Speeches, China Revisited: A New Era in Asia

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CHINA REVISITED: A NEW ERA IN ASIA  

We are in the open-season in politics. The arrows of  
allegation fly thick and fast. Political pot-shots come from all  
directions. North, south, east and west, the land is strewn with  
tattered public reputations.  

I have no inclination to join in the personal carnage. When  
it is over our national ills will still be with us. Their cure will  
not be made any easier by the wounds of politics. In any event, this  
is a bipartisan audience— at least, I hope there are a few Democrats  
present. It would be appropriate in the circumstances, I think, to  
eschew the political in my remarks. Let me proceed on the principle  
that people who live in the glass houses of national politics should  
not throw stones, especially at a convention of glass makers.
It is my intention, instead, to talk to you about a nation where recycling is not an issue because waste has been recycled since time immemorial. It is a nation where neither bottles nor anything else of value is thrown away. It is a nation several thousand years older than the United States and many times more densely populated, yet whose rivers and streams run teeming with fish.

This year the international roads have all led to that country and to its capital of Peking. There is an ancient Chinese proverb which loosely translated says that "the journey of a thousand miles begins with the first step." In a shift of history, the first major step towards China was taken for this nation by President Nixon and I applaud him for it. When a similar shift is also noted in the President's approach to Soviet Russia, we begin to have some measure of the magnitude of the transition which is underway in the international scene.

The President's visit to Peking set off a chain reaction. Subsequent missions were undertaken by the bipartisan leaderships of the Senate and the House. Additional visits of international
significance have been undertaken by other countries, most recently, that of Prime Minister Tanaka of Japan.

To grasp what is taking place today, these visits must be seen against the background of past policy toward China. At mid-century, the American political scene was dominated by one theme: "Who lost China?" Stentorian voices asked the question from one end of this nation to the other. Scapegoats were dragged out of government agencies and academic life to be paraded before Congressional committees and held up to public scorn. We sought an explanation for the failure of a policy in this fashion because none other seemed plausible at the time. Fresh from the great military triumphs of World War II, we were not yet ready--as a nation--to face the fact that three-quarters of a billion people could not be won or lost in the mid-twentieth century by anybody except themselves. It was inconceivable to us that anything except betrayal could be at fault in the "loss of China."
So the idea that China was something which had been allowed to slip through our fingers into the hands of Moscow became firmly imbedded in the nation's Asian policies. So, too, did we come to accept the illusion that China was recoverable by us, in due course, by ostracizing or flailing the government in Peking as "un-Chinese" and "unleashing" Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. These concepts were expressed in a policy of building a military wall around China and preparing, on Taiwan, forces of the National Government to retake the mainland.

In time, this obsessive policy led us to send tens of thousands of Americans and Chinese, not to speak of Koreans to their deaths unnecessarily in the rash extension of the Korean war beyond the 38th parallel. It led us to form a chain of Asian treaties whose links were Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and nations of Southeast Asia—all weak and all dependent on the United States for survival. U. S. bases were established, willy nilly, in countries throughout the area. Tens of thousands of U. S. forces were deployed to man the bases. Tens
of billions of dollars were spent for military activities and foreign aid. Huge staffs of U. S. government administrators, military advisors, construction workers and others were sent to administer the aid.

The so-called "containment policy" for the Far East which had been precipitated by an expression of indignant public aversion to a revolutionary China led us, step by step, into the terrible tragedy of Indochina. Nowhere along the line—and I include the Congress with the various presidential administrations and the permanent bureaucracy of the government—did we find the wisdom and strength to break the inertia. We failed even to restrain this process until more than half a million Americans were bogged down in Indochina and our country was confronted with the greatest internal divisiveness since the Civil War.

We were drawn into a vortex by what was seen as a "lost" China, a reckless, beligerent communist monster, set loose by Moscow. The irony was that at the very same time, the leaders in Peking were regarding themselves as trying only to assert control over traditional
territories and attempting to build a new and unified nation capable of meeting the needs of the Chinese people. Our policy of "containing China" whether expressed in Korea, Taiwan or Viet Nam, in nuclear bases in Okinawa or in U-2 flights over Chinese territory, was interpreted by Peking as a vicious extension of Western imperialist efforts to dominate China. We were held up to a new generation as the number one enemy. For the first time in decades, Chinese children were encouraged to hate the government of the once "beautiful country" as the name "America" translates into Chinese.

That is in the past. The raw confrontation is now over. Together with the Peking government, we have embarked on what is likely to be a long slow journey of restoration. President Nixon's visit to China early this year was a symbolic act of the highest significance in this process. When the President and the Chinese Premier touched glasses in toasts of mutual friendship, the death knell of the containment policy in Asia tolled across the Pacific.
As I have noted, the joint Senate leadership followed the
President to China last April and May. Let me give you, now, a
few first-hand impressions of the changes which have taken place
in the lives of over 800,000 people--one fourth of the world's
population. I do so in order to provide some indication of the
kind of nation with which the world must reckon. What the joint
leadership concluded differs little from what other Americans have
found in visits to the new China.

To digress for a moment, I might mention that I served as a
Marine in the old China. Ever since I have been partial to the
Marines. When I was in the Navy, I never rose above the rank of
Seaman 2nd Class. During my Army hitch, I remained a buck private.
But the Marines, recognizing certain exceptional qualities in my
soldiering, elevated me for the rest of my military career to the
rank of P. F. C.

I must add that my exposure to the old China was not limited
to a KP's view of the warlord era when Chinese scavenged the garbage
cans of the mess halls for food. In 1944, I went again, as a young Congressman on a mission for President Roosevelt, to a disease-ridden, famine-stricken, wartorn free China, traveling the old Burma Road and many parts of the West, specifically Yunnan and Szechwan. Again, shortly after the Japanese surrender, I visited Peking and Tientsin once more and Tsingtao on the Northeast coast.

The contrast between the old China and China today, is extraordinary. To be sure, the Chinese People's Republic is more closely controlled and highly organized than ever before. Intellectual and artistic freedom are non-existent. Nor is there representative government and free enterprise, as we know them. However, if we have learned one truth from our experiences in Asia, it should be that American values are not necessarily adaptable wholesale in Asia.

What is of greatest relevance to the Chinese people at this time is that the present system has led to the availability of adequate food, shelter, clothing and simple consumer goods. It
has led to great advances in public health care, basic education, transportation, electrification, and the like. It has developed an economy which is capable of manufacturing, out of Chinese resources, thousands of products, from a pin to nuclear devices and space satellites and the machine tools to produce them.

What is relevant, too, is that the superstructure of control is manned, not by a conspicuous and highly privileged elite as in the past but by men and women who work among the people, who dress like them and live with them. Conformity there is, as there has always been, for the great numbers of Chinese but it is not produced by a visible whip. Indeed, I do not think I saw more than one or two fire-arms anywhere in China during the entire visit.

What is most striking is a universal sense of participation in work. A bona fide national family is emerging, with a "one for all and all for one" concept of society. The present system, in short, seems to have succeeded in undergirding the personal pride of the Chinese in China. As Chou En-lai put it, "The Chinese people
can stand up again." As never before, China seems strong, dynamic, unified and virtually classless.

As this vast uplift has gained in momentum, nations have beat a path to China's door. For us, the time was over-ripe for the President's initiative. For several years, hostility between the United States and China has been receding. Long before the President's visit, this country has ceased to be an unmitigated ogre in China's eyes. The focus of Peking's concern began to shift elsewhere a decade ago, notably to the Soviet Union and to Japan. Only the intrusion of the ill-fated Vietnamese involvement concealed the extent of the shift.

As for the Soviet Union, at first, the Chinese leaders felt bound closely by what seemed to be a common ideology. Moreover, the relationship was cemented by the unifying force of a hostile outside world. Over the years, however, ideological concepts diverged. A serious cleavage developed between the two nations and long-standing border questions and other irritants came into view.
The Soviet aid-program is a prime example. At first welcomed, it came to be seen in China as something of a fraud which carried too high a price tag for inferior goods and technologies. While the program has long since been discontinued and the Russians paid in full and sent home, the sense of being cheated still rankles among the Chinese.

Most serious, one million Soviet and Mongolian armed forces on China's border are no longer regarded as communist allies. On the contrary, these forces now loom as a menace of major proportions on a par with, if not greater than U.S. military bases in Asia or the prospect of a rearmed Japan.

As for China and Japan, the recent meeting of Premier Chou and Prime Minister Tanaka sets the stage for further changes in the special ties of the latter country with the United States. Since World War II, the Japanese have looked primarily to this nation not only for security but also for the great portion of the foreign trade which supports their economic well-being. On the other side of the
coin, Japan has followed very closely the U. S. lead in international relations. Now, an immense economic dynamism has developed in Japan. Japanese productive capacity ranks third in the world and Japanese trade is flourishing on all continents. This economic growth makes possible greater independence in international policies; indeed, it makes greater independence necessary.

The political settlement which has been achieved with China foreshadows the end of the unequal and quasi-dependent relationship with the United States. On the one hand this change is welcomed both here and in Japan. On the other hand, anxieties over what the future may hold have led to some mutual recrimination. It is the responsibility of diplomacy and statecraft to hold in check tendencies of this kind. On that score, I must say in all candor, that there has been some slippage on the part of the Administration.

I can conceive of no greater tragedy for the Pacific region than that the inevitable transition in the U. S. - Japanese relationship terminate in its disruption. To avoid such an outcome,
it would be helpful to recognize frankly that Japan's great economic achievements in recent years have been pinching at sensitive political and commercial nerves in this country. Preoccupied for too long with Viet Nam, we have awakened to discover that our industry is no longer able to compete in many fields with the Japanese. While we have been wasting our substance, skills, manpower and industrial creativity in Indochina, the Japanese have been putting insignificant outlays into military purposes. Their economic energies have been concentrated, instead, on peaceful production and trade. It is not surprising, in the circumstances, that for the last six years, the United States has had a bilateral trade deficit with Japan, which reached an all-time high of $3.2 billion last year.

Japan's reestablishment of relations with China, in my judgment, is in the interests of all concerned. The door will now open still more widely to a Sino-Japanese trade which is already large and growing. In so doing, it will lessen the pressure of
Japanese competition in U.S. markets. Furthermore, it may well stimulate the Soviet Union into a heightened economic interchange with Japan, especially in connection with the Soviet Maritime Provinces and Siberia.

These adjustments can go far to untangle the trade lines of the Far Pacific which were distorted by ideological conflicts in the aftermath of World War II. Moreover, they dovetail with the clearing away of trade barriers between the United States and China and the United States and the Soviet Union. Taken all together, these shifts could lay a firm economic base for peaceful relationships between Japan, China, the Soviet Union and the United States in the Western Pacific. The question is can there also be found in all four countries the political wit and diplomatic wisdom to build a quadripartite base of stability in that region?

Early steps will involve adjustments in security relationships, notably in the defense treaties between Japan and the United States and the Soviet Union and China. These treaties were entered
into in a different time and situation. Insofar as the Japanese - U. S. relationship is concerned, it is likely that the U. S. nuclear safeguards for Japan will remain significant for some time. Outside this umbrella, however, it seems to me that U. S. bases on Japanese territory, which have already declined in importance, will have lost additional significance as a result of the Chou - Tanaka and the Chou - Nixon communiques.

Present developments among the larger countries of Asia have set in motion repercussions elsewhere. After two decades of unrestrained invective, for example, the two Koreas are talking amicably. Thailand has accepted a Chinese invitation to take its table tennis team to Peking. The ping-pong players will be accompanied by government emissaries carrying not only paddles and ping-pong balls, but, in all probability, briefs on Sino-Thai international issues. It will be only a matter of time, I should think, before relations are normalized between China and Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand.
In short, from one end of the Western Pacific to the other, outmoded policies are on the way out. What still remains intact, however, are this nation's military and other arrangements around the rim of the People's Republic of China. The next step for this Administration or its successor, it would seem, will involve an examination of these arrangements, indeed all the tools—the treaties and other measures—by which antiquated doctrines are still being pursued in Asia. The cutting edge of these tools will have to be reset so that they may be applied in follow-through on the President's initiative and with relevance to the contemporary realities of the Far East.

It would be well to bear in mind in this connection that the United States is, and will continue to be, a Pacific power. We should cease now to act as an Asian power as we have been trying to do for the past quarter of a century. The fact is that we have no vital— I stress the word vital—interest on the mainland of Asia except to extricate ourselves from the quicksands of Indochina.
To meet our vital Pacific interests—and, as distinct from those in Asia, they are vital—does not require us to continue to maintain hundreds of thousands of armed forces and over 100 major bases throughout the Western Pacific at a cost of billions of dollars annually. It does not compel us to give vast quantities of arms and other wasteful aid to dubious governments. The deployment of our military forces and our resources should be matched to contemporary needs and not to the myths of the past. It is time for careful, in-depth studies of all of our non-nuclear security commitments in Asia and it would be my hope that such studies will be undertaken in the Senate and elsewhere during the next Congress.

Over the hopeful developments in Asia, there still hangs the cloud of Indochina. Our nation remains entrapped by its own Southeast Asian policies. To be sure, fewer Americans than in the past now die in Indochina each week and that is cause for gratitude. That does not excuse us, however, from facing the fundamental issue. What we must ask ourselves bluntly is why any American should die
in Indochina? Why is there, still, any American involvement in a war which is now looked upon as a mistake by almost all Americans?

The continued involvement in Indochina works against the long-range interests of this nation not only in Asia but throughout the world and at home. It is debilitating our economy at the rate of at least some $3 billion a year now, or about $40 out of the pockets of every man, woman, and child in the nation. We are building up public obligations which not only feed inflation but which will carry well into the 21st Century. The involvement is helping to destroy the lives of thousands of Indochinese every week in a war which, less and less, draws distinctions between combatant and non-combatant, "smart bombs" notwithstanding. Like a cancer, the war eats away at the vitality of our national life and the trust of Americans in each other and in their government. It is feeding on the nation's soul, stripping away the concern that has made America, America—a decent concern for the life of all human beings wherever they may be.
The longer we continue in Indochina the more we place ourselves at a disadvantage in tackling the real problems facing us in the Pacific. The waters of that ocean touch the shores of the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and China. We are all Pacific nations. Our fates are interwoven in a complex of common and divergent interests. It is going to tax us to the fullest to deal with that complex in a way which serves the well-being of this nation. We can ill afford to approach the new situation in the Western Pacific with one foot in the trap of Indochina.

We have made a start—a good start. We have begun, belatedly, to face up to the present and to look to the future. We have a long way to go but the first step is the longest and the most difficult. We can continue with assurance along this path on which we have entered in Asia, recognizing that it is but a sector of the path of brotherhood, mutual understanding and equality for all men everywhere. In the end, the goal is the same—peace, peace for ourselves and our children and our children's children.
A New Era in Asia

1971 has been a year of momentous political changes in Asia. All center about China, that vast home of one-fourth the people on this globe. Ironically, although a change in American policy toward China set off the chain reaction, in Indochina our nation's blood and treasure are still being shed in a war founded on a myth that has now been discarded. I would like to talk to you today about China, the fast-changing scene in Asia, and the relationship of the war in Indochina to what is taking place.

There is an ancient Chinese proverb which says "the journey of a thousand miles begins with the first step." This year, the roads in the Far East have all led to Peking. And the first step which started these journeys was taken by the man who bears much of the responsibility for creating the emotional climate that shackled America's Asia policy for almost a quarter of a century. A principal creator of the mythical Communist Chinese dragon, seemingly ready to gobble up its neighbors, became the one to slay the myth. The policy perpetrated by this fraud has been the most misguided and ill-fated chapter in the history of American foreign policy.
A bit of perspective is needed to relate our past policy toward China to what is taking place in Asia today. Following the Communist takeover in 1949 the American political scene was dominated by an emotional witch hunt to find the culprits "who lost China." Americans did not understand that China was never ours to lose. Yet the fruits of McCarthyism became firmly rooted as the major planks of our foreign policy in the Far East. Following the Korean War, the United States erected a ring of treaties designed to choke off what were thought to be China's aggressive designs. The SEATO Treaty, the mutual defense treaties with the Republic of China, Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, and the Republic of Korea all formed links in the chain. With these treaties came U.S. bases, U.S. troops to man the bases, billions of dollars in military aid, and advisors to show our Allies how to use the arms we gave them.

But, the reality is that while we have seen China as a reckless, belligerent and powerful dragon to be contained, China has seen itself as a weak, underdeveloped country trying to pull itself up by its own economic boot straps, minding its own political business. The Chinese have viewed the United
States efforts to contain China simply as an extension of the Western World's efforts to dominate and exploit China over the last 150 years.

Now, after these many years of confrontation and hostility, the United States and China have taken far-reaching steps on the journey to restoration of normal, friendly relations between our countries and our peoples. The significance of President Nixon's visit to China does not lie in the words of the Shanghai Communiqué, or in any dramatic moves by either country, but in what it symbolizes and the waves of change it set in motion:

It meant the death knell for the long-discredited policy of attempting to contain a China which is not aggressive or expansionistic.

It meant an end to our missionary approach toward the nations of Asia, a policy of "Uncle Sam knows best."

It meant that the United States recognizes that its ability to influence the course of events in Asia is quite limited.

It meant that we are beginning to deal with the world as it is and not as we would like it to be.
The President's trip has already had profound meaning for future United States policy and relationships throughout Asia. The tree of relationships in Asia, and, indeed, in the world, was shaken by the U.S.-China initiative and the outline of what the tree will look like in the future is now becoming discernible.

As you know, Senator Scott and I spent sixteen days in China last April and May, at the invitation of the Chinese Government. Let me say a few words about my impressions because I believe that what is taking place in China has a great bearing on why the world's leaders are looking and listening to Peking as never before.

The contrast between the old China and the new is nothing short of remarkable. To be sure, it is a classless, controlled society; there is as yet no real intellectual freedom. And the free enterprise system, as we know it, does not exist. But China has always been a controlled society. The difference is that before 1949 it was controlled for the benefit of a small elite, now it is controlled for the benefit of the masses. If we have learned one truth from our experiences in Asia over the last quarter century, it should