That is true for our present course or, more accurately, the non-course. Have we dared to ask ourselves, for example, whether or not the ten or fifteen years in which policy has been in abeyance in regard to the Chinese mainland might bear some responsibility for the tragedy in which we are presently involved in Viet Nam?
Let me turn, then, to that tragedy, to Viet Nam. It is the critical focus of this nation's present anxieties. It commands the attention of the Administration and the Congress almost to the exclusion of other pressing issues. Abroad, Viet Nam affects every aspect of our foreign relations. As for relations with Europe, the involvement in Viet Nam narrows the scope of response to significant change. As for relations with the Chinese mainland, the involvement in Viet Nam vastly complicates the difficulties which have long been present. Moreover, with every military escalation we are brought closer to another military involvement with China.

It is ironic that a small country whose name, Viet Nam, was scarcely known in the United States twenty years ago has become a critical component of the nation's international affairs. It is ironic that we are engaged on China's border with one of China's "natural enemies" but also with a people for whom we have no tradition of hostility. It is ironic that this phenomenon has occurred twice in less than two decades, the other occasion being, of course, Korea.

One indication of the depth of our involvement in Viet Nam is the great concentration of United States military forces in the Southeast Asian region. On the ground in South Viet Nam there are now more than 430,000 American forces. In the waters, offshore, there are the additional 75,000 men who compose the 7th Fleet. Another 35,000 American soldiers are stationed in Thailand, performing duties which are largely connected with the situation in Viet Nam. In total, then, well over half a million of our armed forces are consigned to the Vietnamese conflict, along with massive amounts of supplies and equipment. These forces are backed by powerful elements of American military strength in Okinawa, the Philippines and Guam.
A year and a half ago, I returned from Viet Nam and reported to Congress and the President that we were engaged in what was, in effect, an open-ended war whose conclusion was not in sight. At that time, the commitment of U.S. forces had not yet reached 150,000 and the bombing of the north was sharply circumscribed. A few days ago, the Commander of the United States forces in Viet Nam, General Westmoreland, told a convention of the Associated Press: "I do not see any end of the war in sight." In the months between these two comments, there has been the immense increase both in the U.S. manpower commitment and the level of military violence. The war, however, remains open-ended; there is not in sight any military way to a conclusion which bears a rational relationship to the original purpose for which the commitment was undertaken. It will be recalled that that purpose was to help the people of South Viet Nam preserve their freedom of political choice and to assist them and all the people of Southeast Asia to build a better material life for themselves.

However it may eventually be brought to an end, it seems to me that the war in Viet Nam is not going to be resolved by personal criticism such as that which, from time to time, has been aimed at the President, the Vice President, Ambassador Goldberg and others. Nor, may I say, will it be resolved by the stifling of the constructive debate of differences in or out of the Senate. Differences of viewpoint, responsibly arrived at and responsibly expressed, in my judgment, are essential to a solution in Viet Nam. Restrained and thoughtful debate of policy is not a luxury, it is a necessity.

Insofar as President Johnson is concerned, he is open to any suggestions which may emerge from discussion and debate and which may hold some promise of peace. He knows as do we that the crucial question is not
how this war began but how this war can be ended at the earliest possible moment and in an honorable manner. An honorable ending is not going to be brought about by simplistic formulas such as "get all the way in" or "get all the way out." An honorable ending is not going to be brought about by the spread of military violence, with its attendant tragedy for all Vietnamese, north and south, for ourselves, and for all concerned.

President Johnson's concern with this tragedy is as deep as yours or mine--deeper perhaps because he has to live with it twenty-four hours a day. The ultimate responsibility is his and, for him, there is no surcease.

Insofar as the Senate is concerned, there are many viewpoints on Viet Nam, but there is unanimity on the desirability of a prompt ending of this war in an honorable peace. Indeed, a few weeks ago by a vote of 89 to 2 the Senate endorsed a continued search by the President and others for a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

As for myself, I have expressed the view many times that the only practicable course is one which seeks to contain a further spread of the conflict in Asia, one which seeks to limit our involvement in the conflict while the effort to achieve an honorable settlement is intensified. The failures so far to find the formula which might lead to negotiations, in no sense, divests us of the obligation to ourselves, to the Vietnamese people and to the world to continue the search.

To that end, many suggestions have been made. Over the past year or so, for example, I have publicly proposed the following:
1. Military emphasis should be placed on sealing off of the northern border of South Viet Nam at the 17th parallel by the construction of a line of defense which could be maintained largely by South Vietnamese forces as an alternative to the continued bombing of the north.

2. The reconvening of the Geneva Conference on the basis of the 1954 and 1962 agreements, by call of the co-chairmen, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, or by any other participants;

3. The holding in Rangoon or Tokyo or in any other suitable place of an all-Asian conference to consider the conditions of an honorable peace in Viet Nam;

4. The inclusion in a peace conference on Viet Nam of any and all governments or groups whose concurrence may be necessary to bring about an end to the conflict;

5. The broadening of the Manila Conference of 1966 to include China and other non-participating nations in Asia;

6. The arrangement of a face-to-face meeting of Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the Foreign Minister of the Peking government to discuss the restoration of peace in Viet Nam.

In addition, I have suggested that our policymakers examine with great care, the views expressed by the French government, as well as by the Cambodian leader, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. I have urged that the proposals of U Thant and Mrs. Gandhi receive consideration. I have endorsed various statements of the President, Secretary Rusk, and Ambassador Goldberg, all
of which have made clear that not only our proposals but also those of Hanoi and the People's Liberation Front might provide a basis for settlement. I have recommended that there be not just a cessation of the bombing of North Viet Nam but a general cease-fire and standfast, with a halt on both sides, to maneuvers on the ground, in the sea, and in the air, to the end that efforts might be made to initiate talks.

Many others in the Senate and elsewhere have offered suggestions. There has been no lack of proposals. Many have been pursued through the channels of traditional diplomacy. The distinguished Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, has been a central figure in these secret diplomatic efforts to bring about peace. In spite of his great efforts and those of other diplomats and men of good will, peace is no closer.

This factor has led me to question an apparent reluctance to bring into play the more formal machinery of the Charter of the United Nations in an effort to break down the barriers to peace. I question this reluctance again today. The fact is that the U. N., to date, has not even taken official cognizance of the existence of a conflict in Viet Nam. That sort of ostrich-approach seems to me to court for the organization irrelevancy at best and eventual disaster at worst.

I do not believe anyone has a right to expect, with respect to Viet Nam, a miracle of peace from the U. N. I do believe, however, that the peoples of the world have a right to expect some public indication of concern of member nations, as to the dangers of this conflagration. There is a right to expect, at least, some effort to use the machinery of the Charter to dampen down the flames in Viet Nam before the war goes entirely out of control.
There are, of course, great difficulties involved in the assumption of an active role by the U.N. with respect to Viet Nam. Two of the principal parties concerned—North Viet Nam and Communist China—for example, are not members of the United Nations. That does not foreclose, however, a contribution from the U.N. It has seemed to me entirely appropriate that at the very least, the U.N. should open its forum to discussion of the problem by all involved directly or indirectly in Viet Nam—members and non-members alike. Such a procedure is proper; it is precedented; it is not subject to veto. There is no reason, so far as I can see, why the Security Council cannot offer to bring together not only the member states who are most intimately concerned in the situation—that is, the United States and the Soviet Union—but also the non-members, that is, Communist China, North Viet Nam, the government of South Viet Nam and any other group of relevance to a peaceful settlement. I should think, too, that the Security Council might also consider requesting the International Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. All of the belligerents have made reference, from time to time, to these Accords as the basis for a peaceful settlement. Certainly, it is appropriate to try to see through the impartial and judicious eyes of the Court what the applicability of these agreements may entail in present circumstances.

Let me make clear that I suggest the pursuit of peace through the U.N. Security Council not in lieu of private or secret diplomacy, not in lieu of a revival of the Geneva Conference. Rather, I suggest it as a
supplement or precipitant of these approaches or any other which may hold some promise of a solution.

As I have noted, the effort has been made since the outset to find a pathway to peace through secret and traditional diplomacy and it has been unsuccessful. Therefore, I think there is everything to be gained and nothing to be lost at this time by a public search before the U. N. for the gaps between the positions of the belligerents and the means by which they may be bridged.

There is no assurance that a resort to the procedural machinery of the United Nations will produce any more significant results than those yielded by secret and traditional diplomacy. That will not be known, however, unless and until the approach is tried.

Insofar as this nation is concerned, I cannot see that we violate our own interests or the interests of any other nation by a vigorous pursuit of peace at the U. N. Based on the Korean precedents, our government can very properly urge upon the Security Council a vote on these two specific resolutions pertaining to Viet Nam:

One, that the Secretary General be instructed to invite governments and groups directly and indirectly involved in the Vietnamese conflict, including China and North Viet Nam, to participate before the Council in an open and unlimited discussion of the conflict;

Two, that the Security Council request the International Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on the current applicability of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 and the obligations which these agreements may place on those directly or indirectly involved in the Vietnamese Conflict.
In closing, may I emphasize that the responsibility for the conduct of our nation's foreign affairs is vested in the President of the United States. Whether we agree with him or disagree, whether he pleases or displeases us, will not lighten one iota the onerous burdens which rest on his shoulders as a result of the Vietnamese conflict. The President may look for advice to his aides in the Executive Branch. He may look to the Senate and to the people of this nation. Whether or not advice is forthcoming, whether or not there is consent to his course, the President still must decide what he believes to be in the best interests of the United States. That is his responsibility. He cannot share it—he can only assume it, on behalf of all of us.

The President needs and should have our understanding, our help and prayers, and the support which can be given to him in good conscience. It ought to be borne in mind at all times that whatever contribution this nation can make to a peaceful settlement in Viet Nam, that contribution can only be made and will be made on behalf of all of us, in the end, by the President of the United States.