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## Congressional Record S. 14343 - Amendment to End Hostilities in Indochina

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

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rect. He has worked long and hard to keep as much of the Senate amendment as possible. I would also agree with him that the amendment as agreed to in conference goes a long way in the direction which I am sure all of us seek—that is, to become a full partner with the President in trying to bring this tragic and wasteful war to an ultimate conclusion.

But I still do not think—speaking personally—that it goes far enough. It is not that I am in love with the language which the Senate has agreed to. But I cannot reconcile myself to the disposition of the word “policy” of the United States and the replacement with “sense of Congress.” To me, “policy” has more strength than “sense,” and is more determinative, and should be more effective.

Nevertheless, I agree with the chairman of the committee that the fact that the House and the Senate did get together on this in conference is a long step forward—and for the first time. The two Houses of Congress, at least, are acting together in urging the President to take the initiative to achieve a ceasefire, a practicable date for the withdrawal—and note this—of all, repeat, all, military forces of the United States, contingent only upon the release of all American prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam, and so forth. The word “all” is very important; because if this is carried through, it will mean that no residual force will be there, so to speak, and I want to see this country withdraw—lock, stock, and barrel.

(Applause in the Visitors' Galleries.)

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will be no more demonstrations in the galleries.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Chair.

That is along the order that Gen. Matthew Ridgway, for example, one of the real soldier-statesmen this Republic has produced in modern times, advocated, if I recall correctly, in Foreign Affairs Quarterly—he called for a 9-month termination date and then a withdrawal of all our armed personnel, leaving only the Marine guards at the Embassy to take care of the security situation there.

As to the third factor, which the distinguished Senator and I have discussed, frankly, I would be more than willing if an agreement could be reached to have an up and down vote on the conference report. But if what I hear is correct, if we attempt to operate on that basis, we will be confronted with a talkathon. For my part, I do not want to see the consideration of this conference report delayed any longer than necessary.

Because of my desire—and the desire of others, I assume—it is quite possible that a tabling motion will be made tomorrow. That at least, if it is made, will give the Senate an indication of the difference in feeling and view in this body. If it is agreed to—I do not know whether or not it will; I have not taken a poll and do not intend to—then, of course, we get to the question of going back to conference with instructions.

It would be my intention in that case to try to get the Senate to agree to instructions relative to the Senate amendment as it was adopted by the Senate 2½

months ago, with the proviso that the 9-month period be shortened by the 2½ months which have elapsed. If the tabling motion is not agreed to, then, of course, we are open to continued debate, and the only procedure to be followed then would be to invoke cloture. I do not know whether that could be achieved, but my guess is that it would not be achieved immediately.

I do not intend to filibuster, any more than, as stated, I do not intend to vote for the conference report. But, so far as the Senator from Montana is concerned, the situation in Vietnam is not going to be placed on the back burner as long as that conflict exists and as long as I am a Member of this body.

I cannot reconcile myself to the fact that as of September 9, 1971—these are figures released by the Department of Defense—301,504 Americans have been wounded, 45,487 Americans have been killed in combat, 9,757 Americans have died from noncombat injuries. The total casualties as of September 9, less than a week ago, were 356,784 Americans. Too many, too much, too long.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I greatly appreciate the remarks of the Senator from Montana, but I ask the Senator this question: Is it not true, talking about finding out the sentiment of the Senate, that if the motion to table should prevail, that would mean that the conference report is dead? Is that not correct?

Mr. MANSFIELD. For the time being.

Mr. STENNIS. The conference report, as such, is dead.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct.

Mr. STENNIS. It is a new start.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct.

Mr. STENNIS. It is further true that then we would be back to the point where we passed the bill on the rollcall vote on June 29 or 27, whatever the date was. We would be back to that point, would we not?

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct.

Mr. STENNIS. As to instructions the Senate might give, none of that, of course, would be binding on the House.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator would propose to instruct only in the limited field that he mentioned. So the Senate conferees would go back and confront a group that had no instructions on their part, and the Senate conferees would be morally bound only to the degree of the instructions on those two subjects. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is absolutely correct.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senate conferees would have no control over what would be brought up at the conference table, because the House conferees would be footloose and fancy free, unless the House limited its conferees.

It is true, as the Senator knows, that the House already has discharged its conferees and it would be a new start for them, too. I appreciate, though, the Senator's remarks.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I am very glad to yield to the Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I was interested in what the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee had to say about the Senate amendment having to do with termination of hostilities in Indochina.

May I say that I, of course—as I have stated many times—will not vote for a draft bill under any circumstances, nor will I vote for a draft conference report. My reason primarily is that the draft law is inadequate and unfair. I would be not at all averse to considering universal military service, which would affect everyone, but not a system which is so inequitable, unfair, and has so many loopholes. So much for that.

So far as the Senate amendment on the termination of hostilities in Indochina is concerned, what the distinguished chairman of the committee has said is cor-

I understand the Senator now wishes to take a recess.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am delighted that the Senator has laid out the steps, because I must repeat, regardless of the outcome, I want action. I do not want this matter dragged out, because we have other business to attend to. Every Senator will vote as he sees fit, because what any Senator does is that Senator's responsibility.

I hope that I have made my position clear. I do not wish to repeat it. I do not intend to make a speech tomorrow, because the facts are there for all to see.

I would, though, express this hope, that if the motion to table is made tomorrow, we lay aside at least 4 hours for that motion, to be equally divided.

I would hope that the distinguished chairman of the committee would agree with me in that contention.

Mr. STENNIS. I indicated in my opening remarks that I was very much concerned that a bill which has taken 7 months, with so much work on it by the membership, and so many decisions having been made, and then having it go to conference, and now to have it shot down, not in the back, but from the side, with a motion to table that does not decide anything, merely compounds the confusion.

I want a decision like the Senator from Montana, except I want a different decision.