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Critical Components of Current U.S. Foreign Policy

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

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VIETNAM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have read with great interest the speech by the distinguished Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Cooper] and I also listened to what he had to say and the colloquy which ensued subsequent to his delivery of the speech.

I commend the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Cooper] for showing his usual calmness, good judgment, restraint, and wisdom in what he has to say, and to assure him that he has a great deal of company in what he has said.

When it comes to worrying about the situation in Vietnam, it is the shadow which affects all our lives, and it is preeminent to the consideration of any other question.

When I think of how much Vietnam is costing us in men and money, it makes me sad indeed to consider the tragedy which is the lot of this country in that far distant land.

We became involved in Vietnam because of mistakes, because of miscalculations, because of misunderstandings, and because of good intentions.

As was pointed out in the Senate this afternoon by the distinguished Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Young], it is too late to question how or why we got into Vietnam. The question is moot. It belongs to history. There is no question, as far as any Member of the Senate is concerned that I know of, of withdrawing from Vietnam at this time. But I do think the overriding question, if not the only question, in the mind of every Senator, regardless of his position on this subject, whether he is labeled a dove or a hawk, or has no label, is to find a way to the negotiating table, to the ways in which an honorable truce, or an honorable peace, or an honorable settlement, can be achieved.

It was brought out that perhaps the bombing should be suspended, and that this would pave the way to negotiations. Frankly, I would like to advocate a suspension of the bombing, because I have never advocated the bombing itself; but I feel, if we were to suspend the bombing and there were no reaction on the part of North Vietnam, the reaction on our part, both government and people, would be far more bitter and far more dangerous than is the situation at the present time.

Perhaps the distinguished Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Cooper] has given us a way out by means of which bombing would be confined to interdiction of supply routes and would increase at the 17th parallel and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. It is certainly a proposal worthy of consideration.

As far as the membership of this body is concerned, I wish to state that I believe in the right of dissent. No matter how a Senator is labeled, he does have a right to dissent and the right to express his opinions as he sees fit, but always, I would hope, constructively.

I would not consider even those who say, "Go in all the way," or who want to turn North Vietnam back into the Stone
Age, as unpatriotic. I disagree with their judgment; I think they are wrong. Just how much would it be necessary to bomb North Korea and China to stop the Korean war, because just how far is their economy out of the Stone Age?

I also believe in the right of demonstration, because that is guaranteed under the Constitution, and it is a right which should be honored—not the right to burn one's draft card; not the right to insult the President of the United States; or the Secretary of State; or a Senator; or the Ambassador to the U.N.; not the right to burn the U.S. flag. In Montana we have penalties for that. The penalty is a $5,000 fine or 3 years in jail, or both. These actions represent licenses, in my opinion, not the exercise of free speech, not the exercise of the right to dissent, not the right to make one's demands known.

The tendencies toward open-ended conflict are becoming more and more recognizable, whereas the alternatives toward a reasonable negotiation in seeking an honorable conclusion are becoming fewer and fewer all the time.

I would say that the weight of the responsibility rests heavily on the shoulders of every Senator, but heaviest of all, on the shoulders of the President.

If we remain silent, future generations will look back upon our inaction with amazement, as we stand by, tracery, as cowards, and as cowards. It is to them, and to the generation now fighting in Vietnam, that we owe our chief responsibilities, because those who are over there are not there of their own free will. They are carrying out policy laid down here in Washington.

I would hope that those of us who think of Vietnam as something which will disappear will, as the distinguished Senator from Vermont (Mr. Aiken) stated this afternoon, look at the reality and recognize the situation which confronts us. If it means increasing the payroll—mark in pay—the money ought to be known about it. If it means an increase in taxes—and I assume it will—the money ought to be known about it. If it means calling up the Reserves and the National Guard, the country ought to know about it; it means the imposition of wage and price controls, the country ought to know about it. I say that because the way we have been going cannot last, and one day, if it continues, we will face a confrontation, and it may be too late to do the things then that we should be doing now.

One of the ways which was mentioned by the distinguished Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Cooper) this afternoon was through the United Nations. I join with him in the statement that the principal factor which will hold today is Vietnam in the world. The conflict is discussed from every conceivable angle in living rooms, offices, classrooms, and bars and circles around the world. There may well be, in fact, a surfeit of talk but very little in the way of productive action in getting a convention of the belligerents at a conference table.

One place where this vacuum is especially evident is at the United Nations. The charter—a treaty obligation on all member states—does assign to the U.N. responsibilities in meeting threats to peace. These responsibilities have not been faced. Apart from the individual efforts of Secretary General U Thant and United States Ambassador Arthur Goldberg that the Security Council take up the matter, and scattered proposals by other member nations, the U.N. has been silent on Vietnam. As an organization, it has been silent and, in my judgment, it has been silent for too long. To date, the U.N. has not even taken formal notice of the conflict in Vietnam as a threat to peace even though the distinguished Secretary General has expressed the fear that unless it is soon terminated, it may lead to another world war.

Mr. President, I do not pretend to grasp the full extent of this obligation of organizational responsibility by the U.N. during these months and years. It does seem to me, however, that whatever the reasons in the past, the time is now long past due for the United Nations—as an organization—to attempt to make some contribution to ending the conflict. It is my attempt by open procedure and not merely through the diplomacy of its distinguished Secretary General and the corridor diplomacy of various representatives at the U.N. The Security Council, where the matter of Vietnam can be and should be considered, contains among its members those nations who have a decided relevance in seeking to alter the present course of events in Vietnam. It contains Great Britain and the Soviet Union, the Co-chairmen of the Geneva Conferences. It contains France, whose experience in Indochinese affairs is great and whose deep and sympathetic interest in the people of that country is a matter of record. It contains Canada, which, as a member of the International Control Commission, is in a position to observe developments in Vietnam. It contains Japan, which feels every day more strongly the gathering turbulence of the world in this Asia. It contains the United States, a major combatant in the war in Vietnam.

The Security Council also has the necessary precedents from the Korean war which would serve to bring into the situation the other combatants or potential combatants, who are not members of the U.N. Let us make it clear that I mean by this reference Communist China, North Vietnam and any other government or group whose presence may be relevant to the restoration of peace in South Vietnam—and in that category I include the NLF. Let me also make clear that I do not view the U.N. at this point as a source of ultimate solution to the Vietnamese problem. Rather, I see it as a possible initiator of a face-to-face public confrontation of the conflicting views of the most relevant combatants. The need for such a confrontation is more and more urgent. An open and frank discussion can help to pinpoint the roadblocks to an honorable and equitable negotiated solution before the expansion of the war shuts off even the slim possibility of such a solution. Each combatant may gain from a confrontation of this kind if it opens up direct communication. Who stands to lose from it? All.

I ask unanimous consent that, at the conclusion of my remarks, those statements which I read from printed matter be printed in the Record.
there is ever present the possibility of its explosion on a regional, continental or world-wide dimensions.

The conflict in Viet Nam may end, of course, with a truce, or it may end with a negotiated settlement with China or universal nuclear catastrophe. That is certainly the rational hope. Whether or not the settlement would be durable is another matter. In any event, the Vietnamese conflict now, today, already has the capacity to shatter the foundations of civilization and human survival. That will continue to be the case until the war begins to yield to rational solution.

Whatever else it is, therefore, the war in Viet Nam is a most urgent warning to all nations. It flashes a danger signal with respect to the adequacy of the present international instruments of peace. These instruments have not only failed to prevent a breakdown of peace in Viet Nam; they also appear incapable of restoring peace in any prompt and generally acceptable fashion.

It is high time, therefore, to note with emphasis that the structure of international order which has evolved during the past twenty years is, to say the least, dangerously hazardous. As it is now, each state has its own formula for safeguarding the security of its people. Each state tends to bend into this or that combination of elements—unilateral military power and a participation in a variety of bilateral and regional military associations. Each adds to this mixture its own version of traditional diplomacy and modes of international institutions. These international institutions complete the blend with a dash of the United Nations.

The fact that the U.N. has become less and less pronounced. Indeed, with respect to Viet Nam the U.N. presence is in reality nil. It is true that the distinguished Secretary-General, U Thant, has taken public note of the conflict in Viet Nam and its dangers to the world, warning that the General Assembly is a man of peace and an exceptional diplomat. He has made clear that he is more than willing to use his knowledge of diplomatic skills at the disposal of the disputants in Viet Nam. In his diplomatic role, he has arranged that meetings might provide at some point a basis for a settlement of the conflict and he has, otherwise, sought tactfully to engage the interest of various powers in a settlement.

With all due respect, however, the sincere efforts of the Secretary-General are hardly to be equated with bringing to bear on this situation a structure of international institutions. Viet Nam is, clearly, a breakdown in the peace within the meaning of the Charter. It presents the threat of a conflict of universal war. With these characteristics, it would appear that the conflict should long since have brought into operation every resource of the United Nations in an effort to restore peace. Yet, I regret to say, that apart from the personal efforts of the Secretary-General, the U.N. reaction to Viet Nam has had something of the character of that of a disinterested, entitled or impotent onlooker. It is almost as though the conflict in Viet Nam were taking place not on the other side of this planet but rather on some other planet entirely.

It may be, of course, that the U.N. is unwilling to see Viet Nam, and this may be, also, be, however, that the failure to seek a contribution from the U.N. is a matter of the breakdown in the restoration of peace in Viet Nam.

Whatever may be involved, the non-role of the U.N. in the Secretary-General is another matter. It is not to go unnoticed. An embarrassed silence is no longer a sufficient response to the nation and the situation. There are other reasons for silence, but even though there is, there is more involved in these needs than ending the war in Viet Nam. There is the danger of preventing one more monstrous conflict. There is also to stake their continued credibility and utility of what has herefore been a fundamental instrument for the maintenance of peace.

In my judgment, it is high time to face up to the conspicuous absence of the U.N. from the Vietnamese conflict. It is necessary to ask why the U.N. has failed to act, when the need for a peace-effort is maximal, the output of the U.N. is minimal. And we Belive, if we fail to see the poise for the engagement of the organization in the fight to bring about a termination of the conflagration of Viet Nam.

The U.N. was an essential element, among others, in the Korean cease-fire. Why, then, is it not at the table? Is the central problem of Viet Nam? In this connection, it is manifest that there have been striking changes in the structure of the U.N. since the Korean conflict. Whatever their virtues, it may be that these changes inhibit the engagement of the organization in Viet Nam.

The most sweeping change, of course, is that the U.N. has become a General Assembly-organized entity at the same time that the membership has grown to over 120 states. It will be recalled that originally there were 51 united nations. Among the present members, there are, as there have been since the outset, states of differing national interests, and still, in between, all of the gradations. There are enormous differences of significance among these states insofar as the practical problems of maintaining peace are concerned. They have different access to time, which might be helpful.

The U.N. was, at the dawn of its existence, a body designed to be effective. As I have already noted, the General Assembly has made and it can continue to make important contributions which, under the circumstances, are exemplary. That the U.N. is minimal. And we believe, if we fail to see the poise for the engagement of the organization in Viet Nam.

It is hard to formulate this statement to the fact that the structure of the General Assembly is appallingly cumbersome. Nevertheless, the Assembly can continue to make important contributions which, under the circumstances, are exemplary. That the U.N. is minimal. And we believe, if we fail to see the poise for the engagement of the organization in Viet Nam.

In my judgment, the General Assembly is not competent for this purpose. In this case, it is difficult to believe, at this time, to expect it to play a role in the restoration of peace. We need to know, too, what must be done sooner or later by all the parties directly or indirectly involved in the Vietnamese conflict to comply with the Geneva Accords and so establish conditions for a just and acceptable peace. In the circumstances, therefore, it might be useful for the Security Council to ask an advisory opinion of the International Court on these questions.

It would seem to me, too, that the Security Council is an appropriate setting for a conference on the implementation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 as a legal basis for a restoration of peace. We need to know, too, what must be done sooner or later by all the parties directly or indirectly involved in the Vietnamese conflict to comply with the Geneva Accords and so establish conditions for a just and acceptable peace. In the circumstances, therefore, it might be useful for the Security Council to ask an advisory opinion of the International Court on these questions.

I do not believe, after the fundamental relevance of the Geneva Accords, which would seem, that the question of Viet Nam is an appropriate setting for a conference on the implementation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 as a legal basis for a restoration of peace. We need to know, too, what must be done sooner or later by all the parties directly or indirectly involved in the Vietnamese conflict to comply with the Geneva Accords and so establish conditions for a just and acceptable peace. In the circumstances, therefore, it might be useful for the Security Council to ask an advisory opinion of the International Court on these questions.

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these proposals, that we do not expect miracles, that we keep our heads, and that we do not indulge in personalities.

In closing, I emphasize that the re-
sponsibility of this Nation's foreign affairs is vested in the President of the United States. Whether we agree with him or disagree, whether he has served his term or not, the President is our chief executive, and we should lend our support to his aides in the executive branch. He may look to the Senate and to the people of this Nation. Whether or not advice is forthcoming, whether or not there is consent to his course, the President must still decide what he believes to be in the best in-

terests of the United States. That is his responsibility. He cannot share it. He can only assume it on behalf of all of us.

In this most perilous hour, Mr. Presi-
dent, I think the President needs and should have our understanding, our help, our prayers, and the support which can be given to him in good conscience. It ought to be borne in mind that the greatest contribution this Nation can make to a peaceful settlement in Vietnam, that contribution can only be made, according to the judgments of those of us, in the end, by the President of the United States. So I would hope, Mr. President, that this suggestion, made first at the n°. Council, later repeated at the University of North Carolina, and still later at The Temple in Cleveland, a suggestion made originally by the distinguished senior Senator from Oregon (Mr. Morse) and others, that we go to the Security Council, and that we ask the U.N. to face up to its responsibilities, will be taken to heart by the administration, and that some action along these lines will get underway. As I have said before, the hour is growing late. There is not too much time left.

EXHIBIT 1

VIETNAM AND THE UNITED NATIONS

(Address by Senator Mike Mansfield, Dem-
ocrat, Montana, at the University of St.
verey, the George Huntington Williams Memorial Lecture, Nov. 10, 1966)

The United Nations is the most successful of politics in Montana. Elections in my State
usually involve a great deal of personal ex-

change with very little organization. Al-
though not running myself, I found the
 campaign as intensive as Montana is exten-
 sive. It carried me into conversation with many, many Americans over a trail of
 thousands of miles. I had occasion to speak
to Montanans on the range, in the high
mountains, along the roads, at ranch and
reservation, and in village, town, and city.

Political campaigning is not, as it might
appear to be, an exhausting pursuit. On the
contrary, at least to the politically sensitized,
it is invigorating and restorative. It reactivates
the ability to differentiate between what is im-
portant and what is grossly over-rated in the
public mind. From a political perspective, I say, is frequently dis-
torted in the political prisms of Washin
gton. A campaign may be designed to inform
the voter but it also informs the campaigner.
It unfolds the deep disquiet as well as the
hopes and fears of the political makeup of
the nation. Each election campaign, in my view, is a revelation of the human side
of American public life.

I meet with you fresh from an exposure
to a cross-section of American sentiment as
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sive reading and not a little reflection. Moreover, thanks to a seniority system accumulation of years may or may not be relevant at this time. A vigorous effort on the part of the U.N. may prove as futile as all other efforts to date, military and non-military, to terminate the conflict. But with the world enmeshed in the most dangerous international situation since Korea, we must seek by every avenue to facilitate the restoration of a just peace in Viet Nam. We owe that to the unfortunate people of that nation, to ourselves and to the world.

EXHIBIT 2

CENTRAL CONCERNS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

[Address by Senator Mike Mansfield, Democrat of Montana, before the Carolina Forum, the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, May 15, 1967.]

Prior to my coming to Congress a quarter of a century ago, I thought my stock of solutions to the problems of the world was quite adequate. I was, of what Senator Taft of Ohio might call the arrogance of brain power. In more common idiom, there were years I thought I knew it all. So may I say, is a falling common to exceptional human beings, not to be belittled to Schlesinger.

As a new Member of Congress, my background in history was highly useful. I also discovered to my surprise that international affairs did not go very far. It did not begin to provide much of an underpinning to the kind of answers to the whole range of new and tumultuous questions with which we were presented as senators or as members of the Senate.

For many decades to come, historians will look upon the period from the end of World War II to the present as a prime example of the indulgent misuse of the accumulated wisdom of the ages. We have been unable to learn from what is perhaps the greatest collection of evidence available in the history of the world. We may use the term "isolationism" or "internationalism," whatever may have been the case years ago, we are now closer to the world than ever before. We may not have the chance to go back to the days of, for example, the League of Nations. But we are, in the midst of the events of today, and we can learn by anticipating both the advantages and the dangers that lie ahead of us.

For many of us, a prime example of the future which relates to the central concerns of our foreign policy is the future of Europe. As I have said before, I am convinced that the American soldier is stationed in every nation of the world, on the basis of great material commitments and peripheral clashes elsewhere. More than twenty years ago, we were engaged in a struggle to make sure that we did not have any built-in military action anywhere on the globe, except, perhaps, the Antarctic. The strategic air force is on a minutes-alert. Intercontinental and other missiles are pre-set for instant retaliatory launching. Day and night the American navy patrols the seven seas.

These far-flung commitments have been questioned from time to time. In my judgment, it is most proper that pertinent questions be raised about them. Not only do they involve great expenditures of public funds, they carry, at all times, immense implications for the very survival of the nation and civilization. As I have said before, we can do so many and scattered defense obligations as any other group of the world. We are under immense pressure to make sure that we are able to provide for our own defense. I do not think we should be our own worst enemies. I think we should be our own best friends. I think we should be our own best benefactors. I think we should be our own best citizens.

I am convinced that we have been able to see the future and to plan for it in terms of isolationism or internationalism. Whatever may have been the case years ago, we are now closer to the world than ever before. We may not have the chance to go back to the days of, for example, the League of Nations. But we are, in the midst of the events of today, and we can learn by anticipating both the advantages and the dangers that lie ahead of us.
West was a severe one. It was compounded of political and war-born vendettas, ideological personal feuds, and factional turning of human energy to meet the massive demands of post-war reconstruction. Everywhere in Western Europe, there has been a general loosening of the ideological and other strait-jackets throughout which there has also been a growing response on the part of governments there to consumer needs, the satisfaction of which suggests experiments of preparation with the non-Communist world.

As indications of this breadth of change, communications, travel, cultural exchange and other contacts have grown rapidly between Western and Eastern Europe. The rise of trade levels between the two regions has been very pronounced, and it should be noted that, Berlin Wall notwithstanding, West Germany leads all other non-Communist nations in commerce with Eastern Europe.

For those who read the tea leaves of official sociability, moreover, I would call attention to the recent visits of President Podgorny of the Soviet Union to Italy and the first reception of a Chief of that State by the Pope, as well as Premier Koglyf's warm receptions in Paris and elsewhere. One may attach greater significance to these visits than the strictly formal values as he chooses to these events. The facts of change in Western Europe, however, take the form not only of talk of war subsidies; the sounds of intra-European cooperation are heard on all sides. The West German intends to neutralize the exchange costs of maintaining these forces on the Rhine. The Europeans to a greater or lesser degree appear to regard their N.A.T.O. commitments in the same non-urgent fashions. It is now very evident that the United States alone has felt the need to sustain the full burdens of the earlier common commitment to N.A.T.O. Our allies in Western Europe are much closer to the firing line, yet, in a period of unprecedented economic prosperity they are most unwilling to carry the financial burden of the world's defense depenses, which, if not only, will lead to a catastrophic conflict.

One of the number of significant agreements with the Soviet Union are already involved in this effort. They deal with cultural exchanges, consular questions, commercial aviation, and the peaceful use of outer space. Negotiations are also anticipated, in the near future, to try to strengthen by the fact of the durable use of the economical community.

Many of these measures, of course, involve not only the President but also action by the Congress, and particularly by the Senate. And, certainly, they involve understanding the part of the people of the nation. However, emotions run deep on any question of U.S. relations with Communist nations, particularly, in the light of the bloody conflict in Viet Nam. I am frank to say that I have my own reticences about the pursuit of agreements with nations on one side of the globe, while a war against us is being waged with their help on the other. These judgments we can obtain, however, the tell us that the rejection of the contemplated agreements with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe makes no sense of the difference in the situation in Viet Nam. It will, in no way, diminish our casualties or hasten the progress of the war.

In those circumstances, I do not see that it serves our purposes to turn our back on agreements with nations on the other side of the globe in an effort to further of the interest of this nation. I do not see that we advance the cause of peace by refusing to build the bridge that is needed ever and wherever an opportunity to do so presents itself.

Peace, behind-the-wall building to Eastern Europe is not unrelated to the possibility of serving notice that we regard the pledge of the North Atlantic Treaty as binding and serious. There is no indication of a new alignment of the North Atlantic region. To talk of six divisions as a manifestation of international Communism is to suggest a situation that the dedication of a revived isolationism is to reveal how irrelevant if not downright misleading it is.

On the other side of the globe, in Asia, there looms the spectre of a possible want of the situation of foreign policy. It is the confrontation with China, across the littoral states of Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Formosa.

Almost two decades have passed since the collapse of the national government on the mainland of China and its return to the island of Taiwan. That event, which occurred when most of you were too young for it to be remembered as the catastrophe of this nation's foreign policy. In the ruble, theCache-blown word became "wait for the dust to settle" before dominating among the possibilities that the Americans do not go there. Mainland Chinese do not come here. There is not only an absence of peace talks but a complete absence of war and communicative dialogue. The Taiwan R.O.C. has been alone and not only has not made a primary boycott for many years but also seek to enforce a non-Boycott foreign policy.

We have had brief negotiations with Chinese spokesmen on various issues over the years, but not at any time within the last eight years of 1954 and 1962. Our sole continuing diplomatic contact with the Peking government, however, has been through the U.S. and Chinese Ambassadors in Poland which have gone on regularly for many years and have been able to discuss the free space, as far as I am aware, has been conducted.

In short, "waiting for the dust to settle," has been the watchword of this nation's relations with the other quarters of a billion Chinese through the administrations of three Presidents. In truth, the dust has settled.

The initial hostility between a revolutionary China for which we had had little sympathy and which we have observed closely in the last two decades, has been either immediately by the Korean Conflict in which we became directly engaged in military conflict with the Chinese. The Chinese have exploded nuclear devices at the test site in 1967. The recent ideological conflicts have sent great tremors through the whole of the inner political structure of China. There has been, finally, the great cleavage in Sino-Soviet revolutionary solidarity which has torn apart all of the relations of the two big nations of the European Continent.

In the context of these events, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the recent development of which American policy has waited eighteen years, is heavier than ever. The obscenity, morally and otherwise, which has been great for the last ten years, and it may well be repeated unless there is a willingness to make timely adjustments.

I have, therefore, joined with 43 other Senators in the introduction of a resolution which recommends to the Executive Branch that the Executive Branch make substantial reductions in the present deployment of our forces in Western Europe. We have felt, for several years that two or three rather than six divisions would be more sufficient to contribute to the North Atlantic Treaty. That figure is in line with estimates of present need which have been sent to President Eisenhower and General Gavin, both of whom have had a long association with this question. I find it most extraordinary why these divisions are any less effective than six in
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respecting China must inevitably contain a major element of irresponsibility toward China. China is an ancient and powerful state. These considerations, may I say, apply not only to what we may do respecting China but to any other matter. The consequences which we may visit on China might well be far more serious than it may appear at first sight. A change in China's position is of vital importance to the world. China is of major importance to the world. If we had no real understanding of China, we would be unable to judge its significance.

The American attitude toward China has been somewhat surprising. At the same time, it is of the utmost importance to understand China. China is an ancient and powerful state. If we had no real understanding of China, we would be unable to judge its significance.

I would like to end by saying that I have been impressed with the wisdom of the President's policy toward China. I believe that the President is doing the right thing. I am concerned with the situation in Viet Nam, and I believe that the United States should be doing all that it can to help the Vietnamese people. I am also concerned with the situation in Viet Nam, and I believe that the United States should be doing all that it can to help the Vietnamese people.
Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. I am delighted to note, in passing, that Congress only last week expressed its overwhelming favor for these agreements as a basis for a negotiated settlement.

I betray no confidences when I note that, on reflection, I would have preferred last fall to go to New York for the sole purpose of discussing these two proposals regarding the image of the United Nations with Ambassador Goldberg and the Secretary-General. On the basis of these discussions, I would have preferred at that time that the search for peace then being actively pursued be carried on via the private avenues of diplomacy rather than in the forum of the Security Council.

That was weeks and months ago. In the interim, intense and many-sided efforts of diplomacy have been exerted through many private channels to find the key to peace. Hopes rose during the cease-fires at the Christmas holidays and at Tet, the Oriental New Year. However, the extension of these truces not only was unable to find a road to negotiations, it was not able even to bring about the extension of these truces.

The Pope tried. The Russian and British leaders have tried. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, with his diplomatic capacity, has tried. Ambassador Goldberg has tried countless times to negotiate a diplomatic and constitutional settlement by the Executive Branch of the government have tried.

The strenuous efforts of traditional diplomacy have been unavailing. As indicated by recent statements of both Ambassador Goldberg, in Santa Barbara, and the prime minister of Japan, who has spoken of the need for a constitutional settlement, the immediate hope has shrivelled. There is now no immediate prospect on the horizon, except for the possibility of a conflict being waged.

In the circumstances, it seems to me that a contribution to peace might well be sought from the United Nations as an organization. The Secretary-General's personal efforts to date have been dedicated and strenuous and he is entitled to the gratitude and support of the entire world community. With all due respect, however, there are other resources for peace inherent in the United Nations, as an organization, which have gone untapped and untried. The U.N. does have a responsibility to try to contribute to the resolution of this conflict. That response in the Charter to this is given to the United Nations, as a body, every member nation, including ourselves, shares that responsibility by solemn Treaty obligation.

It seems to me that the cause of a peaceful and honorable settlement may possibly be advanced—certainly cannot be hurt—by modest recourse at this time to the procedural machinery of the United Nations. In my judgment, this nation should consider seeking a face-to-face confrontation of all the belligerents at the United Nations. Following the Korean precedent, it seems to me eminently desirable that this government give every consideration to a possible initiative which would bring to a vote in the Security Council two resolutions along the following lines:

One, that the Security Council invite all belligerents, direct and indirect, including China and Viet Nam, to participate in an open discussion of the situation in Viet Nam and ways and means of ending it;

Two, that the Security Council request the U. N. Secretary-General to render an expert opinion on the current applicability of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 and the obligations which these agreements may place on the present belligerents in Viet Nam.

Whether or not there is much prospect of a change in the military situation from others in the world, the lessons of the desirability of offering these resolutions deep and widespread interest and using them to press for a vote. In my judgment, such an initiative of this kind serves not only our interests but the interests of peace in Viet Nam.

Let me conclude, now, by clarifying one point: a solution cannot be settled from the Congress or from the campus. In the end, if it is to be settled honorably, there must be personal offi ces of your government who can speak for you and for the entire nation in its foreign relations. Whether or not, whether we like him or not, whether we abhor him or love him, that man is the President of the Republic of Viet Nam.

In a government such as ours, a Senator lives with a Constitution, a constituency, and a conscience. All three considerations underlie the suggestions respecting Viet Nam which have been made here today and others which have been expressed on other occasions. President Johnson and all the Presidents who have gone before him have listened to advice from many sources, including the Senate.

In the President, however, who makes the fundamental decisions of foreign policy. These decisions are of an immunity which he may not make on public advice. The President makes the decisions and any opposition to them is the opposition of the Congress against the President. Nevertheless, while he does not have to make these decisions, he has a responsibility torender an advice that is in the best interest of the country.

EXHIBIT 3

CRITICAL COMPONENTS OF CURRENT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

(Comments of Mike Mansfield, Democrat, of Montana, the Kobolz Memorial Lecture, the Temple, April 30, 1967, Cleveland, Ohio)

Along with rabbis, ministers and priests, a member of the Senate is among those most acutely aware of the great range of problems which face the nation and give rise to its principle anxieties. Both in domestic and international matters, Senators are compelled by their responsibilities to chart a course through a maze of disturbing public issues.

A Senator's guide in this process is a kind of triangle. At the base is the United States Constitution. One of the sides is the Constitution, the other his conscience. For each Senator, the three angles are adjusted differently. The integrity of the Congress is another element in the triangle; however, all Senators are confronted with the need for action which, in the end, are enclosed in this triangle.

A Senator's duties also have a tripartite character. In addition to his constitutional responsibility Congress is a government which is responsive to the needs of the people and which governs over the rest of the world by means of a responsive foreign policy. Three of the Senate's actions during this session of Congress is illustrative.

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1967, which recently passed the Senate, points the way to the major upbuilding of Congressional procedures in two decades. The revision and extension of the Appalachian Act which the Senate approved a few days ago is a response to the current needs of a multi-state region in the shifting tides of economic development. Senate consent to ratification of a Consular Treaty with the Soviet Union is the President's efforts to bring about better relations not only with that nation but with all of Eastern Europe.

These three measures share a common characteristic. In their intent, all seek to keep pace with the shifting factors—change—to changes in the international situation—that I would first address your attention. From the outbreak of World War II, we have seen a drastic revision in the political and economic structure of the world. We have witnessed the emergence and growth of the United Nations and other international groupings of nations. We have been almost overwhelmed by a mass outpouring of developments. War has been present at the addition of the nth power of nuclear weapons to the already incalculable variables of the world peace and civilized survival. We have been compelled to face the frightful gaps in the statesmanship of the United States, peoples and to confront the dilemmas which the rapid growth of population poses to effects of these factors.

The extent of change over the past two decades is also suggested in the contrast of the haunted, war-ravaged Europe of 1946 and the glittering, assertive Europe of 1967. It is sensed in the stirrings for human betterment throughout Latin America and Africa and in other underdeveloped regions. They are fused for almost instantaneous reprisals by the extraordinary recovery and the technological advance of Japan. It is felt in the tensions of that society.

It used to be that we were so immersed in change within our own nation that our concern for change beyond our own was minimal. Some speak of that not so distant time as the era of information. Actually, we were not so much isolated and insular as isolated in a much less complicated world by an enforcing national belief in a fortuitous geography. Our energies, fortunately, could be directed largely to the inner development of a national society which, as sparsely settled as it was plentifully endowed. There was little need for us to look elsewhere for our challenges. The changing American frontier—physical, scientific and economic—was as stimulating and as promising of personal fulfillment as any in the world. Except to indulge a limited curiosity, to cater to a few exotic wants, we were inclined to avoid an external involvement or extension of American power.

We did not seek our present involvement in world affairs. Even on the eve of Pearl Harbor, as a nation, we were reluctant to accept it. Yet, as a sequel to World War II, we became deeply and irrevocably immersed in the affairs of the rest of the world.

During the past two decades, we have directed tremendous resources, human energy and national power into a multitude of activities abroad. The cost of aid programs of one kind or another, for example, has run to tens of billions of dollars over the years. The programs have been for the most part directed to the aid of those regions and international services. We have had expenditures of $30 billion a year and have a budget of $70 billion each year, under it, since the end of World War II, millions of Americans have been involved.

The strategic air force is on a minutes alert. Intercontinental and other missiles are being produced faster than ever before. Our naval fleet has been deployed worldwide. Our Army is stationed in an innumerable nations. In Europe as well as in Viet Nam, the level of this deployment, today, rises to hundreds of thousands.

In the two decades since World War II, our position in the world has grown, not from the recognition of the extent of the conflict. The conflict now is fought in Viet Nam and has incurred tens of thousands of casualties in the process. It is not just one war, but a war in Viet Nam, the way it is fought not on the Continent, and elsewhere in Asia and elsewhere in the world. In the Cuban confrontation, the nuclear explosion no longer a threat of the sky and the earth by a stroke of wise and restrained diplomacy.

We have entered into so many mutual security, military, commercial and cultural agreements. That we are committed to military action in every part of the globe except, perhaps, Antarctica. This is a global policy. It has been questioned from time to time, and in this and in the political process. These relations are now so enormous and so dispersed
that were the operative provisions of a number of these commitments to come into play simultaneously, our ability to discharge them under a nuclear confrontation, would be most doubtful.

In my judgment, all outstanding military commitments, our foreign policies, are subject to continuous scrutiny as to their current validity. From time to time we close supermarkets to home. We drop not to be reluctant, in any sense, to reduce costs and transfer of resources abroad just as the U.S. economy, as a whole, as its utility becomes questionable and their foreign policy purposed obsolete.

In this connection, I would note that the large U.S. military deployment in Europe. For a number of years, six U.S. divisions have been stationed in Western Europe under NATO. These forces plus dependents add up to a quasi-permanent military establishment in Europe of over half a million Americans.

The annual outlay for this commitment amounts to billions of dollars. Many have urged a reduction of the deployment on the basis of cost or the gold drain and balance of payments difficulties, or because of the competing needs of Viet Nam. The costs of the European deployment, to be sure, are a pressing problem. They have long since abandoned earlier common conceptions. The actions suggest that they have been reflected in the attitudes of the Westernism. Whatever the situation is, it is reflected in the attitudes of the West, in the actions of the West. From his recent trip to Western Europe, was quoted in the European relations between the Soviet East and West Europe. They have changed. It is to ask ourselves whether conditions in Europe have changed since NATO.

These forces plus dependents add up to a substantial commitment to NATO. Today, the actions of the Westernism. Whatever the situation is, it is reflected in the attitudes of the West, in the actions of the West. From his recent trip to Western Europe, was quoted in the European relations between the Soviet East and West Europe. They have changed. It is to ask ourselves whether conditions in Europe have changed since NATO.

The French have withdrawn all divisions and other detachments from NATO. Moreover, President de Gaulle has required the removal of NATO headquarters from his country. Great Britain has decreased its commitment of men and resources to NATO and is contemplating the removal of its last two of the Hunter class. Indeed, all of the European NATO members, to one extent or another, have lowered the priority they attach to their military contributions to the NATO command.

It can hardly be financial difficulties that have caused the anxiety of allies to veer sharply from earlier military pledges; in an economic sense, the West European economy is far more capable of meeting these pledges today than when they were made. The reenforcement, instead, appears to be grounded on the conviction that the style in which NATO was originally tailored is no longer the mode for Europe.

In these circumstances, it seems a paradox that we alone and apart from our Western European allies—have felt some compelling need to maintain at full strength the pledged deployment of forces in Western Europe. The fears for the safety of that region against Soviet aggression are obviously far greater in the Executive Branch of the United States government than they are to the European governments.

This variance of view emphasizes the catastrophic nature of our policy on troop deployment in Europe over the past few years. Of late, however, there has been a relaxation in this rigidity. Even though the reductions in the deployment which are being discussed would be inadequate, it is to be hoped that there is at least a better appreciation of the realities of change in Europe. Early this year, I joined with 43 other Senators in introducing a resolution which recommends that the Executive Branch make a substantial reduction in the U.S. military deployment in Europe. In my judgment, it is the case that the U.S. establishment in Europe ought to bear some of the responsibility for the absence of mutual suspicion and hostility which no longer is the case today. Today, the European relationship is a case of a reasonableness that borders on annulling.

Vice President Humphrey, on returning from his recent trip to Western Europe, was quoted as predicting that in 30 years the Iron Curtain would be replaced with an open door. Whatever the situation may be, two decades hence, I venture to speculate, as well as the Western Europeans. The change in the general climate in Europe is reflected in the attitudes of the Westernism. The Alliance. At one time, the European allies joined with us in a willing pledge of manpower and resources to the NATO. Today, the attitude of the Western Europeans speaks far louder than words. The actions suggest that they have long since abandoned earlier conceptions of NATO force goals, at least insofar as the economic community of manpower and matériel may be involved.

The French reaction in this respect has been even more pointed. Although still adhering to the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance in terms of our national interest and implications for a more durable peace. The fact is that such opportunities have been lost. The Western European nations, those not only of changes in Eastern Europe but also in the attitudes of that region towards Western Europe. After World War II, the schism in the continent was a severe one. It was compounded of ancient rivalries, war-born identities, ideological passions, local fears and the inner absorption of human energy in order to meet the great demands of national and colonial vendettas, ideological parochialism, reciprocal withdrawal in each war-shattered region. Even upon the death of Stalin, however, there was a general loosening of straitjackets throughout Eastern Europe. This development was manifest in various ways and notably in the growing response to consumer needs on the part of the Communist govern­ men. In turn, involved expanded commerce with the non-Communist world and Western Europe was quick to welcome.

The rise of trade levels between the two regions in the past decade has been very pronounced. It should be noted, moreover, that—Berlin Wall notwithstanding—West Germany leads all other non-Communist nations in commerce in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. There has been a rapid growth of commercial transactions, especially in exchange of agricultural surpluses between Eastern and Western Europe in the last few years. How far this has process has run is indicated by a recent Yugoslavian announcement that visas would no longer be required of visitors from Yugoslavia.

These facts of change in Europe speak for themselves. The talk of war subsides; the sounds of intra-European cooperation are heard more clearly on all sides. In short, a European detente has not only begun, it is already well advanced.

Our reaction to change in Europe includes the initial achievements of President Eisenhower and President Kennedy to which I have already alluded, as well as the interna­ tional bridge building upon which President Johnson has embarked. What is involved in the latter case is a sustained effort in the direction of restoring normality to our relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European nations. At the same time, the President is seeking a significant reduction in the military tension. Whether which, unwittingly or unwittingly, could lead the world into a catastrophic conflict.

In any case, I believe there have been strong tendencies to inertia in foreign policy, under Democratic no less than Republican administrations. The NATO situation, as I have just discussed it, is but one case in point. A large part of these policies toward Eastern Europe. Only in recent years have these policies begun to take cognizance of the changes in that region.

It is true that President Eisenhower sought in his administration to reverse some of the excesses of cold war recrimination. He tried to restore to at least some civility to the conduct of U.S.-Soviet affairs, for example, by his personal meeting with Mr. Khrushchev and other leaders of the Soviet Union. It is true, too, that during President Kennedy's administration, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty removed a rigidity which for years had decreed that no agreements, regardless of form, could be reached for the benefit of the Soviet Union. It is only been in the last year or two, however, that as a nation we have opened our eyes to the change in Eastern Europe and have begun to explore vigorously its potentialities. We tend no longer to act as if nuclear "nymph" when opportunities for understanding and mutual advantage appear. Rather, there is a new sense of demilitarization which highlights opportunities in terms of our national interest and implications for a more durable peace. The fact is that such opportunities have been lost. The Western European nations, those not only of changes in Eastern Europe but also in the attitudes of that region towards Western Europe. After World War II, the schism in the continent was a severe one. It was compounded of ancient rivalries, war-born identities, ideological passions, local fears and the inner absorption of human energy in order to meet the great demands of national and colonial vendettas, ideological parochialism, reciprocal withdrawal in each war-shattered region. Even upon the death of Stalin, however, there was a general loosening of straitjackets throughout Eastern Europe. This development was manifest in various ways and notably in the growing response to consumer needs on the part of the Communist govern­ men. In turn, involved expanded commerce with the non-Communist world and Western Europe was quick to welcome.

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In those circumstances, I do not see that it is possible to turn our backs on the agreements which would or could be of concern to this nation. I do not see that we are faced with a fait accompli situation in which the only answer is to build more stable relations whenever and wherever opportunity to do so is present.

If the changes in Europe constitute one of the critical components of the situation which concerns us, then a second is to be found in Asia. Along the littoral of the Western Pacific, the United States occupies no position but in confrontation with China across the states of Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Viet Nam.

In that region, we have yet to resolve the dilemma of policies which were posed by the overthrow of the national government on the Chinese mainland almost two decades ago. That cataclysmic event compelled the complete recasting of our relations with China. In the space of a few postwar years, the framework of our relations with the Chinese central government was altered from one of great intimacy to one of great hostility. The Russians replaced us in the role of friend and mentor.

Cast in the role of foreign devil by the new government in Peking, our policy toward the mainland became a non-policy. Of necessity, we had to "see and understand." And through the administrations of three Presidents, we have continued to look for the happening which has, in effect, happened. We have yet to see clearly either a way to put an end to the policy which collapsed years ago or a way to begin something in our relations with the Chinese mainland.

In our relations with the Chinese mainland, we have dwelled almost to the point of non-existence. Americans do not.go there, mainland Chinese do not come to the United States. At intervals, U.S. diplomats have had significant encounters with Peking in our efforts to define various issues. For example, we faced Chinese Communitists at the United Nations, on the issues of the Korean conflict. We sat down with the Chinese again at the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962, on the issues of Indo-China.

In each of these situations, our talks with Peking have been governed by self-interest. It is a policy which did not begin with the new bitterness generated by Vietnam. It is more than a decade old. We are the only nation in the world, so far as I am aware, which has sought for years to enforce not only a principle, but a policy, that the Chinese are not to be appeased. This is a policy which has not been quite regularity but not to my knowledge, with results of any real import.

The absence of travel and diplomatic exchange between China and the United States has been accompanied by a mutual abstention from other customary international relationships, notably those of trade. The fact is that as a matter of official policy, we have wanted no part of trade with China. That is a policy which did not begin with the new bitterness generated by Vietnam. It is more than a decade old. We are the only nation in the world, so far as I am aware, which has sought for years to enforce not only a principle, but a policy, that the Chinese are not to be appeased. This is a policy which has not been quite regularity but not to my knowledge, with results of any real import.

In the light of the succession of clashes and near clashes in the Western Pacific it is not surprising that the U.S. is pursuing a policy of "wait and see." Moreover, events inside China have supplied additional blocks to the foreign policies on the mainland. We see these events not firsthand, but from a distance. However incomplete this view may be, it is still sufficient to tell us that the Chinese have entered upon a new period with the capacity of inflicting nuclear devastation. It is evident, moreover, that there is in the Chinese position a dental strike which gnaws at the inner core of Chinese Communism. The epithets and the accusations and the protest-marches and the inflammatory slogans tell us that political introspection in China is very deep and widespread at this moment. Its impact is being felt particularly in the coastal cities which have long felt the pull of the Russian pressure.

Ironically, the Soviet Union has now joined the United States as anathema in the policies of the Soviet. The origin of Sino-Soviet difficulties can be traced historically to the imperial projection which once reached Russian over the Caspian across the Asian mainland into Asia and perhaps as far as California and Hawaii before it began to recede. Recently there have been Sino-Soviet clashes in the border regions of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang. Indeed, within the last few days there has been a convergent of the interests of China and Russia across the lands of the Central Asia, ancient antagonisms have periodically been reactivated. In my judgment these historic antagonisms have been a factor second not even to ideological differences in contributing to the bitterness and estrangement of Sino-Soviet relations over the past several years.

However serious the current difficulties, we ought to be able to indulge ourselves with the expectation that they will solve our problems in Viet Nam or Asia. Recent developments concerning the situation of mainland to North Viet Nam underscores this point. In spite of the bitter antagonism, the Soviet Union and China have worked out an agreement which insures the transshipment of Soviet supplies by way of China to North Viet Nam. The prospect would appear to be, moreover, for a diminution rather than an intensification of military hostilities at this time. Indeed, in the absence of basic changes in the situation, the level of interdependence between China is likely to continue to rise the longer the Vietnamese conflict persists.

In any event, constrained by the "wait and see" approach from making adjustments of policy which would take cognizance of changes in the Sino-Soviet situation, I might add that we have waited for years, but it is housed strong Western influences and in the provinces along the inner borders which have long felt the pull of the Russian pressure.

However it may eventually be brought to an end, it seems to me that the war in Viet Nam is not going to be resolved by personal criticism such as that which, from time to time, has been aimed at the President, the Vice President, Ambassador Goldberg and others. Nor, may I say, was it the stifling of the constructive debate of differences in or out of the Senate. Different viewpoints, reasonable and responsibly expressed, in my judgment, are essential to a solution in Viet Nam. Restricted and restrained thought and debate of policy is not a luxury, it is a necessity.

Just as President Johnson is concerned, he is open to any suggestions which may emerge from discussion and debate and which he may or may not accept. He has pointed out that we have no right to say that we are not prepared to live with a situation which we are presently involved in Viet Nam?

Let me turn, then, to that tragedy, to Viet Nam. It is the critical focus of this na-
The factor has led me to question an answer that I have previously given. I had played the more formal machinery of the Charter of the United Nations in an effort to break down the barriers. But, as the President said this evening, perhaps because he has to live with it twenty-four hours a day. The ultimate responsibility is his and, for him, there is no excuse.

Insofar as the Senate is concerned, there are, of course, many matters on which few members of the Senate have been informed in detail. There have been many news reports in the press that the President has recommended to Congress that the Security Council request the International Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on the applicability of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 1962 and the obligations which these agreements may entail in the Vietnam conflict.

In closing, may I emphasize that the responsibility of the Senate for our nation's foreign affairs is vested in the President of the United States. Whether we agree with him or disagree, whether he pleases or displeases us, will not lighten one iota the onerous burdens which rest on his shoulders as a result of the Vietnamese conflict. The President may look for advice to his sides in the Executive Branch. He may look to the Senate and to the people of this nation. Whether or not advice is forthcoming, whether or not there is consensus to his course, the President still has to decide what he believes to be in the best interests of the United States.

I suggest that our policy, the Security Council cannot offer to bring together not only the member states who are most intimately concerned in the situation—the U.N. and the United States, and any other group of relevance to a peaceful settlement. I should think, too, that the Security Council might seek to request the International Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 1962. All of the belligerents have made reference, from time to time, to these Conventions as the basis for a peaceful settlement. Certainly, it is appropriate to try to see through the impartial and judicious eyes of the Court what the applicability of these agreements may entail in present circumstances.

As I have indicated, I do not think that the solution of the Vietnam conflict is going to be brought about by the charts and men of good will, peace is no closer.
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 64, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
There is a great deal of controversy, too, and a great clash of interest between labor and management which the Congress had to be having to Intrude more than it has ever done.

Do you think that, looking over the field with the collapse of a newspaper in New York and the union pressure in the automobile industry facing very serious contractual negotiations with the matter of the UAW, would you say that the time is right for a whole new look at the situation of collective bargaining?

Mr. AGRONSKY. Yes, I do.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Well, Dick, I am an ex-expert in the subject, if I ever was an expert. I constantly must seek new looks, but I doubt very much whether there are any magic solutions about major conflicts, just as I doubt that whether by the wave of a wand, which we would all like to find, a magic wand, we can get this conflict in Vietnam over.

In our domestic area we have a great problem. We would like labor conflicts to subside. We would like them to be all solved, but would also like to preserve our freedom. Now, all of the solutions to the grave labor conflicts of the nation are to find a way to solve the problems and maintain freedom. This is not easy to do, whether it is newspapers in New York or the UAW. I mean, you suggest that we don't have a very domestic scene, and, by and large, we get together settle contentions, but now, since you ask questions recently, that was settled. We had some problems on the television industry. I think, unless, unless, unless, conditions will be settled. I believe it ought to be.

Mr. AGRONSKY. I refer to the same problem. I mean here said—this is, this is a good opportunity here is now, in the domestic scene, when we have a grave conflict.

It is much—I can testify by personal experience now. In two years, it is much more difficult to settle basic conflicts internationally as domestically for a very reason—domestically, whatever our differences, we all serve the same goals and believe in them; internationally, we have wide divergencies of goals, objectives, methods, and that presents us with a great problem.

Mr. AGRONSKY. Mr. Ambassador, let's return you to the area of your competence in the United Nations. Why don't we use the UN to seek peace in Vietnam?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Well, Martin, in the foreign area and one of the possible solutions I accepted my present post, is I believe strongly that the UN, after all, we are the principal sponsor of the UN, and many, many have felt that the UN is not alive enough. It is true, and in the face of this problem, if there is to be any effective settlement of Vietnam, there would be a great outcry in the press and on TV, and not only in our country, I would think, but across the world. I mean, from expressing his sincere convictions, there would be a greater outcry in the press and once again it would drag the General. The official position of the United States was given in an official letter which Mr. Acheson delivered the Secretary General, with the approval of the Government at the highest levels, in which we said:

1. You have made a brave and we are ready to talk about the modalities and the choice of the Government that they are ready to talk about the modalities of a peace settlement.

Second, so that remains the position. We are for a mutual cease-fire, and we are ready today to talk about the modalities of such a cease-fire, the official position of the United States Government.

Now, there are difficulties, as General Westmoreland, properly pointed out. But the official position of the United States Government is, we are for a cease-fire.

Mr. AGRONSKY. How do you explain the refusal of the Soviet Union to permit the discussion of the Vietnam problem in the United Nations?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Well, that is a very troublesome situation. Dick, I do not think—and I would join the United States in putting its full force behind working out an honorable solution to Vietnam. I think it is in their interest. I think it is in our interest. We have two large nuclear powers; the day we say that peace is too great a responsibility to try to work out world peace and world security.

Now, how do you explain their attitude? They say, Mr. Ambassador, they said the UN hasn't got competence to deal with this subject, I don't agree with him.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Ambassador, when you brought the question to the Security Council in January, '66, the same day, simultaneous issuance of the Dept., the Secretary of Defense, of the resumption of the bombing. This, of course, created a certain type of impression that maybe was not too favorable for a dispute.

-In the same way you have, I believe, recently, you yourself accepted the latest plan of the Secretary General U Thant which calls for a cease-fire, stand-still truce, and General Westmoreland a few weeks later said that a cease-fire was not in the interest of the United States. Now, how do you resolve these contradictions and the credibility gap that has developed at the UN and anywhere else?

Ambassador GOLDBERG. Well, Mr. Ambassador, what we have tried; I believe, and one of the reasons I believe the UN must play a role is that, we have tried to seek peace. It is Is, I wish the United Nations had a greater role. I think that maybe the United Nations has a great role, but we have been very unsuccessful. I don't want to say that the UN is ready to do the job, but we have a greater role. The UN is ready to do the job, but we have a greater role.

In President Kennedy's Cabinet, which was not satisfactorily resolved because it has not been honored by the Pathet Lao and the Communists, but at least we brought about a cease-fire.

I would hope they would do the same.

On the other hand, because we cannot persuade them to do that, we mean we should not try in other areas to try to bring about an accommodation of point of view.

As a matter of fact, every time we bring about an accommodation of point of view, especially in our area, you will find that they are nuclear proliferation, we illustrate the inconsistency of their policy because here we are pursuing the paths of getting along, trying to minimize the area of conflict and we have an area where the conflict exists. We think they are inconsistent is not the United States.

Mr. HOFFEPS. But this approach toward agreement seems to have ground to a stop now, because the negotiations on the anti-ballistic missile treaty on the Treaty to Ban the Spread of Nuclear Weapons seem to be at least in trouble, if not in complete collapse. Ambassador Goldest. No, Dick, I don't quite agree with that. It is not easy to find agreement on these matters. We are in charge of our team that negotiated the Space Treaty.

On the other hand, we made some significant steps this year. We have the air agreement, and we have some technical agreements. I think we did agree upon the Treaty. We did agree upon the Consultative Treaty.
Now, we have ratified them, by the way, and I am very proud of our country, that we were able to do so. Now we expect and anticipate that the Soviet Union will ratify them.

It is now up to them.

Now, on nuclear proliferation, we are in conversations and we have some problems which we are trying to solve. I notice Mr. Foster has gone to Tokyo. It is natural that we should have to explain and show all points of view to them, so I don't agree that they have a corner.

Mr. Agronsky. Well, we have run out of time, unfortunately, Mr. Ambassador. I wish you could have concluded by telling us of a new specific peace bid in which you are operating, but apparently, as you say, it's always going on. Thank you very much for being here to face the Nation.

Ambassador Goldberg. Thank you, Martin.

Answerer. Today, on the face of the Nation, United States Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg was interviewed by CBS News United Nations Correspondent Richard C. Hottelet, Anne Well-Tuckerman of Agence France-Presse, CNS News Correspondent Robert C. Hottropic led the questioning. Next week, another prominent figure in the news will face the Nation.

Mr. Fulbright. Mr. President, will the Senate yield?

Mr. Mansfield. I yield.

Mr. Fulbright. Mr. President, I join with the distinguished majority leader therefrom from Montana, in his recommendation.

I agree with him that the hour is growing late and these last 2 or 3 weeks, particularly since General Westmoreland was here, I feel that there has been an increase in tension not only in the conflict between the United States and Russia, and we have noted the incidents that occurred in the Sea of Japan. They do not seem to be so important in and of themselves. However, I think they are symptomatic of a nervousness which could lead to world war III.

I think the mention in the newspapers recently of the President's own thought almost a year ago about the possibility of this war leading to world war III is very ominous. I think the situation certainly warrants the recommendation that has been made by the Senator from Montana.

I join with him in that recommendation. I also take this opportunity to pay my respects to the Senator from Oregon, who, I believe, was the first Member of the Senate, that I can recall, who so strongly recommended early in the conflict that it be taken to the United Nations.

I think it is quite correct that we recognize his foresight in that connection. I wish I could think of something that could be built on this idea.

I am afraid I do not see much inclination on the part of the Executive to move in this direction, however. There seems to be a feeling that nothing can be done, or is it not in or out of the United Nations and that we are now following another course?

I hope that feeling is not so and that the recommendations of the Senator from Montana will be taken seriously. I congratulate him for his very effective statement.

Mr. Mansfield. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. I hope that his forgoing is not correct, because the time is getting pretty short.

I hope that we will refer this matter to the United Nations, which, in my opinion, has not met its responsibility from the very beginning of this conflict, and that if the United Nations does face up to this matter, it is issued to the Vietcong, the North Vietnamese, the Chinese, and others to come to the conference and be prepared to accept the verdict of the United Nations in that instance, whatever it may be.

Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from Vermont.

Mr. Aiken. Mr. President, we have this afternoon had two proposals made to the Senate, each hopefully looking either to the desecration or the ending of the war in Southeast Asia.

The Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Cooper) recommended desecrating the war without in any way abdicating any responsibility that we might have in South Vietnam.

The Senator from Montana (Mr. Mansfield), recommended that we make an effort to reach some solution through the United Nations. It must—as we hope—be done either from the executive committee, or at least taking notice of the situation in South Vietnam. As yet, nothing has been done.

I believe the United Nations is in a position where it can, if it will, be the police-man for the whole world; and the trouble we are having in one very small part of that world indicates that we could not possibly police the entire world even if we attempted to do so.

I hope that the President will instruct Ambassador Goldberg to insist that the Security Council take some action. If the Security Council takes any action, we will then know who wants war and who does not want war in this world of ours.

If any of the five major nations, the five nations holding veto power on the Security Council, undertake to veto any action at all, then they must take the responsibility of the continuation of the escalation of the war in the world. It is hard to believe that they will do that, but it is possible.

I am not sure that any of the plans or proposals submitted to us today will work, but we would certainly be negligent if we did not try them. And if the Security Council and the United Nations do undertake to restore peace in the world, in the majority opinion of the organization—to maintain peace in the world—and then come forward with a solution, even though it is not 100 percent what the United States wants, I hope that the President will see fit to accept it.

It is high time now that we find out who really is promoting this war in Southeast Asia and who really wants to maintain peace in the world.

I believe that other countries besides the United States will be in a position where the responsibility will rest upon their shoulders if we do not achieve any favorable result at all in the way of bringing the world to peace again. I hope that President Johnson will not hesitate to direct Ambassador Goldberg to insist upon action by the United Nations so that we may know once and for all who are the real promoters of the war in the world.

Mr. Mansfield. Mr. President, I think the distinguished Senator from Vermont.

Mr. Pell. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. Mansfield. I yield.

Mr. Pell. Mr. President, I associate myself with the views of the majority leader of the distinguished Senator from Montana. I congratulate him on his speech.

The basic reef upon which negotiations between us, the NLF and the North Vietnamese founder is that our adorers do not believe that we will accept a government that represents all the various factions of that unhappy nation, South Vietnam.

I think if the suggestions made today were presented to a United Nations or Security Council conference—or to any other conference—within the next few weeks and we agreed to accept the recommendations coming from it, a great deal could thus be done to clear the air.

I believe the Senator from Montana has put his finger on the sticking point when he said that he would accept with good grace whatever the results of the conference were.

We did not accept with good grace the results of the Geneva Conference. We have usually been opposed to going to a conference and agreeing to accept the result. I think we will have to publicly agree to accept the results before going into a conference. I hope that we will do so.

I thank the distinguished Senator from Montana.

Mr. Mansfield. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished Senator from Kansas.

Mr. Carlson. Mr. President, it seems to me that Monday, May 15, may be a significant day in one of our concerns.

Two outstanding authorities have been delivered in the Senate, one by the distinguished majority leader, the other by the distinguished Senator from Montana (Mr. Cooper), in regard to the concern of citizens about our situation in Vietnam. I believe that the expressions in the Senate today speak of the united nation.

It is prevalent everywhere one goes. I sincerely hope that the administration
SENATE

leading to a dangerous escalation that sages that have been given in the Senate from Vermont, who have been my lead­

Committee on Foreign Relations are in Vietnam on an honorable basis. It believe the speech outlines one of our last

the majority leader is very great. The

may involve many of the countries with

should reach not only our Nation's Capi­

settled

speak out of turn when I mention that

of the Committee on Foreign Rela­

who we are committed to enforcing peace, to prevent a threat to the peace against any country in the world or any

of the distinguished Senator from Ore­

in the presence of the majority

I do not believe I speak out of turn when I mention that

the possibility of a settle­

the Charter is truly a scrap of paper. If signa­

tories to a treaty are not willing to carry out their obligations under the

I believe the Senator from Vermont was correct when, a few moments ago, he pointed out what the primary purpose of

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Kansas for his kind remarks. I did not note that those who are on

the floor this afternoon all happen to be members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, in some form or other.

I yield to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. Morse. Mr. President, the sig­
nificance of the speech just delivered by

the majority leader is very great. The significance is so great that I believe I will not be

involved in the present discussion of the desirability of making use of existing peacekeeping procedures, of the United Nations

charter and of other treaties under which we have made to my consistent plans for the last

3 or more years that the administration should insist that the United Nations take jurisdiction over the threat to the peace of the

world which has developed in Southeast Asia.

The majority leader, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senator from Vermont, have been very kind to

allude to my record in this request and I thank them. I prepared for the speech from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON] and I have had dis­
cussions about the desirability of having the United Nations intervene in this war by exercising its rightful jurisdiction un­
der the charter. More than 2 years ago, at the President's request, I prepared two legal memoranda for him on the subject of our
definition of international law with respect to this problem through the

United Nations Charter. The second memorandum was a draft of specific resolutions that the President had asked me to draft, which would conform to the existing peacekeeping procedures of the

charter.

The majority leader knows that of re­cent date those memoranda again were discussed. They became of current im­
portance and were the subject of some consideration in an exchange of views with some officials within the administra­tion.

I wish to stress that many people who are now saying that the United Nations cannot be of help and that the United Nations is not yet taken the time to study what the obligations of the members of the United Nations really are under the charter.

One of the proposals I have urged, and urge again this afternoon—the only one

I can speak about publicly, because it is the only one that has become public from

sources—is that some consideration be given by the Security Council to re­

ferring the whole matter to the General Assembly. Yes, I would add that con­
sideration should be given by the Security Council to even recommending and ex­
panding of the membership of the Geneva Conference. An enlarged Ge­

The General Assembly in September of 1967 appropriated $250,000 for the administra­tion of the Geneva Conference. We have agreed to use this money for the purpose of supporting research institutes in the field of international law. Mr. BEAN

one of the arguments you hear is that

China, North Vietnam, and the Vietcong do not belong to the United Nations. Of course, no great nation is not that peace will be enforced only between members. The United Na­tions Charter places the obligation upon members of the United Nations to use peaceful means to prevent a threat to the peace in any part of the world. This is one of the obligations that all members of the United Nations recognize.

This is why I speak so emphatically in favor of the United Nations Charter and the United Nations. I believe the Charter is a great instrument of world peace. It provides a mechanism for a peaceful solution through the intervention of the United Nations. It is a moral and legal obligation for the United Nations to use its influence to prevent a threat to the peace.

I believe the United Nations Charter should be given a greater role in maintaining world peace. The United Nations has the authority to intervene in conflicts in order to maintain peace and security. The United Nations Charter places the obligation upon members of the United Nations to use peaceful means to prevent a threat to the peace in any part of the world. This is one of the obligations that all members of the United Nations recognize.

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very well have been averted if the United States had continued to serve as a voicing member of the Geneva Conference in 1954.

It is not too late to try to reestablish the Geneva Conference and expand its membership. Even if we had to wait 15 years, and even though it took us a long time to come to this point, we now support reconvening the Geneva Conference. The administration reached that point some 15 months after it was proposed by the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GATENBY) and me. For that proposal, then we were attacked by some administration officials, and by the press of this country with the charge that we were advocating negotiations with Communist nations. Our reply was, "That is 100 percent correct. We better get on with negotiating with the Communists, because they are an ugly reality which cannot be bombed out of existence. We are going to have to negotiate a peaceful settlement with them. We must let that time of history pass until the peoples of Communist countries become more enlightened and are allowed to develop a better standard of living. When this is achieved, they will have economic freedom. When they enjoy, ultimately, a better standard of living and economic freedom, in the course of history they will then develop by self-determination their political freedom. But that may be 50 to 100 years from now."

This is no overnight problem with an easy solution that confronts us here in the United States nor, for that matter, the rest of the people of the world. What I wish to emphasize is that we cannot impose either our will or our economic, political, social, cultural, or military systems on the people of Asia.

The trouble is that there are not many persons thinking about the world 50 to 100 years from now. Too many are thinking about the state of the world in 1970. I fear what the state of the world will be if the warmaking policies of those advocating ever-increasing escalation of the war in Southeast Asia are continued into world war.

Again I wish to say that the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD) has performed a great service here today by urging the Security Council to let its Charter prevail, formally and officially to give consideration to what it can do to try to lead the combatants in the war in Vietnam to a peaceful solution.

The Senator from Vermont (Mr. Aiken) pointed out that more than a year ago we filed a resolution with the Security Council. In connection with the filing of that resolution, the very day we filed it we proceeded to bomb North Vietnam. As a result, discussion in the corridors of the United Nations building in New York City was not at all about our filing a resolution suggesting that the Security Council take action in SouthEast Asia. Instead on that hateful day the discussion in the United Nations consisted of bitter criticism of the United States for being so eager to escalate the war into North Vietnam the same day that we pretended to offer with our other hand an olive branch. That hurt us irreparably.

It is one of the great diplomatic mistakes our Government made when it rejected the United Nations, in respect to our conduct in Vietnam.

But let us get it behind us. We will have that debate eventually in some form, but we should have addressed ourselves to the United Nations in a diplomatic form. But let me point out that it will not be only violations of the United States that will be discussed, because the Soviet Union also has been violating the United Nations Charter. Although it is one of the cochairmen of the Geneva accords, it has also been violated the Geneva accords. What are we afraid of? It would be an international debate about what happened factually in South-East Asia. It would discuss the legal consequences of those happenings. Eventually the debate will come, and we should have it now before increasing thousands of human beings are killed as the result of a war that should be stopped now by the members of the United Nations, because I believe that the United Nations can stop it now. Of course, I know it can be pointed out that the Secretary General made statements, recently quoted in the press, even over the objections of which he expressed great doubt that the United Nations can be of great help. However, he is not the United Nations. I should point that for what this man of peace has been trying to do. However, on this point, I say respectfully, I believe he would be proved wrong if the members of the Security Council proceeded to carry out the terms of the Charter and their obligations relative thereto. I am convinced that the great Secretary General would be the first to welcome it if the United Nations would only agree to act.

Mr. President, a debate in the Security Council would be most helpful to clear the international atmosphere in regard to the situation in Vietnam. As I have said to my President and to others in the executive branch, "If our resolution is vetoed in the Security Council, then move into the General Assembly." We would be surprised, in my judgment, by what a salutary effect it would have on the troubled world to have the matter thoroughly discussed in the General Assembly. If the Security Council refuses to act do not forget that under the charter, the General Assembly could take jurisdiction if it deemed it necessary, in order to stop a threat to the peace of the world. Every member of the General Assembly, as well as any other country not a member of the United Nations, has now come to have a great stake in the ending of the war. If the war continues, as was pointed out by the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Cooper) this afternoon, and the United States and time and time again, we are involved in a war that will mean, of course, the beginning of world war III.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE

Mr. McCARTHY. I would add two points. First, it is important that we try the United Nations to see whether it can solve this problem. It is just as important, I think, at this time, that the United States should show it has confidence and belief in the United Nations organization.

We have been too much inclined to treat the United Nations as though it had no jurisdiction within the Western Hemisphere. First place, no real jurisdiction or application if the United States should become involved in problems in some other part of the world.

Thus, it would be helpful in trying to resolve the problem of Vietnam if a device for building up the United Nations as a truly effective instrument for preserving and achieving peace could be accomplished.

Mr. MORSE. Those are two very important points, stated so much better than I could state them. I completely agree with the observations of the Senator from Minnesota.

I think it is important that we follow the framework of international law which is available to us, so that there is not the slightest question of a doubt in the minds of anyone that the United States does seek a peaceful solution to the problem under the rules of international law.

Is it not going to be sad in the history of mankind if we fail to make use of the available procedures of the United Nations, the Geneva accord, or any other existing treaty which can be used to stop this war? If we in our time fail history, resulting in having a major holocaust break out, ending in the loss of millions of lives and great devastation throughout the world, our generation will be rightly considered the cause of this difficulty. That is why Senators have heard me plead, as I have, now, for 3 years on the floor of the Senate, for a multilateral settlement of this dispute. We cannot accomplish it bilaterally because, as the Senator from Kentucky Mr. Coopers stated earlier this afternoon—these are my words, but they are consistent with his meaning—we have not made unconditional offers of negotiation at any time in Southeast Asia. All of our offers of negotiation have not been unconditional at all. They have been conditional; we just have not expressed the conditions.

The enemy in fact would have to come to the peace table pretty much on our own terms, recognizing and agreeing that there shall be two Vietnams. Who is the United States to say that there shall be two Vietnams? Let the rest of the world decide that question by way of negotiation, of course, and the United Nations could develop for a peace-treaty settlement of this dispute. I believe we would have to kill the Vietnamese and the Vietcong to the point of being only a few left before they would ever agree to two Vietnams. Even then the resentment in the rest of Asia would be so tremendous that they would dig in against us for decades to come, out of sympathy both for the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong because of what the United States has been doing, until we were finally driven out.

Thus, what concerns me is what people 100 years from now will say about our failure, if we miss this great, historic opportunity and duty which the Senator from Montana [Mr. Mansfield] this afternoon has pleaded we rise to and fulfill.

Let us face it: We are never going to settle this problem bilaterally. That is the position of the United States today. As to all the talk about winning and getting out: We can win a military victory, but it would be a victory which would have to police the country with hundreds of thousands of American troops for decades to come. Eventually, we would be driven out.

What is the matter with us?

The American people constitute only 6 percent of the total population of the world. Does the United States think it can maintain a permanent, dominating foothold anywhere on the land mass of Asia? If we think that, we should have our heads examined.

We should eliminate from our minds the inexusable, nationalistic ego that has taken over the American people. The trouble with us, public opinionwise, is that we have developed an almost psychopathic ego.

The world, however, is not going to permit us to stay in Asia. If we were Asians, we would not permit the United States to do a single thing if we were Asians who had not become puppets of the United States.

So I think our problem is that we need to have others come in and substitute the rule of law for the jungle law of military might going back through centuries. That is why I believe that there cannot be the slightest question of the position of the United States today.

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be joining the United States in its violation of its international law obligations.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In that connection, is the Senator familiar with a statement which has been made by the State Department, and documented by a little pamphlet, showing that 30 nations are behind us on Vietnam, using as evidence of their approval of our policy and their support continued flow of medicines for the relief of sick people?

Mr. MORSE. Or an ambulance.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Or an ambulance, or a sprocket, or some such device.

I was told this afternoon that even the Pope in the world wishes that the States depletes.

Ing

This morning I had an hour and a half with Senator Goldberg and the Secretary General. At that time Ambassador Goldberg believed it might not be advisable to present it to the Security Council; that perhaps more could be done on the basis of contacts which had been opened. On that basis, it was not pushed.

In December of 1966, following that up, the President sent a letter to Ambassador Goldberg, which I have not had a chance to peruse.

I have nothing but commendation for his efforts. Maybe this approach will afford an opportunity to place the matter before the United Nations, because as the Senate has pointed out, in January 1965, the United States put a resolution before the Security Council—a resolution which is not subject to a veto. That resolution is still there.

So I would assume, on the basis of what has been done, that the President would not be unfavorably disposed or in any way be likely to look favorably on this proposal.

Mr. AIKEN. I personally do not believe the President would reject the proposal, which has been done in all sincerity, and which could conceivably let down the bars on the road to peace.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I would agree with the Senator in his analysis.

Mr. MORSE. The Senator from Arkansas was speaking just before the Senator from Vermont made his statement.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The point I was about to make was that, based on what I believe were erroneous, misleading statements about the support of other countries, and based on reports indicating that we have made those efforts for negotiations, the people of this country believe that we have made good faith and open efforts at negotiations—by which I think ordinary people mean honorable, open negotiations—they believe we have made an open offer for a compromise settlement, as contrasted to a dictated settlement or a surrender.

I mention this partly by way of propounding my own explanation, but partly because this was brought out in the hearings of last year by members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, when we had as witnesses members of the administration, particularly General Taylor, and finally the Secretary of State, to develop the point as to what is meant by "settlement by negotiation," and whether it is equivalent to a surrender.