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Congressional Record S. 491 - S. Res. 292 - U.S. Forces in Europe

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

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The House was not in session today. Its next meeting will be held on Monday, January 26, 1970, at 12 o'clock noon.

House of Representatives

Senate

Saturday, January 24, 1970

tion of S. 30, I had some words to say about certain Members who participated in that debate, notably the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McClellan), the Senator in charge of the bill.

Through inadvertence, I forgot to mention the outstanding efforts of the distinguished Senator from Nebraska (Mr. Hruska), the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee and good right hand of the Senator from Arkansas in consideration of the bill which had been considered for the previous 3 days and which passed the Senate yesterday.

At this time I wish to extend to the Senator from Nebraska my thanks for his diligence, for his integrity, for his knowledge, and for the continual efforts he made not only during the 3-day debate but also over the past year in helping to bring out S. 30.

I would feel remiss if the Record did not show, in addition to those mentioned by me yesterday, my personal appreciation to the distinguished Senator from Nebraska for the contributions he made to the consideration of this most important bill.

SENATE RESOLUTION 292—U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on yesterday, I made a speech relative to Senate Resolution 292, a resolution seeking to bring about a substantial reduction of U.S. troops and dependents in Europe, which together number somewhere in the vicinity of 600,000, almost a quarter of a century after World War II ended.

At that time, I brought out some statements made by the President of the United States in his address on the state of the Union to Congress assembled in the Hall of the House of Representatives on Thursday last.

In the Record, it is carried as a separate statement, which I do not mind, because it points up what he said and it also emphasizes the fact that I approved thoroughly of what he had to say in the field of foreign policy.

But what I intended to do was to show the relationship between the excerpts from the President’s statement in the foreign policy field and the situation which confronts us in Europe where we have, as I have indicated, roughly 600,000 troops, dependents, and civilian employees a quarter of a century after the end of World War II.

I had hoped to develop a continuity which could be used in answers to questions. So, Mr. President, in view of the fact that this was not done as I had anticipated, I ask unanimous consent that, following the news story from Frankfurt in West Germany, which I incorporated in the Record, my remarks relative to President Nixon's state of the Union message as it affects foreign policy be incorporated not only in the permanent Record but also in the Record today and that it all be reprinted as spoken at that time.

The President pro tempore. Without objection it is so ordered.

SENATE RESOLUTION 292—U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in the New York Times of January 21, 1970, on page 4, there is published an excerpt from a speech by Under Secretary of State Richardson in Chicago, telling us how the European countries, our allies, especially Germany, are hoping to offset the balance-of-payments drain on our military deployment in Europe and how we are exploring ways and means of making this arrangement more adequate.

In that same issue of the New York Times, on page 64, an article states that Germany has just cashed in prematurely a billion marks' worth of U.S. Treasury bonds.
bonds purchased in 1968 to offset the drain caused by the stationing of American troops in West Germany.

Mr. Mansfield asked unanimous consent to have the article entitled "Germany Recalls Bonds of United States Early" ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Ger many Recalls Bonds of United States Early

FRANKFURT, WEST GERMANY, January 20.—The Bundesbank disclosed today that it has prematurely recalled a billion marks of United States Treasury Bonds purchased in 1968 to offset the dollar drain caused by the stationing of American troops in West Germany.

Under the 1968 offset agreement with the United States Government, West Germany had acquired $2,000,000 worth of 4% -year Treasury Bonds for 2 billion marks.

The premature recall was made to help increase the West German Central Bank's own liquidity in a continued increase in West German foreign currency reserves increased $36,400,000 marks to $500,000,000.

Because of the inflow of dollars resulting from the stationing of American troops in West Germany, the Bundesbank explained.

During the course of that speech he said, speaking of foreign policy:

Today, let me describe the directions of our new policies.

We have based our policies on an evaluation of the world as it is, rather than as it was two, three years ago at the end of World War II. Many of the policies which we chose were necessary and right then are obsolete today.

Then, because of America's overwhelming military and economic strength, the weakness of other major free world powers and the inability of scores of newly independent nations to defend--we, ourselves, America, to assume the major burden for the defense of freedom in the world.

In two wars, first in Korea and then in Vietnam, we furnished most of the money, most of the arms and most of the men to help others defend their freedom.

Today the great Industrial nations of Europe, as well as Japan, have regained their economic strength, and the nations of Latin America--and many of the nations which acquired their freedom from colonialism after World War II in Asia and Africa have a new sense of pride and dignity, and a determination to assume the responsibility for their own defense.

That is the basis of the doctrine I announced at Guam.

If I may interpolate there, the Guam doctrine is the basis of the Nixon doctrine, which I wholeheartedly endorse and which I was pleased to see the President announce yesterday.

1.

As I noted in my December 1 statement, however, it has always been argued that bringing a substantial number of forces back from Europe will not affect our defense budget because we cannot reduce the number of men under arms. But it is also argued that it is impossible to reduce the number of men under arms.

Second, Mr. Richardson stated that if "all of our forces in Europe were brought home and stationed in this country, little or nothing would be saved or the number of our defense budget. As I noted in my December 1 statement, however, it has always been argued that bringing a substantial number of forces back from Europe will not affect our defense budget because we cannot reduce the number of men under arms. But it is also argued that it is impossible to reduce the number of men under arms.

Fourth, Mr. Richardson referred to the possibility of negotiating with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe mutual and balanced force reductions and said that the other nations of the administration opposes Senate Resolu-
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But it seems to me that there is a contrast between these words and the fact that the 250 million people of Western Europe, with tremendous industrial resources and a trained military force, are unable to organize an effective military coalition to defend themselves against 200 million Russians, who are contending at the same time with China and North Korea. It is not only $1.9 billion, but must continue after 20 years to depend on 200 million Americans for their defense. The status quo has been preserved by continued, even increasing, European defense. And as I observed on December 1, it has made the Europeans less interested in their own defense, has disturbed the relationship between Europe and the United States, and has resulted in a drain on our resources which has adversely affected our ability to deal with the urgent problems we face at home.

In fact, the Soviets may not be willing to reduce the military presence in Eastern Europe no matter what the United States does or does not do. Because the level of that presence may well be dictated by political considerations within Eastern Europe. On the other hand, if the United States were to reduce that presence, it may be the most effective way to bring about Soviet reductions because the Soviet Union could no longer justify the presence of thousands of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe on the ground that there were hundreds of thousands of American troops in Western Europe.

Fifth, Mr. Richardson stated that "the bulk of any substantial reduction in U.S. forces will have to be made up by West Germany, the most populous and wealthy of our allies." He went on to say that the German people and the Soviet Union do not favor a larger German military establishment and that such a development "would give pause even to some of Germany's allies."

I am not arguing that there should be a larger German military establishment than has been agreed to before but only that the West Germans meet their pre-determined NATO commitments as we have met ours. I might say, parenthetically, that the same comment pertains to other NATO countries as well. The fact is that in the United States, the budget of armed forces to men of military age, in many NATO countries that percentage is not only below the 8.7 percent found in the United States, but even below the 1944-45 condition of the Manhattan Project, and even that is almost 5 percent which applies to West Germany. And in all of the NATO countries that have compulsory military service—except Greece, Portugal, and Turkey—the period of service is shorter than it is in the United States. In the case of Canada, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom, there is no compulsory military service. So it would also like to point out that the United Kingdom with a population of 55.5 million, and Italy, with a population of 53.7 million, are almost equal population-wise, and yet the German Federal Republic, with a population of 65.5 million, had a defense budget of $5.3 billion. Furthermore, according to the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, Britain's 1965 defense budget was $5 billion for a population of 56.5 million, which is higher than Germany's 1969 defense budget of $5.3 billion. On the other hand, Italy's 1969 defense budget was only $1.9 billion.

Finally, it is all very well to talk about the "strength, closeness, trust, realism, and solidarity" of NATO, as Mr. Richardson did in his concluding paragraph, which our European policy rests, to examine its continuing validity, and to appraise frankly and realistically the proposals being made for change and modification linked to the security of Western Europe.

Pursuant to this belief, which was formalized in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, the United States has maintained a major military establishment on European soil since the early 1950's. U.S. nuclear forces are available in support of this treaty commitment. Although Europe is now incomparably stronger than it was when this arrangement was first contracted, its ultimate security, like our own, cannot be linked to a distinct and nuclear deterrence. Because of this, one of President Nixon's first acts upon taking office was to reaffirm the American commitment to NATO and to promise close and continuing consultation within the Alliance.

Deterrence is a subtle concept. Its reality takes form largely in the minds of those who might be contemplating aggression. It is effectiveness is therefore hard to define, but its most obvious possible advantages of aggression would be offset by its predictable costs.

NATO's strategy is that response is calculated to insure that any potential aggressor would come to just this conclusion. Our conventional forces are in such a position in Europe to resist possible attack by Warsaw Pact forces. They are meant to deter any immediate, overwhelming attack by the enemy might be tempted to conclude he could get away with it if only the alternative were a protracted and destructive nuclear war. These forces are supported by a broad arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, available for use if the intensity of the aggression rises.

In a reverse twist on the early days of the Cold War when George Washington used to preach against yielding to "the insidious wiles" of Europe's influence, our basic tie to Europe is in contrast to that. It is established that commentary on the subject is regarded as a tiresome reaffirmation of the obvious. If the President is warned that European military alliances were essentially foreign to our concerns, President Nixon is moved to observe on NATO's birthday last spring that many people now find NATO "quaint and familiar and a bit old fashioned."

In public the purposes of NATO have been characterized as a stalemate. The very climate of security which NATO has fostered has, perniciously, seemed to permit many to disregard it or to think it obsolete. In the wake of the re-examination of foreign commitments occasioned by the Vietnam war, there is a tendency by some to say that NATO has done its job, so why not bring that alliance to a peaceful dissolution? We have taken concrete political expression in the form of a resolution introduced by Senator Allen: it would have the Senate commit to re-examine our major allies, one of the purposes of our roles in world affairs. His resolution calls for "substantial reductions" of U.S. forces in Europe.

Meanwhile, Western Europe itself, prosperous, mostly democratic, stable, and probably more secure than at any time in its modern history, has been preoccupied with the inevitable problems that are the by-product of affluence and rapid economic growth. These problems seem to have caused it to drift somewhat from the lofty goals of a Unified Europe and Atlantic partnership which gave a sense of mission to its leadership two decades ago.

On both sides of the Atlantic there are signs of restless anticipation of new events. The memory of Czechoslovakia is fading, the Brezhnev Doctrine is dimmer, and a reduced sense of danger merges with the feeling that new initiatives are both called for and inevitable. Perhaps in response to this atmosphere the United States and the United Kingdom, have called for the creation of a European Security Conference, although—to quote Mr. Mansfield, one of the sponsors of this movement—"the leadership of the United States has been remarkably linked to the security of Western Europe.

Pursuant to this belief, which was formalized in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, the United States has maintained a major military establishment on European soil since the early 1950's. U.S. nuclear forces are available in support of this treaty commitment. Although Europe is now incomparably stronger than it was when this arrangement was first contracted, its ultimate security, like our own, cannot be linked to a distinct and nuclear deterrence. Because of this, one of President Nixon's first acts upon taking office was to reaffirm the American commitment to NATO and to promise close and continuing consultation within the Alliance.

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In contrast between these words and the fact that the 250 million people of Western Europe, with tremendous industrial resources and a trained military force, are unable to organize an effective military coalition to defend themselves against 200 million Russians, who are contending at the same time with China and North Korea. It is not only $1.9 billion, but must continue after 20 years to depend on 200 million Americans for their defense. The status quo has been preserved by continued, even increasing, European defense. And as I observed on December 1, it has made the Europeans less interested in their own defense, has disturbed the relationship between Europe and the United States, and has resulted in a drain on our resources which has adversely affected our ability to deal with the urgent problems we face at home.
during the last few days we have been concerned about the possibility of a new crisis. The United States is preparing to deploy a new missile system designed to strengthen our strategic forces. This system will be able to strike the Soviet Union with superior accuracy and will give us a significant advantage in the event of a nuclear war. We are very concerned about the implications of this decision and we strongly urge the United States to consider fully the impact of such a development.

The deployment of the new missile system in the United States is a grave concern for our country. It is clear that the United States is planning to use this system for offensive purposes. We believe that this will lead to an increase in the danger of nuclear conflict and we urge the United States to consider the possible consequences of such a development.

The new missile system will also have a significant impact on our relations with other countries in the region. We believe that this will lead to increased tensions and a decrease in cooperation between our countries. We urge the United States to take into account the concerns of other countries in the region and to consider the impact of its actions on international relations.

In conclusion, we strongly urge the United States to reconsider its decision to deploy the new missile system. We believe that such a development will lead to an increase in the danger of nuclear conflict and we urge the United States to take into account the concerns of other countries in the region.

Senator Mansfield
In Europe, there is a force of about 479,500 in Vietnam.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, we have had several hundred thousand men in uniform stationed in Europe since 1951 when President Truman, responding to the then existing situation and to a Senate sense resolution of that day, announced the first substantial post-World War II increase in U.S. forces there. When Senate Resolution 49 was introduced 2 years ago there were about 372,000 military personnel in Europe, including Turkey, Spain, and the U.S. Fleet in the Mediterranean; this force was accompanied by some 240,000 dependents, a grand total of 612,000. There was also a reduction—and they are accompanied by 235,000 dependents—not a good enough reduction—and 14,000 civilians employed by the U.S. Government over 500,000 Americans in Europe today who are either in military service or associated with the a. m. wharves, including logistics, and the Federal Republic of Germany in Wiesbaden to the Berlin airlift, and the Federal Republic of Germany in Nuremberg and Munich. There were a total of 1,150,000 men under arms, and 1,100,000 stationed outside the United States, according to figures provided by the Department of Defense. In addition to those

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The United States sees no conflict between the goal of integration and the efforts now going forward to end the dangerous and increasingly anarchistic division of the Continent. The President's indication that dissatisfaction over the continuing guilt between the two halves of Europe is growing less will, we believe, facilitate the building of strong and cordial relationships in Western Europe itself can, we believe, facilitate the building of strong and cordial relationships. The United States has no effective way of providing for continuous and far-reaching consultation; trusting enough to accept diversity of views; realistic enough to deal with the world as it is; flexible enough to explore new channels of constructive cooperation.

In the past year, I believe, we have strengthened the Alliance on each of these counts. Strength, closeness, trust, realism, flexibility—these will be useful assets as we move toward the new hopes and new possibilities of the "era of negotiation."

SENATE RESOLUTION 292—SUBMISSION OF A SENATE RESOLUTION RELATING TO SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF U.S. FORCES PERMANENTLY BASED IN EUROPE

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at this time this country has 429 major bases overseas and 2,297 leaseholds. These bases cover 1,400,000 square miles and are located in 30 countries. Stationed on these bases are 1,700,000 servicemen, families, and foreign nationals. There are, and the cost of maintaining these bases is approximately $4.8 billion a year.

Mr. President, and 1967, the area in which we have a large number of bases and an extraordinarily large number of troops, namely, Western Europe.

On January 19, 1967, I submitted Senate Resolution 49 which expressed the sense of the Senate that we should seek a substantial reduction in the number of U.S. forces permanently stationed in Europe can be made without adversely affecting either our resolve or ability to meet our commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty. "I wish to introduce an identical resolution again today and ask unanimous consent that its text be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks and that the resolution be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committee."

The FAXMUNO OFFICES. The resolution will be received and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committee. I would like to make several comments on the agreement. It is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, agreement was reached with the West German Government on July 9 covering fiscal years 1970 and 1971. The Export-Import Bank and Marshall Plan loans purchased by the Federal Republic of Germany would bear, on the average, the interest rate with respect to certain loans and five percent with respect to other loans.

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more drastically than in the past. Furthermore, the agreement represents only about 80 percent of the foreign exchange outflow from the United States for the coming 2 fiscal years. And, while the West German Government loan to the United States has been substantial, it is only about 3.5 percent, nevertheless it represents an obligation of the United States which must be renewed every year. Its renewal would result in some annual capital outflow and the capital of the United States and other forms of aid, a large item of outflow. Finally, since the agreement is for a 3-year period, it may imply a commitment on our part to retain substantially the present level of U.S. forces in Germany for the next 2 years whether or not that would prove desirable or in accord with our national needs now or a year from now. In fact, the new West German Chancellor said in an interview in the November 14 issue of Time magazine that there was "an understanding on both sides," when arguing was reached on an offset arrangement for the next 2 years, that there would be no substantial changes in the level of U.S. forces during this period.

No matter how the current agreement is regarded, the fact remains that the assignment of U.S. military forces in Germany and Europe is a voracious consumer of U.S. resources. In present circumstances, a factor in the reduction in the international strength of the U.S. is a cliché to say that the United States is a rich and powerful country. It is long past, however, it may be wise to take another look at that glib assertion. In terms of its economic or national position at home and abroad, we are beginning to scrape the bottom of the barrel.

Other nations have come to realize that if they are to accomplish the essential tasks at home, it may be necessary to concentrate on only the essential tasks abroad. In my judgment, it is long past time for us to face the facts of our situation and reach the same conclusion. In this connection, I welcome the President's July 9 order to reduce the number of military men based in Europe from 14,000—to his most recent order of the day or so ago in which approximately another 14,000, almost all in the Farabun area, of our forces were reduced. Our Armed Forces are concerned—although in my judgment it is regrettable to think that the decision is so little and so soon for committed to NATO have been completely exempted from this cut in military forces overseas.

On April 1 I had written in the Record the defense policy statement made by the Canadian Prime Minister on April 3. In that statement, Prime Minister Trudeau said: "NATO itself is continuously reassessing the role it plays in the light of changing world conditions. Perhaps the major development affecting NATO in Europe since the organization was founded is the magnificently recovery of the economic strength of Western Europe. There has been a very great change in the ability of European countries themselves to defend themselves, in the defenses forces and armaments to be deployed by the alliance in Europe."

"It was, therefore, in our view entirely appropriate for us and for everyone else to re-examine the necessity in present circumstances for maintaining Canadian forces in Western Europe. Canadian forces are now committed to NATO until the end of the present year. The Canadian force commitment for deployment with NATO in Europe is now determined and will be deployed with our allies at the Defense Planning Committee meeting in May. The Canadian Government intends, in the event of a cease-fire, to bring about a planned and phased reduction of the size of the Canadian forces in Europe."

According to press reports, which I understand stand to some extent the official plans do not result in only the Canadian contingent of about 10,000 in Western Germany being reduced to about 10,000 numbers but a large reduction in percentage and would seem to represent, in effect, an adjustment of the situation in Europe, as well as a revision of policy on the part of NATO Governments. I think it was necessary for us to meet our NATO and other overseas commitments. This endless circle leading, in the end to no result, needs to be broken. Last year at this time, we too, appeared to be on the verge of moving in the same direction. There was widespread support in the Senate for a proposal by the distinguished Senator from Missouri (Mr. Stums) which would have had the effect of lowering substantially the level of our forces in Europe. Most regrettable, there was the occupation of Czechoslovakia on August 20 by 400,000 Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces. The extent of this extreme uncertainty, with various obscure troop movements in Eastern Europe. It was far from clear that a bloodless coup in Czechoslovakia would mark the culmination of this activity. There was fear that the difficulties in Eastern Europe might spread throughout Europe.

As I stated at that time, a substantial reduction in the forces in Europe, in those circumstances could have been subject to misinterpretation in the East, and brought grave uncertainty to Western Europe. However, that, in my judgment, it remained desirable to undertake a gradual reduction in U.S. forces in Western Europe. By 1970, the Eastern Europe offered reasonable assurance that developments there were not going to spill over to concentrations in Western Europe. It seemed to me that that time has now arrived. The Soviet Union faces serious problems in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. If that were not enough, there is a difficult situation to the East on the Soviet-Chinese border. Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, moreover, have been cut from several hundred thousand to about 70,000. While it is regrettable that the internal political life of that enlightened nation is again dictated by a foreign power, certain realities as they bear upon our military presence need to be considered. Western Europe is no longer the same as it was in 1968. The transpiration in Czechoslovakia was not controllable in any fashion by NATO and bears a direct relation to the size of the forces assigned to Europe. This nation is being reduced in size and strength or its military force. The proposal for an integrated defense is supposed to be what NATO is all about. To the extent that the United States may have failed to overtake the defense in the defense of Europe, it follows that there has been far less interest in the defense of Europe than of the American forces in Europe.

Finally, a substantial reduction of American forces would help to correct what I regard as a distorted relationship between the United States and the West. In other words, the Russians may ascribe this pressure to a threat from the West, the fact is that the Soviet presence is also a significant factor in maintaining communist governments in power, as Czechoslovakia has so clearly illustrated. The democratic nations need to do their part to maintain themselves within the boundaries of Western Europe; yet, that most significant factor which gives us our military presence in such great magnitude.

In my judgment, it is not a desirable situation for a foreign power either in Eastern Europe or Western Europe to keep somewhere in the neighborhood of a million men in these two camps, a quarter of a century after the events which initially put them there. Both contingents are somewhat anachronistic, to say the least. Yet the continuing presence of the one has become the principal basis for the continuing presence of the other. The persistence of the anachronism leads not only to a distortion of political relationships, but to a distortion of economic relationships. Indeed, domestic offset strategy with the West German Government is a case very much in point. For example, if, in effect, we are to continue to be a major banker for this Nation in order that we may pay for the continued maintenance of U.S. forces in Germany at this Nation's expense.

The presence of American forces in Europe in such large numbers, in my judgment, has vestiges, if not of empire in a 19th century sense, but of the cold war and of the cold war and one-sided financial preeminence are
of the past. The persistence of these vestiges in present policies involves, in my judgment, a wasteful and dangerous use of our available resources. It acts to dilute this Nation’s capacity, both at home and abroad, to deal with the urgent problems of the contemporary era.

"Mr. President, "

"S. Res. 202"

"Whereas the foreign policy and military strength of the United States are dedicated to the protection of our national security, the preservation of the liberties of the American people, and the maintenance of world peace; and"

"Whereas the United States, in implementing these principles, has maintained large contingents of American Armed Forces in Europe, together with air and naval units, for twenty years; and"

"Whereas the security of the United States and its citizens remains interwoven with the security of other nations signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty as it was when the treaty was signed, but the condition of our European allies, both economically and militarily, has appreciably improved since large contingents of forces were deployed; and"

"Whereas the means and capacity of all members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to provide forces to resist aggression has significantly improved since the original United States deployment; and"

"Whereas the commitment by all members of the North Atlantic Treaty is based upon the full cooperation of all treaty partners in contributing materials and men on a fair and equitable basis, but such contributions have not been forthcoming from all other members of the organization; and"

"Whereas relations between Eastern Europe and Western Europe were tense when the large contingents of United States forces were deployed in Europe but this situation has now undergone substantial change and relations between the two parts of Europe are now characterized by an increasing two-way flow of trade, people and other peaceful exchange; and"

"Whereas the present policy of maintaining large contingents of United States forces and their dependents in Western Europe more directly affects our fiscal and monetary problems in the United States: Now, therefore, be it"

"Resolved, That—"

"(1) It is the sense of the Senate, that with the changes and improvements in the techniques of modern warfare and because of the vast increase in capacity of the United States to wage war and to move military forces and equipment by air, a substantial reduction of United States forces permanently stationed in Europe can be made without adversely affecting either our resolve or ability to meet our commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty;"

"(2) S. Res. 99, adopted in the Senate April 4, 1951, is amended to contain the provisions of this resolution and, where the resolutions may conflict, the present resolution is controlling as to the sense of the Senate."

"Terms of offset agreements between the United States and Western Germany, fiscal 1962-1963"

"[In millions of dollars]"

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<tr>
<th>Agreed Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1964-1965 Military procurement by West Germany from the United States</td>
<td>1,975</td>
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Mr. ELIENDEY. Mr. President, I am in complete accord with the views of the Senator from Montana.

For the past 10 years I have been advocating that we should remove our troops from Western Europe. It has been costing the taxpayers of our Nation over $2 billion annually to hold an umbrella of military protection over our allies in that part of the world.

In my humble judgment, there is no reason for keeping them there. It is irritating to our former allies and has the tendency of widening the breach between us and the U.S.S.R. We have been supporting Western Europe for over 20 years, and I sincerely believe that it is long past time to move out of there. If protection is needed, which I doubt, the countries of that area are well able to care for themselves.

Keeping our troops there tends to maintain the fear and suspicion that the U.S.S.R. has of us and I have no doubt that the Russians will follow suit and remove their forces from the countries of Eastern Europe. As I have often said in the past, when former President De Gaulle of France ordered us out of his country we should have then and there left Europe.

In my most recent visit to the U.S.S.R., in 1968, I have reported to this body that I can see no world peace unless and until we can dispel the fear and suspicion that now exists between us and the U.S.S.R. and we should make every effort to accommodate ourselves with the Russian people. That can be done without in any manner embracing each others philosophy of government.