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THE NEW ECONOMIC PROGRAM AND WESTERN EUROPE

I. INTRODUCTORY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, this statement to the Senate is in the nature of a summary of my impressions of reactions in Western Europe to the administration's new economic program. In due course, I shall file with the Committee on Foreign Relations a formal report on this subject. The observations which I make now and others which will be contained in my subsequent report flow from a recent visit to various European states and, briefly, to Morocco. Some of these states are members of the European Economic Community and others are on the verge of membership. All of them are affected directly or indirectly by the new economic policy.

I held direct exchanges with U.S. Embassy personnel and government leaders in seven countries. These conversations were supplemented, under my direction, by staff reports from still other areas. The journey culminated in Paris at the 59th Interparliamentary Union which I attended for 2 days. The focus of the study was the new economic program although in Morocco and elsewhere other subjects were raised. In Paris, I made it a point to eschew discussions of Vietnam with the various delegations to the Paris Peace Conference.

My principal concern was to weigh European reactions to the new economic program for communication to the Senate. Wherever I went, however, I also took occasion to emphasize to European leaders the urgency of the economic problems at home which had led to the promulgation of the program. I pressed for their understanding of our situation even as the people of the United States have shown understanding to theirs on many occasions in the past. Invariably these exchanges were frank and friendly and, at the same time, reassuring of the continuance of a high degree of mutual consideration between Western Europe and the United States.

II. EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO THE NEW ECONOMIC PROGRAM

The European nations have been aware of the economic difficulties which have been gathering for the past several years in the United States. They have watched the unchecked inflation, the persistent high level of unemployment, and the shifting trade flow with deep interest and concern. Indeed, a number of major European countries have long been pressing the United States to take strong measures to correct its payments deficits.

The alarms which had been rung in the Senate and elsewhere had reached Europe. Closer at hand, European governments also had evidence of the ineffectiveness of the initial remedies for this Nation's difficulties. European central banks were witness to gyrations in gold prices, periodic speculative rushes of dollars from one currency to another and other manipulations in the European financial markets.

Notwithstanding these harbingers, the first reaction to the new economic pro-

gram was one of stunned surprise. European nations groped for a proper response to the administration's new course and for new footholds for their monetary policies. Under EEC leadership, an effort was made to find a common European approach. It was not successful, largely in consequence of the great divergencies between the positions of France and Germany. For the present, therefore, the European nations are acting individually and with a variety of responses. All of the reactions, however, to one degree or another, involve some degree of free market determination of the present value of the dollar. Nor are the forthcoming monetary conferences expected to make much difference in the situation.

There was a certain inevitability in the initial European shock. The administration's course was a drastic change in direction which for three decades, had assigned to a stable dollar-gold relationship the central role in the commerce of the North Atlantic nations and much of the rest of the world. Moreover, the impact was intensified by the suddenness of the announcement as well as by the nature of certain of the specific remedies which the administration chose to pursue.

The first wave of reaction has now passed. In a calmer aftermath the Europeans tend to acknowledge that the need to shore up this Nation's financial position was long past due. If there ever was any tendency to gloat over our economic difficulties, as some earlier press reports indicated, it has long since passed. The fact is, that the European stake in the outcome of the President's program is very great. The stability of the U.S. economy still lies at the base of North Atlantic commercial relationships. In turn, the well-being of all of Western Europe is still intimately woven into those relationships.

That the European governments are understanding does not mean that they concur in every aspect of the administration's new program. On the contrary, they are articulate in setting forth differences. Certain European nations, for example, would have preferred that the currency readjustments take the form of a revaluation in the price of gold rather than the suspension of the relationship between the metal and the dollar. The preference for what might be termed gold levitation over dollar floatation is not too difficult to understand. As the Europeans see it, a rise in the fixed price of gold would not only have forestalled the necessity for revaluations of their currencies but it would also have increased greatly European exchange reserves which are now held extensively in gold.

There is also concern that the proposed investment-tax credit is to apply exclusively to purchases of U.S. origin. From the point of view of European self-interest, a tax incentive for U.S. industries to "buy American" can only serve to reduce the competitive effectiveness of many European manufacturers—notably of machinery—in the U.S. market. The proposed repeal of the excise tax on automobiles is similarly regarded as a blow on a blow to European exports in most of those nations which are heavily committed to the sale of vehicles in the U.S. market.

III. THE TEMPORARY 10-PERCENT ADDITIONAL IMPORT DUTY

The most universal reaction to the new economic program, however, is reserved for the general 10-percent add-on, or surcharge, with regard to U.S. import duties. All of the European governments oppose the provision although certain countries are hit more directly and painfully than others. Recession and unemployment are now anticipated among certain European exporters of highly competitive commodities such as shoes, jewelry, and watches. On the whole, however, the European economies do have alternative sources of trading strength—notably the inner market of the European Economic Community and they appear sufficiently stable to be able to absorb the increase in duty without widespread disruption.

There is little disposition to challenge this increase under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Nor is there any inclination to engage in or to threaten reprisals. The fact is that there are unchallenged European precedents for the action which has now been taken by the United States.

Objections to the increase in duty are expressed largely on philosophical grounds. It is described as a step back from freer international trade which, to call a spade a spade, is what it is even on a temporary basis. As noted, however, it is not the first happening of that kind in the Western trading community. Other nations have made similar retrogressions. That the step now looms as a giant one in European eyes is because it has been taken by the largest nation and over the past several decades one of the most consistent advocates of freer trade.

Hence, great stress is laid on the "temporary" tag which has been attached to the provision. The word is, at once, both reassuring and disturbing in Europe. On the one hand, the Europeans find themselves able to adjust to a "temporary" increase and they can also appreciate that a "temporary" lapse in the economic philosophy which has fueled U.S. trade policy for decades need not be permanently disruptive of the economic relationships in which they have invested so heavily. On the other hand what troubles them is the possibility that "temporary" may become permanent. The fact is that the Europeans are far more heavily dependent on international trade than is the United States.

In the circumstances, the question weighs heavily; what if the add-on is only the opening breach? The European nations do not dismiss the possibility that the breach may be widened by subsequent unilateral U.S. measures should the new economic program prove inadequate in showing us the way out of the economic doldrums. The President has taken the lead in offering the reassurances of his administration on that score. During the course of my visit I emphasized that both the administration and the Congress were not predisposed to retreat to the days of Smoot-Hawley and the Great Depression. There is no gain-saying the fact, however, that a doubt persists in Europe as to our course in the future. The fear is real.

If developments were to bear out this

fear of further restrictive measures, the consequences would be portentous for both Europe and the United States. For two decades, the people of both regions have profited greatly from a vigorous economic interflow. The growing movement of goods and capital and, increasingly, skills and people across national borders has done much to raise living levels and enrich the mutual human experiences of Europeans and Americans.

A reversal of that pattern on a temporary basis may have been unavoidable but it is nonetheless regrettable. Should there be further retrogression, the most serious damage could be done to the well-being of both the European nations and the United States. In the end, both might well be cut loose from the moorings of a commonly sustained stability which has contributed so much to the evolution of peace in Europe and the North Atlantic.

In the circumstances, too much stress cannot be laid on the significance of the word "temporary" as it is applied to the increase in duty. The increase in the import duty is, at best, an awkward and dubious remedy for the Nation's economic difficulties. It does not combat inflationary pressures; it accommodates to them and, hence, contributes to higher prices at home. It serves as a relief for inefficiency rather than as an incentive to more efficient production. To be sure, the add-on may provide a breather for the dollar abroad but, in any durable sense, it will do nothing to pump new breath into the international financial position of the United States.

IV. NATO AND THE NEW ECONOMIC PROGRAM

A more pointed correction of the weakness in that position would involve ending excessive governmental expenditures and especially those which are made in other nations. Many of these expenditures seem to persist out of resistance to change rather than out of any significant relationship to the Nation's current needs or interests.

It is only too obvious, for example, what damage has been done to the Nation's economic position by an outflow in the range of \$130 billions of dollars for the tragic and wasting war in Indochina. Yet the war goes on; so, too, do the expenditures, not to speak of the tragic waste of life and resources.

On a smaller scale, the expense of military bases abroad and of foreign aid illustrates the same point. With regard to the latter, year in and year out, billions have poured abroad. In many cases, constructive results have been scarcely perceptible and, sometimes, as in the India-Pakistan situation, the consequences have been downright deplorable. Yet the indiscriminate outflow for aid continues and even spreads further afield.

The cut of 10 percent in aid which has been proposed this year by the administration is to be welcomed even though it seems to me that it is far too meager. Moreover, no distinction is drawn in the proposed cut between what might be constructive and what is ineffective or worse in aid.

For the purposes of this report, the most pertinent example of the kind of excessive government expenditure which

tends to erode the financial position of the United States is the outlay for NATO at the present level. Clearly, the billions which are spent every year, directly and indirectly, for this enterprise bear a significant relationship to the weakness of the dollar abroad. In my judgment, these expenditures come from the hand of an outdated policy. It is a heavy hand which, fixed on the Treasury, diminishes the capability of the United States for dealing with contemporary economic realities.

That is not to say that expenditures for NATO should be eschewed for reasons of economy if they are required to meet urgent security needs in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty. However, there is nothing in that treaty which constitutes a commitment to make expenditures at the present level. The phrase "at the present level" is emphasized because what we do in the way of contribution to NATO is the consequence of our own national decision. Consultation with NATO allies may be desirable but the question of a reduction in U.S. Forces from their present level, however, is not one of international consent but of unilateral determination.

This question was reviewed by the Senate a few months ago and a cut in the U.S. contingency in Europe on the basis of legislative initiative was rejected at that time. However, the fact that the administration has now found it necessary to resort to urgent economic salvage operations underscores the necessity for further consideration of this question. It is to be hoped that a cut might now be brought about by Executive action. If it is not, the question of a legislative initiative may be raised once again in the Senate this session.

V. OBSERVATIONS ON NATO

For the present, however, I would only set forth certain observations on the status of NATO which derive from my recent study abroad. It seems to me that—

First. The Western European nations remain firmly wedded to joint defense of the West under the North Atlantic Treaty. May I add, it is my hope that such will also be the case with regard to the policies of the United States because the mutual stake in the North Atlantic Treaty is very high.

Second. When it comes to material support of NATO, the European nations are prepared to urge the United States not to make reductions in its contribution. There is no indication, however, that any NATO nation is ready to make a substantial increase in its support of NATO. On the contrary, it is not far-fetched to anticipate further reductions in the present European effort under the organization. Even now what the Western Europeans are doing in the name of NATO probably differs very little from what they would be doing, in any event, for their national defense establishments in the absence of NATO.

Third. The reluctance of the European nations to take over any major part of the heavy U.S. burden in NATO is part and parcel of the present mood of Europe. The mood is one of detente and peace not of confrontation and war. It

may be that this mood derives from a dangerously deceptive sense of security. It may be that the NATO command is still well-advised to think and plan in terms of imminent military conflict between East and West. That is not, however, the contemporary idiom of either peoples or governments on the European continent. Quite the contrary, the talk in Europe is of peace and so is the action. Words of reconciliation flow across the line of separation accompanied by accelerating trade, technological exchange, and travel. Indeed, Communist workers from the East form a part of this flow as they move on contract into labor-short Western Europe even as European private enterprise operates in Eastern Europe.

The detente has been gaining momentum in Europe for several years. Even the Czechoslovakian intervention in 1968 slowed it only momentarily. Now it is extending rapidly from the cultural and economic realms into the political. The SALT talks, for example, were reported to me in Helsinki as making very good progress. I spent a whole day going over the progress being made. Moreover, while I was in Europe, an agreement was reached by the Soviet Union, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom which is designed to defuse the Berlin situation—incidentally, President Nixon played a very significant and important part in this—Germans of East and West are now engaged in itemizing this accord. Thereafter should come the formalizing of the Soviet-West German and Polish-West German pacts which have already been negotiated and which will settle, for all practical purposes, the border questions carried over from World War II.

To be sure, the unexpected could intervene to rewrite this diplomatic scenario. For the present, however, developments in Europe underscore the antiquation of NATO in its present form. That is not to deprecate its past contribution nor the continuing value of the Western Alliance in order to meet unforeseen contingencies. The problem is not with the desirability of the North Atlantic Treaty; it is desirable and, perhaps, vital to all concerned. The problem, rather, is the form and content of a NATO two decades old. Despite its so-called policy of "flexible response," NATO has remained rigid in its design for conventional warfare even as the confrontation which might give rise to that warfare has been receding for many years. Moreover, NATO has continued to be overstaffed, overmanned, and overfinanced by the United States long after the Western Europeans have gained the capacity to play the preponderant part in whatever conventional defense they may deem necessary for their security.

In the circumstances, NATO engages in exercises designed for an era of cold war while the climate in Europe warms to the prospect of an all-European peace settlement. In the circumstances, an enormous effort in manpower and funds disappears from the coffers of the United States, at the expense of the national economy and the international strength of the dollar. All the while, Europe uses its resources more pointedly for the economic well-

being and progress of its people. This situation highlights the need, in my judgment, to face up to the anachronism of the current consignment of U.S. military forces in Europe. The presence of over half a million American servicemen and dependents in Europe is irrelevant to the political situation on the continent. The great cost of maintaining the consignment is damaging to this Nation's interests both in Europe and at home.

VI. INDICATED CHANGES IN NATO POLICIES

With or without mutual force reductions, it seems to me highly necessary that there be a substantial and graduated reduction in U.S. forces in Europe. Indeed, what value in any negotiations is the debilitating waste of our financial resources? To follow the line of reasoning that suggests we should keep U.S. forces in Europe in order to increase our bargaining power with the Soviet Union is to argue that if the present forces were doubled in size our bargaining power would be doubled.

It should be noted that there have been some administrative reductions in U.S. force levels in NATO below the maximum of several years ago. However welcome, these limited economies are not to be confused with the financial benefit to the Nation which could be derived from an updating of the policies which govern present troop-numbers in Europe. A realistic reading of the current situation, in my judgment, indicates possible changes which should contribute effectively to the recovery of the Nation's financial health without in any way impairing its security. Specifically, the following measures may be practicable:

First. A reduction in the U.S. military contingent in Western Europe on a graduated basis within the near future. The critical factor in maintaining the North Atlantic Treaty in present circumstances is not the size of the U.S. military contingent but the reliability of the total U.S. commitment. In my judgment, two divisions or less of U.S. forces would be as effective in the latter connection as four or more.

Second. A substantial cut in U.S. command participation in NATO. It would seem most appropriate, in particular, that a European be designated as the next Commander in Chief of the organization and for the United States to take the initiative in encouraging such a selection.

Third. A substitution of multinational NATO forces in the Mediterranean for the conspicuous and overwhelming presence of the 6th Fleet.

Fourth. A development of effective techniques for keeping alive the vital concept of the North Atlantic Treaty while at the same time NATO, as it presently exists, is cut to streamlined essentials, ready for prompt remobilization in the event of emergencies. If present political trends in Europe continue, this conversion of NATO to standby status might well be possible within 5 years.

VII. ADJUSTMENTS IN U.S. POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION

As already noted, the trends in Europe are toward detente. In this Nation's economic interest, and in the interest of

maintaining a constructive diplomatic role in the evolution of peace in Europe, we should adjust our policies, in all respects, to those trends and do whatever we can to encourage them. To that end, it seems to me that—

First. All parts of the Federal machinery, involving the administration of U.S. policies regarding Europe should be reexamined by the President and the appropriate congressional committees in order to update procedures which may be still out of harmony with present trends.

Second. Our policies with regard to Germany should be redesigned to stabilize the existing situation. To that end, these policies should accept the permanence of the two Germanies for the foreseeable future and encourage peaceful and developing contacts between them. They should provide affirmative support for ratification of the West German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact and for the West German-Soviet Union Non-Aggression Pact.

Third. Finally, our policies should endorse, without reluctance, an all-European choosing for the purpose of seeking among other things, a non-aggression treaty between the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations. And this meeting should be attended by both Canada and the United States.

VIII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

To give the direction which has been outlined to U.S. policy, as I see it, would be to point it by the compass of the Nixon doctrine. It would be a direction in accord with the mood in Europe, in accord with the Nation's domestic and international economic interests, and in accord with the needs of a stable peace.

Europe may well be at a most decisive moment in intra-European relations and in relations with the United States. It is a moment which contains promise along with pitfalls. It would be tragic if we were to turn away from this moment which may offer us an opportunity to cement the peace of Europe either because of a delayed and faulty reaction to the financial difficulties of years of diplomatic and military overextension or because a topheavy and aging machinery for the conduct of our European policy continues to flail at the ghosts of the past.

If we fail to grasp this moment, the possibilities loom large for the rapid growth of economic sniping and intrigue. From that point, it is a short distance to a militant economic nationalism and blocism and the crumbling of Western political unity in a general fit of recrimination and reprisals.

There need not be this slide in the Western community into what, in the end, may well be self-destructive. It should be possible to move out of that era which since World War II has had the United States at the core of responsibility and burden without these consequences. We should be able to move into a new and fruitful age of mutuality with Western Europe, within a peaceful Europe, if we will set aside the fears of the past and act in timely fashion on the facts of the present.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I yield at this time to the distinguished Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I wish to join with the Senator from Montana and express my agreement with what he has just said. I think what he has said has been dramatically highlighted and fortified by the articles which have recently been published in the Washington Post with respect to our Army in Europe.

I would hope that the Senator from Montana would and I urge him again to offer his well-directed and well-known amendment for the reduction of our troops in Western Europe.

I congratulate the Senator on his preliminary report, and I agree that it is high time in our own interest to reduce our presence there and approve of these various moves that have taken place.

I certainly agree with the Senator from Montana and I congratulate him on a very fine statement.

I wish to ask the Senator a question. I ask the Senator, in view of his observations and the reports on the military regarding the demoralizing effect on our troops in occupation, if it would not perhaps be proper to again raise this question for a vote in the Senate?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I would agree with the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and I wish to say to him that it is my intention to do so at an appropriate time in connection with an appropriate bill. There are a number of measures to which the amendment seeking to bring about a substantial reduction of U.S. forces in Western Europe on a graduated basis could be attached.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I hope the Senator will do so. To me the reports coming out about the demoralization of our forces are absolutely horrible. I can think of nothing more serious with regard to our own military defenses and, in addition to that, to our reputation, to our influence generally in Europe and over the world. I hope the Senator will do so. I assure the Senator my support and I think he has a great deal of other support. I thank the Senator for his report.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I have inserted in the Record the three articles by Haynes Johnson and George Wilson, which were published in the Washington Post over the past 3 days. If everyone will take the time to read them the articles will be found to be eye-opening. I am disturbed at the lack of morale of our troops in Europe. I am disturbed greatly about the drug traffic, the crime increase, and the shabby conditions under which our enlisted men live, and I emphasize the word "enlisted." I think something should be done because what I want there is an effective and lean army and not the kind of army we have there at the present time, which I think is far from lean. It is quite to the contrary.

Certainly, in view of the race problem, the drug problem, the crime problem, and the slackness of morale, it is not efficient at this time.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Senator.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HOLLINGS. I yield to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I would also congratulate the distinguished majority leader for one of his typically wise and constructive observations to the Senate, this one based on his recent trip.

On the floor of the Senate it has been stated and restated that we have over 7,000 nuclear warheads in Europe. With that type and character of defense in Europe it still seems incredible to me that we have to continue to keep these hundreds of thousands of our conventional military over there. Surely these countries can handle more of this problem of military bodies.

I would join the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations in hoping that, as soon as he considers it proper, the majority leader will again introduce the resolution for a reduction of our troops in Europe.

A prominent physician only this morning told me that once a person is really "hooked"—that was his expression—on heroin, there is no out from his standpoint except suicide.

In reading these three articles referred to it would seem that the Army, not contributing in a real sense, is creating the probability of additional Atticas. Regardless of who is wrong or right in the dreadful situation that developed in that town in the State of New York—a sad business, indeed—all this is something in which every American as well as every Member of the Senate should be, and I am sure is, deeply interested.

Putting it mildly, the drug problem in the most recent article in question was verified to Senator PASTORE and me by officers and enlisted men of the Army when we visited Europe last April.

I would hope, therefore, again inasmuch as I believe in Germany we are creating additional Atticas, that we would look further into these articles entitled "Army in Anguish," published in the Washington Post and written by two responsible newspapermen.

With that in mind I have requested the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services to establish a subcommittee to investigate thoroughly the allegations in these articles. It is about time, from the standpoint of our military posture, that we begin to look at the vital problem of morale in the services, a characteristic of military preparedness that is just as important as any weapons system or group of weapons systems.

So again I congratulate the distinguished majority leader for the thoughtful position he has presented this morning.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish to thank the distinguished Senator and to say that I believe we have to have an

army based not on numbers but effectiveness. There is a job to be done in rebuilding the Army, and I am sure the Congress as a whole stands ready and willing to participate in that effort, which must be undertaken for the security of the United States.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, of course, I agree. We should have a mighty fine Army. I would hope this matter could be cleared up, not only in the Armed Services Committee but also, from the standpoint of commitment, in the Foreign Relations Committee, of which the majority leader is a member.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator from South Carolina yield to me without losing his right to the floor?

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I am glad to yield to the Senator from Vermont.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, the remarks of the majority leader, the Senator from Montana, are very timely and should be heeded and will be heeded, not only in this body but in the rest of the country as a whole.

I was at home on August 15 when the President made his unexpected and startling announcement relative to our national economy and the action he proposed to take. I think that, with very few exceptions the President's statement and proposed plan were very well received even by those who disagree with him on many, many other things. But there is also a feeling that this statement must be followed up by action without much delay. That action must not be a party issue, it must not be an issue between the Congress and the White House, it must not be an issue between industry and labor, because the stakes are too high and the situation is too serious to indulge in that kind of play.

It was only natural that other countries showed resentment at this statement. It came unexpectedly. They were surprised. Many of them thought it was directed at them, so they were not very happy. They do not feel very happy at having anyone in authority in the United States telling them how much they should revalue their own currency, which runs from 15 percent in Japan down to almost nothing in some of the other countries. But these other countries have a share in this responsibility themselves. They forced the President to take the action he did, in a way. They have in the past subsidized their own products through dumping them on the rest of the world, particularly the United States.

They have made internal restrictions against products imported from the United States which have been very costly to us and are largely responsible for the imbalance of our economic situation. Many of them have failed to observe the mandates of the United Nations while expecting the United States to fully observe those mandates.

Finally, I think Western Europe has to bear a great deal of the responsibility for forcing the hand of the President in doing what he did, because the time has now come, as the Senator from Montana has said, for Western Europe to assume the responsibility for their own defenses.

I agree with him that the next commander of the NATO forces should be a European.

The situation now calls for consultation and cooperation, not confrontation. There can be no delay if the damaging conditions of the 1930's are to be avoided, because what hurts the United States hurts these other countries as well, and even more. Reverting to fortress America is not in the interest of the United States. It could be popular at first. It is not in the interest of the rest of the world.

I am very, very hopeful that all nations, we share responsibility too, for the present situation and threatening situation in the world will be able to sit down together and work out fair and equitable trade agreements.

I do not want to see this country slide back into isolation, although there are people in this great Nation of ours who are advocating steps that would have that very result.

I think the Senator from Montana performed a real service, and I thank the Senator from South Carolina for yielding me time to say so.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I want to express my thanks to the distinguished senior Senator from Vermont and to assure him I appreciate what he had to say. I agree with him. There is much more I would like to say in view of the interest generated, but I do not want to intrude myself further on the generosity of the Senator from South Carolina.