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Congressional Record S. 1143 - ABM Missile System re: Additional Sites

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

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There are 2,150 Americans in Laos, 830 of them in official government positions. The U.S. has lost at least 100 pilots in Laotian missions and about 25 other Americans have been killed in line of duty.

This summation of U.S. engagement shows a marked similarity to the Vietnam war buildup in the early 1960s. So the disturbing question arises as to whether the Nixon administration is actually escalating military activities in Laos while de-escalating the war in Vietnam.

Sen. Fulbright maintains the government is "hiding the extent of our involvement in Laos . . . its cost in money and lives."

Sensa. Fulbright, Mansfield and Symington are bristling over the State Department's withholding of secret evidence on Laos which was given to the committee in four days of testimony last October.

These senators are properly indignant over a vastly enlarged American participation in Laos without public announcement or Senate approval.

Having been burned once in believing Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam campaign promises of 1964, they are no longer in a trusting mood and in fact suspect the worst.

While the nation is disposed to be patient with the Nixon administration in its efforts to disengage from Vietnam, be warned that Laos contains the same ingredients of future trouble.

It was a somnolent Senate, remember, which condoned our growing entrapment in Vietnam in the days when spirited debate might have prevented the tragic consequences of a full-scale war.

In the light of correspondent McCartney's revelations, we think the President now has an obligation to take the American people into his full confidence on the Laotian situation.

And we applaud the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for demanding that the truth be told as it is without further fraud or deception.

JOHN S. KNIGHT.

THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Tuesday, February 3, 1970, be dispensed with.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

LIMITATION ON STATEMENTS DURING TRANSACTION OF MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of my remarks there be a limitation of 3 minutes on statements in relation to routine morning business.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE ABM MISSILE SYSTEM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, last year the Senate and the Congress approved the building of an ABM missile
system at two missile sites in Montana and North Dakota. The decision was made by the Congress, Mr. President, I repeat. That decision is in effect today and, without question, the projects in Montana and North Dakota will go ahead, because that is the intent of the Congress and the administration as far as these two proposals are concerned.

Mr. President, last year's April 23 vote on the ABM program represented a comparatively narrow relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States in the field of ICBM's, SLCM's, and intercontinental bombers.

According to the information I had, in 1968 we had a total of 1,054 intercontinental missiles, a figure we still have, because there have been no additions; and the Soviet Union at that time had 905.

According to what information I have been able to obtain the Soviet Union now exceeds this Nation in ICBM's by approximately 25 to 30 missiles of that type. In the field of sea-launched ballistic-missile launchers—that is, the Polaris type—646 missiles are all our Polaris submarines. Incidentally, this is a matter of public information, so I am not divulging any secret. Compare that number, the Soviet Union had 45 of a similar type.

Undoubtedly, the Soviet Union has increased its missiles of the Polaris type in its submarines, but I would hazard the guess that the number of missiles of this type does not exceed the number of 100; which would indicate, if that assumption is correct, that we have a 6-to-1 superiority in the field of Polaris missiles over the Soviet Union.

In the field of intercontinental bombers, in 1968 we had 646, and the Soviet Union had 150. Our bombers were the B-52 and the B-58, and the Soviet's were the Bear and the Bison.

It is my understanding that the number, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, is almost the same as it was then, and that the number which we had, 646, has remained fairly constant.

So there we find an approximately 4-to-1 superiority in the field of intercontinental bombers. And while the Soviet Union may have 25 or 30 more ICBM's than we do, that is virtually a standoff because both nations already possess destructive power beyond the point of saturation.

Mr. President, on Sunday I appeared on a television program on ABC known as "Issues and Answers." A good portion of that program was used by Mr. Scalzi and Mr. Clark to challenge my opinion about the President's statement at the last press conference that phase 2 of the ABM program was going to go into effect and that Secretary Laird would make an announcement giving the details within 30 days.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pertinent parts of that TV appearance be incorporated at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Mr. SCALL. Yesterday you denounced the Nixon Administration's plans to expand the antiballistic missile defense system and said that another one would be off the table. Won't this wind up as a rehearsal of the debate that you and other opponents lost after 20 days of argument and counter-argument last year?

Senator MANSFIELD. Let me say "denounce" is a pretty strong word. You are correct as to the details yet. What I want to see is a bill of particulars and I want to see also whether or not the President himself in the minds last year have been answered to our satisfaction.

Mr. SCALL. I would point out that as far as the two sites in Montana and North Dakota are concerned, they are under way. They were agreed to last February in the Senate and an overwhelming vote in the House, so they will go ahead. It is the expansion beyond that which disturbs me, plus the fact that the questions which were raised last year will be raised again this year.

For example, it is our information that the radar system is highly vulnerable and if it is hit the whole ABM system dependent on the radar system would become inoperable. We are not as yet anywhere near certain that the computer system is reliable and accurate and we have some questions in the field of Sparta, which is one that indicates on the basis of the what the scientists tell us that it would be a little slow, unless it is corrected in meeting an incoming missile.

I may say that as far as the ABM is concerned I want to ask the Secretary Laird to tell me I know of is it against it is it needed, reliable and accurate. If we are going to go into this area let us get all the facts, recognize It is an expensive system. Recognize It is a Sentinel system or an anti-missile system. That is in effect just as it was in effect just”.

Mr. SCALL. Senator, you said the expanded ABM system might cost as much as $50 billion. Senator MANSFIELD. That is correct.

Mr. SCALL. A figure which I think is far higher than any administration spokesman has put on it. Where do you get that figure and how do you support it? Senator MANSFIELD. In the last two years. I would point out that it was estimated that the Sentinel system itself would cost somewhere in the neighborhood of $15 billion. If we are getting a combination, it appears to me that with the cost increase which must be added to that figure is that figure realistic. If you put in the whole system because, remember, it takes the Northwest Washington state, southern New England, Texas, the Southeastern part of the United States, Michigan, two sites in California, Washington, D.C., and perhaps eventually sites in Alaska and Hawaii. Those last two have not been mentioned, however.

I may say also that the present estimates for the hard point missile systems in Montana and North Dakota have already far exceeded the original estimates.

Mr. CLARK. Well, Senator, do you think if the President had told Congress last year that the ABM system was needed for defense of American cities rather than for the very limited protective system that was submitted by the Defense Department, that he would have won that big Senate battle which, of course, he won by only one vote?

Senator MANSFIELD. Well, he didn't win it by one vote really because it was a stand-off and an amendment was in order with any particular to a bill falls because of—

Mr. CLARK. The margin was essentially one vote.

Senator MANSFIELD. The margin was essentially one vote.

Mr. CLARK. I don't think I would imagine that the results would have been the same whether it was a Sentinel system or a Safeguard system.

Mr. CLARK. There were two or three Senators at least—Senator Scott was one who had in mind the need for a real anti-missile system but then swung the other direction when the President proposed only the very limited protective system. The people who voted with the President last year might not be now pulled back the other way.

Mr. SCALL. I couldn't say because this matter was in effect just sprung on us. I had only read speculative reports and none of the present system. Those reports were denied and then the President, of course, made the referral in his press conference the other night.

Mr. CLARK. Do you see anything that has happened in the past year to make the situation so that the Red China that would justify the shift in the Administration's position to point that anti-missile system now to China rather than just protecting our own missile sites?

Senator MANSFIELD. I have no access to such information, though I am quite certain the President undoubtedly has. There certainly can't be any question but that the President is going ahead with his missile system. How significant it is, whether that is an ABM or an ICBM, I do not know. At the present time—well, I do know they at least have a certain expansion thereby they have developed an ICBM capacity, I am not in a position to state. But I do recall that last year the President had reasons for turning down the Sentinel System, said that he couldn't buy the idea that there was a system set up for usage against a possible Chinese threat.

Mr. SCALL. Senator, I gather from what you say that President Nixon's doctrine which would force the Asians to rely more on their own defense. Can we now know that umbrella over their heads for safety, aren't the oppositions of this new plan making it impossible to carry on or making the United States vulnerable to a sudden attack by Red China.

Senator MANSFIELD. No, I don't think so because I don't think we are vulnerable at this time to a sudden attack by Communist China and I believe the President made it very clear in his press conference that this was somewhere in the future, in the seven-

Mr. SCALL. Well, in the future, aren't you in effect denying the President the kind of anti-missile system he needs for missiles while we laid a nuclear umbrella over their heads for our allies?

Mr. SCALL. I wouldn't say so because as I have indicated, nobody is against the ABM if it is reliable, if it is ac-

Mr. CLARK. Senator, that is as I know is in favor of continued research and development, but I would have to see a sys-

Senator MANSFIELD. The margin was essent-

Mr. CLARK. Senator, if we can explore just a little further the President's decision to expand this anti-missile system to protect the country against the possibility of a surprise attack by Red China, does this get to the heart of the new Nixon doctrine for Asia?
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SENATOR MANSFIELD. Oh, if it is necessary, the cost is of no significance. If it has to be done, it will be done, and it should be done. But if it is going to be done, I must make sure that it can be done on and reliable basis. The money shouldn't be wasted. There shouldn't be an overcost in the program. The Administration provided, as I have been informed, and I think quite accurately by the GAO, there is at the present time a 2.8 billion dollar over-cost on weaponry contracts which have been let by the Department of Defense.

Senator MANSFIELD. Why do you think that practically all, if not all, of these contracts had been let under a previous Administration and I think that Mr. Mclnaul said, were fairly good trying to correct some of these deficiencies?

Senator MANSFIELD. That is one of the questions we have to ask. We want to find out exactly what is going on in the system to make the computers more reliable, to make the radar screens less vulnerable, and to make the missiles as far as their speed capacity is concerned.

Senator MANSFIELD. Do you think that disclosure of these plans at this time will in any way jeopardize the beginning of the dialogue with the Soviet Union? The Administration has set up such for that purpose. Senator MANSFIELD. That is one of the things which worry me because we have the LITLJL talks going on which seek to bring about a diminution in the amount of armaments, missiles and other weapons of destruction which we both developing, and we both have enough to obliterate the world ten times over. We are probably on the verge of a mad momentum. I don't know what is going to happen if we keep on this way because if we keep on building weapons, someday we are going to use them and everybody in the people of the world are going to suffer.

Senator MANSFIELD. Has Senator HARKIN had a great deal of trouble with the Democrats in the last months of reordering national priorities? Now what happens to national priorities and how do we spend funds on defense or health or education. If you get into an extremely costly program of anti-missile defense which you say is all right with you, as long as the President in effect can prove that it is needed.

Senator MANSFIELD. Then priorities go out the window. What I want to see is a balance between our security needs and our domestic needs and balance is the key word. It won't do us any good to have the best security system in the world if we have uneasiness, discomfort or instances rebellion at home. What we have to do is to have a good security system and we have to face up to the problems of pollution, the needs of our people here at home. Both of them must go together.

Mr. SCALI. Do you think the President is a bit too high a priority to defense, then, Senator?

Senator MANSFIELD. I think so, but I must admit that information is available to him than I have but we have been going through the spending of defense funds and there is not only the Congress and especially the Senate been raising questions and trying to draw back on some of these over-costs, some of these ill-conceived contracts and some of these wap-ones which have proved useless but on which billions of dollars have been spent.

Mr. CLARK. Senator MANSFIELD, there is a mounting impression in Washington that Democrats are allowing the President to preempt the field in the priorities, the thinking of pollution and health and welfare programs, even draft reform where the President moved in at the last minute in the last Congress.

Are Democrats being out-manuevered by a President who is a titler politician than they expected in the White House?

Senator MANSFIELD. No, I don't think so, and after the last experience in the nation, the welfare of the people which must always come first. It isn't a matter of being politically astute. It is a mission, moreover, which is a matter of doing what you can for the country as a whole and if it affects you personally and you lose, that is immaterial. The country must come first always.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, last Friday's announcement of a new and expanded ABM is most disturbing. What the administration is proposing is to shift the mission of this anti-ballistic missile system once again to defending cities. It is a mission which was first assigned to the Sentinel during the Johnson administration but was expressly discarded by the present administration as a practical impossibility. It is a mission, moreover, which the administration described last year as not only impractical but as unduly provocative and escalatory of arms competition.

It is proposed to rename the "Safeguard" and to move the proposed ABM sites away from the cities. It assigned the weapons the function of defending, not cities, but a principal deterrent of the Nation's nuclear terror, the hardened ICBM sites, specifically at Grand Forks, N. Dak., and Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana. At the time, it was said quite clearly that the Sentinel system had to be abandoned because it could not safeguard the Nation's urban centers from substantial enemy missiles and protect a city from a single attack. It was pointed out, the ABM screen would have to be more than just half-safe. It would have to be all-safe--inexhaustible as well as infallible.

All agreed, last year, that the Sentinel-Safeguard components—whatever the mission, wherever placed—could not claim perfection. The Sentinel-Safeguard system—the rationale for which has shifted four times in 4 years—still uses the same components each year and those components were designed in 1962. The components were then and they still are less than infallible.

By general recognition, an ABM defense could not repel any penetration by a nuclear warhead is no defense of a city at all. If a dozen are stopped but one substantial warhead enters, it is quite enough to do the deadly job of humiliation and partial incineration of the inhabitants of a city almost perfectly shielded by an ABM would find little consolation in statistics showing near perfection.

Last year, the President, quite properly in my judgment, announced that the Sentinel system was being abandoned because it could not be made to work to defend cities against a hypothetical at-tack of Soviet warheads and because he would not "buy" the contention of its value for that purpose against a hypothesis of short-range Soviet missiles. Yet, this year it is proposed that Safeguard be extended to include defense of cities against precisely such an attack from Chinese sources, on the ground that we have found the facts stating one conclusion 1 year and the same facts stating the opposite the next. A true credibility gap does, indeed, open up when, each year for 4 years, and repeatedly, we have been presented for the same system. As the distinguished Senator from Maine (Mrs. SMITH) so aptly stated last year:

"The revelations on the ABM proposal—first Russia then Red China and then back to Russia—coupled with the shifting of what to defend—first the cities and population centers and now the missile sites—not only taxes one's credibility but even challenges one's imagination as to what the next shift will be by the advocates of the ABM."

I fear that the "next shift" of which the distinguished Senator from Maine spoke is about to be presented.

It may be helpful to refresh memories at this moment of how the changes were made, the questions which were clarified during last year's debate on the ABM. Among the weaknesses of the system—as they were revealed at the time—was the vulnerability of the radar components and the unreliability of the computer. The weaknesses of these links are fundamental weaknesses. Last year, the ABM was regarded as less reliable and less than fully reliable and less than invulnerable in its protection of the hardened missile sites against incoming warheads from the Soviet Union. The approval of the extension of the system suggests that the same components are now reliable and no longer vulnerable. The implication is that even if the system cannot guard cities against Soviet warheads, it will be able to protect the Nation's urban regions, a few years hence, from Chinese warheads which do not yet exist but which may exist in the future.

Last year, the President announced that a further expansion of the Safeguard system beyond the two sites would not be requested of Congress until the completion of a special study. That study was to take into consideration the technical feasibility of any extension or the system, the state of international tensions and the experience of phase 1: that is, the experience with the initial two sites in Montana and North Dakota.

Was the study done? Has the Senate Armed Services Committee had access to it? Has anyone in the Congress seen it? Have the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense examined it? I assume that there is a tape-recorder somewhere in the executive branch because the President made clear that it was a prerequisite for any request to the Congress for a further expansion of the system. And according to the President's announcement, Congress will be asked this year to provide for an expansion.

Since that is the case, I presume that the study will adopt the same chauvinistic assumptions that the study must have found the state of international tensions to have grown more serious, very serious, during this past year. It must have concluded, too, that...
the SALT talks are not yielding fruitful results. Has it found, as well, that the technology of the Safeguard is now perfected to the point of infallibility and, hence, that the system can be usefully involved in the defense posture? Has it concluded, moreover, been strengthened by experience in handling the missiles at the first two ABM sites? The answer is that at the President, Mr. President, it is difficult to understand how that can be the case. There can hardly have been an accumulation of technical experience with this system of installation that has yet to take place. So far as I am aware, most of the year has been spent in buying land and building approaches and in other of the most preliminary of preparations. So far as I am aware, all that the experience to date has proven is that actual costs are far higher than the original costs estimated for the installations.

I am at a loss, too, to understand how any study can justifiably go ahead with expansion of the ABM system on the grounds of a two-year interval and expansion. The public reports of the administration on that score suggest precisely the opposite. We have had nothing but refusal on the part of the administration to take a bearing on the improvement of the international climate and on the progress of the SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union.

What must now be asked is whether the proposed expansion of Safeguard to a population-defense concept will have the effect of upsetting the negotiations being held in Helsinki. In the esoteric chase of war gamesmanship, with which the SALT negotiations are interwoven, an attempt to defend cities on either side is regarded as an escalation in the arms race whereas a defense of ICBM installations is not. From that viewpoint, therefore—from the viewpoint of the Soviet technicians and negotiators in Helsinki—it is hard to see how the new proposal to expand the system can be construed as other than an escalation. Now, in the face of the President's desire last year to remove that element from the ABM system, Nor does the contention that the proposed extension is a protection of cities against Chinese missiles rather than Soviet missiles change fact that it seems to be very likely, therefore, that these talks will now fall into stalemate—along with those in Paris on Vietnam—at least until the development of this system by us is matched by a similar development of an ABM on the Soviet side. In this paranoiac posture of mutual destruction neither side is likely to acquiesce in an advance in technology on the part of the other, notwithstanding rhetorical assurances that the objective of the advance is a third country.

The proposal, in my judgment, therefore, may well compel another round of escalation and add billions to the costs of the arms race among the countries. In addition, it may well leave the Soviet Union and the United States in a state of near fiscal exhaustion but neither nation in a more admissible defense situation. May I add that this cost is not the block if an essential and practical addition to the defense of the Nation is at stake. The Senate has never stinted on that kind of outlay in the past; it is not likely to do so now. To ask funds for a defense system that is necessary and effective is understandable. The Senate should urge the Congress to make a commitment to spend, in the end, tens of billions of dollars for the exercise of another round in nuclear gamesmanship, is alarming, to say the least. To ask for this commitment to a system that gives the impression of technological invulnerability and the illusion of security, but provides neither is an invitation to disaster.

Many, many questions have arisen, Mr. President, in the wake of this latest development regarding the ABM. I have today dispatched a number of questions to the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Stennis), with the request that they be considered by his committee when the question of ABM expansion is under group. I am told, knowing the Senator's integrity, forthrightness, and honesty, that my request will be honored and that this information will reach him, before the Senate.

The Senate will want to review most carefully the specific proposals both in committee, under the distinguished chairmanship of the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Stennis), and on the floor. The overriding concern will be to weigh the need for a costly extension of the ABM system in the scales of the future. What is involved in this proposal is a commitment which, in the end, would claim, probably, upward of $50 billion of the Nation's fiscal resources. That will be asked not at once, but in chunks, this year and the next and the next and so on into the future. They will be requested in order to counter a type of nuclear threat from China which the President states does not exist even theoretically—I repeat, hypothetically—so stated on the floor of the Senate. Last year, the name “Safeguard” was changed to Safeguard—same design, but now for a different use.

Frankly, Mr. President, that application appeared as more logical. My only apprehension was the relative vulnerability of the two radar systems, primarily the MSR, for the computer would not function properly, because the software had not yet been installed in the computer. But the Safeguard was approved by the Senate. The majority leader will recall that at that time arguments were used in an effort to obtain the approval of the Safeguard system by illustrating why the planned application of the Sentinel system—have been a defense—was not the correct system for the purpose of this.

For these reasons, it is difficult to understand why the administration now reverses back to the concept of the discarded Sentinel system. To me this is especially unfortunate, because, based on my knowledge of the subject, I think it makes very difficult indeed any possibility of reaching agreement in the SALT discussions with respect to MBFR control, not to mention what it might do to SALT limitation agreement. I should not go into the details of that at this time, well studied the matter, and that is my belief.

Second, many cities in the United States will not agree to only a thin area defense. People will say, “If you are going to defend some cities, why not defend mine?”

The figure the distinguished majority leader uses—$50 billion—may well not be adequate to cover the cost of a thick system that can now be just around the corner.

For these reasons, Mr. President, again I commend the majority leader for bringing this important matter before the Senate. We have spent over $100
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billion in postwar Europe and over $100 billion in Vietnam; and at the same time we know we have increasing problems with respect to our domestic requirements—such problems as air pollution, water pollution, education, and adequate housing—in all of which areas the people have been asking for with an increasing voice during recent months.

To add this gigantic burden so as to obtain a system which, at best, is questionable, and base that request on the discarded arguments used year before last, when the Sentinel came before the Senate for discussion, is hard for me to understand.

I thank the majority leader, and again congratulate him on his outstanding address.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, may I say that, to the best of my knowledge, no Member of the Senate is against continued research and development. No Member of the Senate would be against the ABM if the need and practicability were demonstrated. No Member of the Senate would be against appropriating all funds necessary to put in such a system if that happened to be the case. But there are questions relative to the reliability of a system which, if fully carried out at a cost of tens of billions of dollars—that it would not be protective, would not enhance our security, but would be only a myth, created to shroud the fears of the people of this Nation against other nuclear powers.

I want to make it very plain, Mr. President, that the Senate and the Congress last year expressed approval for the two sites in North Dakota and Montana. That decision has been made, and that decision will be carried out.

What we will be faced with this year is an expansion, beyond the two hard missile sites, into places like the northwestern part of the State of Washington, southern New England, the Michigan-Ohio area, the Southeastern United States—I suppose around Florida and Georgia, the Texas area—and two sites in California, one in the northern part and one in the southern part.

While no mention was made of Alaska or Hawaii, they were mentioned a year ago in relation to the Sentinel system. I would assume that further consideration would be given to them.

Whether these areas which I have mentioned are accurate, I do not know. I am going on the basis of newspaper reports and a newspaper map which seemed to indicate that that is where the new sites might be.

I think that the Senate has a responsibility in this matter, and it will live up to it, win or lose, as it did last year.

I am certain that the President will, as he did last year, face up to his responsibility. But there is a wide gap between us at the present time, because we do not know what has been done in the way of research and development.

A total of $14 million was allocated this year for construction for continued research and development in Kwajalein. It was stated in the Senate last year that the sites in Montana and North Dakota would be used for research and development purposes.

Well, that could not be as yet, because they are still purchasing the land and making preparations. The hard work will not get underway this spring in North Dakota or in Montana. It will be many months—many, many months—before an ABM system will be installed. As a matter of fact, I believe it will take about 4 years.

How can we carry on research and development on that basis, in the amount of time which has elapsed, I am not at all certain.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I have always been for intense research and development, but not for premature deployment.