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Statement of Senator Metcalf (Including Senator Mansfield's Views) Gun Control Legislation

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

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support of our troops—to infiltration routes near the demilitarized zone where men and supplies enter South Vietnam, over the 17th parallel, or from Laos and Cambodia.

The key of the proposal was that the action of the United States should be without precondition—without the requirement of some parallel reciprocity by the North Vietnamese; without stages of cessation, without fixing terminal dates; and not centered upon religious days, because the purpose of the pause is unclear.

The unconditional cessation of bombing has been the consistent and indispensable requirement of North Vietnam for negotiations. I do not believe there will be negotiations until the bombing stops, and unconditionally.

I made the proposal as a way for our Government to determine whether an unconditional cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam would lead to negotiations, as has been reported by many official and private channels, including Secretary General of the U.N., U Thant and Premier Kosygin of the Soviet Union. My proposal was made as an alternative to an escalation of the bombing, an escalation of forces, and of the total war, which could reach a point when North Vietnam would be compelled to ask the Soviet bloc for volunteers and Communist China to come to its aid, and when China would intervene to prevent the defeat of its Communist neighbor.

Above all, it was—and is today—a proposal for negotiation, and for an honorable peace, which our country, with the assurance of its vast power, and with the conviction of its desire for an honorable peace, can make.

Of course, such a cessation entails serious risks, and they are apparent, but they are risks that the United States can take. It is difficult to believe that the United States, with its overwhelming power, could not protect the security of our troops. As I pointed out on May 15, the risks are not as great as a continuing and expanding war—with its rising casualties and cost—the increased support by the Soviet Union to North Vietnam, the possibility of intervention by Communist China, and, if that should occur, the possibility of a third world war, with consequences one can scarcely contemplate.

No one can say that our initiative would be successful, but the retraction of bombing—like a curtain of fire pulled back—would have to be recognized by North Vietnam, and its purpose known by the world.

The decision for peace—not war—will then have been made by our country. The choice of peace or war will then pass to the North Vietnamese and its Communist supporters.

My proposal of May 15 received wide support from many sources—from Members of the Senate, including the majority leader, Senator Mansfield, from the news media, and people throughout the country. A thoughtful proposal for peace has been made in some important respects from the one I have made—has been made by Representative Morse and seven other Members of the House.

In referring to our distinguished majority leader, Senator Mansfield, I have been asked whether I knew in 1954, when it was suggested that the United States then either send troops into South Vietnam or use its Air Force in support of the French at Dien Bien Phu, he pointed out the danger of the involvement of the United States in that country. And year after year he has continued to point out the danger of further involvement.

I have not mentioned in this speech the suggestion of Senator Mansfield that this matter be referred to the Geneva Conference or to the United Nations, a proposal I have supported, because I wanted to place my emphasis upon the unconditional cessation of bombing, which I believe is indispensable for the start of negotiations. But if cessation of bombing should occur, and negotiations are not possible, then, of course, his position—his urging to submit the question of the war in Vietnam to the United Nations—should be supported by our Government and by Congress, without reservation.

But soon after May 15, the attention of the country was focused on the Middle East. A war had been fought. It was mercifully short, but it brought costly destruction and the loss of many lives—bombers and American lives. It has not brought peace or security to the Middle East. The underlying problems remain to be settled. And as with any war today, there was concern that it would involve an increasing number of countries, including our own.

The conflict in the Middle East raised again, during that period of crisis, the prospect of a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union—one which may have been averted or at least lessened by the speed of the Israeli victory.

The debates in the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations, the conference between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin at Glassboro, once again laid bare with awesome clarity the delicate balance between the two great powers. There have been incidents only recently which warn that this balance is delicate indeed and could be upset. Soviet naval vessels have harassed, and U.S. merchant ships have been strafed in North Vietnam harbors. Doubts about the intentions of each other, and concern for security are leading—and I believe inexorably—to the establishment of antiballistic missile systems in the Soviet Union and in the United States. These developments, and the possibility of a confrontation about which we were so concerned during the Middle East crisis, demonstrate the importance of a settlement in Vietnam.

In making this statement, I do not place our country on the same plane as the Soviet Union, but I do know that the President and the United States sincerely desire peace in Vietnam, and I am not certain that the Soviet Union does.

If the United States were in a confrontation in the Middle East—a greater war was averted. President Johnson acted with restraint and statesmanship. The Soviet Union did not intervene with its
forces after the war began. The Security Council agreed on a resolution for a cease-fire, which was accepted. There is recognition that the basic problems of the Middle East must be met. And thereby, at the time the belief, or at least hope in the world, that steps can be taken to find peaceful solutions in other dangerous areas, including Southeast Asia.

The U.S. Government has reached another difficult stage of the war in Vietnam.

It is reported, and I believe accurately, that the decision has been made to send additional troops to Vietnam. I do not question the military basins upon which the request for additional troops was made. I do not question the desire and duty of the President of the United States and the Congress and the American people to protect our troops. And if the call is made, I shall support it as I have supported our troops in past years.

But these decisions deal with military policy and with war, and implicit in them is the prospect of additional calls for more troops, supplies, and more bombing if the war continues. All this may come, but before it does, I urge our Government to take a path towards peace and with the prospect that we do not believe has been fully tried—cease unconditionally the bombing of North Vietnam. It bears risk—but one that the citizens of our country—great, free, and humane—and the conscience of our people compel us to take.

Some country someday, must show the way from the morass of wars which is threatening our security and the peace of the world. I do not know of any other country that has the power, as well as the obligation of leadership and the concern to lead the way, except the United States. I hope that the United States will lead the way.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, the importance of the statement which the Senator from Kentucky has made cannot be overstated. Because of its inherent soundness, it is something that the administration must take into account.

Mr. President, to my deep regret the suggestion made by the Senator from Kentucky and others, including the majority leader, has not been given consideration by the administration; or, if it has, we have not been advised that this is so.

I wish to emphasize this point as strongly as I can by relating the colloquy I had with the Secretary of Defense at a hearing in which he was a witness before the Committee on Foreign Relations, and I yield.

Mr. CASE. Mr. Chairman, there is just one other thing, and that is with relation to the Senator from Missouri. Mr. Cooper has been making suggestions about limitation of bombing, and many other members of Congress have used him as an example. I myself have stated that bombing of North Vietnam ought to be limited to that which is essential or significant upon the movement of men or supplies into South Vietnam. The decision apparently has been made by the Administration to continue with the general present program; is that correct?

Secretary McNAMARA. Senator CASE, I do not want to forecast future military operations. Senator CASE. But this I read in the newspapers, that the U.S. will modify the Vietnam bombing. This is in the New York Times July 11. William Beecher Johnson said he would rule out both curbs and wider raids.

Secretary McNAMARA. I think you would have to ask Mr. Beecher for his sources. He did not discuss the matter with me, and I am sure he did not discuss it with President Johnson.

Senator CASE. So far as you know there is no intention of—I am not putting this in personal terms but merely as an illustration—taking Senator Cooper's advice. Secretary McNAMARA. I do not mean to be less than candid here, but I should not. I think, give any indication of future military operations.

Mr. President, I do not regard that reply as a casual or proper response to the suggestions made by the Senator from Kentucky and many other Members of Congress. If the Secretary of Defense feels, and he may properly feel, that it is beyond his authority, competence, and what is appropriate and proper for him to talk about, it is the President's prerogative to make response to this broad question—not about operations but about the broadest kind of leadership and the con­

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I am happy to yield to my friend, the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, the able Senator from Kentucky knows of what he speaks. Nevertheless, Mr. Cooper, I do not think that the address of his creates certain apprehensions. We are talking about a way to determine if the war can be ended.

The Vietcong, the North Vietnamese, the South Vietnamese, all of the others, are simply waiting for the United States to make a decision. They are not doing anything.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I do not know whether the normal military attacks against North Vietnam can ever bring us any true "success" in this war. I do not know whether the United States is determined to stop at the source the guns coming down from North Vietnam which are killing Americans. I do not know what the President of the United States is going to do about this. This is all that we know.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I think it is our duty as legislators to stop what we have done.

Mr. COOPER. I do not believe this is so.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, the Senate is going to stop its efforts to halt the flow of this lethal equipment at the source, by attacking military targets in North Vietnam.

The opposition is centered in the phrase "stop the bombing;" and the influence of the campaign that has centered around this phrase has resulted in much of our air and sea attack program being more a matter of "form" than one of "substance."

The death of every young American in combat is a sad and terrible business—a life, with all its promise for the future, ended forever.

We have recently received classified testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee which pointed out that the casualty rate in North Vietnam is so high that the ability of the North Vietnamese to bring down their heavy armor during the bombing pause incident to the Tet holiday caused the slaughter of many young Americans. We have seen photographs, which are available to any Senator, which proved it.

It is easier to direct this war from the Senate Chamber than from the spot. The actions of our fighting men just south of the DMZ, and all over South Vietnam.

Over here, however, except for certain families who grieve for their loved ones, it is a fact that we are giving up nothing; whereas over there, 12,000 young Americans have given up everything.

It is hard to understand why there would appear to be at least as much solicitude for the live American GIs in the South Vietnamese military as against American military and the lives and safety of young Americans who have been drafted from their schools and colleges and jobs by their Government, and who are fighting with superb courage for their country, 10,000 miles from home.

If I do not know what normal military attacks against North Vietnam can ever bring us any true "success" in this war. But I do know that, unless the United States attempts to stop at the source the guns coming down from North Vietnam which are killing Americans in South Vietnam, there is no chance whatever for any possible success.

Incidentally, but pertinent to overall thinking on this subject, the casualties of our South Vietnam allies during that same week totalled 556, which were less than 40 percent of U.S. casualties.

After four trips to Vietnam, three of them in the last 18 months, it is my belief that the morale, the very fiber, of the South Vietnamese people has, to a considerable extent fallen away, eroded by over a quarter of a century of almost continuous war—first with the Japanese, then with the French, then with our own troops, for purposes of national security, and almost continuously among themselves.

There are those who support the sending—more American servicemen—to South Vietnam. If we used the technological advantages of air and sea power, however, instead of such concentration on a ground war, based on my trips in
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the theater, I am convinced that we would have more chance for success with less troops instead of more.

Based on this above, let me make this suggestion. This morning, if I may, Mr. President, that instead of the constant offer to have our Government stop air attacks against North Vietnam as a pre-

liminary to negotiations in 1967, we offer to stop the fighting in North Vietnam, but also the fighting in South Vietnam—

and start negotiations from there. Surely that action would give us a better chance to attain these negotiations and we could then apply at least part of the appalling cost of this Vietnam war—already some $70 million a day—

to our grave and growing problems here at home.

Mr. President, I want to thank the able Senator from Kentucky for yielding to me.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia subsequently said to the Senate that a few moments before, the distinguished Senator from Missouri mentioned the casualties of the United States Forces and the South Vietnam forces.

As I recall, he gave the figures for 1 week. I would like to expand those figures and give at this point the figures for the first 5 months of 1967.

In the first 5 months of 1967, the U.S. combat casualties totaled 31,036 killed and wounded.

In that same period the South Vietnamese casualties totaled 17,005.

Mr. COOPER, Mr. President, I have listened carefully to the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Missouri, but I must say that we are discussing different approaches to a solution of the war.

In a way, he made a strong argument for the proposal I am making. I have said that everyone knows that should there be a cessation of the bombing it would entail risks; the possibility of the Introduction of additional forces and supplies from North Vietnam. But with the strength of our forces and with the U.S. forces and South Vietnamese forces, we can accomplish what we are trying to accomplish there.

I recall that it was in February or March of 1965 the bombing began. I believe we had 24,000 men in Vietnam at the time. There was no great movement of either men or supplies into South Vietnam. But as we have stepped up bombing, the entry of troops and supplies into South Vietnam has increased. The movement of supplies and men into South Vietnam has not been stopped by the bombing.

The Senator from Missouri speaks about—and rightfully so—of concern for those who fight, who are wounded, and who die. The present rate of casualties through 15,000 a month.

The Senator and I are not talking about the same thing. Of course, if we want to apply every bit of force we have upon North Vietnam, and some would use nuclear weapons, we could destroy North Vietnam. I do not propose that because I do not believe there has been an unconditional cessation of bombing.

I propose it again to determine if it will open new opportunities to stop the fighting in North Vietnam, but also the fighting in South Vietnam—

and start negotiations from there. Surely that action would give us a better chance to attain these negotiations and we could then apply at least part of the appalling cost of this Vietnam war—already some $70 million a day—
to our grave and growing problems here at home.

Mr. President, I want to thank the able Senator from Kentucky for yielding to me.

Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, will the Senator from Kentucky yield?

Mr. COOPER, I am happy to yield to the Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD, I have listened with interest, and I have read with interest, the speech just made by the distinguished Senator from Kentucky. I want to commend him for having said this again. He has a perfect right to speak as he does, as every Senator has. When we speak out, it does not mean we are breaking any agreement or any understanding on the war in Vietnam. The President has that responsibility as Chief of State and as Commander in Chief.

But, may I point out that every Senator from every State likewise has a responsibility, and the place to make his views known is on the floor of the Senate in full and open view.

May I say to the distinguished Senator from New Jersey—and I think I can say this without fear of contradiction—that all proposals which have been made or suggested here have been given serious consideration in the executive branch of the Government.

The Senator from Kentucky states that the chief issue before the country continues to be Vietnam. It is the overriding issue. While, for the time being, the situation in our urban areas and major cities is of prime importance, even there, in my opinion, the shadow of Vietnam continues.

As I listened to the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Kentucky, it appeared to me that what he had said in effect is what he said on May 15. The only difference is that he has gone into more detail. But, as I recall the Cooper formula proposed on the floor of the Senate on the 15th of May, it was to confine the bombing to the Ho Chi Minh trails around the 17th parallel.

Thus, what he said then is now saying again; this is one way to confine the war to South Vietnam.

I have assumed all along that our chief objective in Vietnam was to maintain the stability, the integrity, and the independence of South Vietnam.

This is one way in which more success can be achieved, in my opinion, than can be achieved by continued bombing of the north where, I believe, our forces are rapidly running out of targets.

What was the bombing of the north supposed to achieve? It had two objectives. One, either to stop or decrease infiltration of men and material along the Ho Chi Minh trails, and, two, to bring the conference table, both, with respect, those objectives have not been attained. There are more men and more tons of material coming down from the north than was the case before the bombing started, or at least before it was reduced to a level of great significance.

As far as bringing Hanoi to the conference table is concerned, in my considered opinion, it is farther away from that table than ever before. You cannot bomb those people into submission. You cannot override their opinion, and to do so would, because they are living in conditions not very far from it. They will dictate the kind of war which will be followed, whether it be conventional or guerilla. They have been dictating the kind of war and when it is to be fought. They have fought it all too often at the time and place of their own choice.

What have we accomplished with our search-and-destroy tactics? We have taken, for a time, control of a part of their territory, but after we do that, we go back to our bases. There is even a question of doubt as to how secure our bases are. I would recall what happened last week, when some of our mortars shelled Dan Na. I read in the papers that our losses ranged from $80 million to $90 million.

The Senator from Kentucky also performs a service for the country when he points out what the possible potentials in this war are if is keeps going on, escalating step by step, gradually or otherwise.

I am taking too much of the Senator's time. All I want to say is I think, once again, as he has many times, the Senator has performed a public service.

Mr. COOPER, I thank the Senator. Mr. PULHRIGHT, Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. COOPER, I ask unanimous consent that I may have 10 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COOPER, I yield to the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I wish to associate myself with the Senator from Montana, the distinguished majority leader, has said, in commending the Senator from Kentucky. I read his speech with a great deal of interest. I join in his recommendation to stop the bombing. This subject has been discussed at considerable length by the Senator from Kentucky in a slightly different context, but the purpose is still the same, I think; it is to try to bring the war to an honorable end.

Mr. COOPER, with respect to the comments of the Senator from Missouri, if he knows of any way to approach a cessation of the fighting, I will join in that. I would perhaps suggest that the bombing is to set the stage for negotiations which would leave both parties in an acceptable political posture. That is the purpose of a negotiated peace.

I think the Senator from Kentucky and I wish to bring about the same objective. It is a question of how to bring it about. I think the proposal from Kentucky is correct in pointing out that we
I ask my friend from Kentucky that North Vietnam, while it might very well result in negotiations with Hanoi, is not too likely to stop the search and destroy technique which is costing the lives of so many young Americans and causing so many others to be wounded, we would then have a comprehensive plan which in my opinion would have a better chance of success; for I am not convinced, and I wonder whether the President from Kentucky is convinced, that Hanoi completely dominates the Vietcong.

Mr. COOPER. No, I do not think Hanoi completely dominates the Vietcong. The Vietcong were active for many years before the war expanded.

I have addressed myself to North Vietnam, because North Vietnam, in every proposal, has made as its central point the unconditional cessation of bombing. As we all know from our sources, the Vietcong proposals have had air strikes but always this has been the central point.

I shall confine myself to the question that I have raised this afternoon. I do recall that the Senator from Pennsylvania, has suggested the same proposal.

I thank the Senator.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Kentucky be dispensed with her time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Kentucky may ask additional questions.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DOMINICK. I must say, though I would like to agree with the Senator, that I find myself unable completely to agree. I say this because it seems to me that his proposal is predicated upon the idea that North Vietnam wants peace, while there has been no sign of any kind that North Vietnam wants either to negotiate or to cut down its rate of infiltration into South Vietnam, or to otherwise approach the peace table.

We have probably made the most extensive effort to find a method of sitting down at a table with the North Vietnamese that any country has ever made in time of war, and we have been unable to find any possibility whereby they will even sit down and discuss the matter.
I was in South Vietnam and Thailand in May. There was certainly no indication then that the North Vietnamese were moving in a direction which would cut down on their involvement in South Vietnam. As a matter of fact, during one of my trips to Hanoi, we were informed by both intelligence and diplomatic sources, and by our ministry—I was personally so informed—that the road south looked like Los Angeles freeway on New Year’s Day; that when we stopped the bombing, truckload after truckload and convoy after convoy, which up to that time had been held back and were only dribbling through at night, were coming down, with vast sources of supplies and equipment to be put into South Vietnam. In addition to the 112-millimeter rocket which has been talked about by the distinguished Senator from Missouri, there were 144-millimeter rockets, now being made available by the Russians, which are capable of going 7 miles or more before they hit.

It would seem there was no indication under any circumstances that they would be willing to seek peace. If we stop our bombing—and this is what concerns me now—having at least some kind of word that they are willing to stop and sit down and see how we can find peace; if we stop without even that assurance, it strikes me that what we will be doing is experimenting with the position of our troops in South Vietnam.

That is why, much as I should like to, I am unable to agree with the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER, Mr. President, I appreciate the comments of the distinguished Senator from Colorado.

As he has said, there has been no open or public indication upon the part of North Vietnam to negotiate. We know that the President of the United States has undertaken many courses to try to get to the table.

But this being true, I have asked that before we start on another stage of increased buildup of forces, of increased bombing, increased casualties, of increased costs, all of which are not bringing the war to a close, we should see if the one requirement made again and again by North Vietnam, the unconditional cessation of bombing, will lead to negotiations and peace.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have listened to this debate this afternoon with a great deal of interest. It is well that the different points of view held by various Senators be brought forth. I appreciate the candor and the frankness of the distinguished Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON]; I appreciate the reasoning and the thoughts behind the words of the distinguished Senator from Colorado [Mr. DOMINICK]. It is obvious that there are divergencies of opinion. But I believe that what we must face up to is that either we have to seek to find new ways of reaching the negotiating table, or face the prospect of escalating still further. There are not many more targets outside of Haiphong and Hanoi and per-