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Congressional Record S. 15110 - Military Procurement Authorizations '72

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that continues to wrack and split the Nation. It should not take long to consider the amendment because it expresses an action which the Senate has taken already. In every respect, save one, the amendment is identical to the Vietnam withdrawal amendment adopted decisively just 3 months ago.

The amendment calls for a total withdrawal from Indochina within 6 months on condition only that our Americans held captive or located among the missing-in-action be released. The change is solely an adjustment in time from the 9-month span of the previous amendment to allow for the lapse of 3 months.

In simple terms, this amendment would fuse the cooperation of the Congress—the legislative branch of our Government—to the President's direction of policy in order to bolster this Nation's objective of withdrawal from Indochina. It would assure withdrawal on a single condition—that the President reach an agreement whereby our prisoners of war and those missing in action who can be located—the POW's and MIA's—be returned home. The time frame, I repeat, is 6 months, 6 months from the date of enactment of this bill.

It is my hope that this effort will be accepted in the spirit in which it is made. Within the context of the independent responsibilities of the Senate, it is an effort to cooperate with the President in bringing about an end, once and for all, to this tragic mistake.

There are good reasons for joining the Congress and the President in a national policy of full withdrawal from Vietnam. The repeal of the Tonkin Gulf resolution, for instance, struck down last year what many believe was the sole legal foundation for involvement. There is, moreover, the upcoming election in South Vietnam, the circumstances of which have led others to note the increasing urgency of our withdrawal. Insofar as I am concerned, the most over-riding reason has been and remains the utter waste of this involvement. It is the waste of lives, the waste of tens of billions of dollars as the needs of cities and towns and other urgencies within the Nation are compelled to stand aside. It is the waste of spirit as the Nation remains torn by the divisiveness of the war.

So there is ample cause to get out. That is what the amendment proposes, a final getting-out of Vietnam with 6 months, tied only to the complete release of the POW's and recoverable MIA's. It proposes, in a sentence, a decisive end to this tragic chapter in the Nation's history.

In meeting that objective it should be said that the amendment works hand in hand with the tripod approach which has been set down by the President by protecting the three parties most affected. The assurances are there for all: assurances to the South Vietnamese people themselves that they be given a reasonable chance to survive freely and elect their own government; assurances to the POW's and surviving MIA's that they be guaranteed safe passage home; assurances to young Americans—draftees in large part—who are still being compelled to lay down their lives in Southeast Asia,

that there will be a quick end to the killing.

That is the threefold objective of the amendment and it fits with the tripod of the President's approach. It should be noted in this connection that next Sunday the South Vietnamese go to the polls in an election which, with justification, has come under a cloud. Such as it is, nevertheless, it is an election and it forms the first leg of the tripod of the President's approach which is to give the people a chance to choose a government.

In going to the polls next Sunday, moreover, the people of South Vietnam do so under an armed-forces umbrella of more than a million South Vietnamese. For the last 17 years, they have been advised, trained and supported by the United States. They stand as one of the world's largest military establishments. There is, thus, no question that the South Vietnamese have that reasonable chance to survive freely. That is the second leg of the tripod which the President has set up as a basis for U.S. withdrawal.

The third is based on the POW's and MIA's who, to me, represent the most tragic aspect of this entire issue. Insofar as I am personally concerned, the fate of these men, at this late date, is the only significant basis for this Nation to remain any longer in Vietnam. To the POW's and MIA's, this amendment offers not an expressed intention or a helicopter in the sky but a sober assurance of action on their release and recovery. It is the assurance that inside of 6 months after a ceasefire, concrete steps will be taken to locate them and to secure their release. No more pressing issue exists at this late date in the war than that of seeking out and bringing back the men held captive or the recoverable MIA's. Indeed, it must be faced in all candor that the prospects are dim for the return of any of these men unless and until we decide that for this Nation the war in Vietnam is completely over and act accordingly. It is unfair and irresponsible to stimulate the hopes of those men and their families with promises of action where action is not feasible. Unless and until this Nation moves in the direction set forth in the amendment, either by Presidential directive or law, I repeat, it is highly doubtful that the POW's or the MIA's will return to this Nation. That is the true warranty of the amendment. It is a sober assurance of the release, forthwith, of the POW's and MIA's who survive.

The purpose of the amendment is clear. Except as indicated, its content is unchanged from what the Senate, by vote of 61 to 38, has already adopted. If the Senate votes to restate its position and the House now concurs, it would represent, I think, a constructive action by the legislative branch of Government which complements the administration's policy to the end that the tragedy in Vietnam will be concluded at last.

I send the amendment to the desk, Mr. President, and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD at this point.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment will be received and printed, and will lie on the table; and, without

MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, 1972

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Pursuant to the previous order, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which the clerk will state.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (H.R. 8687) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1972 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senator from Montana is recognized for 15 minutes.

AMENDMENT NO. 437

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in the past several months I have received at least 10,000 cards that all read as follows:

JULY 31, 1971.

To you, Sir, and your Party Members:

Do you realize that it has been over seven years since the first U.S. servicemen was taken prisoner in Southeast Asia? It is the responsibility of the elected officials of this country to take all possible actions to bring about treatment of these men as required by the Geneva Convention of 1949.

Further, it is the responsibility of our elected officials to bring about a release of all prisoners of war.

What have you done?

Mr. President, in an effort to seek out and bring back Americans held captive or missing in Indochina, the issue of Vietnam will be raised again, and, may I say, if necessary, again and again this year. It will be raised in the form of an amendment to the pending measure. The Senate will be asked once again to join in seeking a conclusion to this tragedy

objection, the amendment will be printed in the RECORD.

The amendment is as follows:

At the end of the bill add a new title as follows:

TITLE VI—TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES IN INDOCHINA

SEC. 601. (a) It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to terminate at the earliest practicable date all military operations of the United States in Indochina, and to provide for the prompt and orderly withdrawal of all United States military forces not later than six months after the date of enactment of this section subject to the release of all American prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam and forces allied with such Government. The Congress hereby urges and requests the President to implement the above expressed policy by initiating immediately the following actions:

(1) Establishing a final date for the withdrawal from Indochina of all military forces of the United States contingent upon the release of all American prisoners of war held by the Government of North Vietnam and forces allied with such Government, such date to be not later than six months after the date of enactment of this Act.

(2) Negotiate with the Government of North Vietnam for an immediate cease-fire by all parties to the hostilities in Indochina.

(3) Negotiate with the Government of North Vietnam for an agreement which would provide for a series of phased and rapid withdrawals of United States military forces from Indochina in exchange for a corresponding series of phased releases of American prisoners of war, and for the release of any remaining American prisoners of war concurrently with the withdrawal of all remaining military forces of the United States by not later than the date established by the President pursuant to paragraph (1) hereof or by such earlier date as may be agreed upon by the negotiating parties.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I had hoped that the majority leader would not find it necessary to reintroduce this amendment at this time, but apparently progress in reaching the desired results which were incorporated in his earlier amendment or proposal has not been very satisfactory.

I want to say I have tried to support the President down the line in his efforts, his apparent efforts to bring the war in Indochina to a close. I have felt that he was going in the right direction. I still feel he is going in the right direction and give him a high mark in the conduct of foreign relations, but I am beginning to be rather apprehensive that the desired results may not be attained.

I have felt, for myself, that next July 1 is the deadline for the time when our military forces should be completely out of Vietnam. I have made this clear not only to people in our own Government, but also to people in other governments, including the South Vietnamese Government. I have come to the conclusion that continued participation by our Armed Forces beyond that date could be a liability rather than an aid to that Nation.

Now, the Senator from Montana has reintroduced this amendment with the 6-month limitation of time after the bill becomes enacted into law. Assuming that may be in early December, it would still give us until some time in the month of June to complete this withdrawal.

I have felt deep concern, indeed, for the families of the prisoners of war who have been held over there, some of them now for almost 7 years. It was over a year ago I had a suggestion which had been made to me which I passed on to the Defense Department relative to an attempt to rescue some of these prisoners by helicopter raid. I got a letter back from the Department of Defense telling me why it would not work, and then they tried it and it did not work, so they were absolutely right in their earlier judgment.

I am afraid that the war in Southeast Asia will be written down as the most disastrous chapter in American history. There is no question about that. The small country of Laos has been torn to pieces. In Cambodia, 90 percent of the economy has been destroyed, as far as their export business goes, since Cambodia was invaded. South Vietnam itself is in terrific political turmoil, with the outcome in doubt. And the United States economy, thanks to the losses we have sustained in this abortive effort in Southeast Asia, at a cost of over \$200 billion, is now in the most critical situation it has been at least for the last 35 years. It is something that we should all worry about.

As I have said, I think next July 1st is about the limit for our participation, in a military sense, in South Vietnam or in Southeast Asia. I would still support reconstruction in Indochina and would hope to undo the damage which has happened there insofar as our resources will permit, but I do not know at this time whether our resources will permit steps in that direction.

International finance associations are now meeting here in Washington, and I do not know just what they will want. I suppose they will want the United States to participate as generously as we have done in the past providing amounts running into billions upon billions upon billions of dollars. I would like us to participate with those who are trying to establish and maintain adequate international financing in this world, but I have to say in all truth that I do not know what we can do and I do not see how we can contribute further to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the IDA, and the other organizations, until we know with certainty, or almost with certainty—nothing is ever quite certain—what we are going to do from now on in Indochina.

So, while I had hoped that we would have progressed far enough now—I notice we are still withdrawing a few troops from that area; I do not expect we will withdraw them in increasing numbers until after the South Vietnamese election next week—I do think the President has it in his power to straighten out this matter. Approval of the Mansfield amendment as reintroduced will certainly demonstrate not only to the executive branch of Government but to the rest of the world the position that the U.S. Senate holds in this matter. We might, perhaps, have settled it in connection with the draft bill. I do not feel too badly that we did not, because we had two or three different subjects to deal with in that bill.

So, under the circumstances, I feel that I will vote for the new amendment offered by the Senator from Montana, in the hope that it will contribute toward an early and a decent settlement of a situation which we should never have gotten into in the first place.

Mr. STENNIS and Mr. COOPER addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, are we under a limitation of time?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. There is no limitation.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment introduced by the distinguished majority leader, MIKE MANSFIELD, the main provision of which declares that it is the policy of the United States to withdraw all its forces from Vietnam by the spring of 1972 provided that all U.S. prisoners of war are returned by the North Vietnamese and its allies.

I have joined with Senator MANSFIELD, Senator AIKEN, Senator CHURCH, and other Senators, in previous efforts to prevent the expansion of the war by U.S. forces in Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand and I am happy to join him in this effort to bring U.S. participation in the war to a close.

The Senate approved a similar amendment to the Draft Extension Act by a substantial majority, and by so voting reflected, I believe, the majority will of the people of this country to withdraw its forces from Vietnam and end its participation in the war in Southeast Asia.

I agree with the Senator from Montana that with the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the Government of the United States has no constitutional authority to keep its forces in Indochina or to engage in hostilities there except to protect our troops from imminent danger as they are withdrawn. In the absence of any approval by the Congress through constitutional processes, the President is without authority except to withdraw and to protect our forces against imminent danger as they withdraw. In fact, he has steadily withdrawn U.S. forces, keeping every commitment and reversing past policies, for which he deserves full credit and support. More than half of the 535,000 ground troops in Vietnam when he assumed office have been withdrawn. But the pace of future withdrawal is said to be linked to the ability of the Government of South Vietnam to take over the continuation of the war.

South Vietnam has over 1 million men under arms, and after over 30 years of war and as the recipient of tens of billions of dollar of direct assistance ought to be in a position to conduct its own military effort without U.S. forces.

I do not believe there is any constitutional or practical reason why the United States should any longer determine its rate of withdrawal upon the strength or weakness of any particular government in South Vietnam or upon the outcome of elections there. As a matter of logistics, the time provided by Senator MANS-

FIELD's amendment is ample, particularly since over half of our forces have already been withdrawn since President Nixon assumed office almost 3 years ago.

I have always believed the final solution to the Indochina war should not hinge upon military force but through negotiations, by all the nations concerned. Expanded war, and the application of force—massive firepower and bombing, have not brought a peaceful settlement. When U.S. forces are withdrawn the United States may have little control over the nature of the settlement. But our lessened influence in a settlement does not preclude a stable, peaceful settlement—in fact, it may enhance it. For I doubt that other countries, our adversaries in the war—North Vietnam, China, and Russia, or our friends, the United Kingdom and others, or the neutrals, or the U.N. will seriously assist in negotiations as long as the United States maintains forces—even residual forces in Vietnam.

This is confirmed by the history of negotiations at Paris. In August, on my return from the SALT talks in Helsinki I met with Ambassador Habib, now appointed as Ambassador to Korea, and then our chief negotiator in talks with the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. He confirmed, as the Senate well knows, that there has been no progress in Paris and the war has continued. I believe failure is due primarily to the intransigence of North Vietnam and the Vietcong and that an international settlement offers the best chance for a stable peace for the entire area. The reconvening of a Geneva Conference consisting of all the countries involved, or as Senator AIKEN has wisely suggested an Asian conference, or possibly the U.N., will provide the best means of achieving a political settlement when U.S. forces are withdrawn.

The interest of the United States is to have a stable peace in Southeast Asia and certainly it is the desire of all people, and particularly the people of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam.

The United States made an error in continuing its presence in Vietnam after it was clear it was not in our national interest or necessary for our security, but I recognize the difficulty in changing our course, as President Nixon has done. But through a series of legislative actions the Congress, and particularly the Senate, has moved to end our military involvement in Indochina, first to end the widespread bombing of the North, later by amendments to contain the war to Vietnam, and not to enlarge the engagement in hostilities by U.S. forces to Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos.

It is now the time to end U.S. military involvement in Indochina completely. Senator MANSFIELD's amendment is a fair and proper way to express the support of the Senate, the Congress, and the country for the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces. It is the proper role of the Congress to declare such a fundamental policy. I would hope that the administration, which has reversed the policy of past administrations would concede the right of the Congress to carry out its

duties under the Constitution to affirm a fundamental policy clearly desired by a majority of the people of this country. The people of this country want an end to U.S. participation in the war in Indochina, and the Congress should express this national will. For these reasons the Congress should support the amendment offered today by Senator MIKE MANSFIELD.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, regarding the amendment just filed by the Senator from Montana, I shall be quite brief, but shall undertake, along with other Senators, to discuss it on its merits more fully later.

I want to start with two points here. I appreciate so very much the fine attitude of the Senator from Montana, all the way through regarding this subject, at every turn, down to now. Also, the second point is, in his remarks on this subject about the war and the POW's, he certainly started off with an expression of interest and sympathy and desire for the termination of this conflict as soon as possible, consistent with our mission and all of the matters that go in connection with our intervention there. Certainly we want the POW's to be released not only at the earliest month possible, but the earliest time possible, even at the earliest hour possible.

But, Mr. President, I submit there is much more involved in this amendment than just subject matter itself, as offered as a part of this bill, and I most respectfully submit that as legislation on a bill of this kind, or the draft bill, the subject matter of the amendment has already had its day in court. There are many other far-reaching matters involved in this bill, and it is a bill that must move along; it must make its legislative tracks and move to its ultimate end, because it is just obviously necessary to authorize weaponry, and it cannot be appropriated for until it is authorized. Appropriation bills are hanging up, waiting for the passage of this bill.

That is not enough reason for keeping the war going, Mr. President, or keeping the POW's in prison, but it is merely a legislative fact of life on the 27th of September 1971, when we are faced with all these other legislative problems in this bill and beyond this bill; and I shall urge that upon the Senate for consideration later with a detailed statement of the facts with which we are confronted.

The second point I wish to make is that I believe—and I have been rather close to this subject—that in the first place we already have a legislative expression on this subject; even in a bill as controversial otherwise as the draft bill was, we already have that expression. But I believe it would be a far more effective legislative expression and legislative determination if the substance of this amendment could just travel on its own, and not as a part of another bill—especially a bill that must be enacted—dealing with other subjects.

I think it is relevant to this bill; I am not arguing that it is not. The bill has money in it for use in connection with this war. But I think it would be a far better, more effective legislative expres-

sion; even if the President of the United States should veto a resolution to this effect by Congress, it would be clearer and more positive, and would not be the result of a compromise in conference, as sometimes is necessary. If it were passed purely on its merits as an independent resolution, I think it would go much further. I believe it would gain more support in Congress, frankly, and would be more effective as a legislative determination of what should be done about this war.

Frankly—and I say this with the utmost respect—we have two members of that fine committee on the floor now who have just spoken in favor of this proposal.

Mr. AIKEN. Three.

Mr. STENNIS. Yes, three. I think that Congress and the people are entitled to a resolution on this subject that has been before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the two Houses, with the great eminence of their members, and their experience and background of knowledge of this subject matter, and their activity in it—to have the Committee on Foreign Relations pass on it directly and come here with a report from their committee on this subject matter. It has been fully debated, but we have not had the benefit of a report yet.

The same would apply in the other body, and I think there would then be a far better chance to pass it, frankly, than there would when piling it on the so-called military bills.

I am not dodging the work nor dodging the issue, but just talking common sense; and frankly, I have not understood why it does not go that route. I just do not see yet—and I have raised this point more than once—why the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, where the debate is going on, on this matter, has not taken up the matter in the form of a resolution, or in such form as they see fit, and given us a definite, concrete recommendation here in the form of some legislative proposal backed up with their opinions and consideration, and the testimony and the evidence. I just do not understand why that does not happen. This is not said critically of the committee, because obviously this is a problem of the Nation, and members of that committee have worked here on the floor. But as a Member of Congress and a Member of this body, I have expressed, as I said last year, a desire to have that committee pass on it, and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, if they see fit.

So, Mr. President, at a later date I shall seek the privilege of speaking further on this subject. The Senator from Montana has spoken to me about agreeing to a time to vote on the amendment. I certainly do not want to delay a vote. I want those who want to speak to have an opportunity to do so. We have to know something about the prospects of attendance on certain days, and when I speak again on the bill, and I shall speak briefly, at that time I intend to say something especially about agreeing to a limitation of time and a vote on all the amendments. The committee will be ready, and, subject to information about attendance, we are ready to make agreements.

Mr. AIKEN, Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator from Vermont.

Mr. AIKEN. I hope an early determination can be made on this amendment, because we not only have to deal with the Asian Bank, the Inter-American Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and so forth, but the committee is now working on the foreign aid bill, and we have got to know where we are going and how long we are supposed to be going in that direction before we can really take these other matters up and work on them intelligently.

Mr. STENNIS. I can make this suggestion to the Senator: the way to control that is to take jurisdiction of this subject matter and hold hearings on the resolution as introduced by the Senator from Georgia, and then you can control when it comes up.

Mr. AIKEN. Well, if the Senator from Mississippi, the chairman of our Armed Services Committee, can only persuade the House of Representatives to act favorably on the Mansfield amendment and send it over here, I am sure the whole matter would be settled without much, if any, delay.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. We will get to a vote on this matter, as far as I am concerned, very soon, and I hope it can be disposed of.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, as always, the distinguished Senator from Vermont has hit the nail on the head. In emphasizing the part which the House of Representatives could, should, or might play, he approaches the nub of the situation which confronts the Senate.

May I say that I appreciate the courtesy and consideration shown by the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services and the manager of the bill now before us. May I say also that in my opinion nothing is more important than this amendment as far as the future of this country is concerned. I cannot think of the Senate voting on a more important issue than the one which hopefully will be before us in the next 2 or 3 days.

As the Senator from Mississippi has indicated, I did discuss with him the possibility of a time limitation on the amendment just offered, preferably tomorrow, Wednesday, or Thursday—even Friday. The day makes no difference to me. All I want is a vote, an expression of the sentiment of the Senate. I think this issue is so important that perhaps on this occasion a great majority of the Senators will be in attendance to face up to it, one way or the other.

As I say, there is no issue of greater importance. When we think of drug addiction in this country, what do we think of? Vietnam? Turkey? Not much. It comes from the golden triangle—northeast Burma, northeast Thailand, and the Kingdom of Laos. That is where nine-tenths of the white stuff comes from.

I do not have to talk to anybody in this country—certainly no one in this Chamber—to emphasize the effects of what

drugs have done and will do to Americans, not only in Southeast Asia but in this Nation as well. We have the rise in crime, attributable in considerable degree to the rise in drug addiction. We have our ghettos in disrepair. We have the question of racial animosities in this country, in Vietnam, in western Europe.

What this country is going to have to do is to get together to combat these difficulties. We are going to have to cut down on the spending and the waste and the adventurism which have marked our foreign policy since the end of the Second World War, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, and face up to the problems at home.

Maintaining troops or even maintaining bombers in Southeast Asia is not the answer. Nor, incidentally, is the maintaining of 525,000 U.S. military personnel and dependents in Western Europe the answer. Nor is the maintenance of approximately 2,000 bases, scattered throughout the world and encompassing every continent, the answer.

We know the kind of economic situation which confronts us today. We are in trouble, deep trouble. That, too, along with just about all other issues which confront us, can be traced indirectly or directly to Vietnam. It is a cancer on the soul and the body of America, and it will not be cured until the cause is removed and we withdraw—lock, stock, and barrel—not just from Vietnam but from Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand as well. That area is not and never has been vital to the security of this Republic.

The distinguished Senator from Mississippi said or suggested that the Gambrell-Talmadge resolution, which is the same as the resolution introduced today, should be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and that a report should be issued.

Mr. President, may I say that a report already has been issued. It has been issued by the Department of Defense and is contained in the figures, in the statistics in the casualties—the dead and wounded bodies, if you will—which are enumerated on a weekly basis to the American people but to which, unfortunately, too little people pay attention.

Here are the figures for Thursday last: 301,700 Americans wounded; 45,514 Americans dead in combat; 9,781 Americans noncombat dead; the dead total, 55,295. None of us can take solace in that figure, because those figures mean Americans, men of this Nation, mostly draftees, men who died in the prime of their lives and did not have a chance. Total casualties, 356,000 as of last Thursday—356,995; missing, 1,601; totally disabled, roughly 35,000 Americans.

What about the other combatants? South Vietnam, 138,001 dead. Other free world forces, 4,697 dead North Vietnam and the Vietcong, 770,850 dead. Those total 913,548 dead. Regardless of the color of a man's skin, regardless of his cultural or social background, these men were men—animate, human, living, breathing beings.

Yes, we have permitted a great deal; so many Americans have been lost; so many Americans have been disabled; so

much of the Nation's treasure has been spent. The figure 356,995 American casualties is 356,995 too many. The figure of \$130 billion, roughly, spent in this war—and it will treble into the next century—is \$130 billion too much.

The length of this war, almost 10 years—although we have been involved there for 17 years—makes it the longest war in the history of the Republic, and that is too long—much too long.

Yes, I agree with the distinguished senior Senator from Vermont (Mr. AIKEN). Insofar as our capacities will allow, we do have a duty and an obligation to participate in the reconstruction of what used to be one of the Associated States of Indochina, but which is now four separate entities. Reconstruction will only resurrect in part what has been destroyed in human spirit, what has been destroyed physically through napalming, defoliation, and ruthless destruction. There is a moral obligation to do what can be done to compensate. There was no moral obligation to become engaged in the war.

I want to say one thing in conclusion that I have said many times; in this I am in the great minority. It is my belief that the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 was a tragedy of the greatest magnitude, because Ngo Dinh Diem was an honest man, incorruptible, and he gave a measure of stability to South Vietnam. With his assassination—and evidently this Nation played a part in that tragedy—we found a succession of coups by the generals taking place.

Finally, 4 years ago, we saw an election which brought into office the present president and vice president. They were minority victors. Now we approach another election, 17 years after we became involved in Vietnam. What we have is not democracy but one man on the ticket and that one man is going to win.

I think there has been enough said and done about Vietnamization by this country. There has been enough American blood spilt. Yes, Mr. President, there has been enough South Vietnamese, North Vietnamese, Vietcong, Laotian, and Cambodian blood spilled.

The Senate, if it desires, can make a move which I think could help to shorten the war. It is a move which is well within the constitutional responsibilities of this body. It would call for a cease fire, it would call for negotiations, and it would call for the simultaneous withdrawal of U.S. personnel from Vietnam with the simultaneous release of U.S. prisoners of war and all recoverable of the missing in action.

We have to face up to this matter. We cannot avoid it. So far as I am concerned, it will be brought up again and again—and, if need be, again, and this year.

There is no more overriding issue. I want no more blood on my hands. I want to see these men brought home. I want to see, wherever possible, the MIA's recovered and the POW's released as soon as it can be done.

Thus, I would hope that it would be possible within the next 1, 2, or 3 days to reach a decision to vote on this.

So far as the Senator from Montana is concerned, there is not much that I can add to what I have already said. My time spent on this issue will be very brief.

What I want is a vote, and a vote in this body soon.