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### Congressional Record S. 6678 - Troop Withdraws In Europe

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

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have an all-volunteer army. We have tried to discriminate against our own citizens and their wives in a manner that I could not imagine any country in the world doing.

We have never given this a fair try.

Mr. President, I will have a little more to say later. However, I conclude my statement at this time.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum with the proviso that I do not lose my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, at the present time there are over 300,000 U.S. military personnel, including 20,000 in the 6th Fleet, stationed in Western Europe. Of this number, 128 are general flag officers, or one general flag officer for every 2,343 men.

That is an introductory statement.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may submit an amendment to H.R. 6531, a bill to amend the Military Selective Service Act of 1967; to increase military pay; to authorize military active duty strengths for fiscal year 1972, and for other purposes; and I further ask unanimous consent that, after the reading of the amendment—and I do this with the approval of the authors of the pending amendment—the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, the amendment offered by the Senator from Montana—and I only read it a few minutes ago—is a far-reaching matter. It is highly important. It involves international policies. However, any Member might wish to vote on it. I am sure most Members want a thorough discussion and debate on it. I would not be in a position to agree now to make it the pending matter.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Would the Senator mind withdrawing his amendment so that I can offer my amendment and then the Senator's amendment could follow my amendment?

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may I be heard on that request?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I understand the Senator from Pennsylvania has a right to do so voluntarily if he wishes to do so.

Mr. STENNIS. Reserving the right to object—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I suggest to the Senator from Pennsylvania before he agrees to withdraw his amendment that there be time for a conference. I think the amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania goes to the very vitals of this entire bill. The major part of the debate on it will affect the

whole system of the Selective Service Act, the entire military setup, and I welcome the debate on it, and a vote on it. However, I really do not think it should be set aside now and another amendment brought up.

To that extent I appeal to the Senator from Pennsylvania in the interest of orderly procedure that he not withdraw his amendment. He told me on Friday and he told me this morning that he wanted to bring up his amendment. I had asked him not to at that time. I told him I would let him know when the committee had gotten near the point of making its initial presentation. I notified him to that effect. I hope that now he does not withdraw his amendment, certainly until we can have a conference.

Mr. SCHWEIKER. Is the Senator willing to have a conference on it now?

Mr. STENNIS. Yes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I will go ahead with my speech while the Senators confer.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana is recognized.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, has the amendment been read?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It has not been read.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask that the amendment be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be read by the clerk.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I withdraw my request in view of the situation that developed, but I want the amendment read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The request for the amendment to be offered for purposes of parliamentary action is withdrawn and the amendment will be read for the information of the Senate.

The amendment was read, as follows:

At the end of the bill add a new title as follows:

#### TITLE IV—REDUCTION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE

SEC. 401. (a) The Congress hereby finds that the number of United States military personnel stationed in Europe can be significantly reduced without endangering the security of Western Europe, and that such a reduction would have a favorable effect on this Nation's balance-of-payments problem and would help avoid recurring international monetary crises involving the value of the dollar abroad. It is therefore the purpose of this section to provide for such a reduction at the earliest practicable date.

(b) No funds appropriated by the Congress may be used after December 31, 1971, for the purpose of supporting or maintaining in Europe any military personnel of the United States in excess of 150,000.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my name be added as a cosponsor of the amendment of the Senator from Montana, if the Senator has no objection.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The name of the Senator from Alaska is added as a cosponsor of the amendment.

The Senator from Montana is recognized.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the essential purpose of this amendment is to bring about a reduction of approximately 150,000 Armed Forces personnel

below the number presently stationed in Europe.

In short, the amendment says it is too late for the U.S. Government to keep playing the role of Wilkins Micawber, hoping that something will soon "turn up." Something has indeed turned up: a full-blown monetary crisis created in large part by our failure to deal decisively with our enormous balance-of-payments deficits. These in turn derive mainly from our military expenditures in Vietnam, in Europe, and elsewhere around the world.

Mr. President, for several years now other Senators and I who have long felt that an excessive number of American troops and dependents are stationed in Europe have been strenuously cautioned against precipitous action to reduce those totals. Several times I have introduced resolutions making clear our belief in the need for a substantial reduction in our forces in Europe. Several times I have held off action because I have not wished to disrupt an allegedly delicate situation, or to give any justification to those who might charge that we in the Senate have not given the most mature and informed consideration to the problem.

The cautionary voices urging us to wait and see have raised a variety of reasons for inaction. Again and again we are told there can be no question but that the present level of American troops in Europe in time must be reduced, and reduced substantially. But the cautionary voices keep murmuring that now is not the time.

We have been told that so-called offset agreements with West Germany are going far toward closing the serious U.S. balance-of-payments deficits incurred by our military expenditures in Europe. Yet, on examination we have found that much of the offset payment has turned out to be relatively short-term German loans to the United States. These merely postpone our problem; they do nothing to resolve it.

Then at the NATO ministerial meeting late last year quite a different tack was attempted. In December we were told that our European allies would be making a special effort to strengthen their forces. As part of the supposed bargain the United States would not only maintain its current levels of forces intact, but would also contribute to the projected increased effectiveness of the alliance's military position. Once again, close examination reveals that the much touted special effort over the period of the next 5 years at best will represent rather modest progress.

Over each of the next 5 years the Europeans together plan to spend an additional \$100 million toward improving their force levels and readiness, while a similar sum would be invested in infrastructure—that is, the facilities located on European soil for logistical and related purposes. In any one of the next 5 years the combined extra European effort would amount to roughly \$200 million, or about one-ninth of the annual U.S. balance-of-payments deficit incurred as a result of American military expenditures in Europe. This, to me, is

not a very impressive effort when one considers how much energy and time went into arguing for an increase which would encourage Americans to believe that the corner had at last been turned.

When other arguments fail—as indeed they have—the executive branch always seems to fall back on something which we can only call the psychological argument. We have been lectured constantly over the last year on the theme that West German efforts to promote detente, under the heading of "ostpolitik," should not be disrupted or endangered in the slightest by any action which would affect the balance of military forces in Europe. No one is more interested than I in promoting a peaceful dialog between the Soviet Union and the Western allies leading to a permanent and reliable stabilization of the European scene. However, I have never believed that this is a short-term proposition or process. If we are to wait for the full success of ostpolitik before we can change our force levels in Europe, then we may have to be prepared to endure a stalemate which could last for one or two decades, or even longer, because some of the arguments against this proposal to reduce our forces in Europe seem to have a ring of permanency about them, and some of my colleagues feel that U.S. troops should remain in Europe ad infinitum.

The related point is also stressed that we must take no action which could jeopardize the political position of the Brandt government in Germany. There is no question about the depth of the Chancellor's commitment to the West. Yet, it is conjectured that some other German leader in the future might try to work out a unilateral deal with the Soviet Union at the expense of the Alliance if the United States were to jar the supposedly delicate psychological balance of the German people. Frankly, this sort of argument is not flattering to the German people—any more than comparable speculation abroad is to us about the possible faithlessness of the United States. Both countries should resent and reject these hypotheses. Indeed, one could turn the argument around and say that, since the leaders of the two largest German political parties are unqualified advocates of Western European unity, it would be better to scale down the U.S. presence while they are in office and can handle any possible repercussions.

Mr. President, today we are seeing the high cost of postponement of consideration of urgent problems. Time and again Members of this body have taken the floor to discuss our persistent and increasing balance-of-payments deficits, to urge immediate attention to the problem, and to prophesy critical times ahead if matters are left for the most convenient time. The distinguished senior Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) in particular, and also the distinguished senior Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), have given us an excellent lead in warning against just what has come to pass; yet another international monetary upheaval.

Last year the United States incurred

a record balance-of-payments deficit of over \$10 billion on an official settlements basis. Instead of taking the lead in calling for early and dramatic measures to overhaul the system which could produce such disruptive deficits, the executive branch devoted most of its efforts to figuring out different means of computing the balance-of-payments formula and to assuring us that the situation—although admittedly less than desirable—was tolerable.

Unfortunately, the financial community in Western Europe has taken quite a different view of the international monetary scene. While we have been worrying about the fancied psychological problems of West Germany, Europeans have been worrying about the very real problems of the United States. When they looked at this country they have seen mounting waves of unrest breaking on a beach where the administration, figuratively speaking, sits like King Canute, with arms folded, saying that it would not be moved by the urgency of the situation. Confidence in the willingness of the United States to put its house in order has certainly not been increased by our display of stubborn petulance. It is too bad we have forgotten the original point of the story was that of an astute ruler showing his adoring courtiers that his power had limits.

In fact, the European reaction amounts to a vote of no confidence in the international monetary policies pursued by our Government. Ironically, taking a lead in giving expression to this sentiment has been the country which has most strongly encouraged us to keep on playing the same world role, and to keep our forces in Europe intact. When the chips are down it appears that a number of our European allies are far more interested in their domestic concerns than they are in the international scene which they expect us to improve.

It seems to me we have been refusing to face up to a paradoxical European attitude which has persisted for some half dozen years. On the one hand, many of our European friends constantly urge us to maintain unchanged our commitments and our military forces. On the other hand, they argue strenuously for a reduction in our payments deficits, which are incurred largely from the activities which they say cannot be altered. As far as Vietnam is concerned, the NATO Allies offer little advice and less help; at least the French do us the favor of speaking their minds clearly and forcefully in urging withdrawal.

While a number of palliatives have been proposed and applied, our payments position in Europe and the world has deteriorated further. For example, in fiscal year 1968 the amount of U.S. defense expenditures entering the international balance of payments in Western Europe was about \$1.611 billion. In 1969 the figure fell slightly to \$1.586 billion. In fiscal year 1970, however, the figure had risen again to more than \$1.731 billion. This could hardly be termed progress.

Now we are in a position where we must break out of this endless circle of frustration and take clear-cut action to reduce

the payments deficits which have weakened international confidence in the dollar. Our European friends have met urgently to discuss means of coping with the currency crisis. Their main accomplishment was to reject for their own individual domestic reasons the compromise proposal put forward by the Commission of the European Community. In one case, we find the finance minister of a friendly nation avidly seeking the devaluation of the U.S. dollar. But there is no purpose to be served in complaining about the alarms and excursions of the international monetary situation. Our Government is just as much to blame as any other for failing to read the message on the wall.

Mr. President, my amendment is designed to bring about early relief to our pressing payments deficits abroad. It is an amendment which is necessary and reasonable. It will permit 150,000 American military personnel still to be stationed in Europe. Further, if these troops that will be returned are disbanded upon their return to the United States, it will represent a further gain for our budget, as well as our balance of payments. The financial savings in that case could well be as high as \$1½ billion.

It may be argued by some that this leaves uncertain the intentions of the United States with respect to the defense of Western Europe and with respect to the numbers of American forces for that defense. But if there is one cardinal foreign policy tenet agreed upon by virtually all Americans, it is the proposition that Western Europe, for a variety of reasons, must not be allowed to come under Soviet or other external domination. I will not go into all the many arguments we have made publicly over the last few years to support our contention that there is no compelling military argument for the exact number of forces which we now maintain in Europe. Instead, I would like to append to this statement an article on this subject by a recently retired Army officer, Edward L. King, written for the October 1970 issue of the Forum periodical, published by the Ripon Society. Mr. King makes many of the same arguments, and I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed at the conclusion of my remarks in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.  
(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in closing these remarks, let me stress that I believe my amendment represents a constructive move which will respond not only to the demands of American citizens for greater expenditures at home rather than abroad but also to the demands of our European allies for urgent American measures to get our payments deficits under control. This does not in any way represent a withdrawal from Western Europe or its defense. It is quite simply an illustration of the old French saying that one recalls in order to jump better.

Our forces in Europe have been inflated and musclebound, with far more logistical than combat capability. It is my conviction, and that of many other

observers—including experienced military men—that trimming away the fat in the form of excess supplies and headquarters will result in a leaner, more mobile, and more efficient combat force

#### EXHIBIT 1

[From the Ripon Forum, October 1970]

#### THE U.S. ARMY IN EUROPE

In a recent article I touched on a few of the strategic and tactical implications of the organization and purpose of U.S. Army forces in West Germany. Let's now more closely examine these implications and expand on the questions they raise in regard to U.S. conventional war force levels in Europe.

#### ORGANIZATION

Is the U.S. Army overstuffed in West Germany? One way to figure whether there is fat in our European command and force structure is to compare it to Army doctrine and World War II experience factors.

In West Germany the Army has stationed a total force of approximately 195,000 soldiers. Congress and the public were told that these soldiers are all required to fight the enemy in a conventional war. This force is under the overall command of the unified (i.e. triservice) U.S. European Command with headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. This headquarters, heavily staffed with generals and admirals, also has an element in NATO headquarters in Belgium. In time of peace this unified command serves as the senior command for all U.S. armed forces in Europe, but in time of war it performs NATO duties. U.S. European Command exercises its command supervision by passing Joint Chiefs of Staff (in Washington, D.C.) directives to U.S. Army Europe/Seventh Army headquarters located 38 miles away in Heidelberg, Germany. In peacetime this headquarters commands all Army forces in West Germany. In wartime this combined Army headquarters performs both NATO and U.S. command functions.

The next command level is the corps headquarters. (A corps headquarters exercises tactical command over military operations; it is not normally concerned with administrative support.) In West Germany there are two U.S. corps headquarters. Additionally, there is another command element approximately equal to a corps headquarters which provides logistical support. These three command levels (U.S. European Command, U.S. Army, Seventh Army, V & VII Corps headquarters) pass directives down to the combat divisions. There are the equivalent of five divisions in West Germany. And once we pass the division headquarters of these divisions, we will have finally found the Army units (the brigades and battalions) that actually engage in combat.

All of these command and supply headquarters require numerous generals (over 30 in Stuttgart alone), field grade officers and senior NCO's to command and staff them. This is in addition to the large number of troops required to man them. How many men are engaged in these noncombatant jobs?

The best way to answer is to consider how many men are in the five combat divisions. Each division at full strength contains around 16,000 men. If our combat divisions in Europe were at full strength (and they seldom have been during Vietnam) there would be a total of about 80,000 men assigned to them. We can then reasonably speculate that the remaining 115,000 men (of the 195,000 total force) are serving in other than the combat divisions. In other words roughly 115,000 men serve in administrative and logistic situations.

These 115,000 men are not the only ones serving in these situations. Each division of about 16,000 men includes only roughly 7,000 soldiers who are assigned the mission

of firing at the enemy. The remaining 9,000 or so are assigned to administrative command and logistic support positions *within the division!* This means that in terms of combat manpower for conventional combat the U.S. Army in West Germany has only about 40,000 soldiers in its combat divisions who are assigned to place killing fire on the enemy.

There is no valid military reason why the Army must organize itself so that it needs over 100,000 men to command and supply a combat force of 80,000 soldiers (of which less than half fire at the enemy). For example, Army doctrine indicates that a corps headquarters "normally" commands two or more divisions. In World War II, each combat corps normally commanded an average of four divisions. Moreover the U.S. Seventh Army commanded no less than three corps during World War II combat.

So why then does it require two corps headquarters and a field army headquarters to command the equivalent of 5 understrength divisions *in peacetime*? Because the U.S. Army in West Germany has grown top-heavy through (a) bureaucratic inertia, (b) military preference for soft career living in Europe rather than extended periods of living in such places as Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri or Fort Polk, Louisiana and (c) civilian abdication of control over military policy. At least 50,000 men could be brought home from West Germany without reducing the conventional combat capability of the existing U.S. Army presence if those forces were streamlined and efficiently organized, commanded and supplied. Or, if present troop levels have to be maintained, this much manpower could be converted from fat to combat muscle.

None of these reasons justifies the huge costs incurred to support the existing system of organization and command. It cost 2.2 billion in fiscal 1970, to maintain our forces in West Germany. This figure does not include the additional costs involved in moving, storage and shipment of household goods and automobiles of the military personnel and their dependents who were automatically rotated back and forth during fiscal 1970. Much of this rotation is unnecessary and is done only for career improvements. It is also one of the reasons that nearly all Army personnel in Germany are either learning their job or "coasting," waiting to rotate back to the U.S.

In any event there is no acceptable justification for obvious military paunch even in times of national budgetary surplus, much less when inflation munches on tax-dollars and domestic programs are forced to exist on subsistence levels.

#### PURPOSE

The organization of U.S. Army forces in Europe is unsatisfactory in terms of costs and manpower utilization. Even worse are the problems which are created by their mission.

The U.S. combat units—in consort with other NATO forces—are supposed to be able to fight a conventional war against Soviet and satellite troops. Let us assume that our 195,000 men were organized and commanded efficiently. Would there be a reasonable prospect that they could do what they are supposed to do successfully? The answer is probably not.

Part of this answer is prompted by the location and sheer numerical advantage enjoyed by their adversary: nearly 200 Soviet and East European divisions (about 2 million men) could be thrown into battle against 18 or 20 NATO divisions (about 350,000 men). There are other disadvantages.

#### ILL POSITIONED

Relative positioning of forward units. Within sight of many of the autobahns leading westward through East Germany, for-

ward Soviet divisions are positioned in austere, mobile tank and truck parks. The distance from a soldier's tent or hut, to his tank, truck or armored vehicle is a matter of minutes. Contrast this with the positioning of U.S. Army forward units: the troops live in barrack compounds often removed a half-mile or more from their tanks and vehicles. The truck parks themselves are not always immediately accessible to major roads. The time needed to get our troops on the road is more than minutes.

U.S. divisions are still comfortably positioned in the World War II occupation-zone positions that they took up when they arrived in Southern Germany in 1950-51 during the dark days of the Korean War. But strategic considerations would most likely motivate the Soviet armored forces to strike boldly across the flat North German plains along the historic invasion route to the Ruhr and the English Channel ports. U.S. Army forces would undoubtedly be needed to help defend not only the industrial heart of Europe but also to protect their own supply lifelines which during war run back to the channel ports. To accomplish this, they would have to move considerable distances to the north to reach viable battle positions. If a sudden attack occurred, they would have to make this movement over roads jammed with other NATO troops, overrun with millions of refugees (many of whom would be their own wives and children attempting to flee) and constantly attacked by low-flying enemy aircraft. Time would be critical in such a northward movement; only hours would be available to attempt to intercept and stem the Soviet advance. Yet during the Berlin Crisis of 1961 when such a movement was considered, *days* not hours were estimated as being required. And this movement would have been conducted under peacetime conditions!

Even assuming that U.S. Army combat elements have reached improved maximums of mobility and flexibility since 1961, exhibiting these qualities would require absolute tactical air superiority. I know of no military planner who honestly assumes that the U.S. Air Force will attain such absolute superiority (which it enjoyed over Western Europe in 1945) until a considerable period after the opening of hostilities. And there are some who doubt if it could ever attain such a degree of superiority.

But if we assume that U.S. forces *will* have absolute air superiority, could our 80,000 combat troops (i.e. 40,000 who fire on the enemy) plus approximately 260,000 NATO combat troops, reasonably be expected to stop the advance of Communist Bloc troops? (Before answering we must remember that if we fight a conventional war in Europe it will be with the forces already there. The Czechoslovakian invasion showed that we can no longer count on a comfortable mobilization period during which, in the best traditions of World Wars I and II, more combat troops can be flown or shipped to Europe from the U.S.). Most military professionals privately agree that the answer is no. However, the Army several years ago devised a very simple solution to this problem for Congress and the public. They can give an affirmative answer because they allocate "tactical" (i.e. low-yield) nuclear weapons to the conventional forces in Europe.

Simple. Now our conventional forces can offset the Soviet and satellite manpower advantage and delay their advance westward by exploding large numbers of nuclear devices against them from the very first moments of battle.

#### MOST UNCONVENTIONAL

The Army has been training for years in Europe on the basis of such plans. Simulated use of nuclear weapons is written into the scenario of most major unit training exercises. In one NATO field training maneuver, the *Stars and Stripes* newspaper reported

that large numbers of simulated nuclear weapons were used. What was not reported was that while nuclear devices turned a losing conventional effort into a winning one, it also would have turned a conventional war into a nuclear one. And at the same time it was estimated by West German press sources that about 65 percent of West Germany would have been destroyed. In discussing low-yield "tactical" nuclear weapons we should remember that the average "tactical" nuclear weapon has the explosive force of roughly one-quarter to one-half the destructive power of the Hiroshima A-bomb. Strictly in terms of physical damage and indiscriminate loss of civilian and military lives, the one-sided use of such weapons can scarcely be called conventional.

And can we be sure that the Soviets would not use at least equivalent nuclear weapons in retaliation? One cannot believe that the Soviets will fight with their rifles and conventional artillery while we destroy whole divisions with tactical nuclear weapons.

#### THE FLIGHT OF DEPENDENTS

In the event of hostilities the *necessity* of using nuclear weapons first could present the United States with a grave national dilemma. The President would be faced with the choice of authorizing the military commander in Europe to use nuclear weapons (and thereby open a nuclear war) or deny their use and risk the loss of a field army and the lives of nearly 250,000 U.S. servicemen and their families. The choice between initiating nuclear escalation or failing to protect the lives of American fighting men would not be an attractive one for any President. Yet every President for the past fifteen years has been faced with this possibility as a result of our effort to maintain the fiction of a conventional war capacity in Europe.

The choice is complicated by the fact that wives and children of U.S. servicemen would be the almost inevitable victims of our tactical nuclear weapons. If there is a warning period from hostilities being some of the 225,000 dependents could be evacuated by air and private automobile to "Safehavens." If hostilities begin suddenly—and there is no reason to believe the Soviets intend to provide convenient advance notice of their attack—most officials are convinced that the majority of the military dependents would have to "standfast" where they are living. These dependents would be left to fend for themselves, as would their less fortunate civilian countrymen who are working or traveling privately in Europe and who are not considered for assistance by U.S. armed forces. The soldier-husbands of the military dependents would have to fall back toward the Rhine River while covering their delaying action with "tactical" nuclear weapons. In short, firing nuclear shells and rockets on the Soviet units, hundreds of thousands of West German civilians and on their own families. (In spite of this potential disaster, the military opposed President Eisenhower's courageous and military sound decision in late 1960 to stop further movement of dependents to Europe. This decision was rescinded by President Kennedy in late 1961 in response to opposition from the armed services, even though no effective dependent evacuation plan had been devised.)

We have permitted the continuation of our conventional structure to placate the West German government, not to fight a conventional war. Our military leaders have advocated retaining these forces because they have provided increased promotions and pleasant duty stations. These military leaders have been comfortable in the knowledge that they would not really be expected to fight a conventional war against the formidable Red Army, because they could quickly change such a war into a nuclear one in

which the U.S., until recently, held a vast advantage. In other words political expediency and parochial service interests have been allowed to supercede national best interests.

The presence of our over 200,000-man conventional force in Europe is fraught with potentially dangerous risks to our national security and immense problems of organization and mission. It is long past time for concerned civilians and military officers to begin the very difficult task of streamlining our force structures and more responsibility rationalizing their purpose in Europe. Perhaps the recent signing of the West German-Soviet nonaggression pact marks the historical juncture for our work to begin in earnest.

EDWARD L. KING.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

H.R. 7931. An act to amend the District of Columbia Code with respect to the administration of small estates, and for other purposes.

#### THE MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 6531) to amend the Military Selective Service Act of 1967; to increase military pay; to authorize military active duty strengths for fiscal year 1972; and for other purposes.

AMENDMENT NO. 86

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I call up my amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment of the Senator from Montana will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

At the end of the bill add a new title as follows:

#### TITLE IV—REDUCTION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE

SEC. 401. (a) The Congress hereby finds that the number of United States military personnel stationed in Europe can be significantly reduced without endangering the security of Western Europe, and that such a reduction would have a favorable effect on this Nation's balance of payments problem and would help avoid recurring international monetary crises involving the value of the dollar abroad. It is therefore the purpose of this section to provide for such a reduction at the earliest practicable date.

(b) No funds appropriated by the Congress may be used after December 31, 1971, for the purpose of supporting or maintaining in Europe any military personnel of the United States in excess of 150,000.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we have order?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I requested the preparation last week of a memorandum on this overall question of troops in Europe by Mr. Edward L. King. Mr. King has had extensive opportunity to study these questions both as a staff planner within the military and as a sensible and concerned citizen since his retirement. He brings to bear a clearness of presentation of the arguments and a crispness of focus and recommendation that should benefit the entire Senate.

The memorandum is in every respect outstanding. I ask unanimous consent that this memorandum of Mr. King be printed at this point in the RECORD, so as, in effect to follow my previous remarks.

There being no objection, the memorandum was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

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RETENTION OF U.S. FORCE LEVELS IN  
WESTERN EUROPE  
OVERALL PROBLEM

Can the number of U.S. Armed Forces personnel stationed in Europe be substantially reduced without seriously weakening the deterrent capability of the NATO military structure?

SOME FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

a. Over 300,000 U.S. military personnel (including 20,000 in the 6th Fleet) are stationed in Western Europe.

1. Of this number 128 are general/flag officers—or one general/flag officer for every 2,343 men.

2. About 250,000 of these troops are assigned to the tri-service U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). The Department of Defense has indicated that half of these assigned forces are combat personnel and the rest are support. Over 170,000 of the EUCOM total are U.S. Army troops.

3. Major USEUCOM combat elements are 4½ Army division deployed in West Germany. These divisions are not at full strength. According to Army Tables of Organization and Equipment the aggregate full strength of each of these divisions would be around 16,300 men. It costs approximately \$185 million to maintain one army division on overseas peacetime active duty for a year.

4. There are about 113,500 Army and Air Force personnel stationed in the Continental U.S. committed to NATO. In Europe about 2,000 American personnel are engaged in maintaining and servicing prestocked equipment to be used by these committed forces.

b. There are now approximately 7,000 U.S. nuclear warheads stored in Europe.

c. During fiscal year 1971 it cost approximately \$14 billion for the support of U.S. general purpose forces in Europe and the forces in the U.S. committed to NATO.

1. This total figure includes operating costs and estimated annual investment in equipment and military construction.

2. Annual operating cost to maintain U.S. forces in Western Europe is approximately \$2.9 billion.

d. U.S. defense expenditures entering the international balance of payments in NATO countries (including Canada) in fiscal year 1970 are estimated at approximately \$2 billion, with about \$1.1 billion being spent in the Federal Republic of Germany.

1. For every soldier removed from Germany, an approximate saving of \$1,650 in individual expenditures on the European economy can be realized.

2. The withdrawal and deactivation of 2 mechanized divisions now stationed in Europe would result in annual savings of about \$1 billion.

e. The U.S. forces in Europe have over 79 real property locations in seven countries, that represent a total U.S. investment in excess of \$204.5 million.

f. Payment of land taxes in Great Britain and Western Germany amounts to \$2.9 million annually.

g. Approximately half of the European Command's transportation needs must be accomplished by European commercial sources at a cost of \$29 million in 1969.

h. Expenditures for employment of European local nationals by U.S. forces amounted to \$265 million from appropriated funds in calendar year 1969.

1. Until March 1971, U.S. citizens were in most cases excluded from filling local hire vacancies.

i. Total operating costs of U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force European Commands in fiscal year 1970 were approximately \$87.33 million. During the same year U.S. operating costs of NATO headquarters were \$10,623,033.00.

1. These operating costs represent only a fraction of the total cost of each command.

For example, the headquarters operating cost for U.S. Army Europe was only 2.30 per cent of the total fund it was provided of \$1,761,000,000.00.

2. In addition to these operating costs the 9 U.S. Army Command headquarters, for example, contained 26 generals, 1,286 other officers and 1,908 enlisted men all drawing higher salaries while performing command or staff jobs.

j. While the percentage of U.S. GNP going to defense has increased over the past 20 years, that of our NATO allies has declined.

k. Major NATO ground forces presently available in the center region of Europe consist of 22 division equivalents.

1. This total includes the 4½ U.S. divisions but does not include two French divisions not committed to NATO but present in West Germany.

2. The Lisbon Conference of 1950 called for a total NATO force of 90 divisions.

3. Few, if any, of the 22 NATO divisions are at full combat strength in men or equipment. For example, there are shortages of trained NCO's and junior officers in some of the West German divisions.

1. Soviet forces in East Germany are estimated by the Defense Department to number over 300,000 troops deployed in excess of 20 armored and motorized divisions. Additional Soviet divisions in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary bring the total Soviet forces outside the Soviet borders to over 500,000 men.

1. Estimates by SHAPE indicate that the Warsaw Pact forces have twice as many divisions in the center region as NATO.

2. Warsaw Pact forces have been estimated to be able to mobilize more than 175 divisions.

3. The SHAPE Commander has stated that when "fully mobilized" Warsaw Pact tank forces outnumber NATO's by 3 to 1.

4. The EUCOM Commander has stated that the Soviets "have additional forces in Russia which can move forward rapidly" to reinforce the forces deployed in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

m. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that each member may "take such action as it deems necessary" and it can act individually and in concert with other parties in the event of an armed attack on a member state. The parties do not commit themselves necessarily to take military action to repel any attack.

n. Article 11 of the NATO Treaty stipulates that the provisions of the Treaty shall be carried out "in accordance with their respective constitutional processes."

o. Article 3 of the Treaty stipulates that members agree to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist attack. But no specific means are expressed for meeting this obligation.

*Discussion pro and con of substantially reducing U.S. troop levels in Europe*

Countless arguments have been advanced why it is not feasible or possible, to reduce present U.S. troop levels in Europe. Generally these arguments follow fixed patterns and are based on hypothetical assumptions and predictions. A synthesis of these con arguments can be grouped as follows:

1. The U.S. Departments of State and Defense concept that the Soviets might risk a military move in Europe if they believed American strategic nuclear power had been checked and NATO conventional forces were seriously weakened.

2. A rigid concomitant belief by these two U.S. Departments in the doctrine of flexible response, which poses present U.S. conventional troop levels as a necessity to counter any conventional war attack by Warsaw Pact troops without an early resort to nuclear weapons.

a. As part of this argument the case is

also made that NATO conventional forces must be maintained at current levels so they can effectively meet any low level Soviet or Warsaw Pact military "probe" of the NATO area without having to go to nuclear war to counter such a probing action.

b. Also cited as support for this argument are the agreed NATO contingencies of (1) limited unexpected conflicts which could give rise to larger hostilities, (2) crises preceded by a period of political tension which could occur after a period of several weeks or months. It is advanced that these contingencies preclude a thin forward defense because such a defense would invite "probes", while a balanced posture makes them less likely and in effect deters all such options.

3. The belief that any substantial withdrawals would set in motion a chain of causation that would ultimately unravel the entire NATO alliance.

4. Concern that the psychological shock on our European allies (particularly the West German) of a substantial reduction of U.S. troops would be devastating to their morale and would inevitably lead to eventual Soviet dominance in Western Europe. This result is predicated on the premise that any substantial withdrawal of American forces would be the start of reduced European force levels and cause the Europeans to lose confidence in the significance of their own armed forces ability to deter Soviet attack. This would then cause them to seek a hurried accommodation with the Soviet Union.

a. As an adjunct to this argument it is also postulated that a substantial U.S. force reduction would (in the minds of the Europeans) signal a return to U.S. isolationism and indicate that the U.S. would not defend Western Europe militarily. This is viewed as the rationale for a concurrent rise of Soviet influence and eventual domination of Western Europe.

b. Another variation of this argument is the West Germany position that substantial U.S. troop cuts would demoralize Western European public opinion and convert the current mood of detente with the Soviets into one of appeasement.

5. The conviction that unilateral force reductions would weaken our hand in the current hope of negotiating with the Warsaw Pact countries for mutual balanced troop reductions.

6. Belief that dollar savings inherent in a substantial troop reduction in Europe would be insignificant in relation to the risk to our national security.

7. State and Defense contention that forces approaching current levels must remain in Europe since forces hastily returned during a crisis are not as effective as those stationed in Europe.

a. A buffer to this argument is made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the SHAPE Commander General Goodpaster, who argue that it is not feasible to reduce even the logistics "tail" of the U.S. forces in Europe. They consider that such support troops are vital for the time when additional U.S. troops are flown to Europe during a crisis. They further contend that troops should not be reduced, but if cuts must be made, they should be made in combat forces rather than support forces.

8. Department of State belief that an overriding political argument against substantial reductions arises out of the transitional nature of the early 1970's in Europe and that troop cuts should not be made during this transitional period for fear of introducing a destabilizing factor, which would seriously limit our capacity to achieve effectively an optimum future relationship with Western Europe.

In considering the counterweight pro arguments for making a substantial troop reduction, it is necessary to measure the above con arguments against a criteria of what these

U.S. troops *actually do* in a combat sense to defend the national security. And within that context to critically analyze the basic validity of the counter arguments advanced.

The article attached as Appendix 1 covers some of the specific problems that relate to our conventional troop deployments in Europe and is an overview of what our troops actually do. Briefly stated, our 4½ divisions deployed in West Germany are a delaying force which is badly positioned and insufficient to accomplish its primary mission of retarding Soviet ground advance into Western Europe. Due to its inferiority in numbers of actual combat soldiers, poor tactical organization and positioning, it must basically rely on tactical nuclear weapons for any hope of successfully accomplishing its mission, and in fact for its own salvation in the event of a determined attack by the Red Army.

Anyone considering the argument against substantial troop reductions should do so against the background of the above-mentioned negative facets of our European conventional troop deployments. From that point it then becomes possible to more perceptively answer the arguments. Briefly, those answers can be stated as follows:

*Analysis of Con Argument 1, that Soviets might attack after checkmating American strategic nuclear power and in the event of a weakening of our present conventional forces*

The two substantive points made do not factually fit with the actual conditions they postulate. For example, the so-called checking of American strategic nuclear power through nuclear weapons parity (and it should be remembered that latest intelligence reports credit the U.S. with 4,000 nuclear warheads to the Soviet's 1800) or arms limitation, does not remove the ultimate threat of nuclear war and mutual destruction at the option of either of the superpowers. It is reasonable to assume that the Soviets are quite aware that any military move into Western Europe would be looked upon by us as a threat to our vital interests. They would make such a move only after carefully calculating the nuclear balance and probable weapons, not the current conventional troop levels which they already know they can handily defeat in conventional battle. It is (and will continue to be) the weight of American nuclear response and the possibility of mutual national destruction that would ensue, that restrains any Soviet predilection toward military adventures in Europe.

It is this fear far more than it is the numbers of men, planes, tanks and guns that they would face in making such a move. In a historical context it should be remembered that the Red Army drove several million of the Nazi Wehrmacht's finest combat veterans back into Western Europe in 1945, and in the process lost millions of their own population. It is inconceivable to my mind to imagine that this same people and Army, in the foreseeable future, will this soon after those staggering numbers of dead, be inclined to launch an aggressive war into Western Europe and accept the countless deaths that a nuclear (or conventional) war would surely bring. Conversely, it is equally unlikely that a people who have sustained and recovered from such previous monumental losses in war would long be deterred from a military action by the prospect of fighting 2 or 4½, or 20 U.S. divisions in conventional battle; if that was the only alternative to a direct threat to the continued existence of Mother Russia.

We should remember the Russians traditionally are a brave, but not foolhardy, people. I fail to see the rationality in an argument that a bureaucratic Soviet government and its armed forces would, or could, call on their people to again accept millions of dead

solely for the purpose of an expansionistic military grab of Western Europe. This flies in the face of all logic and most past European history.

*Analysis of Con Argument 2, that the credibility of the doctrine of flexible response depends on present troop levels*

This is a specious argument that has been used long beyond the time it was true. It is a military justification for maintaining large numbers of Army troops (with the accompanying high-rank justifying headquarters and support commands and career-rewarding overseas base living) stationed indefinitely in Central Europe. It is a specious argument because present troop levels do not in fact offer a valid flexible response to a determined Soviet conventional attack at any level of force or purpose. But rather are too weak to effectively react (the Berlin Crisis of 1961 is an excellent example of this weakness when the strongest conventional reaction we dared make to the challenge of the Berlin Wall and closing of the Autobahn to Berlin, was to dispatch one less-than-brigade-strength force to Berlin and this force was then ignominiously forced to dismount from its vehicles inside East Germany and be counted by Soviet officers before being permitted to pass to Berlin). At the same time this force is too large to permit effective flexibility in the manner of U.S. response to any level of Soviet military action.

For example, under the provisions of Articles 5 and 11 of the NATO Treaty all members might not choose to react militarily to all levels of Soviet military action. Their constitutional processes might inhibit or restrict a military response. After the Vietnam experience public opinion in the U.S. could in the near future conceivably not be favorable to an automatic military reaction to all levels of Soviet action in Western Europe. However, with present force levels stationed in Europe, the U.S. has no option but to become involved in a conventional military response. Such a conventional response is in fact too weak to have much chance of success even with all NATO allies participating and foredoomed to early failure if some would choose not to initially engage in a military response.

But this U.S. force is too large (over 170,000 men and 149,000 dependents with the 7th Army alone) to permit the President any degree of flexibility, or the U.S. constitutional processes time to function effectively in regard to a response to almost any form of real or imagined Tonkin Gulf-type attack in Western Europe. The protection of the lives of a field army of U.S. fighting men and their families, would take precedence over all other legitimate questions of U.S. national best interests at the time. Because of their numbers and positioning the U.S. forces would have to be engaged in immediate fighting. Yet because of the insufficiency of these same numbers to fight effectively in conventional battle, there would be the urgent need to permit them to fire the Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM) mines during the first hours of any level of conflict. And there would be the follow-on need for them to quickly resort to further tactical nuclear weapon fires to protect themselves from being pocketed in the Southern German salient. The probability of early use of nuclear weapons is not supposition. This use is written into the 7th Army battle plans.

In an appearance before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, General Goodpaster alluded to this when he stated: "If an enemy were to come at us with all the forces that the Warsaw Pact could generate and were to sustain and press his attack regardless of the losses that he took, after a *short period of time* (italics supplied) it would be probable that at least in some areas we would have to resort to nuclear weapons in order to hold." At another point

when asked what the NATO situation would be 45 days after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe with both sides using only conventional forces, General Goodpaster replied, "I believe that there is a probability that it would be necessary to resort to the support of tactical nuclear weapons." General Lyman Lemnitzer, SHAPE Commander from 1962 to 1969, has stated, "One of the greatest problems that would confront NATO today would be a large conventional attack. Then we would be faced with a decision to use nuclear weapons or be defeated."

These statements and 7th Army training exercises in which simulated tactical nuclear weapons are routinely used, would seem to discredit the concept that present force levels guarantee flexibility and preclude the early resort to nuclear weapons. The same war plans and exercises also minimize the possibility of limited Soviet probes in favor of preparation for a massive attack from Czechoslovakia and through the Fulda and Hof "gaps". This military planning is generally predicated on the assumption that an attack will follow a period of increasing tensions which will permit the evacuation of dependents, repositioning of 7th Army forces and reinforcement from the United States. This warning time allows a thickening of what is actually a presently "thin" forward defense being planned for a very shallow theater-of-operations with France no longer militarily in NATO. From a factual military standpoint present troop levels do not conclusively deter the possibility of rather unlikely probes, nor give much probability of successfully conventional defense against major attack. It would require a much larger commitment of troops than either the U.S. or our NATO allies can afford to do this.

*Analysis of Con Argument 3, that any substantial withdrawal of U.S. forces would set in motion an unraveling of the NATO alliance*

This argument is purely hypothetical. No substantial evidence has been advanced to support this thesis, nor is there any historical precedent which would indicate that such an unraveling of the alliance would be the inevitable result of a phasedown of U.S. troop levels to a force of, say, 100,000 men. Within the alliance there have been past reductions of U.S. and British force levels, as well as the complete withdrawal of 10 French divisions from the NATO military command. This did not set in motion a chain of causation that has led toward collapse of the alliance. On the contrary, it has caused redoubled effort by the remaining members to attempt to improve the capability of the alliance. There is no substantive evidence to indicate that further reduction of U.S. troop levels could not be used to stimulate increased European initiative and interest in strengthening the Atlantic Alliance.

*Analysis of Con Argument 4, concerning the psychological shock that substantial troop reduction would have on our European allies and which would result in eventual Soviet dominance over Europe*

The substance of this argument has been stated by Martin J. Hillenbrand, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, "The psychological shock on our European allies of an American withdrawal from Europe would be devastating. The glacial pressures of Soviet power upon a Western Europe that knows itself to be militarily weak and politically divided would in due course, insure effective Soviet dominance." Furthermore, Mr. Hillenbrand indicated that it "would be beyond the capacity of diplomacy" to convince the Europeans that any substantial withdrawal did not mark the end of the effective American commitment to defend Western Europe even if 100,000 or more U.S. troops remained in Europe.

The foundation of this view is more emo-



tional conjecture designed to justify a continuation of the status quo in Europe, than an accurate assessment of what is likely to happen if U.S. military force levels are reduced. There would of course be some initial adverse reaction on the part of our European allies to a substantial troop cut. But I can not believe it would be of anywhere near devastating proportions to overall European morale and will to defend themselves (and I have lived in Europe 9 of the past 17 years and have friends there).

I fail to find the logic in the reasoning that even an adverse psychological reaction to a cut in the number of U.S. troops stationed in Europe could cause citizens of Great Britain or West Germany to lose confidence in their own national armed forces' ability to defend them. If the level of confidence is truly that low, then NATO is in fact a thin reed. I do not believe this is the case. Nor do I believe that a reduction to a force of over 100,000 U.S. troops in Europe would in the mind of the average European signal a return by the U.S. to pre-World War II isolationism. The European is quite aware that our own people are suffering devastating psychological shocks in the cities across America. He is aware of unemployment, financial problems and our war-weariness. Though he may regret the occurrence of substantial troop reductions, he is far more likely in the long run to understand the reasons that require that they be made, than he is to hysterically lose heart and turn to an accommodation with the Russians. We fail to understand the worldlines and maturity of the European people when we give serious credence to such unreasoned behavior on their part.

In consideration of a remaining force of over 100,000 U.S. soldiers in Europe, our continued nuclear guarantees and the massive capital investment and control exercised by U.S. firms doing business in Western Europe; it is highly unrealistic to conclude that a reduction of two divisions from West Germany will automatically trigger a rise of Soviet influence throughout Western Europe. If numbers of divisions were the criteria for a position of dominating influence in Western Europe, the Soviets would have long held such a position. It should be recognized that a substantial withdrawal of American business enterprise would do more to promote the impact of a Soviet domination in Western Europe than the removal of a few divisions.

The first steps toward a European (chiefly West German) detente with Russia have been made. France has previously made an attempt to achieve some form of detente with the Soviet Union. Neither of these steps have produced any noticeable demoralization of the Western European people. French efforts under DeGaulle at wooing Russia did not create any widespread feeling of appeasement among the West Germans for example. The avowed purpose of current West German efforts at detente are directed toward the easing of tensions in Central Europe. It is equally difficult to accept that a reduction of even half of the current U.S. force levels in Europe would create in European minds such an attitude of demoralization that they would turn from detente to appeasement. This reasoning ignores the French withdrawal from NATO and subsequent efforts at detente with Russia that did not produce an appeasement attitude. It also fails to give full consideration to the weight of the continued American presence and nuclear guarantees that still would exist after a troop reduction.

*Analysis of Con Argument 5, that unilateral force reductions would weaken the U.S. negotiating position with the Soviets for mutual balanced troop reductions*

For years Western statesmen have defined the Soviet goals in Central Europe as a

continuation of a divided Germany, a removal of all American troops from Europe and the dismemberment of NATO. Assuming that this definition is accurate, it would seem that U.S. force levels would not be a decisive factor in negotiating mutual troop reductions. Soviet overall goals would appear to dictate that it would be equally as important to remove a remaining 100,000-plus U.S. troops as to remove 300,000 troops. Any level of U.S. force maintained in Central Europe would be a bargaining agent toward mutual reductions.

No one has suggested that these mutual reductions must be on a man-for-man or division-for-division basis. Obviously, such reductions would favor the Soviets who have a preponderant strength to begin with. Any mutual reductions would have to be worked out on a relative basis and this could be arranged as well with 150,000 U.S. troops as with 300,000 troops. The key to the issue is the Warsaw Pact sincerity in desiring mutual reductions. To date, they have insisted that any discussions concerning mutual balanced force reductions must be within the framework of a European security conference—something our Secretary of State and the NATO foreign ministers oppose in principle. It is unlikely that such an impasse of opinion between East and West is going to be resolved in the foreseeable future and this in fact implies that the U.S. must continue present force levels for an indefinite period until the question of a European security conference can be settled. Such a position is tantamount to saying that U.S. force levels in Europe will remain the same for an indeterminate number of years—possibly another decade.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk speaking in relation to the U.S. troop reductions in Europe in 1967 stated that he favored those reductions "not only because they were steps of economy, but also because they constituted a tension-lessening signal to the Soviet Union." The withdrawals that Secretary Rusk referred to represented a reduction of U.S. forces below their pre-1961 Berlin Crisis strength, and came at a time when world tensions were steadily increasing as the war in Vietnam escalated in intensity. Yet these reductions did not produce any collapse of European morale, nor did they set in motion any chain of causation that caused the Soviets to exploit our position in Berlin that was weakened by the heavy demands of the Vietnam buildup. The further thinning out of our manpower and equipment from our European based troops for use in Vietnam in 1968 and 1969 did not result in any Soviet moves to take advantage of our weakened forces. In fact, it was during this period that continued Soviet troop transfers from Europe to the Siberian front with China occurred.

No public evidence available to date indicates that our force levels in Europe necessarily play a decisive role in the possibility of gaining mutual balanced force reductions. On this question it appears that the intent and purposes of both the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances is far more important to a successful outcome than the tactical question of the precise number of troops involved.

*Analysis of Con Argument 6, which stresses that the actual dollar savings involved in a substantial U.S. troop reduction would be insignificant in relation to the grave risk to our national security*

The fiscal year cost of maintaining U.S. forces in Europe and those in the U.S. committed to Europe, is put at \$14 billion. U.S. annual balance-of-payment costs in NATO countries are estimated at \$1.7 billion. At present offset agreements with West Germany balance out only some of these costs. If U.S. force levels were cut in half, it would be possible to realize savings in the range of \$500 million or more under current conditions. These savings could eventually be substantially much more than that amount,

if we take into account the future increased pay scales envisioned for our armed forces and the growing inflation in Europe.

Opponents to troop cuts cite the fact that unless the troops brought back are demobilized they still must be paid the same amounts. The divisions returned could be deactivated. But even if they are not, the money they spend would go into the pockets of American rather than European businessmen. It would thus directly return to the American economy. Another argument put forward is that if U.S. force levels were cut, West Germany would no longer pay offset costs on the same magnitude as today. Of course the balance-of-payment costs would not continue on the magnitude that they are today either, if two divisions (with all their sustaining elements) were returned from Europe.

Since there is no clear argument on how the removal of two U.S. divisions from Western Europe presents a grave threat to U.S. national security, it is difficult to equate accurately this statement to the very real possibility of effecting annual savings in U.S. balance-of-payment costs in excess of \$500 million.

*Analysis of Con Argument 7, that force levels must remain the same because forces hastily returned during a crisis are not as effective as those permanently stationed in Europe*

This argument has little historical military substance in relation to the U.S. armed forces. In two world wars U.S. forces have traditionally fought well in Europe over battle terrain they had never seen before. Besides, battlefields change from day-to-day as do the personnel fighting the battle. Therefore familiarity with initial battle terrain has little actual effect after the first day or two of combat. If they are well trained, newly arrived forces would be every bit as effective as those permanently stationed in Europe.

In a letter of April 27, 1970, to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Secretary of State in commenting on Senate Resolution 292, stated, "Additional redeployments would bring such disadvantages as the loss of constant liaison with forces on our flanks, danger of massive confusion in a crisis situation and increased risks to our forces as they moved forward into position. Moreover, any division we redeployed to the U.S. could only be returned to Europe quickly if we reposition its equipment and rely on airlift for return of the forces. Since we already reposition equipment for some of our U.S. based divisions, any additional reliance on redeployment with repositioning would strain not only our transport capability but also reception facilities in Europe."

Most of these reasons are straw men. Due to the high personnel turnover in Europe the infantry combat units that I commanded there seldom were half the men in them who were even faintly familiar with the terrain over which our emergency mission called for us to fight. Liaison with forces on the flanks of the U.S. forces in Europe is the responsibility of headquarters higher than division level. The Army has had twenty years to plan for the forward movement of U.S. forces in Western Europe in time of crisis. If there exists today a real possibility of "massive confusion" and "increased risks to our forces" then two decades of Army Commanders and staff planners have failed to do their job. If such a situation truly exists then all U.S. divisions should probably be withdrawn from West Germany. They can't hope to fight and stay there if they cannot be efficiently reinforced in the forward battle areas.

The problem of repositioning division equipment and the subsequent requirement for a second costly set in the U.S. is an old dodge. There are many ways this seemingly insurmountable problem could be overcome. And none would be as costly in balance of

payments as keeping the divisions in Europe. One is to dual-base our stateside divisions that are committed to Europe, with U.S. National Guard or Reserve divisions and have each of these divisions use the same set of heavy division equipment in the U.S.

If the division returned to Europe this heavy equipment could be left in the U.S. for use by the Guard or Reserve division when it was mobilized. Or, some of it could be airlifted with the division to Europe. At present enough equipment for approximately two divisions is prepositioned in Europe. The equipment for two more divisions could be maintained afloat in East Coast ports and could arrive in Europe within 9 to 15 days. The U.S. airlift capacity would require at least that long to transport 4 divisions to Europe. In any event it is not feasible to believe that in time of crisis in Europe, the nation that can put men on the moon cannot expeditiously move two divisions and their equipment to Europe in less than two weeks.

It also makes little sense to me to continue to maintain the excessive logistics "tail" in position to service additional divisions that will theoretically be flown to Europe during a crisis, if those divisions face the danger of "massive confusion" and "increased risks" during forward movement to battle. Yet despite these evident dangers and risks, the Joint Chiefs and the SHAPE Commander advocate withdrawing the combat divisions rather than the logistics support forces. Their concern points up the fact that under today's Army tactical organization there must be a huge logistics base *before* the U.S. Army can commence to fight. This is an organizational concept which must be changed if the Army is going to ever again fight austere and effectively anywhere in the world.

*Analysis of Con Argument 8, concerning the transitional nature of the early 1970's in Europe and the contention that troop cuts would inject a destabilizing factor*

Europe has been in transition at least since 1870 and will no doubt continue so for many years to come. There have been numerous destabilizing factors injected into the NATO scene over the past ten years. The rejection of British entry into the Common Market and French withdrawal from NATO, could be cited as two more recent examples. Yet none of these serious factors have produced a collapse of the alliance on the scale that is being so direly predicted if the U.S. withdraws two Army divisions and their sustaining troops from Europe.

To accept the transitional argument is to accept that it will be necessary to continue indefinitely to provide a level of conventional defense for our NATO allies that they have clearly demonstrated they are unwilling to provide for themselves. This conventional defense is of questionable value and comes at excessive cost to the citizens of the United States. The United States is also in a period of transition. And this transitional period in our country demands that we reduce our overseas balance of payments in order that these millions may be available to assist us through our period of changing priorities. As an American the well-being of our country seems to me a far more overriding argument than a theoretical risk to our national security postulated by Europeans who do not want to divert their money and manpower to defend themselves. These Europeans are supported by our own State and Defense people who for many bureaucratic reasons desire to maintain the Cold War status quo in Europe indefinitely.

It is true that the prosperity of the U.S. and Western Europe has advanced markedly during the past years of NATO. But the time has now come when economic good sense dictates that U.S. defense forces in Europe must be reduced in our own best interest.

To further delay these reductions in the hope of achieving what the Secretary of State has called on "optimum future relationship" is to overlook our past efforts of twenty years while risking the sacrifice of our own national future in the bargain.

#### GENERAL COMMENTS AND CONCLUSION

Despite arguments to the contrary, U.S. troop levels in Europe should be reduced by the equivalent of two divisions and their sustaining troops (roughly 100,000 men). Additionally, at least another 50,000 men should be withdrawn from the layers of U.S. Command headquarters (such as EUCOM, USAREUR, USAFE and USNAVEUR) and non-USEUCOM forces such as the Military Assistance Groups. The number of tactical nuclear weapons stored in Europe should be reduced. Particular attention should be given to the political and military consequences of the possible emplacement and use of Atomic Demolition Mines (ADM) during an emergency. U.S. Southern European Task Force (SETAF) in Verona, Italy, and its supporting logistics complex at Camp Darby, Livorno, Italy, should be withdrawn. If needed, the limited range nuclear fire support that this Task Force now provides to the Italian army could be returned in time of emergency. The Berlin Brigade should be reduced by one infantry battalion. Under EUCOM war planning these forces are written off in time of war. They are only symbolic and two battalions can do this as well as three. The 10th Special Forces and Fifth Psychological Operation Battalion should also be withdrawn.)

War plans of the U.S. 7th Army should be reviewed to establish whether or not this force does have a significant capacity to provide a flexible response to Soviet attack, without early use of some form of tactical nuclear weapons. For example, in 1962 the 7th Army considered it necessary to make early use of ADM's and low-yield (2.5-10 KT) nuclear weapons in making a defense of Europe east of the Rhine River. This was at a time when there were approximately 400,000 troops including 5 divisions in Europe, and the available NATO theater of operations and supply lines extended back across the width and depth of France.

Since that time the force has been reduced to 300,000 troops including 4½ divisions. The possible theater of operations has been reduced to the narrow width of West Germany and the Benelux countries and the British Army of the Rhine has been reduced. U.S. supply line in peacetime runs down from Bremerhaven, Germany, and in wartime must be shifted from the vulnerable route to the Benelux Channel ports, which still are only a day or so travel away from Russian armor in East Germany. To compensate for the loss of the depots in France, huge stocks (60 days level) of supplies have been moved forward to Kaiserslautern, Germany, where they are extremely vulnerable to destruction from a Soviet pre-emptive air strike or early capture by advancing Soviet armor. Our European allies who plan on 90 day mobilization periods stockpile for 30 day levels while we plan on rushing troops to Europe in 30 days. Equally vulnerable to pre-emptive air strike or capture by Soviet armor are the U.S. 17th Air Force fighter squadrons clustered in unprotected sites in the Bitburg-Rumstein-Spangdohlem-Prum complex in West Germany. Furthermore, in case of sudden attack, there are the unsolved problems of how to evacuate the 227,000 military dependents. And the as yet unanswered problem of how we will land the airborne redeveloped forces flown in during a crisis, if the Soviets knock out the available air landing sites by air or rocket fire, capture them by ground attack or dominate the air over them.

All of these serious military problems have long existed in our European defense planning. Since they could not be solved they

have often been ignored or glossed-over. Yet in 1962 when conditions and options were far more favorable for flexible response than today, it was felt that an early use of tactical nuclear weapons would be vital to any successful defense. Now with less options, the same military problems, plus other even more grave, with less troops, and a smaller theater of operations in which to swap space for time, the American public is being told that our conventional forces will put up an even longer conventional defense without resorting to tactical nuclear weapons. This is the rhetoric used to justify keeping our military and State Department empire in position in Europe. But it is not a factual assessment of the probable situation.

In the event of sudden Soviet attack, the U.S. 7th Army must resort to *early* (within the first 24 to 90 hours of commencing battle to meet a sudden attack) *first use* of tactical nuclear weapons if it hopes to prevent being outflanked and pocketed against the Alps and annihilated.

In my opinion one U.S. Army Corps containing an armored and mechanized infantry division reinforced with one armored cavalry regiment positioned along the line Bremen-Hannover-Kassel and supported by supply lines running back to Rotterdam or Antwerp, would provide a much more realistic U.S. contribution to NATO than our present one. Under this concept the present prepositioned equipment for one armored and one mechanized division could remain, as could the tanks of the armored division being withdrawn. This equipment would provide the basis for an early reinforcement of 2 armored and one mechanized division if this were later required. Support forces left in Europe should be those required to austere support the two division force, maintain a drastically reduced number of stored tactical nuclear weapons and maintain the prepositioned equipment. Air squadrons in West Germany should be those required to tactically support the Corps force and accomplish forward strategic missions. The 3rd Air Force in England should command all air elements in Europe. Navy elements should be commanded from afloat command ships under the Atlantic Commander. Only the Corps, division and one logistics command headquarters should be left in Europe. The corps should command all group forces in Europe and be commanded by the Secretary of Defense exercising direction through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Length of tours of military personnel assigned in Europe should be optional. For example, the military member should have a choice of serving in Europe 15 months without his family or 48 months with his family.

Above all we must stop deluding ourselves that we can financially afford to posture a truly effective conventional war deterrent to the Soviet Army in Central Europe. This force is a representative one at best and 4½ divisions are actually no more sufficient for the mission than 2 divisions. There is no valid reason to continue to accept our adverse European balance-of-payments costs in pursuit of the butterfly of conventional war capability in Central Europe. Russia could as soon defend Mexico from a U.S. conventional attack. The answer to Soviet attack in Western Europe will of necessity be nuclear regardless of whether we have 4½ divisions or 2 divisions stationed there. But with 2 divisions and a smaller overall force we have more options before having to resort to nuclear war to defend a large number of U.S. soldiers. True flexible response in Europe calls for either a greatly increased number of U.S. divisions there, or a smaller number that could be risked if national necessity so dictated.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.