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Mike Mansfield 1903-2001
A HOLD-FAST ON MISSILE DEPLOYMENT

After several years of relative stability, the Soviet Union and the United States are on the verge of major additional deployments of nuclear missiles. The pressure to proceed with the installation of these new systems is on in this nation and the indications are that it is on in the Soviet Union. It is on despite the fact that each nation can ill-afford the enormous expenditures of these deployments in the light of other national needs. It is on even though, for years, both nations have urged arms limitations as the better way to national security than the continuance of this appalling missile merry-go-round.

It should be noted, therefore, that during the last months of the Johnson Administration and the first months of the present Administration the Soviet Union apparently made three overtures which suggested a willingness to sit down and discuss a limitation on armaments of various types. In a similar vein, President Nixon has stated that he wants to replace the era of "confrontation" with the era of negotiations." He has made clear that he would prefer the "open-hand" to the "closed fist" in the relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Based on Secretary Rogers' press conference of April 7, I assume that Soviet probings for talks on armaments have received full consideration in the Executive Branch. It would be my hope that the President, on that basis and on the basis of the preparations which he has made since taking office, would now be ready to set a date certain to open U. S.-Soviet discussions.

I am not suggesting that arms negotiations should be "linked" with a consideration of political differences and the host of other issues...
which have separated the United States and the Soviet Union for many years. Panoramic negotiations of that kind may or may not be fruitful at some point in the future. In my view, however, first things should come first.

The first thing, in my judgment, is not to be found in the political issues of many years standing. Nor is the first thing to be found in arms reduction in a general sense which has been under discussion for two decades. Rather, the most urgent need is to curb the rising pressure in both countries for another major intensification of the deadly nuclear weapons confrontation.

The time to respond to Soviet overtures for talks or to take the initiative ourselves should be before not after the deployment of new nuclear weapons systems, for which the gears are now turning, has gained irreversible momentum in both countries. What is needed before all else are U.S.-Soviet negotiations which, confined to one question, may act to halt these gears promptly. What is needed, now, in my judgment, is the negotiation of an agreement to hold-fast on the further deployment of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union and the United States.

If agreement on that single point can be achieved there would be created a climate of calm, as in the case of the aftermath of the Test Ban Treaty, which might help to bring about solutions of mutual interest to the more complex problems of arms-reduction as well as the resolution of political differences. At the least, the immediate result of an agreement to hold-fast on further nuclear deployments would be an immense savings of resources which would otherwise be diverted into new weapons systems in both countries over the next few years. Any initiative by the President in this connection, in my judgment, would be gratefully received, not only by the peoples concerned but by the peoples of the world.
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THE ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE SYSTEM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish to commend the distinguished Sec-

etary of Defense, Mr. Laird, for not appearing before the Republican National Committee today to discuss the question of the ABM.

I wish to express my concern about reports I have read in the newspapers to the effect that the Democratic National Committee has indicated that the question of the ABM might become a partisan issue.

I also want to express my concern about Republican attempts to make it a partisan issue on the basis of pressures which I understand—but cannot prove—have been in operation during the past several days.

Furthermore, I also wish to express my concern about any Democrat in this Chamber who attempts to make the ABM a partisan political issue.

I am also concerned with committees being set up either for or against the ABM and being allied with either party. I think they should go their own way, make their own case. The Senate will make up its own mind, either for or against.

I commend the President, if a report which I have heard is accurate on the statement, attributed to the White House, that he contemplates appearing before the Nation in defense of his point of view for a Safeguard missile system. That is within the area of his responsibility—make his case, so to speak. But the point I emphasize above all else is that this is not a Republican issue or a Democratic issue. It is a national issue which supercedes the interests of both parties. It is an issue which has two sides. There are meritorious arguments on both—let them be heard in the Senate.

In recent years many issues of foreign relations and military policy have come before the Senate. That these questions have been considered in an atmosphere free of partisan political consideration reflects great credit on Senators of both parties.

I have no hesitation in this connection in acknowledging a debt to the distinguished minority leader (Mr. Dirksen) and to the entire Republican membership. During the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations, there was no inclination on their part to play politics with the Nation's security. Equally, there will be no inclination on the part of the majority leadership to play politics with these issues during the current administration.

That is not to say that there will not be differences. There are already differences even as there were differences during the past two administrations. The differences, however, will cut across party lines, now, even as they did then. That is to be expected when complex questions confront the Senate. That is as it should be when these questions are examined in the context of the variety of insights and attitudes which exist in the Senate.

The treatment of Vietnam during the last administration illustrates this point. The Senate will recall that policies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations on Vietnam were disputed. In the first instance, by Democratic Senators, by members of the Democratic majority. My own views of disagreement with these policies are well known because they were expressed publicly and, in private, to both President Kennedy and President Johnson. Clearly, there was no element of politics involved in Democratic Senators assuming positions of opposition to a Democratic administration.

Distinguished Republican Senators, however, also formed a most articulate and perceptive segment of the opposition to the spread of Vietnamese violent fanaticism. To be sure, the opposition of these Republican Senators was directed at a Democratic administration. They acted, however, not out of partisanship but on the basis of their high constitutional responsibilities. In my judgment, those Republican Senators deserve not partisan labels but national thanks for their contribution to preventing the compounding of the tragic conflict in Vietnam.

In the same fashion, the critical examination of the ABM issue has also transcended party lines. The opposition to this immensely costly and questionable military undertaking did not begin on January 20 with a Republican administration. Rather, the opposition had already reached significant expression—political and otherwise—in the last session of the Congress.

There were Democratic Senators, then, who voted their convictions that the Democratic administration was moving into dubious grounds with the ABM proposal. There were Democrats, then, who felt and so stated—the distinguished Senator from Missouri (Mr. Cooper), for example—that we would risk enormous tax funds for what, at the very best, would prove an unnecessary piling up of useless military hardware.

In this instance, too, as in the case of Vietnam, votes of opposition were raised on the Republican side of the aisle. Indeed, the initiative which served to marshal the opposition to the ABM came largely from the perceptive and articulate arguments of the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Cooper).

Why did this distinguished Republican speak out? Did he speak as a Republican to embarrass a Democratic administration? Or did he speak as a Senator of conscience and conviction? Did the Senator from Kentucky speak as a partisan politician or as a former diplomat with an immense knowledge of world affairs? And did the distinguished Senator from Maine (Mrs. Scranton), the ranking member of the minority of the Armed Services Committee, in opposing this project last year, speak as a partisan politician? Or did she speak as one of the Senate's ablest experts in military matters, with a far longer experience in the problems of nuclear weaponry than most of the Defense Department officials who were urging the ABM?

I need not labor the point. I make the point only to underscore the total absence of partisanship, heretofore, in the consideration of the issue of the ABM. I make it only because of disturbing reports of outside efforts to synthesize a political partisanship where, in fact, none has existed and where none should exist.

We were, none of us, born yesterday. We are, none of us, strangers to the more
The debate has involved the question of national security, which no responsible person of either party would want to compromise. Beyond the question of whether deployment against some sudden or unforeseen threat, is the larger issue of determining the elements of security in a system of weapons, and the question of deployment concerns its effect on negotiations with the Soviet Union or control of nuclear weapons, for which the President is striving. The question of whether such arrangements are possible is always a doubtful one, but the very nature of our system of government demands always that we make the effort. A sensible ground upon which we can expect an opportunity to reach such an accord is that our interests in this case are mutual. The Soviets are unpredictable, but like the United States we cannot consider that they want to be destroyed.

We must consider the effect of the continued escalation of defensive and offensive nuclear weapons. Will their continued expansion cause the balance of terror to tip so far as to drive the nuclear nation with increased danger that one nation may try a preemptive strike? This condition would create a sense of fear, and perhaps, among the young people of our country who would like to live their lives in a peaceful world, at least relatively peaceful, and one not hanging by the thread of a nuclear race and a nuclear war. I do not suppose that any of us, young or old, want a nuclear weapons system hanging over us—and to live in mind if not in fact, like our ancient ancestors in caves. It may be there is no other way, but I am constrained to believe that reason can prevail.

When Senator Hart, of Michigan, and I introduced an amendment last year to postpone the testing of the ABM system, joined by Members of the Senate, both Republicans and Democrats, we did so that the Senate, the Congress, and the country the chance to fully examine its merits and the necessity of its deployment. Throughout last year as Senator Hart and I persisted in the submission of amendments joined always by a bipartisan group and as others introduced amendments—Senator Yorvit of Ohio, Senator Nixon of Wisconsin, Senator Clark of Pennsylvania—continuing debate had the effect we had desired—submission of the issue on its merits to the country.

The debate has brought forward many versions of the purpose of the system—whether against a Chinese or Soviet threat, whether to protect our missile sites, whether to protect population and missile site protection, or whether to strengthen the hand of our country in negotiations with the Soviet Union. Each of these has been questioned at times both by proponents and opponents. But the debate has been upon the merits and not upon partisan grounds. The exercise of the authority of both the majority and the minority and other Members of the Senate have taken their positions on the merits and some are proponents and some are proponents of the system.

I hope this is the way it will continue and that the decision in the Congress will be made upon the merits. I continue to hope that the President will establish a committee such as Dr. Killian recommends which the executive branch will provide the best judgment of the best informed minds of our country upon this—and that a judgment of the expenditure which will have the support of the great majority, perhaps an overwhelming majority, of our people.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Eagleton at the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

MISSILE DEPLOYMENT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, as long as no Senator seems to be endeavoring to get recognition at this time, I wish to read a statement which I made on Saturday. It may be a part of the record of my position on the ABM:

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After several years of relative stability, the Soviet Union and the United States are on the verge of major additional deployments of nuclear missiles. The pressure to proceed with the installation of these new systems is on in this nation and the indications are that it is on in the Soviet Union. It is on despite the fact that each nation can ill-afford the enormous expenditures of these deployments in the light of other national needs. It is on even though, for years, both nations have urged arms limitations as the better way to national security than the continuance of this appalling missile merry-go-round.

It should be noted, therefore, that during the last months of the Johnson Administration and the first months of the present Administration the Soviet Union has made three overtures which suggested a willingness to sit down and discuss a limitation of various forms of offensive nuclear systems. In the last instance, President Nixon has stated that he wants to replace the era of "confrontation" with the era of "negotiations." He has made clear that he would prefer the "open-hand" to the "closed fist" in the relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Based on Secretary Rogers' press conference of April 7, I assume that Soviet proposals for talks on armaments have received full consideration in the Executive Branch. The text of those talks from that press conference, at which time Secretary of State Rogers was asked whether there was any standing proposal on the part of the Soviet Union, was as follows. He gave this answer: "No, there is nothing that stands in the way and they are prepared at any time with the readiness of preparing for them now and we expect they will begin in the late spring or early summer.

I would be my hope that the President, on that basis and on the basis of the preparation he has made since taking office, would now be ready to set a date certain to open U.S.-Soviet discussions.

I am not suggesting that armaments negotiations should be "linked" with a considera-
tion of political differences and the host of other issues which have separated the United States and the Soviet Union for many years. Panoramic negotiations of that kind may or may not be fruitful at some point in the future. In my view, however, first things should come first.

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