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4-25-1969

Congressional Record - ABM (No. 6)

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

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Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "Congressional Record - ABM (No. 6)" (1969). *Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews*. 758.

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Project	Year started	Year canceled	Funds Invested (millions)
Army:			
Hermes.....	1944	1954	\$96.4
Dart.....	1952	1958	44.0
Loki.....	1948	1956	21.9
Terrier, land based.....	1951	1956	18.6
Plato.....	1951	1958	18.5
Mauler.....	1960	1965	200.0
Total Army.....			399.4
Navy:			
Sparrow I.....	1945	1958	195.6
Regulus II.....	1955	1958	144.4
Petrel.....	1945	1957	87.2
Corvus.....	1954	1960	80.0
Eagle.....	1959	1961	53.0
Meteor.....	1945	1954	52.6
Sparrow II.....	1945	1957	52.0
Rigel.....	1943	1953	38.0
Dove.....	1949	1955	33.7
Triton.....	1948	1957	19.4
Orion.....	1947	1953	12.5
Typhon.....	1958	1964	225.0
Total Navy.....			993.4
Air Force:			
Navaho.....	1954	1957	679.8
Snark.....	1947	1962	677.4
GAM-63 Rascal.....	1946	1958	448.0
GAM-87 Skybolt.....	1960	1963	440.0
Talos, land based.....	1954	1957	118.1
Mobile Minuteman.....	1959	1962	108.4
Q-4 Drone.....	1954	1959	84.4
SM-72 Goose.....	1955	1958	78.5
GAM-67 Crossbow.....	1957	1958	74.6
MWRBM.....	1962	1964	65.4
Total Air Force.....			2,774.6
Grand total.....			4,167.4

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the following table shows the total investment for missile systems which have been deployed but are no longer deployed. These two sets of figures add up to a total of \$23,053 billion:

[Cost in millions]

Army:		
Nike-Ajax.....		\$2,256
Entac (Antitank missile).....		50
Redstone.....		586
Lacrosse.....		347
Corporal.....		534
Jupiter.....		327
Total Army.....		4,100
Navy:		
Polaris A1.....		1,132
Regulus.....		413
Total Navy.....		1,545
Air Force:		
Houndog A.....		255
Atlas D, E, F.....		5,208
Titan I.....		3,415
Bomarc A.....		1,405
Mace A.....		328
Jupiter.....		498
Thor.....		1,415
Total Air Force.....		13,241
Grand total.....		18,886
Plus missile systems terminated before deployment.....		4,167
Total.....		23,053

In view of the fact that the estimated cost of the Safeguard system will increase considerably above the present approximate \$8 billion—\$6 billion plus for acquisition, construction, and deployment and \$2 billion plus for research and development—that there are grave questions about the reliability of the system; that, inherent in the Safeguard proposal, is the start of a new phase of the arms

race which could cost tens of billions of dollars; and in view of the fact that there are alternatives both of diplomacy and weapons technology which have yet to be considered, it seems to me that it is high time to put first things first.

First. I would suggest that on the basis of a number of Soviet diplomatic probes over the past several months suggesting a readiness to go forward on an arms limitation or freeze, a diplomatic reaction should be tried on our part which might lead to the setting of a time certain in the first part of June for negotiations to begin in earnest between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Second. In the meantime, research and development should be continued on the ABM system to determine more clearly the prospects of resolving the technical problems which have raised serious doubts about the effectiveness of this system.

Third. A year from now, we should know as a result of diplomatic initiatives as well as further research on the ABM whether there is a sound basis for going ahead with the building of an ABM system or for setting it aside entirely. In my judgment the Defense Department and the State Department have not yet provided the Senate with persuasive grounds for going ahead with the deployment of the ABM at this time.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I associate myself with the conclusions of the distinguished majority leader, the Senator from Montana. In presenting these facts to the Senate and to the public, he has rendered a great service. I hope that his suggestions will be taken most seriously.

I congratulate the Senator on his fine statement.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I have noted with deep interest the views of the Senator from Montana. They are most authoritative and have been well borne out under the auspices of the Senator from Arkansas and the Senator from Tennessee both in the principal committee and in the subcommittee.

I appreciate the feeling of the President of the United States upon this matter. But I think one thing needs to be made very clear—and I know the Senator from Montana will agree—that there is not one whit less feeling about the security and future of our country in the heart of the Senator from Montana, the Senator from Arkansas, and myself than there is in the heart of the most ardent advocate of the Safeguard or antiballistic-missile system.

There is no partisanship in this matter. I took this position before. The Senator from Arkansas, the Senator from Montana, and the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) also took this position before President Nixon was even considered for the nomination of the Presidency of the United States.

I hope that these two factors may be

made crystal clear by so authoritative a voice as that of the majority leader.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I appreciate the remarks of the distinguished senior Senator from New York. But I think he gives the Senator from Montana too much credit.

I not only appreciate what the Senator had to say, but I also agree with him. There are two sides to this question, maybe the proponents are right.

It is a matter of judgment. It is a matter of searching our consciences to try to find the truth on the basis of the best evidence available, and arriving at a judgment.

I honor the President for being responsible for a review of this system. I appreciate that he made a decided change in the system which he inherited—the Sentinel.

He faced up to his responsibility of exercising his best judgment on the basis of the facts. And what he has done, we in our individual capacities will have to do as well. It is a part of our responsibility as Senators from sovereign States.

I hope that recognition will be given to the fact that probes have been made by the Soviet Union and that the President himself, as well as the Secretary of State, have indicated that there is a very strong possibility that talks will get underway either late this spring or early this summer. We need only refer to Secretary Rogers' latest press conference.

I am somewhat disturbed at the question of priority. I think the key word is "balance"; that we must balance our foreign policy and our defense expenditures, on the one hand, with our domestic problems and needs on the other.

If we can achieve a balance on that basis, we shall all be further ahead than we would be if we were to place too much emphasis on the use of the word "priority" in one field or the other.

If we were to become the strongest nation in the world and were to spend all of the money that has been requested, of what good would it be? If our cities burned and our society were disrupted, our people became discontented and uneasiness were to spread throughout the land, of what good would it be?

That is why we cannot give either of these factors a priority, but, rather, ought to treat them, in effect, as a duality. That is why we must, in accommodation with the President and the executive branch, work to try to obtain a balance. We must face up to these matters which are difficult, but which cannot be avoided.

The matter must be considered, as the distinguished Senator has already said, on a nonpartisan basis.

It will do neither party any good to win a victory in this or in any other area if the country is the loser.

I have been especially pleased with the tone with which the debate on the ABM has developed in the Senate, not only this year but also last year. I have also been pleased with the lack of partisanship and the understanding on the part of the President and the executive branch of our responsibility and our reciprocal understanding.

more than a weapons system. The development of technology as applied to missile systems and other implements of war affect our chances for disarmament and tend to distort domestic priorities. They have great implications not only in the military field but in the fields of industry, labor, the universities, and politics and all these factors can be, and have been, without any prior determination and without any deliberate intent, developed into a partnership of enormous proportions.

Mr. President, I have nothing but the greatest respect for the military. I think they are doing their job with integrity, dedication, and patriotism. I have great respect for industry in this country. They are seeking business and achieving it. Sometimes I think perhaps they go to undue lengths. I have great respect for labor, too, but labor too often finds desirable the jobs which missile installations and other systems make available, the work pays well and often carries a good deal of overtime.

The universities have also been benefiting for some time. The latest figure I have indicates that last year, educational and nonprofit institutions earned \$772 million in research contracts—\$16 million more than in 1967.

For example, with no intention of impugning any university, but rather to note their excellence, I note from published news sources that the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is in 10th place in this field, with \$119 million in Defense research contracts, and that the Johns Hopkins University, for example, is in 22d place with \$57,600,000.

As far as the politics is concerned there are many of us in this Chamber, myself included, who must share a part

of the responsibility, and a part of any blame, because when it comes to getting defense installations, missile or otherwise, for our States and into our areas, none of us have been shrinking violets. I think that ought to be made clear.

So what has developed along with the technological developments over the past two decades, is a military-industrial-labor-academic-political combination, and that development simply cannot be gainsaid.

To come back to the main theme of my remarks, I would note that the Pentagon's allegation, in defense of the ABM—Safeguard—system, is, in my opinion, predicated on its belief that the Soviet Union is developing a first strike capacity and that almost all our land-based missiles or at least a sizable portion of them would be destroyed on that basis.

It is well to reiterate and to emphasize that the second strike capacity is only in part predicated on the reaction of our land-based missiles and that we have, in addition, 41 Polaris submarines with 656 nuclear missiles and 646 nuclear armed strategic Air Force bombers.

At this point, I ask to have printed in the RECORD a table showing the increase from 1963 through 1968 on the part of the United States and the U.S.S.R. of ICBM—intercontinental ballistic missile—SLBM—sea-launched ballistic missile—and total missiles from these two systems. In addition, I would like on the same basis to include the number of intercontinental bombers. All this is public information.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE ABM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the ABM debate symbolizes and encompasses

	1963		1964		1965		1966		1967		1968	
	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.
ICBM launchers.....	514	100	834	200	854	270	934	340	1,054	720	1,054	905
SLBM launchers.....	160	90	416	120	496	120	512	130	656	30	656	45
Total missiles.....	674	190	1,250	320	1,350	390	1,446	470	1,710	750	1,710	945
Intercontinental bombers.....	1,300	155	1,100	155	935	155	680	155	697	155	646	150

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, with regard to this table, I merely wish to say that while the Senator has included, in the table which he has just asked to be inserted, I think, a very complete and very good table of the nuclear weapons, this by no means exhausts the capacity of this country to destroy any enemy or any antagonist, because we have enormous capacity in the field of chemical and bacteriological warfare agents, sufficient at least to duplicate the destructive capacity represented by the figures in the table the Senator has inserted.

I wish only to make the point that this table, with all of its impressive figures, by no means tells the whole story. The Russians, as do we, have, in addition, the further capacity to decimate populations.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), is correct. And may I say that I have not even given all the information at my disposal relative to the number of warheads and the like, but I shall do so now.

It is my understanding, subject to verification, that in 1963 the approximate number of nuclear warheads was 7,844 for the United States and 755 for the Soviet Union and that by 1968 the figure was 6,556 for the United States and 3,295 for the Soviet Union.

I say that subject to verification; but I have a pretty good idea that what I have just stated is fact, and can well be proved.

Another aspect of the development, or in some instances, lack of development, of missiles is indicated by the fact that

approximately \$23 billion has been expended on missile systems planned, produced, deployed, and abandoned. Of that figure about \$4.1 billion was spent on missiles which were abandoned in the research and development stage. I shall ask to have printed in the RECORD a list of major missile projects terminated during the past 16 years and not deployed; but before doing so, I wish to give full credit to the distinguished senior Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON), who placed these figures in the RECORD on March 7, and thereby made them available to the rest of us.

I now ask unanimous consent that the list of terminated projects be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: