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F O R R E L E A S E O N D E L I V E R Y

ADDRESS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

at

BOSTON COLLEGE COMMENCEMENT, CHESTNUT HILL, MASSACHUSETTS

Monday, June 14, 1971, 10:00 a.m.

BEFORE THE BOOK IS CLOSED ON VIET NAM

It is a good place to be, today, here in this city and at this University. Boston is out of a chapter of liberty written a long time ago. Boston College is from a transcendent experience of love 2,000 years old. These two streams of human enlightenment flow together in today's commencement.

There are young people here and old. Whatever the differences in our years, we are brought face-to-face by these graduates. While chronological gaps between the generations are inevitable, credibility gaps are not pre-ordained. I shall try my best to avoid one in what I have to say to the class of 1971.

My remarks will be directed to what we have in common. Whatever we may not have, we have the United States in common and at a most difficult moment in history. Clearly, we are not passing through the best of times. Clearly, this is not freedom's finest hour.

Do not look to me, however, to condemn an older generation for the present state of affairs. Do not look for me, either, to blame the nation's plight on the young. Young people did not make the situation in which, together, we find ourselves; they have not yet had that opportunity. As for older generations, it is to be noted only that they have had time to add to the mistakes which they inherited when they were younger.

So, I will not lead this commencement in a search for scapegoats. Let me try, instead, to set forth where I think we are, how we have arrived at this point, and where we may hope to go from here. These questions cannot be considered except in the context of Viet Nam. Viet Nam is a book not yet closed.

It is, this unfinished war, the roadblock to the future. It remains a funnel into which is drawn a great segment ^{of} ~~on~~ the nation's ideals, energies and expectations.

What has transpired in Viet Nam is a tragic story told again and again. My own views have been placed before three Presidents. They have been stated in public on many occasions during the past five years and before. For these remarks, today, it is sufficient to note that fifty-five thousand Americans are dead in Viet Nam, cut out of life at an age not much different from that of this graduating class. The wounded are three hundred thousand. Well over \$100 billion of public funds have been spent to support the war. Before the final reckoning (all the bills will not be paid until into the next century), the cost undoubtedly will have doubled and doubled again.

A large part of the national economy has been diverted to support this venture in Southeast Asia. What has

needed doing at home by government has not been done or not done very well. In the name of security against threats from Viet Nam, the inner security of the nation has been neglected.

We find ourselves, now with an economy that spurts and sputters but seems not able to hold a reliable momentum. Heavy unemployment is notable, especially among young people and returning veterans. A persistent inflation plagues us even as it erodes confidence in our currency abroad.

We find ourselves, too, living uneasily in a badly abused environment, with some scientists even dubious of the capacity of air, water and earth to continue to sustain us. Not only in pollution-control but in all public services-- safety, transportation, education, sanitation, drug-regulation and whatever--shortcomings have been tolerated to the point of breakdown. The deterioration is especially serious in the urban complexes where, together, with the unabated tensions

of race and poverty, it casts a profound uncertainty over the inner stability of the nation.

These problems cry out for concentrated public attention. They call for an input of young energy, new leadership and fresh resources. It has not been forthcoming in adequate supply. That it has not is due in no small part to the diversions abroad.

Whatever may have led us into the conflict in Southeast Asia, it is now clear that the involvement has hit us where it hurts most--in the nation's inner unity. The war opened with a Presidential call for support of the Commander-in-Chief; it was met by a patriotic affirmation of national unity. Before the war is over, however, we will have gone through deeper divisions than any since the Civil War. In the end, the restoration of the nation's unity may well come again only in the common revulsion with the war.

For the present, the involvement goes on. Even as the President has sharply cut back the U. S. troop levels in Viet Nam--and he is to be commended for doing so--the actual involvement has spread from Viet Nam into Cambodia and Laos into an all Indochina war. We remain deeply enmeshed. We have yet to extricate ourselves.

It is now apparent that even though we may have thought to enter the war as welcomed liberators, circumstances are otherwise. We find, instead, that our policies have cast us in the role of military arbitrator of a brutal conflict which concerns other peoples. We find, too, that the conflict is not subject to resolution by the military intervention unless, indeed, Indochina is to be "saved" by being "destroyed" utterly.

We know now what we did not know at the outset. The involvement does not serve the interests of this nation or the Vietnamese people.

That is the bitter reality of this frustrating experience. We have pursued a well-intentioned but impossible dream. In its pursuit, the lands and peoples of Indochina have been torn and battered almost beyond recognition. Young Americans have died in the tens of thousands. Vietnamese--men, women and children--have died in the hundreds of thousands. Three simple rice cultures--Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos--have been overwhelmed by the technology of modern warfare. Millions have fled the paddy fields, villages and hill-towns to escape the bombs and crossfire. They huddle as refugees in the cities, there to live in one way or another--including the widespread trafficking in heroin--off the troops. The swollen urban populations are fed, in part, by imported rice paid for by U. S. aid programs--ironically, in what is one of the richest rice surplus areas of the world.

Why? To what end? What impelled us into this ill-fated enterprise? What keeps us in it? How can we continue to order young men to war in Indochina?

These are questions which cannot be put aside.

We have an obligation to clarify what we have been about in Viet Nam. That is an obligation which is owed to the living generations as well as to the future. It is a way of keeping faith with the men whom we sent to Viet Nam and who have not come back. Unless the questions are resolved in all honesty, this nation's historic purpose will emerge under the permanent cloud of the war. On the other hand, if an understanding of the tragic experience assures that this is, indeed, the last Viet Nam, then the sacrifices which have been asked will not be without meaning.

It is pointless, in this connection, to try to put the finger of responsibility on one President or another, on one party or the other, on the Defense Department, the

State Department or some other. We are all involved. There is no evading a national responsibility.

If the war is pursued, today, under a Republican Administration, it is not to be forgotten that the military escalation began under a Democratic Administration. If there are, now, Democratic Senators and Congressmen who seek to bring the war to a close forthwith, there are also Republicans whose dedication is to the same purpose. There are many who today are disenchanted with the conflict; there were very few at the outset, either Republicans or Democrats, who opposed the ever-deepening involvement. Indeed, who did not support or acquiesce in it?

In short, Viet Nam did not spring suddenly out of partisan politics. Nor did it begin just a few years ago, in 1969, 1966, 1964 or even 1961. In my judgment, the present involvement is a culmination of a foreign policy which was born before this graduating class.

Parents here, today, will remember a great war and its aftermath a quarter of a century ago. They will remember a tremendous military power assembled by a united people, a power which overwhelmed a tyranny in Europe and another in Asia.

This nation moved into the post-World War II era, intact and dynamic in contrast with vast areas of the world which lay in ruins around us, hungry, exhausted and bankrupt. In the circumstances, the international leadership of the United States was sought by friend and former enemy even as it was opposed by the Soviet Union. As we saw it, then, this nation's economic strength was the only hope for the recovery of what came to be called the "free world." As we saw it, too, this nation's military supremacy, including an atomic monopoly, was the principal bulwark against the aggressive spread of what was termed "monolithic Communism."

There began an era of foreign policy based on those premises. Tens of billions of dollars of materials,

services and credits poured out of the United States into other countries. Aid went to Western Europe, to Asia, to Latin America and eventually, to Africa. In the name of the United Nations, a war was fought and financed by this country to hold back Communism in Korea. We led the United Nations into a boycott of the revolutionary Chinese People's Republic and worked to exclude the Peking government from the world community. Multiple alliances were built which wove us into a common NATO defense of Western Europe and linked us in some sort of defense arrangements with about fifty nations. Hundreds of thousands of Americans in uniform went abroad, into military garrisons and bases in Europe and Japan and elsewhere. Tens of billions of dollars worth of construction, equipment and weapons and nuclear warheads went with them.

These policies were devised in the name of national security and world peace. They were called accurately bipartisan and were described less accurately as a mutual

security program. The fact is that the policies were and to this day remain largely a one-sided effort of the United States. They rest now as they have long rested on the readiness of this nation to carry the preponderant burdens of cost.

For years, there was little reason to question these policies. Congress was predisposed to accept the leadership of the President during a period of cold war. By the same token, allied nations were predisposed to accept the leadership of the United States which alone had the capacity to sustain this postwar system.

To be sure, there were flaws in the structure but they were not readily visible in the exuberance of the times. In the first place, the security system relied so heavily on military power to maintain peace that an undue burden of responsibility was consigned to the Armed Services and an excessive drain was attached to the national economy. A zeal for a new-found internationalism, moreover, led us, beyond

essential national needs and humanitarian considerations, into an incautious involvement in almost every area of the world either in the name of "fighting Communism" or "promoting progress." This worldwide projection involved heavy expenditures for all kinds of aid-programs and the creation of elaborate U. S. official establishments abroad. Moreover, it prompted us to take on, as allies, a number of governments who were dependents in all but name. The great vitality of the postwar economy also created an erroneous belief in its inexhaustibility. Even as late as the onset of Viet Nam, we proceeded as though the nation could have not only guns and butter but also pay for fat and trimmings.

We pursued these policies, flaws and all, with little change for many years. We pursued, them, however, in a world which was changing greatly. The nation's atomic monopoly came to an end. The myth of "monolithic Communism" disappeared in the political shifts of Eastern Europe and in

the upheaval in the Chinese-Soviet relationship. Numerous new states appeared in the underdeveloped areas, as colonialism was being reduced to an historic relic. Europe recovered and went far beyond recovery to new heights of well-being. New economic dynamisms emerged, notably in Germany and Japan, even as our own economy showed signs of overwork if not exhaustion.

It was in these changed circumstances that we became involved in Viet Nam. We became involved for what had long been accepted as highly worthwhile ends. We became involved in the name of resisting "aggressive Communism," in the name of "safeguarding international peace," and in the name of "honoring commitments" to a weak and dependent government.

We went into Viet Nam, in short, on the wheels of the same policy and for many of the same reasons that we had gone into Korea a decade and a half earlier. We did so,

however, almost as an habituated response, with far less understanding of the actual situation in Indochina, unmindful of the changes in this nation, in Asia and in the world.

Viet Nam was a mistake, a tragic mistake.

To persist in it now is to add outrage to the sacrifices of those who have suffered and who have died in this conflict.

To persit³ in it now is to do violence to the welfare of the nation.

The need is to terminate the mistake not to prolong it. No national commitments of this nation remain to be discharged to the governments in Indochina. We have armed, trained, financed and fought for those governments. We have done our share--far more than our share--to inject them with the elements of survival. What last ditch effort, as we are withdrawing, is likely to do anything more? Can the dragging out of the withdrawal do other than add to the tragedy?

What is needed forthwith is a redoubled effort to terminate the military involvement. What is needed is an end to the further accumulation of casualties, costs and prisoners of war. What is needed is to bring about the safe return of U. S. forces and all prisoners of war. And when the guns fall still, what will be needed is to help restore the devastation of the war.

So far as I can see, initiatives which might serve these purposes have yet to be taken in the negotiations at Paris. It would be my hope, therefore, that the President with the cooperation of the Senate would seek in some appropriate negotiating forum an immediate cease-fire throughout Indochina on the basis of:

- 1) providing for a series of phased and rapid U. S. withdrawals in return for a series of phased releases of prisoners of war; and

2) a coupling of the final release of all U. S. prisoners with the final withdrawal of all U. S. forces by a specific date in the near future.

An agreement on this basis, it seems to me, could act to close out this ill-fated involvement. It would also bring about, I believe, the end of an era in the nation's international relations. Mistakes have been made during the past quarter of a century in the conduct of these relations. Do not think for a moment, however, that it has all been a mistake. Much that has been done had to be done, in the enduring interests of this nation. Much that is being done now needs still to be done.

A vast web of trade and cultural relationships, for example, has been woven with the rest of the world. It serves for the mutual enrichment and contentment of hundreds of millions of people. By the same token, a sudden rupture of the web could

bring upheavals and conflicts of a most disastrous kind. We have also begun to perceive in these twenty-five years, I believe, the dimensions of the problem of maintaining permanent peace. We have come, too, to a greater awareness of the significance of human interdependency and mutual concern if the world is ever to know stability. Moreover, rudimentary machinery which can give expression to that awareness is now in existence.

It would compound the tragedy if, in the bitter aftermath of Viet Nam, we were to turn our backs on this advance. It would be a step backward if we were to veer from what has been an excess of international involvement to an extreme of disinvolvement.

I hope it will be recognized, therefore, that it is possible to withdraw from Viet Nam without seceding from the world. If we make that distinction--and I believe the people of this nation will make it--then it should be possible to withdraw

militarily not only from Indochina but from the Southeast Asian peninsula without abandoning our vital national interest in what transpires on the periphery of the Asian mainland.

Similarly, we should be able to reduce sharply the United States deployment of over half a million armed forces and dependents in Western Europe a quarter of a century after World War II without forsaking the essential mutual pledges of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. We should be able, too, to exercise a firm and discriminating control over the enormous expenditures which are made in the name of national defense and, at the same time, still provide adequately for the defense of the nation. We should find it feasible to curb the corruption and carelessness which have filtered into the Armed Forces without demeaning and discouraging the millions of dedicated men and women who wear the uniform. We should be capable of shutting down obsolescent and over-extended aid

programs without losing a human compassion for the other people with whom we share the earth.

These adjustments involve, in the President's words, "lowering the profile" of the nation abroad. If they are to be made effectively, it seems to me that they must be accompanied by a new and vigorous effort of American diplomacy. That effort should be aimed at securing agreements with other nations which make international stability more dependent on mutual understandings and undertakings and less on the unilateral commitment of the military power of this or any other nation. Such agreements in the Far Pacific, for example, would have to involve not only the United States and Japan, but also the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the Philippines and other nations.

In Europe, a new and updated approach would presuppose a substantial shift of the burden of NATO from this nation to Western Europe--a step which, incidentally, is long overdue and will be pressed in the Senate until it is taken.

It will also call for agreements embracing both East and West Europe and the anomolous situation at Berlin. Indeed, in a new approach to the security of Europe it might be helpful if the Soviet Union and this nation were to stand to the side for a time and let the lead pass to the smaller European states on both sides of the divide. The efforts of the two super-powers might well be concentrated, instead, on ending the game of musical chairs with regard to disarmament, mutual reductions of their forces in Europe, and the control of nuclear weapons which has been pursued for so many years. In this connection, some risks for peace are clearly indicated if we are to reduce the ever-present and immediate risk of the collapse of human civilization that is inherent in international nuclear anarchy. In matters of aid and assistance we will accept our share of responsibility for the well-being of the world but it will be a proportionately lower share than in the past and it will be discharged in cooperation with others.

In short, in the era ahead, we will get away from the excess of unilateral internationalism which has characterized our policies for the past two decades and try to recast our relations with others to the end that they are multilateral in substance as well as in name, to the end that the common burdens of the world are more equitably shared.

This transition will derive from Presidential leadership but not Executive fiat. It will depend, rather, on a concerted effort in which the President is joined by the Senate and the Congress, with each respectful of the Constitutional sensibilities of the other. Most of all, it will depend on a government which can be trusted by an informed people because it is credible in what it says and does and because it is alert and responsive to their needs.

You who graduate, today, and your counterparts throughout the nation, loom large in what may be anticipated during the decades ahead. You have the vote and, therefore,

are in a position to make your weight felt in the conduct of the government. That is a highly important aspect of your role in shaping the nation's future. Beyond it, however, there is the part which young people will have played in ending the tragedy of the involvement in Indochina.

That tragedy will be terminated; I would hope that it will be terminated very soon. The responsibility for bringing it to an end rests heavily on those of us who are the "old hands" of another generation. To move beyond Viet Nam into a future of peace will devolve just as heavily on you. To open a new era of constructive cooperation with the rest of the human race, to act with compassion and with high purpose, that is your opportunity, you who are the "new hands" of tomorrow. It is your life which lies ahead. It is your nation. It is your world. May you make the most of them all.

Professor of History of Religion, University of Chicago: Bridge-builder between the religious histories of the East and the West, translator of the myths of ancient covenants, Mircea Eliade has shown us the chain of being and belief that links Chartres, Stonehenge and Ur of the Chaldees. We gratefully acknowledge his affirmation of the unity of worship, the unity of love, and, in a dark hour, the unity of hope.

ElI Goldston, *Doctor of Laws*, President, Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates, Boston: Brilliant lawyer and industrialist in the national and international marketplace, this fourfold son of Harvard has set the pace for his fellow businessmen in community affairs, and in constant challenge to the social problems of our age. Fast friend of the Far East, and protector of us all from the rigors of the Montreal Express, his imaginative ideas and irrepressible spirit leave breathless competitors and colleagues alike.

Elma Lewis, *Doctor of Fine Arts*, Director, Elma Lewis School of Fine Arts, Boston: Performer, teacher and inspiration for nearly thirty years, she has put the children of Roxbury on dancing feet and Boston's businessmen on their toes. In a school where a kindness is spoken she has taught thousands the language of pride and the beauty of black. Not by might, not by power but by her spirit she has captured the park, the synagogue and the nation.

The Honorable Michael Joseph Mansfield, *Doctor of Laws*, Majority Leader, United States Senate: As a university founded and fostered by immigrant sons, Boston College today welcomes an immigrant son from the rugged West. Working always for peace, this silent, stoic and steadfast Senator has given votes to the young and security to the old in a catholic concern for every citizen of the United States. With his strength, simplicity and integrity, he leads by example not only his colleagues in the Capitol, but all Americans.

William James McGill, *Doctor of Social Science*, President, Columbia University: Foe of cynicism and apathy, friend of scholarly tradition and the humane society, this new man at an old Ivy stand is uniquely sensitive to the wide range of people, politics and problems which make a university. He has fostered fresh hope in the future with his firm belief that intellectual and professional skills achieve their true purpose not for profit or power, but where they are needed most, for the benefit of all mankind.

Most Reverend Humberto Sousa Medeiros, *Doctor of Sacred Theology*, Archbishop of Boston: Hospitable, gentle, reserved, just, holy and faithful: these Pauline ideals, set forth for Bishops in the church twenty centuries ago, are happily fulfilled in the person of Boston's fourth Archbishop and seventh Ordinary. A champion of his brothers whether in high station or low, Humberto Sousa Medeiros graces this State and See by his exemplary quest for the Kingdom of God in our midst.

Walter George Muelder, *Doctor of the Science of Theology*, Dean, School of Theology, Boston University: A civil defender of liberty, a dean among theologians, a member of that first friendly cabal that grew into the Boston Theological Institute, a man of whom Ignatius of Antioch would say (as he did of himself): *one bent on unity*, Walter George Muelder is a neighbor whom we greet today with the familiar words which he knows and lives: "If we cannot as yet think alike in all things, at least we may love alike."

The Honorable Leverett Saltonstall, *Doctor of Laws*, Former United States Senator: This distinguished citizen of Massachusetts has served his community, state and nation as Alderman, Assistant District Attorney, Legislator, Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, Governor, and United States Senator during a large part of

this century. For his high ideals, his selfless efforts, and his dedication to the common weal, the people of Massachusetts have given him their unswerving support and permanent affection.

BEFORE THE BOOK IS CLOSED ON VIETNAM
(By Senator MIKE MANSFIELD)

It is a good place to be, today, here in this city and at this University. Boston is out of a chapter of liberty written a long time ago. Boston College is from a transcendent experience of love almost 2,000 years old. These two streams of human enlightenment flow together in today's commencement.

There are young people here and old. Whatever the differences in our years, we are brought face-to-face by these graduates. While chronological gaps between the generations are inevitable, credibility gaps are not pre-ordained. I shall try my best to avoid one in what I have to say to the class of 1971.

My remarks will be directed to what we have in common. Whatever we may not have, we have the United States in common and at a most difficult moment in history. Clearly, we are not passing through the best of times. Clearly, this is not freedom's finest hour.

Do not look to me, however, to condemn an older generation for the present state of affairs. Do not look for me, either, to blame the nation's plight on the young. Young people did not make the situation in which, together, we find ourselves; they have not yet had that opportunity. As for older generations, it is to be noted only that they have had time to add to the mistakes which they inherited when they were younger.

So, I will not lead this commencement in a search for scapegoats. Let me try, instead, to set forth where I think we are, how we have arrived at this point, and where we may hope to go from here. These questions cannot be considered except in the context of Viet Nam. Viet Nam is a hook not yet closed. It is, this unfinished war, the roadblock to the future. It remains a funnel into which is drawn a great segment of the nation's ideals, energies and expectations.

What has transpired in Viet Nam is a tragic story told again and again. My own views have been placed before three Presidents. They have been stated in public on many occasions during the past five years—and before. For these remarks today, it is sufficient to note that fifty-five thousand Americans are dead in Viet Nam, cut out of life at an age not much different from that of this graduating class. The wounded are three hundred thousand. Well over \$100 billion of public funds have been spent to support the war. Before the final reckoning (all the bills will not be paid until into the next century), the cost undoubtedly will have doubled and doubled again.

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COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS BY
SENATOR MANSFIELD AT BOSTON
COLLEGE

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on yesterday I had the distinct honor and privilege to give the commencement address at Boston College and, at the same time with 10 other recipients, to receive an honorary degree. Among those with whom I was honored on this occasion was our former, beloved colleague, the Honorable Leverett Saltonstall. I am happy to report to the Senate that he is in excellent health and that he and Mrs. Saltonstall wished to be remembered to all their friends in the Senate.

I ask unanimous consent that a list of those who received honorary degrees from Boston College on yesterday and the commencement address which I made at that time be incorporated in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the list and address were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HONORARY DEGREES

Walter Jackson Bate, *Doctor of Humanities*, Abbott Lawrence Lowell Professor of the Humanities, Harvard University: Oft has he travelled in the realms of gold! Abbott Lawrence Lowell Professor of the Humanities at Harvard, Pulitzer Prize winning biographer, Walter Jackson Bate is that rare example of the contemporary man for whom scholarship is teaching and teaching is scholarship. His life has been truly an allegory: the example of what he professes.

Andrew Felton Brimmer, *Doctor of Social Science*, Member, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System: Distinguished economist, champion of human rights, and an outstanding public servant who has shot like the star that he is, high in the skies of our government, Andrew Felton Brimmer has brought clarity, vigor and scholarship to public policy debate and, in this rejection of separatism as a path to economic development, has given courage to controversy.

Reverend Monsignor George William Casey, *Doctor of Letters*, Pastor, St. Bridgid's Parish, Lexington, Massachusetts: For more than half a century of priesthood, George William Casey has embraced the people of God in a unique ministry of wisdom and charity. As curate, chaplain, pioneer ecumenist, pastor and journalist, he has taught tough truth to three generations of his fellow men, commanding their respect, and winning their love. The God who gave joy to his youth has given youth to his age.

Mircea Eliade, *Doctor of Religion*, Sewell L. Avery Distinguished Service Professor and

especially serious in the urban complexes where, together, with the unabated tensions of race and poverty, it casts a profound uncertainty over the inner stability of the nation.

These problems cry out for concentrated public attention. They call for an input of young energy, new leadership and fresh resources. It has not been forthcoming in adequate supply. That it has not is due in no small part to the diversions abroad.

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Parents here, today, will remember a great war and its aftermath a quarter of a century ago. They will remember a tremendous military power assembled by a united people, a power which overwhelmed a tyranny in Europe and another in Asia.

This nation moved into the post-World War II era, intact and dynamic in contrast with vast areas of the world which lay in ruins around us, hungry, exhausted and bankrupt. In the circumstances, the international leadership of the United States was sought by friend and former enemy even as it was opposed by the Soviet Union. As we saw it, then, this nation's economic strength was the only hope for the recovery of what came to be called the "free world." As we saw it, too, this nation's military supremacy, including an atomic monopoly, was the principal bulwark against the aggressive spread of what was termed "monolithic Communism."

There began an era of foreign policy based on those premises. Tens of billions of dollars of materials, services and credits poured out of the United States into other countries. Aid went to Western Europe, to Asia, to Latin America and eventually, to Africa. In the name of the United Nations, a war was fought and financed by this country to hold back Communism in Korea. We led the United Nations into a boycott of the revolution of Chinese People's Republic and worked to exclude the Peking government from the World community. Multiple alliances were built which wove us into a common NATO defense of Western Europe and linked us in some sort of defense arrangements with about fifty nations. Hundreds of thousands of Americans in uniform went abroad, into military garrisons and bases in Europe and Japan and elsewhere. Tens of billions of dollars worth of construction, equipment and weapons and nuclear warheads went with them.

These policies were devised in the name of national security and world peace. They were called accurately bipartisan and were described less accurately as a mutual security program. The fact is that the policies were and to this day remain largely a one-sided effort of the United States. They rest now as they have long rested on the readiness of this nation to carry the preponderant burdens of cost.

For years, there was little reason to question these policies. Congress was predisposed to accept the leadership of the President during a period of cold war. By the same token, allied nations were predisposed to accept the leadership of the United States which alone had the capacity to sustain this postwar system.

To be sure, there were flaws in the structure but they were not readily visible in the exuberance of the times. In the first place, the security system relied so heavily on military power to maintain peace that an undue burden of responsibility was consigned to the Armed Services and an excessive drain was attached to the national economy. A zeal for

a new-found internationalism, moreover, led us, beyond essential national needs and humanitarian considerations, into an incautious involvement in almost every area of the world either in the name of "fighting Communism" or "promoting progress." This worldwide projection involved heavy expenditures for all kinds of aid-programs and the creation of elaborate U.S. official establishments abroad. Moreover, it prompted us to take on, as allies, a number of governments who were dependents in all but name. The great vitality of the postwar economy also created an erroneous belief in its inexhaustibility. Even as late as the onset of Viet Nam, we proceeded as though the nation could have not only guns and butter but also pay for fat and trimmings.

We pursued these policies, flaws and all, with little change for many years. We pursued, them, however, in a world which was changing greatly. The nation's atomic monopoly came to an end. The myth of "monolithic Communism" disappeared in the political shifts of Eastern Europe and in the upheaval in the Chinese-Soviet relationship. Numerous new states appeared in the underdeveloped areas, as colonialism was being reduced to an historic relic. Europe recovered and went far beyond recovery to new heights of well-being. New economic dynamisms emerged, notably in Germany and Japan, even as our own economy showed signs of overwork if not exhaustion.

It was in these changed circumstances that we became involved in Viet Nam. We became involved for what had long been accepted as highly worthwhile ends. We became involved in the name of resisting "aggressive Communism," in the name of "safeguarding international peace," and in the name of "honoring commitments" to a weak and dependent government.

We went into Viet Nam, in short, on the wheels of the same policy and for many of the same reasons that we had gone into Korea a decade and a half earlier. We did so, however, almost as an habituated response, with far less understanding of the actual situation in Indochina, unmindful of the changes in this nation, in Asia and in the world.

Viet Nam was a mistake, a tragic mistake. To persist in it now is to add outrage to the sacrifices of those who have suffered and who have died in this conflict.

To persist in it now is to do violence to the welfare of the nation.

The need is to terminate the mistake not to prolong it. No national commitments of this nation remain to be discharged to the governments in Indochina. We have done our share—far more than our share—to inject them with the elements of survival. What last ditch effort, as we are withdrawing, is likely to do anything more? Can the dragging out of the withdrawal do other than add to the tragedy?

What is needed forthwith is a redoubled effort to terminate the military involvement. What is needed is an end to the further accumulation of casualties, costs and prisoners of war. What is needed is to bring about the safe return of U.S. forces and all prisoners of war. And when the guns fall still, what will be needed is to help restore the devastation of the war.

So far as I can see, initiatives which might serve these purposes have yet to be taken in the negotiations at Paris. It would be my hope, therefore, that the President with the cooperation of the Senate would seek in some appropriate negotiating forum an immediate cease-fire throughout Indochina on the basis of:

(1) providing for a series of phased and more rapid U.S. withdrawals in return for a series of phased releases of prisoners of war; and

(2) a coupling of the final release of all

U.S. prisoners with the final withdrawal of all U.S. forces by a specific date in the near future.

An agreement on this basis, it seems to me, could act to close out this ill-fated involvement. It would also bring about, I believe, the end of an era in the nation's international relations. Mistakes have been made during the past quarter of a century in the conduct of these relations. Do not think for a moment, however, that it has all been a mistake. Much that has been done had to be done, in the enduring interests of this nation. Much that is being done now needs still to be done.

A vast web of trade and cultural relationships, for example, has been woven with the rest of the world. It serves for the mutual enrichment and contentment of hundreds of millions of people. By the same token, a sudden rupture of the web could bring upheavals and conflicts of a most disastrous kind. We have also begun to perceive in these twenty-five years, I believe, the dimensions of the problem of maintaining permanent peace. We have come, too, to a greater awareness of the significance of human interdependency and mutual concern if the world is ever to know stability. Moreover, rudimentary machinery which can give expression to that awareness is now in existence.

It would compound the tragedy if, in the bitter aftermath of Viet Nam, we were to turn our backs on this advance. It would be a step backward if we were to veer from what has been an excess of international involvement to an extreme of disinvolvement.

I hope it will be recognized, therefore, that it is possible to withdraw from Viet Nam without seceding from the world. If we make that distinction—and I believe the people of this nation will make it—then it should be possible to withdraw militarily not only from Indochina but from the Southeast Asian peninsula without abandoning our vital national interest in what transpires on the periphery & I emphasize the word "periphery"—of the Asian mainland.

Similarly, we should be able to reduce sharply the United States deployment of over half a million armed forces and dependents in Western Europe a quarter of a century after World War II without forsaking the essential mutual pledges of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. We should be able, too, to exercise a firm and discriminating control over the enormous expenditures which are made in the name of national defense and, at the same time, still provide adequately for the defense of the nation. We should find it feasible to curb the corruption and carelessness which have filtered into the Armed Forces without demeaning and discouraging the millions of dedicated men and women who wear the uniform. We should be capable of shutting down obsolescent and over-extended aid programs without losing a human compassion for the other people with whom we share the earth.

These adjustments involve, in the words of President Nixon, "lowering the profile" of the nation abroad. If they are to be made effectively, it seems to me that they must be accompanied by a new and vigorous effort of American diplomacy. That effort should be aimed at securing agreements with other nations which make international stability more dependent on mutual understandings and undertakings and less on the unilateral commitment of the military power of this or any other nation. Such agreements in the Far Pacific, for example, would have to involve not only the United States and Japan, but also the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the Philippines and other nations.

In Europe, a new and updated approach would presuppose, a substantial shift of the burden of NATO from this nation to Western Europe—a step which, incidentally, is long

overdue and will be pressed, and pressed hard and continuously, in the Senate until it is taken.

It will also call for agreements embracing both East and West Europe and the anomalous situation at Berlin. Indeed, in a new approach to the security of Europe it might be helpful if the Soviet Union and this nation were to stand to the side for a time and let the lead pass to the smaller European states on both sides of the divide. The efforts of the two super-powers might well be concentrated, instead, on ending the game of musical chairs with regard to disarmament, mutual reductions of their forces in Europe, and the control of nuclear weapons which has been pursued for so many years. In this connection, some risks for peace are clearly indicated if we are to reduce the ever-present and immediate risk of the collapse of human civilization that is inherent in international nuclear anarchy. In matters of aid and assistance we will accept our share of responsibility for the well-being of the world but it will be a proportionately lower share than in the past and it will be discharged in cooperation with others.

In short, in the era ahead, we will get away from the excess of unilateral internationalism which has characterized our policies for the past two decades and try to recast our relations with others to the end that they are multilateral in substance as well as in name, to the end that the common burdens of the world are more equitably shared.

This transition will derive from Presidential leadership but not Executive fiat. It will depend, rather, on a concerted effort in which the President is joined by the Senate and the Congress, with each respectful of the Constitutional sensibilities and responsibilities of the other. Most of all, it will depend on a government which can be trusted by an informed people because it is credible in what it says and does and because it is alert and responsive to their needs.

You who graduate, today, and your counterparts throughout the nation, loom large in what may be anticipated during the decades ahead. You have the vote, thanks to the determined effort of the distinguished senior Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Kennedy and his amendment and, therefore, are in a position to make your weight felt in the conduct of the government. That is a highly important aspect of your role in shaping the nation's future. Beyond it, however, there is the part which young people will have played in ending the tragedy of the involvement in Indochina.

That tragedy will be terminated; I would hope that it will be terminated very soon. The responsibility for bringing it to an end rests heavily on those of us who are the "old hands" of another generation. To move beyond Viet Nam into a future of peace will devolve just as heavily on you. To open a new era of constructive cooperation with the rest of the human race, to act with compassion and with high purpose, that is your opportunity, you who are the "new hands" of tomorrow. It is your life which lies ahead. It is your nation. It is your world. May you make the most of them all.