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SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD

THE COMING CRISIS IN GERMANY

ILLNESS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, before I proceed to the remarks which I intend to make on the German situation, I wish to say that I am deeply distressed by the news of the illness of the Secretary of State.

The duties of the Secretary of State are just about the most exacting and strenuous in the Government, not excluding the Presidency. The intellectual demands of the job are enormous. The physical demands are appalling. For years, Secretary Dulles has borne up under them without complaint. His stamina and durability have been little short of incredible. However, in the Secretary, as in other men, there is a physical limit. His total personal dedication to the service of the Nation has taken its toll of his health. As one doctor put it, the Secretary is worn out. It is a shame, Mr. President, that the Nation has required so much of one man. And it is to the Nation’s detriment, moreover, that he has had to push himself beyond the limit.

We can ill afford to lose his services at any time. We can spare them least at this moment. Secretary Dulles is needed as never before to complete the very delicate negotiations on Berlin and Germany which he had just begun so suspiciously.

Mr. Dulles has capable associates in the Department of State. With all due respect to them, however, the Secretary will be sorely missed in the weeks ahead. The Nation needs his great experience, his balance, his strength, his ability to decide.

I share with the President and the Nation the feeling of distress which the Secretary’s illness brings. I know the Senate joins with me in wishing Mr. Dulles a full recovery and a prompt return to his key role in the search for a secure peace.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I endorse everything that has been said by the distinguished Senator from Montana concerning the illness of Secretary of State Dulles and the work which he has been doing. I have often marveled, as I am certain many other persons have, at his stamina. I recall reading in the press recently that during the time Mr. Dulles has been Secretary of State, he has traveled more than 500,000 miles. He has made many long journeys, and often after his return, perhaps within a day or two, he would be off on another long trip.

I first knew Mr. Dulles when he served for a short time in the United States Senate. But I came to know him better when I served with him in the United Nations as a delegate in 1950 and, subsequent to that time, for the ensuing 12 months.

On September 8, 1950, at about 12 o’clock noon, President Truman called Mr. Dulles to the White House. Mr. Dulles at that time was an assistant in the Department of State under the then Secretary of State Acheson. President Truman asked Mr. Dulles on that day if he would be willing to assume the responsibility of formulating the Japanese Peace Treaty, and in getting the two score or more nations which would be parties to the conference to agree to its general terms.

If an assignment can be imagined which was more difficult and more complex than that of bringing together some 40 nations of the world which were greatly concerned about the terms of the Japanese peace treaty, I cannot conceive of it. But Mr. Dulles undertook to do the job. Mr. Dulles told me later that President Truman asked him at the time how long it would take. Mr. Dulles replied that he thought it would take a year. Mr. Truman then said, “I will give you one year in which to finish the job.”

At that time I was the chairman of the Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. I became a member of the committee in January 1951. Naturally, I had a close relationship with Mr. Dulles in his work during the entire year 1951. I was, in conference frequently with him, because this was a Far Eastern question. The subcommittee and our assistants met...
with Mr. Dulles at all times of the day, sometimes in the morning, sometimes at lunch, sometimes at evening. I feel quite certain that during the time the treaty was being formulated, the Subcommittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and his associates had probably 100 different meetings. I have often said it was one of the most remarkable jobs I ever saw any man perform. It was not easy to bring together the British, on one hand, and the Nationalist Chinese, on the other. It was not easy to bring together the Southeast Asia nations and the central European nations. But gradually Mr. Dulles wove a plan under which all nations were at least willing to attend a conference.

The conference was held in the San Francisco Opera House on September 8, 1951. Just before we left the Opera House, I said to Mr. Dulles, "This is the anniversary of this day in 1940, that it was at 12 o'clock noon. I looked at my watch, and, making allowance for the time between Washington and California, I said to him, "You have 8 minutes to spare." In other words, the time lacked 8 minutes being very early in the morning, the time Mr. Dulles had undertaken to do the work.

Following the conference, former Senator Smith, of New Jersey; Mr. Dulles, acting for Mr. Truman and Secretary of State Acheson; and I visited a number of the Far Eastern countries. We spent several weeks in Japan, working with the different groups there in arriving at understandings, as best we could, and working on the rather difficult problem involving Nationalist China, particularly, and the whole China problem, as well.

It was then that I came to admire Mr. Dulles. I admired his tenacity, his power of intellect, and his skill in negotiating. One of the great services he has performed as Secretary of State has been in the field of negotiating between nations which had differences and problems which were most difficult to solve. I think this judgment was expressed by my good friend, the Senator from Montana, to the need for Mr. Dulles. The most difficult part of the problem about which the Senator from Montana will speak to us today, I am delighted to know that since Mr. Dulles' physical condition is such that his doctors advise him of leaving and entering a hospital, he has acted on that advice. I hope he will remain away from his work for as much time as will be necessary to result in a complete and permanent recovery of his health, which I am confident will take place, because I know something of the physicians.

I wish him a speedy recovery and a return to his position as Secretary of State, just as soon as he is able to do so. I am sure that his influence will be felt in the negotiations in the various conferences which will be held in the future. In his capacity as Assistant Secretary of State and his position in the Department of State who have worked with him for so long and so well will be able to carry on. I am sure they will support Mr. Dulles, and that his negotiating ability will be felt in the conferences, and continue to be helpful even in his absence.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senate yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. I have been very happy to hear the expressions of good will toward Secretary Dulles which have been spoken today. I wish to join in them. I have been a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations only 4 years, and have not been so closely associated with the work of Mr. Dulles as has the Senator from Alabama (Mr. Sparkman), for instance, who has just concluded his very fine statement.

I think few men in public life have given so much of their time during so many years of their lives to the formulation and administration of foreign policy as has Secretary Dulles. I know the Nation is grateful to him for his accomplishments. I know ours is a bipartisan friendship, also, as the Senator from Alabama has well expressed.

I do not suppose that all of Mr. Dulles' plans have materialized as he hoped they would, but I recall that he has been serving as Secretary of State and as adviser to the Secretary of State during one of the most critical periods of history, and many of the most difficult problems the world has faced have come before him. We have seen the solution of some situations which were considered virtually insoluble—for instance, the situation in Trieste. I know we are all happy to learn that there are prospects of permanent peace and harmony in the Island of Cyprus, that the Turks and the Greeks have come to an agreement.

I believe the whole world owes a considerable debt to Mr. Dulles. I wish to join my colleagues in hoping that Mr. Dulles will have a speedy recovery, following his trip to the hospital, and soon will again be back at work. Even though everything may not have gone as he hoped it would, yet I know of no one who could have achieved a larger percentage of success than he has over these troublesome years.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator from Vermont.

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Montana yield to me?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Montana yield to the Senator from Kansas?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. CARLSON. I appreciate very much the opportunity to associate myself with the remarks of the acting majority leader (Mr. Mansfield), the Senator from Alabama (Mr. Sparkman), and the Senator from Vermont (Mr. Aiken) in regard to the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles.

It seems to me that at this time, which seems to be the greatest international crisis, our Nation and the other nations of the world can ill afford to spare the services of this most able man.

Secretary Dulles has demonstrated not only his ability, but, it seems to me, a peculiar temperament for working in this field. I think he gets that temperament and that background from being a great Christian scientist, a man who is fearless in his thoughts and his approach to the solution of the problems.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senate yield?

Mr. Aiken. Mr. President, will the Senate yield?

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the Record, as a part of my remarks, a radio commentary by Senator Hiram W. Plaza, S.C., No. 10, 1959, the evening of the announcement of the leave of absence for the Secretary of State.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

This is Jack Jury with the WTOP comment for tonight.

The newest illness of Secretary of State Dulles, which caused us all to join President Eisenhower in extending best wishes to this dedicated official who, however much one may disagree with his policies, has worked so tirelessly on behalf of the United States. We long ago lost track of the total mileage logged by Mr. Dulles in his perilous quest for peace, or the number of stops he has made, or the number of officials to whom he has talked in virtually all quarters of the globe.

But we do know this: That John Foster Dulles since 1943 has expended his energies and health at a reckless rate, at a time of life when most of us would be resigned to sitting down with pipe and slippers, especially since his operation for cancer, he has dispensed with an uncomplaining silence.

This newsman recalls particularly that after his next-to-last illness, a bout with diverticulitis, Mr. Dulles turned on redoubled energy, held a news conference, for not having reporters for a period of several weeks. Such an apology was not only unusual in an administration which sometimes seems to take a lackadaisical attitude toward news- men, but was expressive of the inner stuff of this unusually gifted man. In many respects he was far better liked by newsmen than some of his critics would have us believe.

Speaking of critics, it seems an appropriate time to mention that many Americans may not comprehend what has happened in the last decade to the office which Mr. Dulles holds.

For well over a century and a half, a Secretary of State was, the Cabinet official, subject only to comparatively minor influence in the formulation of U. S. foreign policy. The United States considered itself and, was, for the most part, a remote island in the vast sea of international trouble. In the occasional period when the Nation was confronted with brutal war, it was the President himself who bore the brunt: Jefferson, Madison, Lincoln, Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt.
THE COMING CRISIS IN GERMANY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I am delighted to yield to my distinguished friend from Idaho.

Mr. CHURCH. I wish to apologize for interrupting so soon the remarks of the Senator from Montana, because I believe that the attitude of the President of the United States toward the Senate on the subject of Germany has been and always will be most significant.

I wish to say that, as a Senator from Montana, I have the honor of my State to the President of the United States.

I wish to thank the Senator from Montana for coming forward at this stage in the developing Berlin crisis with a speech which will be helpful in giving guidance to all of us, to the President, and to the Secretary of State, in our common effort to meet the challenge of the new Germany.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank you for your kind remarks.

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Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank you for your kind remarks.
That is water under the bridge. We did not choose to act in a positive fashion, but rather that the Russians have chosen to break it. They have chosen to make the break at Berlin. This effect, that after the spring of 1959, the situation will no longer be as it has been in that city. They are quite right, Mr. President. Things will no longer be the same in Berlin or anywhere in Germany. If there is any certainty, it is that the situation in Germany at the close of 1959 will be far different from the present situation. We are approaching the beginning of the end, the beginning of the end of two Berlin and of two Germany.

The question, as I have already observed, was never, Would Germany be unified? It was, When and how would Germany be unified? We may now have begun to comprehend the when; the actual process of unification is likely to begin this year. Only one question remains: How is Germany to be unified? Will it be by conflict, by negotiation, or by some other process? And the question which is impelling us and the rest of the world toward the coming crisis in Germany.

CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE GERMAN CRISIS

The responsibility for establishing high policies to deal with the impending crisis, the coming change in Germany, rests with the President and his Secretary of State. Let there be no doubt on that score. In this body, at home, in the executive branch, or abroad. It is not for the Senate to direct the President in this matter. The President will have to make his own decisions, with the assistance of the vast resources of the executive branch. When he speaks officially on Germany, however, he will be speaking for all of us, whether or not we agree with what he says. There is no other way under the constitutional system of the United States.

To say that is not to constrain upon the Senate a silence in these matters. On the contrary, since we shall be bound, since the people of the United States shall be bound, by what the President and the Secretary of State do or say, the Senate has a duty to speak. To do in the coming crisis, the obligation of the Senate to debate, to discuss, and to advise is compelling.

The Senate of the 86th Congress was not constituted so that it might ignore pressing domestic questions. How much less then, can we remain silent on the life-and-death matters of foreign policy? The President and the Secretary of State have given no indication that they would have this body turn its back on the crisis in Germany. On the contrary, I note that the Secretary of State has already sought the counsel of the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations (Mr. Paul). I commend it to his initiative. Nor is the brilliant chairman of the committee has much to contribute to the development of this situation in Germany.

If the Senate is to meet its responsibilities, Mr. President, we must face, through debate and discussion, an understanding of what is going on, and how it is evolving in Germany. We must also discern clearly the stakes of the people of the United States and of freedom in that situation. And we must formulate, finally, ideas for consideration in formulating the foreign policies which are to safeguard the vital interests of our people.

These are the thoughts which have led me to these remarks on the coming crisis in Germany. I make them in the spirit of responsible Democratic cooperation with a Republican administration in a matter of vital concern to all the people of the United States.

TWO GERMAN AUTHORITIES IN ONE GERMAN

Let me begin by exploring the significant realities in Germany, as I see them.

The basic reality, Mr. President, is that there are two political authorities in one Germany. That is a contradiction which cannot and will not stand. There is one Germany. And there are compelling historic and practical reasons which require that the unity of that nation begin to emerge without delay if there is to be peace in Europe and in the world.

I stress the point, Mr. President, that when we speak of the two Germans we are really speaking not of two nations but of two political authorities. Each of these authorities presumes that it is the wave of the future in all Germany. Each seeks to draw a circle of the German people into its orbit.

To be sure, there are profound differences between the West German government in Bonn and the East German Communist regime in Pankow. The Bonn government is based upon principles and practices of democracy which are consonant with those of other Western nations and are expressly supported by the United States. The Pankow regime exists by the methods of authoritarianism which come from the East. Its source of authority lies in the will to hold on to, and wield the authority and the acquiescence—however hollow—of the repressed people of East Germany. It depends, for a far greater degree than anything we know in the Western democracies, on military and police power—its own and the Soviet military.

The West German democratic government exists. It is there, at Bonn, and the Communist regime is not going to wish it away or subvert it away. It is going to stay as long as the people in that zone sustain it and as long as the Western nations remain committed to its protection against military aggression from the East. We cannot ignore the facts; however, that the East German regime also exists. It is there at Pankow, and German communists run it, even though Russians may pull the strings from behind the curtain. Un fortunately, I see no evidence that the Western nations are going to wish away or subvert away that East German political authority in the practicable future.

If neither side can be wished away, or subverted away, how is the division of Germany going to be made to disappear? How is a unified Germany, this essential Germany, this inevitable Germany, to come into being? There was a time, perhaps, when it might have been reasonable to hope that the Russians and German Communists would soon find it too costly to maintain their control in East Germany. For years we have waited for this promised development. We have waited for the question of the division and their camp followers to fold their tents and steal away.

What we must ask ourselves now is whether there is any reasonable hope that this development will come about in the practicable future? I regret to say that such public indications as there are suggest that the Pankow regime, with Soviet support, is consolidating in position, that the authoritative hold on East Germany is, if anything, more secure today than it was a few years ago.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. LAUSCHE. With respect to the last thesis which is now being put forward by Senator Mansfield, have you been able to ascertain whether the Democrats in the Senate of the 86th Congress have stated that the authoritarian hold on East Germany is now greater than it was before? Will the Senator deal a little more directly with that, and state whether the hold is the result of the power of the Communists, or whether it is the result of the fact that they are held by the Communists?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I should be delighted to try to answer my distinguished friend from Ohio. I can say, of course, without equivocation that the present status is not the desire or the will of the people. The source of my statement is the U.S. News & World Report, the issue of February 13, 1959.

I read from page 67, at the bottom:

"East Germany's Communist government has just published official figures on its planned expenditures for 1959."

Before I read further I wish to say that all the information I have in my presentation has appeared in the public print. There is nothing secret or official about what I am saying, and it simply represents my opinion as to what I think is the most difficult and dangerous question of today.

I continue with the quotation from the U.S. News & World Report:

"West German financial experts, looking into the Reds' figures, in the budget and out of it, made a startling discovery. Military spending by the East German Reds in 1959 is to be 30 percent higher than military spending planned by West Germany. Yet the Reds say that West Germany is threatening the peace of the world.

"That is what I mean when I say that the Pankow regime is more secure, not in a political sense but in a military sense. They have been strengthening themselves on a military and partly on a military basis. Of course, the 22 to 28 Soviet divisions are still in East Germany."

Mr. LAUSCHE. I agree with the Senator. My inclination would be to believe that the people of East Germany, if they had the opportunity, would unshackle themselves from the hold which the Soviet has upon them.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is absolutely correct. I have been told that the figure would run as high as 65 to 69 percent. This is the status of the East Germans who, if
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I wish the Senator from Montana to give in a little greater detail the element of legalism being introduced. I have my own understanding of the proposition that there are certain legal obligations rooted in agreements which we have made in the past. I think we are advocating the proposition that there are other obligations. Does the Senator mind discussing that question?

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator from Ohio is correct. References have been made to the agreement entered into by Gen. Lucius Clay, at my command, of some of our forces in Germany, with the Soviet authorities, by means of which we were guarantied some authorities access by rail, by road, and by air, from the western zones in Germany into the western sectors of Berlin.

Then, Mr. President, and I believe the Senator will corroborate me on this—some sort of agreement was made by Mr. Phillip Jessup, the Russian representative whose name I cannot recall at the moment, which agreement Mayor Willy Brandt brought to our attention at the luncheon held in the Foreign Relations committee room the other day. If I remember correctly, he stated that in making our demands we insist upon adherence to those obligations. Mr. President, I think we are to see our way through this pending crisis.

Mr. LAUSCHE. It is the East Berlin. It Is a slogan, not a policy. Nor is it enough, Mr. President, to stand fast in Berlin. But the fact is, Mr. President, that to stand firm in Berlin, but I doubt very much that the people of the United States will countenance any sacrifice of a single human life for the purpose of propagandistic demonstrations in Berlin. And before this year is out many lives may have been spent in furthering this purpose.

No, Mr. President, it is not for reasons of legalism or propaganda that we stand fast in Berlin. It belongs neither to East Germany nor West Germany. It belongs to the whole German people. We are in Berlin to see to it that when that city is once again the capital of all Germans, as it surely will be, the concept of freedom in peace will not be absent from the scene. If that concept were to disappear from Berlin, the citadel of German nationalism in order to get out, it would disappear from all Germany. Then, sooner or later, the torch would be lit in Berlin. We are in Berlin to see to it that that city is once again the capital of all Germans, as it surely will be, the concept of freedom in peace will not be absent from the scene.

It belongs neither to East Germany nor West Germany. It belongs to the whole German people.
fast in Berlin. I question, however, the adequacy with which we have related that position to the changing situation in Germany. I question a policy which provides for a standstill in Berlin, but also implies or demands that the Russians stand fast. After years of trying to get the world out of the numeorus places into which they swelled after World War II, it is indeed strange to hear that we are insisting that the Russians must not, indeed, cannot, leave Berlin. That is a most peculiar position to say the least; and the Russians obviously have no intention of obliging us by remaining.

It is clear what is at stake there. In a few months hence, the Russians will leave East Berlin despite our demands or urgings to the contrary. East Berlin will then be, once again, a German city—Communist, to be sure—but nevertheless German. By contrast, West Berlin will retain the appearance it now has, the appearance of a Western enclave in the heart of Germany, for there are thousands of Allied officials and military personnel in the area. The contrast will not be in line with German nationalism in East or West Germany.

Further, Mr. President, if we are to hold the Luftbrucke, we will be at the suffering of the East German Communist authorities. If they do not choose to accommodate us, then we shall in all probability have to retreat through to Berlin, not against Russians, but against Germans. Even if this conflict should not lead to a great conflict, the repercussions in Germany will be profound. Among Germans, as among others, blood may prove thicker than ideology.

As I said, there can be no quarrel with the need to stand fast in Berlin. I do question, however, a policy which does not anticipate the developments which I have just outlined and fails to take steps to mitigate them.

Is that the kind of policy which presumes as our policy does that the Great Powers of World War II—the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United States—can bring about German unification. There may have been a time when such a course was possible. If it ever existed, however, it was years ago when Germany lay devastated and prostrate. It was years ago. In the freshness of the common sacrifices of World War II and in the measure of mutual respect and tolerance which these sacrifices engendered. Those years are gone. The time is not today. Today, there is little respect between this Nation and the Soviet Union except the fearful respect which the military power of the one may generate in the other. Today, Germany is neither devastated nor prostrate; it has become one of the most dynamic nations in Western Europe.

No, Mr. President, the erstwhile Allies, the divided Allies of World War II, are not in a position to order a unification in peace for a revived Germany. At most, they may be able to contribute to this end, but the whole problem of Germany’s security needs in anticipation of its inevitable development. At most, they may be able to contribute to unification by exercising such influence as they may possess to encourage the Germans themselves to reach a reasonable procedure on unification and by sanctioning that procedure. But, the Russians, themselves, however, who will make the decisive decisions on unification, if this question is to be settled in the indefinite future, of achieving any degree of success. Therefore we should try to work out other means.

As I shall indicate in the course of my speech, there are contacts in existence between the East German Government and the West German Government. These contacts are made on an international basis, and are tied up with commercial intercourse and trade commitments. I would hope that in considering the idea of elections, we might be able to explore, perhaps, ideas other than all-German elections, even though they are the most desirable, and I should like to see them come to pass, and we might try to break the deadlock. The sooner the better—so that the East Germans could express themselves at the polls, perhaps just as the other, East Germans, and declare to the world where they want to go. In that way they might get out from under the yoke of the Uribrecht government, which is ineffective and incomplete and complete control over 17 million Germans in East Germany.

Mr. LAUSCHE. The Senator from Montana clarifies my mind on the subject. In other words, all of us want a free election under which the people themselves would decide the type of government they desire to have.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Absolutely.

Mr. LAUSCHE. How every effort in that direction has been rebuffed, and it is therefore necessary to find other means of trying to reach an agreement.

Mr. MANEVELD. That is the idea. The Senator is correct. Every effort to achieve an all-German election has failed because of the insistence on a dogmatic “no” of the Soviet Union.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Do I understand correctly the position of the Senator from Montana to be that, while he adheres to what we have advocated so long, that is, free elections for all of Germany, and the idea of a unified Germany, he recognizes the very practical difficulty of having that under present conditions? Therefore he says that perhaps we ought to make ourselves more flexible and start exploring some other way, and that there might be held a separate election in East Germany and in separate election in West Germany, and thus perhaps there could be agreement upon some kind of independent government in each of these areas, with the idea that eventually, as we grow, because blood is thicker than water, with the two temporary Germanies would combine themselves into one overall, united Germany some time in the future, even though we do not how far in the future.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The purpose of my speech today is to suggest, respectfully and constructively, some possible alterna-
Mr. MANSFIELD. I should like to propose to the Senator from Montana. He spoke about the rigidity of our position in the past. Undoubtedly it has been rather rigid. So rigid that perhaps our country, as well as a great part of the world, was rather shocked recently when Secretary Dulles suggested there might be more flexibility than we have given to the idea, and when he suggested there might be methods other than free elections for the solution of the problem. It is not true, and would not the Senator agree with me in this, that perhaps we have oversimplified the matter in assuming that a reunification could be easily brought about between the two Germans?

I may say that about 3 years ago I had the pleasure of attending an international conference at Garmisch in Germany. The conference was made up of representatives of the NATO countries, representatives of governments, officials, business people, economists, members of Parliaments, and so on, and one of the German Ministers with whom I had quite a long talk made the point to me, the first time I had ever heard it mentioned, that reunification is not a simple matter. As has been pointed out by the Senator from Montana, it might have been a comparatively simple matter several years ago, right after the war. But since that time the two Germans have grown away from the condition which the Senator has so well described in his speech. They have grown away from some of the incentives which might have pushed them together.

Furthermore, different enactments have taken place. For instance, the Minister of the Bonn government said to me, 'It is a sound strange thing coming from me, but East Germany has a social security system which in many respects is better than ours.'

Mr. MANSFIELD. It also antedates our own.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes. Although I was speaking of the social security of West Germany, it is also true that theirs antedates ours, too.

East Germany has a system which is in many respects better than that in West Germany, so the East Germans could not be asked to give up their system of social security, workers' compensation, and land reform.

The Senator from Montana, I believe, heard me ask the mayor of West Berlin, the other day that very question, and he heard the mayor's comments, to the effect that he would bring the two Germans together, whenever it may be done, will necessitate the resolving of differences and the making of allowances between the two governments. As I understand, that is exactly what the Senator is talking about. He is speaking of the necessity of those concerned to be ready to consider and to negotiate with reference to all the changes which have taken place throughout the years.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I think the Senator from Montana is exactly correct. Certainly we should be exploring all the alternatives. I think the Senator will agree with me that we ought not simply, easily, and quickly reject any proposal which is made, but we should be willing to let the world know that we are willing to sit down and negotiate concerning any proposal which may come from either side.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes. I hope both the Soviet Union and the United States will get away from the automatic rejection of the proposals which one country makes to the other. Usually the answer is an automatic, 'No.' In the case of the proposal which the Senator has mentioned, it is occasionally a 'Yes' which would be useful. I think in that way we may begin, at least on the marginal level, to do away with some of the differences. If we can do that, perhaps we can work our way upward to an eventual solution of the bigger problems.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. LAUSCHE. The other day, in the talk with the mayor of West Berlin, I was greatly encouraged by his reasonableness in wanting to explore every avenue which might lead us out of darkness into an assured peace for those people. May I ask the Senator from Montana if he has given any consideration to the suggestion that, if the Soviet Union, after it has once withdrawn its troops, to jump in again because of their closeness to this area of East Berlin?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I have, indeed. If the Senator will bear with me, I shall discuss this matter when I come to the ninth point in my recommendation.
shchev's comments on a thaw in the cold war and the need to prepare for a setting for successful negotiations. They may be meant simply to confuse or beague.

If they do confuse, if they do beguile, however, we shall have no one to blame but ourselves. We ought to be able by this time after years of self-inflicted quiescence to distinguish between the conciliatory gesture and the act of conciliation. Those of us who come from the cold country have learned through bitter experience that winter thaws can be followed by summer frosts. The prospect of spring in East Germany is not the same as the coming of spring in May.

There is, as I say, no way of knowing with certainty what some particular Soviet gesture or other signifies. What we can know, Mr. President, is that they are all, good or bad, peripheral to the crisis which is coming in Germany. Mr. Mikoyan's visit is not going to free us from that crisis. Mr. Khrushchev's thaws will not do it. Increased Soviet-American trade will not do it.

If we are to be prepared to face this crisis in Germany it will be best not to become distracted or obsessed by the twin problems of Soviet behavior. It will be best to keep our eyes on Germany. The fundamental question of policy for us is not so much what the Russians are looking for but what they are looking at. We know that they are looking for; and they may very well seize it while we amuse or fascinate ourselves by trying to interpret the charades of Russian behavior.

No, Mr. President; more important; far more important, to us is to know what we are seeking in East Germany. We must bring to this crisis not only courage, but also conviction. We must bring to it a positive and understandable policy which meets our essential national needs and the essential needs of freedom.

The Essentials of a Western Policy in the Crisis

As I noted earlier in my remarks, it is not for the Senate to direct the President and the Secretary of State in the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States. It is a responsibility of Senators to try to contribute constructively—and I wish to repeat the word “constructively” to the policies which govern those relations. It is in that sense, Mr. President, that I seek, in these final comments, to express the thoughts which this exploration suggests—thoughts on the essentials of a sound Western policy for the coming crisis in Germany. I have no crystal ball. I have no secret information. I have not been coached by anyone, nor have I been asked by anyone to deliver this speech. What I suggest may not be valid in the light of the greater understanding of others. It is one Senator's view; what I have written, what he has heard, what he has tried to reason. It is, in short, the course which suggests itself to me on the basis of the arguments that have been drawn out of the confusion and complexity of the German situation. I can be—and may very well be—wrong or good. I am ready to accept a better illumination of the problem through discussion and debate.

In the Senate. For whatever they may be worth, however, I outline the following points as essentials of a sound Western policy on Germany.

First, Mr. President, that forces representing the concept of freedom in peace not be driven out of Berlin. They need, at the least, to remain on the ground with the forces of totalitarian communism in the future capital of Germany. If those forces are to have a chance to remain in peace, a Western initiative for peace is essential.

Second. It is time to call upon German leaders of the two Berlin communities—East and West—to begin serious efforts to unify the municipal government and public services of that city.

Third. To that end, Mr. President, it would be helpful to enlist the conciliatory services of the Secretary General of the United Nations. If agreement can be reached by East Germany and West Germany to establish an all-Berlin governmental structure and to replace both Soviet and Allied forces with a United Nations interin police force composed of contingents from nations not directly involved. That force might supervise the agreement, and might see to it that all the routes of access to the city remain open until Berlin once again becomes the capital of a peaceful, unified Germany. It may be that in the Berlin microcosm there may evolve patterns of unification which will be applicable to the larger problem of all-German unification.

Fourth. If this approach or some such approach to a unified, neutralized Berlin fails, Mr. President, then it is essential that the forces representing the concept of freedom in peace in Berlin remain in Berlin, regardless of whether the Russians leave. Let them go, if they will. I would not wish to see this country a party to any百分之廿一 of the forces in Berlin.

Fifth. At the same time, however, the forces representing freedom in Berlin must be prepared as realistically as possible. It is time to think seriously of replacing the thousands of allied military personnel in Berlin with German militia, fully supported by NATO guarantees.

Sixth. Some may regard discussions between the German peoples and Germans of the East as tantamount to recognition of the East German Communist regime. Some who regard as appeasement not only talk, but even thought, which apparently is alien to them, on the serious problems of the Nation, may even so far as to label this support of political change as an appeasement. These proposals of meetings between East and West Germans. Let them do it, Mr. President; it is their right.

But let me say this: If talk constitutes recognition or appeasement, then we have appeasement and recognition Communist China, because a representative of this Government has been talking on its behalf, on and off, for years, with a Chinese representative in Geneva and at Peking. If talk constitutes recognition or appeasement, then the United States and the Western Allies have appeased Pankow. For the fact is that East Germans and West Germans have worked out practical agreements of various kinds between the two zones of Germany. As early as 1957, West Ger-

many's exports to East Germany for the first eight months of the year totaled $1,050 million, of which half of 1958, $1,256 million in trade moved in each direction. That kind of trade, Mr. President, does not take place without the consent of the two zones.

I do not know what the theory of international law may be. I do not know whether talk is tantamount to recognition. I do know that, as a practical matter, we have talked with, but have not recognized, Communist China. West Germans have talked with and traded with, but have not recognized, Pankow. What is involved in the coming crisis in Germany is not a classroom problem on the theory of international law. It is the life or death problem of peace or war. The stake is the lives of tens of millions of human beings, Americans included.

I cannot see that there is going to be any peace or solution of this problem without a great deal of talk—between Germans who are in authority in the Federal Republic and Germans who purport to be in authority in the Eastern zone. It seems to me essential, moreover, that this talk cover the whole range of problems of unification of the two zones, the whole range of problems involving the harmonizing of the political, economic, and military systems of the two zones.

Seventh. There is a point beyond which the search for peace can lead to the jeopardizing of freedom. Regardless of whatever agreements emerge, it seems to me essential that the people of East Germany have some genuine choice in the form of control which is exercised over them. There must be provision for the protection of the rights of all peaceful political forces in all Germany. All-German elections may not be essential—although I think them highly desirable—but at least there must be a chance for men and women of Eastern Germany, as well as those of Western Germany, to express themselves and their political preferences and to participate in political affairs without the threat of violence.

Whatever may be the details of the fusion of the two zones, they are best left to the Germans. We must be German friends, not German masters. The Germans are likely to know better than anyone else what will suit them and what is possible among them. Furthermore, it is inconceivable that at this late date the erstwhile allies of World War II can work out these details on their own.

Eighth. The contribution which the Western allies, as well as the Soviet Union, need to make, if there is to be peace and guarantees for a period of time, the kind of unified Germany which may emerge from discussions among the German peoples. The form this contribution may take is to see to it that a united Germany neither is subjected to military pressures from its neighbors, nor becomes a source of military pressure to its neighbors.

Ninth. To that end, Mr. President, it is essential that the Senate be given the fullest facts of our policy the search for agreements which, while they do not compel a sev-
Mr. President, I have taken a great deal of the Senate's time today. I have tried not to take it lightly. I have done so because it is clear that this administration, and in the example of its predecessor, has committed the Nation to stand fast at Berlin. It is a resolution well taken. Since we cannot yet perceive to what extremity of sacrifice it may lead in the months ahead, I have felt it essential totry to set forth for the consideration of the Senate my understanding of what is involved in the coming crisis in Germany. We believe that this is a crucial time for the Senate's principal member in these matters, the outstanding Senator from Montana, to speak with such a deep understanding and intelligent grasp of the international forces that play on the scene. I hope that he in his voice heard. I am sure that the President and the Secretary of State will listen most carefully. I would hope between them that they will evolve a policy that all of us, as Americans, will be glad to support. Most important, I hope that the President of the United States and his Secretary of State, and the Congress will fortify the resolve to stand fast in Berlin with the recognition that only a positive policy for peace can give it. The Secretary of State has spoken of mutual compunctions and wise words for this moment in time, with the clouds of radioactive death waiting to envelop the world. I hope deeply that they will lead to a positive policy for peace. It is that kind of a policy for which rational men everywhere are waiting, a policy in which they will be able to comprehend and to which, if need be, they will be able will be able to conspire than with this.

The policy has yet to be formed. It needs to be formed soon. If it is formed, the concept of freedom in peace will not perish in Berlin, in Germany, or in the world.

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Senator from Montana.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the money be furnished to the President?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I agree with the statement of the Senator. In my opinion, there is a condition existing in which, if the Soviet Government continues to dictate to the government of East Berlin, it will be impossible to bring about a reconciliation of East and West Berlin. Soviet Russia will not tolerate it. Based upon the adamant position of Soviet Russia, and based upon the rigidity of the situation as described by the Senator from Montana, while the matters about which I have spoken are highly desirable, I agree we should look for other avenues to escape the great holocaust. I see no reason why the Senate should be treating us in the future. I, for one, and I believe confirmation has been given to this view by the members of West Berlin, would want every avenue explored, talks had, continued talks, in the hope that some solution could be found.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is correct.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I was given a copy of the fine address which the distinguished Senator from Montana delivered today. I read it, and I have heard part of the address today. I agree very much with the very fine encomium paid by the distinguished majority leader in the Senate from Montana. As many folks have said, "Mike Mansfield is a real guy." I agree with that statement. I can agree with much the Senator from Montana has stated. I particularly agree about the need for us in this Chamber to discuss responsibly and constructively not only foreign policies but also all measures in that manner. Full and free debate was, and is an essential element of a bipartisan approach.

I wish to say to the very able Senator, there is no need for the Senator to reassure the Senate regarding his serious purpose and his careful choice of words. I and my colleagues on this side of the aisle always are confident that the Senator will give sober, intelligent addresses on any subject, foreign policy or anything else. He is "that sort of a guy." I hope, Senator, that the Senator has set high standards for himself, and I congratulate him.

I would like to record my agreement with the Senator concerning the seriousness of the Berlin situation and the need for all of us to maintain open minds and the utmost of flexibility in considering possible avenues for a possible resolution of the problem, in accord with the free world interest. Indeed, I think we have been given a sound account of the background of the situation in Germany, as well as a number of clues—I hesitate to call them all essentials—toward finding the peaceful solution we seek.

However, I should also like to state my belief that at least two main elements in the current German scene have been barely mentioned in my colleague's notable speech. The first missing ingredient concerns the East and Central Europe. It seems to me that the United States consult with and move in concert with its allies, especially France, Great Britain, and West Germany. There is no question that the Soviet Union, acting only in its own interests, in the very nature of things has made any measures in that part of Europe, more flexible than the West in propaganda and diplomatic approaches to central European problems.

We must remember that the West German Government itself has been a foremost exponent of firmness in dealing with the U.S.S.R. This point seems to me in importance when we recall the remarks made by the Senator about the unification question being one for action by the Germans themselves.

We know who holds the strings in East Germany. We know who controls East Germany. We might as well look at the fact that they still control East Germany, but they also control Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Baltic States. The unification of the East Germans and the West Germans getting together.
We were told the other day by Willy Brandt that unity, which was confirmed to me personally by Mr. Adenauer, that if the East Germans had their own percent of them would join with the West.

In fact, I could not help feeling that the address of my distinguished colleague had some influence in it which was hard to understand. The Senator seemed to alternate back and forth between giving us and the German primary responsibility for taking the initiative. I do not complain, for this is a natural consequence of the great complexity of the situation at stake. More important, I do not complain of any sacrifice of flexibility which may be inherent in our need to act as one. I am certain that we can all agree the Western alliance is the cornerstone of the present situation.

The second missing ingredient, in my view, is the lack of recognition accorded to the efforts of our Government and to the efforts of our allies over the years, to say nothing of the recent concentrated work over the past weeks and months, toward a way to negotiate the crux of our problem, an extremely serious problem. In fact, the headlines this morning contain news of Western efforts to bring them to join with the framework of envisaged negotiations, which continue the activities of Mr. Dulles and his European counterparts. Clearly, our policy is to put us in a straightjacket.

I think it is also clear that my colleague has, in the fashion of Don Quixote, been fighting a battle at a stone wall, and that stone wall is the Kremlin, not the East Germans.

Despite these few difficulties I have encountered so far, I thank the distinguished Senator from Montana, in all seriousness, for a highly illuminating presentation of the crux of the Berlin problem. I am not prepared to comment in depth on his useful address, because I have not had time for that. However, as frequently happens, Mr. Walter Lippmann's column of this morning contains some thoughts which I consider extremely relevant to this subject. I ask unanimous consent that there may be printed at this point in my discussion the last column of Walter Lippmann in his article of this morning.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

**Mr. Dulles Is Needed**

There is no reason to doubt that John Foster Dulles will once again come out on top, carried through his ordeal not only by his stamina, which is fabulous, but also by the knowledge that he is at this moment the indispensable man. There have been times in the past when things were at the end of a chapter, and he could with grace and dignity have made way for a younger man. But not now. This is a period when things are moving toward a climax, after which the world may be very different, and he, himself, is at the climax of his career.

There is no one else in the Western World who has authority, comparable with his, to lead the enormously complex negotiations about Germany and about Europe which in one way or another are now unavoidable and imperative. If the West moves, as it must, from a policy of standing pat, to one of negotiation and compromise, his personal leadership will be the best guarantee that flexibility is not faddishness and that a strong and tough hand is in charge. The Russians will make no mistakes while he is there, and our allies will be much less apprehensive.

There is one question which, if we know the answer to it, would light up the whole situation. When Mr. Dulles opened up Berlin and the German question now rather than, let us say, 2 years hence? The Russians know quite well that German opinion evolves, and that Dr. Adenauer's refusal to negotiate on a realistic basis will not be held to by his successors. In 2 years, Mr. Dulles will be out of office, and until very recently there was no difference between his position and Dr. Adenauer's. In 2 years, moreover, there will be—if the Russians believe what Senator Bricker and others say—a marked shift in the balance of power. Why, then, are they in such a hurry now? My own guess, which rests only on hints and inferences, is that they regard the position in Eastern Europe as precarious and potentially explosive. But our efforts, which have not been made, will make it less likely that they will have to say—a marked shift in the balance of power.

The Senator has been very careful in his logic. We have not only recognized that fact, but we have recognized that a divided Germany constitutes a serious threat to the peace. Both the Republican and Democratic Presidents were able to say that the two German states are not equal, and that the 1945 and the 1946 have made unrelenting efforts to bring the four zones together. It is a fact which has been made time after time.

We actually got an agreement at the Geneva Conference in 1955 for a reunification of Germany that was held in free elections. What happened? Of course, the Russians broke the agreement wide open. The Russians respected the agreement. All of the subsequent efforts to achieve reunification, including the notes we sent last fall, have been unrelenting efforts to bring the four zones together.

I desire to give credit where credit is due. I do not care to simply say that we are at fault if we cannot get a government to reason with us and to work with us. There is nothing as far as the Kremlin is concerned, but we have been on the job.

As we have said at Geneva we obtained an agreement for free elections. Who pushed that agreement? We did. Afterward it went out the window. The reason the West Germans have been rebuffed is that the Soviets have been unwilling to agree to any plan of reunification that would imply bolshevism of Western Germany and its annexation to Eastern Germany.

This is not the first time in world history that we have been unable to obtain agreements that were valid, and that we should be kept by the other party. Out of 24 agreements we made with the Kremlin, the Kremlin broke 50 of them. That is the situation we are meeting. We must recognize the simplest fact that the Soviet side will not have a clutch hold on Eastern German. The Germans are not free. They are running elections of a free society. Willy Brandt. When we look at that fact
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Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 22, Box 75, Folder 8, Mansfield Library, University of Montana

in the face, we begin to realize what the

The Senator from Montana suggests

that the way to work toward reunifica-

tion would be to start by having the West

Germans and the East Germans talk

among themselves and attempt to

negotiate the unification of the two divisions

of Berlin. I heard that talk on the floor

today. That is a consummation devoutly

to be wished, but we cannot make an

agreement with the slave when the mas-

ter has the slave under his thumb. That

is the situation. We might as well recog-
nize it. That is what we have been try-

ing to break down. If the master were to

allow the slave freedom to work out his

own salvation, 95 percent of the East

Germans would vote for reunification.

It is difficult to see how the attempt to

work out reunification could be any more

successful than our past efforts with the

Russians. We have tried to get the Rus-

sians to agree. The East Germans are

not free to negotiate on their own. That

is the big point. They are controlled by

the Russians, and therefore they would

control the Russian tool.

In effect, the Senator is saying in his

speech that the West Germans should be

more flexible; they should enter into

negotiations under the East Germans.

This is something that the West German

Government, up to date, has refused to

do. The West German Government is an

independent nation. It claims that

East Germany is a part of Germany.

The contention is made that the United

States can make the West Germans

change their position and become more

flexible.

MR. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WILEY. Let me finish this para-

graph.

The fact is that West Germany is a

proud and powerful ally of the United

States. As an ally, it is a part of its

own, and we cannot dictate to it, as the

Russians are dictating to the East Ger-

mans. The West Germans are the least

people under the sun. They know the situa-

tion; and when they take the position

they have taken, they take it with their

eyes. In fact, they are under the thumb of the Russians, or the

East Germans, and they realize that they
cannot even negotiate with the people

who are the serfs.

I now yield to the Senator from

Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I be-

lieve that there should be called to

the Senator’s attention the fact that rela-

tionships exist at the present time be-

tween the East German Government and

the West German Government. Such

relationships have existed for some

years. Those relationships are based

upon interzonal agreements. The re-

sult is that trade amounting to hundreds

of millions of dollars is generated be-

tween the two areas.

The Senator makes the point that I

seem to be advocating an American

initiative. What I have been trying to

advocate is a western initiative, includ-

ing the President, and including West

Germany. I do not think we can main-

tain a petrified policy, because we know

that there is no prospect of going for-

ward on this problem if we stand firm.

We are facing a deadline. May 27, 1959,
at which time the Soviet Union has in-

dicated it will have all its troops and de-

fense installations withdrawn from the

eastern sector of the city. I think we

must come up with something in the way

of alternatives. I was very pleased when

Secretary Dulles came back and said

that he would be willing to consider con-

cessions on a quid pro quo basis. I was

delighted with the degree of success the

Secretary had achieved among our allies,

Dr. Adenauer, General de Gaulle, and

Prime Minister Macmillian.

So I do not quite get the point the dis-

tinguished Senator from Wisconsin has

made, but because of the different interest I have

in it, but because of the fact that some

suggestions are being made, and perhaps

out of those suggestions, or others which

might be generated, we may come to a degree

of success in meeting the difficulties which

confront us in the German and Berlin

situation, and of which, perhaps, may come

unification of the two Berlins and the

two Germanies at an earlier date than any

of us can anticipate at the moment.

I thank the Senator for yielding to me

and giving me an opportunity to answer

him in part.

Mr. WILEY. Did the Senator wish to

address any particular question to me?

In what direction did he desire to direct

my thought?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I wished to bring

to the attention of the Senator the fact

that I understood him to say that I was

advocating American initiative. I was

advocating a Western initiative, which

would include all Allied Powers, and also

Dr. Adenauer.

Mr. WILEY. I do not think we are

very far apart.

The only thing I disagree with is the

implication that there has been no

initiative. In my opinion the executive

department, whose function it is to

handle foreign relations, has done a great

job. As I said the other day, the situa-

tion is similar to that of the man who

has an ornery jackass. He can talk to

him and talk to him, but he had better

not get too close to him, or he may be

kicked.

The Secretary of State and his asssis-

tants have worked diligently at this prob-

lem; and because they cannot get the

jackass to agree, they are to blame.

That is the sort of implication which

I do not like to have go out to the coun-

try. I want the country definitely to

understand my figure of speech.

We are continually in the midst of a

political picture. I say, give credit where

credit is due. I conclude my remarks, I shall have something to say

about the distinguished Secretary of

State. He served under Eisenhower. When

I was chairman of the Committee on

Foreign Relations, I saw his work. I

observed his work as a servant of the

Democratic Party. I have seen him serve

for years under President Eisenhower.

I have seen him get acquainted with

this globe, as was indicated by a distin-

guished columnist this morning, as no

other man in history has done. He

knows every neighborhood. He knows

all the peoples. He knows the problems.

He has dealt with them.

Because we could not get the divergent

interests to agree, he is to blame. That

is what I am objecting to. Such an

implication is absolutely unfair. Un-

doubtedly it has had much to do with

sending Secretary Dulles to the hospital.

He is only human.

My next point is that the Senator from

Montana, in his speech, asks that not

only the West Germans, but the United

States, take a more flexible approach to

the problem of German and European

security. The Senator from Montana

mentioned the Rapacki plan and the

Eisenhower plan, and said we should explore

both of them. We not only explored the

Eisenhower plan, but put it forward as a West-

ern proposal at the Geneva Summit Con-

ference. We have been considering all

kinds of possible European security plans.

We have agreed that we must keep an open mind on this subject.

On the other hand, all these plans involve a general withdrawal of

Western strength from Western Europe; and we must be careful not to

engage in too much loose talk about the seeming re-

treat type of policy unless we have rea-

son to believe that the Soviets are dispo-

sed to initiate a pullback toward their

borders. As the Senator from Montana

stated a few minutes ago, they would

get out of East Berlin; but they would

be on the line where troops would be

ready to march in and take over West

Berlin.

Our people are not blind. They recog-

nize the fact that they are dealing with

some of the most efficient—if I might
call them that—international Machia-

veilians in history. In doing so they are

going to protect the interests of the West

and of America.

We agree that we must keep an open

mind on this subject. On the other hand,

all these plans involve a general withdrawal of Western strength from

Western Europe and a deliberate policy that we do not engage in too

much loose talk about this seemingly retreat-type of policy unless we

have reason to believe that the Soviets are disposed to initiate a

simultaneous pullback of their forces toward their borders. Nothing in

the present situation gives us any reason to believe that the Soviets are,

in fact, willing to carry out a meaningful pullback of their forces.

Too much general talk regarding neutral

zones in withdrawal or thinning out

of our forces at this time, therefore, could

give the impression of softness on our

part and weakening of our resolve to

stand firm in this situation.

Finally, the distinguished Senator

from Montana says the stand firm in

Berlin is a slogan and not a policy.

The fact is that standing firm is the

bedrock of our policy. It is quite true

that we are not having talks on the

problem of how we implement the stand

in the face of the many variations in
which the threat can actually present itself to us must be worked out. That is exactly what the executive division has been doing in the past for the better part of the year, the crucial period that is, when the crisis developed and it was the primary reason that Secretary Dulles undertook his recent trip to Europe. Mr. Mansfield is fully aware that we must not only be agreed on the fundamental concept of standing firm; but that we must also be agreed on the details of implementing this policy.

It was to help work out a common agreement on these details that the Secretary undertook this trip to London, Paris, and Bonn.

In other words, the Senator from Montana knows very well that the executive branch here, as well as the governments of our allies, knows that we must agree on the detailed implementation of the policy in that we are all working now to get agreement on these details.

When we do get agreements, what good will they do? What does experience teach us? Fifty out of 52 agreements were not worth the paper they were written on. That is just a part of the world and it is only fair to say that." He spoke about a treaty being a scrap of paper. We are dealing with a people whose philosophy and interest in connection with international affairs is very low.

My overall reaction to the speech of the Minority Party, however, is that it is a great deal more reasonable than many one has to listen to, and that this is the Senator from Montana to conclude his remarks as indicated, in the speech which make pretty good sense.

I do want to make very clear that, as the distinguished Senator has said, when the Executive is "in the saddle" and has the responsibility to deal with crises, and that is the function which is hoped for is not forthcoming, that is no reason to criticize the executive branch of our Government. The Executive has had to deal with the representatives of the Kremlin for many years.

Our past experience, as I indicated, shows that agreements with the Kremlin are worth.

I want to make it clear also, that in my view the executive department has done everything that it can do to bring about a settlement of the German issue, as well as a settlement on the wider scale of world tensions, of which the Kremlin is the source.

In my opinion the Berlin crisis in connection with the Moscow date is merely another indication of what we have had in the past, particularly some months ago. Mr. Mansfield is the purpose of the Kremlin to get our attention on one point on this little globe, and then do its nefarious work at another point. The executive department is keeping an eye on the whole show, so to speak, not merely on the Kremlin, and it recognizes that this is the way of the world-dominating influence and philosophy of the Kremlin.

Mr. President, when I heard the other evening that John Foster Dulles had gone to the hospital once again, I issued a release, and I shall read that release at this time.

All Americans and many in far off lands heard with sorrow of the hospitalization of John Foster Dulles. Countless thousands will pray for his recovery.

When Mr. Dulles speaks, his words are not to be treated lightly. When he speaks he must mean it, that is the way we have known him. Burke's definition of a statesman comes to my mind: He possessed "to devise a purpose to preserve, an ability to improve." He has always been a "friend to truth, in action firm, in cause clear, who broke no promises, served no private ends." These words of Pope characterize this great public servant.

Let us hope that during his convalescence the column will keep the American people aware of the developments in Europe.

In my opinion no American in the last 50 years has given of himself more unstintingly and dedicated himself more to preserve American than Foster Dulles. When others threw bricks at him, he smiled and kept on working for the general welfare. No man in American history has become so well acquainted with his now neighborhood world and its problems.

So we join with the countless thousands who wish him a speedy recovery. His country needs him.

As the President and Walter Lippmann have said, the country needs him.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WILEY. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Montana.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I have listened with a great deal of interest to the extremely able address by my good friend from Wisconsin in defense of the State Department.

Mr. WILEY. I thank the Senator.

Mr. CLARK. I want to ask my friend this question. Earlier in his remarks he offered for the Record the column written by Walter Lippmann published in the Washington Post this morning. My question is whether he agrees with that column.

Mr. WILEY. I took the column from the paper, and the part that I read I agreed with. However, I shall have to go over it very closely, because the implication is that I am not aware of something in the article. I have not read it closely, because I have been waiting for the Senator from Montana to conclude his remarks, so that I may obtain the facts.

Mr. CLARK. I would be happy to have my good friend review Mr. Lippmann's column, which I personally believe is a sound article. What it seems to me, is rather inconsistent with the point of view which my friend from Wisconsin has been expounding.

I should like to call to his attention the parts of the column I have in mind, and I should like to ask him whether he agrees that the principal point Mr. Lippmann makes is that the Russians are frightened by the situation in Eastern Europe and that they fear an explosion or revolution, and that such an explosion or revolution might require them to repeat what they did in Hungary; that if they did it in Eastern Germany what they did in Hungary it would bring about the great danger of starting world war III, because we would be unlikely to permit East Germany to go down the drain the way we let Hungary go. Mr. Lippmann suggests that the problem is how we can prevent a revolution in a satellite country and how we can maintain a situation in which the Russians can get out of satellite countries and the satellite countries can remain neutral and Berlin and Germany can still be free.

I suggest to the Senator from Wisconsin that we cannot solve this problem purely by appeasement, or by saying over and over again that the Russians have broken 50 or 50 agreements, and that therefore it does not do any good to talk to them. I suggest that we must talk and talk and live with them, or else we will die with them.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. WILEY. I yield.

Mr. CLARK. I have no intention of attempting to engage in a debate concerning whether the action of the State Department in the past was right or wrong. I think the Senator from Montana [Mr. Mansfield] was very wise, indeed, in avoiding that pitfall, which it would be so easy to fall into.

I suggest to the Senator from Wisconsin that we cannot solve this problem purely by appeasement, or by saying over and over again that the Russians have broken 50 or 50 agreements, and that therefore it does not do any good to talk to them. I suggest that we must talk and talk and live with them, or else we will die with them.

There are such things as self-executing agreements, particularly with respect to the withdrawal of forces, which are enforceable, and this regardless of the effect of the written word. It has been my feeling that to have a more flexible policy toward negotiation is highly desirable.

I think the Senator from Montana has rendered a distinguished service, because in many ways he is sending word to the State Department and to the country that, at least so far as a majority of the U.S. Senate is concerned, we are ready right now to negotiate a meaningful agreement.

We do not dismiss from our minds plans which were ridiculed when they were first brought forward 2 years ago.
by Mr. Kennan, Mr. Galt toskill, and Mr. Ranger tell me a lot about anything in the interest of getting a workable agreement toward peace. We are not afraid to negotiate. We do not try to repress any more than some of our friends in the State Department do. But that is no reason for not sitting down at the table and talking with them.

Mr. WILEY. Again, the Senator from Pennsylvania has made an implied attack on the other branch of the Government.

The Senator talks about flexibility. Why does he not talk about flexibility with the people who are most concerned with it, instead of making a general statement? That is the point I am making. If I tried lawsuits, I tried to arrive at conclusions on the facts, not on implications, not on rumors. That was my only point in raising this particular issue.

The Senator refers to the breaking by the Russians of 50 out of 52 agreements. I commend the Senator that it was in the days before Pearl Harbor that this Chamber was asleep; the President was asleep; the people were asleep; the Army and the Air Force were asleep. They said it could not happen. It did. That was the only reason I referred to the breaking by the Russians of 50 out of 52 agreements. I do not want to have this country go to sleep on the generality that it is possible to deal with a skunk or someone who does not keep faith.

Mr. CLARK. I think what the Senator from Wisconsin has said and what I have said will appear accurately in the Record, as our good friends, the Official Reporters, will write it out. I have no intention of engaging in further colloquy, other than to say that I implied nothing. It was not I who spoke of the breaking of 50 out of 52 agreements; it was my good friend, the Senator from Wisconsin, who did so. I am entitled to let the Record stand as it will appear in print tomorrow.

Mr. WILEY. I agree that I made the statement. I did so for the simple reason that men like the Senator from Pennsylvania were here at the time of Pearl Harbor and had said it could not happen. I do not want the breaking of 50 out of 52 agreements to be forgotten by the Senator from Pennsylvania either.

Mr. CLARK. At the time of Pearl Harbor, I was in the uniform of my country, and not on the floor of the Senate.

Mr. WILEY. Oh, yes. But other Senators were talking as the Senator from Pennsylvania is now speaking. That is the only point I am making.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, at the very beginning, I commend the Senator from Montana for the study which he has given to the problem he discussed today. Although I want the Soviet Union to know that the Senators of the United States are intent on desirous of obtaining peace for the people of the world, I may see some difficulties in carrying out the plans suggested by the Senator from Montana, and projecting themselves over his talk, I see a fervent purpose and desire to bring about peace in the world. That is the light in which I wish the people of Europe and the people of the world would understand the intention and the purpose of the United States today.

What are some of the weaknesses which I see in the proposal made by the Senator from Montana? The Soviet says: "We will withdraw from East Berlin." The question is, how far will they withdraw? In what posture will they be after they have withdrawn? In what position would we be if we withdrew from West Berlin and moved a distance of say, 120 miles to the west? My query would be: Based upon the past conduct of the Soviet Union, could we rely upon their word that they have withdrawn and would stay withdrawn? Or would there be the necessity of negotiating in a manner which would preclude the possibility of their abandoning their word and moving immediately back into the area out of which they came if conditions developed which were unsatisfactory?

Second, for the people of West Berlin and East Berlin to negotiate would be simple. I think it is generally agreed that 99 percent of them would subscribe to the philosophy of the West and would repudiate that of the East. If there were a unification of the government of West Berlin and the government of the Soviet and communism in East Berlin, my query is: What type of government would result? I cannot forget what happened in China when a coalition government was formed. I cannot forget what happened in Yugoslavia when a coalition government was formed, and Mikhalovich, the spirit of the fight for freedom, was scuttled. The result of that coalition government was that the Communists took control.

Nor can I forget what happened in Poland when the Soviet Union proposed a coalition government. The coalition government was created, the Red troops were there, they took control and gave orders, and soon the government of Poland became a Communist government.

But in this situation there is one gleam of light which would cause me to analyze the East Berlin and the West Berlin situation in the belief that it might be distinguished from the Yugoslav situation, the China situation, and the Poland situation. In China, the Soviet troops were in the northern part of that country, and they dictated what was to happen. A similar situation existed in Poland. In Yugoslavia, the word which came from Britain and from the United States was that Mikhalovich should be abandoned and Tito should be accepted. What would happen in East Berlin and in West Berlin if those governments combined and if the Soviet would stay back? In all the other countries I have mentioned, conditions were fertile for the overthrow of those who wanted freedom and for the installation of those who wanted dictatorship. But that condition would not prevail in Germany. As we have said, in Germany 95 percent of the people would stand by the governments of the free West.

But despite my belief that these dangers are connected with the suggestions which have been made by the Senator from Montana, I believe it is the responsibility of the executive branch of our Government and of this legislative branch to explore every means of reaching an agreement, restricted only by the proposition that we maintain our honor and that we do not fall into a pit which would leave us weaker, after we negotiated, than we were before we began to negotiate.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.
positive Western policy on Germany, are not numerous. In official policy—without a shadow of a doubt on the part of anyone, either Democrat or Republican—we are committed to stand fast at Berlin. We are committed to the participation of Germans of both zones in the discussion of the problems of German unity. We are committed to explore ways other than all-German elections, at least as a beginning of the solution to the problem of German unity. We are prepared to consider proposals which seek to limit certain types of weapons and the alien military forces in both parts of Germany within the framework of all-European security arrangements. With these essentials, Mr. President, I expressed substantial agreement in my remarks of February 12, although I may differ in particulars with respect to the way they are being presently pursued.

DIFFERENCES WITH OFFICIAL POLICY

The basic points at which I diverge from what is present official policy, I believe, are these:

First. Official policy, in effect, says that the Americans cannot leave Berlin or the routes of access to the city from the West; certainly, that they cannot leave in spirit and, perhaps, not even in body. For my part, I would have no particular desire to see them stay, in body or in spirit, even if they could be persuaded from going, which I doubt.

Second. Official policy does not seek actively to try to bring about a unification of the municipal services and government in two Berlin at the present time. I believe that effort should be made.

Third. Official policy does not seek to enlist the United Nations in the Berlin crisis at this time. For my part, I believe it is high time that this be done; particularly, that the conciliatory services of the Secretary General be sought.

Fourth. Official policy gives no evidence of considering replacing the thousands of Allied forces in Berlin with West Germans. If we are not going to move or cannot move in the direction of trying to bring about the unity and interim neutralization of all Berlin through U.N. conciliation, then, I believe, for the reasons I have already stated, we must give serious consideration to making this replacement.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Finally, Mr. President, I must bring to the attention of the Senate the testimony of General Maxwell D. Taylor, the Chief of Staff of the Army before the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee on February 2, testimony which was released only last weekend. The General said, in effect, that there must be total mobilization of this Nation if we are to render our forces in Berlin. I must ask: What is being done to bring about this total mobilization, or are we to assume that it will not be necessary?

I hope deeply, Mr. President, that force will not be brought into play at Berlin but there is no certain promise in present circumstances that it will not be. I reiterate my belief that if there is to be a chance to avoid its use, "a Western initiative for peace is essential."
And even if we cannot, what shall we have sacrificed by trying?

Points 4 and 5: Unless a unified, neutralized Berlin under United Nations' auspices is established as an international neutral, there is little reason to remain, in Berlin, regardless of whether the Russians leave. It is time to think seriously of replacing as rapidly as possible the thousands of non-German military personnel in Berlin with West German militia.

Here, again, Mr. President, I find in present policy nothing comparable to this suggestion. Present policy, says, in effect, that the Russians must stay in Berlin—in spirit, if not in body. Apart from the fact that I see no practicable way to make them stay in either body or spirit if they wish to go, I am most reluctant to go along with a policy that seeks to require the Russians to stay anywhere, if they propose to take even a few steps backward—eastward. I am fully aware that their going may complicate our remaining in Berlin. We shall still, then, with the Germans. They will be Communists, to be sure—but, nevertheless, Germans, not Russians. The Allied forces may well be compelled, in the last analysis, to face them, if we mean to stay in Berlin at all costs.

It was an awareness of this probability, Mr. President, which prompted me to suggest that it is time to think seriously of replacing the thousands of Allied military personnel in West Berlin with West German military. If there is to be a loss of life among East Germans, in order to preserve what is, in the last analysis, a West German position even more than an Allied one in Berlin, then it seems to me that the Allied forces move as quickly as possible to the reserve, even as the Russians intend to do on the other side. This is not a matter of “passing the buck.” It is a matter of recognizing that among Germans, as among others, blood may well prove thicker than ideologies.

It will be a tragedy if men must die in this situation in any event. It will hurt the cause of freedom in Germany even more, however, if the Germans who may lose their lives in limited conflict for access to Berlin lose them by the action of foreign forces.

I know, Mr. President, that there are grave risks in using West German forces in this fashion. Once injected into the situation at Berlin, it is difficult to foresee the contingencies which may subsequently arise. That is why I said it is time to think seriously of using them, not that it is time to use them. The risks must be weighed in the light of all the information now available to the Executive. They must be weighed against the countless risks of trying to preserve forces, a standard which will change, inevitably, once the Russians have left Berlin. There may be sound reasons for not doing so, but there are surely ways of using West Germans for the Allied forces at West Berlin. There are no sound reasons, however, for not exploring fully its implications within our own Government and with Allied governments, or for failing to do so promptly.

Point 6: There must be a great deal of talk between Germans who are in authority, in Berlin, and Germans who purport to be in authority in the Eastern zone.

This is important, Mr. President, of which much has been made in comments on my remarks of February 12. It seems to me that a monumental issue has been generated here, although, in fact, no substantial issue exists.

The administration—the Western allies—have proposed talks with the Russians, at which each side might have German observers. In other words, East Germans and West Germans are both to be admitted to these talks on Germany, if the Russians accept the Western proposal.

Now, Mr. President, does anyone believe that in talks on the German problem, these Germans—East and West Germans—are going to do nothing but observe? I think they are going to talk, the West Germans through the allied nations, the East Germans through the Soviet Union. If there is a difference between official policy and what I suggested in this respect, it is certainly a minor one. If I may draw an analogy, it makes no difference this time. I suggested, in effect, that the Germans-East and West—go off into another room and try to come up with a concrete proposal on the problem of German unification, which they would then lay before the allied powers and the Soviet Union, for approval and for guarantees.

Many of those who have commented on this proposal have said in effect, “No. That is a dangerous procedure.” They have said—that those who endorse present official policy on this point—that the West Germans must whisper in the ear of the allies what they think should be done about unification and the East Germans must whisper in the ear of the Soviet Union. Then, the Western allies and the Soviet Union will add their own thoughts and try, out of the conglomerations, to reach a point.

Mr. President, either way is agreeable to me. Out of my own limited experience at international conferences, however, I have always viewed as to which way is likely to offer greater prospect for success. Those who now conduct foreign policy have theirs. I am more than willing to try their way if they believe it will work. I have a feeling, however, that before we are done with this matter of whispering in ears and the friction of no contact between the Germans, we shall be more than willing to try others.

Point 7: All-German elections may not be essential to peace and to freedom, but there must be some opportunity for the people of East Germany, as there is in West Germany, to express their political preferences and to participate in political affairs without terror. Unless there is, the search for peace can lead to the jeopardizing of freedom.

Here again, Mr. President, I do not believe there is a basic difference between the present policies of this Government and the view which I stated.

The Secretary of State made clear, long before my speech of February 12, that all-German elections need not be essential as a first step in German unification. I do not know at what stage the hand of political terror would become essential, nor, with all due respect, do I believe anyone else does at all time.

The Secretary has recognized that reality, and I applaud his recognition of it. I say further, however, that unless the hand of political terror begins to lift in East Germany there is a danger to freedom in any form of unification which may be tried. While this point has not been explicitly stated by the Secretary, I am sure that those who are responsible for the conduct of foreign policy are not unaware of it.

Point 8: The Western allies and the Soviet Union must guarantee for a prolonged period the unified Germany which may emerge from discussions among the Germans. They must see to it that Germany is neither subjected to military occupation, which would provide for the reasonable security needs of its neighbors, including the Soviet Union, an essential of peace. One may differ with the basis of this objective, but it has been pursued, but there are few differences as to its essentiality.

Point 9: It is essential that our policy, NATO's policies, do not exclude a careful consideration—may I repeat that word, “consideration”—of the Rapacki plan, the Eden plan for a demilitarized zone in middle Europe, or similar proposals in connection with the unification of Germany, predicated—may I repeat that word, “predicated”—or contingent upon the outcome of the conferences on surprise attack, and suspension of nuclear tests now going on in Geneva.

The Western Powers have indicated an interest in negotiating a similar pact. We should now seek an agreement, at Geneva, on the problem of nuclear testing and the prevention of surprise attack.

Further, I am given to understand that it is the policy of this Government to recognize that agreement is possible to exclude missile bases from all German soil. Similarly, that it is possible to thin out foreign forces in Germany. In return for a thinning out of Soviet forces in East Germany.

If that is the case, Mr. President, there is no basic incompatibility between the essentials that I listed and what official policy is prepared—I repeat that word, “prepared”—to do. The objective, however, is not, however, to examine subsequently the way we are going about trying to reach it.

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN OFFICIAL POLICY AND NINE POINTS

The differences between what we are doing, as a matter of official policy, and what I suggested as the essentials of a
and because of his great capacity, his great knowledge, his great ability, and the leadership which he has displayed, in order to be in Germany and considerations. He is in a very large sense indispensable.

I hope he may conferences covering these two questions—because they are interrelated—will be held in Washington, where we can make use of Mr. Dulles' great talents and abilities, to advise and lead the West.

In the last analysis, whether his health will permit him to make that contribution is for the President, the Secretary, and his doctors to decide, as the President so cogently pointed out in his press conference of February 25, 1959.

Let me emphasize, however, that because Mr. Dulles is ill no reason for declaring a moratorium on a frank and full discussion of the policies in the light of the critical situation in Germany. If I know Mr. Dulles at all, he would be the first to recognize the need then to continue and expand them. The West would be the first to deny any foolish political posturing on his illness in order to avoid the issue.

Even those who have expressed confusion as to how I can support Mr. Dulles' continuance in office and still criticize some of the policies executed under them, must say that it is not the first time, and I hope it is not the last. We shall have reached a very low point indeed, in the practice of free and responsible government when a Senator has no choice but to agree 100 percent with a Secretary of State on every point.

I intended to go on as I have in this matter. I shall endorse the foreign policies of this administration when I believe they are sound policies. I shall try to contribute constructively to their reshaping when I believe that they are not—I repeat the word "constructively," because I have always tried to operate constructively. That is a position, Mr. President, which I have maintained since I first held, and also during the 10 year prior thereto when I served as a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. It is the position I propose to maintain so long as I am in the Senate. I shall maintain it regardless of the party which is responsible for the administration of the Nation's affairs.

ATTITUDE ON MR. KHRUSHCHEV

Further, I propose to say what I have to say when I have to say it, irrespective of Mr. Khrushchev's threats or blandishments. It is, to me, a matter of indifference whether Mr. Khrushchev agrees or disagrees with me. I hope this Government, Mr. President, will never, out of a timorous feeling that Mr. Khrushchev may disagree, fail to stand for what is right and for what is good. Finally, Mr. President, I hope that this Government will never fail to act as it must act out of an even more timorous feeling that Mr. Khrushchev may disagree. What I have on this point on February 12 I believe bears repeating. I said then, and I say again today:

"Mr. President, it is more important to us, far more important, to know what we ourselves are seeking in Germany. We must bring to this crisis not only courage, but also conviction. We must bring to it a positive and understandable policy which meets our essential national needs and the essential needs of freedom, and, if possible, meets them in peace.

I was that thought, Mr. President, which prompted me to list nine points for exploration in a search for a positive policy on Germany last February 12. Some of these points were then, or at least have since become, a part of the present official policy of the United States. But a part of that policy. They represent, what to me, seem rational approaches to various aspects of the German situation. In the great majority, they are not original except in their restatement, as my inserts in the Congressional Record of February 16, 1959. But for their restatement in the context of the speech, I wish to make it clear that I claim full responsibility.

RECAPITULATION OF THE NINE POINTS

Mr. President, I should now like to review the nine points and to discuss their status in official policy at the present time, as well as certain of the comments which have been made upon them. On February 12 I said:

"I can be wrong, and I stand ready to accept a better illumination of the problem through discussion and debate in the Senate.

"I say that again. I may add, however, that little which has since transpired or has since been said prompts me to modify those three points in any significant degree.

"Point 1: There must be no retreat of the forces of freedom at Berlin. Mr. President, be it ever so much, we cannot retreat from the city. Mr. President, it was in 10.6 times during the course of my remarks on February 12. Weeks before that date, I had publicly endorsed a draft Senate resolution which would have upheld the position of the administration to stand fast. That, I may add, is the only resolution on the German situation which I have endorsed so far.

So far as I know, there has not been any significant difference among Democrats and Republicans, or between the Senate and the executive branch of the Government, on the need to stand fast at Berlin. Certainly there never has been any question of a constructive role for the United Nations and the Secretary General. I believe that there is something to be said for an attempt to end the United Nations into the situation, now, in the role of fire-prevention, not merely later, in the role of putting the fire out. But I have had much time to see the whole city of Berlin neutralized on an interim basis, under United Nations auspices, if that can be obtained, rather than the free movement of East German agents of the Soviet Union stamping the permits of western allied transports to West Berlin. We can not know whether such a solution can be obtained until we try to obtain it, for peace.
POLICIES RESPECTING GERMANY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I, too, wish to speak on the German question. I am sorry that I did not complete the preparation of my speech in time to give copies to my colleagues, to the Official Reporters, or to the press.

I am grateful to the Senator from Connecticut for showing me and others of his colleagues—if not all of them—the courtesy of sending us copies of the magnificent speech which he has just completed. I commend him most highly, because I think he has made a real contribution to the public understanding of this most important problem. I believe that in emphasizing the difficulties which will face our country and the free world on or before May 27, he has rendered a service which should be appreciated by all.

He mined no words in his speech. I shall mine no words in mine. As a U.S. Senator from the State of Montana, like the U.S. Senator from the State of Connecticut or any other State, I have a duty and a responsibility to call my shots as I see them, to let the cards fall where they may.

So with this apology to my colleagues, the Official Reporters of Debates, and the press for not having a prepared copy of my speech, and with my public commendation and congratulations to the distinguished Senator from Connecticut for making an able speech and laying it on the line. I wish to say thanks because he has rendered a public service. I hope other Senators, in addition to the Senator from Connecticut and the Senator from New York, will likewise take the floor and try to let the people of this country and the world know just what the American position is, and to emphasize that, regardless of any differences as to how we shall achieve our objective, there are no differences so far as our desire and our determination to remain in West Berlin are concerned.

Some days ago, I discussed in the Senate the coming crisis in Germany. Other Members have since contributed to the discussion of this critical matter. That is all to the good. I am persuaded that out of this turmoil of thought will come a firm and positive policy, a policy which, even if it does not yield a rapid resolution of the German situation, will at least unite and steel the Nation for the dangerous days which lie ahead.

THE PROSPECTS IN GERMANY

Let there be no mistake about what does lie ahead. This is no diplomatic lark on which the world is about to embark at Berlin. This is no child's play of blind man's buff.

When I addressed the Senate on February 12, Mr. President, I made a delegation from my remarks just a few moments before I delivered them. I did so because I did not wish to be unduly alarmist. Now the same thought has been expressed by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. It has been recognized by Members of this body such as the distinguished Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) and increasingly by the press. It is at least beginning to sink home that the world is entering into a situation in Germany in which the lives of tens of millions of people—Americans included—may well balance on the avoidance of a single significant error.

The British Prime Minister warned, the other day, of a suicidal war by “misguided” and “muddled” politicians, and the distinguished Senator from Kentucky (Mr. MAVERICK), a former Assistant Secretary of State, has said this Prime Minister, had he not been “muddled” by his colleagues. The British Prime Minister also used the word “muddling.”

I can say now with greater assurance what I intended to say but did understand from my remarks on February 12: “I express to the Senate my belief that just ahead lies a period which may well see the nations of the earth, under the leadership of the United States, miss a devastating war by a very narrow margin. Indeed, it is a period which may see us in war, limited war or unlimited war, war by accident or war by design, war by childish stubbornness or bravado.”

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF SENATORS IN THE IMPENDING CRISIS

If that is the case, Mr. President, what are the Members of this body to do? Are they to guard their silence when conscience compels them to speak? Are they to ignore their responsibilities to their States and our country as they see their responsibilities? Are they to accept as all-pervasive the undoubted wisdom of the President and the executive branch of the Government? Or are they to think for themselves and speak for themselves?

Are they to be more concerned with how words will sound abroad, and so hold their peace? Or must they, even more, seek to dispel any uncertainties of the people of the Nation as to the course which this Government is pursuing, and to seek to do so by examining the issues which underlie that course? Are they to wait until they hear what the Department of State has to say on the matter and then parrot agreement? Are they to wait to hear what Mr. Kruschev will say, so that they may be sure that what they subsequently say will be in disarray?

I do not know what others may contend in this matter. I can speak only for myself. For myself, Mr. President, I can say that conscience compels me to speak, I owe it to the people of my State and our country to speak out. For myself, Mr. President, I hold that the most important matter is not how people abroad may interpret my words. Important as that may be, it is more important that the people of my State and our country understand fully what is at stake in this situation.

More important is the need of the people of the United States to be satisfied that the course to which they are committed by their Government is a sound one. If they are to be asked to give their lives, as well as they may be, then the course of this Government must represent the outgrowth of policies which reflect the deepest needs of the people of the United States. They must be policies which are, in fact, the best that can be devised by this Government to safeguard the Nation and freedom, and to do so, if possible, in peace.

Mr. President, to those who say we may upset people abroad by our discussions, I can say it makes me feel foolish if we fool ourselves at home. The unity of the slogan may well be no unity at all. It may well be merely the facade of unity. The Communists, like the Nativists, are not fools. To stand fast in Germany, as indeed we must, we need to think carefully, to think deeply, and we need to do it now. We need to speak out seriously, soberly, and we need to do it now. The time to examine policies is before, not after, their consequences are upon us. I emphasize that point—before, not after—as in Korea a few years ago.

POSITION ON MR. DULLES

Mr. President, I yield to no one in my appreciation of the enormous burdens of the Secretary of State and his Department, charged, as they are, with primary responsibility, under the President, for the Nation's policies. I believe the record of my position in this matter is very clear, and, if I have been accused of not being fully aware of his position, I have since I have known him, as an able and a dedicated civil servant. I have always hoped that the end of the man and his policies which have been pursued since he took office. I have worked with him closely, very closely, on several of these matters. I have never felt, however, that this misunderstanding upon me a silence when I disagreed; nor, I am sure, did he. I favor the continuance of Mr. Dulles in office now, not out of any sentimentality, but because I believe that if his health permits, Mr. Dulles is capable of making an extremely significant contribution to the peace of the world and to the search for peace, particularly at this time.

I do not believe in the concept of the indispensable man. However, I do believe that there are times when a man may become virtually indispensable. Because of what Mr. Dulles has done over the past several months, especially during the past several weeks, in going to Western Europe and to meeting the Tarnin and German matters with our allies,