9-1-1970

Congressional Record S. 14844-S - Indochina
McGovern - Hatfield

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

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Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, we are on the verge of a vote which will stand stark in the light of the continuing tragedy in Indochina. The vote is sought as a step toward peace in a time of war. Despite incessant talk of the one we remain enmeshed in the other. In my judgment, therefore, it is a necessary step.

We are still in Vietnam. We are still in Laos, deeper perhaps, than a year or 2 ago. The lives of Americans are still risked over Cambodia where they were not risked a year ago. The zone of combat, in short, does not contract; it expands. The war goes on.

To be sure, as Americans have been withdrawn in the tens of thousands, the tempo of ground combat has slowed. To be sure, in consequence, the rate of American casualties has dropped. As Commander in Chief, the President deserves every credit for bringing about this reverse thrust. He deserves every support in continuing to press the military withdrawal. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the fact that despite his efforts, the totals of American dead and wounded continue to rise every day. They rise relentlessly, from week to week. As of August 22:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>267,216</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat dead</td>
<td>43,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-combat dead</td>
<td>82,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total dead</td>
<td>51,804</td>
</tr>
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<td>Total casualties</td>
<td>339,020</td>
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That was a week ago. Since then others have died; others have been wounded. What will the totals be when they are reported as of August 29? What of the week after? And after that? Where is the end, Mr. President, where is the end?

The Senate cannot evade its share of responsibility for the answer to such questions. The dead and wounded are not the President’s obligation alone. The burden falls on all of us. What we do or do not in conjunction with the President, in the end, will determine the end of the road.

We cannot say, “Leave it to the President,” and then wash our hands of the matter. The Senate so said at the beginning of this ill-fated military involvement, a half decade ago. We left it to a President. We raised no caveat. All in the name of leaving it to the President, we endorsed a war which we did not expect to begin. In the same name, by rejecting Hatfield-McGovern, will we now hail an American military withdrawal which has yet to take place?

We do not confront this vote on Hatfield-McGovern lightly or suddenly. It has been coming for a long time. In a legislative sense, it has been coming ever since last year when the Senate sought, in the Cooper-Church amendment on Laos to restrain the deepening involvement in Indochina. Then on June 24 the Senate voted for the Dole amendment, 81 to 10 to repeal the Tonkin Gulf resolution. In a legal sense that may have been redundant but, in my judgment, it was not a useless gesture. The repeal of Tonkin served notice once and for all that whatever its initial responsibility, the Senate was henceforth disassociating itself from a course of policy which had enmeshed us and was tending still to plunge us deeper into Indochina. Then, on June 30 the Senate voted 58 to 37 for Cooper-Church on Cambodia. In so doing, the Senate sought to establish a legal barrier to the enlargement of the commitment of American lives and resources as the Vietnamese tragedy expanded into that country.

I am only too aware that these actions date have had a limited effect. The Senate’s repeal of the Tonkin Gulf resolution has not yet brought an end to the involvement in Vietnam. Nor did the first Cooper-Church terminate our involvement in Laos. Even now, a creeping commitment is underway in Cambodia notwithstanding the Cooper-Church amendment. But who is to say these Senate measures were without effect? Who is to say to what other places and depths in Asia the inertia of present policy would have carried this Nation without the resistance of the Senate?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senate has expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. May I have 2 minutes?

Mr. McGOVERN. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. We come, now, to Hatfield-McGovern. I respect the President’s sincerity in opposing this amendment just as I do his intentions with regard to this tragic conflict. I know that he desires to restrain the involvement, to end the war and to hasten the American withdrawal.

I do not question the President’s will or skill in conducting foreign policy and as Commander in Chief in the pursuit of
September 1, 1970

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

these ends. I would seek only to reinforce them, as the Constitution intended, by the exercise of the separate Senate function of advise and consent in concert with the President's powers. With all due respect, the difficulties are such, in my judgment, as to require a joint effort of this kind if there is to be an orderly termination of this conflict.

The Hatfield-McGovern amendment offers an opportunity for concerted action. It offers an opportunity to strengthen the President's efforts both abroad and at home in seeking to speed up the drawdown of American forces. It offers, therefore, an opportunity to reduce more rapidly toward zero the level of American casualties. It offers an opportunity to hasten our military exit from the Southeast Asian mainland where we had no vital interests which required us to lodge our military strength in the first place.

To bring to an end a mistaken policy: to save American lives, to help restore the inner unity of this Nation—reasons enough to support Hatfield-McGovern. I will vote for this amendment.
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