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Incidentally, he will be the first American Chief of State to visit the People's Republic of China and also when he visits Moscow in May he will be the first American Chief of State to visit the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, about 4 years ago, the University of Montana initiated a new public lecture series. The University was kind enough to invite me to deliver the first address. In contrast to today, the subject which was selected was not much in the public awareness in those days. The remarks were entitled "China Respect, and Prospect."

I have just referred to the statement which I delivered at the University on March 29, 1968. It was, in general, a plea to the largely student-audience to cut away the shackles of thought which an older generation, of which I am a part, had self-imposed on itself in its reactions to the cataclysmic experience of the Chinese revolution. I urged the students to examine new approaches, approaches which might provide the beginnings of a beginning in restoring relations of peace with China.

For the most part, the approaches which were discussed then have now been incorporated into the foreign policies of the Nation. President Nixon has played an exceptional personal role in bringing about this transition. He has ended the boycott on Chinese goods. He has not only removed the ban on travel to China, but has given encouragement to visits, through his words and, of course, his personal example.

Most pertinent, the President has acted to change the language of intercourse between the two nations from that of mutual hostility and deflection to tolerance. In so doing, the President has set the stage, in my judgment, for a peaceful evolution of United States-Chinese relations which could serve well that generation of students whom I addressed 4 years ago and their successors for many years to come.

There is no assurance, of course, that this evolution will not be cut off by the President's impending visit. Clearly, it will take far more than a visit of state to undo the knots of two decades of a venomous animosity. No doubt, as I know the Senate joins with me in wishing President Nixon every success in the endeavor he is about to undertake.

Mr. President, just for my own personal benefit I will to read the concluding portion of that speech which I gave at the University of Montana 4 years ago:

To sum up, then, it seems to me that the basic adjustment which is needed in policies respecting China is to make crystal clear that this government does not anticipate, even much less less the overthrow of the government of the Chinese mainland. In addition, there is a need to end the discrimination which confines China to an inferior status as among the Communist countries in this nation's policies respecting travel and trade. Finally, it ought to be made unequivocal that we are prepared at all times to meet with Chinese representatives—formally or informally—to examine the common differences between China and the United States over Viet Nam or any other question of common concern.

Adjusting to this kind in the policies of the nation, it seems to me, requires above all else a fresh perspective. We need to see the situation in Asia as it is today, not as it appeared twenty years ago in the Himalayan upheaval of the Chinese revolution. We need to see the situation not through the fog of an old and stagnant hostility but in the light of the enduring interplay of the United States in the Western Pacific.

In this context we will better be able to find appropriate responses at appropriate times to the specific problems of the Sino-U.S. relationship, whether they have to do with U.N. representation or diplomatic recognition or the other or whatever. Without prior adjustment in perspective, however, to seek to deal definitively with these questions, would be, to say the least, an exercise in futility.

I should emphasize before concluding that it is unlikely that there will be any eager Chinese responses to initiatives on our part. Nevertheless, I see nothing to be lost for this nation in trying to move along the lines which have been suggested. Chinese intransigence is no license for American intransigence. Our stance in the situation in the Western Pacific is too large for that sort of infantile indulgence.

I see great relevance in thinking deeply and carefully about China and the United States to see if they can be recast in new and uncluttered moods. There is every reason, especially for young people, to examine most closely the premises of policy regarding China which were enshrined almost two decades ago. The fact is that the breakdown in Chinese-U.S. relations was one of the great failures of my generation and it is highly doubtful that it shall be seen in my lifetime. The problem, therefore, will fall largely to you.

This was delivered to the student body at the University of Montana at Missoula, but it applied to all young people all over the country.

It is a not a particularly happy inheritance, but there is reason to hope that it may fare better in your hands.

Unlike my generation, you know more about Asia. You have a greater awareness of its importance to this nation and to the world. In 1942, four months after Pearl Harbor, for example, an opinion poll found sixty percent of a national sample of Americans still could not locate either China or India on an outline map of the world. Certainly that would not be the case today. Furthermore, you have had experience of national traumas in moving abruptly from an era marked by an almost fawning reverence toward China to one of disenchanted stoning. You were spared the fierce hostilities which rent this nation internally, and the anxieties and insecurities regarding China gave way to feelings of revulsion, hatred, and insecurity.

You, Chinese counterparts, the young people of today's China—they are called the "Heirs of the Revolution"—have a similar gap to bridge as they look across the Pacific. Your generation in China, too, has been contained and isolated, and its view of the United States has been colored with the hates of another time. It has had no contact with you or, indeed, with much of the world outside China.

On the other hand, those young people have grown up under easier conditions than the older generation of Chinese who lived through the Cambridge and revolution. It may be that they can face you and the rest of the world with greater cynicism and assurance. China and the United States may be the case at any time in modern Chinese history.

I urge you to think for yourselves about China. I urge you to approach, with a new receptivity, with an open mind, with the great population of industrious and intelligent people. Bear in mind that the peace of Asia rests upon the condition that the world will do as much as it does on this nation, the Soviet Union, or any other, not because China is Communist but because China is China—among the
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Chinese resistance to the Japanese invasion in 1937 produced another shift from neutrality to full war. At the end of the Second World War, admiration was displaced by disappointment and frustration, as the weakness of the Chinese Communist forces collapsed in cataclysmic internal strife. This nation became profoundly disaffected with the west during the period which was replaced abruptly in 1949 by hostility.

The hostility was largely a reaction, of course, to the coming to power of a Communist regime on the Chinese mainland. We did not interpret this event as a consequence of the massive difficulties and the vast inner weaknesses of a war-born China. Rather, we saw it almost as an affront to this nation. We saw it as a treacherous extension of the Soviet steamroller policies which had reduced Eastern and Central Europe to subjection at the end of World War II.

Then, in 1948, came a Communist coup in Indo-China, and the Soviet attempt to blockade Berlin. The triumph of a Communist government in China followed immediately after these events in Europe. The nation was shaken to its fingertips.

Still, the press of events continued relentlessly. In November of that year the United States launched a sudden attack on South Korea. The Chinese forces intervened in the war in November of that year. We brought this into a major military confrontation in which, for the first time, the Chinese became our enemies.

After these events, the assumptions of American policy towards China were revised. America was then the major capitalist power, and the foreign policy of the United States to contain and oust the Chinese Communists. This was summed up in the phrase 'containment' and the containment policy of the National Security Council under the administration of President Truman, in which the Chinese mainland and subsequent change of the Chinese Nationalist state, to which we were committed, could not be held. We lost the war.

In the meantime, the government on the mainland has not only survived, it has provided China with a functioning leadership. This has not only brought the Chinese mainland to within the borders of the Soviet bloc, but it has achieved a degree of economic and scientific progress, apparently sufficient for survival as a great and living population and sophisticated enough to produce clear and continuous explosions.

In the last two years, the so-called Cui-
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I see great relevance in thinking deeply of the issues which divide China and the United States to see if they can be recast in new and more fruitful terms, especially for young people, to examine most closely the premises of policy regarding China and Taiwan, and Vietnam.

The fact is that the breakthrough in Chinese-U.S. relations was one of the great achievements of my generation and it is highly doubtful that its full repair shall be seen in my lifetime. The problem, therefore, will fall largely to you. It is not a particularly happy inheritance, but there is reason to hope that it may fare better in your hands.

Perhaps you know more about Asia. You have a greater awareness of its importance to this nation and to the world.

On the other hand, those young people have grown up under easier conditions than their youth in years of continuous war and revolution. It may be that they can face you and the rest of the world with greater equanimity and assurance that have been the at any time in modern Chinese history.

I urge you to think for yourselves about China. Do not regard China as the "Heirs of the Revolution"—have a similar attitude as the "heirs of the Enlightenment". Your generation in China, too, has been contained and isolated, and its view of the United States and its policies, as has been the case with us, will be influenced by the tone and circumstances in which China's policies were received in the West.

In perspective, it may be a prophesy of doom or a forecast of a happier future which will depend not so much on us, the "Old China Hands" of tomorrow, as on you. The "New American Hands" of tomorrow.

Mr. Scott. Mr. President, the distinction made by the President in his speech of some years ago, spoke with great foresight and intuitive wisdom. I congratulate him for that, and I am delighted to be a spoke of the President's visit in such hopeful terms.

We will all—the world will—watch this meeting, not expecting great things immediately, but recognizing that the opening of a dialog with 800 million people is itself a world-shaking event. We may achieve—and I hope we will achieve—some easing, some partial solution, of what the Germans call Kulturkampf der Menschheit, which means the cultural struggle of mankind.

We have had this cultural struggle. I
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