

University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana

Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews

Mike Mansfield Papers

1-24-1970

Congressional Record S. 491 - S. Res. 292 - U.S. Forces in Europe

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.

Recommended Citation

Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "Congressional Record S. 491 - S. Res. 292 - U.S. Forces in Europe" (1970). *Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews*. 822.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/822

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.



United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 91st CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 116

WASHINGTON, SATURDAY, JANUARY 24, 1970

No. 6

House of Representatives

The House was not in session today. Its next meeting will be held on Monday, January 26, 1970, at 12 o'clock noon.

Senate

SATURDAY, JANUARY 24, 1970

tion of S. 30, I had some words to say about certain Members who participated in that debate, notably the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McCLELLAN), the Senator in charge of the bill.

Through inadvertence, I forgot to mention the outstanding efforts of the distinguished Senator from Nebraska (Mr. HRUSKA), the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee and good right hand of the Senator from Arkansas in consideration of the bill which had been considered for the previous 3 days and which passed the Senate yesterday.

At this time I wish to extend to the Senator from Nebraska my thanks for his diligence, for his integrity, for his knowledge, and for the continual efforts he made not only during the 3-day debate but also over the past year in helping to bring out S. 30.

I would feel remiss if the RECORD did not show, in addition to those mentioned by me yesterday, my personal appreciation to the distinguished Senator from Nebraska for the contributions he made to the consideration of this most important bill.

SENATE RESOLUTION 292— U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on yesterday, I made a speech relative to Senate Resolution 292, a resolution seeking to bring about a substantial reduction of U.S. troops and dependents in Europe, which together number somewhere in the vicinity of 600,000, almost a quarter of a century after World War II ended.

At that time, I brought out some statements made by the President of the United States in his address on the state of the Union to Congress assembled in the Hall of the House of Representatives on Thursday last.

In the RECORD, it is carried as a separate statement, which I do not mind,

because it points up what he said and it also emphasizes the fact that I approved thoroughly of what he had to say in the field of foreign policy.

But what I intended to do was to show the relationship between the excerpts from the President's statement in the foreign policy field and the situation which confronts us in Europe where we have, as I have indicated, roughly 600,000 troops, dependents, and civilian employees a quarter of a century after the end of World War II.

I had hoped to develop a continuity which could be used in answers to questions. So, Mr. President, in view of the fact that this was not done as I had anticipated, I ask unanimous consent that, following the news story from Frankfurt in West Germany, which I incorporated in the RECORD, my remarks relative to President Nixon's state of the Union message as it affects foreign policy be incorporated not only in the permanent RECORD but also in the RECORD today and that it all be reprinted as spoken at that time.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection it is so ordered.

SENATE RESOLUTION 292—U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in the New York Times of January 21, 1970, on page 4, there is published an excerpt from a speech by Under Secretary of State Richardson in Chicago, telling us how the European countries, our allies, especially Germany, are hoping to offset the balance-of-payments drain on our military deployment in Europe and how we are exploring ways and means of making this arrangement more adequate.

In that same issue of the New York Times, on page 64, an article states that Germany has just cashed in prematurely a billion marks' worth of U.S. Treasury

bonds purchased in 1968 to offset the drain caused by the stationing of American troops in West Germany.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the article entitled "Germany recalls Bonds of United States Early" printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GERMANY RECALLS BONDS OF UNITED STATES EARLY

FRANKFURT, WEST GERMANY, January 20.—The Bundesbank disclosed today that it has prematurely recalled a billion marks of United States Treasury Bonds purchased in 1968 to offset the dollar drain caused by the stationing of American troops in West Germany.

Under the 1968 offset agreement with the United States Government, West Germany had acquired \$500-million worth of 4½-year Treasury bonds for 2 billion marks.

The premature recall was made to help increase the West German Central Bank's own liquidity in foreign currency, a Bundesbank official explained.

Because of the inflow of dollars resulting from the transaction, West German foreign currency reserves increased 536,400,000 marks to 5,928,891,000 marks on balance in the week ended Jan. 15, Bundesbank reported.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on yesterday, the President of the United States delivered his state of the Union message to a joint session of the Congress.

It was a fine message. It was a message with a lot of merit to it. Certainly the meat will be there when the specifics are forthcoming to cope with the recommendations and goals, which President Nixon has outlined.

During the course of that speech he said, speaking of foreign policy:

Today, let me describe the directions of our new policies.

We have based our policies on an evaluation of the world as it is, rather than as it was twenty-five years ago at the end of World War II. Many of the policies which were necessary and right then are obsolete today.

Then, because of America's overwhelming military and economic strength, the weakness of other major free world powers and the inability of scores of newly independent nations to defend—let alone govern—themselves, America had to assume the major burden for the defense of freedom in the world.

In two wars, first in Korea and then in Vietnam, we furnished most of the money, most of the arms and most of the men to help others defend their freedom.

Today the great industrial nations of Europe, as well as Japan, have regained their economic strength, and the nations of Latin America—and many of the nations that acquired their freedom from colonialism after World War II in Asia and Africa—have a new sense of pride and dignity, and a determination to assume the responsibility for their own defense.

That is the basis of the doctrine I announced at Guam.

If I may interpolate there, the Guam declaration formed the basis of the Nixon doctrine, which I wholeheartedly endorse and which I was pleased to see the President announce yesterday applied not only to Asia but to the rest of the world as well.

Continuing the President's remarks:

Neither the defense nor the development of other nations can be exclusively or primarily an American undertaking;

The nations of each part of the world should assume the primary responsibility for their own well-being; and they themselves should determine the terms of that well-being.

To insist that other nations play a role is not a retreat from responsibility, but a sharing of responsibility.

We shall be faithful to our treaty commitments, but we shall reduce our involvement and our presence in other nations' affairs.

Mr. President, to that I say, "Amen."

Mr. President, on January 20, the Under Secretary of State, the Honorable Elliot L. Richardson, examined U.S. relations with Western Europe, in general, and the question of U.S. force levels in Europe, in particular, in an address before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. At the beginning of his speech, Mr. Richardson referred to the resolution I submitted to the Senate on December 1, Senate Resolution 292, which calls for "a substantial reduction of U.S. forces permanently stationed in Europe."

In introducing that resolution on December 1, I made a statement on the floor of the Senate setting forth the reasons that I thought justified a downward adjustment of the level of our forces in Europe. I pointed to the enormous costs involved in maintaining a Military Establishment of 3.5 million men under arms with 1.2 million men outside the United States and over 300,000 of these— together with 235,000 dependents and 14,000 U.S. civilian employees—in Western Europe. I pointed to the fact that our net foreign exchange gap with Germany is running at about \$965 million a year, and I should note parenthetically that Mr. Richardson reminded his Chicago audience that—

The balance-of-payments drain of our military deployment in Europe is currently about \$1.5 billion a year.

I also pointed to the need to reduce our military budget from its present level of somewhere between \$75 and \$80 billion.

Mr. Richardson has now given the administration's arguments for maintaining the status quo, as far as our force levels in Europe are concerned. There are, of course, two sides to every argument. I presented one side on the Senate floor on December 1. The Under Secretary of State presented the other in Chicago on January 20. I hope that my colleagues in the Senate, those in the other body, and members of the public will examine the two sides of the argument closely.

In this connection, and in order to avoid repeating what I have already said on the floor of the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of Mr. Richardson's speech, and the full text of my December 1 statement, be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CRANSTON in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I consider it necessary to make a few comments today, on Mr. Richardson's speech, in order to make my position clear:

First of all, Mr. Richardson referred to Senate Resolution 292 as an expression of the "tendency by some to say that NATO has done its job, so why not bring those troops home?" May I point out that Senate Resolution 292 is not an expression of a belief that "NATO has done its job" but, on the contrary, of a belief that the United States has been doing a disproportionate share of NATO's job and that the other 14 members of NATO are in a position to do more and should do so. Nor does Senate Resolution 292 urge that all U.S. troops be brought home but only that there be a "substantial reduction of U.S. forces permanently stationed in Europe."

Second, Mr. Richardson states that the effectiveness of the strategy of flexible reasons "rests perforce on the conviction in both parts of Europe that the United States will fulfill its determined role." Mr. Richardson added that "the U.S. military presence in Europe, whether we like it or not, continues to be taken as tangible evidence of our commitment" and that "any sudden or dramatic reduction" of that presence would have "unpleasant consequences."

I would like to emphasize that Senate Resolution 292 neither states nor implies that we will not fulfill our NATO obligations. On the contrary, it affirms specifically that a substantial reduction of U.S. forces permanently stationed in Europe can be made "without adversely affecting either our resolve or ability to meet our commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty." Furthermore, the resolution does not urge, and I have not urged, that such a substantial reduction be either "sudden" or "dramatic." Mr. Richardson did not argue against a "sudden" or "dramatic" reduction but against any reduction at all, for only a few paragraphs later he referred to the administration's having "pledged to maintain our present troop strength in Europe through fiscal year 1971."

Third, Mr. Richardson stated that if "all of our forces in Europe were brought home and stationed in this country, little or no savings would appear in our defense budget." As I noted in my December 1 statement, however, it has always been argued that bringing a substantial number of forces back from Europe will not affect our defense budget because we cannot reduce the number of men under arms. But it is also argued that it is impossible to reduce the number of men under arms, among other reasons because of the need to maintain present force levels in Europe. I contended then, and I do so again now, that this endless circle, which will lead in the end to fiscal exhaustion, can and must be broken.

Fourth, Mr. Richardson referred to the possibility of negotiating with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe mutual and balanced force reductions and said that the other reason the administration opposes Senate Resolu-

tion 292 is "the firm belief that it would weaken our bargaining position."

Mr. President, NATO has been studying mutual and balanced forced reductions for years and has still not arrived at an agreed proposal. Even when such a proposal is formulated, there is no reason to assume that negotiations will begin for it is my understanding that there has been no indication that the Soviet Union is interested in such negotiations. And what if that continues to be the situation? Will we then be locked into maintaining our present force levels in Europe in perpetuity regardless of the costs involved or the wisdom of doing so in the light of our national interests?

In fact, the Soviets may not be willing to reduce the military presence in Eastern Europe no matter what the United States does or does not do because the level of that presence may well be dictated by political considerations within Eastern Europe. On the other hand, if that is not so, then U.S. reductions may be the most effective way to bring about Soviet reductions because the Soviet Union could no longer justify the presence of hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe on the ground that there were hundreds of thousands of American troops in Western Europe.

Fifth, Mr. Richardson stated that "the bulk of any substantial reduction in U.S. forces will have to be made up by West Germany, the most populous and wealthy of our allies." He went on to say that the German people and the Soviet Union do not favor a larger German military establishment and that such a development "would give pause even to some of Germany's allies."

I am not arguing that there should be a larger German military establishment than has been agreed to before but only that the West Germans meet their predetermined NATO commitments as we have met ours. I might say, parenthetically, that the same comment pertains to other NATO countries as well. The fact is that in terms of the percentage of armed forces to men of military age, in many NATO countries that percentage is not only below the 8.7 percent found in the United States but also below the 4-percent figure which applies to West Germany. And in all of the NATO countries that have compulsory military service—except Greece, Portugal, and Turkey—the period of service is shorter than it is in the United States. In the case of Canada, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom, there is no compulsory military service at all. I would also like to point out that the United Kingdom with a population of 55.5 million, and Italy, with a population of 53.7 million, are almost as populous as West Germany with a population of 58.5 million. Furthermore, according to the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, Britain's 1969-70 defense budget of \$5.4 billion was higher than Germany's 1969 defense budget of \$5.3 billion. On the other hand, Italy's 1969 defense budget was only \$1.9 billion.

Finally, it is all very well to talk about the "strength, closeness, trust, realism, and flexibility" of NATO, as Mr. Richardson did in his concluding paragraph.

But it seems to me that there is a contrast between these words and the fact that the 250 million people of Western Europe, with tremendous industrial resources and long military experience, are unable to organize an effective military coalition to defend themselves against 200 million Russians, who are contending at the same time with 800 million Chinese, but must continue after 20 years to depend on 200 million Americans for their defense. The status quo has been safe and comfortable for our European allies. But, as I observed on December 1, it has made the Europeans less interested in their own defense, has distorted the relationship between Europe and the United States, and has resulted in a drain on our resources which has adversely affected our ability to deal with the urgent problems we face at home.

EXHIBIT 1

ADDRESS BY HON. ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, BEFORE THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CHICAGO, ILL.

I would like today to examine one of the most fundamental of our foreign policy concerns, and one which in some ways is too much taken for granted, if not overlooked—the United States relationship to Western Europe and Western European security.

In a reverse twist on the early days of the Republic when George Washington used to preach against yielding to "the insidious wiles" of Europe's influence, our basic ties to Western Europe are now so firmly established that commentary on the subject is regarded as a tiresome reaffirmation of the obvious.

Whereas President Washington warned that European controversies were "essentially foreign to our concerns" President Nixon was moved to observe on NATO's birthday last spring that many people now find NATO " quaint and familiar and a bit old fashioned."

To much of the public the purposes of NATO have the character of a cliché. The very climate of security which NATO has fostered has, perversely, seemed to permit many to disregard it or to think it obsolete. In the wake of the re-examination of foreign commitments occasioned by the Viet-Nam war, there is a tendency by some to say that NATO has done its job, so why not bring those troops home? In the U.S. Senate this feeling has taken concrete political expression in the form of a resolution introduced by Senator Mansfield, one of the most thoughtful students of America's role in world affairs. His resolution calls for "substantial reductions" of U.S. forces in Europe.

Meanwhile, Western Europe itself, prosperous, mostly democratic, stable, and probably more secure than at any time in its modern history, has been preoccupied with the inevitable problems that are the by-product of affluence and rapid economic growth. These concerns seem to have caused it to drift somewhat from the lofty goals of a Unified Europe and Atlantic partnership which gave a sense of mission to its leadership two decades ago.

On both sides of the Atlantic then, there are feelings of complacency and a restless anticipation of new events. The memory of Czechoslovakia is fading, the Brezhnev Doctrine is dimmer, and a reduced sense of danger merges with the feeling that new initiatives are both called for and inevitable. Perhaps in response to this atmosphere the Warsaw Pact nations, led by the Soviet Union, have called for the convocation of a European Security Conference, although—ironically—their suggested agenda would not even touch the basic issues of European security.

In this situation, it is, I think, worthwhile to take a fresh look at the suppositions on

which our European policy rests, to examine its continuing validity, and to appraise frankly and realistically the proposals being made for change and adjustment.

Two World Wars have led the American people to perceive with great clarity that the security of the United States is directly linked to the security of Western Europe.

Pursuant to this belief, which was formalized in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, the United States has maintained a major military establishment on European soil since the early 1950's. U.S. nuclear power as well as conventional forces are available in support of this treaty commitment. Although Europe is now incomparably stronger than it was when this arrangement was first contracted, its ultimate security, like our own, continues to be linked to our power and nuclear deterrence. Because of this, one of President Nixon's first acts upon taking office was to reaffirm the American commitment to NATO and to promise close and continuing consultation within the Alliance.

Deterrence is a subtle concept. Its reality takes form largely in the minds of those who might be contemplating aggression. It is effective only when they conclude that any possible advantages of aggression would be offset by its predictable costs.

NATO's strategy of flexible response is calculated to insure that any potential aggressor would come to just this conclusion.

Our conventional forces are maintained in position in Europe to resist possible attack by Warsaw Pact formations. They are meant also to deter piecemeal aggression which an enemy might be tempted to conclude he could get away with if the only alternative to our capitulation were the unleashing of nuclear war. These forces are supported by a broad arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, available for use if the intensity of the aggression rises.

The entire effectiveness of the flexible response strategy rests perforce on the conviction in both parts of Europe that the United States will fulfill its determined role. And the United States military presence in Europe, whether we like it or not, continues to be taken as tangible evidence of our commitment.

We must face the fact, therefore, that any sudden or dramatic reduction in the United States military presence in Europe would have unpleasant consequences of two kinds.

First, as a practical military matter, NATO's conventional defenses would be significantly weakened. Other NATO members might be tempted to follow suit and cut forces further. In the event of aggression, a less powerful NATO Alliance might be driven to resort more quickly to nuclear weapons.

Secondly, and of probably greater consequence, any sudden or major withdrawal of American forces would have a distinctly destabilizing effect on the European scene.

The structure of the Alliance, as indeed the entire structure of world order which we have helped erect since the war, rests in the final analysis on the shared confidence that we shall honor our commitments.

If that confidence is eroded a rapid deterioration can occur—a deterioration not unlike that which can send prices on the stock market plummeting. And for this reason it is doubly necessary that we not lightly or hastily make moves that might undermine confidence in the strength of our support. It is for this reason that we have pledged to maintain our present troop strength in Europe through Fiscal Year 1971.

Let me stress that none of this suggests that U.S. troops will have to remain in Europe at present strength forever and ever. Certainly we hope that future conditions will allow modifications of our role. Our current force level in Europe of 310,000 men already, in fact, represents a considerable drop from the peak of 400,000 in 1962 during the Soviet war of nerves on Berlin. We are also con-

tinually studying and trying to improve the means by which troops stationed in the United States can be rapidly returned to Europe in case of crisis. The Mansfield Resolution urges that greater use be made of this redeployment option.

Our studies show, however, that under present conditions front-line forces hastily returned to Europe in time of crisis could not carry out their mission with the same effectiveness as forces already in place. Although rapid redeployment of limited forces is feasible, large-scale efforts of this sort expose these forces to hazards and potential confusion.

Moreover, financial savings would be negligible. If, for example, all of our current forces in Europe were brought home and stationed in this country, little or no savings would appear in our defense budget. We might even have to send a bit more, because we would lose significant financial advantages.

In Germany, the Federal Government makes land, housing, facilities and services available to our forces at no cost, or at reduced costs. Duplicating such facilities and support in the United States would involve a heavy and continuing expense—one roughly cancelling out savings in shortened supply lines and transportation costs to Europe.

The balance-of-payments drain of our military deployment in Europe is currently about \$1.5 billion a year. This is unquestionably a large figure, and, if our forces were returned to this country, many of those dollars would stay at home. The problem is partially neutralized, however, by offset arrangements with the European countries, particularly Germany and we are exploring means of making these arrangements more adequate. In addition, withdrawal of our force from Europe would be likely to evoke prompt countervailing effects, notably in reduced sales of military equipment to our Allies and in general exports to those countries.

If we have not neglected the consideration of means by which our presence in Europe could be streamlined or modified without damaging the essential structure of the Alliance, neither have we ignored the opportunities which the era of negotiation we have now entered may hold for the future. In this area we must also make meticulous and balanced judgments, taking care not to allow our efforts to bring about agreements with the Soviet Union to undermine our relations with our friends in Western Europe.

We must have a proper regard for the always latent fear that agreements will be reached detrimental to European interests. We cannot, of course, allow the existence of this fear to deter us from seeking to lower tensions. Ironically, in fact, there exists among a younger generation of Europeans the converse suspicion that the United States and the USSR are collaborators in the defense of the status quo. But we intend to do everything possible to allay such fears and suspicions by sticking strictly to our pledge to consult closely with our allies and take their interests into account as talks go forward. Only by such close consultation can we quiet the Cassandra who sees every effort at US-Soviet rapprochement or even minor moves to adjust force levels as evidence of betrayal.

During the past year in-depth consultations have been held on a wide range of subjects, including the question of strategic arms limitations. The Deputy Foreign Ministers of the NATO governments, at President Nixon's suggestion, held the first of what we expect to be periodic reviews of major, long-range problems before the Alliance.

It is particularly important that there be the fullest consultations on the SALT talks. The very fact that these talks are going on has stimulated some uneasiness in Europe. It is well understood that the talks imply changing strategic relationships and

that their success could further affect the situation. As President Nixon put it last spring: "The West does not have the massive nuclear predominance today that it once had, and any sort of broad-based arms agreement with the Soviets would codify the present balance."

Given the European sensitivities on SALT and nervousness about changing military relationships, it would seem wise not to compound anxieties at this time by any moves to reduce our troop strength on the continent.

While attempting to keep our allies abreast of our own negotiating activities, we are welcoming and encouraging their own efforts, particularly those of West Germany, to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. One of the most promising areas of potential progress with the Eastern European nations lies, we believe, in reaching agreement on mutual and balanced East-West force reductions.

We are now working with our allies to develop models which could form the basis for such an agreement. The NATO countries Foreign Ministers, meeting last December, said in their Declaration that despite the fact that there had been no response on earlier suggestions, the Allies "will continue their studies in order to prepare a realistic basis for active exploration at an early date." They concluded their studies on the subject had already progressed sufficiently to permit the establishment of criteria which reductions should meet. They directed that further consideration also go forward on related measures such as advance notification of military movements or maneuvers, the exchange of observers at maneuvers, and the establishment of observation posts. This, we are convinced, is a constructive approach much more specifically directed at a concrete issue generating tension than the Warsaw Pact's vague proposal for a European Security Conference.

We hope the Warsaw Pact nations will respond. Realism, however, suggests that they will be less likely to respond if a unilateral reduction of U.S. forces appears in the offing anyway. The firm belief that it would weaken our bargaining position on balanced force reduction is thus another reason why the Administration opposes the Mansfield Resolution.

Among the questions raised by those who favor an immediate and substantial reduction of our forces in Europe is whether the burden of NATO defense is now fairly allocated. The prosperous Europeans should, they feel, carry a much larger share of the defense of their own continent.

We agree—up to a point. The United States believes that our European allies can and should do more. We have told them often that if they increase their own efforts, it would help us to maintain ours. So even though they actually have increased their defense budgets to cover improvements in their forces, while our own defense budget has been declining, we have and are continuing to press them to assume a larger share of Europe's defense responsibilities.

A precipitate reduction of United States forces in Europe would, however, not only fail to stimulate additional European effort, it would probably produce the contrary effect. The bulk of any substantial reductions in U.S. forces would have to be made up by West Germany, the most populous and wealthiest of our NATO allies. But the German people do not relish an enlargement of their country's military establishment. Nor certainly does a Soviet Union still highly emotional about its 20 million World War II dead and enormously sensitive on the subject of German "revanchism." Indeed, it would give pause even to some of Germany's allies.

Any insignificant rise in the German defense effort could thus destroy Chancellor

Brandt's constructive efforts to improve relationships with the Federal Republic's Eastern neighbors and thereby halt the attempts to lay the foundation for a settlement of the issues still dividing Europe.

I spoke earlier of the fact that we did not want to suggest that the present number of U.S. troops in Europe was inviolate and could or would never be changed. We hope that conditions will eventually come about which will render their presence altogether unnecessary. But when such conditions do come, I feel certain they will be the result of hard and patient bargaining.

Back in 1948, when the Cold War was very cold indeed, Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Henri Spaak, addressing himself to the Soviets' Andre Vyshinsky at a UN Security Council session, said: "The basis of our policy today in Europe is fear. We are afraid of you. We are afraid of your government and we are afraid of the policies which you are pursuing."

Twenty-two years later tensions are lower and East and West are engaged in substantive discussions aimed at lowering them further. But the basic cement holding together the Alliance is still the threat from the East. The United States does not control the Alliance. When France chose to withdraw from NATO we could not prevent it from doing so. Unlike the Warsaw Pact which rests on an ideological base guarded and sanctified by the Soviet Union, NATO has no dogmatic underpinnings. There is no Western version of the Brezhnev Doctrine. When there is no more threat to the security of the nations of Western Europe, there will be no more need for NATO. And only when the confrontation in Europe truly ends and a genuine peace replaces the always precarious peace of mutual deterrence will the role of our troops be finally accomplished.

On another front, in response to the President's initiative, the Alliance has taken on a new dimension by creating a permanent Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society to help deal constructively with some of the most pressing problems common to all of its members—the problems of the environment.

The United States, meanwhile, continues to support the goal of a politically and economically integrated Europe. Despite the recent signs of drift, economic integration has come far, and there are indications that new moves forward may be developing. The most ambitious of the European regional arrangements—the European Community of the Six—has already gone beyond the earlier conception of international cooperation to a new form of relationship among nation states.

Since the EEC was established in 1958 its members have abolished tariffs among themselves, agreed upon important measures of the harmonization, instituted an ambitious common agricultural policy and removed most barriers to the free movement of capital and labor. As a group the Six have enjoyed significantly higher rates of economic activity, trade and growth than before 1958. Inter-Community trade has almost quadrupled. Since 1967 Community trade with the outside world has exceeded that of the United States.

The recent Summit Conference of the Six at the Hague and the success of the Council of Ministers of the Community in agreeing on a far-reaching plan for financing their common agricultural policy preface moves to perfect the economic union and extend it to new members in the next year or two. On the latter point, the interests of the United States are very much engaged, not only economically but militarily, for enlargement of the European communities to admit countries not committed to the defense of the West raises questions about the possibilities of political unity, and the underlying strength of the NATO Alliance itself.

The United States sees no conflict between the goal of European integration and the efforts now going forward to end the dangerous and increasingly anachronistic division of the Continent. We welcome the indication that dissatisfaction over the continuing gulf between the two halves of Europe is growing in the East as well. Stronger relationships in Western Europe itself can, we believe, facilitate the building of stronger relationships with the east.

"I believe we must build an Alliance," the President has said, "strong enough to deter those who would threaten war; close enough to provide for continuous and far-reaching consultation; trusting enough to accept diversity of views; realistic enough to deal with the world as it is; flexible enough to explore new channels of constructive cooperation."

In the past year, I believe, we have strengthened the Alliance on each of these counts. Strength, closeness, trust, realism, flexibility—these will be useful assets as we move toward the new hopes and new possibilities of the "era of negotiation."

SENATE RESOLUTION 292—SUBMISSION OF A SENATE RESOLUTION RELATING TO SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF U.S. FORCES PERMANENTLY STATIONED IN EUROPE

MR. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at this time this country has 429 major bases overseas and 2,297 lesser bases. These bases cover 40,000 square miles and are located in 30 countries. Stationed on these bases are 1,750,000 servicemen, families, and foreign employees, and the cost of maintaining these bases is approximately \$4.8 billion a year.

Mr. President, I would like to discuss one area in which we have a large number of bases and an extraordinarily large number of troops, namely, Western Europe.

On January 19, 1967, I submitted Senate Resolution 49 which expressed the sense of the Senate that "a substantial resolution of U.S. forces permanently stationed in Europe can be made without adversely affecting either our resolve or ability to meet our commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty." I wish to introduce an identical resolution again today and ask unanimous consent that its text be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks and that the resolution be referred to both the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committee.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be received and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committee; and, without objection, the resolution will be printed in the Record.

(See exhibit 1.)

MR. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, we have had several hundred thousand men in uniform stationed in Europe since 1951 when President Truman, responding to the then existing situation and to a Senate sense resolution of that day, announced the first substantial post-World War II increase in U.S. forces there. When Senate Resolution 49 was introduced 2 years ago there were about 372,000 military personnel in Europe, including Turkey, Spain, and the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean; this force was accompanied by some 240,000 dependents, a grand total of 612,000. There are now about 315,000 men—a good reduction—and they are accompanied by 235,000 dependents—not a good enough reduction—and 14,000 civilians employed by the U.S. Government. Thus, there are over 550,000 Americans in Europe today who are either in military service or associated with the military, and maintained wholly or largely by the Government of the United States.

We now have, overall, about 3.5 million men under arms. Of this total, about 1.2 million are stationed outside the United States, according to figures provided by the Department of Defense. In addition to those

in Europe, there is a force of about 479,500 in Vietnam.

May I say, parenthetically, that as of last Thursday, this is 4,500 in excess of the 60,000 announced withdrawal by the President of the United States, a withdrawal which was to be met by December 15, 1969. Thus, I congratulate the President for going beyond the 60,000 mark. I hope that this is a continuation of a policy which, perhaps, may not be announced but which will be continued in effect, to the end that more and more troops can be withdrawn as appropriately as possible from Vietnam and all of Southeast Asia.

There are 129,000 in the fleets abroad, 58,000 in Korea, 45,000 in Thailand, 42,000 on Okinawa, another 40,000 in Japan, 28,000 in the Philippines, 24,000 in Latin America, 10,000 in North Africa and the Middle East and another 10,000 in Canada, Greenland, and Iceland.

This commitment of men abroad obviously represents an enormous cost to the people of the United States. It is reflected in a military budget of some \$80 billion and in the tax rates. It is also reflected in a balance-of-payments deficit which amounted to \$1.3 billion in the first quarter of this year.

Our net foreign exchange gap with Germany alone is now running at about \$965 million per annum. This is the highest figure to date. In 1968, the figure was \$887.4 million. It had been between \$700 and \$800 million in the period 1963 through 1967, and under \$700 million in the years before 1963.

In the past, part of this exchange gap has been covered through various agreements with the West German Government. In fiscal years 1962 through 1965 these so-called offset agreements consisted simply of commitments by the West German Government to procure military equipment in the United States. The agreement for fiscal years 1966 and 1967 provided for military procurement plus the prepayment of a West German debt. The fiscal year 1968 agreement provided for military procurement plus purchase of special medium-term U.S. Treasury securities by the West German Government. In fiscal year 1969 the agreement provided for military procurement plus the purchase of special U.S. Treasury securities by the West German Government, plus additional purchases of U.S. Treasury securities by West German banks plus an agreement by Luft-hansa to finance purchases of aircraft.

I have had the Library of Congress draw up a table showing the terms of these so-called offset agreements between the United States and West Germany in fiscal years 1962 through 1969 and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2.)

MR. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, agreement was reached with the West German Government on July 9 covering fiscal years 1970 and 1971. The agreement provides for an inflow of foreign exchange in the amount of \$1.52 billion over the next 2 years. In addition to military procurement in the United States, the agreement provides for a West German Government loan, plus retention in the United States for 2 years of interest earned by West Germany on U.S. Treasury deposits, plus the purchase by West Germany of U.S. Export-Import Bank and Marshall Plan loans, plus West German civil procurement in the United States, plus payment to a fund in the United States for encouraging German investment plus advance transfers for debt repayment by the West German Government to the United States. A concessional interest rate of 3.5 percent will apply to the West German Government loan and to certain deposits in the U.S. Treasury for military procurement. I ask unanimous consent that the text of a press release issued by the Department of State on

July 9, giving the terms of the agreement, be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the press release was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

"PRESS STATEMENT

"The U.S. and German delegations announced today the conclusion of a new agreement for offsetting foreign exchange costs of American forces in Germany for U.S. Fiscal Years 1970 and 1971. The delegations have been conferring in Washington this week on the third and concluding round of their talks.

"The agreement provides for an inflow of foreign exchange to the U.S. in the amount of 1.52 billion dollars. These inflows will be achieved by \$925 million of procurement of U.S. goods and services (61% of total agreement) and \$595 million of financial measures (39% of total).

"Details are as follows:

"[In millions of dollars]"	
"Military procurement in the United States....."	800.00
Federal Republic of Germany loan to the U.S. (repayable after ten years)	250.00
Purchase by Federal Republic of Germany of loans held in portfolio of Eximbank and of outstanding Marshall Plan Loans..	118.75
Civil procurement in the United States by Federal Republic of Germany	125.00
Creation of fund in U.S. by Federal Republic of Germany to encourage German investment in United States.....	150.00
Advance transfers by the Federal Republic of Germany for debt repayment to the United States..	43.75
Retention in the United States of interest earned by the Federal Republic of Germany on U.S. Treasury deposits.....	32.50
Total	1,520.00

"It was agreed that the interest rate which would apply to the inter-government loan and to certain Federal Republic of Germany deposits in the U.S. Treasury for procurement would be 3.5 percent.

"The Export-Import Bank and Marshall Plan loans purchased by the Federal Republic of Germany would bear, on the average, a rate of interest at four percent with respect to certain loans and five percent with respect to others.

"The U.S. delegation was led by Deputy Under Secretary of State Nathaniel Samuels; the German delegation was headed by State Secretary Guenther Harkort of the Foreign Office."

MR. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I would like to make several comments on the agreement. Before doing so, I should note that the Department of State apparently believes that this agreement represents a considerable improvement over previous agreements. To be sure, the amount of the military procurement is greater than last year, or the previous years. The borrowing by the United States is for a longer period than in the past and a concessional rate will apply to the West German Government's loan. The total amount is higher than ever before and the agreement is for 2 years instead of only one.

In those respects there has been "improvement." It would be well to bear in mind, however, that there is another side of the coin. While the amount of foreign exchange inflow involved is higher, so is the foreign exchange gap because it becomes more expensive every year to keep our forces in Germany. With the reevaluation of the German mark, moreover, this expense stated in dollars will increase again, and, possibly,

more drastically than in the past. Furthermore, the agreement represents only about 80 percent of the foreign exchange outflow from the United States to Germany in the coming 2 fiscal years. And, while the West German Government loan to the United States will carry a concessional interest rate of 3.5 percent, nevertheless it represents an obligation of the United States which must be renewed or redeemed; the interest will result in some annual capital outflow and the capital of the loan itself must be regarded as, eventually, a large item of outflow. Finally, since the agreement is for a 2-year period, it may imply a commitment on our part to retain substantially the present level of U.S. forces in Germany for the next 2 years whether or not that should prove desirable or in accord with our national needs now or a year from now. In fact, the new West German Chancellor said in an interview in the November 14 issue of *Time* magazine that there was "an understanding on both sides," when argument was reached on an offset arrangement for the next 2 years, that there would be no "substantial changes" in the level of U.S. forces during this period.

No matter how the current agreement is regarded, there is no escaping the fact that the assignment of U.S. military forces in Germany and Europe is a voracious consumer of U.S. resources, a source of inflation and, in present circumstances, a factor in the reduction in the international strength of the dollar.

It is a cliché to say that the United States is a rich and powerful country. After the long drain on Vietnam, however, it may be wise to take another look at that glib assertion. In terms of surplus for necessary national purposes at home and abroad, we are beginning to scrape the bottom of the barrel.

Other nations have come to realize that if they are to accomplish the essential tasks at home, it may be necessary to concentrate on only the essential tasks abroad. In my judgment, it is long past time for us to face the facts of our situation and reach the same conclusion. In this connection, I welcome the President's July 9 order to reduce the number of military men based abroad by 14,900—also his most recent order of the day or so ago in which approximately another 14,000, almost all in the Pacific area, will be reduced insofar as our Armed Forces are concerned—although in my judgment it is regrettable that the reduction is so limited and that the forces committed to NATO have been completely exempted from this cut in military forces overseas.

On April 15, I had printed in the *RECORD* the defense policy statement made by the Canadian Prime Minister on April 3. In that statement, Prime Minister Trudeau said:

"NATO itself is continuously reassessing the role it plays in the light of changing world conditions. Perhaps the major development affecting NATO in Europe since the organization was founded is the magnificent recovery of the economic strength of Western Europe. There has been a very great change in the ability of European countries themselves to provide necessary conventional defense forces and armaments to be deployed by the alliance in Europe.

"It was, therefore, in our view entirely appropriate for Canada to review and re-examine the necessity in present circumstances for maintaining Canadian forces in Western Europe. Canadian forces are now committed to NATO until the end of the present year. The Canadian force commitment for deployment with NATO in Europe beyond this period will be discussed with our allies at the Defense Planning Committee meeting in May. The Canadian Government intends, in consultation with Canada's allies, to take ~~such steps as~~ being about a planned and

phased reduction of the size of the Canadian forces in Europe."

According to press reports, which I understand to be accurate, the present plan is to reduce the number of the Canadian contingent of about 10,000 in Western Germany to about 4,000. This is a small reduction in numbers but a large reduction in percentage and would seem to represent, in effect, a change in the Canadian estimate of the situation in Europe, as well as a revision of policy on the part of the Canadian Government. I would hope this Nation would study the Canadian action most carefully. To me, it seems an adjustment which looks to the future instead of to the past.

Last year at this time, we too, appeared to be on the verge of moving in the same direction. There was widespread support in the Senate for a proposal by the distinguished Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) which would have had the effect of lowering substantially the level of our forces in Europe. Most regrettably, there was the occupation of Czechoslovakia on August 20 by 400,000 Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces. The time was one of extreme uncertainty, with various obscure troop movements in Eastern Europe. It was far from clear that the relatively bloodless coup in Czechoslovakia would mark the culmination of this activity. There was fear that the difficulties in Eastern Europe might spread throughout Europe.

As I stated at that time, a substantial reduction in U.S. Forces in Europe in those circumstances could have been subject to misinterpretation in the East, and brought grave uncertainty in the West. I added, however, that, in my judgment, it remained desirable to undertake a gradual reduction in U.S. forces if and when the situation in Eastern Europe offered reasonable assurance that developments there were not going to spill over into Western Europe. It seems to me that that time has now arrived. The Soviet Union faces serious problems in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. If that were not enough, there is a difficult situation to the East on the Soviet-Chinese border. Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, moreover, have been cut from several hundred thousand to about 70,000. While it is regrettable that the internal political life of that enlightened nation is again dictated by a foreign power, certain realities as they bear upon our military presence in Europe must be faced. What transpired in Czechoslovakia was not controllable in any fashion by NATO and bears no direct relationship to the question of the size of American forces assigned in Europe to that organization. Had there been only one or two divisions or, for that matter, seven or eight or 18 divisions of Americans in Western Germany, instead of four or five, would they have had any different effect on the situation as it developed in Czechoslovakia last year? I can find no basis for any such contention. Events within Eastern Europe are, as they have been since the Hungarian interlude made apparent for all to see more than a decade ago, beyond the direct reach of the North Atlantic Treaty and the military structure of NATO.

Nevertheless, it will be argued, as it is always argued, that the time is not right to make a substantial reduction of our forces in Europe. But it seems that the time is never right. I am aware of the recent press reports, for example, implying that NATO may be on the point of making a proposal to the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies for negotiations on reducing conventional forces in Europe. I would like to point out, however, that NATO has been studying the subject of balanced force reductions for years. My understanding is that there is still no agreed NATO proposal for balanced force reductions and it is not planned that there will be one until at least early in the sum-

mer. Even then, there is no reason to assume that discussions, much less full negotiations, will begin, for there has been no indication, direct or indirect, that the Soviet Union is interested in such discussions.

It will also be argued, as it is always argued, that bringing a substantial number of forces back from Europe will not affect our defense budget because we cannot reduce the number of men under arms. But it is also argued that it is not possible to reduce the number of men under arms because of the need to meet our NATO and other overseas commitments. This endless circle leading, in the end to fiscal exhaustion can and must be broken.

I am not now advocating, and I have not in the past advocated, that all U.S. troops be removed from Europe. Our vital interest in what transpires in Europe remains and a U.S. presence should remain. In this day and age an armed attack on Western Europe will certainly involve us almost from the outset. It is to our interest, therefore, that we are present before the outset. That need can be met, in my judgment, and should be met with a much smaller military force.

At the same time, a substantial reduction of our forces in Europe would have certain immediately beneficial effects on this Nation. In the first place, the balance of payments should soon reflect a sharp decrease in outflow for military purposes, even as it becomes possible to bring about a reduction in the National military budget. In the second place, a reduction in U.S. forces in Western Europe might provide some impetus for Western Europeans to develop their own defense efforts in line with their needs and to work together more closely in doing so. Integrated defense is supposed to be what NATO is all about. To the extent that we have continued to overparticipate in the defense of Europe, it follows that there has been far less interest in bearing the burdens of that defense among the European themselves.

Finally, a substantial reduction of American forces would help to correct what I regard as a distorted relationship between Europe and the United States. The Soviet Union maintains half a million soldiers in Eastern Europe. While the Russians may ascribe this presence to a threat from the West, the fact is that the Soviet presence is also a significant factor in maintaining communist governments in power, as Czechoslovakia has so clearly illustrated. The democracies have no need of U.S. forces in order to maintain themselves within the nations of Western Europe; yet, that most significant political fact is disguised by our military presence in such great magnitude.

In my judgment, it is not a desirable situation for a foreign power either in Eastern Europe or Western Europe to keep somewhere in the neighborhood of a million men in these two camps, a quarter of a century after the events which initially put them there. Both contingents are somewhat anachronistic, to say the least. Yet the continuing presence of the one has become the principal basis for the continuing presence of the other. The persistence of the anachronism leads not only to a distortion of political relationships, but to a distortion of economic relationships. Indeed, the annual offset negotiation with the West German Government is a case very much in point. West Germany is, in effect, becoming a major banker for this Nation in order that we may pay for the continued maintenance of U.S. forces in Germany at this Nation's expense.

In short, the presence of American forces in Europe in such large numbers, in my judgment, has vestiges, if not of empire in a 19th century sense, then of military occupation and of the costly cold war and of the one-time complete preeminence of the dollar in international finance. Yet the age of empire, the era of occupation, the period of the cold war and one-sided financial preeminence are

of the past. The persistence of these vestiges in present policies involves, in my judgment, a wasteful and dangerous use of our available resources. It acts to debilitate this Nation's capacity, both at home and abroad, to deal with the urgent problems of the contemporary era.

"EXHIBIT 2
"S. Res. 292

"Whereas the foreign policy and military strength of the United States are dedicated to the protection of our national security, the preservation of the liberties of the American people, and the maintenance of world peace; and

"Whereas the United States, in implementing these principles, has maintained large contingents of American Armed Forces in Europe, together with air and naval units, for twenty years; and

"Whereas the security of the United States and its citizens remains interwoven with the security of other nations signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty as it was when the treaty was signed, but the condition of our European allies, both economically and militarily, has appreciably improved since large contingents of forces were deployed; and

"Whereas the means and capacity of all members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to provide forces to resist aggression has significantly improved since the original United States deployment; and

"Whereas the commitment by all members of the North Atlantic Treaty is based upon the full cooperation of all treaty partners in contributing materials and men on a fair and equitable basis, but such contributions have not been forthcoming from all other members of the organization; and

"Whereas relations between Eastern Europe and Western Europe were tense when the large contingents of United States forces were deployed in Europe but this situation has now undergone substantial change and relations between the two parts of Europe are now characterized by an increasing two-way flow of trade, people and other peaceful exchange; and

"Whereas the present policy of maintaining large contingents of United States forces and their dependents on the European Continent also contributes further to the fiscal and monetary problems of the United States: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved, That—

"(1) It is the sense of the Senate, that with changes and improvements in the techniques of modern warfare and because of the vast increase in capacity of the United States to wage war and to move military forces and equipment by air, a substantial reduction of United States forces permanently stationed in Europe can be made without adversely affecting either our resolve or ability to meet our commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty;

"(2) S. Res. 99, adopted in the Senate April 4, 1951, is amended to contain the provisions of this resolution and, where the resolutions may conflict, the present resolution is controlling as to the sense of the Senate.

"Terms of offset agreements between the United States and Western Germany, fiscal 1962-1969

"[In millions of dollars]

	<i>Agreed target payments</i>
"Fiscal years and terms agreed by Western Germany:	
1962-1963, Military procurement by West Germany from the United States	1,875
1964-1965 Military procurement by West Germany from the United States	1,875

	<i>Agreed target payments</i>
1966-1967, Military procurement by West Germany from the United States plus prepayment of West German debt to the United States in the amount of \$192 million	1,350

1968, Military procurement by West Germany from the United States..	100
1968, Purchase by West Germany of special U.S. Treasury securities..	500
Total	600

1968, West Germany agreed that the Bundesbank would continue its practice of not converting dollars into gold.	
1969, Military procurement by West Germany from the United States..	100
1969, Purchase by West Germany of special U.S. Treasury securities..	500
1969, Purchase of U.S. Treasury securities by West German banks..	125
Total	725

1969, Lufthansa agreed to finance \$60 million purchase of aircraft in West Germany rather than U.S. market."

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I am in complete accord with the views of the Senator from Montana.

For the past 10 years I have been advocating that we should remove our troops from Western Europe. It has been costing the taxpayers of our Nation over \$2 billion annually to hold an umbrella of military protection over our allies in that part of the world.

In my humble judgment, there is no reason for keeping them there. It is irritating to our former allies and has the tendency of widening the breach between us and the U.S.S.R. We have been supporting Western Europe now for over 20 years, and I sincerely believe that it is long past time to move out of there. If protection is needed, which I doubt, the countries of that area are well able to care for themselves.

Keeping our troops there tends to maintain the fear and suspicion that the U.S.S.R. has of us and I have no doubt that the Russians will follow suit and remove their forces from the countries of Eastern Europe. As I have often said in the past, when former President De Gaulle of France ordered us out of his country we should have then and there left Europe.

In my most recent visit to the U.S.S.R., in 1968, I have reported to this body that I can see no world peace unless and until we can dispel the fear and suspicion that now exists between us and the U.S.S.R. and we should make every effort to accommodate ourselves with the Russian people. That can be done without in any manner embracing each others philosophy of government.