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Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

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town will take my remarks seriously, because the fault is not entirely on one side.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I want to add my commendation to those of my colleagues to the distinguished senior Senator from Vermont for the remarks he made this morning. As always, listening to Senator Aikens is education- al. When he speaks, it is like a breath of fresh air. His candor is commendable. His integrity, his ability, and his honesty are unquestioned. Would that we had more George Aikens. The country would be a good deal better off.

I agree with the distinguished Senator in his call for bipartisanship. I have been aware of the fact that in all too many discussions in this body there have been those who have attacked, those who have defended, and very few who have understood the gray area in between. The fault lies not wholly with the White House, nor does virtue lie wholly within the confines of the Senate. We have both made our share of mistakes.

I would hope, in the interest of the Nation, the responsibility which the Senate has shown during the past 2 years will continue, and that all of us will work together—the legislative and the executive—to end that the Nation will come ahead of any particular party.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-pore. Under the previous order, the Senator from Montana is recognized for 15 minutes.

FOREIGN AID POLICY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, this has been a troubled and confusing and agonizing weekend. We have been confronted with a request for tens of millions of dollars in aid for Cambodia, in addition to aid for Indonesia, Vietnam, Korea, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel.

In all those areas, only one part was previously authorized, and that is the $500 million credit to Israel, which was incorporated in the defense authorization bill, agreed to some weeks ago. The others are not authorized and will be the subject of hearings in committee and debate on the floor of the Senate.

I can find justification for assistance to Jordan and Lebanon in the sum of $30 million and $5 million, respectively, because it will tend to stabilize the situation in the Middle East; and the credits to Israel will tend to keep us from becoming involved physically. I do not want to see this Nation become involved physically anywhere else in the world unless it is in the interest of our own security; and when I say I do not want to see any more Vietnams, I mean it, because even one Vietnam is too much.

I can understand also the reason for the aid-proposal for Korea, because it is tied to a drawdown of 20,000 American troops from that country.

I can understand it in South Vietnam, because it is tied to the continued withdrawal of U.S. troops. Hopefully that will be accelerated.

But I find it difficult to locate any compensating factors as far as the Cam-
bodian-aid proposal is concerned. It appears to me that if we act on the basis of this request, we will just be making a second downpayment, because the first has already been made over the past few months by aid from U.S. or Cambodian through withdrawals from funds which had originally been allocated to Taiwan, Greece, and Turkey.

As to the situations which developed over the weekend, I am concerned. I am uneasy. When you tie the request for aid to Cambodia with the 250-plane flight over North Vietnam, with the commando raid some 23 miles west of Hanoi, I think we have a set of circumstances which should cause us concern.

I point out that history seems to prove that air power is not the weapon. It must keep in mind; their safety is something which all of us devoutly pray for. There has been some talk about an understanding which all of us devoutly pray for. They are still being held in North Vietnam, and I would wonder no later than November 24, 1970

The President does have a responsibility. His is the ultimate responsibility. But, as the distinguished Senator from Vermont has indicated, we also have a responsibility.

One may wonder at their reactions, now, after even this modest scaledown seems to be in the process of abandonment. Mr. KARNOV touches on the basic factor that seems to trap successive administrations—iden
tifying the present administration—in this unending involvement in Indochina notwithstanding efforts to terminate it.

The summary of the special issue of the Foreign Service Journal points out that many of our diplomats who are closely involved in these affairs were fearful of the sweeping change in policy implicit in the Nixon doctrine when it was first proposed. In due course, however, they came to the conclusion that, by and large, it was a mistake and that the idea of “lowering our profile” a little might actually have some virtues.

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I understood to be the Nixon doctrine as it has been enunciated and propounded by the White House and the State Department. I should like to ask the Senator another question.

Does the Senator think that the Nixon doctrine is a cover for the recent bombing of North Vietnam? To put it another way, does that action raise or "lower the profile of the United States in Asia"? In my judgment, it is essential to avoid the impression of that we are retreating from the commitments that we have undertaken.

Mr. AIKEN. I think the answer to those questions is perfectly obvious. It does not improve our profile in the rest of the world. It will not improve our prospects of getting completely out of the war in Southeast Asia at an early date.

In fact, we have been through this before. The majority leader may remember the day we were called to the White House along with several of our colleagues, to be told that we would be undertaking the bombing of North Vietnam; and it was pointed out that a few bombs dropped on them would soon bring them to their knees and they would be begging for peace.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is correct.

Mr. AIKEN. The Senator may recall that I protested rather vigorously to the President, Mr. McNamara, and Secretary Rusk, but they went ahead with it. I had hoped that by the thousand planes, including many of our finest aviators, and something like 500 helicopters, I fear that these new raids, these incursions, this hope that they are in fact a prelude to no invasion—will simply delay the end of the war, just as the initial bombing of North Vietnam.

I do worry about the effect which this failure to rescue prisoners of war—in spite of the fact that it was bravely carried out—may have on the more than 450,000 Americans who are held in the North, that we cannot abandon those people. The South Vietnamese hold about 30,000 prisoners of war. North Vietnam holds over 60,000 prisoners, according to our estimates. Certainly, we are not going to abandon the hostages who are held by the North Vietnamese, and the war will not be over until they have been accounted for and released.

I certainly appreciate the remarks of the Senator from Montana in regard to this whole matter. It points up the need for better understanding.

I understand, Mr. President, that perhaps two or three Members of Congress were called in the middle of the night to be kept informed of this last-resort operation of the air raids on Vietnam was in effect. But that is not consultation.

Mr. MANSFIELD. No. But I would say it is a continuation of an old policy in which Members have been informed after the fact. That happened in previous administrations as well.

Mr. AIKEN. The Senator may recall that when I was President, the predecessor to President Nixon, used to advise us shortly before the fact, a few hours in advance, and then asked us to keep still about it, which we did.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I appreciate the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Vermont.

I ask your attention that excerpts from my interpretation of the Nixon doctrine, as contained in a report I made to the Committee on Foreign Relations and to the Senate, private capacity, a year ago last August, be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

PERSPECTIVE ON ASIA: THE NEW U.S. DOCTRINE AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

(Report of Senator Mike Mansfield to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate)

Today, there are treaties and executive agreements and an accumulation of decisions of the executive branch which enmesh this Nation deeply in the affairs of Southeast Asia. In consequence, there are over 600,000 U.S. troops and 200,000 Vietnamese, 60,000 in Thailand. In the general area and at least partially connected with our involvement in Southeast Asia, over 300,000 men in Japan, 45,000 in Okinawa; 10,000 in Taiwan; 60,000 in the 7th Fleet; 30,000 in the Philippines and additional forces in Guam—in all, a figure approaching 1,000,000.

Whatever the initial validity of these immense commitments is, it seems to me to take on severe cultural and political dimensions, just as whether it is wise or beneficial for this Nation and the countries concerned to perpetuate the present state of affairs. In the first place, the independence of Asian countries would be hollow indeed if it involved merely an additional military establishment for the indefinite prop of U.S. support. From our own point of view, moreover, the United States cannot afford to be a peripheral nation now. Our vital interests with respect to the Asian mainland have always been peripheral. They are likely to remain peripheral in the future.

On the other hand, we have been and will continue to be a Pacific Nation, our interests are indeed, lodged in that ocean. Four of our States border on the Pacific. In addition, our borders lie in the middle of that vast expanse of water. We have territories and dependencies all over the Pacific. The Aleutians, part of the State of Alaska. American Samoa, Guam, Wake, Johnston, Midway and the Howland, Jarvis, and Baker Islands, dependencies of the United States. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, which we have administered since the end of World War II, comprises over 2,000 islands and atolls within a land area of 678 square miles scattered over 3 million square miles of the Pacific.

As a Pacific power, we have and will continue to have a profound interest in what transpires in the western reaches of that ocean. In my judgment, however, that interest can best be expressed not by our intervention in the regions' internal political affairs but by an orderly, responsible, and judicious participation, as Pacific nations among several, in its peaceful development.

Indeed, it is difficult to discern any other realistic course for this Nation in present circumstances. It is a choice. The age in which foreign military dominance of any Asian people was a practical possibility is long since ended. Even the postwar period of one-sided dependency—most of it on the United States—is drawing to a close. Civilized survival, not to speak of peace and progress in the Western Pacific, may well depend on the timely emergence of a new age of national self-reliance, based on mutual respect, on a basis of mutual respect, and on a mutual basis of technological development and assistance. That is a course that reduces the risk of war and increases the likelihood of peace.

II. THE PRESIDENT'S NEW ASIAN DOCTRINE

In the course of his recent trip, President Nixon enunciated in the Guam Declaration a new approach to Asian Pacific which seems to me to take cognizance of the considerations that are outlined in the preceding section. The President's doctrine contains the following precepts, as I understand them and as I interpret to you:

1. The United States will maintain its treaty commitments, but it is anticipated that the United States will be able to meet the treaty commitments and maintain their own defense problems, perhaps with some outside material assistance but without outside manpower. Nuclear threats are
November 24, 1970

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

another matter, and such threats will continue to be checked by counterposed nuclear capacities.

2. As a Pacific power, the United States will not turn its back on nations of the Western Pacific, but its policies in that area will not be denied a concerned and understanding ear in this Nation.

3. We will avoid the creation of situations in which there is such great dependence on us that, inevitably, we become embroiled in their local difficulties, or we are essential to their problems and conflicts.

4. To the extent that material assistance may be forthcoming from the United States, the more emphasis will be placed on economic help and less on military assistance.

5. The United States will continue to be significant in the affairs of Asia. It will be enjoined, however, largely in a manner consistent with and on the basis of multilateral cooperation.

6. The United States will look with favor on Southeast Asia. This is not to say that the various nations of the region have not anticipated this contract; in all the nations which I visited, there is understanding of its inevitability. Most are ready for the transition and, in general, welcome it. As a result, the United States interests do not disappear suddenly under a wave of national retribution or indifference.

V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The President's new doctrine clearly calls for a contraction of the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia. In some instances, the nations of the region have anticipated this contraction; in all the nations which I visited, there is understanding of its inevitability. Most are ready for the transition and, in general, welcome it. As a result, the United States interests do not disappear suddenly under a wave of national retribution or indifference.

The President's doctrine, of course, does not carry in any sense the latter implication. Indeed, only by an utter disregard of our own national interests can the Congress insist completely on our concern from the affairs of the Western Pacific. Without any such abrupt withdrawal, there can be no orderly contraction of the prevailing U.S. presence in Asia. Most pressing, there is an immediate need for restraint on the unilateral and precipitate the changes which the President's new concepts are directed to avoid.

In all, however, there is the basis of the distinguished Senator's visit.

Mr. AISKEN. Mr. President, I point out again that, to me, the Nixon doctrine means that we play as a team and not as a coach who assigns each player to his position. I hope that all of the nonmilitary practices which follow the above lines would be acceptable in most Southeast Asian nations. Not so in Vietnam. Here we have the fires continue to burn, what nation will then claim the victory? All nations involved will only have lost.

So I join the Senator. I hope that what he has had to say will be given consideration downtown, I hope that all of these decisions will be made on the basis that there is no black and white picture so far as Southeast Asia is concerned; that there are gray areas which will be considered. Hopefully, there will come a coordination and an accommodation and a sense of cooperation which will benefit us not as individuals, not the parties we represent, but-to repeat what I said in the beginning and which I think is the basis of the distinguished Senator's speech-the welfare of the people of the Nation.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes. Not leadership; partnership would be better.