3-21-1972

Congressional Record - Page S. 4283 - Southeast Asia

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there has been a good deal of talk about certain issues of paramount importance at the present time, not the least of which has been the issue discussed this morning, the need for tax reform.

There are other issues, such as pollution, busing, the condition of the ghettos, crime, justice, drug control, and the like, all important. However, in my opinion, Mr. President, the most important issue now—and it has been for some years past—is the issue of our involvement in Southeast Asia.

It is brought to our attention because of recent events in Laos and Cambodia. According to the latest reports the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese are very close to Long Cheng, the CIA-sponsored base in southern Laos.

According to the latest reports the constitution of the Khmer Republic formerly known as Cambodia, in effect has been overthrown and the position of first responsibility has been taken by Lon Nol.

In Cambodia we are witnessing the folly of the American desire to export its political, economic, and social institutions to foreign lands where they do not need them, do not want them, and should not have them forced upon them.

Two years have elapsed since the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the result has been chaos. Two years later seven-tenths of Cambodia is under the control of hostile forces; and 2 years later, out of an estimated population of 7 million, one-third has become homeless. The net result has been nothing but destruction and ruin.

There is, of course, the makings of a constitutional republic, but when the constitution supposedly was to have been put into effect Lon Nol threw it to one side and said he would not recognize it. So now the constitution and the republic, except in name, have gone down the drain. Marshal Lon Nol dismissed the assembly and he has taken over complete control as a dictator in his pitiful country.

The South Vietnamese Army, the traditional enemy of Cambodians, is once again penetrating into Cambodia, to the extent of approximately 30,000 or 40,000 troops. Does anyone remember the invasion of Cambodia just about 2 years ago? Does anyone know what has happened since? Well, the North Vietnamese are back where they used to be, in the area of the Parrot's Beak. More of Cambodia is under the control of the North Vietnamese and their allies and more of Cambodia has been destroyed in the meantime.

So I would hope that those who are advocating continued aid to this small country, made up of kindly people—those in the Pentagon, those in the administration, those in the State Department, and those in the aid program—will think and think again, because this is not a prime example of the Nixon doctrine; it is anything but. It proves just how bankrupt the policy of our country has been allowed become, not only in Cambodia, but also in the rest of that part of the world.

Then there is Laos, another small country with a very kindly, peaceful people. What happened there? Hundreds of thousands of Laotians have been made homeless refugees and much of their country has been destroyed. A clandestine army under the control of the CIA has been operating; the overall commander is the proconsul, the U.S. Ambassador to Laos. He is the one who directs operations, tells where the strikes will be, whether they will be on the Plain of Jars or in the region of Long Slaughter, the CIA subsidized base which is now under siege.

Much could be said about what happened in these two countries in addition to what happened and what is happening in Vietnam. But it is all a tragedy as far as this republic is concerned. It is the worst tragedy in our entire history.

I think if anything is going to be done it is going to be up to King Sihanouk Vathanas in Laos, SRL, and Prince Norodom Sihanouk, now in exile in Peking, to put their talents and their efforts to use, so that a degree of stability and peace can be returned to their respective countries.

Let us take a look at the statistics. These are not the latest statistics but they are up to February 19, 1972. Combat killed, wounded, Americans, 302,651; combat dead, Americans, 45,650; dead from other causes, American, 10,077, for a total of 55,727 Americans dead as of February 19, 1972, and total American casualties as of the same date of 356,378.

As far as the others are concerned, we find that the South Vietnamese have suffered death losses of 145,414 and other free world forces have suffered deaths of 4,838. It is estimated that the other side has suffered deaths of 796,458.

I ask unanimous consent to insert in the Record a table supplied by the Department of Defense, which details these casualties.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SOUTHEAST ASIA CASUALTIES STATISTICAL SUMMARY

The Department of Defense released today the cumulative casualties reported in connection with the conflict in Southeast Asia as of 10 February 1972.

Total U.S. deaths from action by hostile forces is the sum of the following categories: Killed In Action, Died of Wounds, Died While Missing, and Died While Captured. Line 3 provides a breakdown of the same totals by environment (air or ground). Totals are cumulative from January 1, 1961 through February 19, 1972.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if we add all these deaths together, on our side and on the other side, the figure is in excess of 1 million. Furthermore, we have expended in Southeast Asia at least 2 billion dollars, more than the combined expenditure used in the Second World War in both the Pacific and European theaters, as well as in the Korean war, and the end is not in sight. The bombings are continuing and the number of POW's is increasing, as well as the number missing in action.

I want to give the President credit for drawing down the number of U.S. forces in Vietnam, and for that matter in Thailand, as well.

The number at the moment, I understand, is 100,000, roughly, but by the first of May that is supposed to go down to 69,000. I have no doubt but that it will and around that time the President will very likely announce a further reduction. But the war is continuing. No progress is being made in Paris, and no end to the war is in sight. I would hope that despite the manpower-downs in troop personnel in the Far East, in South Vietnam, in Thailand, in the South China Sea, as well as in the Pacific and the Far East and elsewhere, we could reach the stage quickly when we would be able to withdraw lock, stock, and barrel every American from Vietnam, from Laos, from Cambodia, and from Thailand.

Mr. President, I would hope, in view of the impasse which has been reached in the negotiations in Paris, that the President would consider most seriously setting a date certain, an actual date tied only to the release of the U.S. prisoners of war and the recoverable missing in action.

I would hope that at that time, and on the basis of that date, if this proposal is advanced, we would recognize the fact that the future of Vietnam will be determined not by us, but by the Vietnamese, North and South, themselves. It is their country, whether it is divided into two or three parts or is whole in one. It is their future. It is they who must determine under what conditions they will live, and it is not our responsibility.

Mr. President, I would hope that there may—and I emphasize the word "may"—have been a need, following the Second World War, for this country to be a world policeman, that need has long ago vanished.

So let us live today and look to tomorrow, and let us divest ourselves of policies and mistakes of the past, which bring nothing but ruin, nothing but death and destruction, and nothing but huge outlays to this Republic.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article by Mr. David Brinkley be published in the Boston Globe of the 7th of this month, entitled "Vietnam . . . biggest blunder in U.S. history the biggest," an article in U.S. News & World Report under date of January 3, 1972; and an editorial carried in the Philadelphia Inquirer of March 21, 1972, be incorporated in the Record at this point; but before the Chair rules, may I say that those who study the figures in the U.S. News & World Report article should keep in mind that considerable changes have occurred in the drawdown of U.S. troops, a further decline in Southeast Asia, in Latin America, and in other areas, except Western Europe. So with that proviso, Mr. President, I renew my request.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Boston Globe, Mar. 7, 1972]

VIETNAM . . . BIGGEST BLUNDER IN U.S. HISTORY THE BIGGEST (By David Brinkley)

(David Brinkley made the following commentary March 2 (David Brinkley's Journal) during John Chancellor's NBC news program (Ch. 4)).

The Senate voted to raise the price of gold—to make official what had happened already—the devaluation of the dollar. Meaning that in relation to other currencies the dollar is worth less.

That great extent it's one more side effect of the Vietnam War. One of many. The others are familiar.

An inflation that already made the dollar worse, even before it was devalued.

The loss of about 50,000 young Americans and the wounding of a quarter of a million more.
SENATE

DURING THE YEAR. BUT THOUSANDS MORE HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD, FOR OTHER REASONS.

IN SOUTH VIETNAM, FOR INSTANCE, INCREASED STRENGTH OF THAT U.S. ARMY HAS RESULTED IN A PULLBACK OF 3,000 U.S. MILITARY FORCES BASED THERE, INCLUDING ONE OF THE TWO ARMY DIVISIONS STATIONED IN KOREA. THIS CUTS U.S. STRENGTH IN SOUTH VIETNAM FROM 26 TO 23,000 RECREATIONS BEGIN.

IN THE PHILIPPINES, AMERICAN STRENGTH DROPPED DURING THE YEAR BY ABOUT 2,000 MEN, TO A CURRENT LEVEL OF 18,000.

IN JAPAN, WHERE WE HAVE 7,500 MILITARY PERSONNEL, A SMALL NUMBER OF U.S. MILITARY QUALITY JOBS WERE PULLED OUT DURING THE YEAR, LEAVING 5,000 U.S. ARMSMEN AND SAROLES BASED IN THAT COUNTRY.

ON THE TWO BIG PACIFIC ISLANDS Bases, there have been other major pullbacks.

U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH DROPPED IN PHILIPPINES FROM 26,000 TO 23,000.

ANOTHER 10,000 MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE PULLED OUT OF JAPAN DURING THE YEAR, LEAVING 5,000 MILITARY PERSONNEL BASED IN THAT COUNTRY.

KOREA, WHICH WAS THE BIGGEST PULLBACK OF 2,000, IS A STRATEGY DECISION, NOT A POLITICAL ONE

SOME TOKEN REDUCTIONS

IN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN, AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE PULLED OUT OF WESTERN EUROPE, WITH A SMALL NUMBER OF TROOPS REMAINING IN GERMANY TO SUPPORT THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THAT COUNTRY.

IN SOUTH VIETNAM, U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE PULLED OUT OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH, LEAVING A SMALL NUMBER OF TROOPS FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES.

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hearing about for a generation mobilized 40,000 South Vietnamese troops at the Khmer border. Thousands invaded U.S. B-52s bombed day after day. "We are saturating the area," a senior South Vietnamese officer said of the new incursion. "It is our purpose to destroy everything we can."

They would do well to work quickly while there is something left to destroy in what once was a slow-paced, peaceful and majestically beautiful country. In the last two years, the effect of American, and American-sponsored, policy has been to make homeless an estimated one third of the Khmer population of 7 million and to provide rampant corruption by a handful of the ruling and military elite—many of whom are fleeing now to safer bases with their pelf.

For all our dismay with Communism or other totalitarian forms of government, it is hard to argue that any indigenous administration could come close to producing the misery and slaughter which is the daily life in most of Indochina today.

But small chance, in Vietnam or in the Khmer non-republic, so long as the present U.S. Asian policy continues. For U.S. aid to the Lon Noi regime is flowing in at a rate of more than $300 million a year, and the Nixon Administration in its latest military aid requesting to Congress, shows no sign of reverting that policy.

To the contrary, the powerful voices in the Pentagon and other bureaucracies and in Congress—which sponsored America's Vietnamese intervention are still being heard. Their bankrupt argument that U.S. armed might and economic force can refashion an Asian nation into a mini-America holds sway today. As a matter of fact, in a view at least not publicly recanted, President Nixon said last fall that "Cambodia is the Nixon doctrine in its purest form."

The results suggest, however, that all to be found in pure form there is the folly of a fundamentally false premise.