

University of Montana

## ScholarWorks at University of Montana

---

Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews

Mike Mansfield Papers

---

7-12-1973

### Amtrak in Montana

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Follow this and additional works at: [https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield\\_speeches](https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches)

**Let us know how access to this document benefits you.**

---

#### Recommended Citation

Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "Amtrak in Montana" (1973). *Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews*. 1196.

[https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield\\_speeches/1196](https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/1196)

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact [scholarworks@mso.umt.edu](mailto:scholarworks@mso.umt.edu).

July 12, 1973

### AMTRAK IN MONTANA

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, Senators may recall that I have been following the development of Amtrak very carefully, especially its service to my State of Montana. Amtrak is faced with some problems, and there have been some successes since its inauguration. I have been anxious to see an expansion of their service to Montana, because I believe the patronage is there if the service is made available. I do, however, recognize the problems created by limited availability of equipment and certain OMB restraints.

I recently asked the able chairman of the Subcommittee on Transportation appropriations, Senator ROBERT C. BYRD, to inquire into these matters as they affect Amtrak and Montana. I have received a lengthy report from Amtrak, and I must say I am impressed with the tremendous detail involved in this presentation.

I wish to make several points. First of all, I believe that daily service on the southern route can be justified. There is every indication that the people will patronize this passenger train if given an opportunity. This route is of great service to the State. The northern route, the old Empire Builder line, provides more direct service between Minneapolis-St. Paul and Seattle, but here again I wish to point out that my major concern is that Montanans get service, and they do along the Hi-Line and points west. Also I wish to make an open appeal to my fellow citizens in the State of Montana that we continue to demonstrate the need and desire for this service. I believe that the expenditure of the additional funds to implement daily service on the southern route can be justified in the near future.

Also, Amtrak discusses the possibility of implementing 3-day-a-week service

between Salt Lake City, Utah, and Butte, Mont. This service would be most useful, but apparently would generate some schedule problems in addition to projected financial losses.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter of July 10 and the attached statistical information be printed at the conclusion of my remarks. I know that the Senate Subcommittee on Transportation will continue to watch this situation, and we are most appreciative of the cooperation indicated by the National Railroad Passenger Corporation.

There being no objection, the letter and attachments were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JULY 10, 1973.

HON. MIKE MANSFIELD,  
U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MANSFIELD: Since receipt of your June 4, 1973, letter, which followed up your letter of May 14 and included the questions you asked the Appropriations Committee to pursue with us, various Amtrak staff groups have been assembling the data necessary to provide the answer. The material that follows first addresses the questions raised in your May 4 letter; then the questions put to Senator Byrd's Subcommittee are discussed.

In your May 14 letter you asked that Amtrak reconsider the possibility of providing daily rather than tri-weekly service over the southern route through Montana. Our train-frequency patterns are, of course, subject to continuous revaluation. This activity culminates in the seasonally based schedule adjustments that are reflected in major timetable changes. For most of the country the major changes come at the start or at the end of the peak summer travel season; that is, in May and in September. Except for the Florida routes, the May timetable changes are those that generally entail as much service expansion as may be possible under the constraints of costs and equipment availability. The September changes usually involve reduced train frequencies and train



consists commensurate with the decline in passenger demand after Labor Day.

Any request, such as you have made for daily southern-route service, will be considered for possible implementation before each major timetable change. We have, I should add, not made any final decision on the future possibility of daily southern-route service either one way or the other. You may be assured that this question will be fully examined and considered as a part of our ongoing scheduling process.

Service on the southern route continues this summer on a tri-weekly basis because of a number of interrelated circumstances. In general, all Amtrak's decisions to expand service this year have been affected by the Department of Transportation's recommendation that a number of our present basic system routes be dropped entirely. As we have testified before the appropriate Congressional Committees, our present budget and the financial plan for fiscal year 1974 is tight. We can and are making service improvements, but there is competition for the resources involved, and each project must be ranked in order of its potential contribution to either short-term deficit reduction or to longer-term market development leading ultimately to the same end.

Although substantial improvement in ridership on the southern route occurred in the two-week period ending June 17 over that for the same period a year ago, ridership for the first five months of 1973 was generally lower than that in the first five months of 1972. This may be seen on the ridership charts set forth in Attachment 1. This level of ridership taken by itself did not justify expanding the service from tri-weekly to a daily basis.

In addition, we are very tight on equipment, especially for the peak summer months. As you know, we have gone to daily service on some tri-weekly routes for the summer. Other major routes have remained on a tri-weekly basis, including the Sunset Route between Los Angeles and New Orleans. One tri-weekly route that was made daily for this summer's peak season (Denver-Oakland) also had daily service last summer. Only one route that ran tri-weekly last summer was

given daily service this summer—the Coast Starlight/Daylight route between Oakland and Seattle. The decision to go daily on this route was based on a demonstrated heavy growth in ridership, which at times throughout the winter and spring was more than double the ridership for a year ago. It was also found that little additional equipment would be required to expand service from tri-weekly to daily on this particular route, because of the operating schedules and the time available at each terminal for train turnarounds.

But, as mentioned, the decision was based on heavy patronage demand. Our latest ridership graph for the Oakland-Seattle route is also shown on Attachment 1. (It should be noted in comparing the Oakland-Seattle chart with the Chicago-Spokane charts that a different scale is used on the Oakland-Seattle chart because of the much heavier ridership. The chart for the Oakland-Seattle service shows combined ridership in both directions.)

A year ago, when the possibility of daily service during the summer on the southern Montana route was reviewed, the cost-revenue projections indicated an annualized route deficit increase from \$2.1 million to \$2.9 million. This projection assumed a revenue increase of \$300,000. In the time elapsed since the base period that was used for the cost calculation, real costs (mostly labor) have been increasing. Wage rates have or will shortly be increased by as much as 25 percent over the base period for the analysis. Whether revenues can be increased enough to offset the rising costs is a continuing problem we face for all routes, but the net effect to date on the decision whether or not to institute daily southern-route service has been on the negative side.

As noted, even if other factors had been more favorable, equipment limitations also argued against daily southern-route service this summer. The present tri-weekly service requires three complete trainsets for operation. Daily service on the present schedules would require six. In time, as we complete our heavy program of car rebuilding and refurbishment, and as we acquire new equipment, this will become a less restricting constraint, but for the present it is a serious one.



Attachment 2 contains a summary analysis of total boardings and debarkings in Montana during 1972 and the first four months of 1973 on both the Empire Builder and the North Coast Hiawatha. Attachment 3 breaks down the total boardings and debarkings in Montana to a station-by-station basis for the month of April of this year. These are the most up-to-date station-by-station traffic counts that can be abstracted. They provide a measure of relative activity for each community served during a typical non-peak month containing a holiday weekend. The base data comes from conductors' reports which include all passengers holding tickets regardless of their fare status (full fare, half fare, etc.). The figures listed for "on" are for all those boarding at each stop, as totaled for the month. The "off" figures count all those getting off the trains, no matter where they may have boarded (within or beyond Montana). It should be noted that Troy was no longer a stop in April, but the reports did show two boardings on train number 7. Troy was originally made a stop (with very light traffic) because it was a crew-change point where the trains had to stop anyway, but the need to change crews there was eliminated under a run-through agreement.

A stop-by-stop analysis similar to that in Attachment 3 could be constructed for other months, but because of the way the data is reported and recorded this would require a very large number of man hours to prepare. Ridership figures based on tickets collected, then computerized, were used to prepare Attachments 2 and 3.

Part of Attachment 2 gives total Montana boardings and debarkings for the first four months of 1973, as well as data for ridership and traffic between Minneapolis-St. Paul and Seattle. It may be seen that "traffic" involves double counting (once when a passenger boards the train and once again when the passenger gets off the train). The data on total riders, on the other hand, is essentially only a count of boardings, thus measuring the actual number of persons using a train. The traffic figures, however, are used as a measure of total station activity. Accordingly, for ridership comparisons, the column for boardings in Montana is the one that can be

compared directly with the column showing total riders for the Minneapolis-to-Seattle portion of each route.

It will be noted from Attachment 2 that the ridership for the first four months of 1973 on the North Coast Hiawatha was less than the ridership during the same period of 1972. This lower level of ridership in 1973 can probably be explained in part by the relatively mild winter. We are, however, encouraged by the spurt in ridership during the two week period ending June 17, which, based on preliminary checkpoint counts, amounted to an almost 12 percent increase over the same period in 1972.

During calendar year 1972 traffic into and out of Montana, as a percent of total ridership between Minneapolis and Seattle, represent 17.2 percent on train number 7, 16.2 percent on train number 8, 37.4 percent on train number 9, and 39.4 percent on train number 10. While the percentage is much higher on the Hiawatha (trains number 9 and 10), the seasonal patterns are relatively consistent. The principal peak occurs during the winter season when total volume is lower than the summer, but when local travel is more common. Another peak, while somewhat less pronounced when expressed as a percentage (although larger in terms of absolute numbers), occurs in the summer as tourist traffic increases.

Although it is the general impression within the state that the southern-route trains are doing more Montana business than the northern route trains, it can be seen from the figures in Attachment 2 that the opposite is the case. Because the southern-route service is tri-weekly (running at three-sevenths the frequency of the northern-route service), there may appear to be more activity at the southern-route stations when trains arrive or depart than at the northern-route stops, but the total number of boardings, debarkings, or persons handled at the northern-route stops is larger. Southern-route Montana traffic is more than three-sevenths (i.e., more than 43 percent) of northern-route traffic within Montana, but total traffic on the southern route between Minneapolis and Seattle (at 31 percent) is less than three-sevenths of the overall



northern-route traffic. This may no doubt be at least partially explained in terms of through-passenger preference for the northern route because of its shorter overall running time, although the new rerouting via Wenatchee in Washington State, by being one hour shorter, may slightly improve the time-competitiveness of the southern route.

There is no exact science for predicting the amount of added traffic a daily service—as opposed to a tri-weekly service—may generate. One thing we *have* learned from other routes where frequency has been increased is that it would be unreasonable to suppose that total business would increase by the ratio of three-sevenths to seven-sevenths if trains ran every day. Much of the present tri-weekly traffic may be bunched on the tri-weekly service and would only spread to the added trains if service was expanded to operate on the other days. However, it may be expected that there would be some increase as it became generally known within the market that there was a train every day. Costs, however, would be increased immediately by a substantial amount. Total train operating costs vary directly with train miles, and train miles would at once jump by 133 percent (or more than double) although ridership could not be expected to make the same leap. Therefore, any increase in frequency must be viewed as longer-term market development, with a correlative financial investment and operating loss for an undetermined period (until added revenues would at least cover added costs).

Amtrak faces a number of such market-development possibilities nationally, and with limited financial (and equipment) resources, prospects for added train-mile service must be ranked according to the likelihood of, and the probable length of time required for, achieving successful operation. To date, it has not been Amtrak's judgment that daily service on the southern route is justified in terms of the resources that would have to be committed. However, this decision will be re-evaluated periodically and as conditions change, because we do regard daily service as preferable both from a marketing and from a public-service standpoint, if it can be justified by prospective ridership increases.

Your letter of May 23, 1973, to Senator Byrd, Chairman of the Appropriations Sub-

committee on Transportation, also indicated an interest in the possibility of service between Salt Lake City or Ogden and Butte. Prior to the advent of Amtrak, tri-weekly service was provided on this route by the Union Pacific Railroad, although the Union Pacific had attempted to discontinue such service. As your letter observes, the Interstate Commerce Commission favored this route for inclusion in the Amtrak basic system. The ICC, in commenting on the Secretary of Transportation's preliminary report on the Amtrak system, advocated a number of route additions, and the route of the Butte Special was included as a secondary recommendation.

In the Secretary of Transportation's Final Report, issued January 28, 1971, the ICC's recommendation for inclusion of the Butte Special route was rejected. The department specifically cited the criteria of existing and projected ridership, population served, and the profitability criterion (indicating that "substantial losses" would be incurred if the route were to continue in operation).

The ICC's recommendation to the Department of Transportation contained no estimate of probable revenues and costs. The ICC proposal rested mainly on the usefulness of the route as a "bridge" line connecting the northern Great Plains states with the Salt Lake City-Los Angeles markets. As designated, however, the Amtrak basic system—even in the preliminary report—did not include Salt Lake City-Los Angeles service, and the ICC did not recommend this route for inclusion.

With the coming of Amtrak, the pre-existing route structure was changed substantially, and Amtrak's present transcontinental schedules no longer permit the same connecting services as may have been possible before May 1, 1971. While it may have been possible in pre-Amtrak days to arrange a Butte Special schedule that would provide reasonable connections bringing the southern Montana markets east of Butte with the Ogden-Oakland route, such connections are not possible unless our present schedules are to be drastically revised. Such rescheduling, which might be designed in an attempt to maximize the connection patterns for a Butte-Ogden route, would, it was found, have an adverse effect on the other markets served by the Chicago-Seattle and Chicago-San Francisco trains.



Accordingly, for the purpose of our analysis, all possible schedules for a Butte-Ogden connection service under our present service patterns on the two existing routes were examined. The bridge service as contemplated in the ICC recommendation—interconnecting the areas from Butte to the east with the routes from Ogden west—was found to entail a 22-hour (overnight) layover at Butte for eastbound passengers and an all-day layover at Ogden for westbound connections. (This assumes that if all three services were tri-weekly then each train would be scheduled on the days of the week that would minimize layover times. If this could not be done because of marketing reasons elsewhere, layovers might have to be lengthened at each point to another full day. The layover times cited above also presume exact adherence to schedules, but in practice some time cushioning would have to be provided.)

All other possible schedules were examined to try to find the best set of possible connections for market maximization. The strongest pattern that could be found was one that would permit convenient connections for all trains from Ogden (and points west) to Butte, as well as convenient service from Butte to Ogden (and points west) in the other direction. In addition, for two of the three trains weekly the connection at Butte from the eastbound North Coast Hiawatha would also be possible (i.e., from Missoula to Reno or Oakland, or from Missoula, Spokane or Seattle to Ogden/Salt Lake City).

This schedule would not involve an overnight run between Butte and Ogden, and the daylight running over much of the route in both directions would provide better service at the intermediate stops and also capitalize on the scenic values of the route (as the overnight service contemplated by the ICC and as previously operated by the Union Pacific would not). However, this tri-weekly schedule would entail a 4:00 a.m. departure from Salt Lake City. This has been taken into account in making estimates of probable revenues.

Based on the best information presently at our disposal, we estimate that yearly revenues would be in the neighborhood of \$130,000 and yearly expenses in the neighborhood

of \$800,000, resulted in a yearly deficit of about \$670,000, or about 16 cents per passenger mile. Based on these projections, we cannot conclude that operation of such service would be economically prudent.

In your May 23 letter to Senator Byrd, you also suggested that the Subcommittee ask Amtrak when Amtrak intends to consider revision of the present system; that is, in terms of additions to or deletions of existing service.

We regard the process of route readjustments as a continual one. It is, it should be added, a process that is already well under way; the consideration of revisions began immediately after our assumption of the responsibility for operating the trains, on May 1, 1971.

Service expansion or contraction can involve changes in routes or changes in service. We have been active on both fronts. Since May 1, 1971, a number of routes have been added. Some of these additions are temporary (experimental or operated in conjunction with the states under Section 403[b] of the Act) and others have become part of the basic system. The southern route service through Butte and Billings began as an experimental service, but having been operated more than the statutory two years it is now a part of the basic system. The three international routes are by statute part of the basic system.

State-supported Amtrak routes have been established in three States—Illinois, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania—although it appears as of this writing that the financial support will be withdrawn by Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. State support is being sought for continuation of Washington-Cumberland service. The earlier experimental service between Washington and Parkersburg via Cumberland was not successful and has been terminated. Another earlier service, which was to be supported by the states involved, linked Buffalo with Chicago via Cleveland, but service was stopped when it became clear that the state support would not be forthcoming.

Meanwhile, Amtrak has agreed to operate two more experimental services: one that would connect with the Mexican railway sys-



tem at Laredo via Little Rock and the other to serve the San Joaquin Valley in California. Funds were appropriated for these new routes, but the money was impounded.

The latest area to receive Amtrak service is between Spokane and Seattle on the old Great Northern route (via Wenatchee). This was achieved by rerouting the North Coast Hiawatha trains to a route previously without Amtrak service. In the process, the rerouting also decreased running time, which should help improve service and revenues throughout all areas served by these trains.

Additional experimental routes would be provided under the Amtrak legislation recently passed by the Senate. This change in the law would require the institution of at least one new experimental route each year, to be operated for at least a two-year trial period. These mandated experimental routes are to be selected by the Secretary of Transportation, and the effect would be to add another impetus toward system expansion. A similar provision has been ordered reported by the House Commerce Committee's Transportation Subcommittee.

Mention should also be made of expansions of service offered on existing routes. These involve adding trains or increasing the frequency of service. On some Amtrak lines the number of trains daily has been decreased, but as a general rule the trend has been in the other direction. All the service changes made since Amtrak issued its first timetable would be too complex to identify and list, but two aggregate figures show that the trend has been toward expansion of service. Our first timetable, which took effect May 1, 1971, listed 184 separate Amtrak trains. Under our current (June 10) timetable 245 trains are being operated. Total train miles operated per month also show an increase. Amtrak began calculating the total number of train miles operated in September 1971, after many services, including the southern Montana route, had already been added to the May 1, 1971, system. Based on weekly data beginning in September 1971, service then being operated amounted to approximately 2,001,000 train miles per month. The corresponding

figure for train miles operated in March of this year is 2,380,164.

If service is eliminated on the several routes as recommended by the Department of Transportation, there will, of course, be a corresponding reduction of route miles and train miles but the system would still be larger in terms of train miles than the May 1971 Amtrak system. The decision of whether or not to make the recommended changes is, of course, not Amtrak's alone. Congress, the Department of Transportation, and the Administration will have an important role to play as well as the Interstate Commerce Commission.

In time, our operating results will no doubt indicate the desirability of other changes to the Amtrak system. These changes may involve routes as well as train frequencies. In general our indications to date are that changes in service will on balance involve more expansion than contraction. In this regard, however, it is necessary that Amtrak be allowed to keep the flexibility to adjust services to maximize ridership.

We feel that our operations have shown that much potential exists for rail passenger service, if the service is operated attractively. Because of the limits to growth facing other modes of travel, we expect that rail service will become even more important in the future.

Although the trends we can now observe indicate an expanding role for intercity passenger trains, the problems we face today continue to indicate that we should build carefully.

It is precisely because we see these possibilities that we believe an attempt to build too quickly or carelessly could prove counterproductive to the nation's future needs and to Amtrak's ultimate success.

Best regards,  
Sincerely,

GERALD D. MORGAN,  
Vice President,  
Public and Governmental Affairs.



## ATTACHMENT 2

## BOARDINGS AND DEBARKINGS IN MONTANA, 1972

Months	Boardings and debarkings in Montana			Total on/off for Min- neapolis/ Seattle section	Montana as percent of total on's/off's	Total riders Minne- apolis/ Seattle section
	On <sup>1</sup>	Off	total			
Train No. 7—Empire Builder, westbound:						
January	2,118	1,496	3,614	19,222	18.8	9,611
February	2,116	1,224	3,340	15,428	21.6	7,714
March	1,989	1,591	3,580	18,496	19.5	9,203
April	1,051	887	1,938	12,708	15.3	6,354
May	1,067	1,215	2,282	13,948	16.4	6,974
June	1,599	2,344	3,943	23,816	16.6	11,908
July	1,891	3,185	5,076	28,340	17.9	14,170
August	2,000	2,477	4,477	27,294	16.4	13,647
September	1,122	1,121	2,243	15,216	14.7	7,608
October	1,000	1,091	2,091	14,292	14.6	7,146
November	1,314	1,237	2,551	15,742	16.2	7,871
December	2,092	1,962	4,054	23,760	17.1	11,880
Total for year	19,359	39,89	228,172	17.2	114,086	
Train No. 8—Empire Builder, eastbound:						
January	1,525	2,083	3,608	19,996	18.0	9,998
February	1,242	2,027	3,269	16,222	20.2	8,111
March	1,583	1,934	3,517	19,874	17.7	9,937
April	1,030	1,116	2,146	14,750	14.6	7,375
May	1,504	1,500	3,004	15,996	18.9	7,953
June	1,825	1,748	3,573	23,296	15.3	11,698
July	2,638	1,616	4,254	27,846	15.3	13,293
August	3,106	1,933	5,039	30,804	16.4	15,402
September	1,375	914	2,289	17,278	13.2	8,639
October	1,084	1,048	2,132	15,248	14.0	7,624
November	1,314	1,600	2,914	17,098	15.1	8,549
December	2,850	2,300	4,150	25,952	16.0	12,976
Total for year	20,076	39,555	244,370	16.2	122,185	
Train No. 9—North Coast Hiawatha, westbound:						
January	1,444	1,558	3,002	6,426	46.7	3,213
February	956	892	1,848	4,140	44.6	2,070
March	884	1,003	1,887	4,544	41.5	2,272
April	860	864	1,724	4,180	41.2	2,080
May	914	885	1,799	4,354	41.3	2,177
June	1,096	1,503	2,599	6,906	37.6	3,453
July	1,707	1,986	3,693	10,780	34.3	5,390
August	1,818	1,628	3,446	11,184	30.8	5,592
September	1,204	1,153	2,357	6,418	36.7	3,209
October	1,725	769	2,494	4,304	34.8	2,152
November	833	799	1,632	4,614	35.4	2,307
December	1,505	1,577	3,082	8,518	36.2	4,259
Total for year	13,950	28,567	76,368	37.4	38,184	
Train No. 10—North Coast Hiawatha, eastbound:						
January	1,045	1,039	2,084	5,366	38.8	2,683
February	703	999	1,702	4,342	39.2	2,171
March	853	872	1,725	4,678	36.9	2,339
April	706	723	1,429	3,800	37.6	1,900
May	997	1,041	2,038	4,728	43.1	2,364
June	1,618	1,336	2,954	7,306	40.4	3,653
July	1,650	1,279	2,929	8,036	36.4	4,018
August	2,172	1,595	3,767	9,690	38.9	4,845
September	1,185	1,066	2,251	5,778	40.0	2,889
October	973	901	1,874	4,514	41.5	2,257
November	844	821	1,665	4,132	40.3	2,066
December	1,508	1,387	2,895	6,944	41.7	3,472
Total for year	14,254	27,313	69,314	39.4	34,657	

<sup>1</sup> This column represents Montana ridership as distinct from "Traffic" (on/off) and can be compared directly with total ridership figures in the last column.

## ATTACHMENT 2

## BOARDINGS AND DEBARKINGS IN MONTANA, 1973

Months	Boardings and debarkings in Montana			Total on/off for Min- neapolis/ Seattle section	Montana as percent of total on's/off's	Total riders Minne- apolis/ Seattle section
	On <sup>1</sup>	Off	Total			
Train No. 7—Empire Builder, westbound:						
January	1,503	1,372	2,875	15,504	18.5	7,752
February	1,566	1,172	2,738	13,026	21.0	6,513
March	1,345	1,294	2,639	14,614	18.1	7,307
April	1,254	1,037	2,291	14,026	16.3	7,013
Year to date	5,668		10,543	57,170	18.4	28,585
Train No. 8—Empire Builder, eastbound:						
January	1,284	2,094	3,378	16,832	20.1	8,416
February	1,041	1,592	2,633	13,712	19.2	6,856
March	1,438	1,387	2,825	16,420	17.2	8,210
April	1,181	1,257	2,438	15,404	15.8	7,702
Year to date	4,944		11,274	62,368	18.1	31,264

Months	Boardings and debarkings in Montana			Total on/off for Min- neapolis/ Seattle section	Montana as percent of total on's/off's	Total riders Minne- apolis/ Seattle section
	On <sup>1</sup>	Off	Total			
Train No. 9—North Coast Hiawatha,westbound:						
January	1,797	1,951	3,748	5,140	34.0	2,570
February	635	655	1,290	3,980	32.4	1,990
March	725	775	1,500	3,920	38.3	1,960
April	752	701	1,453	3,954	36.7	1,977
Year to date	2,099		5,991	16,994	35.3	8,497
Train No. 10—North Coast Hiawatha, eastbound:						
January	1,149	829	1,978	4,962	39.9	2,481
February	638	659	1,297	3,314	39.1	1,657
March	814	749	1,563	3,692	42.3	1,846
April	817	795	1,612	4,056	39.7	2,028
Year to date	3,189		6,450	16,024	40.3	8,012

<sup>1</sup> This column represents Montana ridership as distinct from "Traffic" (on/off) and can be compared directly with total ridership figures in the last column.

<sup>2</sup> Detail in the January reports is estimated. The January computer printouts are missing, and a replacement copy has been requested from the Burlington Northern. The figures in the "Total Riders" column are actual, not estimated.

## ATTACHMENT 3

## APRIL 1973: TOTAL BOARDINGS AND DEBARKINGS AT MONTANA STOPS

	Train No. 7, Empire Builder, westbound			Train No. 8, Empire Builder, eastbound			Totals for Empire Builders, eastbound and westbound		
	On	Off	Total	On	Off	Total	On	Off	Total
Wolf Point	118	75	193	92	120	212	210	195	405
Glasgow	130	91	221	99	171	270	229	262	491
Malta	64	38	102	104	80	184	168	118	286
Havre	231	287	518	305	202	507	536	489	1,025
Shelby	101	79	180	101	104	205	202	183	385
Cut Bank	61	58	119	49	98	147	110	156	266
Browning	49	20	69	14	33	47	63	53	116
Glacier Park	11	17	28	34	15	49	45	32	77
Belton	7	13	20	11	0	11	18	13	31
Whitefish	371	304	675	302	347	649	673	651	1,324
Libby	109	55	164	70	87	157	179	142	321
Troy	2	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	2
Total	1,254	1,037	2,291	1,181	1,257	2,438	2,438	2,291	4,729
	Train No. 9, North Coast Hiawatha, Westbound			Train No. 10, North Coast Hiawatha, Eastbound			Totals for North Coast Hiawathas, Eastbound and Westbound		
	On	Off	Total	On	Off	Total	On	Off	Total
Glendive	96	52	148	52	111	163	148	163	311
Miles City	95	31	126	56	80	136	151	111	262
Forsyth	16	37	52	19	21	40	35	58	93
Billings	214	150	364	216	241	457	430	391	821
Livingston	56	38	94	66	69	135	122	107	229
Bozeman	46	101	147	129	38	167	175	139	314
Butte	114	87	201	107	110	217	221	197	418
Deer Lodge	5	6	11	14	21	35	12	20	32
Missoula	95	186	281	151	100	251	246	286	532
Paradise	15	13	28	14	11	25	29	24	53
Total	752	701	1,453	817	795	1,612	1,612	1,453	3,065

Source: National Railroad Passenger Corp., June 26, 1973.