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May 12, 1969

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

A B M

The debate on the Safeguard ABM that has occurred to date and the testimony that has been given have resulted in a conflict and not a consensus of views. No confluence of opinion has developed, no winnowing process has yet clearly divided the convincing from the confusing. As far as the technical merits of the Safeguard system are concerned we do not yet have the lucid guidelines we need for a prudent judgment.

To be sure, there has been a consensus of sorts. There is virtual unanimity, for example, that an ABM system for the protection of cities would not be much good against an all-out nuclear attack and there is substantial agreement that regardless of what decision is made with respect to deployment, research and development of anti-missile defenses should continue.

The differences over the technical efficacy of Safeguard constitute, however, only one segment of the problem. More significant is whether our deployment of Safeguard will upset international stability, whether it will provoke an escalation in the arms race, and whether it will assist or handicap proposed negotiations with the Soviet Union on strategic delivery vehicles.

One of the critical questions for which we seek an answer is: Will the deployment of the Safeguard provoke another round in the arms race? Will it be escalatory? It has become virtually a truism that arms races are dangerous and can lead to war. It is even more significant that they can be very costly in terms of national resources and that, despite the cost, after each upward spiral is turned by the competitors in the race, the security of

none is any greater. All too frequently, the rivals continue to balance each other, only at a more heavily armed and more expensive level. Arms racing, in short, can be an extravagant futility for all concerned.

The United States admittedly has at times been a victim of the temptation to dissipate its resources in arms racing. The "bomber gap" of the fifties and the "missile gap" of the early sixties are well known instances in which the United States reacted to what were thought to be weapons advances on the other side but which later did not materialize. The Soviet government, too, has frequently reacted by expansions of its strategic weapons with the aim of matching or even outrunning the United States. There is no evidence that the action-reaction syndrome has been purged from the psychology of either the United States or the Soviet Union. A provocative weapons advance on either side today can be expected to trigger very much the same kind of counter-reaction as it did five, ten or fifteen years ago.

Yet we slowly learn. One of the more encouraging aspects of the current Safeguard proposal is the conscious effort of American defense officials to devise a weapons system that is intended to be non-provocative and non-escalatory. The President, the Secretary of Defense and other officials have portrayed the installation of the Safeguard as a defensive not an offensive measure and have concluded, as the President has said, that "the Soviet Union cannot interpret this as escalating the arms race." Unfortunately, the conclusion does not necessarily derive from the premise.

Distinctions between so-called "offensive" and "defensive" weapons are often semantic, not real. During negotiations in the League of Nations in the 1920's and 30's the attempt to distinguish between such weapons was a failure, one which contributed importantly to the stillbirth of those

negotiations. Although "defensive," the Safeguard system is designed to protect and preserve an "offensive" weapon. How the Soviet government chooses to react may hinge very little on whether it perceives the Safeguard system as "defensive" or "offensive" in a strictly military sense. The fact is it is another weapons system which has an impact on over-all strategic and political relations. The Soviet Union may well conclude that it has to compensate for this American initiative, not so much because of military logic but because of broader political imperatives. All of our experience with the international interaction between national military establishments leads to the conclusion that we cannot be dogmatic in asserting that the Safeguard will not have an escalatory effect. Indeed if we are calculating prudently, then we must anticipate the opposite. If it does, then, it could seriously prejudice endeavors to arrive at an understanding with the Soviet government on limiting strategic armaments.

There is also a serious question whether the Soviet government may not be engaged in a weapons deployment that could gravely prejudice the possibility of negotiating an agreement on strategic armaments. I refer to its deployment of the SS-9, an ICBM with a warhead reported to be as large as 20 to 25 megatons. The Secretary of Defense has sought to justify the Safeguard proposal on the grounds that the SS-9 deployment indicates the Soviet Union is striving for a first-strike capability against the United States. A certain portion of the Minuteman force must be safeguarded, he argues, in order to insure its survival and to maintain our capability for assured destruction against the Soviet Union.

I do not intend to take issue with the principle of assured destruction as the core of national deterrent policy. Nor, if the alleged Soviet

threat is valid, do I necessarily quarrel with the thesis that it may be desirable to defend a portion of our offensive strike force in order to make certain we retain a capability of assured destruction. But the suddenness with which the threat of the SS-9 has been conjured up necessitates a close examination.

It is disconcerting that Mr. Laird's disclosures come close on the heels of another Department of Defense appraisal of the national strategic posture that was formulated in entirely different terms. It is disturbing that one Secretary of Defense can communicate to the Congress one intelligence conclusion regarding the Soviet Union and another Secretary of Defense only two months later, presumably relying upon the same data, the same intelligence organization, and the same estimate, can arrive at a substantially different conclusion.

The last posture statement of Secretary Clark Clifford, which appeared in mid-January of this year, declares that "even against the highest Soviet threat" projected in the National Intelligence Estimate, the U. S. strategic forces programmed over the next few years could destroy in a second strike more than two-fifths of the Soviet population and about three-fourths of their industrial capacity. This, the Secretary confirmed, was sufficient assured destruction capability to comprise an adequate deterrent.

The Secretary warned, however, that we must be prepared to cope with unexpected developments in the Soviet strategic threat and take appropriate actions to hedge against them. One of the unexpected contingencies foreseen by the Secretary was the possibility of development of a Soviet ICBM with target kill capability that would be able to destroy a large number of U. S. land-based missiles in hard silos. But he saw no need to take

countermeasures against this possibility until there was evidence that the threat was beginning to emerge. Yet in March, Secretary Laird perceived such a threat and decided to revamp the Sentinel system not only by changing the object of its defense from the cities to Minuteman, but also by placing the emphasis on the Soviet Union, rather than Communist China, as the principal adversary. The villain responsible for this switch in scripts was the SS-9 which was described as being deployed at a menacing rate.

But the SS-9 is nothing new. Its existence has been known for some years and its increasing deployment has been observed. Did some new element suddenly stimulate the fears of the Defense Secretary? He mentioned evidence as recent as last December of Soviet deployment of the SS-9. But are we to believe that Secretary Clifford's assessment in January was not made with full awareness of the SS-9 deployment and its potential? If the Defense Department in January deemed that the Soviet deployment of SS-9's implied such a formidable threat to our offensive missiles, if they considered it a first-strike force, why did not Secretary Clifford's statement reflect that judgment? Was some radically new intelligence gained between January and March? Was a new estimate made by the intelligence community which dramatically enlarged the Soviet threat in those two intervening months? I do not find in Secretary Laird's public utterances claims of either significant new data or a new National Intelligence Estimate.

Since his first disclosure of the threat of the SS-9, the Defense Secretary has asserted he referred only to a Soviet capability and not to an intention. Moreover, the Secretary of State has disclaimed a belief that the Soviet government intends a first strike against the United States. In any case the Defense Secretary is not referring to a Soviet first-strike

capability that exists now but only to one which might exist in the mid-1970's, assuming that present trends of deployment continue over a period of years. He has in a word assumed just about the worst possible projection of Soviet deployment and, then, has reacted as though it were certain to become a reality.

But we have seen these projections of Soviet capabilities go awry all too many times. Too many times before we have over-reacted to a theoretical projection which never became a tangible fact. I have already cited the well-known bomber and missile gaps. I would also like to point out that when the Sentinel ABM system was proposed in 1967 it was predicated on projections of Chinese and Soviet deployments which did not materialize. It was then estimated that the Soviet ICBM deployment would level off. ^{According to Secretary Laird,} /it did not. But now the Safeguard proposal is predicated on the assumption that it will continue. But what if it levels off?

There are many reasons to expect that it might. According to Under Secretary of Defense Packard the Soviet ICBM force has attained "parity" with our own, and it is reasonable to suppose that the Soviet Union might have sought this level as a precondition for negotiations on a strategic arms agreement with the United States. It would not be realistic on our part to expect they would agree to freeze armaments at less than parity. And they are not so unrealistic as to dream that we would accept a ratio that was unbalanced in their favor.

Both we and they should grasp and ponder the fact that we are at a decisive milestone. A state of approximate strategic balance now obtains between the two sides. Each has sufficiency of strategic power to deter the other. If at this critical moment either tries to gain an advantage by

introducing new strategic systems or by substantially enlarging existing deployments, then the present stability could be upset. And there would be no prospect that it could be regained, at least not until another major round in the arms race had been completed, perhaps years hence and at dire economic, social and political costs.

The immediate manifestation of the deployment or non-deployment of Safeguard will be its possible effects upon the long-pending negotiations on strategic delivery vehicles. I fear that the Safeguard proposal has already had a baleful effect upon the decision to start these parleys. The major survey of defense policy which the new Administration apparently is now conducting seems to have become an obstacle to the diplomacy of "non-confrontation and negotiation" which President Nixon established as the main thrust of his Administration's foreign policy. "Late spring or early summer"--the announced time for beginning the talks--is a vague deadline which contrasts sharply with the urgency of the hard sell to win approval of appropriations for the Safeguard ABM in the fiscal year beginning July 1. The enthusiasm for building the weapon compares starkly with the dawdling pace of the preparations alleged to be necessary for United States entry into the talks. Actually preparations for strategic talks have been underway for several years--the United States first made the proposal for freezing strategic delivery vehicles in January 1964, and was ready to start negotiating in the summer of last year. Why should it be necessary to pull everything up by the roots again just to see if it is alive and well? Let us get on with the talks. Let us set a date--a date in early June. This will dispel suspicion that the United States is reluctant to undertake these talks and is more in favor of expanding than constricting the arms race.

On April 25, I inserted in the Congressional Record a chart comparing the relative nuclear strength between the United States and the Soviet Union. Shown rather graphically is the growth rate that has maintained this balance of nuclear terror; it is an ugly picture that has not changed significantly for years. In the same insertion, I suggested that in view of the questions raised about the feasibility of the system, its exorbitant costs, etc., rather than begin the Safeguard deployment even in a limited fashion it would be a better course at this time to hold off this phase pending a good faith effort to open disarmament talks with the Soviet Union. At the same time I said our missile defense research and development efforts could go forward, thereby keeping viable the option to begin a deployment if and when it is clear that talks will not be productive and that the Safeguard system is technologically feasible.

The need now, it seems to me, is to move promptly on negotiations and to try to maximize the chances for their success. To that end, it might be helpful if talks were begun by the Soviet and the United States with simultaneous declarations calling for an interim moratorium on further deployment of all strategic weapons. It would be my hope that this nation would consider taking the initiative by inviting the Soviet Union to join us without delay in a temporary freeze of this kind pending talks which would be designed to make the freeze permanent. In that fashion both nations would underscore the mutuality of interest which can exist--which, in fact, does exist--in bringing to a close this costly, wasteful and futile competition in nuclear armaments. It would be my further hope that the initiative which is suggested would be pursued by the Executive Branch before the consideration of the Safeguard deployment reaches a point of no return in the Senate.



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WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, MAY 13, 1969

No. 77

Senate

The Senate met at 11:30 a.m., and was called to order by the President pro tempore.

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Trust in the Lord with all thine heart; and lean not upon thine own understanding. Proverbs 3: 5.

Almighty God, we thank Thee this day that Thou hast gathered our people into a great nation and established their freedom under Thy sovereignty. Let not our goodly heritage fade or the bright vision of service to all mankind be disowned. Deepen the root of our life in everlasting righteousness. Make us equal to our high trust; reverent in the use of freedom; just in the exercise of power; generous in the protection of the weak. May wisdom and morality be the stability of our times; and our deepest trust be in Thee, Lord of the nations and King of Kings. Amen.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the order of yesterday, the Chair recognizes the distinguished majority leader, the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), for not exceeding 20 minutes. The Senator from Montana.

THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Monday, May 12, 1969, be dispensed with.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all committees be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ABM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the debate on the Safeguard ABM that has occurred to date and the testimony that

has been given have resulted in a conflict and not a consensus of views. No confluence of opinion has developed, no winnowing process has yet clearly divided the convincing from the confusing. As far as the technical merits of the Safeguard system are concerned, we do not yet have the lucid guidelines we need for a prudent judgment.

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The differences over the technical efficacy of Safeguard constitute, however, only one segment of the problem. More significant is whether our deployment of Safeguard will upset international stability, whether it will provoke an escalation in the arms race, and whether it will assist or handicap proposed negotiations with the Soviet Union on strategic delivery vehicles.

One of the critical questions for which we seek an answer is: Will the deployment of the Safeguard provoke another round in the arms race? Will it be escalatory? It has become virtually a truism that arms races are dangerous and can lead to war. It is even more significant that they can be very costly in terms of national resources and that, despite the cost, after each upward spiral is turned by the competitors in the race, the security of none is any greater. All too frequently, the rivals continue to balance each other, only at a more heavily armed and more expensive level. Arms racing, in short, can be an extravagant futility for all concerned.

The United States admittedly has at times been a victim of the temptation to dissipate its resources in arms racing. The "bomber gap" of the fifties and the "missile gap" of the early sixties are well-known instances in which the United States reacted to what were thought to be weapons advances on the other side but which later did not materialize. The Soviet Government, too, has frequently reacted by expansions of its strategic weapons with the aim of matching or

even outrunning the United States. There is no evidence that the action-reaction syndrome has been purged from the psychology of either the United States or the Soviet Union. A provocative weapons advance on either side today can be expected to trigger very much the same kind of counterreaction as it did 5, 10, or 15 years ago.

Yet we slowly learn. One of the more encouraging aspects of the current Safeguard proposal is the conscious effort of American defense officials to devise a weapons system that is intended to be nonprovocative and nonescalatory. The President, the Secretary of Defense, and other officials have portrayed the installation of the Safeguard as a defensive, not an offensive, measure and have concluded, as the President has said, that "the Soviet Union cannot interpret this as escalating the arms race." Unfortunately, the conclusion does not necessarily derive from the premise.

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There is also a serious question whether the Soviet Government may not be en-

gaged in a weapons deployment that could gravely prejudice the possibility of negotiating an agreement on strategic armaments. I refer to its deployment of the SS-9, an ICBM with a warhead reported to be as large as 20 to 25 megatons. The Secretary of Defense has sought to justify the Safeguard proposal on the grounds that the SS-9 deployment indicates the Soviet Union is striving for a first-strike capability against the United States. A certain portion of the Minuteman force must be safeguarded, he argues, in order to insure its survival and to maintain our capability for assured destruction against the Soviet Union.

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The Secretary warned, however, that we must be prepared to cope with unexpected developments in the Soviet strategic threat and take appropriate actions to hedge against them. One of the unexpected contingencies foreseen by the Secretary was the possibility of development of a Soviet ICBM with a target kill capability that would be able to destroy a large number of U.S. land-based missiles in hard silos. But he saw no need to take countermeasures against this possibility until there was evidence that the threat was beginning to emerge. Yet in March, Secretary Laird perceived such a threat and decided to revamp the Sentinel system not only by changing the object of its defense from the cities to Minuteman, but also by placing the emphasis on the Soviet Union, rather than Communist China, as the principal adversary. The villain responsible for this switch in scripts was the SS-9 which was described as being deployed at a menacing rate.

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and its increasing deployment has been observed. Did some new element suddenly stimulate the fears of the Defense Secretary? He mentioned evidence as recent as last December of Soviet deployment of the SS-9. But are we to believe that Secretary Clifford's assessment in January was not made with full awareness of the SS-9 deployment and its potential? If the Defense Department in January deemed that the Soviet deployment of SS-9's implied such a formidable threat to our offensive missiles, if they considered it a first-strike force, why did not Secretary Clifford's statement reflect that judgment? Was some radically new intelligence gained between January and March? Was a new estimate made by the intelligence community which dramatically enlarged the Soviet threat in those two intervening months? I do not find in Secretary Laird's public utterances claims of either significant new data or a new national intelligence estimate.

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But we have seen these projections of Soviet capabilities go awry all too many times. Too many times before we have overreacted to a theoretical projection which never became a tangible fact. I have already cited the well-known bomber and missile gaps. I would also like to point out that when the Sentinel ABM system was proposed in 1967, it was predicated on projections of Chinese and Soviet deployments which did not materialize. It was then estimated that the Soviet ICBM deployment would level off. According to Secretary Laird, it did not. But now the Safeguard proposal is predicated on the assumption that it will continue. But what if it levels off?

There are many reasons to expect that it might. According to Under Secretary of Defense Packard the Soviet ICBM force has attained "parity" with our own, and it is reasonable to suppose that the Soviet Union might have sought this level as a precondition for negotiations on a strategic arms agreement with the United States. It would not be realistic on our part to expect they would agree to freeze armaments at less than parity. And they are not so unrealistic as to dream that we would accept a ratio that was unbalanced in their favor.

Both we and they should grasp and ponder the fact that we are at a decisive milestone. A state of approximate strategic balance now obtains between the two sides. Each has sufficiency of strategic power to deter the other. If at this critical moment either tries to gain an advantage by introducing new strategic

systems or by substantially enlarging existing deployments, then the present stability could be upset. And there would be no prospect that it could be regained, at least not until another major round in the arms race had been completed, perhaps years hence and at dire economic, social, and political costs.

The immediate manifestation of the deployment or nondeployment of Safeguard will be its possible effects upon the long-pending negotiations on strategic delivery vehicles. I fear that the Safeguard proposal has already had a baleful effect upon the decision to start these parleys. The major survey of defense policy which the new administration apparently is now conducting seems to have become an obstacle to the diplomacy of "nonconfrontation and negotiation" which President Nixon established as the main thrust of his administration's foreign policy. "Late spring or early summer"—the announced time for beginning the talks—is a vague deadline which contrasts sharply with the urgency of the hard sell to win approval of appropriations for the Safeguard ABM in the fiscal year beginning July 1. The enthusiasms for building the weapon compares starkly with the dawdling pace of the preparations alleged to be necessary for U.S. entry into the talks. Actually preparations for strategic talks have been underway for several years—the United States first made the proposal for freezing strategic delivery vehicles in January 1964, and was ready to start negotiating in the summer of last year. Why should it be necessary to pull everything up by the roots again just to see if it is alive and well? Let us get on with the talks. Let us set a date—a date in early June. This will dispel suspicion that the United States is reluctant to undertake these talks and is more in favor of expanding than constricting the arms race.

On April 25, I inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD a chart comparing the relative nuclear strength between the United States and the Soviet Union. Shown rather graphically is the growth rate that has maintained this balance of nuclear terror; it is an ugly picture that has not changed significantly for years. In the same insertion, I suggested that in view of the questions raised about the feasibility of the system, its exorbitant costs, reliability, and so forth, rather than begin the Safeguard deployment even in a limited fashion it would be a better course at this time to hold off this phase pending a good-faith effort to open disarmament talks with the Soviet Union. At the same time I said our missile defense research and development efforts could go forward, thereby keeping viable the option to begin a deployment if and when it is clear that talks will not be productive and that the Safeguard system is technologically feasible.

The need now, it seems to me, is to move promptly on negotiations and to try to maximize the chances for their success. To that end, it might be helpful if talks were begun by the Soviet Union and the United States, with simultaneous declarations calling for an interim moratorium on further deployment of all strategic weapons. It would be my hope

that this Nation would consider taking the initiative by inviting the Soviet Union to join us without delay in a temporary freeze of this kind pending talks which would be designed to make the freeze permanent. In that fashion both nations would underscore the mutuality of interest which can exist—which, in fact, does exist—in bringing to a close this costly, wasteful, and futile competition in nuclear armaments. It would be by my further hope that the initiative, which is suggested, would be pursued by the executive branch before the consideration of the Safeguard deployment reaches a point of no return in the Senate.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, the majority leader, the distinguished Senator from Montana, has given us a statement on the implications that deployment of an anti-ballistic-missile system at this time would have for this country. He has struck at the key issues with clarity and wisdom.

Underneath the technical complexity and difficult judgments about missile technology lies a simple truth. It is this—we are at a moment in time, the first time in the quarter of a century of the nuclear age, where it may be possible to halt the nuclear arms race with all the danger it holds for all our people and for the world. Already, we are informed, the equivalent in nuclear power of more than 15 tons of TNT hovers over the head of every man, woman, and child on the earth.

We who oppose deployment of the ABM at this time are asking for a brief delay in the arms race during which the United States can enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union to determine whether it is possible—either by formal or tacit agreement—to halt the arms race, or whether it is necessary to go on as in the past, piling up more and more deadly nuclear weapons.

The United States can defer deployment of the ABM for three principal reasons:

First. It presently has an overwhelming retaliatory capability—an ability to destroy the Soviet Union. This capability can be maintained even if the Soviet Union continues the development of nuclear weapons at its maximum capacity through the mid-1970's.

Second. A reasonable analysis of the intelligence available is that there is no new or present danger to our deterrent.

Third. The ABM system proposed by the administration, is the subject of so much responsible doubt about its feasibility for missile site protection that a delay of deployment would serve the Nation well. The most effective strategic response to a real threat to our deterrent could be developed in the time our Government is seeking a halt in the nuclear arms race, rather than in haste to build and deploy an ineffective system.

In conclusion, it is my hope that the administration will heed the wise words of the majority leader. There is no desire of those opposed to the ABM deployment to confront the administration politically. Reasonable solutions are still possible. The United States can enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union

with confidence in its existing and preponderant strength. The United States can do so with the knowledge that if negotiations fail, we have the resources and time to do what is necessary to insure the credibility of our deterrent and awesome, if uncertain, security.

It is my view that delay can be taken in safety. It is my view that a brief delay to determine if a halt in the nuclear weapons race is possible is the course of reason, the course of responsibility, and the duty of a great country.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from Kentucky for the brief statement he has just made. He has said more in a few words than I said in many. He has stated the case better and more succinctly. I join with him in the postulate that this is not a political matter, that this is something in which we are all vitally interested regardless of politics, and that those of us who oppose the system do not doubt the honesty and integrity of those who are in favor of it.

It is a matter of judgment which must be faced up to and on which a decision must be made. I join the Senator from Kentucky in saying that we ought to undertake to start negotiations if it is at all possible, and that they ought to be undertaken in good faith. If results are not forthcoming and good faith is not displayed, then we ought to get busy and enlarge the deterrent.

I do not believe that a delay would cause any difficulty. I think it would yield much good. If an agreement to halt arms race can be brought about through the two superpowers, it would mean that in this country we would be able to divert funds to the needs of the cities and to the needs of various segments of our population which must be met and faced up to. In that way we shall bring about a balance in our sense of responsibilities, which in the long run will react to the welfare of this Nation as a whole.

I again commend the distinguished senior Senator from Kentucky, who has taken the leadership in this matter over several years and who has done a lot of good groundwork to bolster the case he has presented on occasion to the Senate.

I assure the Senator once again that this is not a political matter. It is not a matter of a gain or loss for either the Republican or Democratic Party. It is a matter in the best interest of the country. Regardless of its effect on either party or on any candidate, it is the issue which should have priority at all times.

Let us at least make an effort. Let us go ahead and see if we cannot do something which would benefit mankind; instead of continually building and building and acting and reacting with missiles and other systems, which can do nothing but bring destruction on mankind as a whole.

We have a great responsibility in the Senate. Let us face up to it and build for peace and not for disaster; or at least let us try to move toward the elimination of that which is designed to destroy people.