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Congressional Record S. 6678 - Troop Withdraws In Europe

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

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have an all-volunteer army. We have tried to discriminate against our own citizens and their wives in a manner that I could not imagine any country in the world doing.

We have never given this a fair try.

Mr. President, I will have a little more to say later. However, I conclude my statement at this time.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum with the proviso that I do not lose my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at the present time there are over 300,000 U.S. military personnel, including 20,000 in the 6th Fleet, stationed in Western Europe. Of this number, 128 are general flag officers, or one general flag officer for every 2,343 men.

That is an introductory statement.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may submit an amendment to H.R. 6531, a bill to amend the Military Selective Service Act of 1967; to increase military pay; to authorize military active duty strengths for fiscal year 1972, and for other purposes; and I further ask unanimous consent that, after the reading of the amendment—and I do this with the approval of the authors of the pending amendment—the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, the amendment offered by the Senator from Montana—and I only read it a few minutes ago—is a far-reaching matter. It is highly important. It involves international policies. However, any Member might wish to vote on it. I am sure most Members want a thorough discussion and debate on it. I would not be in a position to agree now to make it the pending matter.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Would the Senator mind withdrawing his amendment so that I can offer my amendment and then the Senator's amendment could follow my amendment?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may I be heard on that request?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I understand the Senator from Pennsylvania has a right to do so voluntarily if he wishes to do so.

Mr. STENNIS. Reserving the right to object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I suggest to the Senator from Pennsylvania before he agrees to withdraw his amendment that there be time for a conference. I think the amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania goes to the very vitals of this entire bill. The major part of the debate on it will affect the
whole system of the Selective Service Act, the entire military setup, and I welcome the debate on it, and a vote on it. However, I really do not think it should be set aside now and another amendment brought up.

To that extent I appeal to the Senator from Pennsylvania in the interest of orderly procedure that he not withdraw his amendment. He told me on Friday and he told me this morning that he wanted to bring up his amendment. I had asked him not to at that time. I told him I would let him know when the committee had gotten near the point of making its initial presentation. I notified him to that effect. I hope that now he does not withdraw his amendment, certainly until we can have a conference.

Mr. SCHWEIKER. Is the Senator willing to have a conference on it now?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I will go ahead with my speech while the Senators confer.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana is recognized.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, has the amendment been read?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It has not been read.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask that the amendment be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be read by the clerk.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I withdraw my request in view of the situation that developed, but I want the amendment read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The request for the amendment to be offered for purposes of parliamentary action is withdrawn and the amendment will be read for the information of the Senate. The amendment was read, as follows:

At the end of the bill add a new title as follows:

TITLE IV--REDUCTION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE

Sec. 401. (a) The Congress hereby finds that the number of United States military personnel stationed in Europe can be significantly reduced without endangering the security of Western Europe, and that such a reduction would have a favorable effect on this Nation's national defense position and would help avoid recurring international monetary crises involving the value of the dollar. Congress therefore finds that the purpose of this section to provide for such a reduction at the earliest practicable date.

(b) No funds appropriated by the Congress may be used after December 31, 1971, for the purpose of supporting or maintaining in Europe any military personnel of the United States in excess of 150,000.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my name be added as a cosponsor of the amendment of the Senator from Montana, if the Senator has no objection.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The name of the Senator from Alaska is added as a cosponsor of the amendment.

The Senator from Montana is recognized.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the essential purpose of this amendment is to bring about a reduction of approximately 150,000 Armed Forces personnel below the number presently stationed in Europe.

In short, the amendment says it is too late for the U.S. Government to keep playing the role of Wilkins Micawber, hoping that something "turns up," a full-blown monetary crisis created in large part by our failure to deal decisively with our enormous balance-of-payments deficit. These in turn derive mainly from our military expenditures in Vietnam, in Europe, and elsewhere around the world.

Mr. President, for several years now other Senators and I who have long felt that an excessive number of American troops and dependents are stationed in Europe have been strenuously cautioned against precipitous action to reduce those totals. Several times I have introduced resolutions making clear our belief in the need for a substantial reduction in our forces in Europe. Several times I have wished to disrupt an allegedly delicate situation, or to give any justification to those who might charge that we in the Senate have not given the matter the informed and careful consideration to the problem.

The cautious voices urging us to wait and see have raised a variety of reasons why we should not act now. But we are told there can be no question but that the present level of American troops in Europe in time must be reduced, and reduced substantially. But the cautionary voices keep murmuring that now is not the time.

We have been told that so-called offset agreements with West Germany are going far toward closing the serious U.S. balance-of-payments deficits incurred by our military expenditures in Europe. Yet, on examination we have found that much of the offset payment has turned out to be relatively short-term German loans to the United States. These merely postpone our problem; they do nothing to reduce the deficit.

Then at the NATO ministerial meeting late last year quite a different tack was attempted. In December we were told that our European allies would be making a special effort to strengthen their forces. As part of the supposed bargain the United States would not only maintain its current levels of forces intact, but would also contribute to the projected increased effectiveness of the alliance's military position. Once again, close examination reveals that the much touted special effort over the period of the next 5 years at best will represent rather modest progress.

Over the next 5 years the Europeans together plan to spend an additional $100 million toward improving their forces level and readiness. While a similar sum would be invested in infrastructure facilities located on European soil for logistical and related purposes. In any one of the next 5 years the combined extra European payments to be roughly $200 million, or about one-ninth of the annual U.S. balance-of-payments deficit incurred as a result of American military expenditures in Europe. This, to me, is not a very impressive effort when one considers how much energy and time went into arguing for an increase which would encourage Americans to believe that the corner had at last been turned.

When other arguments fail—as indeed they do in this case—something always seems to fall back on something which we can only call the psychological argument. We have been lectured countless times about the statements of West German efforts to promote detente, under the heading of "ostpolitik," should not be disrupted or endangered in the slightest by any action which would affect the balance of military forces in Europe. No one is more interested than I in promoting a peaceful dialogue between the Soviet Union and the Western allies leading to a permanent and reliable stabilization of the European scene. However, I have never believed that this is a short-term proposition or process. If we are to wait for the full success of Ostpolitik before we can change our force levels in Europe, then we may have to be prepared to endure a stalemate which could last for two decades, because some of the arguments against this proposal to reduce our forces in Europe seem to have a ring of permanency about them, and some of my colleagues feel that U.S. troops should remain in Europe ad infinitum.

The related point is also stressed that we must take no action which could jeopardize the political situation of the Brandt government in Germany. There is no question about the depth of the Chancellor's commitment to the West. Yet, it is conjectured that some other German leader in the future might try to work out a unilateral deal with the Soviet Union at the expense of the Alliance if the United States were to jar the supposedly delicate psychological balance of the German people. Frankly, this sort of argument is not flattering to the German people—anything more than comparable speculation abroad is to us about as plausible as the appearance of the United States. Both countries should resist and reject these hypotheses. Indeed, one could turn the argument around and contend that the two largest German political parties are uninterested advocates of Western European unity, it would be better to scale down the U.S. presence while they are in office and can handle any possible repercussions.

Mr. President, today we are seeing the high cost of postponement of consideration of current posture in Europe. The support of the administration in this time to grant Members of this body have taken the floor to discuss our persistent and increasing balance-of-payments deficits, which urge a dedicated attention to their problem, and to prophecy critical times ahead if matters are left for the most convenient time. The distinguished senior Senator from Missouri (Mr. FARMER) has discussed the distinguished senior Senator from Illinois (Mr. PASCY), have given us an excellent lead in warning against just what has come to pass; yet another international monetary upheaval.

Last year the United States incurred
a record balance-of-payments deficit of over $10 billion on an annual basis. Instead of taking the lead in calling for early and dramatic measures to overhaul the system which could produce such a deficit, this sensitive branch devoted most of its efforts to figuring out different means of computing the balance-of-payments formula and urging us that the situation, although admittedly less than desirable—was tolerable.

Unfortunately, the financial community in the West German capital has been worrying about the very real problems of the United States. When they looked at this country they have seen mounting black holes on a beach where the administration, figuratively speaking, sits like King Canute, with arms folded, saying that it will not be moved by the floods of gold they foresee.

It is too bad we have forgotten the original point of the story was that of an astute ruler showing his adoring courtiers that his power had limits.

In Western Europe reaction amounts to a vote of no confidence in the international monetary scene. While we have been worrying about the fancied psychological vulnerability of our own nation, the West German authorities have been worrying about the very real problems of the United States. When they looked at this country they have seen mounting black holes on a beach where the administration, figuratively speaking, sits like King Canute, with arms folded, saying that it will not be moved by the floods of gold they foresee.

It is too bad we have forgotten the original point of the story was that of an astute ruler showing his adoring courtiers that his power had limits.

In Western Europe reaction amounts to a vote of no confidence in the international monetary policies pursued by our Government, Ironic, this is in the West, where in the past, they have been looking up to us as the leader in giving expression to their sentiments. Confidence in the willingness of the United States to put its house in order has certainly not been increased by this golden token of confidence. It is too bad we have forgotten the original point of the story was that of an astute ruler showing his adoring courtiers that his power had limits.

The financial scene in Western Europe is of the same magnitude. Confidence in the willingness of the United States to put its house in order has certainly not been increased by this golden token of confidence. It is too bad we have forgotten the original point of the story was that of an astute ruler showing his adoring courtiers that his power had limits.

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of firing at the enemy. The remaining 9,000 or so administrative command and logistic support positions within the division! This means that in terms of control and administrative command, the U.S. Army in West Germany has only about 40,000 soldiers in its combat divisions, all assigned to placing killing fire on the enemy.

There is no valid military reason why the Army, with its manpower, could not have the need to create an active division of about 100,000 men to command and supply a combat force of 30,000 soldiers of which less than 2,000 are in the U.S. Army. For example, Army doctrine indicates that a corps headquarters “normally” commands two or more divisions. In World War II, each combat corps normally commanded an average of four divisions. Moreover the U.S. Seventh Army, occupied territory with three corps during World War II combat.

So why then does it require two corps headquarters and a field army headquarters to command the equivalent of five understrength divisions in peace time? Because the U.S. Army in West Germany has grown heavy through (a) bureaucratic inertia, (b) military preference for soft career living in Europe rather than extended periods of living in such places as Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri or Fort Polk, Louisiana and (c) lack of control over military policy. At least 50,000 men could be brought home from West Germany without reducing the conventional combat capability of the existing U.S. Army presence if those forces were streamlined and efficiently organized, commanded and supplied by the Seventh Army’s president, President Kennedy. The manpower that needs to be maintained, this much manpower could be converted from fat to combat muscle.

This problem justifies the huge costs incurred to support the existing system of organization and command. It cost $ 2.2 billion in 1965 to maintain 19 combat forces in West Germany. This figure does not include the additional costs involved in moving, and supporting, the consumption of household goods and automobiles of the military personnel and their dependents who were automatically rotating back and forth during fiscal 1970. Much of this rotation is unnecessary and is done only for career improvements for officers in the U.S. Army. This rotation means that nearly all Army personnel in Germany are either learning their job or “coasting,” waiting for something else.

In any event there is no acceptable justification for obvious military paucity even in time of the effort to require this excessive surplus when inflation mangles on tax-dollar and domestic programs are forced to exist on subsistence levels.

PURPOSE
The organization of U.S. Army forces in Europe is unsatisfactory in terms of costs and manpower utilization. Even worse are the problems which are created by their mission.

The U.S. combat units—in concert with other NATO forces—are supposed to be able to fight a conventional war against Soviet and satellite troops. Let us assume that our 220,000 men were organized and commanded efficiently. Would there be a reasonable prospect that they could do what they are supposed to do successfully? The answer is probably not.

Part of this answer is prompted by the locations, and sheer numerical advantage enjoyed by their adversary: nearly 200 Soviet and East European divisions (about 2 million men) to be thrown into battle against 8 NATO divisions (about 350,000 men).

There are other disadvantages.

ILL POSITIONS
Relative positions of forward units. Within sight of many of the autobahns leading westward through East Germany, forward Soviet divisions are positioned in austere, mobile tank and truck parks. The distance from a soldier’s tent or hut, to his tank, is a quick or slow ride of minutes.

Contrast this with the positioning of U.S. Army forward units: the troops live in barrack compounds a half mile or more from their tanks and vehicles.

The truck parks themselves are not always immediately accessible for roads. The time needed to get our troops on the road is more than minutes.

U.S. division is still comfortably positioned in the World War II occupation-zone positions that they took up when they arrived in Southern Germany in 1950-51 during the dark days of the Korean War. But strategic considerations would most likely motivate the Soviet armored forces to strike boldly across the flat North German plains along the historic invasion route to the Ruhr and the English Channel ports. U.S. Army forces would undoubtedly be needed to help defend the industrial heart of Europe but also to protect their own supply lines which were the war run back to the channel ports. To accomplish this, they would have to be able to move considerable distances to the north to reach viable battle positions. If a sudden attack occurred, they would have to make this movement across roads jammed with other NATO forces, Allied and American. The annihilation of retreating Soviet soldiers (many of whom would be their own wives and children attempting to flee) and constant traffic jam of U.S. and American military transport. Time would be critical in such a northern movement; only hours would be available to get the U.S. forces in position as soon as possible. This time would not be able to bring about the advance of the Soviet Union and delay their advance westward.

There is no question that we would have absolute air superiority, could our forces be rushed to the Soviet advance. Yet during the invasion period during which... (this delayed an invasion which is not now reported to be 225,000 U.S. soldiers, presumably increased as much as possible, and required. And this movement would have been conducted under peacetime conditions)

Even assuming that Soviet long range missiles have reached maximum levels of nuclear air superiority. I know of no military planner who honestly assumes that the U.S. President, if faced with such a situation, would choose... (in this war)

If this occurs, it is likely that the U.S. President would be faced with the agonizing choice of dropping a new weapon in the West European theater of operations, sending a new weapon to West European nations to... (then we might as well have a database)

The President would be faced with the choice of either authorizing the military command to use a new weapon of unprecedented power and effectiveness and (thereby open a nuclear war) or deny their use and risk the loss of a field army and millions of civilians which they have already done... (in a nuclear war, would not be an attractive one for any President. Yet every President for the past 20 years has agreed with the possibility as a result of our efforts to maintain the fiction of a conventional war capacity in Europe)

The choice is complicated by the fact that wives and children of U.S. servicemen would be the most inevitable victims of our nuclear weapons. The warning period from hostilities being some of the important warnings. In... (if hosts... is not reported to... the President's... lives)

If hosts. If this is because they could quickly and deliberately... (if this weapon is not dropped)

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which the U.S., until recently, held a vast advantage. In other words political expediency and parochial service interests have been allowed to supercede national best interests. The presence of our over 200,000-man conventional force in Europe is fraught with potentially dangerous risks to our national security and immense problems of organization and mission. It is long past time for concerned civilians and military officers to begin the very difficult task of streamlining our force structures and more responsibility rationalizing their purpose in Europe. Perhaps the recent signing of the West German-Soviet nonaggression pact marks the historical juncture for our work to begin in earnest.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

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Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I call up my amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment of the Senator from Montana will be stated.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I request the preparation last week of a memorandum on this overall question of troops in Europe by Mr. Edward L. King. Mr. King has had extensive opportunity to study these questions both as a staff planner within the military and as a sensible and concerned citizen since his retirement. He brings to bear a clearness of presentation of the arguments and a crispness of focus and recommendation that should benefit the entire Senate.

The memorandum is in every respect outstanding. I ask unanimous consent that this memorandum of Mr. King be printed at this point in the Record, so as, in effect to follow my previous remarks.

There being no objection, the memorandum was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

THE MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 6531) to amend the Military Selective Service Act of 1967; to increase military pay; to authorize military active duty strengths for fiscal year 1972; and for other purposes.

AMENDMENT NO. 86

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I call up my amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment of the Senator from Montana will be stated.

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The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

At the end of the bill add a new title as follows:

TITLE IV—REDUCTION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE

Sec. 401. (a) The Congress hereby finds that the number of United States military personnel stationed in Europe can be significantly reduced without endangering the security of Western Europe, and that such a reduction would have a favorable effect on this Nation's balance of payments problem and would help avoid recurring international monetary crises involving the value of the dollar abroad. It is therefore the purpose of this section to provide for such a reduction at the earliest practicable date.

(b) No funds appropriated by the Congress may be used after December 31, 1971, for the purpose of supporting or maintaining in Europe any military personnel of the United States in excess of 150,000.

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RETENTION OF U.S. FORCE LEVELS IN WESTERN EUROPE
OVERALL PROBLEM

Can the number of U.S. Armed Forces personnel in Europe be substantially reduced without seriously weakening the deterrent capability of the NATO military structure?

SOME FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

a. Over 300,000 U.S. military personnel (including 20,000 in the 6th Fleet) are stationed in Western Europe.

b. About 250,000 of these troops are assigned to the triservice U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). The U.S. investment in Defense has indicated that half of these assigned forces are combat personnel and the rest are support. Over 170,000 of the EUCOM total are U.S. Army troops.

c. Major USEUCOM combat elements are 4 1/2 Army divisions deployed in West Germany; 46,000 American personnel are not at full strength. According to Army Tables of Organization and Equipment the aggregate full strength numbers of these divisions would be around 10,500 men. It costs approximately $185 million to maintain one army division on overseas duty for one year.

d. There are about 113,500 Army and Air Force personnel stationed in the Continental United States (CONUS) and 2,343 men in the Department of the Army Europe.

For example, the headquarters operating cost for U.S. Army Europe was only 2.29 % of the total fund it was provided of $1.761,000,000.00.

2. In addition to these operating costs the 9 U.S. Army Command headquarters, for example, has an average of 1,286 other officers and 1,987 enlisted men all drawing higher salaries while performing command or staff jobs.

3. While the percentage of U.S. GNP going to defense has increased over the past 20 years, the dollar amount has declined.

4. Major NATO ground forces presently available in the center region of Europe consist of 22 divisions, organized as follows:

a. This total includes the 4 1/2 U.S. divisions plus 2 French divisions which can move forward rapidly to reinforce the forces deployed in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

b. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that each member "shallforthwith take such action as it deems necessary" and it can act individually and in concert with other parties in the event that an armed attack occurs in a member state. The parties do not commit themselves necessarily to take military action to repel any attack.

c. Article 11 of the NATO Treaty stipulates that the provisions of the Treaty shall be carried out "in concert with their respective constitutional processes.

d. Article 3 of the Treaty stipulates that members agree to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist attack. But no specific means are expressed for meeting this obligation.

Discussion pro and con of substantially reducing U.S. troop levels in Europe

Countless arguments have been advanced why it is not feasible or possible, to reduce substantially the U.S. forces in Europe. Generally these arguments follow fixed patterns and are based on hypothetical assumptions and predictions that in the authors' opinion are unfounded.

1. The U.S. Departments of State and Defense conducted a joint study of the risk of a military move in Europe if they believed American strategic nuclear power had been checked adequately. All conventional forces were seriously weakened.

2. A rigid concomitant belief by these two U.S. Departments in the doctrine of flexible response or "prompt, preface" is the primary reason for conventional troop levels as a necessity to counter any conventional war attack by Warsaw Pact forces without an early resort to nuclear weapons.

a. As part of this argument the case is also made that NATO conventional forces must be maintained at current levels so they can effectively meet any low level Soviet or Warsaw Pact military attack on the NATO area without having to go to nuclear war to counter such a probing action.

b. The technical difficulties cited in this argument are the agreed NATO assumptions of (1) limited unexpected conflicts which could give way to settlement by a period of political tension which could occur after a period of several weeks or more and (2) the assumption that any such unforeseen conflicts preclude a thin forward defense because such a defense would invite "probes," while being increased enough to be less likely and in effect deters all such options.

3. The belief that any substantial withdrawal of U.S. troop could demoralize Western Europe would ultimately unravel the entire NATO alliance.

It is also postulated that a substantial U.S. forces would be devastating to their morale and would inevitably lead to eventual Soviet dominance in Western Europe.

This result is predicated on the premise that any substantial withdrawal of U.S. forces would be the start of reduced European force levels and that the Soviets might risk causing the Europeans to lose confidence in the stability of their armed forces ability to deter Soviet attack.

4. Another variation of this argument is that the West Germany position that substantial U.S. troop cuts would demoralize Western European public opinion and convert the current mood of detente with the Soviets into one of appeasement.

5. The conviction that unilateral force reductions would weaken our hand in the current hope of negotiating with the Warsaw Pact countries for mutual balanced troop reductions.

a. As an adjunct to this argument it is also postulated that a substantial U.S. forces reductions would (in the eyes of the Europeans) signal a return to U.S. isolationism and indicate the U.S. would not defend Western Europe militarily viewed as the rationale for a concurrent rise of Soviet influence and eventual domination of Western Europe.

b. Another argument is that the West Germany position that substantial U.S. troop cuts would demoralize Western European public opinion and convert the current mood of detente with the Soviets into one of appeasement.

6. The belief that dollar savings inherent in a substantial troop reduction would be insignificant in relation to the risk to our national security.

7. The argument that forces approaching current levels must remain in Europe since forces hastily returned during a crisis are not as effective as those stationed in Europe.

a. A buffer to this argument is made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the SHAPE Commander General Goodpaster, who argue that it is not feasible to reduce even the logistial "tail" of the U.S. forces in Europe. They consider that such support troops are vital for the time when additional U.S. forces are flown to Europe during a crisis. They further contend that combat troops should not be reduced, but if cuts must be made, they should be made in combat forces rather than support forces.

8. Department of State belief that an overruling political argument against substantial reductions arises out of the transitional nature of the early 1970's in Europe and that troop cuts should not be made during this time.

They argue against a strategy of producing a destabilizing factor, which would not only limit our capacity to achieve effectively an improved future relationship with Western Europe.

In considering the counterweight pro arguments for making a substantial troop reduction, necessary posture makes them see arguments against a criteria of what these
U.S. troops actually do in a combat sense to defend the national security. And within that context, it is not possible to analyze the invalidity of the counter arguments advanced. The article attached as Appendix I covers some of the most significant aspects of the limitation, does not remove the ultimate decision at the option of either of the groups for tactical or strategic nuclear weapons. stationing independently in Central Europe. It is a specious argument because, in fact, it offers a valid flexible response to a determined Soviet conventional attack at any level of conflict. Such a conventional response is too weak to effectively react (the Berlin Crisis of 1961 is an excellent example of this weakness when the stripping and foredoomed to dismount to its vehicles inside East Germany and be counted by Soviet officers before being permitted to pass to Berlin). At the same time this force purports to permit effective flexibility in the manner of U.S. response to any level of Soviet military activity.

For example, under the provisions of Articles 5 and 11 of the NATO Treaty all members might not choose to react militarily to all levels of Soviet attack. Some provisions or institutional processes might inhibit or restrict a military response. After the Vietnam experience, it is clear that a force could in the near future conceivably not be favorable to an automatic military reaction to all levels of Soviet action. However, with present force levels stationed in Europe, the U.S. has no option but to become involved in some form of conflict. Such a conventional response is in fact too weak to have much chance of success even with all NATO forces participating and foredoomed to early failure if some would choose not to initially engage in a military response.

But this U.S. force is too large (over 170,000 men and 149,000 dependents with the 7th Army alone) to permit the President any degree of flexibility, or the U.S. constitutional process to influence time sensitivity. In regard to a response to almost any form of real or imagined Tonkin Gulf-type attack in Western Europe, if even a part of a field army of U.S. fighting men and their families, would take precedence over all other legitimate questions of U.S. national interests at the time. Because of their numbers and positioning the U.S. forces would have to be engaged in immediate fighting. Yet because of the insufficiency of the same numbers to fight effectively in conventional battle, there would be the urgent need to permit them to fire the Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM) mines during the first hours of any level of conflict. And there would be the follow-on need for them to quickly resort to further tactical nuclear weapon fires to protect themselves from being pocketed in the initial level of Soviet attack. The early use of nuclear weapons is not suppression. This use is written into the 7th Army battle plans.

In an appearance before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, General Goodpaster stated: "I believe that there is a probability that it would be necessary to use such weapons of tactical nuclear weapon."

General Lyman Lemnitzer, SHAPE Commander from 1962 to 1964, has stated: "The fundamental problems that would confront NATO today would be a large conventional attack. Then we would be faced with a decision to use nuclear weapons or be defeated."

These statements and 7th Army training exercises in which simulated tactical nuclear weapons are routinely used, would seem to discredit the concept that present force levels guarantee flexibility and preclude the early resort to nuclear weapons. The same war plans and exercises also minimize the possibility of limited Soviet probes in favor of preparation for a massive attack from Czechoslovakia and through the Fulda and Hof "gaps". This military planning is generally predicated on the assumption that an attack will follow a period of increasing tensions which will permit the evacuation of dependents, repositioning of 7th Army forces and reinforcement from the United States. This warning time allows a thickening of western European forces especially with NATO, and a military standpoint present troop levels do not conclusively deter the possibility of rather unlikely probes, nor give much probability of success, consistent with the use of major attack. It would require a much larger commitment of troops than either the U.S. or our NATO allies can afford to do this.

Analysis of Con Argument 3, that any substantial withdrawal of U.S. forces should not be considered an unraveling of the NATO alliance.

This argument is purely hypothetical. No substantial evidence has been advanced to support this thesis, nor is there any historical precedent which would indicate that such an unraveling of the alliance would be the inevitable result of a phasedown of U.S. troop levels to a force of, say, 100,000 men. Within the alliance there have been past reductions in our and British force levels, as well as the complete withdrawal of 10 French divisions from the NATO military command. The removal of the United States has not led to a disintegration of the alliance. On the contrary, it has caused re-strengthened to fulfill improved capability and interest in strengthening the Atlantic Alliance.

Analysis of Con Argument 4, concerning the psychological shock that substantial troop reduction would have on our European allies and which would result in eventual Soviet domination over Europe.

The substance of this argument has been stated by Martin J. Hillebrand, the Assistant Secretary of State for Defense, that: "The psychological shock on our European allies of an American withdrawal from Europe could be devastating. In our possession the power of Soviet power upon a Western Europe that knows itself to be militarily weak and politically divided could in time lead to a Soviet dominance." Furthermore, Mr. Hillebrand indicated that it "would be beyond the capacity of diplomacy to prevent the European situation from unraveling."

The foundation of this view is more emo...
tinuation of the status quo
But I can not believe
that even selves and I have lived over Isolationism. Truly that low, then where fall to understand the worldlines and maturity of the European people when we give U.S. serious credence to such unreasoned behavior.

continued nuclear guarantees and the reduction of two. In current West German efforts directed toward the easing of West German and control exercised by the Warsaw Pact is far in fact, the French withdrawal from NATO and subsequent efforts at detente with Russia still would exist after a troop reduction.

Analysis of Con Argument 7, that force levels must remain high because of the futility of detente during a crisis are not as effective as those permanently stationed in Europe.

The argument has little historical military substance in relation to the U.S. armed forces. In two world wars U.S. forces have traditionally fought well in Europe over battle terrain they had never seen before, from Normandy to the Rhine, battlefields change from day-to-day as do the personnel fighting the battle. Therefore faith in initial training and little actual effect after the first day or two of combat. If they are well trained, newly armed, they would be just as effective as those permanently stationed in Europe.

In a letter of April 27, 1970, to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Secretary of State in commenting on Senate Resolution 362, stated, "Additional redeployments would bring such disadvantages as the loss of constant liaison with forces on our flanks, danger of massive confusion in a crisis situation and increased risks to our forces as they moved forward into position. Moreover, any division we redeployed to the U.S. could only be returned to Europe quickly if we could redeploy the equipment and aircraft needed to provide it with lift for return of the forces. Since we already preposition equipment for some of our U.S. forces, any future redeployment with prepositioning would strain not only our transport capability but also storage facilities in Europe.

Most of these reasons are straw men. Due to the high personnel turnover in Europe the infantry combat units that I commanded there seldom were half the men in them who were even faintly familiar with the terrain over which our emergency mission called for us to fight. Liaison with forces on the flanks of the U.S. forces in Europe is the responsibility of headquarters higher than divisional. The Army plans to plan for the forward movement of U.S. forces in Western Europe in time of crisis, and it is the Army's plan for the day of "massive confusion" and increased risks to our forces then two decades of Army Command experience to do their job. If such a situation truly exists then all U.S. divisions should probably be withdrawn from West Germany. They can't hope to do the job. If such a situation truly exists then all U.S. divisions should probably be withdrawn from West Germany. They can't hope to do their job.
payments as keeping the divisions in Europe. One is to dual-base our state-side divisions that in Europe, with the National Guard or Reserve divisions and have each of these divisions use the same set of bases. This has now become a common practice.

If the division returned to Europe this heavy equipment could be left in the U. S. for use as the division was in Europe. This would not only be more efficient but the equipment could be used by both the U. S. and Defense people who for many bureau.
dictates that War status quo to assist us through our period and manpower to defend themselves. These are our national security the world.

This is the rhetorical used to justify keeping our military. Despite the Department of Defense in Europe. But it is not a factual assessment of the probable situation.

U.S. 7th Army must resort to early (within the first 34 to 90 hours of commencing battle to meet a sudden attack) first use of tactical nuclear weapons if it hopes to prevent being outflanked and pocketed against the Alps and annulated.

In my opinion one U.S. Army Corps containing an armored and mechanized infantry division reinforced with one armored cavalry regiment positioned along the line Bremen-Hannover-Kassel and supported by supply lines running back to Rotterdam or Amsterdam would provide a realistic U.S. contribution to NATO than our present one. Under this concept the present prepositioned armored and mechanized division could remain, as could the tanks of the armored division. We would provide the basis for an early reinforcement of 2 armored and 1 mechanized division if this was later required. Support forces left in Europe should be those required to support the division force, remain a drastically reduced number of stored equipment remaining in the prepositioned equipment. Air squadrons in West Germany should be those required to tactically support the Corps force and accomplish forward strategic missions. The Air Force in England should command all air elements in Europe. Navy elements should be command from ashore command ships under the Atlantic Commander. Only the Corps, division, and one logistic command headquarters should be left in Europe.

The forces in Europe should be optional. For example, the military member should have a possibility of serving in Europe without his family or 48 months with his family.

Above all we must stop deluding ourselves that we can afford to posture a truly effective conventional war deterrent to the Soviet Army in Central Europe. This force is a representative one of the best and 41 divisions actually no more sufficient for the mission than 2 divisions. There is no valid reason to continue to accept our defense strategy to reduce the nuclear forces in Europe.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.