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SPEECH OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)  
For Release Weds. A.M.'s, Apr. 20, 1960

OUTER MONGOLIA AND NEWSMEN TO CHINA  
Suggested New Approaches

Mr. President:

It has long been the policy of this government not to establish diplomatic relations with the Chinese government at Peking. And so far as I am aware, the Peking government has not indicated any desire to establish diplomatic relations with this nation. The Chinese in Peking, in short, appear to be as wedded to the continuance of the present diplomatic situation as we are.

The question of whether or not to seek to establish diplomatic relations--to extend official recognition depends on many factors. I presume that this Administration has weighed these factors in the same unemotional, objective and non-political fashion as its predecessor, and has come to the same conclusion: that to establish diplomatic relations with Peking is not in our national interest. I do not quarrel with that decision. The Executive Branch has custody of all the facts which go into the decision and the responsibility for the decision ultimately rests with that branch. I must say, however, that on the basis of such information that is public, it seems to me that the decision of the Executive Branch, in this connection, is the correct one.

Whether or not to establish diplomatic relations with any nation is one question. Whether or not to seek unofficial contacts is another. And in this situation, it seems to me that any avenue of contact which may help us to understand and to act intelligently on what is one of the most formidable developments of our times--the emergence and transformation of China into a

militant communist state, is not only not to be avoided but is to be sought out. I assume that this is one of the major considerations which has prompted this Administration to keep a representative talking on and off with a Chinese Communist counterpart in Geneva and Warsaw since 1954. I assume that this is one of the considerations which prompts the Administration to spend public funds in obtaining, wherever possible, information about developments within China and in analyzing and interpreting this information. I assume that this is one of the considerations which inspires various departments of the Administration to spend public funds in training employees in the Chinese language.

It seems to me that no opportunity should be lost for providing to the people of the nation--no less than to those who conduct foreign policy--as much objective information about developments in China as can be obtained. That information should be drawn, if it is at all possible, from the actual source of the developments.

Since the Communists achieved military supremacy on the Chinese mainland, American journalists have been trying to do this job of information-gathering for the American people in much the same way as the Executive Branch does for its official purposes. They have tapped much the same second-hand sources in Hong Kong, Formosa and other places along the rim of China and elsewhere. They have put together a scattering of facts and rumors with the glue of speculative interpretation. Most American journalists recognize, I believe, that this is an inadequate way to do their job even though it is the best that can be done in present circumstances.

But some years ago, apparently, an opportunity existed for reporters to get news as they would prefer to get it--first-hand in China. That opportunity, which depended on the cooperation of the Executive Branch, was

withheld for a time. Many months later the Executive Branch recognized the right of the newsmen to go but the situation had changed. By then, the Chinese Communists had closed the door which, for a moment, appeared to have opened.

I do not know what it will require now to get American newsmen into China. I do not know whether any arrangement is even possible. I believe now, however, as I did when the issue first arose, that it will be greatly in the interests of this nation if the newsmen can gain entry. If for no other reason, it will give the people of the United States an opportunity to check, against their objective reporting, the second-hand composite picture of the cataclysmic changes in China which trickles down to us through the sieve of speculation. In the long-run, if our present policies with respect to China are to maintain their validity, in this as in any other matter, they must be supported by public attitudes arrived at through an independent evaluation of the facts. The failure to grasp the opportunity to gain entry into China in the past, the failure now to seek to reopen the opportunity helps our policies not at all, and serves only to deny to the people of the United States the contribution which a free press is intended, under the Constitution, to provide to them in the conduct of the public business.

While the responsibility for paving the way rests within the Administration, I would suggest most respectfully, that a sincere and determined effort be made at this time to reach some agreement with Peking for the reciprocal exchange of newsmen. That effort has little if anything to do with the question of formal diplomatic relations with China. It has much to do with an eyes-opened rather than an eyes-closed policy on an area which carries the most far-reaching implications for the future of the nation and the peace of the world.

In a similar vein, I refer to the situation in Outer Mongolia. Merely to mention Outer Mongolia in a serious vein is to invite a humorous reaction or at best, a look of perplexity. While it may be difficult to grasp the relationship of a vast stretch of deserts and desolate mountains in Central Asia to major trends in world affairs, the relationship, nevertheless, is there. It is there, because in those deserts and mountains, the outward pulsations of Chinese and Russian society converge in a setting which is not, in the least, fixed or static.

Brought into direct juxtaposition in this fashion are two great powers, to sets of national interests and fears as well as two variations of a shared ideology. That is the reality, whatever may be the apparent universality of international communism. How these national interests and these ideological variations reconcile or diverge, how these fears intensify or relax on contact--these questions involving Russia and China are of the greatest significance for the conduct of effective foreign policy. Indeed, the importance of this contact has been recognized in the many words which have been written by skilled people on this question, without specific reference to Outer Mongolia.

In Outer Mongolia, however, the living drama of the convergence is being enacted. It has been brilliantly described by Mr. Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times who visited the area last year. If there is any need for evidence of the extraordinary value to the people of this nation and, indeed, to the government, of competent American journalists penetrating where the government does not choose to tread, I would most respectfully submit these articles by Mr. Salisbury.

According to Mr. Salisbury, Chinese and Russians in large numbers are present in that borderland. Separate missions from each are at work on

separate undertakings. Each acknowledges, formally, the national independence of the Mongolian people but each seeks to influence the orientation and development of the Mongols in its own fashion. The picture which emerges from Mr. Salisbury's articles is by no means one of a monolithic, single-minded communist super-state extending from Eastern Europe to Peking.

We have chosen in official policy--under both Democratic and Republican Administrations--not to be first-hand witnesses to the drama in Outer Mongolia. We have chosen, apparently, to exclude ourselves from the legitimate and continuing observations which would be possible in Outer Mongolia, if official contact were maintained with that country, observations which would be extremely helpful in the formulation of effective policies with regard to all of Asia as well as Russia.

So far as I am aware we have not explored the possibilities of some kind of formal ties with the Mongolian government at Ulan Bator. That is the case although the arguments against recognition of Peking do not apply in this situation and there are indications that the Mongolian government, which is recognized by certain Asian countries, is anxious to establish contact with Western states. Further, we have frowned upon the admission of Outer Mongolia to the United Nations. We apparently have marked it, and perhaps in error, as just another Soviet province. In short, we may well be imprisoning our policies in an unnecessary separation of ourselves from a most valuable source of information and official contact in the heart of Asia, out of inadequate facts, inertia or a fear of derision.

The decision to act in the case of Outer Mongolia, as in the case of a reciprocal exchange of newsmen with the Chinese mainland is one which rests with the Administration. I suggest, however, that we stand to gain by an

initiative in this remote and little-known but highly significant area. I have yet to see any persuasive reason why we should not offer to exchange exploratory missions with the Outer Mongolian government with a view to considering the establishment of diplomatic or other ties. Further, I believe this government should propose in the United Nations that the Outer Mongolian government, if it still desires admission to that organization, should exchange missions with the Secretary-General of the U.N. If the Secretary-General finds a reasonable basis --comparable to some of the other admissions with which that organization has been able to live--if he finds a reasonable basis for the admission of Outer Mongolia then the United States should not stand in the way.