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Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Missouri. I again express my appreciation to the distinguished Senator from Maryland (Mr. Mathias) for making his maiden speech in such a statesmanlike manner on one of the most important subjects of our time. 

Mr. President, before I go into my prepared remarks, I want to say a few words. The American people have clearly understood that this is not a political matter, that there is no partisanship involved. I think that the debate today and prior to today, which two hundred Members from both sides of the aisle, emphasizes that fact. Second, as far as I am concerned personally, I wish to state for the record that I had grave doubts in my mind about the ABM during the previous 2 years of a Democratic administration under President Johnson. I have grave doubts, as I am concerned personally, I wish to state for the record that I had grave doubts in my mind about the ABM during the previous 2 years of a Democratic administration under President Johnson.

The doubts I have raised about the particular proposal under discussion, the ABM, have to do with the cost—the accurate cost and not a guess or an assumption—with the validity, the accuracy, of the system, and whether it is already obsolescent.

I think it should be emphasized that those who have raised questions about the ABM have, to the best of my knowledge, unanimously advocated a continuing research and development program to the end that if the figures should mean it has branched as a brass hat and as someone who does not have the interest of the country at heart. I think that has been a campaign of the military. I think that the military by and large is trying to do what they can, as they see the situation, in the interest and the security of the country.

The fact that we may differ with them from time to time in no way should cause for denigration of dedicated service.

The questions I have raised about the particular proposal under discussion, the ABM, has to do with the cost—the accurate cost and not a guess or an assumption—with the validity, the accuracy, of the system, and whether it is already obsolescent.

I also have some questions about the Soviet ABM system, the Galosh, around Moscow, which may be a system on which work has stopped entirely, or which may be a system which is quite ineffective. Then, of course, there is the Tullin system along the northern coast, which I understand is not an ABM system in any sense of the word but is an aircraft defense system.

There is also the question of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. negotiations I recently had, several times, the statement by the President, Mr. Nixon, in his inauguration address, in which he stressed negotiation and not confrontation. And I believe that what he has done to that end is highly commendable. I want to have, on the other hand, the military people.

Then I have to weigh against each other the internal security of this country and its external security. It is a balance which we must maintain in some way, because we could become far stronger than we are at the present time in our external security if we weaken our internal security as it is involved in the difficult and dangerous situations which have become so apparent in our urban areas and in our rural areas as well.

Mr. President (Mr. Cook in the chair), the deployment of the Sentinel antiballistic missile does not boil down to the question of whether or not dangerous hardware should be placed close to or distant from the densely inhabited localities of the Nation—whether in urban or rural settings. The decision involves much more. It involves more, even, than the initiation of an arms race, it involves a dilemma. Important as these considerations may be, the ramifications of this issue far behind them.

The deployment or against deployment of the Sentinel, in present circumstances, may well determine the basic direction of public leadership for a decade or more. If we decide to go ahead with this project des­pite, as we have done in other more affluent times with other weapons systems of questionable value, the decision can only intensify both the future armament practices and the priorities of the past. It will be seen, properly, as an inability to escape from the shackles of our own rhetoric. Having spent our military and so loudly of a distant danger, we are not able to hear the rising voice of need at hand. We are unable to do other than keep the emphasis of our national efforts on costly military systems as we have for the past two decades. We are not able to shift gears despite the serious inner difficulties which loom ahead.

Yet it is these inner difficulties, in my judgment, which present the Nation with the clearest and most imminent danger. The multibillion-dollar Sentinel does not meet these needs more than Vietnam has met them. On the contrary, it, too, may well act to intensify them.

As I have indicated, the deployment of the Sentinel is not a continuation of the policy of containment or mutual assured destruction. It derives no strength from the Soviet Union, which has become so apparent. It may well deter us from taking on a great expenditure of questionable value in the light of the other demands which are being made on the tax-burdened and inflation-pressed citizens of the Nation. Quite apart from the technical shortcomings of the Sentinel, its deployment would be, in my opinion, a movement of the Nation's leadership in the wrong direction and at the wrong time. Sentinel will not add one iota to the security of life in the United States. It may well detract from it.

Let me illustrate the point. Since the near catastrophe of the Cuban missile crisis, in 1962, nuclear weapons seem to me to have been eliminated as a practical alternative in the international strategy of both the Soviet Union and the United States. It did not require a broad public understanding. The message came through loud and clear, from the brink of nuclear annihilation. We learned and, I believe, they learned that a relevant survival for both countries and the world depended upon neither nation entering on any path of policy which, in the end, had to lead to nuclear confrontation. The Cuban crisis when coupled with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has provided a respite of many years from the pressure which has been apparent in the last two decades, tension and competition between the Soviet Union and the United States.

In my judgment, the deployment of a Sentinel ABM system would once again open up a period of grave uncertainty. It would tend to reactivate the use of nuclear weaponry as a component of the international strategy of the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, it would have that effect without benefit to either nation but with increased risks to the survival of both.

That such is the case is indicated by the so-called action-reaction pattern of developments between the two countries over the years. For two decades or more, when the Soviet Union has acted by deploying a weapons system, the United States has responded by deploying a weapons system which is essentially a new and dangerous development. We in the past have not worked out competitive agreements, and a sense of nuclear equations between the two countries, we have reacted by an advance in order to maintain the balance of terror. In the same fashion, the Soviet Union has responded to our nuclear advances.

Even if the action-reaction process is recognized as necessary to the maintenance of a precarious balance of mutual terror, it does not follow that it is being applied in a relevant fashion in the context of the ABM issue. It is argued, for example, that since the United States is deploying an ABM system around Moscow, we must respond with the Sentinel ABM system. However, the relevant reaction to deployment of a Soviet ABM is not necessarily an identical action on our part but rather a balancing action. We have, in fact, already responded to the Soviet ABM system. In the fully developed MIRV system we will have assured that whatever defense the Soviet Union might build in the way of an ABM structure, let alone the system which has actually been deployed, our capacity to penetrate it will be more than sufficient. To respond now, a second time by putting a system in place—an ABM system—that is, by deploying the Sentinel—is not a relevant response. It is, rather, the opening of another round of nuclear escalation.

Under the action-reaction formula, the deployment of the Sentinel should and undoubtedly would precipitate a relevant response from the Soviet Union, regardless of the testimony to date. The Russians may be expected to increase even further their offensive capacity in order to assure penetration of the Sentinel defense. By deploying the system in short, we will have put ourselves in the ironic position of stimulating the expansion of the over-all offensive capabilities of the Soviet Union against the American people.

Recent statements in favor of deployment indicate the possibility that an alternate plan of deployment of the Sentinel will be offered in the near future. As I understand the new concept, the chief protection of the system will be transferred from the vicinity of great
cities to the remote ICBM missile sites. Instead of offering protection to people which obviously it cannot do, the Sentinel is now proposed as a missile to protect other missiles. This irrationality, however, would have to be coupled with an irrational Chinese choice of delivery systems if the Sentinel's deployment is to be justified as a deterrent. The Chinese would have to decide to use intercontinental ballistic missiles to launch the nuclear warheads, a nuclear approach five orders of magnitude higher than which we would have the defensive capacity of the Sentinel. They would have to choose that means, rejecting the use of off-shore submarines, which firing nuclear weapons of low trajectory could eliminate Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Norfolk, Charleston, S.C., Miami, New Orleans, and Houston without activating Sentinel. Why would they have to reject this approach by sea and with intermediate range missiles which would be clearly the more promising from their point of view? Because the Sentinel is ineffective against missiles of insufficiently high trajectory. It is amazing to what lengths of irrationality the Chinese are expected to go in order to validate the deployment of this thing. But it is not true that President Nixon has already rejected completely this specious contention as a basis for decision.

There are other arguments which are made to justify the Sentinel deployment arguments of greater or lesser fragility. There is no need to reiterate them now. Each of them harden the site more or less effectively than trying to protect them with other missiles.

It has been said last year and again this year, in effect, that Sentinel deployment will improve our bargaining position with the Soviet Union. It will make it easier to negotiate a mutual disarmament agreement. The nuclear factor, however, what value does Sentinel as it is now proposed to deploy it, add to an already bulging overloaded arsenal of deterrent? Beyond the emplaced missiles of Sentinel has been introduced with precisely the same assurances—that somehow a movement forward in disarmament will produce a similar agreement in disarmament 25 years later. Where are the disarmament agreements which the expansion of armaments were to produce? A quarrel of a century later, where is there one such agreement on a reduction of armaments? The fact is that not a single nuclear weapon has been dismantled on the basis of a disarmament agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. So let us at least have the good sense to reason from this experience that whatever its other merit or demerit, Sentinel is hardly an instrument for bringing about disarmament.

The Sentinel system is already, admittedly, dated—dated back to 1962, as I recall. It is readily acknowledged that it will not work against a Soviet attack. Nevertheless, it is contended it will be usable against a small attack. This contention presupposes not one irrational Chinese decision but two. In the first place the Chinese would have to make the irrational decision to launch a dubiously effective nuclear attack upon us with their most inadequate nuclear resources even though it would bring great retaliatory destruction to their homeland. This irrationality, however, would then have to be coupled with an irrational Chinese choice of delivery systems if the Sentinel's deployment is to be justified as a deterrent. The Chinese would have to decide to use intercontinental ballistic missiles to launch the nuclear warheads, a nuclear approach five orders of magnitude higher than which we would have the defensive capacity of the Sentinel. They would have to choose that means, rejecting the use of off-shore submarines, which firing nuclear weapons of low trajectory, could eliminate Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Norfolk, Charleston, S.C., Miami, New Orleans, and Houston without activating Sentinel. Why would they have to reject this approach by sea and with intermediate range missiles which would be clearly the more promising from their point of view? Because the Sentinel is ineffective against missiles of insufficiently high trajectory. It is amazing to what lengths of irrationality the Chinese are expected to go in order to validate the deployment of this thing. But it is not true that President Nixon has already rejected completely this specious contention as a basis for decision.

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There are other arguments which are made to justify the Sentinel deployment arguments of greater or lesser fragility. There is no need to reiterate them now. Each of them harden the site more or less effectively than trying to protect them with other missiles.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is correct. Many thousands of missiles, is the correct way to state it.

Mr. PERCY. I am glad that you feel that way. In view of the fact that we have had the ability to police the agreement, whether our satellite reconnaissance would be adequate, and whether an ABM system was effective in the Soviet Union without detection.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Senator Mansfield has just raised, because I believe he has heard that he had expressed it to other people, that Mr. Foster expressed to the Senator from Montana on how we could protect our ICBM bases or missiles in another way. As I understand it, within a quarter of a mile, they could withstand that kind of impact.

Mr. PERCY. Would this not be a better system, and superharden the missile sites and withstand an impact of tremendous power.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The statement by the outgoing Majority Leader, which I believe have been exceedingly helpful. I wonder whether he would express an opinion as to whether the Senate, from Illinois and ask him whether he could answer the question which he has just raised, because I believe he has been a close friend of Mr. Foster for a long time.

Mr. MANSFIELD. If the Senator will allow me to interrupt him let me say that on the question of Mr. Foster and his associate director or deputy, Adrian Fisher, this country has been served well. I anticipate that we will be served just as well by the present Director, Girard Smith, who has had previous experience in this area in the State of Illinois, a well known, highly regarded and war-experienced individual, and who, in response to a question before the Gore subcommittee, made it very clear that while there had been a meeting of the National Security Council and this is all in public—absolutely no decision had been made. It is that, in part, which makes me hopeful that the President is giving his closest, personal attention and is trying to look at all the factors involved, keeping in mind the need for funds to take care of the decay, disintegration, violence, and crime which are occurring within the Nation itself. I feel for him, because he has a great and grave responsibility.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MATHIAS. The Senator from Illinois, I think this action-reaction process holds true not only in the field of arms, but also in this body as well.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The distinguished majority leader has pointed out, about this senseless and reckless escalation of nuclear war capabilities, would be carried on because that is the military policy of the President. It is in the President’s responsibility and obligation to always build something to offset the defensive weapons established. The same mentality that exists in the United States, I am sure must be prevalent in this body.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MATHIAS. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I wish to thank the distinguished majority leader for his continued efforts to shed light in this area, not only by what he has said today but what he has done in the past and throughout the time. I was particularly struck by the value of that part of his remarks today which detailed the chronology of thinking in the ABM field, as to the objective of such a system, on the one hand directed against a Russian attack, on the other hand directed against a Chinese attack. I think by detailing the chronology, as he has done, he made it very clear that the proponents of the system are not able to define what their objective is, over an extended period of time, with any great precision. This is certainly a very major factor that has to be considered before a decision to go ahead. I am singling out this particular aspect of the Senator’s remarks, I am not in any way overlooking the value of the rest of what he said, but I think the question of whether the Senate would have to be decided conclusively, and until it is, we cannot make any intelligent decisions.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I appreciate the remarks of the able Senator. I am hopeful that the discussion this afternoon, and the discussions over the past several thousands of warheads. Is that not correct?

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is correct.
weeks - discussions which, I want to emphasize, have been carried on in a very statesmanlike manner and on a very high plane - will be given the consideration which many of us feel they warrant. It is my firm belief that both sides of the aisle will be given that attention, and, hopefully, will play a part before a final decision is reached. My colleagues from the Senate do not know what decision the President may make on the deployment of the Sentinel system, but I believe that the process of consultation with the Congress, and of education and open debate in our country, should go on until all facts available have been presented to the Congress and the country before a decision is made to deploy. We do not yet know all the facts.

My second reason is that deployment should be delayed until the President has had an opportunity to determine whether the Soviet Union will enter negotiations and negotiate in good faith on the control of defensive and offensive nuclear weapons systems. There is no surer way to test the fidelity of the Soviet offer to negotiate a cessation of the nuclear arms race. The clearly understood ability of both the United States and the Soviet Union that each has the assured ability to destroy each other has been the deterrent against nuclear war and is the basis for a possible settlement. It is the only kind of "bargaining from strength" that has meaning.

Is there not some new element of danger which we do not yet know which requires the early deployment of some defensive system? And it is to this question that I want to turn. The clear understanding by the President and the Congress which the American people have of the extent of the danger we face is not yet a consensus. I think that the American people believe that the President and Congress should be given the consideration and that the issue is one that the administration is presently considering, and upon which it may base its recommendations to the Congress. The scientists agreed that the deployment of the radar and missile defense system is a prudent one. I am glad we are going ahead, you understand, but I don't like people to think that I am being kidded by this talk of defense against any nuclear threat because I don't think that the Chinese are likely to attack us with an intercontinental ballistic missile at any time in the near future.

I am delighted that the executive branch finally decided to proceed with the deployment of even this "thin" ABM system, because it is the first step toward the deployment of the effectiveness of the system that I think is required. I have often said that it felt that the first country to deploy an effective ABM system and an effective ABW system is going to control this world militarily.

The three witnesses raised another key issue in their testimony which must be considered. It is relevant because I believe the issue is one that the administration is presently considering, and upon which it may base its recommendations to the Congress. The scientists agreed that the deployment of the radar and missile defense system is a prudent one. I am glad we are going ahead, you understand, but I don't like people to think that I am being kidded by this talk of defense against any nuclear threat because I don't think that the Chinese are likely to attack us with an intercontinental ballistic missile at any time in the near future.

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There being no objection, the material from the Wall Street Journal, March 5, 1969, was placed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record.

THE GREAT ABM DEBATE

Were its implications not so grave, the great American debate over the anti-ballistic missile might be somewhat comical. At first blush, it is hard to believe that a number of prominent congressmen and senators, proceeding from the same data, can arrive at diametrically opposed conclusions.

In any event, the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions has performed a useful service in publishing a microcosm of the debate, in the form of statements and a discussion by experts and others at least familiar with the issues.