9-27-1974

Conference on Inflation - Washington Hilton Hotel

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches

Recommended Citation
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/1229

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there seems to be a madness throughout the land. We are looking for short answers—quick answers. We think that by doing certain things, we can establish a quick fix to a problem which will take a long time to heal.

I point out, in all candor, that the situation which developed in Cyprus was because of a corrupt, dictatorial government which we supported, on the Greek mainland—the so-called Colonels Clique. Then they ran up against a proposition with which they could not cope. They tried to put in an ex-gangster as the chief of state of what remained of the Republic of Cyprus. It did not work.

In retaliation, the Turks came in. They overreacted, in my opinion, and they took over much of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus and carried their reaction to an extreme.

So I would hope that we would look at the broad picture of what the situation is in the Middle East and in the Aegean.

The adoption of this amendment is not going to force the Turks out of Cyprus, in whole or in part. The adoption of this amendment is going to undermine the efforts of Secretary Kissinger, if he is called upon to do so, to act as a mediator between the Greeks and the Turks.

May I say, parenthetically, that I think the policy followed by this administration in relation to the situation which has developed in Cyprus has been the right one. For once, we did not try to intervene. For once, we did not try to interfere, as we did in Vietnam, as we came pretty close to doing in the Middle East.

We have enough to do to look after our own affairs. It is not up to us to become involved, with our manpower and our treasure—what remains of it—in every conflagration which starts in any place throughout the globe. Maybe we have learned our lesson.

There is a treaty, signed in 1960, and the guarantors of the Republic of Cyprus are the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey—not the United States. If we adopt an amendment aimed directly and specifically at Turkey, what might be the result? For one thing, we might see a tilt on the part of Turkey toward the Soviet Union. They have a thousand-mile frontier, and within that area they have nuclear warheads and U.S. installations—our warheads and our installations.

Up to now, Turkey has maintained a hands-off attitude so far as the Middle East is concerned. But the Turks are a Moslem people. Perhaps there might be a tilt on the part of Turkey toward what we call the Middle East. Perhaps that will have a decided effect, too.

What about NATO? I have wanted to cut down NATO concentrations of U.S. troops and dependent personnel for years. But that does not mean that I do not believe in NATO, because I do. I think it is our first line of defense. But Greece is out of NATO now. Are we going to go ahead and force Turkey out of NATO?

Think about it. Think what it means to this country in our relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and think of what it will mean to Greece. If we are going to bring about a settlement, we have to find some way to get Turkey to withdraw from parts of the Republic of Cyprus. If we think this amendment is going to force the Turks out of Cyprus, we had better take another guess because it will, perhaps.
solidify their position there, and they occupy too much of that island already.

What about Greece? Where is the government of Karamanlis—a good man, a man who never should have been forced out of Greece, a man in whom we have every confidence and whom we support, as do the Greek people, but a man who is beset on the one hand by the right, the old colonels, and their group—they want to come back—and on the left by the far left, the ones who want to go the way of the Communists.

Here we have a man fighting for his existence, and what we are doing if we pass this resolution is weakening the position of Karamanlis. I do not care how many telegrams we get from organizations in this country asking us to vote for the Eagleton amendment. What I am telling you is the fact, and what I want to do is help the Karamanlis government. What I want to do is see it remain in power.

I do not want the right to come in again—the dictators, the colonels, the people who never think of people; and I do not want the left to come in again, either, because it was the left which caused this country to inaugurate the Greek-Turkish assistance program in 1948.

So my advice, my fellow Senators, is if we have the welfare of Greece at heart, we will support the administration in the position of Kissinger, who is trying to undertake a procedure which will benefit Greece in the long run; which will bring about a withdrawal, at least partial, of the Turkish forces from Cyprus; which will give some sustenance, some substance, and some strength to Karamanlis, who faces elections, I believe, around October 10.

Do we want to strengthen his hand in his own country, or do we want to weaken it?

Do we want to allow the situation which has developed to continue, with the Turks occupying the greater portion of the Isle of Cyprus? Or do we want something done to get the Turks to withdraw, to give the Cypriots, both Greek and Turkish, a chance to settle their own affairs?

This has been a horrible mess, but this is a time, I think, for statesmanship—not that I am exhibiting any—so that people downtown, Mr. Kissinger and others, can do something to bring about a rectification of the difficult situation, with bad blood on both sides, to the end that Cyprus will once again be reborn as a republic; so that Karamanlis can be retained in office; and so that Greece can achieve some of what it has lost—not through its own fault, not through the fault of Karamanlis or the people of Greece but through the fault of the dictatorial colonels' clique, which thought it could do anything and get away with it, unfortunately all too often with the support of the United States.

I hope we shall look at reality. I hope this amendment will be defeated, and I hope that out of it will come a triumphant Greece, a democratic Greece, and that we shall continue to have a man like Karamanlis—a man of great integrity, great ability, great understanding,