4-23-1974

Arms Reduction - Detente and SALT

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

United States of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 93d CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 120 WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, APRIL 23, 1974 No. 55

Senate

ARMS REDUCTION, DÉTENTE AND SALT

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, as Senator JACKSON said in his address of April 22 to the Overseas Press Club:

The issue facing us is not whether we want a détente, but how to achieve a real détente that will produce results favorable to a more peaceful world.

We are now negotiating with the Soviets in SALT II, and the outcome of these negotiations can decisively affect the real meaning détente will have. I believe it is of the utmost importance that SALT II follow a course that is consistent with the national security of the United States and the prospects for a SALT II treaty based on United States-Soviet equality.

In this spirit, Senator JACKSON has set forth a U.S. SALT proposal to stabilize the strategic balance through substantial reductions in the strategic forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union. As he said:

It is time for serious arms reductions by both sides—a stabilizing disarmament.

I wish to bring to the attention of my colleagues the full text of Senator JACKSON's constructive and statesmanlike address. I urge the widest reading of his remarks. If agreed to, Senator JACKSON's program would mark an historic turning point in East-West relations, and could dramatically increase the confidence of all the world's people in the prospects for a cooperative and stable peace.

I ask unanimous consent that the full text of Senator JACKSON's address be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DÉTENTE AND SALT

(By Senator HENRY M. JACKSON)

In recent years, and especially in recent months, the foreign policy of the Nixon Administration has been centered on the development of a relationship between East and West which they have called detente. No matter how hard or in which direction it has been punched—in the Middle East, in the SALT negotiations, on matters of human rights—the foreign policy of the Administration has revolved, like a tether ball, around the pole of that detente.

The detente has gone from a dream to an incantation without acquiring a definition along the way. And we have been left without a clear sense of where we are going or, for that matter, a common understanding of where we have been.

In its most fundamental sense detente must mean a relaxation of tensions accompanied by an effort to achieve mutual accommodation through the negotiating process. Defined in this manner, as a process of negotiation, it has the broad support of the American people. But like any process, the process of detente must be judged by the substantive results of the negotiations themselves and by the actual behavior that follows after agreements are negotiated.

Thus the issue facing us is not whether we want a detente, but how to achieve a real detente that will produce results favorable to a more peaceful world.

The centerpiece of the 1972 Moscow summit and the first test of the product of detente was the treaty on anti-ballistic missiles and the interim agreement on strategic offensive weapons—SALT I. I had considerable misgivings about the SALT I outcome, especially the interim agreement. The military advantage that the interim agreement conferred on the Soviets was, in my judgment, an inauspicious beginning.

Now we are engaged in SALT II; and it is this set of negotiations, perhaps more than any other, that will determine what real meaning detente will have. I welcome this opportunity to share with you a proposal that could stabilize the strategic balance through substantial reductions in the strategic forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union. In the course of my remarks tonight, which are directed to the SALT II negotiations, I have tried to develop a new direction in the effort to bring strategic arms under control—a direction based on the search for the sort of wide-ranging disarmament that would do much to bring us closer to a genuine detente and a more peaceful world.

In recent months we have seen the development by the Soviet Union of a significant number of new weapon systems incorporating an impressive range of new and costly technology. Not only have the Soviets achieved a genuine MIRV capability, but they have done so by developing two quite distinct MIRV technologies. They have tested a whole new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles, land and sea based, incorporating new technologies as well as new launch techniques. They have developed a mobile, land-based ICBM. They have moved to increase by a very substantial factor the throw weight of their missile forces despite the fact that they already enjoy a threefold advantage in this area. These developments, all of which have come to light since the SALT interim agreement which was sup-

posed to limit offensive weapons, have, individually and in combination, added significantly to the offensive potential of the Soviet missile forces.

In assessing the significance of these developments, all of which are consistent with the often ambiguous terms of the SALT interim agreement, it is necessary to digress for a moment to consider the rationale by which the interim agreement was defended.

The numerical disadvantage into which the United States was frozen by the SALT I interim agreement was held by some to be effectively offset by our technological superiority. The most obvious American technological advantage—obvious in part because of the frequency with which Dr. Kissinger reiterated it—lay in the fact that we had achieved a MIRV capability and the Soviet Union had not. Today our monopoly in MIRV technology has vanished like last year's snow and the lead in this area that we still possess by virtue of our earlier development of MIRVs can be expected to diminish rapidly as time goes on. This is neither novel nor surprising. In the long run—made longer if we find ourselves forced into a technological arms race and shorter if we do not—technology tends to even out. That is the history of technology; and it is, in particular, the history of military technology. Given the numbers and throw weights agreed to in the SALT I interim agreement, under which the Soviets enjoy a protected advantage, technological equality will mean Soviet superiority in strategic weapons.

In the final analysis, an arms control agreement will not be stable if it freezes for one side an advantage in quantity while the other has to rely on an edge in quality that it cannot maintain. In the interim agreement we agreed to inferior numbers but the Soviets did not agree to inferior technology. We should never have presumed—I, for one, did not—that they would fail to seek the combination of superior numbers and comparable technology that add up to overall superiority; and this is precisely the direction that they have chosen.

In the current SALT II negotiations the Soviets are seeking to consolidate the advantage they obtained in the interim agreement while pressing for equality in technology. Again and again when the interim agreement was before the Senate I warned that this would be the Soviet strategy at SALT II. My amendment to the authorization for the interim agreement placed the Congress and the Administration on record on this issue by insisting that the interim agreement was not an acceptable basis for a SALT II treaty.

Now, with negotiations underway, we find that, just as expected, the Soviets have actually hardened their position. Far from viewing SALT II as an occasion to search for the sort of stable strategic balance that can result only from equality, they are insisting on a SALT II arrangement that would widen and deepen their strategic margin still further.

The response of the Administration to this situation has been disappointing in the extreme. For rather than concentrating on the design and presentation of an arms control proposal that could form the basis for a long-term stabilization of the strategic balance, the Administration has concentrated on quick-fix, short term proposals that can be readied in time for the forthcoming June summit meeting in Moscow.

In their desire to preserve the impression of momentum in the SALT negotiations, the Administration has abandoned its previous conviction that the essential purpose of a follow-on agreement should be to rectify the imbalance of SALT I. In their haste to meet an arbitrary and politically expedient self-imposed June deadline, the Administration has now begun to entertain Soviet proposals which are inimical to the national security of the United States and to the prospects for a SALT II treaty based on U.S.-Soviet equality.

Kept on such a course, SALT II is doomed to fail in the supreme mission of reducing the risk of mutual destruction. Indeed, instead of putting a damper on the arms race, such a failure would add fuel to the fire.

Given this situation, I am persuaded the time is ripe for the United States to put forward a bold and imaginative proposal for serious disarmament—a proposal that will test uncertain Soviet intentions by inviting them to join with us in concluding a far-reaching agreement to bring about a measure of stability in the nuclear balance at sharply reduced levels of strategic forces.

Instead of arms limitation agreements that do not limit, it is time for serious arms reductions by both sides—a stabilizing disarmament.

In outlining my proposal it is useful to begin by recalling the numbers agreed to under the terms of the SALT I interim agreement, according to which the United States may have no more than 1,054 intercontinental ballistic missiles. This force consists principally of Minuteman missiles that are termed "light" (in contrast to "heavy") under the definitions worked out in conjunction with the interim agreement. For their part, the Soviets are permitted 1,618 intercontinental ballistic missiles of which approximately 1,300 are of the "light" variety. The other 300 Soviet ICBMs are "heavy"—so heavy, in fact, that these 300 alone carry as much "throw weight" as the entire permitted U.S. force of 1,000 Minuteman missiles. With respect to the Soviet missile force the terms "light" and "heavy" are misleading because the missile that the Soviets apparently intend to deploy as a substitute in the "light" category for the missiles in that category at the time of the interim agreement are several times more powerful, several times "heavier" than our comparable systems.

At sea the interim agreement provides that the United States may have up to 44 missile-firing nuclear submarines containing 710 launch tubes. The Soviets are permitted up to 62 comparable submarines, with 950 launch tubes, in addition to a number of older type submarines. The Soviets are now engaged in building up to these levels.

I believe that strategic forces on both sides are larger than they need to be, *provided* that we can negotiate with the Soviets toward a common ceiling at a sharply lower level. Therefore I propose that we invite the Soviets to consider a SALT II agreement in which each side would be limited to 800 ICBMs and to no more than 560 submarine-launched missiles, equivalent to 35 missile-firing submarines of the Poseidon type. Long range strategic bombers, which were not included under the interim agreement, would also be limited to 400 on each side. Because the throw weight of the Soviet missile force is so much greater than that of our own, the two SALT delegations would be instructed to negotiate a formula for varying these basic numbers so as to bring the throw weight of the two intercontinental strategic forces into approximate equality.

The numbers resulting from the negotiat

ing process need not be precisely the numbers outlined here, although I believe that significant variation from these numbers, if essential to successful negotiation, ought to move in the direction of further reductions rather than upward adjustments. Because the strategic forces of the countries are structured differently at present and because we are always searching for ways in which to reduce the potential vulnerability of our deterrent, the treaty need not follow the precise numbers for each type of weapon system I have suggested—so long as the aggregate total of intercontinental strategic launchers was 1,760 or less. Reductions to a level of equality would be carried out, in phases, over a period of time to be negotiated.

A treaty reflecting the essential features that I have outlined here would represent a real and significant step in the direction of stabilizing disarmament. It would put to rest many of the misgivings that we now have that the Soviets are seeking to attain strategic superiority by consolidating their advantage in SALT I. It would permit both sides to shift their resources from the building up of nuclear arsenals to the building up of their economies.

The Soviet Union has turned to the United States for economic assistance, for our capital, our agricultural produce and our advanced technology. So long as the Soviets support the greatly exaggerated military sector of their economy at anything approaching current levels, an American program of subsidized economic transactions and the transfer of sophisticated technology, whatever its intended purpose, will inevitably amount to aid to the Russian army, naval and air forces.

At a time when the Soviet economy is in great difficulty we ought to be able to persuade them that a reordering of their priorities away from the military sector is the best way to achieve economic well-being. Adoption of my proposal could be an important step along a path that could lead eventually to billions of dollars in savings on strategic weapons systems.

It would enable us *both* to reorder our priorities.

If agreed to, it would mark a turning point in U.S.-Soviet relations of historic proportions. It would carry us to the brink of peace

Such an accord could transform the atmosphere of mistrust and apprehension that has clouded the horizon of East-West relations since the end of World War II. It would add immeasurably to the confidence of both our peoples, indeed, of all mankind, that the grim prospect of thermonuclear war can be set aside and our energies devoted to purposes more constructive and more enduring than the amassing of the weapons of war. It would be, if ever there was one, a genuine conceptual breakthrough.

In the new and more hopeful world that would result, we could look forward to a broadening of the foundation of mutual accommodation, a deepening of the spirit of cooperation in trade and commerce, science and technology and the arts, and in the freer movement of people and ideas.

This is a program for the beginning of a more peaceful world. It is worthy of our best efforts. And I am committed to do whatever I can to bring it about.

I am under no illusion about the difficulty of negotiating an arms reduction agreement along the lines outlined here. It will take time and hard bargaining. The view of some in the Administration that force reductions are not negotiable is premature; and there are many who do not share this judgment. After all, it was Henry Kissinger himself, who warned—in his book *The Necessity for Choice*—that to reject sound proposals because they appeared to be non-negotiable was to acquiesce in negotiating on Soviet terms.

Some weeks ago I urged the President to consider the program that I have outlined here tonight. The response has not been encouraging. The refusal of the Administration to consider seriously a program for Soviet-American force reductions is as disappointing as the tendency to seek a quick cosmetic agreement in June is dangerous.

There is no critical point for negotiations that will be passed if June comes and goes without a follow-on SALT arrangement. There is nothing unique about the month of June that would justify an extension of the SALT I interim agreement and thereby legitimize its terms beyond 1977 and prejudice the prospects for a meaningful and stabilizing SALT II treaty.

I am not content to let the matter rest upon the complex and multi-purpose judgments of an embattled White House, or with a Department of State whose passion for momentum is sometimes indifferent to the direction in which it is headed. I have today requested, as Chairman of the Arms Control Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, that the Secretary of Defense undertake an immediate and thorough assessment of my arms reduction proposal for transmission to the Subcommittee.

Adoption of this proposal would mark a radical departure from the tentative and often marginal approach to arms control that we have followed in SALT. Reductions on the scale I am proposing will encounter opposition , not least of all from those in the military services whose training, experience and orientation are likely to militate against strategic force reductions in general, and extensive reductions in particular. While it would be imprudent to discard the professional judgment of the military and irresponsible to ignore their advice, I believe that we must not allow their skepticism to stand in the way of a proposal which will enhance our security.

I am confident that American military planners can be persuaded of the advantages of bilateral cutbacks in strategic weapons and that they too, in the final analysis, reflect the hopes we all share for a more stable strategic balance and a more peaceful world. I would hope that the Soviet military, which has been unreceptive to proposals such as this in the past, would give careful consideration to the promise of a better life for the Soviet people, who could be freed from part of the enormous burden of the arms they now bear. Here the job of persuasion must fall to the Politburo, and to them I am simply saying: Let us break with the troubled past and seek a more fruitful and secure future for both our peoples.