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#### SOUTHEAST ASIA

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there has been a good deal of talk about certain issues of paramount importance at the present time, not the least of which has been the issue discussed this morning, the need for tax reform.

There are other issues, such as pollution, busing, the condition of the ghettos, crime, justice, drug control, and the like, all important. However, in my opinion, Mr. President, the most important issue now—and it has been for some years past—is the issue of our involvement in Southeast Asia.

It is brought to our attention because of recent events in Laos and Cambodia. According to the latest reports the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese are very close to Long Cheng, the CIA-sponsored base in southern Laos.

According to the latest reports the constitution of the Khmer Republic formerly known as Cambodia, in effect has been overthrown and the position of first responsibility has been taken by Lon Nol.

In Cambodia we are witnessing the folly of the American desire to export its political, economic, and social institutions to foreign lands where they do not need them, do not want them, and should not have them forced upon them.

Two years have elapsed since the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the result has been chaos. Two years later seven-tenths of Cambodia is under the control of hostile forces; and 2 years later, out of an estimated population of 7 million, one-third has become homeless. The net result has been nothing but destruction and ruin.

There is, of course, the makings of a constitutional republic, but when the constitution supposedly was to have been put into effect Lon Nol threw it to one side and said he would not recognize it. So now the constitution and the republic, except in name, have gone down the drain. Marshal Lon Nol dismissed the constitution as unacceptable. He dissolved the assembly and he has taken over complete control as a dictator in his pitiful country.

The South Vietnamese Army, the traditional enemy of Cambodians, is once again penetrating into Cambodia, to the extent of approximately 30,000 or 40,000 troops. Does anyone remember the invasion of Cambodia just about 2 years ago? Does anyone know what has happened since? Well, the North Vietnamese are back where they used to be, in the area of the Parrot's Beak. More of Cambodia is under the control of the North Vietnamese and their allies and more of Cambodia has been destroyed in the meantime.

So I would hope that those who are advocating continued aid to this small

country, made up of kindly people—those in the Pentagon, those in the administration, those in the State Department, and those in the aid program—will think and think again, because this is not a prime example of the Nixon doctrine; it is anything but. It proves just how bankrupt the policy of our country has been allowed become, not only in Cambodia, but also in the rest of that part of the world.

Then there is Laos, another small country with a very kindly, peaceful people. What happened there? Hundreds of thousands of Laotians have been made homeless refugees and much of their country has been destroyed. A clandestine army under the control of the CIA has been operating; the overall commander is the proconsul, the U.S. Ambassador to Laos. He is the one who directs operations, tells where the strikes will be, whether they will be on the Plain of Jars or in the region of Long Cheng, the CIA subsidized base which is now under siege.

Much could be said about what happened in these two countries in addition to what happened and what is happening in Vietnam. But it is all a tragedy as far as this republic is concerned. It is the worst tragedy in our entire history.

I think if anything is going to be done it is going to be up to King Savang Vatthana in Laos, SRI, and Prince Norodom Sihanouk, now in exile in Peking, to put their talents and their efforts to use, so that a degree of stability and peace can be returned to their respective countries.

Let us take a look at the statistics. These are not the latest statistics but they are up to February 19, 1972. Combat wounded, Americans, 302,651; combat dead, Americans, 45,650; dead from other purposes, American, 10,077, for a total of 55,727 Americans dead as of February 19, 1972, and total American casualties as of the same date of 358,378.

As far as others are concerned, we find that the South Vietnamese have suffered death loses of 145,414 and other free world forces have suffered deaths of 4,838. It is estimated that the other side has suffered deaths of 796,458.

I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD a table supplied by the Department of Defense, which details these casualties.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### SOUTHEAST ASIA CASUALTIES STATISTICAL SUMMARY

The Department of Defense released today the cumulative casualties reported in connection with the conflict in Southeast Asia as of 19 February 1972.

Total U.S. deaths from action by hostile forces is the sum of the following categories: Killed in Action, Died of Wounds, Died While Missing, and Died While Captured. Lines 1 through 4 subdivide casualties by cause or category. Line 5 provides an additional breakdown of the same totals by environment (air or ground). Totals are cumulative from January 1, 1961 through February 19, 1972.



## U.S. CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM ACTION BY HOSTILE FORCES

	Army	Navy <sup>1</sup>	Marine Corps	Air Force	Total
1. Killed.....	25,268	1,057	11,468	462	38,255
2. Wounded or injured:					
a. Died of wounds.....	3,504	141	1,449	44	5,138
b. Nonfatal wounds:					
Hospital care required.....	96,588	4,099	51,360	824	152,871
Hospital care not required.....	104,425	5,861	37,166	2,328	149,780
3. Missing:					
a. Died while missing.....	1,650	182	5	400	2,237
b. Returned to control.....	48	7	6	28	89
c. Current missing.....	245	114	78	575	1,012
4. Captured or interned:					
a. Died while captured or interned.....	15	3	3	2	20
b. Returned to control.....	57	3	5	6	71
c. Current captured or interned.....	73	146	25	245	489
5. Deaths:					
a. From aircraft accidents/incidents:					
Fixed wing.....	90	157	140	704	1,091
Helicopter.....	2,287	66	429	63	2,845
b. From ground action.....	28,060	1,157	12,356	141	41,714
Total deaths <sup>2</sup> .....	30,437	1,380	12,925	908	45,650

<sup>1</sup> Navy figures include Coast Guard.

<sup>2</sup> Sum of lines 1, 2a, 3a, and 4a.

## COMBAT DEATHS FOR OTHER FORCES IN VIETNAM, SINCE JAN. 1, 1961

	RVNAF <sup>3</sup>	Other free world forces	Enemy <sup>4</sup>
6. Total deaths.....	145,414	4,838	796,458

  

U.S. CASUALTIES NOT THE RESULT OF HOSTILE ACTION, SINCE JAN. 1, 1961					
	Army	Navy <sup>1</sup>	Marine Corps	Air Force	Total
7. Current missing.....	117		12		129
8. Deaths:					
a. From aircraft accidents/incidents:					
Fixed wing.....	254	176	45	281	756
Helicopter.....	1,803	52	242	18	2,115
b. From other causes.....	4,924	617	1,391	274	7,206
Total deaths.....	6,981	845	1,678	573	10,077

<sup>3</sup> Does not include paramilitary losses.

<sup>4</sup> Included in adjustments from previous periods and is subject to later adjustment in turn.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if we add all these deaths together, on our side and on the other side, the figure is in excess of 1 million. Furthermore, we have expended in Southeast Asia at least 2½ times the bomb tonnage used in the Second World War in both the Pacific and European theaters, as well as in the Korean war, and the end is not in sight. The bombings are continuing and the number of POW's is increasing, as well as the number missing in action.

I want to give the President credit for drawing down the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam, and for that matter in Thailand, as well.

The number at the moment, I understand, is 108,000, roughly, but by the first of May that is supposed to go down to 69,000. I have no doubt but that it will and around that time the President will very likely announce a further reduction.

But the war is continuing. No progress is being made in Paris, and no end to the war is in sight. I would hope that despite these draw-downs in troop personnel in the Far East, in South Vietnam, in Thailand, in the South China Sea, as well as in the Pacific and the Far East and elsewhere, we would reach the stage shortly when we would be able to withdraw lock, stock, and barrel every American from Vietnam, from Laos, from Cambodia, and from Thailand.

Mr. President, I would hope, in view of the impasse which has been reached in the negotiations in Paris, that the President would consider most seriously setting a date certain, an actual date tied only to the release of the U.S. prisoners of war and the recoverable missing in action.

I would hope that at that time, and on the basis of that date, if this proposal is advanced, we would recognize the fact that the future of Vietnam will be determined not by us, but by the Vietnamese, North and South, themselves. It is their country, whether it is divided into two or three parts or is whole in one. It is their future. It is they who must determine under what conditions they will live, and it is not our responsibility.

South Vietnam has an army of 1,100,000 men at the present time, and re-

serve forces—paramilitary, militia, and the like—of about 550,000. It has one of the largest armies in the world. It has one of the best equipped navies in the world. It has been subsidized and supported and armed by this country for the last 17 years.

I would hope that we would not forget what is going on in South Vietnam, what is happening to our sons, our brothers, our POW's, who are increasing in number, and not be sidetracked by these other issues, which, while important, are not of the immediacy of the problem which confronts this Nation in South Vietnam, in Laos, in Cambodia, and in Thailand.

This is a real American tragedy, and it has lasted too long. It should be brought to an end, and I hope the suggestion I have made will be given some consideration downtown.

I want to repeat that I recognize and approve of what the President has done in drawing down the numbers from about 550,000 to 108,000 today, down to 69,000 by May 1, and very likely a further reduction beyond that time; but we cannot put our heads in the sand. We cannot be satisfied with just a drawing down in U.S. troops. We cannot be satisfied with a diminution in the numbers of casualties, dead and wounded. And we cannot be satisfied with the fact that, instead of the POW's being reduced in number, and recoverable missing in actions being reduced in number, they are, contrariwise, being increased in number.

Therefore, I hope the proposal I have made will receive consideration. I do not intend to forget that we are involved in a misbegotten, tragic war in Southeast Asia, an area in which we never have had, and do not now have, any vital interest. And the sooner we liquidate it, on a lock, stock, and barrel basis, the better off this Nation will be, and the more possible it will be for us to pay less attention to overseas and to face up to our own difficulties here at home.

We have only so many people, probably 208 million at the present time. We have only so much in the way of resources. Times have changed, and while

there may—and I emphasize the word "may"—have been a need, following the Second World War, for this country to be a world policeman, that need has long ago vanished.

So let us live in today and look to tomorrow, and let us divest ourselves of policies and mistakes of the past, which bring nothing but ruin, nothing but death and destruction, and nothing but huge outlays to this Republic.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article by Mr. David Brinkley, published in the Boston Globe of the 7th of this month, entitled "Vietnam \* \* \* Biggest Blunder in U.S. history \* \* \* the Biggest," an article in U.S. News & World Report under date of January 3, 1972; and an editorial carried in the Philadelphia Inquirer of March 21, 1972, be incorporated in the RECORD at this point; but before the Chair rules, may I say that those who study the figures in the U.S. News & World Report article should keep in mind that considerable changes have occurred in the drawdown of U.S. troops, a further decline in Southeast Asia, in Latin America, and in other areas, except for Western Europe.

So with that proviso, Mr. President, I renew my request.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Boston Globe, Mar. 7, 1972]

VIETNAM . . . BIGGEST BLUNDER IN U.S. HISTORY . . . THE BIGGEST

(By David Brinkley)

(David Brinkley made the following commentary March 2 (David Brinkley's Journal) during John Chancellor's NBC news program (Ch. 4)).

The Senate voted to raise the price of gold—to make official what had happened already—the devaluation of the dollar. Meaning that in relation to other currencies the dollar is worth less.

To a great extent it's one more side effect of the Vietnam War. One of many. The others are familiar:

An inflation that already made the dollar worth less, even before it was devalued.

The loss of about 50,000 young Americans and the wounding of a quarter of a million more.



The killing of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese women and children and the physical devastation of their country.

The waste of far more than \$100 billion of the American taxpayers' money that would have been spent on something useful. Plus another \$100 billion added to the Federal debt.

Serious damage to the morale and discipline of the American armed forces themselves, not to speak of young soldiers hooked on Vietnamese heroin.

Severe disorders in the United States, riots and killing, anger and alienation of a generation of young Americans, more hostility in a country already having too much.

A reduced public confidence in their political system.

Plus My Lai, draft evaders; profiteering and a great deal more.

All of it taken together, make the Vietnam War the biggest blunder in American history. The biggest.

We build monuments to our successors. As a reminder in the future, we might build a monument to this, a historic blunder.

They might also put a speaker's platform on it and require that any future political leader anxious to join other countries war-mongers make his speeches from this platform. To persuade anybody, a speech from that platform would have to be pretty good.

[From the U.S. News & World Report, Jan. 3, 1972]

#### U.S. FORCES ABROAD—BIGGEST DROP IN 16 YEARS

At the turn of a new year for U.S. servicemen stationed overseas, this fact stands out: Continuing massive withdrawals have cut, nearly by half, the number of Americans based abroad at the height of the Vietnam war—from 1.3 million in 1968 to 781,000 now.

In 1971 alone, the number of GI's abroad was reduced more than 220,000—the sharpest one-year drop in 16 years.

As a result, there are fewer American troops abroad than at any time in the past six years.

These sharp cutbacks reflect not only the winding down of the U.S. ground role in Vietnam, but also the closing of overseas bases in line with the "Nixon Doctrine" of emphasizing material aid rather than troops for U.S. allies.

Even so, about a third of America's 2.6 million men in uniform still are stationed in foreign lands or on ships patrolling foreign waters as 1972 gets under way.

As the map and tables on these pages show, the bulk of American servicemen overseas are based either in Europe or Southeast Asia. The tables also indicate the changing pattern of U.S. strength abroad. Area by area, these are the main shifts that have occurred in the past year:

(Maps and tables not reproduced in the RECORD.)

In South Vietnam, U.S. military manpower was cut by half during the year, down 172,700 from a year ago to 171,000 today. The total is 363,000 below what it was when the reductions began. It is to go down to 139,000 by February 1 and could be down to 45,000 by next autumn, depending upon the level of enemy activity.

In nearby Thailand, where much of the war's air support is based, U.S. withdrawals totaled 6,400 men in '71.

At sea off the Vietnamese coast, one U.S. aircraft carrier has been moved out, leaving only one still on station at all times in the war zone. Along with the transfer of other U.S. naval vessels to the Vietnamese, this shift has resulted in pulling back about 6,000 American sailors, with 13,000 remaining in the Vietnam area.

#### LONE DIVISION LEFT IN KOREA

All told, winding down of the war accounts for pulling back about 185,000 servicemen

during the year. But thousands more have been withdrawn from other parts of the world, for other reasons.

In South Korea, for instance, increased strength of that U.S. ally has resulted in a pullback of 9,000 troops from the American forces based there, including one of the two Army divisions long stationed in Korea. This cuts U.S. strength there from a high of 64,000 men at the time of the *Pueblo* crisis in early 1968 to 43,000 now.

In the Philippines, American strength dropped during the year by about 2,000 men, to a current level of 18,000.

In Japan, where the need for U.S. military aid also has declined, about 9,000 American servicemen were pulled out during the year, leaving 30,000 U.S. airmen and sailors based in that country.

On the two big Pacific islands bases, there have been other major pullbacks.

U.S. troop strength declined by 7,500 on Okinawa during the year, to a level of 45,000, principally because of cuts in the Marine and Air Force units stationed there. And another 4,000 servicemen were withdrawn from Guam, a U.S. possession, leaving about 10,000 men still assigned, mainly to the Air Force bomber base or the Navy Polaris submarine base there.

Elsewhere in the Pacific, the Seventh Fleet has kept at about the same strength level, roughly 52,000 men.

#### SOME TOKEN REDUCTIONS

In Europe and the Mediterranean, meanwhile, token cuts were made and major cuts discussed during the year. Biggest withdrawal thus far has been from West Germany, with 5,000 GI's returned to the United States. But this still leaves 215,000 servicemen in Germany—the largest body of U.S. troops in one country overseas.

U.S. troop strength, officially reported, has remained constant in Britain, Spain, Italy and Greece. It has actually increased by 1,000 in Belgium, as a result of a beefing up at North Atlantic Treaty Organization headquarters near Brussels.

Despite strong budgetary pressures, the U.S. Sixth Fleet, stationed in the Mediterranean, has remained at a strength of 21,000 men, operating a force of between 35 and 45 warships over the past year.

In India, a small American "listening post" was disclosed during the year, apparently established to monitor the activities in Communist China and possibly to replace the communications bases that the United States once maintained in Pakistan.

Defense Department officials will say only that the number of American servicemen now manning this installation is "well under 1,000 men."

In other places overseas, smaller troop withdrawals have taken place during the year for a variety of reasons. U.S. forces stationed in the Panama Canal Zone, for instance, were pared down from 12,000 to 11,000 men. American troops based on Guantánamo, in Castro's Cuba, were reduced in strength from 4,000 to 3,000, those in Puerto Rico from 8,000 to 6,000.

In addition, troops manning a U.S. communications base in Ethiopia were trimmed from 1,600 to 1,500. And U.S. airmen stationed in Morocco have been reduced in number from 2,000 to 1,700.

There have been some small increases in troop strength at a few U.S. bases overseas during the year—principally the new American naval bases under construction in Australia and on the tiny island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

Despite the massive net withdrawal of U.S. troops from overseas stations in 1971, American military force abroad remains stronger by about 200,000 men than it was before the Vietnam-war build-up.

Compared with the 781,000 GI's overseas now, the United States in Mid-1964 maintained 583,000 servicemen abroad—of whom

440,000 were shore-based and 143,000 were aboard naval ships at sea.

#### FOR THE FUTURE

The outlook now, defense officials say, is for U.S. strength overseas to level off and remain fairly constant for the next few years.

Troop withdrawals from Vietnam are expected to continue at about their present pace in coming months, arriving at a residual force of 45,000 men—possibly fewer. U.S. strength in Thailand, nearly all of it devoted to air support, is expected to hold at about 25,000 to 30,000 men over the two years just ahead.

Massive cutbacks could be in the cards for Okinawa and Japan, however, when the former reverts to Japanese rule and Tokyo takes on an increased role in its own defense.

In the Middle East area, the Sixth Fleet is expected to remain at close to current strength, despite some congressional pressure to beef it up to offset the growing Russian presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Cutbacks in U.S. forces based in Europe will continue to be urged in Congress. But defense officials expect little or no change in the present American strength assigned to NATO, barring agreement with the Russians on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe.

#### INDIAN OCEAN PLANS

An increased U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean area will be evident, in turn, when the planned bases in Australia and Diego Garcia are fully manned. The Navy also has been studying a shift in part of the Seventh Fleet to patrol off the East African coast.

Some Pentagon authorities, in fact, say that the U.S. naval force in the Indian Ocean area could number as many as 10,000 men over the next five years—depending upon a go-ahead from the White House.

Over all, military sources report that the prospect over the next two years is for a very gradual further reduction in U.S. military strength overseas. Withdrawals could be stepped up only if a major agreement on force levels is reached with the Soviet Union—or quickly reversed if the President responds to a new emergency in the Middle East or elsewhere.

[The Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 21, 1972] AGAIN, THE LESSON IS CLEAR: UNITED STATES CAN'T REMAKE THE WORLD

Once again, this time in Cambodia, we are witnessing the folly of the American urge to export its political, economic and social institutions to foreign lands.

Two years have now passed since Marshal Lon Nol took control of Cambodia in the name of progress and with the material and moral support of the United States. In those two years, he appealed for military aid against Communist insurgency, received it in the form of more than 30,000 American and 40,000 South Vietnamese troops, later withdrawn, and renamed Cambodia the Khmer Republic.

In that time also, work has been going on in the delicate business of fashioning a constitution. With the work almost complete, the Constituent Assembly announced that the new basic document they proposed would make the Khmer Republic a republic indeed—with a National Assembly holding real power, along with a president and premier.

Marshal Lon Nol promptly dismissed the constitution as unacceptable, dissolved the Assembly, and put out enough armed guards to assure compliance. He declared himself president, commander in chief of the armed forces and premier.

Thus any hint of democracy—the rationalization for United States intervention and endless tinkering with Khmer's domestic affairs—disappeared.

And soon after that, a new offensive against the Communist menace the world has been



hearing about for a generation mobilized 40,000 South Vietnamese troops at the Khmer border. Thousands invaded U.S. B-52s bombed day after day. "We are saturating the area," a senior South Vietnamese officer said of the new incursion. "It is our purpose to destroy everything we can."

They would do well to work quickly while there is something left to destroy in what once was a slow-paced, peaceful and majestically beautiful country. In the last two years, the effect of American, and American-sponsored, policy has been to make homeless an estimated one third of the Khmer population of 7 million and to provide rampant corruption by a handful of the ruling and military elite—many of whom are fleeing now to safer bases with their pelf.

For all our dismay with Communism or other totalitarian forms of government, it is hard to argue that any indigenous administration could come close to producing the misery and slaughter which is the daily life in most of Indochina today.

But small chance, in Vietnam or in the Khmer non-republic, so long as the present U.S. Asian policy continues. For U.S. aid to the Lon Nol regime is flowing in at a rate of more than \$300 million a year, and the Nixon Administration in its latest military aid requesting to Congress, shows no sign of reversing that policy.

To the contrary. The powerful voices in the Pentagon and other bureaucracies and in Congress—which sponsored America's Vietnamese intervention are still being heard. Their bankrupt argument that U.S. armed might and economic force can refashion an Asian nation into a mini-America holds sway today. As a matter of fact, in a view at least not publicly recanted, President Nixon said last fall that "Cambodia is the Nixon doctrine in its purest form."

The results suggest, however, that all to be found in pure form there is the folly of a fundamentally false premise.