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A Time to be Stalwart

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The mammoth power that is the United States cannot be exercised in jerks and starts, according to whoever can amass the noisiest protest march against the Pentagon. The Constitution didn't set things up that way.

It is this responsible setup which has enabled the United States to stand tall in the modern world. It is orderly government which mobilizes a nation to halt aggression at Berlin, to distribute grain to hungry peoples under PL 480, to be on the way to a moon landing, to work for détente with Moscow, to give life and treasure, if need be, in honoring far-off commitments. And, of course, to tackle (and win) the great battle of rehabilitating the inner core of American cities with their struggling, long-dented minorities.

There are young dissenters, brought up on permissiveness and now flouting government authority, who would, if they could, destroy the middle class and industrial capitalism. There are bizarre thinkers who make fun of the late President Kennedy's famous injunction to ask not what the country can do for you but what you can do for your country, and who label the Peace Corps a dropout device.

These are minority voices.

But there is an over-abundance of complaining and carping and caterwauling from the pseudointellectual establishment. Nor is there any need that a forthright, vigorous nation should accept into its thinking the debilitating doctrines of either Asian mysticism or homegrown pacifism.

The Asian aim, to extinguish individuality by absorption into a sea of bliss, would substitute contemplation for demonstration. The pacifist outlook, regarding war as totally evil, could not have stood up to Hitler's Nazism, and in America's own Civil War would never have brought the splendidly couraged South back into the Union.

The Civil War had its draft riots and poison-pen editors. Today the news media are summoned to avoid panicky assessments, to omit the pinpricks and the deprecatory and the despairing phrase.

The Viet Cong assault against the cities may be a last-gasp attempt. Or it may show that the United States has built a mere hollow shell of government in South Vietnam—bricks without straw.

Certainly this time of crucial decisions is a time to uphold the government—President and Congress—with our prayers. Yes, to see that no mist of false doctrine or sleazy up-bringing can upset the constitutional order which gives thrust and purpose to our country. And to remind ourselves and affirm that our leaders have the utilization of ever-present intelligence and wisdom from on high, that they indeed can perceive and follow the "path which no fowl knoweth." (Job 28.)

THE MULTILATERAL TREND

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I have read with interest the President's foreign aid message to Congress today.

As we all know, there is now a desirable trend toward multilateralism in foreign aid, and I was gratified to note the emphasis that the President put upon that in his lifting of the fundamental principles of our foreign assistance program. The plan to make 90 percent of our loans on one multilateral basis or another is wise and proper, and the President's statement of the needs of the International Development Association—the World Bank's "soft loan window"—commends itself to our serious consideration.

Those who use terms like "foreign aid giveaway" and who carp at our assistance to less-developed nations should instruct themselves on how many multilateral institutions and arrangements these are.

There is the Development Assistance Committee, headquartered in Paris and composed of members from 15 nations and the European Economic Community. It is the major international mechanism for coordination of free world assistance. There are the World Bank's consortia for India and Pakistan, and other such consortia for other countries, composed of as many as 16 donor countries and institutions. There are consultative groups established by the World Bank and others for the pooling and coordination of assistance to particular countries, such as Nigeria, Colombia, Thailand, Peru, and Korea.

There are other coordination arrangements, such as the Colombo plan for South and Southeast Asia and the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress in Latin America.

We have helped develop and have strongly supported such multilateralism, and some of our partners in these enterprises are devoting larger shares of their national product to foreign aid than we are.

THE NATION FACES REALITY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excellent editorial entitled "Time To Push, Not Merely Prod," published in the Christian Science Monitor of February 7, 1968; and an equally excellent article entitled "Facing Reality," written by Alan L. Otten, and published in the Wall Street Journal of today, February 8, 1968.

There is much food for thought in the editorial and the article. I urge Senators to give them their consideration.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Christian Science Monitor,
Feb. 7, 1968]

TIME TO PUSH, NOT MERELY PROD

It would be tragic if the United States had not learned a worldwide lesson from its long, painful, and presently uncertain labors in South Vietnam. This is the crystal-clear fact that it is impossible to foster or maintain popular democracy anywhere unless local leadership is sincerely dedicated to the welfare of the country and the individual.

As outgoing Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara underlined in his farewell report to Congress, America cannot achieve its goals in Vietnam unless the Saigon government establishes its authority over its territory. And Saigon can do this only through radical reform. It has little hope of winning a popularity contest against the Viet Cong unless it proves its determination to give honest, conscientious government, root out privilege and exploitation, severely punish graft and corruption, and, in short, represent popular rather than restricted interests.

What is true in war-seething Vietnam is equally true at other potential blow-up points. Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Bolivia, Latin America are dotted with tindery areas merely awaiting the right combination of moment, leadership and popular desperation. Cuba should have shown clearly enough where such conditions can lead.

There may at the moment be fewer such areas in Africa and Asia (on these two continents governments more responsive to the popular will have come into being) but there are still spots where deep dissatisfaction gnaws and where there is a broad gap between the governed and the governors. Even

Europe, where the present governments of Greece, Portugal, and Spain were neither popularly elected nor popularly chosen, is not safe from this alienation between those on top and those below.

Although the situation is more desperate in Vietnam than elsewhere, nonetheless there are forces in other parts of the world that would tend to produce other Vietnams. They exist wherever, in this day of rising expectations, the people have come to feel profoundly that their government is against them rather than for them. Wherever there are peasants toiling for others at a few pence a day, wherever there is cruel and glaring contrast between the handful of rich and the throngs of poor, wherever elections bring no real change in the situation, strong and constructive action is urgently needed to prevent the development of other Vietnams.

For the two decades since the end of World War II the United States has generally been content to prod gently in the hope of inducing reform in governments it helps. By 1968, and with the lesson of South Vietnam before us, has not the time come for America to push, and push hard, rather than merely prod?

[From the Wall Street Journal, Feb. 8, 1968]

FACING REALITY

(By Alan L. Otten)

WASHINGTON.—The most interesting thing thus far about the popular American reaction to the Pueblo affair is the lack of it.

Officials and ordinary citizens alike have been comparatively calm and restrained in their response, which suggests that perhaps the United States, after decades of almost adolescent confidence in its infinite ability to shape and reshape conditions at home and abroad, is beginning to comprehend the confines of power. This long-delayed maturing results, at least in part, from the nation's Vietnam involvement; it is an unexpected but valuable byproduct of the war.

We have heard, to be sure, a few hawks' cries for the military to rush in and show those gooks a thing or two, a few wistful recollections of the North African bandit caving in and releasing the Greek-American merchant when good old Teddy Roosevelt laid down his famous ultimatum: "Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead."

But the general attitude of top Johnson men, influential Senators and Congressmen, editorial writers and men on the street has been remarkably relaxed. The feeling seems to be that the Government should certainly do all it can to get the men back (there appears little anxiety over the ship) but that it should be extremely cautious about any steps that might lead to broad military action.

Administration leaders have been pleasantly surprised, for instance, at the comparative composure on Capitol Hill. One State Department official tells of having to brief a Congressman whose mimeograph machine had initially bellowed belligerently for action. The official outlined what the Administration was doing through diplomatic channels, then waited for the angry blast about panty-waist diplomacy. "Well," said the firebrand meekly, "I guess that's about all anyone could expect you to do right now, isn't it." The official assumes this means that the back-home pressure to "do something" had been considerably less than the lawmaker had originally expected.

Admittedly, one element of this new maturity is a certain sophisticated cynicism. In the U-2 affair and the Bay of Pigs, the American involvement eventually was shown to be less than saintly; the same might be true of the Pueblo, people were saying, especially after Secretaries McNamara and Rusk on TV Sunday acknowledged at least the possibility that at some time the spy ship might have been inside North Korea's 12-mile limit. The whole spy craze in books and movies and TV entertainment causes

heads to nod wisely at the Pueblo news: This is a dirty business, those who work at it are likely to get caught and get hurt, and it's all in the game. To many Americans it seems more sensible to take the losses quietly than to risk more chips on a poor hand.

But certainly there is an additional factor working in the Pueblo affair that was not present in earlier incidents: A reluctant recognition that the U.S. does not have limitless military or financial resources, and thus should not expose itself to another long, messy war for anything less than a very clear threat to its self-interest.

The U.S. response to the Arab-Israeli war last spring was remarkably similar. Even the shrillest Vietnam hawks cautioned against rushing into another major battleground, and the nation squirmed uneasily as its conscience urged it to help Israel and its common sense warned it to stay the hell out. A nationwide sigh of relief went up when the Israeli army and air force ended the war before the U.S. had to decide between the promptings of conscience and the counsel of good sense.

It seems highly likely, too, that similar restraint will be the response to future foreign flare-ups. For the Vietnam war has driven home—rubbed the national nose in, if you will—the lesson of the limitations of American power. The nation is coming to realize, as decades earlier Britain and France had to realize, that massive military might, technological superiority and even good intentions aren't always enough to shape events. Particularly the U.S. is learning that there are many situations where nuclear power is too awful to contemplate and conventional power inadequate, and that in such situations discretion is definitely the preferred course.

It is a difficult lesson for a people inherently optimistic and self-confident. Americans have long believed there was almost nothing they couldn't do once they set their minds to it—and, somehow, things got worked out that way until recently. Didn't the U.S. win World War I and World War II, rebuild Western Europe, halt the Communists in Korea? Now, with realistic resignation, the Republic is adjusting to the fact that events don't always march to the American tune.

It still comes as a considerable shock to a nation used to flexing its financial muscle to be told that gold supplies are dwindling dangerously, that the dollar is in trouble, that its citizens may have to accept strict limits on where they can invest and—for the first time—stiff taxes when they travel abroad. Perhaps the Administration's proposals are examples of overkill, and will ultimately be trimmed down or even in part rejected. But whatever curbs finally emerge, and even the debate about them, will force Americans to face reality.

In the domestic field the awakening is proving equally rude. Even those Americans who have had doubts about the nation's power to remake the world have always happily assumed they could pretty well do as they wanted to remake their own country. Good will, hard work and money could overcome the race problem, save the cities, give jobs to practically everyone and so forth. Indeed the President quite properly and accurately recites strings of statistics of advances in employment, housing, education, health. Yet the problems seem to have grown even faster; the list of unmet needs stretches ever longer and race relations grow more bitter.

Perhaps the awakening was bound to come sooner or later, as it came to the British and French and other once high-flying empires. Certainly, though, Vietnam has been a catalyst to speed the American awakening, dramatically underscoring the difficulties of winning wars in faraway lands, the limits of financial resources, the problems of mobiliz-

ing national will. And if, as a result of Vietnam, the awakening has come a little sooner and perhaps even a little less rudely than it might otherwise have come, then perhaps that is a perverse plus for the war—one not usually included on the Administration's Vietnam balance sheet.