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REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

BEFORE

PACEM IN TERRIS IV

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1975

THE SHERATON-PARK HOTEL

WASHINGTON, D. C.

2:00 P. M.

Foreign Policy will be an issue in the 1976 campaign. Barring the unexpected, however, it will be only an issue, not the issue. The emphasis in the coming campaign will be on affairs within the nation. In particular, it will be on the state of the nation's economy. Notwithstanding the effort to talk away our economic difficulties, there has yet to be a recovery from the worst recession in forty years. At best, we have managed only to hold on by fingertips; only a marginal momentum has been generated for recovery. The failure to face up to the nation's economic problems is to be seen in the continued high unemployment and inflation. Deeper consequences are visible in a general public disquiet and disaffection with government. Still deeper, in the bedrock of the nation, are the dangerous fissures of social division.

That is hardly a basis on which to build a national contribution to Pacem in Terris. So, I reiterate, the prime issue in the coming election will be a meandering economy. Unless we put a stop to the present drift and begin, also, to look with some coordinated foresight to the looming economic problems which are only a few years away, the international role of this nation for the

next decade will be, at most, an indifferent one. Indeed, it could even become negative, insofar as contributing to international peace and stability is concerned.

As for foreign affairs, what is likely to be of major consideration in the next election will be the drain of outdated policies as ^acontributing factor in the decline of the economy. Unlike earlier years when money was spent for activities abroad as though the nation had it to burn, every dollar that now goes into anachronistic policies and the military structure to support them is coming, not out of an affluent economy; it is coming out of the hides of the people. It is coming from those millions of Americans without tax havens and with no ways to hedge the inflation. Dated foreign policies are a double burden on an already overburdened segment of the populace.

Expenditures in the name of foreign policy or defense, even valid expenditures, require taxes and contribute to the pressure for inflation. If such expenditures are in excess of contemporary needs, they strain the economy unnecessarily and, in the end, do harm to the structure of the nation.

Take for example, the policy of stationing troops in all parts of the globe. Whatever relevance such policies may have had in the immediate post-World War II period, it does not follow that they are still relevant three decades later. Nor does it mean that the nation's defense will collapse if we alter these deployments, scale them down or even in some cases cut them out entirely. Over half-a-million soldiers were returned from Viet Nam without endangering the national security. There are other areas where similar adjustments, far less drastic to be sure, seem to me to be entirely possible and very desirable.

The world changes. We have to change with it. But the wheels of government, regrettably, tend to remain in ruts, especially in regard to national security affairs. The lesson of Viet Nam, for example, has yet to be learned. Even now an effort is being made to maintain a military position on the Southeast Asian mainland. The Executive Branch beseeches the Thai government to permit us to keep at least a shadow of our former presence in that nation. What for? A toehold in Thailand will cost the nation millions of dollars--that much is clear. But into what grand design for national security and peace do we fit a few thousand American servicemen and a scattering of moth-balled military bases in Thailand? Similarly, there is great reluctance in the government to recognize that over a period of time, there has to be a reduction of U. S. forces in Korea and in Japan.

The emphasis of policy in Asia, in short, is as it has been for the past quarter of a century or more. It remains an emphasis on the United States as a "military defender." There is, to be sure, a military role for the United States to play in the Western Pacific. In any integrated concept of a durable peace in that region, however, the accent should have long since shifted to multilateral diplomacy and on how to sustain an expansion of commerce and other mutually beneficial relationships. In such a concept, too, I should think that we would have already moved to try to establish regular diplomatic relations with the present governments in Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos as a contribution to stabilizing the situation in Asia.

That course would also be the best way to permit a final resolution of doubts concerning the still missing in action as a result of the Indochina war. It is not a sufficient answer to the question of their fate to proclaim

over and over again our national concern or to memorialize our sympathy. Nor is there any real contribution to the peace of mind of the families of the still missing in demanding with words what cannot be obtained in the absence of diplomatic contact. That course, in my judgment, borders on making a political mockery of human heartaches.

It is time to get final answers on the MIA's. It is time to find out what can be found out and then to let the dead rest in peace. It is reprehensible in the extreme to treat the war casualties of this nation as "bargaining chips" of diplomacy or the pawns of politics.

In any design for durable peace, it is also time to drop the approach which led us into the ^{tragic} misadventure in Indochina and into two decades of alienation as regards the people of China. It is time to discard the assumption that this nation's power is such as to be able to control the flow of events on the Asian mainland. Viet Nam should have made clear that our ability even to exercise a rational influence on the affairs of that continent is limited. Underscoring the point are the wasted years and the squandered resources in dealing with China on the basis of the long-distance hostility of cold war.

The United States is, in my judgment, not an Asian power but a major Pacific nation. The difference is more than semantic. It is the difference between a sensible acceptance of the realities of Asia and the dangerous illusions of military omnipotence. It is the difference between what this nation can reasonably do for peace and freedom and the serious damage which it does to itself when it presumes to do more.

The outer limits of our unilateral and bilateral defense in the Pacific, in my judgment, are the Aleutians, Japan and the Philippines. Beyond that, insofar as this nation is concerned, the enhancement of the nation's

security is properly sought in developing multilateral relationships of peace and in strengthening bilateral relationships with Asian governments, preferably those strongly rooted in their own people. In short, the projections of the military defense of the Western approaches to the United States should be confined to the Pacific Ocean. We ought not, as we have done, presume to extend them on to the Asian mainland.

Nor, in the name of defense, should we pursue a course which leads us militarily into a third ocean, the Indian Ocean, and its adjacent lands. The first step in that direction, I regret to say, has been taken by the back-door acquisition of Diego Garcia through questionable leasing practices. The development of that base is probably the opening gun in a campaign to build an Indian Ocean fleet. What for? What interests of the people of this nation are involved that they should be called on to pay for a third-ocean navy? In truth, we have neither the manpower nor the resources to engage in an arms buildup in the Indian Ocean, without massive increases in Federal expenditures. If the Diego Garcia boondoggle materializes, what we will have gained, in my judgment, is not greater security for this nation but a further weakening of our capacity to meet the real needs of the American people. We will have established the nucleus of another massive burden of taxes and inflation.

One hopeful sign in this situation is that the Senate on its own responsibility and the House in conference with the Senate, directed that appropriations for fiscal '76, except for a \$250,000 safeguard--on the airfield at Diego Garcia--be held off until April 1. During that period, the President has been asked to try to negotiate a settlement with the Soviet Union which could preclude both powers from establishing bases in the Indian Ocean. That is not much because if we are determined to waste our substance, I expect that

the Russians are not going to help us to save it. At least, however, the measure does permit a brief period to stop, look and listen before we proceed further along this course.

On the other side of the globe, we have in excess of 500,000 military personnel and dependents in Western Europe, thirty years after the end of the Second World War. It is probably the most costly single expenditure for a non-productive purpose in the Federal budget. This anacronistic deployment is a relic of World War II and the early years of the Cold War. Whatever relevance it may have once had to the nation's security has all but disappeared. Even as an interim measure, the U. S. military deployment in Europe has little significance in its present form, to the search for a durable peace in Europe. Much less does it relate to the actual defense of that continent against an invasion from the East. Nevertheless, the drain on U. S. military manpower and U. S. dollars is unabated. I can only reiterate what I have said many times over the past dozen years or more: The deployment can and should be cut substantially and unilaterally in line with the interests of the United States. It will not weaken our defense, in my judgment; rather, it will strengthen the nation by lightening the burden on the economy.

As of last July, including this European deployment, we had a total of 518,000 military personnel overseas. In addition, 37,000 U. S. citizens and in the neighborhood of 150,000 foreign nationals were engaged as civilian employees in support of these forces. Finally, 370,000 dependents of U. S. servicemen were overseas to accompany them. The total is 1,060,000 people, in one form or another stationed abroad, paid for by U. S. tax-payers, for what are termed "defense purposes." Not even mentioned are bargain-basement sales or gifts of military equipment to other nations also, presumably, for U. S. defense or foreign policy purposes. The subsidized cost of these activities, too, is borne by the people of the nation.

If, as the Executive Branch contends, the role of world policeman for this nation has been rejected, then where is the pattern in this vast military commitment abroad? The fact is that there is no pattern. What this nation has abroad, supports abroad and promotes abroad, is a composite put together out of carry-overs of World War II, the Korean War and the Southeast Asian misadventure. Add to this motley collection, a host of random undertakings over a period of several decades often for purposes long since forgotten. Add to it, finally, military aid to dozens of countries and vigorous arms merchandising by the Defense Department in the manner of some latter-day Sir Basil Zaharoff. Who is trying to sort out this immense, disparate and costly conglomerate? Where is the effort being made to separate the wheat from the chaff? The wasteful from the necessary? Where are the up-to-date integrated strategic concepts into which to fit specific U. S. defense activities abroad? The answers to these questions have yet to be supplied. They must be forthcoming. They are, in my judgment, an absolute requisite both for the restoration of the U. S. economy and for an effective U. S. contribution to peace on earth in the years ahead.



Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 94th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

Vol. 121

WASHINGTON, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1975

No. 179

House of Representatives

The House was not in session today. Its next meeting will be held on Monday, December 8, 1975, at 12 o'clock noon.

Senate

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1975

(Legislative day of Tuesday, December 2, 1975)

REMARKS OF SENATOR MANSFIELD BEFORE PACEM IN TERRIS IV

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that remarks I made before Pacem in Terris IV on yesterday be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD

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