4-1-1969

Congressional Record - ABM (No. 4)

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches

Recommended Citation
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/751

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.
the toxic elements in the tonic of technology, is now a major challenge. For, basically, it challenges our faith in ourselves, it challenges our ability to use our skills in the service of man.

John Diebold has probably coined more money from the new technology than any other man; he even coined the word “automation.” In 1964, he made the statement with which I would like to close my speech. "The problem of identifying and understanding goals to match the new means that technology provides us is the central problem of our time— one of the greatest problems in human history. Its solution can be one of the most exciting and one of the most important areas for human activity. And the time is now." In 1969, even more than ever, the time is now.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate go into executive session to consider a nomination at the desk, as reported earlier today.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Harrison Loesch, of Colorado, to be an Assistant Secretary of the Interior.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified of the confirmation of this nomination.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate resume the consideration of legislative business.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE ABM AND MONTANA

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on March 14, President Nixon presented a new concept of an ABM system to the Nation. Since then, his proposal has been elaborated on by the executive branch. Committees of the Senate are now engaged in trying to clarify what it is that has been suggested. The examination of the proposal may be expected to continue at least for several weeks.

In due course the issue of the ABM should emerge in legislative form on the floor of the Senate. It would be my expectation that when that time comes, ambiguities and obscurities will have been removed. By then, hopefully, scientific fact will have been separated from science fiction. By then, substantial dangers from abroad and practicable defenses against them should be distinguishable from the paranoid possibilities. By then, we should have a more accurate measure of the cost of the newly proposed system. By then, too, we should better be able to understand the prospects of breaking the action-reaction pattern
of two decades—the nuclear arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union which, while pursued in the interest of priority by each nation, has led to greater insecurity for both nations and the world.

In short, when the issue reaches the Senate, we should have a clear idea not only of the reliability of the ABM but also of the relevance or redundancy of its deployment. We will then be in a position to prioritize the installation of the Montana ABM in the external security structure of the Nation against urgent requirements for internal stability and progress.

It has been said that it would profit us little to concentrate on internal national needs only to have the Nation fall or to build another massive ring of nuclear defense questions, not a reliable system of a defensive character. However, is it possible that we would have a defense system not only of the reliability of the ABM system, but also of the relevance or redundancy of its deployment. We will then be in a position to prioritize the installation of the Montana ABM in the external security structure of the Nation against urgent requirements for internal stability and progress.

It has been said that it would profit us little to concentrate on internal national needs only to have the Nation fall or to build another massive ring of nuclear defense questions, not a reliable system of a defensive character. However, is it possible that we would have a defense system not only of the reliability of the ABM system, but also of the relevance or redundancy of its deployment. We will then be in a position to prioritize the installation of the Montana ABM in the external security structure of the Nation against urgent requirements for internal stability and progress.

In the case of nuclear defense questions, not a reliable system of a defensive character. However, is it possible that we would have a defense system not only of the reliability of the ABM system, but also of the relevance or redundancy of its deployment. We will then be in a position to prioritize the installation of the Montana ABM in the external security structure of the Nation against urgent requirements for internal stability and progress.

In the case of nuclear defense questions, not a reliable system of a defensive character. However, is it possible that we would have a defense system not only of the reliability of the ABM system, but also of the relevance or redundancy of its deployment. We will then be in a position to prioritize the installation of the Montana ABM in the external security structure of the Nation against urgent requirements for internal stability and progress.

In the case of nuclear defense questions, not a reliable system of a defensive character. However, is it possible that we would have a defense system not only of the reliability of the ABM system, but also of the relevance or redundancy of its deployment. We will then be in a position to prioritize the installation of the Montana ABM in the external security structure of the Nation against urgent requirements for internal stability and progress.

In the case of nuclear defense questions, not a reliable system of a defensive character. However, is it possible that we would have a defense system not only of the reliability of the ABM system, but also of the relevance or redundancy of its deployment. We will then be in a position to prioritize the installation of the Montana ABM in the external security structure of the Nation against urgent requirements for internal stability and progress.

In the case of nuclear defense questions, not a reliable system of a defensive character. However, is it possible that we would have a defense system not only of the reliability of the ABM system, but also of the relevance or redundancy of its deployment. We will then be in a position to prioritize the installation of the Montana ABM in the external security structure of the Nation against urgent requirements for internal stability and progress.

In the case of nuclear defense questions, not a reliable system of a defensive character. However, is it possible that we would have a defense system not only of the reliability of the ABM system, but also of the relevance or redundancy of its deployment. We will then be in a position to prioritize the installation of the Montana ABM in the external security structure of the Nation against urgent requirements for internal stability and progress.

In the case of nuclear defense questions, not a reliable system of a defensive character. However, is it possible that we would have a defense system not only of the reliability of the ABM system, but also of the relevance or redundancy of its deployment. We will then be in a position to prioritize the installation of the Montana ABM in the external security structure of the Nation against urgent requirements for internal stability and progress.

In the case of nuclear defense questions, not a reliable system of a defensive character. However, is it possible that we would have a defense system not only of the reliability of the ABM system, but also of the relevance or redundancy of its deployment. We will then be in a position to prioritize the installation of the Montana ABM in the external security structure of the Nation against urgent requirements for internal stability and progress.

In the case of nuclear defense questions, not a reliable system of a defensive character. However, is it possible that we would have a defense system not only of the reliability of the ABM system, but also of the relevance or redundancy of its deployment. We will then be in a position to prioritize the installation of the Montana ABM in the external security structure of the Nation against urgent requirements for internal stability and progress.

In the case of nuclear defense questions, not a reliable system of a defensive character. However, is it possible that we would have a defense system not only of the reliability of the ABM system, but also of the relevance or redundancy of its deployment. We will then be in a position to prioritize the installation of the Montana ABM in the external security structure of the Nation against urgent requirements for internal stability and progress.

In the case of nuclear defense questions, not a reliable system of a defensive character. However, is it possible that we would have a defense system not only of the reliability of the ABM system, but also of the relevance or redundancy of its deployment. We will then be in a position to prioritize the installation of the Montana ABM in the external security structure of the Nation against urgent requirements for internal stability and progress.

In the case of nuclear defense questions, not a reliable system of a defensive character. However, is it possible that we would have a defense system not only of the reliability of the ABM system, but also of the relevance or redundancy of its deployment. We will then be in a position to prioritize the installation of the Montana ABM in the external security structure of the Nation against urgent requirements for internal stability and progress.

In the case of nuclear defense questions, not a reliable system of a defensive character. However, is it possible that we would have a defense system not only of the reliability of the ABM system, but also of the relevance or redundancy of its deployment. We will then be in a position to prioritize the installation of the Montana ABM in the external security structure of the Nation against urgent requirements for internal stability and progress.

In the case of nuclear defense questions, not a reliable system of a defensive character. However, is it possible that we would have a defense system not only of the reliability of the ABM system, but also of the relevance or redundancy of its deployment. We will then be in a position to prioritize the installation of the Montana ABM in the external security structure of the Nation against urgent requirements for internal stability and progress.

In the case of nuclear defense questions, not a reliable system of a defensive character. However, is it possible that we would have a defense system not only of the reliability of the ABM system, but also of the relevance or redundancy of its deployment. We will then be in a position to prioritize the installation of the Montana ABM in the external security structure of the Nation against urgent requirements for internal stability and progress.

In the case of nuclear defense questions, not a reliable system of a defensive character. However, is it possible that we would have a defense system not only of the reliability of the ABM system, but also of the relevance or redundancy of its deployment. We will then be in a position to prioritize the installation of the Montana ABM in the external security structure of the Nation against urgent requirements for internal stability and progress.

In the case of nuclear defense questions, not a reliable system of a defensive character. However, is it possible that we would have a defense system not only of the reliability of the ABM system, but also of the relevance or redundancy of its deployment. We will then be in a position to prioritize the installation of the Montana ABM in the external security structure of the Nation against urgent requirements for internal stability and progress.

In the case of nuclear defense questions, not a reliable system of a defensive character. However, is it possible that we would have a defense system not only of the reliability of the ABM system, but also of the relevance or redundancy of its deployment. We will then be in a position to prioritize the installation of the Montana ABM in the external security structure of the Nation against urgent requirements for internal stability and progress.