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Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

town will take my remarks seriously, because the fault is not entirely on one side.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I want to add my commendation to those of my colleagues to the distinguished senior Senator from Vermont for the remarks he made this morning. As always, listening to Senator AIKEN is educational. When he speaks, it is like a breath of fresh air. His candor is commendable. His integrity, his ability, and his honesty are unquestioned. Would that we had more GEORGE AIKENS. The country would be a good deal better off.

I agree with the distinguished Senator in his call for bipartisanship. I have been aware of the fact that in all too many discussions in this body there have been those who have attacked, those who have defended, and very few who have understood the gray area in between. The fault lies not wholly with the White House, nor does virtue lie wholly within the confines of the Senate. We have both made our share of mistakes.

I would hope, in the interest of the Nation, the responsibility which the Senate has shown during the past 2 years will continue, and that all of us will work together—the legislative and the executive—to end that the Nation will come ahead of any particular party.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senator from Montana is recognized for 15 minutes.

FOREIGN AID POLICY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, this has been a troubled and confusing and agonizing weekend. We have been confronted with a request for tens of millions of dollars in aid for Cambodia, in addition to aid for Indonesia, Vietnam, Korea, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel.

In all those areas, only one part was previously authorized, and that is the $500 million credit to Israel, which was incorporated in the defense authorization bill, agreed to some weeks ago. The others are not authorized and will be the subject of hearings in committee and debate on the floor of the Senate.

I can find justification for assistance to Jordan and Lebanon in the sum of $30 million and $5 million, respectively, because it will tend to stabilize the situation in the Middle East; and the credits to Israel will tend to keep us from becoming involved physically. I do not want to see this Nation become involved physically anywhere else in the world unless it is in the interest of our own security; and when I say I do not want to see any more Vietnams, I mean it, because even one Vietnam is too much.

I can understand also the reason for the aid-proposal for Korea, because it is tied to a drawdown of 20,000 American troops from that country.

I can understand it in South Vietnam, because it is tied to the continued withdrawal of U.S. troops. Hopefully that will be accelerated.

But I find it difficult to locate any compensating factors as far as the Cam-

bodian-aid proposal is concerned. It appears to me that if we act on the basis of this request, we will just be making a second downpayment, because the first has already been made over the past few months by aid transfers to Cambodia through withdrawals from funds which had originally been allocated to Taiwan, Greece, and Turkey.

As to the situations which developed over the weekend, I am concerned. I am uneasy. When you tie the request for aid to Cambodia with the 250-plane flight over North Vietnam, with the commando raid some 23 miles west of Hanoi, I think we have a set of circumstances which should cause us concern.

I grieve for all Americans, dead and wounded, whether they are in POW camps, whether they have been killed or wounded in action, or whether they have been casualties in Indochina other than in action. According to the latest figures which I have—and this is out of date now, because it goes only to November 7 of this year—291,559 Americans have been wounded, 43,959 have died in combat, and 8,798 have died from other causes. The total dead about 3 weeks ago stood at 52,757 and the total casualties, dead and wounded, at 344,316.

I grieve for those men, as I have said, because they are carrying out their obligation in a war which is highly unpopular and, in my opinion, totally unnecessary—a war which is one of the great tragedies in the annals of this Republic, a war which is causing a continuing drain on the morale of the American people, a war which makes the troubles confronting us at home much more difficult to confront.

I was heartened by the President's negotiating proposals of October 7, because I thought they contained a good deal of substance, and tied in with the proposals from Hanoi of September 17. It was my belief that the groundwork for possible negotiations had been laid. I still think that is the case. But now I wonder about the possibility of reinvolvement, based on the raids north. I wonder about the reaction of Hanoi to the commando raid and these retaliatory air raids for the shooting down of a U.S. reconnaissance plane. I wonder about the situation which confronts the prisoners of war, and whether the commando raid will be helpful or harmful; and I would wonder no less even if the raid had been successful, because it has placed those prisoners in a very difficult position, and we do have to think of them at all times.

Then I wonder about the effect these events may have on the Paris talks—I emphasize the word "talks," because negotiations have not as yet gotten underway.

All these things are matters which the Senate should consider, which the administration should consider, and hopefully, in the words of the distinguished Senator from Vermont and on the basis of his sage advice, that we would consider together, so that we could work in common for the common good.

There has been some talk about an understanding between North Vietnam and this Government relative to the use of reconnaissance planes over the past 2 years. Frankly, I know of no such understanding. There may be one, but if so, I am totally unaware of it. I am assuming that an understanding is being assumed on our part; that on the basis of the stoppage of the bombing of the North, it was tacitly understood—we assumed—that we would be given the right to continue reconnaissance flights.

I would point out that history seems to prove that air power is not the weapon which so many advocates seem to think it is. To see what it does one needs only look to England as an example, or to North Vietnam in the past. The end result is damage temporarily, but a stiffening of the spine of the people bombed for a long period of time.

The President does have a responsibility. His is the ultimate responsibility. But, as the distinguished Senator from Vermont has indicated, we also have a responsibility.

It would do us no good to give up and lie down, because then we would be shirking our duty. We can and we should, in good conscience, support the President when we think he is right, and support him fully. But, also in good conscience, when we think the President has made a wrong move, we have the right and the responsibility to disagree, and to do so on a constructive basis, so that the relationship between the two segments of our Government will not be ruptured as a result.

May I say that I admire the courage of the commandos who undertook this raid in an attempt to free some American POW's. It was a bold stroke. Those men who participated in it are entitled to the highest commendation. But I also raise the question as to the reliability of our intelligence.

I recall, for example, that when we moved into Cambodia, it was to capture the so-called headquarters of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong—a headquarters which, incidentally, was never discovered. Evidently, as the basis for this recent commando raid, we were again depending on what we thought was reliable intelligence, but according to the reports which appeared in the press, that camp had been evacuated at least 2 weeks before. It was a successful penetration, but the objective was not achieved. My concern now is for the prisoners of war who are still being held in North Vietnam, and what the reaction by North Vietnam to this raid by air and by land will be on them. Their future is something all of us must keep in mind; their safety is something which all of us devoutly pray for.

I wonder if the Senator from Vermont noticed, in the Washington Post yesterday, a summary of a recent special edition of the Foreign Service Journal. Before I carry this further, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that that summary, in an article entitled "Nixon Doctrine Battles Those Who Must Use It," written by Murrey Marder, and published in the Washington Post of Monday, November 23, 1970, and another article entitled "Viet War: A New Version," written by Stanley Karnow, and also published in yesterday's Washington Post, be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibits 1 and 2.)

Mr. MANSFIELD. Both articles are relevant to what the Senator from Vermont has so ably stated. One is a frank exposition of the reaction of professional U.S. diplomats to the Nixon doctrine in Asia. The other by Mr. Karnow touches on the basic factor that seems to trap successive administrations—including the present administration—in this unending involvement in Indochina notwithstanding efforts to terminate it.

The summary of the special issue of the Foreign Service Journal points out that many of our diplomats who are closely involved in Asian affairs were fearful of the sweeping change in policy implicit in the Nixon doctrine when it was first proposed. In due course, however, they came to see that the implied change really was not going to be much of a change at all and that the idea of "lowering our profile" a little might actually have some virtue.

One may wonder at their reactions, now, after even this modest scaledown seems to be in the process of abandonment, with the renewed expansion of the battle area by the bombing of North Vietnam and by this recent abortive attempt to free prisoners of war near Hanoi. One may wonder, too, at the implications of the Cambodian aid request for the Nixon doctrine which, I should note, I have supported since its inception as an expression of a long-needed change in policy to the end that it might lead us out of this tragic and misbegotten military involvement on the Asian mainland.

In any event, I am led by those articles to address certain questions.

I am sure the Senator from Vermont would concur that if the Nixon doctrine has a fundamental purpose, it is to "lower the U.S. profile" so as to reduce and terminate in a progressive fashion the excessive involvement of the United States on the Asian mainland, a situation brought about largely by the presence of our military forces and by military or other massive aid.

Mr. AIKEN. What I tried to point out was that we should have a uniform interpretation of the Nixon doctrine for all countries, and not one interpretation for one country and one for another. If the Nixon doctrine is good for Southeast Asia, it is, of course, good for most of the rest of the world. We do not want one interpretation of it for Vietnam, another for Nigeria, a third for Chile, or perhaps a fourth for some other part of the world.

I have told the State Department, for whatever good it may do, that our ambassadors in foreign countries should all be given uniform interpretations of the Nixon doctrine and just what it means.

As I pointed out, the Cooper-Church amendment in no way conflicted with the Nixon doctrine. In fact, it supported it. Yet, it was interpreted as being a hostile act on the part of Congress.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I would agree with the Senator completely. I concur in what he has to say about the Cooper-Church amendment, it was in accord with what

I understood to be the Nixon doctrine as it has been enunciated and propounded by the White House and the State Department.

I should like to ask the Senator another question.

Does the Senator think that the Nixon doctrine is served by the recent bombing of North Vietnam? To put it another way, does that action raise or "lower the profile of the United States in Asia"? Is it likely to shorten or prolong the time it will take to get our military forces out of all Indochina?

Mr. AIKEN. I think the answer to those questions is perfectly obvious. It does not improve our profile in the rest of the world. It will not improve our prospects of getting completely out of the war in Southeast Asia at an early date.

In fact, we have been through this before. The majority leader may remember the day we were called to the White House, along with several of our colleagues, to be advised that we would undertake the bombing of North Vietnam; and it was pointed out that a few bombs dropped on them would soon bring them to their knees and they would be begging for peace.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is correct.

Mr. AIKEN. The Senator may recall that I protested rather vigorously to the President, Mr. McNamara, and Secretary Rusk, but they went ahead with it. I believe we lost a thousand planes, including many of our finest aviators, and something like 500 helicopters. I fear that these new raids, these incursions—I hope they are incursions and not a prelude to any invasion—will simply delay the end of the war, just as the initial bombing of North Vietnam.

I do worry about the effect which this failure to rescue prisoners of war—in spite of the fact that it was bravely carried out—may have on the more than 450 Americans now being held. I believe that we cannot abandon those people. The South Vietnamese hold about 30,000 prisoners of war. North Vietnam holds over 450 hostages, according to our best estimates. Certainly, we are not going to abandon the hostages who are held by the North Vietnamese, and the war will not be over until they have been accounted for and released.

I certainly appreciate the remarks of the Senator from Montana in regard to this whole matter. It points up the need for better understanding.

I understand, Mr. President, that perhaps two or three Members of Congress were called in the middle of the night to be advised that the resumption of the air raids on Vietnam was in effect. But that is not consultation.

Mr. MANSFIELD. No. But I would say it is a continuation of an old policy in which certain members have been informed after the fact. That happened in previous administrations as well.

Mr. AIKEN. The Senator may recall that the previous President, the predecessor to President Nixon, used to advise us shortly before the fact, a few hours in advance, and then asked us to keep still about it, which we did.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I appreciate the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Vermont.

I ask unanimous consent that excerpts from my interpretation of the Nixon doctrine, as contained in a report I made to the Committee on Foreign Relations and to the President in a private capacity, a year ago last August, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PERSPECTIVE ON ASIA: THE NEW U.S. DOCTRINE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

(Report of Senator MIKE MANSFIELD to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate)

Today, there are treaties and executive agreements and an accumulation of decisions of the executive branch which enmesh this Nation deeply in the affairs of Southeast Asia. In consequence, there are over 500,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam and 50,000 in Thailand. In the general area and at least partially connected with our involvement in Southeast Asia are 40,000 men in Japan; 45,000 in Okinawa; 10,000 in Taiwan; 60,000 in the 7th Fleet; 30,000 in the Philippines and additional thousands on Guam—in all, a figure approaching 800,000.

Whatever the initial validity of these immense commitments, there is growing doubt as to whether it is wise or beneficial for this Nation and the countries concerned to perpetuate the present state of affairs. In the first place, the independence of Asian countries would be hollow indeed if it involved merely an exchange of a past colonial status for the indefinite prop of U.S. support. From our own point of view, moreover, the United States is feeling the adverse effects of the prolonged expenditure of lives and enormous resources and energy abroad, most of it in Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

In the interim, needs at home have been neglected—needs which are too obvious and omnipresent to require cataloging. They are all around us whether we live in cities or on farms, whether our homes are in New York, Washington, California, the Midwest, or Montana. The solution of these problems—whether they involve equality of treatment or pollution of air and water, or education, or public safety, or transportation and roads, or whatever—will require great and sustained inputs of initiative and attention at a time when these assets are heavily diverted abroad. They will also require substantial public funds in a period of inflation and of heavy tax burdens which result in large measure from military expenditures overseas and, notably, from the war in Vietnam.

While urgent needs at home are neglected, there is deep concern over the war in Vietnam which is still without an end in sight. The conflict continues to result in additional American dead and wounded every week and in expenditures at the rate of about $3 million an hour. Moreover, elsewhere in Southeast Asia there are shadow wars and the pockmarks of violent internal dissension. That these situations, under our present course, might evolve in the pattern of Vietnam gives rise to further concern.

Doubts as to our Asian approach are also fed by the visible consequences of the mass entry of American soldiers, money, and official establishments into Southeast Asia. To be sure, this entry has brought a great inflow of wealth and modern technology. In some places, however, little that is constructive is visible as a result. The very magnitude of the American involvement, emerging as it has in a short span of time, has imposed an almost indigestible alien presence and precipitated severe cultural convulsions.

To date, we have acted on the scale that we have in Southeast Asia largely to support small nations against what has been calculated as the threat of Communist aggression—notably from China. In fact, there was little expression of fear in any of the countries visited of an attack or invasion from China. Considerable concern does exist, however, that internal insurgent movements whose origins lie in local grievances or conflicts will be used as spearheads to influence by China or by North Vietnam. The principal threat to most existing governments in Southeast Asia, in short, seems to arise from within Southeast Asia at this time .

It seems to me that our presumption of a primary danger to the Southeast Asian countries, which they themselves do not perceive, does not provide a sound basis for U.S. policy. Rather, it tends to create for this Nation the role of self-appointed, great power protector in an area in which a militant young nationalism speaks the common language of resistance to foreign intrusion. It is sobering to recall, in this connection, that this Nation has never been an Asian power and, in my judgment, it is essential to avoid a further glissade into that ill-fitting role. Our vital interests with respect to the Asian mainland have always been peripheral. They are peripheral now. They are likely to remain peripheral in the future.

On the other hand, we have been and will continue to be a Pacific power. Vital national interests are indeed, lodged in that ocean. Four of our States border on the Pacific. In addition, one of them, Hawaii, lies in the middle of that vast expanse of water. We have territories and dependencies all over the Pacific. The Aleutian Islands are part of the State of Aalska. American Samoa, Guam, Wake, Johnston, Midway and the Howland, Baker, and Jarvis Islands are dependencies of the United States. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, which we have administered since the end of World War II, comprises over 2,000 islands and atolls with a land area of 678 square miles scattered over 3 million square miles of the Pacific.

As a Pacific power, we have and will continue to have a profound interest in what transpires in the western reaches of the ocean. In my judgement, however, that interest can best be expressed not by our immersion in the regions' internal political affairs but by an orderly shift to a restrained and judicious participation, as on Pacific nation among several, in its peaceful development.

Indeed, it is difficult to discern any other reasonable course for this Nation in present circumstances. It is a new day in Asia. The age in which foreign military dominance of any Asian people was a practical possibility has long since ended. Even the postwar period of one-sided dependency—most of it on the United States—is drawing to a close. Civilized survival, not to speak of peace and progress in the Western Pacific, may well depend on the timely emergence of a new age of cooperation based on equality and on a mutuality of responsibility, respect, and tolerance between this Nation and all the states of Asia.

II. THE PRESIDENT'S NEW ASIAN DOCTRINE

In the course of his recent trip, President Nixon enunciated in the Guam Declaration a new approach to Asia and the Western Pacific which seems to me to take cognizance of the considerations that are outlined in the introductory section of this report. The President's Asian doctrine contains the following precepts, as I introduced them and as I interpreted them to various Asian leaders:

1. The United States will maintain its treaty commitments, but it is anticipated that Asian nations will be able to handle their own defense problems, perhaps with some outside material assistance but without outside manpower. Nuclear threats are

another matter, and such threats will continue to be checked by counterpoised nuclear capacity.

2. As a Pacific power, the United States will not turn its back on nations of the Western Pacific and Asia; the countries of that region will not be denied a concerned and understanding ear in this Nation.

3. The United States will avoid the creation of situations in which there is such great dependence on us that, inevitably, we become enmeshed in what are essentially Asian problems and conflicts.

4. To the extent that material assistance may be forthcoming from the United States, more emphasis will be placed on economic help and less on military assistance.

5. The future role of the United States will continue to be significant in the affairs of Asia. It will be enacted, however, largely in the economic realm and on the basis of multilateral cooperation.

6. The United States will look with favor on multilateral political, economic, and security arrangements among the Asian nations and, where appropriate, will assist in efforts which may be undertaken thereunder.

III. REACTIONS TO THE NEW ASIAN DOCTRINE

Achievement of many of the objectives stated above involves a reduction in the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia. While this report does not deal with Vietnam, it is obvious that the war there is the main cause of the massive dimensions which the U.S. presence has attained. That the possibilities of diminution are bound up with the end of that tragic conflict does not mean that application of the new doctrine must await the war's termination. Quite apart from Vietnam, there are other areas where contractions may be possible. Most immediately, under the new approach there is the possibility of curbing what seem to be built-in tendencies in the many-sided U.S. establishments in Asia to expand the U.S. presence.

In general, the leaders of Asian countries agree that the role of the United States in Asian affairs should shrink. Some uneasiness does exist that the pendulum will swing too far, from overinvolvement to noninvolvement. The fear is that the United States may leave the smaller Asian states in isolation and under the shadow of one or another more powerful neighbor.

There is also some uncertainty as to what the new doctrine will mean in specific terms. This uncertainty is understandable since there was not, at the time of my visit, any sign of a followthrough to the new doctrine. Indeed, other than the transient stimulus of the President's recent personal appearance, little, if any, change was visible. The concepts, practices, and programs by which U.S. missions in Asia have operated for many year remain the same.

Notwithstanding the President's recent visit and Presidential statements to the contrary, some U.S. missions still expect this Nation to continue as a major military factor in Southeast Asia after the conclusion of the war in Vietnam. Developments within Southeast Asian countries are still referred to as "vital"to this Nation's interests, "vital" implying more of a commitment than can be derived from a reasonable reading of the President's new approach. Ironically, in some U.S. embassies an inconsistency is not seen between budgetary requests for greatly increased U.S. bilateral assistance and, hence, greater U.S. participation in the indigenous situation, on the one hand, and the administration's new doctrine on the other.

In short, there is no indication, as yet, of when or how the size of the U.S. presence in Asia is to be reduced in any significant degree. It is a fact that the only reductions contemplated at the time of my visit were those which might result from a continuance of periodic blanket percentage cuts in personnel. These cuts were begun more than a year ago, not as a matter of policy so much as a measure of economy and as a palliative for balance-of-payments concerns.

It would appear, therefore, that the first order of business under the new doctrine is to see to it that the President's new concepts are reiterated and thoroughly explained throughout the U.S. departments and agencies concerned and that they are disseminated among all U.S. officials in Southeast Asia. It would appear, too, that directives which are both clear and firm will have to emanate from Washington if these concepts are to be applied effectively and with necessary dispatch by U.S. missions in Southeast Asia.

V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The President's new doctrine clearly calls for a contraction of the official U.S. presence in Southeast Asia. In some instances, the nations of the region have anticipated this contraction; in all the nations which I visited, there is understanding of its inevitability. Most are ready for the transition and, in general, welcome it, provided the U.S. interest does not disappear suddenly under a tidal wave of national retrenchment or indifference.

The President's doctrine, of course, does not carry in any sense the latter implication. Indeed, only by an utter disregard of our own national interests could we disengage completely our concern from the affairs of the Western Pacific. Without any such abrupt withdrawal, there is ample room for an orderly contraction of the prevailing U.S. presence in Asia. Most pressing, there is an immediate need for restraints on the built-in tendency of the presence to grow.

There is room, for example, for the following:

1. A contradiction of bilateral U.S. aid efforts and a shift to expanding U.S. participation in multilateral efforts in the economic development of the region.

2. A rigid and immediate curb on military aid and no deepening of our direct military involvement with any Asian government, to be followed by a reexamination of longstanding treaty commitments and their organizational substructures, notably SEATO.

3. Official encouragement and support of commercial, cultural, technical, and all other forms of nonmilitary interchange on a mutual basis, scaled to the level of the capacity and the clearly expressed desires of the Asian nations.

In my judgment, an interpretation of the administration's doctrine into policies and practices which follow the above lines would be acceptable in most Southeast Asian nations. Nor is it a matter of waiting for the end of the war in Vietnam. To be sure, when this costly and tragic enmeshment is brought to a close, the way will be facilitated for more rapid change. As I have already indicated above, however, and, as I have detailed in specific recommendations to the President in confidential reports, there is much that can be initiated now in order to contract and adjust American activities in Southeast Asia to bring them into line with his Guam Declaration.

It is necessary to reiterate, however, that as of the time of my visit to the region, the President's pronouncements had brought no follow-through in the U.S. missions abroad. Nor did they indicate to me the receipt of new guidance and instructions from the agencies of the executive branch. It would seem to me, therefore, that if the President's initiative is to precipitate the changes which it promises, there is a need for close collaboration between the responsible officials in the elected administration and the Congress.

As a first step, it would be my suggestion that an immediate freeze be placed on all official personnel increases, military or civilian, in Southeast Asia whether by Presidential order, with strong Congressional support, or, if necessary, by legislation, supported by the President, pending full study of the wide range of functions which are now pursued by U.S. Government agencies in Southeast Asia. Some of these functions which began many years ago appear ill-fitted or ill-scaled to present need. A full examination of this kind might well involve a joint effort of the President and the Congress, or it might involve parallel studies or multiple studies by one or the other. However it proceeds, this study should go forward, in my judgment, without delay. It is essential to the maintenance of a U.S. position in Southeast Asia which is relevant to our national interests, to the interests of the people of Asia and to the peace of the Pacific.

Mr. MANSFIELD. May I say that the Nixon doctrine, to me, means a low profile, not just in Southeast Asia or in east Asia, but also in all other parts of the world, as the Senator from Vermont has said. The Nixon doctrine means to me that troops will gradually be withdrawn from overseas in places such as Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan, Okinawa, Japan, and the Philippine Islands, and that our bases will be reduced—they number approximately 2,000 at the present time—and that this doctrine applies to Western Europe just as it does to Asia.

May I say, also, that I concur with the distinguished Senator from Vermont, the ranking Republican in this body, in his plea for a bipartisan conduct of our foreign policy and closer consultation between the Executive and the Senate. Somewhere, somehow, there must be the beginnings of an end to the conflict in which we are engaged, and that end will have to be, in my opinion, not a miltary settlement, not a tit-for-tat policy, but a negotiated settlement. Until that negotiated settlement is found, the fires of conflict will continue to blaze in Indochina; and if the fires continue to burn, what nation will then claim the victory? All nations involved will only have lost.

So I join the Senator. I hope that what he has had to say will be given consideration downtown, I hope that all of us, regardless of our feelings, will recognize that there is no black and white picture so far as Southeast Asia is concerned; that there are gray areas which must be considered. Hopefully, there will come a coordination and an accommodation and a sense of cooperation which will benefit us not as individuals, not the parties we represent, but—to repeat what I said in the beginning and which I think is the basis of the distinguished Senator's speech—the welfare of the people of the Nation.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I point out again that, to me, the Nixon doctrine means that we play as a member of the team and not as a coach who assigns each of the other members to the position which we think they should occupy.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes. Not leadership; partnership would be better.