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Congressional Record - Journey to New China

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001
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I shall speak in some considerable detail because it seems to me that the long deprivation which has been experienced regarding direct information on China warrants a most thorough account. Moreover, since the President has chosen to take new military risks in Indochina, we had better get as clear a picture as we can of the contemporary nature of the immense nation whose southern borders are contiguous with that troubled and tragic region.

If I may, Mr. President, I shall now proceed to report on the journey to the new China, but before I begin I would like to express my gratitude to the distinguished minority leader, the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Scott) and to Mrs. Scott and to the staff, but especially to Mr. and Mrs. Scott because of the assiduousness with which they applied their talents and abilities and to commend most especially the distinguished Republican leader who has a great cultural knowledge of China and an intense personal interest.

I. INTRODUCTION

From arrival in Shanghai on April 18 until departure from Canton on May 7, the leadership was in China a total of 16 days. Five days were spent in Peking; two in the great industrial port of Shanghai on the eastern seaboard; two in the recreational lake-city of Hang Zhou—Hang-chow—which is south of Shanghai; two in Xi An—Sian—which is a gateway to Mongolia, a source city of Chinese dynamic culture and, today, a major agriculal and industrial center of the northwest; 2 days in Chang Sha, in the south-central Province of Hu Nan where Mao Tse-tung began his revolutionary activities; and 2 days in Guang Zhou, formerly Canton, the commercial hub of South China and the site of China's International Trade Fair.

We had ample opportunity to move about in these cities and into the surrounding countryside. We talked to many people, town and country officials, soldiers, medical and health specialists, scientists, teachers, farm managers, factory workers, and students. Our most significant conversations were held in Peking, where we met for 8 hours of informal conversations with Premier Chou En-lai and many more hours with the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ch'iao Kuan-hua, and other officials.

Host for the visit was the People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, which is a quasi-official arm of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. I was deeply impressed both by the kindness and efficiency of the staff of the institute who accompanied us on the entire journey, the warmth of the reception we received everywhere in China. The hospitality shown to us by our hosts and the Chinese people was thoughtful and considerate. The friendliness was unmistakable.

I did not go to China with the expectation of becoming an instant expert on its government, its social structure, its economy, or its internal affairs. I went to see what I had seen a long time before—as a private in the Marines in the early twenties and during and after World War II, as a representative of President Roosevelt and as a young Member of the House of Representatives. After an absence of a quarter of a century, I went to compare the old China with the new and to explore current attitudes of the People's Republic toward the United States.

It is difficult to look at China, today, free of the distortions of national disunity and belligerent posturing. But the distortions can be tempered by perspective. It is possible, for example, to judge a bottle as half full because we are facing it, half empty. If China is measured by some of our common yardsticks, whether they be highway mileage, the number of cars, television sets, kitchen gadgets, political parties, or newspaper editors—the bottle will be seen as half empty. If China is viewed in the light of its own past, the bottle is half full and rapidly filling. Today's China is highly organized and self-disciplined. It is a hard-working, early-to-bed, early-to-rise society. The Chinese people are well fed, adequately clothed and, from all outward signs, contented with a government in which Mao Tse-tung is a revered teacher and whose major leaders are, for the most part, old revolutionaries.

There has not been a major flood, pestilence, or famine for many years. The cities are clean, orderly, and safe; the shops well stocked with food, clothing, and other consumer items; policemen are evident only for controlling traffic and very few carry weapons. Soldiers are rarely seen. The housing is of a subsistence type, but is sufficient to end the spectacles of millions of the homeless and dispossessed who, in the past, walked the tracks and roads or anchored their sampans in the rivers of China and lived out their lives in a space little larger than a rowboat. Crime, peyotism, drug addiction, alcoholism, delinquency are conspicuous in their absence. Personal integrity is scrupulous. In Canton, for example, a display case for lost and found articles in the lobby of the People's Hotel contained, among other items, a half-empty package of cigarettes and a pencil.

The people appear to be well motivated and coordinated. Women and men work side by side for equal pay. There are no visible distinctions of rank in factories, armed services, or government offices. A casual sense of freedom pervades the relationship with an air of easy egalitarianism. There is no sowing, not even to the highest officials.

A factory worker in Peking earns the equivalent of about U.S. $22 a month, and his wife works, making as much or more. That income is ample for a subsistence-plus existence because children are cared for free at a nursery or in public schools. Rent takes only about 5 percent of total income. Basic food prices are low and fixed. Medical care is free. Entertainment is cheap—admission to a movie is about 10 cents. Prices have been stable for years while wages have risen.

Cooking oils, rice, wheat, and cotton cloth are rationed but are ample. The system seems to be designed more to assure basic distribution than to cope with shortages. In fact, large quantities of all rationed items, except wheat, are exported. Bicycle and bus are the almost uni-
versal forms of transportation. The rickshas are gone; so, too, are most of the pedestrian-pedicabs. Although China builds automobiles, including a few fine limousines, as the basis of her transport for official purposes and limited in number. Production has been concentrated on such utilitarian vehicles as tractors, trucks, and buses. Private passenger cars are largely restricted to the streets of some cities. Indeed, there may be fewer now than immediately after World War II when such vehicles were imported in considerable numbers.

Eighty percent of China’s population is rural and is now largely organized into communes. The communes are in the nature of agro-towns and are a fundamental economic unit of the new China. They are also a new concept in social organization which acts to broaden and extend the virtues of interdependence of the old Chinese family system into a community of cooperation and group action by many families.

One such unit which was visited, the Ma Lu commune, with 35,000 families, embraces over 8,000 families. In several successive years, this commune has reported an exceptional expansion of the production of state requisites and other goods is sold as excess to the commune’s needs. Machine cultivation and power equipment are in wide use and electricity is generally available. The commune’s small factories process a large part of the agricultural output and also produce gasoline engines, farm tools, spare tractor parts, insecticides, and consumer goods.

Ma Lu is regarded as a prosperous commune. Income last year was estimated at about $350 per household which is 32 primary and secondary schools, a hospital, a clinic for each of the 14 production brigades, and a health worker for every team.

The accent in China is on today and the future, but throughout the country the new interest is also being evidenced in China’s rich past. Everywhere there are striking restorations of cultural shrines, even those of the ancient heritage. Excavations of historic sites are underway throughout China. Wherever these works are undertaken, the effort is made to distinguish between the “bad”—that is, the cruel and exploiting rulers—of the past and the “good”—that is, the peasants whose creativity and labor were exploited for the well-being and pleasure of the few. Thus, in accordance with the teachings of Mao Tse-tung, a revolutionary content is made a part of archeology as it is in all of China. There is, in other words, a determined effort to preserve a revolutionary consciousness in China.

The preservation of natural resources has also received great emphasis under the present leadership. So many trees have been planted in the Peking area, for example, that it has altered the locale. It is now a part of the new China and it is taking place all over China wherever the land is unsuited to agriculture. Gardening is also widely pursued on postage-stamp plots inside the cities. Throughout China new productivity is being developed out of wastelands and by massive water control projects.

China, today, builds the new on the old and recovers the old, in accordance with the teaching of Chairman Mao’s dictum, “serve the people.” The revolution has swept away much of the ineffectiveness of the past and enshrined a new concept of Chinese self-reliance. Family remains as the basic unit of the social structure, it is no longer in-turned and indifferent. Members of a family are now, also, active participants in the life of the communes and factories and they share a common pride in the achievements of Mao’s revolution. In short, China has become a viable modern society with an approach to social participation and responsibility which is rooted in the past, meets the needs of the present and offers a soundly based hope for the future.

II. BACKGROUND OF U.S. POLICY

In the Chinese view, U.S. policy is seen as having pursued an unremitting hostility toward the People’s Republic for decades, and that the two decades the U.S. has regarded the effort to walk off China by the trade quarantine for 20 years. That, too, is how they see the sending of troops the 38th parallel in Korea. The Interposition of the 7th Fleet between the mainland and Formosa and the leadership of this Nation in urging the United Nations to label China the aggressor in Korea.

That there is a considerable basis for these Chinese feelings about U.S. policy is undeniable. The policy of this Nation was, indeed, hostile for many years, reflecting as it did the shock of the “loss of China” to the Soviet Union. To be sure, much has changed since then. It has slowly dawned upon us, perhaps, that China was not ours to lose nor the Soviet Union’s to gain. Attitudes have changed greatly in the United States. China has changed, too, and in its relationships with other nations.

Yet, our policy has only begun to be revised. Still in place is the chain of “defense against Chinese aggression” whose principal links are the SEATO Treaty, the mutual defense treaties with the Republic of China on Taiwan, Japan and the Republic of Korea. Still largely in place, too, are U.S. bases in Asia, U.S. troops to man the bases, hundreds of thousands of Asians equipped with the modern paraphernalia of war paid for by billions of dollars in U.S. military aid expenditures.

For a quarter of a century, the peoples of two great nations have been kept at arms length and, infrequently, by a sword’s point by the policies which have led to this military confrontation. I regret to say that in the light of what is now taking place in Indochina, it is not yet in sight, as I thought it was after the President’s visit.

In retrospect, this separation has been one of the most ill-fated chapters in the history of this Nation. We may well ask ourselves to what extent are the policies
of the past two decades responsible for the tens of thousands of U.S. casualties in Vietnam and for the destruction of human life and property in Korea? For immense cost to the people of this Nation of these episodes and our other military activity in Asia during the past two decades.

II. THE PATH TO PEKING

The United States and China have taken only the first steps to restore normal relations. In my judgment, the rapprochement began with the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine 3 years ago and the first draw-down of U. S. troops in Southeast Asia. In China's view the U.S. involvement was being reduced in Asia, even though it was accompanied, from time to time, by erratic military thrusts. Still, the troops were not coming into Asia. This signal of a change in U.S. policy was unmistakable to the Chinese. It meant that the President was reducing the military presence of the United States in Asia.

A number of propitious developments in both nations also helped to lay the basis for this rapprochement. In China, the Cultural Revolution came to an end in a stronger, more unified government with a greater ability to handle its problems both at home and in the mire abroad. At the same time, the people of this Nation began to show a renewed interest in China. On October 25, 1971, the People's Republic of China was admitted into the United Nations by a vote of 76 to 35. The world had begun to beat a path to China's door and Peking was prepared to open it.

President Nixon's visit to China last February was a long overdue step in normalizing relations between the United States and China. I applauded his action at the time. I am more than ever persuaded, at the conclusion of this journey, that it was the right action.

Where the path which was opened by the President and followed by the distinguished minority leader and myself will now lead is not clear. If the idea of rapprochement is not a part of the maelstrom of the escalating war in Indochina, the path can lead, in my judgment, to an improvement of relationships throughout Asia.

In any event, a process of communication has begun again between ourselves and a nation whose population constitutes perhaps one-fourth of the human race—a population, according to U. S. Census estimates, which numbers something on the order of 845 million.

The President's visit served, immediately, to lower the level of tension in Asia, and, therefore, has had a salutary effect on world opinion. It has also increased the interest of Japan and other nations of Asia in dealing in a normal way with the People's Republic of China. In short, it is clear that the tree of relationships in Asia and the world was shaken for the better by the President's initiative. What cannot yet be predicted is where the leaves will fall and what will be the look of the new foliage.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 7755

May 11, 1972

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It seems to me high time to ask why we are using the most advanced machinery of destruction in that primitive land. Are we doing so out of force of habit? Out of fear? Fear of what? The fact is that we are still engaged in a war which, to put the best face on it, was sanctioned by what has now become a discredited policy toward China. The President's visit to China was not the great improvement in the Vietnam war which derived from that policy also invalid? How can conscience, in these circumstances, continue to assuage the sacrifices of the armed services?

If we feel deeply for the ordeal of the prisoners of war and the missing in action and for their families, we will no longer acquiesce in the distortion of the problem of their release. They are not going to be released by mining Haiphong Harbor, nor by letter-writing campaigns to Hanoi or by postage stamps issued in their honor. They are going to be released, I believe, only when U.S. air and naval operations cease. While we remain in the war, the promise is not for them alone but for more missing-in-action, more prisoners of war, and more casualties.

Incidentally, both Senator Scott and I have agreed to ask the question of the two American fliers who were shot down near Hainan Island in the South China Sea and the question of the release of Mr. John Downey, of Massachusetts, who was captured during the Tonkin Gulf incident.

We were informed that in the case of Mr. Downey, the sentence had been reduced from life to 5 years, and that consideration would be given. In the case of the two American fliers forced down over Hainan Island, we were informed that that was a different matter, and only that they would look into it.

V. EXCHANGES

In the Shanghai communique President Nixon and Premier Chou "agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two countries through "contacts and exchanges" in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports, and journalism. Our trip was a manifestation of China's desire to carry out this pledge.

Plans are being made to open China's doors to more personal contacts. A date has been agreed to, for example, for the visit to China by the leaders of the House of Representatives. When asked about the possibility of other Members of Congress coming later in the year, the response was that "they will be able to come." What the Chinese have in mind, it seems, is approval of visits by small groups on an informal basis.

As to exchanges in other fields, the Chinese indicated keen interest in carrying out the spirit of the communique. As it was put in the discussions, "Scientists are beginning to come more and more. When they come, more are on the way." Visits by journalists are still being handled on an individual basis and, apparently, will remain that way, at least for the immediate future. The Chinese Government, apparently, is not prepared for permanent U.S.
new bureaus in China at this time, although the question is still under consideration. We were assured, however, that the situation on an international basis, journalists did not have to "sympathize" with China. "If they have doubts about us, they can come also. All that is left to them is to try to tell the truth. Then we will welcome them."

Exchanges in the other direction—that is, Chinese visiting the United States—are of less interest to Peking. There are, nevertheless, some possibilities in the fields of science, culture, athletics, and entertainment in which the Nation might profit greatly from an exposure to Chinese achievements, skills, and talents.

IV. TRADE

We should not expect spectacular results in trade from the rapprochement, although, obviously, it can grow rapidly relative to the present low levels. The Chinese have looked largely to the United States for economic support. In 1971, it is estimated that China's exports were $2.3 billion and imports $2.2 billion, a total turnover of less than one-half of 1 percent of gross national product.

Main imports are wheat, chemicals, machinery, manufactured fertilizer, certain types of iron and steel, other base metals, and transportation equipment, notably ships and aircraft. At present, the major industrial purchases are from Japan and western Europe. Wheat has been purchased from Canada, and, until recently, from Australia. China's exports go principally to Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, Britain, and West Germany, with the main items being rice, soybeans, vegetable oils, cotton, and clothing, building a wide range of light industrial products. There is only a limited trade with the Soviet Union and eastern Europe.

This year China has given visas to 30 or so U.S. businessmen to come to the Canton Trade Fair. It is likely, too, that congressional leaders who specialize in international trade matters would be welcomed at that showing.

The growth of the twice-a-year Canton Trade Fair since its beginning in 1957 illustrates China's capacity to enter into the world market. Goods for sale at the first fair were limited and exhibited to only 1,200 people. More than 30,000 different Chinese products for sale abroad are displayed or represented at the current Fair. In the first 10 days, moreover, attendance was 10,000.

The United States is estimated to have purchased only about $4 million of Chinese goods since the rapprochement, and Hong Kong. As the rapprochement proceeds, a substantial increase in imports of Chinese consumer goods is to be anticipated. It is not yet clear, however, what we have that the Chinese want particularly that they cannot get cheaper elsewhere, or what they have that Americans will need in quantity over an extended period. Nevertheless, every encouragement should be given to the full potential development of commerce, if for no other reason than that trade relations at whatever level can be an important factor in removing the wall of a quarter-of-a-century of separation.

With a bitter history of subjection to the arrogance of "great powers," the Chinese emphasize that their own future is identified with that of ordinary nations. They reject the status of "superpower" and insist that their system does not permit them to impose their views on others by virtue of our own basis of our visit. There is no reason to conclude that the Chinese leaders mean otherwise. The People's Liberation Army seems, in all likelihood, to be well blended into civilian pursuits and is not in evidence as a force for military influence. There are no appeals for military crusades abroad. To the Chinese, defense does not appear to mean maintaining outposts in Southeast Asia or anywhere in the world beyond their own borders. On the contrary, it means that their own cities are now catasbombed with air-raid shelters.

China's energies are clearly concentrated on development of its inner resources and their usage are predominately civilian. Premier Chou En-lai insisted that:

"China wants to build on our own with our own resources. We have enough to do to keep us busy. Our system does not permit us to commit aggression.

President Nixon, by his visit, moved to gear U.S. policies to that kind of China after two decades of biding them in. It is national interest to them. In my judgment, the President has set in motion a process which is not reversible except by what may now transpire in Indochina.

Dangers as well as opportunities involving Indochina. There are three views on how the President's initiative with regard to China. I am persuaded that the opportunities far outweigh the dangers. The United States, and China, and the Soviet Union share a common interest in the peace and stability of the Western Pacific. At some point in the future, these three powers must form the basis of new arrangements concerning the security in the region which will supersede the fear-based concepts which have persisted since World War II. Their normalization of relations between China and the United States is a start. Hopefully, it will precipitate a similar normalization between Japan and China and between the Soviet Union and Japan.

Therefore, the eruptions in Indochina have lengthened the shadows over the prospects for peace in Asia. In my judgment, the new sorts into North Vietnam through the tardiness of the President's visit to China, and, of course, the visit of the Senate's joint leadership. They have thrown into at least temporary eclipse, the confidence of Chinese-United States rapprochement. When these shadows lift and only then can there be an expectation of change, a change for the better in Asia.

There is a Chinese proverb:

"To see one time is better than to hear a hundred times."

For the past 23 years, the American people have not seen much of China. What was heard a "hundred times" often contained gross distortions and added up to a horror story, concocted in the minds of those who sought to block the on the basis of the visit of the joint leadership, and the findings of some other recent observers, bears no relationship to China as it is today.

The 16 days which were spent in China, traveling widely throughout the country and talking to people in all walks of life, have impressed us profoundly. Not only did we go to the places on the schedule but we also went to areas which were forbidden to foreigners and which we knew we would cope with, and the President and the Congress are building a new China.

Premier Chou En-lai closed our talks with these words:

"We have come to the American people the friendship and best respects of the Chinese people."

The joint leadership of the Senate responded in a similar fashion. In my judgment, only what transpires in Indochina blocks the way to a full fruition of these reciprocal sentiments. When they are fulfilled in reciprocal acts of respect and consideration, they will redound to the benefit of the people of the United States, the People's Republic of China, and the people of the rest of the world.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

JOURNEY TO THE NEW CHINA

Mr. President:

When President Nixon returned from Peking last February, he transmitted an invitation from Premier Chou En-lai to the Joint Leadership of the Senate to visit the People's Republic of China. The invitation was accepted by Senator Scott and myself and between April 15 and May 7, we undertook the journey.

On Monday, last, I gave to the President a written report on what I had observed, heard and discussed in China and conclusions which I had reached, as a result, particularly with regard to Indochina. I have requested this time, today, to provide a general account of the journey to the Senate.

I shall speak in some considerable detail because it seems to me that the long deprivation which has been experienced regarding direct information on China warrants a most thorough account. Moreover, since the President has chosen to take new military risks in Indochina, we had better get as clear a picture as we can, of the contemporary nature of the immense nation whose southern borders are contiguous with that troubled and tragic region.

If I may, Mr. President, I shall now proceed to report on the journey to the new China.

I. Introduction

From arrival in Shanghai on April 18 until departure from Canton on May 3, the Leadership was in China a total of 16 days. Five days were spent in Peking; two in the great industrial port of Shanghai on the Eastern sea coast; two in the recreational lake-city of Hang Zhou (Hangchow) which is south of Shanghai; two in Xi An (Sian), which is a gateway to Mongolia, a source city
of Chinese dynastic culture and, today, a major agricultural and industrial center of the Northwest; two days in Chang Sha, in the south-central Province of Hu Nan where Mao Tse-tung began his revolutionary activities; and two days in Guang Zhou (Canton), the commercial hub of South China and the site of China's International Trade Fair.

We had ample opportunity to move about in these cities and into the surrounding countryside. We talked to many people, to government and party officials, soldiers, medical and health specialists, scientists, teachers, farm managers, factory workers and students. Our most important discussions were held in Peking where we met for eight hours of informal conversations with Premier Chou En-lai, and many more hours with the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ch'iao Kuan-hua and other officials.

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for the well-being and pleasure of the few). Thus, in accordance with the teachings of Mao Tse-tung, a revolutionary content is made a part of archeology as it is of almost all other pursuits in China. There is, in other words, a determined effort to preserve a revolutionary consciousness in China.

The conservation of natural resources has also received great emphasis under the present leadership. So many trees have been planted in the Peking area, for example, that it has altered the local weather. Tree planting is a symbol of the new China and it is taking place all over China wherever the land is unsuited to agriculture. Gardening is also widely pursued even on postage-stamp plots inside the cities. Throughout China new productivity is being developed out of wastelands and by massive water control projects.

China, today, builds the new on the base of the old and sometimes, with remarkable results. A most striking example is the revival of the ancient healing practices of acupuncture whose origins go back over three thousand years. Thanks to current research and experimentation, acupuncture is coming into wide usage in the treatment of a variety of ailments and as an anesthesia in surgery.

The Capitol Physician, who accompanied us on the journey, witnessed four major operations in which no sedative or anesthesia was used, only the manipulated needles of the acupuncturist. It is estimated that about half of all the surgery now being performed in China is done with acupuncture anesthesia. Major experimentation is also underway in the use of the technique to cure deafness and other maladies.
The Capitol Physician visited seven different types of medical facilities during the course of which he was exposed to a representative cross-section of the Chinese medical services on the farms, in the factories and in large city hospitals. He saw treatment dispensed by "western" trained physicians, whose efforts are dovetailed with those of traditional Chinese physicians (experienced with herbs and acupuncture) and by basic medical workers, the so-called "barefoot doctors" who number in the hundreds of thousands and whose nearest counterpart in this nation would be the medical corpsmen of the Armed Services.

Only a few years ago no modern medical care to speak of was available to the great preponderance of China's inhabitants. Now some kind of care is provided to every Chinese in need. In more remote regions, it may be elemental but it is available. There is no charge to workers in the cities but each family on the communes pays about 4 cents per month for medical services.

It should also be noted that epidemic and intestinal ailments have been drastically reduced in China. A heavy accent is placed on personal cleanliness and order. The people have also been repeatedly and successfully mobilized to cooperate in mass campaigns to eradicate disease-carrying snails, flies and mosquitoes.

Some of the Chinese health techniques would have exchange value to this nation. So, too, would Chinese methods of dealing with the disposal of human and animal excrement. Traditionally, these wastes have been regarded in China as an asset with great value as a fertilizer. The problem with their use in the past has been that they have also been a major source of intestinal and
other communicable diseases. The Chinese now employ a very simple process for converting wastes into safe and effective fertilizers. It is estimated that 75% or more of all wastes are recycled back into the land, with the result that the fertility of the soil is better maintained while pollution of lakes, rivers and streams is avoided. It is ironic to contrast the waters of this ancient land which are supportive of a very large yield of fish with what has been allowed to happen in this new land of ours.

In every aspect of society, there is evidence of China being rebuilt on the basis of Chairman Mao's dictum, "serve the people." The revolution has swept away much of the ineffectiveness of the past and enshrined a new concept of Chinese "self-reliance." While the family remains as the basic unit of the social structure, it is no longer inturned and indifferent. Members of a family are now, also, active participants in the life of the communes and factories and they share a common pride in the achievements of Mao's revolution. In short, China has become a viable modern society with an approach to social participation and responsibility which is rooted in the past, meets the needs of the present and offers a soundly based hope for the future.

II. Background of U. S. Policy

In the Chinese view, U. S. policy is seen as having pursued an unremitting hostility towards the People's Republic for at least two decades. That is how they regard the effort to wall off China by the trade quarantine for twenty years. That, too, is how they see the sending of troops north of the 38th parallel in Korea, the interposition of the Seventh Fleet between the Mainland and Formosa and the leadership of this nation in urging the United Nations to label China the aggressor in Korea.
That there is a considerable basis for these Chinese feelings about U.S. policy is undeniable. The policy of this nation was, indeed, hostile for many years, reflecting as it did the shock of the "loss of China" to the Soviet Union. To be sure, much has changed since then. It has slowly dawned upon us, perhaps, that China was not ours to lose nor the Soviet Union's to gain. Attitudes have changed greatly in the United States. China, too, has changed internally and in its relationships with other nations.

Yet, our policy has only begun to be revised. Still in place is the chain of "defense against Chinese aggression" whose principal links are the SEATO Treaty, the mutual defense treaties with the Republic of China on Taiwan, Japan and the Republic of Korea. Still largely in place, too, are U.S. bases in Asia, U.S. troops to man the bases, hundreds of thousands of Asians equipped with the modern paraphernalia of war paid for by billions of dollars in U.S. military aid expenditures.

For a quarter of a century, the peoples of two great nations have been kept at arms length and, not infrequently, at sword's point by the policies which have led to this military confrontation. I regret to say that in the light of what is now taking place in Indochina, the end is not yet in sight, as I thought it was after the President's visit.

In retrospect, this separation has been one of the most ill-fated chapters in the history of this nation. We may well ask ourselves to what extent the policies of the past two decades are responsible for the tens of thousands of U.S. casualties in Viet Nam? For the tens of thousands more in Korea? For the immense cost to the people of this nation of these episodes and our other military activity in Asia during the past two decades?
III. The Path to Peking

The United States and China have taken only the first steps to restore normal relations. In my judgment, the rapprochement actually began with the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine, three years ago and the first draw-down of United States troops in Vietnam. The Chinese have been aware that the U.S. involvement was being reduced in Asia, even though it was accompanied, from time to time, by erratic military thrusts. Still, the troops were leaving, not coming into Asia. This signal of a change in U.S. policy was unmistakable to the Chinese. It meant that the President was reducing the military presence of the United States in Asia.

A number of propitious developments in both nations also helped to lay the basis for rapprochement. In China, the Cultural Revolution came to an end in a stronger, more unified government with a greater ability to handle its problems both at home and abroad. At the same time, the people of this nation began to show a renewed interest in China. On October 25, 1971, The People's Republic of China was brought into the United Nations by a vote of 76 to 35. The world had begun to beat a path to China's door and Peking was prepared to open it.

President Nixon's visit to China last February was a long overdue step in normalizing relations between the United States and China. I applauded his action at the time. I am more than ever persuaded, at the conclusion of this journey that it was the right action.

Where the path which was opened by the President and followed by the distinguished Minority Leader and myself will now lead is not clear. If the idea of rapprochement does not sink in the mire of the escalating war in Indochina, the path can lead, in my judgment, to an improvement of relationships throughout Asia.
In any event, a process of communication has begun again between ourselves and a nation whose population constitutes, perhaps, one-fourth of the human race. The President's visit served, immediately, to lower the level of tension in Asia and, therefore, has had a salutary effect on world opinion. It has also increased the interest of Japan and other nations of Asia in dealing in a normal way with the People's Republic of China. In short, it is clear that the tree of relationships in Asia and the world was shaken for the better by the President's initiative. What cannot yet be predicted is where the leaves will fall and what will be the look of the new foliage.

IV. The War in Southeast Asia

Nor can we say whether the process of rapprochement will be aborted by what has now transpired in Viet Nam. Certainly no problem loomed as large as the war in our discussions in Peking. The bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi, the plan for which neither Senator Scott nor I knew when we left, took place while we were en route to China.

While there was no reflection of this development in the personal treatment which was accorded to us by the Chinese, in the discussions, the war dominated all else. The Chinese made it plain that our actions in Indochina were a matter of "great concern." If Taiwan is the crucial question for the normalization of Sino-U. S. relations, it is apparent that Viet Nam is fundamental to a further relaxation of tensions in the Western Pacific. The Chinese comment on this matter was unequivocal and I quote it: "Unless this can be settled," [ ], "there can be no progress on other issues."
How do the Chinese view the war in Viet Nam? They see it as an attempt by the United States to dominate the political life of a region in which we have no business. Their memory of the tortured path of American involvement is long and sensitive. Readily recalled, for example, is John Foster Dulles' refusal to shake hands with Premier Chou En-lai at the Geneva Conference of 1954. So, too, is the disregard of the 1954 Geneva Accord by the United States.

The Chinese made clear their belief that the resumption of the bombing of the North would prolong rather than end the war. Strong exception was taken to the Administration's contention that the action was justified because North Vietnamese armies had invaded the South. From their point of view, "the invasion of Viet Nam began with the (Tonkin Gulf) incident in 1964" and United States actions in Laos and Cambodia, to them, also constituted invasion and aggression.

In my judgment it is illusory to expect the Chinese, out of a desire to improve relations with the United States, to intervene with their Indochinese allies either to secure the release of our prisoners of war or to influence a settlement which is not agreeable to the North Vietnamese and the Cambodian resistance which is led by Prince Sihanouk. The Chinese want a rapprochement with the United States but they also want us out of Indochina. Their support of North Viet Nam's position is unequivocal. They believe that the United States, one way or another, will ultimately be forced to withdraw and they seemed confident that, once we are gone, the people of the three countries will work out their own political arrangements.
In short, the Peking discussions painted a bleak picture of the prospects of peace on the basis of present policies of all concerned. Unless there are changes in the present course, therefore, visits to China will not alter the indefinite continuance of the blood letting of Americans, Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians, the destruction of the culture and environment of the Indochinese countries, the waste of tens of billions of dollars more of our resources, the sapping of the vitality of our government, the distortion of our political processes, and the further division and frustration of our people.

It seems to me high time to ask why we are using the most advanced machines of destruction in that primitive land. Are we doing so out of force of habit? Out of fear? Fear of what? The fact is that we are still engaged in a war which, to put the best face on it, was sanctioned by what has now become a discredited policy toward China. The President's visit to China had the symbolic effect of marking the end of that policy. If the old China policy is no longer valid, is not the present involvement in the Viet Nam war which derived from that policy also invalid? How can conscience, in these circumstances, continue to ask sacrifices of the Armed Services?

If we feel deeply for the ordeal of the prisoners of war and the missing in action and for their families, we will no longer acquiesce in the distortion of the problem of their release. They are not going to be sprung by Commando raids on prison camps where they are not kept. They are not going to be released by mining Haiphong Harbor, nor by letter-writing campaigns to Hanoi or by postage stamps issued in their honor. They are going to be released, if the air war leaves any of them alive to be released, only when U. S. air and naval operations cease. While we remain in the war, the promise is not for their release but for more missing-in-action, more prisoners of war and more casualties.
V. Exchanges

In the Shanghai communique President Nixon and Premier Chou "agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples" through "contacts and exchanges" in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports, and journalism. Our trip was a manifestation of China's desire to carry out this pledge.

Plans are being made to open China's doors to more personal contacts. A date has been agreed to, for example, for the visit to China by the leaders of the House of Representatives. When asked about the possibility of other Members of the Congress coming later in the year, the response was that "they will be able to come." What the Chinese have in mind, it seems, is approval of visits by small groups on a case-by-case basis.

As to exchanges in other fields, the Chinese indicated keen interest in carrying out the spirit of the Communique. As it was put in the discussions: "Scientists are beginning to come, some doctors have come, and more are on the way." Visits by journalists are still being handled on an individual basis and, apparently, it will remain that way for the foreseeable future. The Chinese government, apparently, is not prepared for permanent U. S. news bureaus in China at this time, although the question is still under consideration. We were assured, however, that to be admitted on an individual basis, journalists did not have to "sympathize" with China. "If they have doubts about us, they can come also." All that is necessary is that "they seek the truth. Then we will welcome them."
Exchanges in the other direction, that is Chinese visiting the United States, seem to be of less interest to Peking. There are, nevertheless, some possibilities in the fields of science, culture, athletics and entertainment in which this nation might profit greatly from an exposure to Chinese achievements, skills and talents.

IV. Trade

We should not expect spectacular results in trade from the rapprochement although, obviously, it can grow rapidly relative to the present low levels. The Chinese have looked largely to their own resources for economic building blocks so their urgent import needs are limited. Their industrial competence is substantial and growing rapidly. Such products as locomotives, tractors, cars, sewing machines, clothes, electronic equipment, medicines, machine tools, gasoline, and so on across the spectrum, to nuclear devices and space rockets are now made in China. While supplements to their production in some of these items, new designs and processes are likely to be welcomed from abroad, the development of their own diversified productivity is and will remain the fundamental Chinese consideration.

China pursues conservative fiscal policies in international dealings as well as at home. A rough balance is maintained worldwide between imports and exports. The Chinese have no external debts (or internal, for that matter) and their foreign transactions, in effect, are largely cash on the barrel head.

In 1971, it is estimated that China's exports were $2.3 billion and imports $2.2 billion, a total turnover of less than one half of one percent of
gross national product. Main imports are wheat, chemicals, machinery, manufactured fertilizer, certain types of iron and steel, other base metals, and transportation equipment, notably ships and aircraft. At present, the major industrial purchases are from Japan and Western Europe. Wheat has been purchased from Canada, and, until recently, from Australia. China’s exports go principally to Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, Britain, and West Germany, with the main items being rice, soybeans, vegetable oils, silk, fabrics, clothing, and a wide range of light industrial products. There is only a limited trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

This year, China has given visas to thirty or so United States businessmen to come to the Canton Trade Fair. It is likely, too, that Congressional leaders who specialize in international trade matters would be welcomed at that showing.

The growth of the twice-a-year Canton Trade Fair since its beginning in 1957 illustrates China’s capacity to enter into the world markets. Goods for sale at the first Fair were limited and exhibited to only 1,200 people. More than 30,000 different Chinese products for sale abroad are displayed or represented at the current Fair. In the first ten days, moreover, attendance was 10,000.

The United States is estimated to have purchased only about $4 million of Chinese goods last year, mostly through Hong Kong. As the rapprochement proceeds, a substantial increase in imports of Chinese consumer goods is to be anticipated. It is not yet clear, however, what we have that the Chinese want
particularly that they cannot get cheaper elsewhere, or what they have that Americans will need in quantity over an extended period. Nevertheless, every encouragement should be given to the fullest possible development of commerce, if for no other reason than that trade relations at whatever level can be an important factor in removing the wall of a quarter-of-a-century of separation.

VII. Concluding Observations

With a bitter history of subjection to the arrogance of "great powers" the Chinese emphasize that their own future is identified with that of ordinary nations. They reject the status of "super-power" and insist that their system does not permit them to impose their views on others by force. On the basis of our visit, there is no reason to conclude that the Chinese leaders mean otherwise. While the People's Liberation Army seems to be held in heroic regard, it is well blended into civilian pursuits and is not in evidence as a force for militancy. There are no appeals for military crusades abroad. To the Chinese, defense does not appear to mean maintaining outposts in Southeast Asia or anywhere else beyond their own borders. On the contrary, it means that their own cities are now catacombed with air-raid shelters.

China's energies are clearly concentrated on development of its inner resources and their usages are predominantly civilian. Premier Chou En-lai insisted that China "wants to build on our own with our own resources. The country is big enough and we have enough left to do to keep us busy... Our system does not permit us to commit aggression."
President Nixon, by his visit, moved to gear U. S. policies to that kind of a China after two decades of bending them to fit a preconceived notion of China as an aggressor nation. In my judgment, the President has set in motion a process which is not reversible except by what may now transpire in Indochina.

Dangers as well as opportunities involving all of Asia can flow from the President's initiative with regard to China. I am persuaded that the opportunities far outweigh the dangers. The United States, China, Japan, and the Soviet Union share a common interest in the peace and stability of the Western Pacific. At some point in the future, these common interests may form the basis of new arrangements concerning the security in the region which will supercede the fear-based concepts which have persisted since World War II. The normalizing of relations between China and the United States is a start. Hopefully, it will precipitate a similar normalization between Japan and China and between the Soviet Union and Japan.

Regrettably, the eruptions in Indochina have lengthened the shadows over the prospects for peace in Asia. In my judgment, the new sorties into North Viet Nam have tarnished the significance of the President's visit to China and, of course, the visit of the Senate's Joint Leadership. They have thrown into at least temporary eclipse the possibilities of Chinese-U. S. rapprochement. When these shadows lift and only then can there be an expectation of change, a change for the better in Asia.

There is a Chinese proverb: "To see one time is better than to hear a hundred times." For the last twenty-three years the American people have not seen much of China. What was heard a "hundred times" often contained gross
distortions and added up to a horror story, concocted in the minds of the fearful in this nation which, on the basis of the visit of the Joint Leadership and the findings of some other recent observers, bears no relationship to China as it is today.

The 16 days which were spent in China, traveling widely throughout the country and talking to people in all walks of life, have impressed me most profoundly. The dynamism, energy, and devotion of the Chinese people in confronting what they have set out to do with their society must be seen to be believed. Their system is working for them and it is working well.

We are a young national culture relative to China, hundreds of years compared with thousands of years. There is much to be learned on both sides. The mutual educative process has begun anew. This time it must be maintained on the basis of equality of treatment and mutual respect. The days of a one-sided relationship—of teacher-pupil, master-servant, benefactor and dependent, and so on back into the 19th Century's "enlightened and heathen," are gone and it is hard to see who in China or in this nation will mourn their passing.

Chou En-lai noted that it had taken "100 years since the Opium Wars for the Chinese people to stand up." Today, they are standing up. Self-reliance is their watchword and on that basis they are building a new China.

Premier Chou En-lai closed our talks with these words: "Please convey to the American people the friendship and best respects of the Chinese people."

The Joint Leadership of the Senate responded in a similar fashion. In my judgment, only what transpires in Indochina blocks the way of a full fruition of these reciprocal sentiments. When they are fulfilled in reciprocal acts of respect and consideration they will redound to the benefit of the people of the United States, the People's Republic of China and the rest of the world.