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Japan National Press Club

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

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ADDRESS BY U.S. AMBASSADOR MIKE MANSFIELD
JAPAN NATIONAL PRESS CLUB
TOKYO, JANUARY 28, 1980

PRODUCTIVE PARTNERSHIP AND NEW CHALLENGES

During his visit to the United States last year, Prime Minister Ohira suggested the term "productive partnership" to define Japan's relations with the United States, and it was incorporated in the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of his talks with President Carter.

It is an accurate and appropriate description of what our relationship has become. You are at least as familiar as I am with the evolution in Japan-U.S. relations over the years, and I hope you would agree that our relationship has adapted well to the changes wrought by time and circumstances.

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It is vastly different from what it once was, and more important than it has ever been.

We have moved from a situation in which American weight was preponderant to a condition of equality, growing interdependence and partnership. I would like to say a few words about that partnership as I see it at the beginning of this new decade.

Our relations are in fundamentally good shape as we enter the 80s. They are characterized by a degree of trust and mutual understanding we have often striven for in the past but in my judgment have only recently achieved.

The last few years have not been easy ones in our relations, as we have grappled with new problems as well as old ones re-emerging in new and intense forms. We are confronting an increasing range of new issues relating to technology, for example, an area likely to demand even more attention in the 80s. Sectoral trade problems—steel, color TV, and others—are old and familiar; we have managed them successfully, but others are certain to arise in the years ahead. Our overall trade relationship is moving toward greater balance, thanks to strong mutual efforts, but those efforts will have to continue.
In addressing these issues, we have worked together on many fronts—in bilateral and multilateral forums to discuss the dilemma of nuclear reprocessing and nonproliferation; in the negotiations for the new MTN agreement to which we have both subscribed; in informal and formal bilateral trade negotiations such as those between Ambassadors Strauss and Ushiba; and in the newly formed Japan-U.S. Economic Relations Group. What we need is basically more of the same—continued close attention to the state of our ties so that we can identify and deal with issues as they emerge and before they get out of hand.

Our security relationship has grown steadily more effective, and its importance to the safety and well-being of both our countries is more widely accepted, here and in the U.S., than ever before. One of the better recent examples of productive partnership was the adoption of mutually agreed guidelines for defense planning, now in effect for a little over a year. The uniformed services of our two countries are able to sit down together and work out ways in which they can cooperate with maximum effectiveness, making the best use of our resources.
In this, as in all areas of our relations, the effectiveness of our partnership depends ultimately on the people involved on both sides. In this regard, I would like to say that my military colleagues and I have the utmost respect for the professional competence of the civilian and military leadership of Japan's defense establishment. We work well together, and I think we have the results to show for it.

A good deal of publicity is given from time to time to the question of defense spending. As allies and partners we talk out such questions frankly, but the decisions are Japanese decisions. Japan has been making steady progress in this regard over a good many years. The world situation changes, and we all have to take a fresh look at our priorities each year, but I am satisfied that we will continue to see gradual, steady improvements in the contribution which Japan makes to our mutual security efforts.

We have observed with great interest Japan's increasingly active and wide-ranging diplomatic role, and we value very highly Japan's cooperation with us in dealing with an expanding variety of political, economic and security issues. For example, I believe Japan's large and growing contribution to international efforts to alleviate the refugee crisis in Southeast Asia is
particularly worthy of note. Japan and the United States are the major financial pillars for the massive relief program which has been mounted there. While it is to be hoped that the specter of flight and starvation in Indochina will soon be eased, the end is not yet in sight, and much remains to be done. Japan's role is an essential one, and its efforts have been received with gratitude.

Our partnership in all its aspects is being challenged today by the separate but related crises in South Asia--the seizure of American hostages in our embassy in Tehran, and the Soviet invasion of neighboring Afghanistan. Both have grave implications for the rule of reason in international affairs and for the security and economic progress of the entire world. Both require strong and unified responses.

The American hostages in Tehran are suffering greatly. We are determined to achieve their release. We deeply appreciate the support Japan has given us and continues to give us on this grave problem. Japan has taken a strong public stand against the seizure and to continued detention of the hostages, and it has done this despite the important economic interests it has in Iran. Japan's situation is not
an easy one, but the Japanese government recognizes that to resolve this crisis in a manner consistent with international law and the views of the world community, there must be unequivocal and total opposition to the terrorism being perpetrated there. Only on that basis can we restore normal relations with that important country.

In Afghanistan also, the world community is called upon to react with unity and courage. The Soviet invasion is one of the most blatant acts of aggression since World War II. The Soviets are attempting to consolidate a strategic position that poses a dire threat to the free movement of Middle East oil. They have demonstrated total disregard for the rights of sovereign nations and for the principles of the United Nations Charter. The implications of this Soviet action for the security not only of South Asia, but for the entire world are grave.

Historical parallels are sometimes misleading, but one inevitably recalls the dark period of the 30's, when the failure of the Western democracies to respond with vigor to aggression led inexorably to wider aggression. Here, again, Japan has joined my government and others in strongly denouncing the Soviet action. But, as President Carter said
last week in his State of the Union address, "verbal condemnation is not enough. The Soviet Union must pay a concrete price for their aggression. While the invasion continues, we and other countries cannot continue business as usual with the Soviet Union."

The United States has taken a number of tangible steps. We have stopped Soviet fishing in U.S. waters; we have embargoed grain shipments and restricted other trade; we have taken measures to strengthen our military capabilities in that area and President Carter has notified the Olympic Committee that neither he or nor the American people will support sending an Olympic team to Moscow.

Japan has also taken certain steps and is considering others, as are the nations of Western Europe and many others around the globe. To the extent we join together, I believe the effectiveness of our actions will increase many-fold. We have been in close consultation on these questions with the Japanese government and with our other allies, and those consultations will continue.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan serves as a reminder, if one were needed, that the Soviet system remains today, as
it has been from the beginning, inherently aggressive. This does not mean that it must remain forever beyond the pale of normal relations, that we do not have important interests in common with it, or that we will not continue to seek cooperation in areas that contribute to peace and security. Both Japan and the United States have developed over the past 25 years a rather broad network of relationships with the Soviet Union, touching upon almost every field of national endeavor. We are prepared to continue some of them; in particular, we believe it is important that negotiations concerning strategic arms limitation go forward. Other areas of cooperation, however, seem less appropriate under the circumstances. The management of relations with the Soviet Union thus seems likely to become an even more complex and difficult proposition in the years ahead than it has been in the recent past. It will test our wisdom, and our will, and is likely to figure even more prominently than heretofore in the consultations which form the foundation of our partnership.

Uncertainty in the Middle East is another fact of life with which we will have to contend together in the years ahead. The hostage crisis, we hope, will be solved in the near future. But other unsettling factors, ranging from
the effects of the Arab-Israeli dispute to the propensity of the Soviets to fish in troubled waters, will mean a continued potential for unrest in that vital region. There again, our resolve, and unity, will be required. It seems to me, however, that these crises have demonstrated anew that Japan and the United States share basic values and have common goals, and that we act accordingly. Our situations are not identical and our responses do not have to be identical, but there is no doubt in my mind that our basic policies rest on common assumptions and are entirely compatible. We share a common view of the world, and this gives great strength to our relationship.

In considering the implications for our nations and the world of problems in the Middle East, one of course is brought face to face with an even more fundamental issue of the 80s--the growing energy crisis. Here as well, our partnership faces severe challenges, and in my judgement has much to offer.

I can think of no more important area for productive partnership. This was true before recent events in the Middle East brought even more sharply into focus the
dependence of the industrialized world on oil resources. It is even more true today.

The United States and Japan have already joined together in a major cooperative program to accelerate research and development in regard to such potential sources of energy as fusion technology and coal liquefaction. I would suggest that we move beyond this framework to devise as rapidly as possible comprehensive arrangements, of which research and development will, of course, remain a major part, and that we think in terms of assuring the energy needs of Japan and other Pacific nations in the decades ahead.

I speak of coal. Here in the Pacific Basin are ample reserves of this ancient energy source, sufficient to satisfy the needs of the countries of the region for hundreds of years to come. I propose that on the one hand we devote as many scientific and engineering resources as we can muster to the rapid development of technology to permit the use of coal in economically and environmentally acceptable conditions. But I suggest that at the same time the United States, Japan, Australia, and other interested parties consider together the
development of an infrastructure--transportation, stockpiling, processing and other arrangements--which would assure that coal would be readily available over the long term for efficient, economical and safe use by all of us.

Here is a most challenging area for productive partnership--encompassing economic, scientific, security, and political relations. Its implications will be clear to all who stop and think. I do not suggest the answers will be simple or arrived at overnight, but I would like to plant at least this seed of thought in the conviction that this is an undertaking of great urgency and potentially great reward.

If the energy crisis is a reality of the 80s, and it is, the prospect of at least partially alleviating it through cooperation among the countries of this region illustrates another, more encouraging reality: the growing recognition that many of the most pressing contemporary problems, of which the energy crisis is only one example, are beyond the capacity of any single nation acting alone to resolve; they require effective international action. I am confident that many of the cooperative approaches begun during the 70s will be strengthened during the 80s: coordination of energy policy
among the major oil consumers; international efforts to promote the use of nuclear energy while inhibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons; efforts to deal with problems of the environment; measures to relieve the suffering of refugees—a problem reaching massive proportions throughout the world; coordination of macroeconomic policy among the major Western democracies; efforts to find mutually acceptable solutions to the range of issues encompassed in the North-South dialogue.

In most of these multilateral endeavors, the United States and Japan will play leading roles. Our approaches toward most such issues during the decade just past were complementary and mutually supportive. I am confident that this will be even truer in the 80s, and the multilateral dimension of the U.S.-Japan relationship, important in the 70s, will assume an even greater significance in the coming ten years.

The agenda for the U.S.-Japan partnership is a crowded one. The 1980s are going to be demanding and complex. We should face them with confidence, however, and not be fearful. While there will be inevitable failures from time
to time, the experience of the 70s gives reason to expect some major successes. What is required is awareness of the interests and perceptions of each other; an alert appreciation for emerging problems, both bilateral and multilateral; imagination in working out solutions; and abundant good will—as in all human relationships the last may be the most important of all. I think we have all the necessary ingredients, and I look at the future with optimism.

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1. Maryknoll International News Service
   James Colligan
2. UPI
   Akishi Kuramasu
3. New York Times
   Henry Scott-Stokes
4. AFP
   Marie-France Rouze
5. Sud-Deutsche Zeitung
   Gebhard Hielscher
6. Los Angeles Times
   Samuel Jameson
7. New China News Agency
   Kung Mei
8. Polityka (Poland)
   Andrzej Wroblewski
9. French Embassy
   M. Bouffandeau
10. E.C. Commission
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Selected Questions and Answers at Ambassador Mansfield's Press Conference at the Japan National Press Club, January 28, 1980
Q. Gebhard Heilsher, West Germany: Mr. Ambassador you mentioned as one of the potentially dangerous issues between Japan and the U.S. the question of automobiles. American unions have recently demanded boycotts of Japanese products unless Japanese automobile makers establish production plants in the U.S. About one year ago at the then currency rate between the yen and the dollar at least one major Japanese automotive maker was prepared to seriously consider going to the U.S. but subsequently they changed their attitude because of the currency development meaning that cars can be very easily sold again in the U.S. under the currency exchange rate with the dollar. In spite of this development do you feel that Japanese makers should establish plants in the U.S. at this time although economically it doesn't seem sensible or do you think that it's a question which should be decided basically on economics?

A. I referred to autos as a clear and present danger. I did so on the basis of the fact that in 1978 the Japanese increased their exports by 10% over the year before. Last year the figures were somewhere around 9% over 1978. From what I read in the papers the projections would even exceed that figure. At the present time the American auto industry is closing down some plants creating a great deal of unemployment and the result is political tensions are rising. I do want to see Toyota and Nissan follow the lead of Honda. I think Honda is breaking the ice and setting a good precedent but when you figure that Toyota sold 500,000 cars in the U.S. last year and Nissan 400,000 I would say there is plenty of room for them to invest in the U.S. (for the production of) on the order of 200,000-250,000 cars a year. I think it would be good thing for them....it would tend to break down this exorbitant export rate which amounted to around 22-23% last year mostly Japanese, very little from W. Germany....VW has a very small part of the market and I think it's in the Japanese industry interest and in our mutual interest that this matter be met head-on. The Japanese as they have been asked to by both American labor and American industry (some of you will recall Henry Ford's speech here a few months ago saying he would like to see the Japanese come into America) should invest, build factories and employ American workers. They could keep their share of the market and much more if they did so. It would be in their best interest as I have indicated and hopefully the big Japanese companies are giving some thought to the seriousness of the situation because if something is not done....and I do not utter these words lightly....if something is not done you are going to find in this campaign year, this election year, a great swell of protectionist legislation which will be directed against those who import (into the U.S.) too much, too quickly and it might be very effective. So I would hope that this clear and present danger would be faced up to with understanding on both sides and that this difficulty which is now economic would not become a political issue. The strength of the relationship between our countries is too important to allow a matter like
this to get in the way of that relationship. I'm delighted to note that the President of the UAW, Douglas Fraser, will be coming to Japan next month, at which time I hope that he will be able to meet with the various authorities and officials. And I'm sure that all of us in this room are aware of statements which have been emanating from UAW headquarters over the past several months based on unemployment of 150-200,000 auto workers. There is no prospect that this will diminish in the near future. With the foreign auto makers taking over 22-23% of the American market rather than what used to be the usual 16-17-18%...all the ingredients of an explosion are there and I feel I must speak frankly to you because this is the next big issue...the next cloud on the horizon. This is a clear and present danger with which we have to contend and I hope we can in a statesman-like manner, in the best interest of both our countries. Neither the American auto industry's management or labor is unreasonable and I would hope that we would find the Japanese reasonable and understanding about the predicament which confronts both of us in the world's biggest auto market and that as productive partners we would be able to arrive at a mutually satisfactory solution to the problem which if not tended to in the very near future will become a political issue which would do neither country any good.

Q. David Lammers, Asahi Evening News: Japan was criticized for its response to the Iranian situation, how do you feel Japan has acted in the Afghanistan situation...what would you like to see Japan do specifically in terms of trade relations between Japan and the Soviet Union?

A. In the Afghanistan situation Japan has acted correctly and acted with understanding in the Iran situation. I do not believe in diplomacy by press conference as occurred in Paris. I think if we had been clued in at the Embassy here we could have told them what MITI was trying to do to foreclose or rather to stop the coming in of oil purchased at high spot market prices by 5-7 Japanese trading companies and as far as the financial allegations were concerned at that time I think they are open to question. The Japanese do have a very important economic relationship with Iran having to do with an 85% completed petrochemical plant and of course there are other industries. I am quite certain that in close consultation with us as to what our views and plans are Japan will live up to its reputation and do the right thing when the time comes.

Q. Kubo, Kyodo: On the Olympic games and sanctions against the USSR. There is criticism expressed in Japan and European countries that the Olympic games should be apolitical, that the Olympics might be destroyed. What is the political significance or impact of this move?

A. The logic behind it is to indicate to the Soviet Union our extreme displeasure, to put it mildly, over their invasion of Afghanistan. The questions raised by the gentleman are valid
ones...there has been some concern in my own country but when the showdown came they rallied behind the President and indicated that they support his position. Frankly I have been against the Olympics since the gunning down of 11 Israelis in Munich some years ago. I think they have been terrorized...I think they have been commercialized...I think they have been politicized and any relation between the Olympics of today and the Olympics which used to be held in Greece centuries ago is non-existent.

Q. I understand, Mr. Ambassador, that since the early 1970s you have recommended the withdrawal of American troops deployed on the European continent. Do you hold the same view under the current situation with the USSR invasion into Afghanistan, and do you hold similar views vis-a-vis American troops deployed in the Far Eastern region?

A. Those views would not hold up under current circumstances. I have been advocating for years that there be a gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe because they number somewhere around 250,000 at the present time with almost a like number of dependents, and what I was advocating was that the Western Europeans who number 250 million people should take up their share of the burden as the gradual withdrawal took place. At the present time, of course, there would be no thought given to it because of the grave situation that has arisen out of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As far as Korea is concerned, I would not advocate a reduction of U.S. troops at this time. I have in the past, but only on the assumption that South Korea would be equal in arms in all areas with North Korea, and when the latest intelligence estimates came out some months ago indicating that North Korea was superior, very much ahead of South Korea, I think the President made a wise choice in reversing his position and announcing that the 2nd Division would not be withdrawn but would remain there at least until 1981, which in my opinion means that it would remain there a good deal longer. I think the quid pro quo, the standoff, would have to be parity between North and South Korea before serious consideration should again be given to the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops. When I say parity I mean equality in the air, land and at sea in armaments and in equipment.

Item
私、さきほどのお話の中で自動車に関し言えば言ってしまいましたけれども、これが明らかに衝撃ないという意味で言ったわけではありません。そういったふうに申し出しましたのも、数字をベースにして言っただけのことであって、それから新聞報道などによると、今年の見通しは、この数字はさらにこれが増えるということがわかります。それから現実的にはアメリカ国内でのアメリカの自動車メーカーが工場を閉鎖したことにより、その結果、失業問題が高まってしまっていますということです。そしてこれが引き続き、その結果、失業問題が高まってしまっている状態でありました。これから私としては、日本のトヨタや日産は、何万両を売っておるわけですから、アメリカの国内市場で二三ないし三三%を輸入車が占めるという状態に、彼らにとってよいことだと思います。そしてそれは昨天、アメリカの国内市場で二三ないし三三%を輸入車が占めているという状態であると同じであり、ほんとそうならぬかとは、日本からの車、在独独からはそれほど、そんななさが必要でございません。ですから私がどのように申し上げているのは、日
ます。いまや自動車産業における労働者の失業数は十五万から二十万くらいにあっております。その後改善の見通しがあるわけでもあ

"片や米国市場における外国軍の占有率二二から二三％という歴史的にも未曾有の高い数字となっていることで、彼らの危惧の念が

"何よりまず大きな変化に伴ってしてしまったのであろう。かつて六、七八あるいは八九％台であ

"爆弾の導火線に火をつけたような状態と考えられるのであります。ですから、もう

"見え始めてある状態と深刻にとらえ、そしてこれが大きくなること

"何は何でも抑えるべきだと考えます。"
日本の業界の利益のために言っていることです。また、日系の利益を考えれば、問題が違います。日本の自動車製造業者は、市場の優位性を維持することを求めて利益を出すことができるからです。したがって、日本のメーカーがあまりに多くの利益を求めるからです。このような利益を求めることが出来ない状況ではあると思います。現在、日本は大企業が急激に成長しています。しかし、そのような利益を求めることが出来ないからです。したがって、日本企業が急激に成長していることを理解して、対策を講じることが重要です。
一月二十八日、日本総合開発庁の件について

私、さきほどのお話の中で自動車に関して言及いたしましたけれども、これは明らかに現存する危機といえるのであります。そういうふうに申し上げましたのも、数字をベースにして言ったわけであり、おわかりですか。七八年の日本からアメリカへの自動車輸出は、対前年度の一〇〇％の伸びを見せ、昨年は七八年に比較して九九の伸びを見せております。それから新聞報道などによると、今年の見通しで在アメリカ国内ではアメリカの自動車メーカーが工場を閉鎖したり、その結果失業問題を引き起こしておられます。そしてこれが引き金となって政治的緊張が高まってきています。それから私としては、日本のトヨタや日産がホンダの例にならって行動を起こして頂きたいと希望致します。ホンダは良い例を設定して皮切り、先べんをつけられたと思います。昨年トヨタは五十万台、アメリカに進出して工場を建てて、アメリカ国内で造ることをはせないし二三％を輸入車が占めたという状態に迫るため、全く日本からの車で、西独からはそれほどではありません。今日のところでは、アメリカの国内市場でニニ十分に三三％を輸入車が占めましたので、アメリカ国内で造ることをはせないということですね。
ヘンリー・フォード氏自身が日本自動車メーカーがアメリカに進出してきたことを、日本側に対して対米投資を行うことを求めると言っています。【記憶の内容だと思われます。】三、四か月ほど前に归国したとき、日本側に対して輸出の拡大を求めると言っています。このように日本では日本の自動車メーカーがアメリカに進出してきたことを、日本側に対して対米投資を行うことを求めると言っています。【記憶の内容だと思われます。】
いまや自動車産業における労働者の失業数は十五万から二十万ぐらいになっております。今後改善の見通しがあるわけでもありません。

片や米国市場における外国車の占有率が二三から二三％という歴史的にも未曾有の高い数字に当っていることです。彼らの危険の念が出ていらっしゃるわけであります。かって五六、一七あるいは八九％台であります。だから、もう爆弾の導入線に気がついたような状態と考えられるのであります。ですから次の非常な大きな問題としてはやや水平線・彼方に暗雲が見え始めている状態と深刻にとらえ、そしてこれが大きくなることを何が何でも抑えるべきだと考えます。これが、お互いの国益のために行動を起こすべきだと考えます。アメリカの自動車産業の労使は双方とも不合理なものです。私は日本側もリーズナブルであります。世界最大の自動車市場で両方が遭遇しているこの窮状に対して理解を示してほしいと思います。そして、本当に実り豊かなパートナーシップを組む両国として、両方に満足が得られるような解決策がもたらされることが望んでおります。もしこの問題に対し、今、適切な注目を向けなかったとすれば、政治問題化してしまうでありますし、そうなついてしまいますと双方の国益に決してかかることではないと思います。