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## THE "PUEBLO" AFFAIR

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I applaud the position of President Johnson, who recognizes that there are no simple ways out of the grave crisis which has developed in the wake of the *Pueblo* affair. By taking the matter to the United Nations forthwith, the President has done what he can do, at this point, to set in motion machinery for what is to be hoped can be a satisfactory solution.

In the meantime, however, the substance of our national interest ought not to be lost sight of in hot pursuit of its shadow. The problem of safeguarding the interests of this Nation, and in a very real sense, the world's interests is to see to it that the 83 Americans—which I now learn is the accurate number—are returned alive, I repeat, the word is "alive," and that there is avoided, at the same time, another bloodbath in the model of Vietnam which, in Korea, could so much more readily become world war III.

Whatever it takes to bring about that result in full—not half of it but all of it—is to be welcomed. It may be helpful to bear in mind in this connection that the responses in the Barbary Wars, a century and a half away, are not necessarily the answers for a time and place when nuclear war is only seconds away.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point statements I made over the weekend relative to my perspective on the *Pueblo* seizure; also, editorials from the Christian Science Monitor, the Wall Street Journal, and the Baltimore Sun, having to do with that affair.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD,  
DEMOCRAT, OF MONTANA

## PERSPECTIVE ON THE "PUEBLO"

On Friday last, I made the following statement:

"I am glad that the matter of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* seizure is being taken up by the U.N. Security Council. One war is not only enough for the world; it is too much. I am glad that this organization—representing the world—is facing up to its responsibility in this matter because it is a most immediate and pressing danger.

"The last thing we need is another land war in Asia. If we want to save the lives of the 83 we had better move circumspectly—as we are—with patience—as we are—because this is a time of testing. A rash action could well seal their doom. I want to see these men saved—not destroyed."

Those who would advise rash, immediate and precipitant action against North Korea should remind themselves of what happened during the Korean War. When American forces, having won a great victory by the Inchon landing, then advanced across the 38th parallel to the Yalu River, the dividing line between North Korea and China, a figure close to one million Chinese entered North Korea. The result was a direct and bloody confrontation, a new war which prolonged the conflict and produced tens of thousands of additional American casualties.

In the end, the Korean War terminated in a stalemate at the 38th parallel. What has existed since has not been a peace settlement

but an uneasy truce arrangement. I would also point out that since that time North Korea has entered into mutual security treaties with both China and the Soviet Union. Therefore, any rash action would not only, in all likelihood, seal the doom of the 83 Americans of the USS *Pueblo*, it could also bring about another bloody and prolonged involvement in Korea and, perhaps, even a direct confrontation between this country on the one hand and China and the Soviet Union on the other.

It is well to remember the matter of geography which is not at the moment a factor in Viet Nam where North Viet Nam and Laos lie between China and ourselves and where Russia is thousands of miles away to the north where it borders China. At North Korea, Russia is right there as is China. If we would save these 83 Americans—and that is the most urgent and important consideration—we would do well to ponder these possibilities and to continue to move, as the President is doing, with caution, coolness, and restraint.

The situation in Viet Nam is difficult and dangerous. The situation developing in North Korea is dangerous and difficult and far more delicate.

[From the Christian Science Monitor,  
Jan. 29, 1968]

"PERDICARIS ALIVE"

(By Erwin D. Canham)

We are no longer in the era of gunboat diplomacy.

The terms of power have changed. Time was when a great nation like the United States could have sent a small force of marines in to Wonsan Harbor and tidied up the matter of the *Pueblo* in short order. But today, behind every exercise of power by great nations like the United States or the Soviet Union, lies the specter of the thermo-nuclear cloud. It is a mighty deterrent.

Small nations like North Korea, with minimal physical power, are thus able to act with impunity as they have hardly ever been able to act in the history of the modern world. The role of the great nation is infinitely difficult and dangerous. It is basically inhibited.

These are considerations to keep in mind when it is decided to station surveillance ships like the *Pueblo* off hostile coasts. There isn't much you can do about it when they get into trouble.

## HIJACKING PERIL

Certainly American public opinion, and possibly official judgment as well, has not caught up with the changed terms of power. Possibly the Defense Department authorities should have thought long and hard before they placed craft like the *Pueblo* a few miles off North Korea, or deep in the Tonkin Gulf, or in other such exposed places. The dangers of hijacking are real and present.

Few of us know how valuable the use of spy ships really is. Perhaps the operation is of the essence. Perhaps it is of peripheral importance. The risk is certainly very great. It is to be hoped that the returns are comparable.

Presumably many of the Russian trawlers which hover diligently off Cape Cod, and other parts of the United States coast, both Atlantic and Pacific, have an espionage mission along with their take of fish. But rarely have they pressed the 12-mile limit or anything like it. When they come closer in, they get permission. Realistically, of course, one must assume that submarines are gathering data anywhere there is deep enough water.

## DANGEROUS UNCERTAINTY

There is a lot to be said for the value of all this spying. President Eisenhower's open-skies proposal at Geneva was based on the

wise assumption that the more each great nation knows about the observable military disposition of the other the safer it will be. For the United States to see any unusual troop movements—or their absence—in Eastern Europe is important. Uncertainly breeds fear. The information now gathered by the reconnaissance satellites may well be a factor for peace.

For the Soviets to know something of the United States capacity for instant retaliation in the event of a nuclear attack, and vice versa, helps preserve the over-all peace. And perhaps similar information about the disposition of the North Korean forces—at a time when assassins and saboteurs were invading the South Korean capital—would be helpful to evaluate the scale of the crisis.

## RELATIVE IMPUNITY

But all this information does not provide the United States with the means of invading Wonsan and recapturing the *Pueblo*. Indeed, as American public opinion vividly reflects, the United States is having trouble enough coping with its military problems in Vietnam.

For this reason, it would seem that most Americans are not demanding the kind of action which an American President would have asserted freely in the good old days. "Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead" is now an empty and unrealistic threat.

The age of the small nation is here. And while this relative immunity from big-nation force has its embarrassments for the United States now, this is the kind of world in which the United States believes. If great war has become too dangerous, too suicidal, for the human race, and if lesser wars have each their share of insupportable risk, then the world has come into a new period.

There are circumstances in which force is used, as in Vietnam and in Korea 18 years ago. Or in the Middle East last summer. But a great power has to be very prudent as it embarks upon the use of force.

It is a strange new world in which we live, but despite present chagrins it has stirring possibilities.

[From the Wall Street Journal, Jan. 29, 1968]

## THE MOMENTUM OF BELLIGERENCE

Faced with a possible replay of the Korean war while bogged down in Vietnam, the Administration can hardly be faulted for ordering a limited call-up of air reservists. Yet the danger is great that both sides could progressively harden their "responses" until the second Korean war would become a certainty.

No one pretends to know whether North Korea's capture of the intelligence ship *Pueblo* signals an intent to open a second front. Many doubt it, seeing in the incident instead an attempt to exploit an inviting opportunity—the vulnerability of a lonely, lightly armed vessel jammed with sophisticated electronic gear.

The harsh fact nonetheless remains that the North Koreans are eminently capable of re-starting that war, which has been a most uneasy state of suspension these 15 years, tying down 50,000 U.S. troops. It's not only North Korea; the Communists can open second fronts in Laos and Thailand and elsewhere along the vast periphery of the Red world.

A further fact is that right now may seem an attractive time for the North Koreans (or others) to do so. Along with all its other woes in Vietnam, the U.S. is confronted with what may be the biggest battle of the war, at Khe Sanh below the demilitarized zone. There, 5,000 Marines are tightly encircled by North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces, and the American position is perilous.

To some, indeed, Khe Sanh looks like another Dienbienphu. To us it appears rather

unlikely, the U.S. strength in Vietnam being so much greater than was the French in 1954. At best, though Khe Sanh is a bitter reminder how much power the Communists can still mount after all the punishment they have taken from the U.S. And it could well impress the North Koreans as a good time for major trouble-making precisely for that reason.

For still a further unpleasant fact, the U.S. is in fairly poor shape to wage a new Korean war, let alone any others. As our Washington Bureau puts it, the call-up of reservists emphasizes that very point; for all its enormous power, the Vietnam war has spread the power thin and the nation is short of men and materiel for any sustained struggle with North Korea. Which adds one more chapter to the long lesson about the dangers of getting militarily overextended and overcommitted around the world.

Suppose, however, that the North Koreans have no such intentions, that the *Pueblo's* capture was an isolated foray. It is still a treacherous situation, because it is one in which each side's successive steps could carry things out of hand. North Korea could react to the call-up by more military moves; the U.S. could then react with tougher steps of its own. In no time the fat could be in the fire.

Caution thus is mandatory. So far we think the Administration probably has been reasonably restrained. Certainly it could not just sit there, saying and doing nothing while the North Koreans keep the ship and crew. Washington therefore is trying to exhaust diplomatic means—taking the issue to the UN Security Council, for example—before resort to force. Fortunately, this approach seems to have the approval of most members of Congress.

There is, finally, one specific reason why the Korean confrontation should not be allowed to escalate, willy-nilly, into war. It would be wholly disproportionate to the ostensible cause, namely the *Pueblo* and the nature of its mission.

Remember the U-2? If the U.S. Government considers it necessary, and it doubtless is in the world as it is, to send a lone reconnaissance plane high over Russia, it must realize the risk and be prepared to lose the plane. The U.S. never regarded its shooting down by the Soviets as a cause of war.

Exactly the same with the *Pueblo*. Many questions are unanswered about the handling of its predicament, and the seizure itself is humiliating and infuriating. Still, if the U.S. views that kind of mission as essential, it should be prepared to accept what can happen without over-reacting to the point of risking actual war.

Granted, if the North Koreans do aim to re-open the war, these observations are academic. But for war to come without appropriate cause, merely through the momentum of mutual belligerence, could be as tragic as the consequences of the shot at Sarajevo.

[From the Baltimore (Md.) Sun, Jan. 28, 1968]

#### DEGREE OF CRISIS

For thoroughly good reasons, the Administration in Washington is doing its utmost to find a peaceful solution to the problem of the vessel *Pueblo* and its crew. One reason is that the alternative is military action of unpredictable eventual dimensions, however limited it might be at first; and with our massive commitment in Vietnam we could not easily undertake another large war in Korea.

In Korea we are militarily thin, with some 50,000 troops, among them two divisions not considered combat-ready. Besides that, about 47,000 South Korean troops, presumably the

best, are wed down alongside us in Vietnam. Apart from questions of air and sea strengths and of materiel, those figures on ground troops give the picture. And the Vietnam war is so voracious in its requirements that we could not supply swift reinforcement in Korea.

Also grim to contemplate is the effect involvement in another large conflict would have domestically. The cancellations of internal urgencies, the economic disruptions, the impositions of controls, the mounting taxes, come all too readily to the imagination.

Then there is the fact that, as the Administration knows, this is not inherently a major crisis. It could grow into one, but in its nature it is not. It is an incident; a serious one, but an incident.

One simple way of judging its inherent gravity is to note the comparative degrees of concern with which the public followed the proceedings of the United Nations before and during the Arab-Israel war last June, and follows them now. At that time the facts and the issues were stark and plain, as were the dangers, including the danger of a direct American-Russian confrontation.

Dangers of that magnitude exist today only if permitted to develop from a state of general confusion. The North Koreans could encourage a heightening of danger by refusing flatly to release the men of the *Pueblo*, or by placing them on trial. Others, too, by intent or error, could contribute.

The Administration shows a determination, while preparing for contingencies, to make every effort to obtain the release of the men without using military force—every effort, that is, not to let events take charge and begin to sweep ahead with a momentum of their own, beyond control.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have listened with a great deal of interest to the remarks of the distinguished minority leader. I can understand his great concern about the situation which has developed incident to the seizure of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* and the imprisonment of its crew.

There is no question in my mind—none whatsoever—that the ship was illegally seized outside the 12-mile limit, which is the limit set by the North Korean Government itself. But I think the President is operating on the right wavelength, and in his capacity as the President of the United States and Commander in Chief is using every available means at his diplomatic disposal to see if it is at all possible to bring about the return of the 83 men, including the two civilians, which comprise the crew of the U.S.S. *Pueblo*.

What I am interested in, Mr. President, is the return of those 83 men alive—and I think that is something we ought to keep in mind at all times because it would do no good to go in and say, "sink the *Pueblo*," or "bomb a city," as has been suggested, and in that manner seal the doom of the 83 men who were there, not by choice but under orders. We must see what we can do to save them.

Mr. President, that, I think, is the paramount factor in this whole affair at this time. I am quite certain that the distinguished minority leader would agree with me in that respect.