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Foreign Correspondents' Club

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

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REMARKS BY U.S. AMBASSADOR MIKE MANSFIELD
FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS' CLUB OF JAPAN
TOKYO, MAY 22, 1980

It has been my good fortune to serve in Japan almost three years. That does not make me an old-timer by the standards of this group, but at least I am no longer the new boy on the block. Much has happened during that period—in Japan (although not every week has been as dramatic as the one just past), in the relations between Japan and the United States, and in the world environment surrounding us both. That old adage, "nothing is as constant as change" applies as much to U.S.-Japan relations as it does to life. But even measured against the rapid pace of change to which any observer of Japan is accustomed, these last few years have been extraordinary.
I would like to talk about some of those changes and what I think they mean. I don't propose to give you my analysis of the domestic political situation today, except to say that what we have seen illustrates one of the basic characteristics of democracy—it is unpredictable, and a little untidy. It makes life difficult for pundits, and sometimes for politicians. These remarks were prepared for the most part before last Friday's events, and I have felt no need to change them. Whatever has transpired, I believe there is a broad consensus in this country which underlies Japan's foreign policy in general and its ties with the United States in particular, and that it remains fully intact.

I also do not intend today to try to predict the future—I prefer to leave that to members of the Fourth Estate. But I think it is possible to identify some trends, and perhaps to project them some distance into the 80s in a general way.

I believe that to some extent perceptions in the United States and here as well have lagged behind the realities. While there may be a general awareness that changes have taken place in our relations, their meaning has not been fully appreciated. The perception gap is narrowing, however, and
I would like to try to contribute to that process today. I believe the United States and Japan are approaching a new stage in their relationship. Let me explain what I mean.

A brief look back is instructive. When Prime Minister Fukuda traveled to Washington in May of 1977 for his first meeting with President Carter, the major issues included Japanese concern over the prospect of a U.S. military withdrawal from Korea; our nuclear non-proliferation policy and how it might affect Japan's nuclear energy program; and color television and steel imports. In 1978 we moved from color TVs to other sectorial and macroeconomic issues of even greater scope and severity. Japan's massive current account surplus; the huge imbalance in our bilateral trade; questions of growth rates and of access to the Japanese market— all of these monopolized the attention of policy makers on both sides of the ocean and were the subject of as intensive a process of bilateral economic negotiations as any the United States has undertaken. That complex of economic issues dominated our discourse throughout 1978 and into last year. It received massive press coverage, and seemed at times to pose a serious threat to our overall ties.
The fact that none of these issues was at the top of the agenda in Prime Minister Ohira's recent meeting with the President was not solely a function of our attention having been turned toward Iran or Afghanistan. It also reflected the rather remarkable success we have had over the past three years in dealing with our bilateral problems. We have improved significantly during that period the mechanisms available to us for monitoring and managing our economic ties. We have established new instruments of consultation, ranging from a Trade Facilitation Committee to a Wise Men's Group. We have increased both the candor and the frequency of our informal consultations--the day-to-day contacts at all levels of our two governments which are so essential to cooperative relations. Our aim in all of this has been to identify problems at an early stage, and to solve them before they become unmanageable. We have emerged successfully from a difficult and sometimes disputatious period. We have been successful because we have dealt with the problems in a mutual way, our institutions have been joint institutions, and our approaches have been common approaches. I think the experience has bred a heightened sensitivity on both sides to the need to pay the closest attention to our economic ties--and it has also given us greater confidence in our ability to control events and influence the directions in which our economic relations move.
I am not suggesting that we are out of the woods. There will always be problems in an economic relationship as large as ours, affecting as it does the well-being of so many people in both our countries. And at any given time one or more of those problems is likely to loom large. But, I have said this before and am convinced it is true—the real test of a relationship is not the presence or absence of problems, but the capacity of the partners in that relationship to deal with those problems. We have passed that test with flying colors, and we will do equally well in the years ahead.

While our attention was fastened on economic problems during most of the past three years, some important progress was being made, quietly and without fanfare, in other areas. Developments in our security relationship have been especially noteworthy in recent years. The change has been even more pronounced if one looks back a bit further—it was twenty years ago this week that the Lower House ratified the Mutual Security Treaty, to the accompaniment of street demonstrations.

In the past few months we have witnessed a lively public discussion in this country of the international
security environment and the proper Japanese response to it. To what extent does the Soviet force buildup in this region, or heightened tensions in the Middle East impinge directly on Japan's safety and well-being, and what should this mean for Japanese security policy? What are the implications of these developments for the U.S.-Japan security relationship? For Japanese defense spending? In my opinion this is a healthy, and necessary public debate—and the fact that such questions can now be addressed objectively and without great public rancor or political turmoil is itself a measure of the change which has occurred.

Quite understandably, considerable attention is paid in all of this to the United States, and what it is we are said to want Japan to do. Our position is sometimes misunderstood. We have let it be known for years, publicly and privately, that in our view some improvement in Japan's forces was necessary. This continues to be our position. We welcome the measures Japan has already taken to strengthen its self-defense capability, including decisions to purchase the F-15, P-3C and E-2C, as well as other modern weapons systems. We are also
gratified by Japan's increasing contribution to the costs of maintaining our forces in this country. And we are encouraged by the progress achieved by our uniformed services in developing more detailed contingency plans, in accordance with the planning guidelines adopted by our two governments in 1978.

All of these developments enhance the credibility of Japan's self-defense capability, and in so doing add strength to the U.S.-Japan security relationship and the contribution it makes to the peace and stability of East Asia. We have expressed our hope that steady and significant progress can be maintained in all these areas, recognizing that this would entail commensurate increases in Japanese defense spending. But we do not and will not presume to tell Japan how to spend the money it budgets for defense. We maintain a continuing dialogue on all of these issues, as is proper and necessary in an alliance. However, we recognize and respect the fact that the pace, the extent and the direction of any increase in Japan's defense efforts remain, as they have always been, sovereign decisions for Japan to make.

There has been another important development in recent years in this country—perhaps less a new development than the
acceleration of a trend visible for a long time: the increasing scope and activism of Japanese diplomacy. Most of you would agree that Japan's political influence in the world, and its diplomatic reach, have not expanded as rapidly as has its economic power and worldwide network of economic interests. That anomaly has been significantly reduced in the last few years, however, as Japan has taken on major political responsibilities in a number of areas. In Southeast Asia, Japan's relations with the ASEAN countries can no longer be defined solely in economic terms; Japan's political and diplomatic support for those nations, no less than its large and indispensable contribution to the Indochina refugee relief effort, has added new depth to its role in that region. Japan has been in the forefront of international efforts to deal with the crises of Iran and Afghanistan, which I will discuss more fully a bit later on. I believe there is also a growing political dimension to Japan's ties with the nations of Western Europe. Japan's leading role in the economic summit process has been one factor encouraging this development; another it seems to me has been the close coordination we have seen recently between Japan and Europe brought about by the perceived need to develop a common response to the situations in Iran and Afghanistan. I find this a fascinating phenomenon,
and while its full impact may not be felt for a number of years, its meaning is clear—Japan is going to play an increasingly important and varied role in the world.

This has important implications for all nations. For the United States it means that our ties with Japan, already the most important bilateral relationship we have, will take on even greater significance. It will become even more essential that we consult closely with each other and try to coordinate our policies as much as we can. I am convinced that the general orientation of our foreign policies will remain parallel, resting as they do on a foundation of similar values, interests and objectives. Thus there is no reason to expect any diminution in Japanese and American cooperation vis-a-vis major international issues, be they political, economic, scientific or security-related. On the contrary, I believe our cooperation will increase, producing major benefits not only for Japan and the United States, but for the world.

Iran and Afghanistan have of course been major foreign policy preoccupations in recent months for the United States, and I believe for Japan, and both illustrate the importance and the effectiveness of cooperation between our two nations.
As President Carter made clear to Prime Minister Ohira three weeks ago, the United States deeply appreciates the efforts Japan has made in respect to both these crises. On Iran, Japan has spoken out vigorously in behalf of legal and humanitarian principle, denouncing the hostage seizure and calling for the immediate release of those innocent people. It has joined with our European friends and others around the world in imposing, this week, economic sanctions against Iran which we hope will speed the return of rationality to that country and lead to freedom for our fellow Americans in the not too distant future. Japan's actions have not been risk free. We are grateful for what it has done.

In respect to Afghanistan as well, Japan has worked closely with the United States and our other allies to impose penalties upon the Soviet Union for its invasion of that country and to insure the Soviets understand that neither this nor future such actions can be taken with impunity and without grave risk. Japan has spoken out, and it has acted. Japan is a participant in a framework of economic sanctions which we hope will have an important cumulative effect. The Japanese Government has also called upon this country to join in a more visible, and very meaningful symbolic sanction--the Olympic boycott.
The challenges posed by events in Iran and Afghanistan, like some of the economic and other problems we have had to grapple with in the recent past, have imposed some strains on our relations. Difficult decisions have been required, hard choices have had to be made. Satisfactory conclusions to both of these situations seem some distance away, which is discouraging. But what is not discouraging--indeed, it is most heartening--is the degree of unity and coordinated action we have seen on the part of Japan, the United States and our other friends and allies in the face of these challenges. We have occasionally differed on tactics, on emphasis, on timing--we are not a monolith. But we have remained united, and we are determined to stay the course. We have often remarked, in speeches such as this one, on the growing multilateral dimension of U.S.-Japan relations. I believe that concept has been given new and more concrete meaning as a result of Iran and Afghanistan, and that there is now a
stronger commitment, on both sides of the Pacific, to mutual goals and to joint action in achieving them.

This brings me to a final thought, concerning Japan's international role and the nature of the U.S.-Japan relationship as I see it at this stage in its history. We have spoken for years of the steady progress of our two nations toward a more equal partnership, as Japan has assumed international responsibilities commensurate with its economic power. But I have the sense that only very recently has this concept begun to be accepted by the Japanese people. The crises in Iran and Afghanistan in particular have contributed to this phenomenon. Clearly the Iran situation has been one in which the United States has needed the support of its friends, in Japan, in Europe and elsewhere. Events in both Iran and Afghanistan threaten the interests of the international community as a whole, and have required a united response by peace-loving nations. Japan has responded to these needs, demonstrating in the process—for its own people, for Americans and for the world—that Japan is a factor to be reckoned with on the international scene, and that our partnership is a two-way street in more than just matters of trade. I detect pride in that fact among the Japanese people, and heightened solidarity with the United States.
Along with more widespread acceptance of the notion that Japan is an equal partner of the United States, so there seems to be a greater readiness these days to define that partnership in ways the Japanese have tended to avoid up to now. As all of you will have noted, "alliance", a word seldom used in the past to describe Japan's relations with the United States, has been employed prominently in recent weeks. Perhaps it is not proper for me to try to say what this means--indeed I am not sure that I know. But to me, the word fits the reality. We are allies in every sense, committed not only to friendship and cooperation in good times, but to mutual assistance in time of need, and I am glad that more and more people in this country feel comfortable in saying so.

I think there is an inexact, but relevant, economic parallel. Just as the Japanese are increasingly prepared to involve themselves politically in the world and to accept responsibilities of involvement and leadership, so it seems to me there has also been an important change in the way they look at their economic prospects. We Americans have often felt the Japanese have tended to exaggerate their weaknesses and vulnerabilities and to minimize their strengths--and not simply as a negotiating tactic. Admittedly, our own views have sometimes been canted in the other direction--Japan is
not as awesome an economic machine as its foreign competitors sometimes fear, and it undoubtedly is vulnerable in some respects. But certainly the view of Japan, inculcated into generations of schoolchildren, as an isolated and in some ways beleagured island dependent for economic survival only upon the wits and determination of its traders is no longer entirely realistic. I believe it is being superseded by the more valid realization that Japan, as a full-fledged member of the Western industrialized community, partakes fully of the strengths as well as the weaknesses of that system. Its vulnerabilities are no greater than those of the other members, and its strengths certainly no less. Thus, there is a growing sense of a shared fate, a conviction that the well-being of this country is indivisible from that of its partners and dependent in turn on a stable world environment to which all must contribute. This is more than a philosophical notion; it has immense political significance, reinforcing Japan's global involvement and insuring its steadily growing importance on the world scene.

Not all of the changes in the U.S.-Japan relationship have taken place on this side of the Pacific. There have been some important developments in the United States as well, and they are very similar to what has happened here. We have been
aware for many years of the extent of our economic interdependence with Japan. But for us, as for the Japanese, it has never been clearer that we are not only navigating the same hazardous waters, we are in fact in the same boat. Cooperation and joint action in dealing with inflation or energy are not options, they are imperatives. As a nation, we have probably been less aware until recently of the fact that we and Japan are equally interdependent in other ways as well. The events of the past six months, in particular the Iran crisis, have been very revealing in this respect. We have sought the support of our friends and allies, and we have received it.

I was convinced during my recent trip home that Japan is seen in a new and rather different light. Public opinion polls bear out my impression: a Potomac Associates survey taken last month showed significant increases in the percentage of Americans who rank Japan as the most important country for the United States (89 percent—only Canada ranked higher); who would favor using armed force to defend Japan against attack from the Soviets or any other quarter; and who support the continued maintenance of our forces in this country. Clearly, Japan's contribution to our partnership, the value of its friendship, its steadfastness as an ally are much more broadly recognized
than was once the case. In short, there is a stronger commitment to the relationship among the American people, just as I believe is true in Japan. The conclusion I have reached and which I commend to you is that, while the crises of recent months have indeed generated tensions and imposed strains, our partnership has emerged not weaker, but stronger than before. We have truly gained strength from adversity.

The years ahead promise to be as active and challenging for the United States as any period in our history, replete with crisis—and with opportunity. We will face new problems that will not have occurred to even the most visionary among us. We will probably find ourselves contending as well with some old and familiar problems re-emerging in new and perhaps occasionally more virulent forms. But if we can be assured of difficulties in our path, so we can look ahead with equal certainty toward myriad new opportunities, in which Japan and the United States will merge their efforts in pursuit of common goals.

I said at the outset that I was not going to try to predict the future. But as I think my remarks make clear, I am optimistic about the ability of the United States and
Japan, working together, to cope with anything it has to offer. Success is not assured, and we ignore the state of our relations only at our risk. For while our ties are strong, they are not, as we well know, inevitably trouble-free. Sustaining a productive partnership such as we enjoy requires the continued, dedicated attention of both our governments and, more fundamentally, patient and steady efforts to strengthen the foundation of understanding and mutual regard among all elements of our societies upon which all else rests. We can never eliminate problems in our relationship, or erase all our differences. Our task is to minimize those problems, narrow our differences as much as we can, and be prepared to tolerate opposing points of view when they cannot be reconciled. The formula is simple. Making it work can be difficult. We have succeeded in the past, however—to the great benefit of our two peoples and of the world—and we shall in the future.

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JOHN RODERICK (AP): Mr. Ambassador, you spoke about managing problems between the United States and Japan while they are developing, however made no references of course to adjoining countries. But, as we know, today a very grave problem is developing in South Korea. It started to move after the assassination of President Park towards democracy. It has now been stopped in its tracks. At this very moment as we sit here, the city of Kwangju is taken over by elements which seem to be favorable to democracy. What is the United States doing to stage manage or manage or do to affect the outcome of this very grave struggle?

AMBASSADOR: Well, John, what's happening in the Republic of Korea is of great concern to all of us and to both our countries, but it just happens that Korea is outside my portfolio. It also happens that we have probably our best ambassador in this part of the world, if not the best in the world, in Bill Gleysteen, and I'm sure that anything that can be done will be done by Bill Gleysteen, and that in his hands our interests are in good shape. (laughter)
BRUCE MACDONELL (NBC): Mr. Ambassador, you pointed out that there has been a good deal of cooperation on the Iranian-Afghan issues. However, there is reason to believe that later on today the Olympics boycott issue will be handled by allowing the Japanese athletes to compete as individuals. If that is so, won't this be rather hollow cooperative success?

AMBASSADOR: Well, Bruce, I referred to the attitude, and the positive attitude, of the Japanese government in relation to a possible Olympic boycott. The Japanese government has made it clear to its Olympic Committee, as we made it clear to our Olympic Committee where we stood, and recognize the fact that the decision was in the hands of the respective Olympic Committees concerned.

I personally am against the Olympics, not really because of Afghanistan, but because it has become anything but the Olympic Games according to their original intent. They have been terrorized by the murder of the Israelis in Munich in '72. They have been commercialized long before that. They have been politicized to a large extent, and I think that it is time for the Olympic Committees to take a look at what they're engaging in and try and do something to bring about a return to the original intent and
get away from these very heavy handicaps which are making it so difficult for these people today.

I will wait and see just how they word that announcement which you indicated might be forthcoming today when the Olympic Committee of Japan issues its statement.

GEBHARD HIELSCHER (Suddeutsche Zeitung): Mr. Ambassador, you have said that the Japanese-U.S. bilateral relations have emerged as the most important bilateral relations for the U.S. I'm aware of evident changes in that relation. I am also aware of the results of the Potomac Associates survey which, though, also says, for instance, in the area of where you would be willing, how many people would feel it necessary that the U.S. should come to the defense of Japan in case of aggression, that 64 percent said so in the case of Japan, but more people said so in the case of Britain or France.

So I'm just asking what other indications do you have to back up your statement of the most important bilateral relationship vis-a-vis some of the traditional allies like Britain or France in Europe, and could you elaborate in that context a little bit more on your experiences in Washington at the recent visit of Prime Minister Ohira?
AMBASSADOR: Well, that's a long question, but I'll do the best I can. First, let me say that the figure you used is correct, but I have felt for a long time that the United States has been paying too much attention to the Atlantic and Western Europe and not enough attention to the Pacific and East Asia. I can understand why that remains the policy, though I detect signs of its being shaken at present.

Most of our people came from across the Atlantic, but since the time of George Washington the push has always been westward across the continent, across the Pacific, into Asia. I think that this is where everything is happening.

I think the most important—I repeat—bilateral relationship we have in the world is with Japan. I think the most important strategic area in the world is in the North Pacific, not in Western Europe. If you look at the map, you will find the PRC, the Soviet Union, the U.S., Japan, right close to one another, and right in the middle is Korea which was the subject of the first question this afternoon.

It is out here where American business has its opportunities, where the biggest returns are and where you have I think the most friendly governments, not only friendly
governments but friendly people, markets, resources, and to put it briefly I would say it is in the Pacific and East Asia where it all is, what it's all about, and as far as my country is concerned where their future lies.

The relationship with Japan may not be as long as it has been with Germany, but there isn't too much difference when you get down to the time factors involved. As far as our cousins in the United Kingdom are concerned, that has been a long relationship, with France likewise, though with many tremblers in between. But that's the way people get along. We have our differences with the French, with the British, with the Germans and with the Japanese, but if we didn't have these differences I don't think we would be very good friends.

But to make it brief, this is where it all is and this is where we should have at least a strength based on parity with what we have in the Atlantic and on Western Europe, and I think the events of Iran and Afghanistan are bringing that home to us in a big way. We didn't act. We reacted. It's about time we started to do some acting ourselves in shifting through our priorities and recognizing where our most important primary interests lie. (applause)
JON WORONOFF (Asia Business): You mentioned at the very beginning that there are many surprises in politics. Can you explain how over time the American government and the Japanese government have been able to some extent to align their policy? What would happen if in another month or so there is another surprise and instead of having an LDP government there was a coalition government and among parties which have a slightly different attitude towards many of the policy points from the LDP?

AMBASSADOR: Well, in politics the only certainty is uncertainty as was proven last Friday, and no one can be sure, and when I was in the Senate I was never certain till the votes were counted. Then I knew what the result really was.

But as far as the differences are concerned, we can accommodate ourselves with them. After all, the greatest art in the field of politics is compromise, or in other words accommodation.

I do not want to, as I've indicated in my remarks, become involved in Japanese internal politics. When what you envisage happens, then we'll face up to it, but no matter what it is I'm quite certain in my own mind that
the foundation on which Japanese-American partnership or friendship rests will survive, and grow stronger in the years and the decades ahead.

UMAR KAHN (Arab News Agency): Mr. Ambassador, in your remarks you said that whatever you have been doing until now was a reaction pertaining to certain things happening in my part of the world in the Middle East. You said that now it is time for you to do some action. So, what actions do you suggest to take, because let me just point out that the whole thing started in Afghanistan with the daylight murder of the American Ambassador over there, and President Carter simply said nothing and did nothing, and the whole thing started from there.

And then this, I'm not sure, the action in Iran to rescue the 53 people. That's another thing, so are you pointing out these actions may cause another war in the world, or what actions are you pointing out to?

AMBASSADOR: Quite the contrary. To answer you in one word, the policy I advocate is patience. (laughter and clapping)

ROBERT NEFF (McGraw Hill): Mr. Ambassador, Reuben Askew left here a few days ago saying that he was very disappointed
with the lack of progress in the negotiations between the United States and Japan on the question of procurement by NTT. Just exactly where do those negotiations stand. You said in your speech you don't like to make predictions. What prospects do you see for a settlement, and how important an issue is this in Japanese-U.S. economic relations?

AMBASSADOR: Well, I'm optimistic. I think there was a good, worthwhile exchange between the Japanese and Governor Askew while he was here. I would point out that the Straus-Ushiba agreement, which was initialed last June, still has until December 31st to run, and it's hoped that before that time, as a result of continued negotiations, that a reciprocal agreement will be arrived at which will be mutually satisfactory to both countries.

So I think that Askew made progress in widening the conversations, meeting with the appropriate people here as far as government procurement is concerned, and I think he made very good progress, too, as far as the automobile situation was concerned, all things considered.

GEBHARD HIELSCHER (Suddeutsche Zeitung): At the recent Trilateral Conference in London, I think Mr. Ball suggested this idea of Japan could produce two aircraft carriers and
lease them to the U.S. There was quite, shall we say, almost an unbelievable outrage type of reaction in Japan. Could you elaborate a little bit? The U.S. government maybe hopes, or your personal views on the issue where you could see any scope for cooperation in Japan's military procurement or in arms production or any such lease arrangement as Mr. Ball has suggested. Do you find that completely out of reality, or do you see, in contrast to Mr. Ball, any reasonable chance, even as a mid-term or long-term prospect?

AMBASSADOR: The United States government has expressed no opinion on an opinion made by a private citizen George Ball. As far as my personal opinion is concerned, I think it's a way out, far out idea. We seem to have trouble finding enough personnel to man the carriers we have at the present time.

I don't think we ought to get Japan too involved. Japan has done remarkably well in its own defense situation in view of Article 9 of the so-called Peace Constitution, in view of how they had to get around through the creation of a 75,000 man Self Defense Force, and out of that came the Police Reserve Force, and out of that Police Reserve Force came the present Self Defense Forces.
The Japanese are not interested in becoming a manufacturing armory for other nations, and if there are things that have to be done I think we ought to be able to do them ourselves.

What I would rather see would be the Japanese to continue. This is their responsibility what they have been doing for the last decade or more, and that is to modernize their naval elements and to update their anti-submarine and air defense facilities, and they are doing all those things.

They have a part to play in the defense of their home islands and the seas adjacent thereto. They have to keep in mind the fact that they are not ready as yet to put into operation a regional force. And I would say, to repeat, that the Japanese have been doing the right thing at the right pace in the right way for the past decade. For example, during that decade they increased their defense expenditures at an average rate of 8 percent a year. The NATO countries increased their defense expenditures at a rate of 2 percent a year, and the United States decreased its defense expenditures over the decade of the Seventies, the same period, at a rate of 2 percent a year.

Now, the progress of the Japanese in this respect has been steady and significant, and they have helped to
achieve great stability and to be able to fulfill their own responsibilities when, because of events in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea and that area, we had to transfer elements of the Seventh Fleet to that particular region.

TED SHIMIZU (Kyodo): Mr. Ambassador, what is your prediction on the outcome of the U.S. presidential elections?

AMBASSADOR: Well, it looks like President Carter will get the nomination. It looks like John Anderson will be a stronger candidate than a lot of people anticipated, and if that is true he will draw votes mostly away from the Democrats and make it more difficult for the Democrats to win because of the developing Carter-Kennedy feud, and it also might throw the election in the House of Representatives if neither Carter nor Reagan get the required majority. There, of course, it will be decided by the so-called electoral college, which is not a college. It has no professors. (laughter)

JON WORONOFF (Asia Business): I'm certain that you can keep on outwitting the working press. (laughter) I'm not
certain what your exact term was, whether its increasing agreement or accommodation or coming closer together be­
tween the Japanese and the Americans on a number of economic points.

AMBASSADOR: Coming closer together.

JOHN WORONOFF: Okay. How much of a gap is there, for example, on the question of defense? The Japanese seem to be willing within another few years to reach 1 percent. I have read that some people on the American side would like to see 1.5 or 2 percent.

AMBASSADOR: No gap. It's up to the Japanese. After all, Japan is a sovereign nation. It has to make its own decisions. It has to decide what is best, and so far I think it has done a very good job on its own responsibility, and that's the way it should be. That's the way it will be, and we are not going to attempt in any way, shape or form to tell the Japanese what they should or shouldn't do.

JOHN WORONOFF: Although there seems to be a slight cooling off of the problem regarding exports of automobiles to the United States, in the meanwhile Mr. Fraser, who addressed us
here some time ago, seems to have increased the ante, so the gap might be as far/or even further apart than it used to be. What are the chances of the United States imposing limits on Japanese exports to the United States, and what is the chance of not only coming closer together but reaching some sort of an agreement which will hold?

AMBASSADOR: Well, as far as reducing imports are concerned, the President has made his position clear. Askew has made his position clear before congressional committees, and he did so again here even at his last press conference which I think you attended. He said he would not recommend import restrictions, that they would create a situation which could become highly inflationary and would not solve the problem of unemployment.

I would point out that the Japanese have been making gestures and evolving policies. I recall that just about a year ago I sent letters to all the Japanese auto manufacturers asking them to use American auto parts. The Japanese auto manufacturers gave serious consideration to it, but I began to receive letters from them saying that at that time the American auto parts people were not interested or if they did their work wasn't up to Japanese standard.
And then, of course, we had the changeover which I think you can blame the American auto industry for. They should have seen the handwriting on the wall. In '73 they started to change over then, and now they are trying to play catch-up, but it is going to cost them 70 to 80 billion dollars, and in the meantime you've got foreign cars taking over the field because that is what the American customers want.

Honda is building a 10,000 auto facility in Ohio, and Nissan has announced a 10,000 a month truck facility somewhere in the Great Lakes or the southeast of the United States. Toyota has hired three high grade analytical groups to look into the situation as it might affect possible investments in the United States, and I think they are showing good faith and for the first time are really getting down to bedrock. They're getting serious.

Also, one of the results of Askew's trip here was an increased amount in the purchase of American auto parts for Japanese cars, and we hope that progress will continue along that line.

Now, you also mentioned I believe something about a 1 or 1.5 percent defense expenditure. That is 1.5 percent of GNP. I notice where Admiral Zumwalt had something in the papers this morning advocating a 2 percent increase of
defense expenditures by Japan. You know, Zumwalt used to be the Chief of Naval Operations some eight or ten years ago, and now he's a private citizen. I think we ought to try and keep the record clear.

If we calculate Japanese defense expenditures on the same basis that NATO and the United States does, instead of spending less than 1 percent, they're spending somewhere between 1.1 and 1.2 percent. That's a lot of money. Even though it's from a small base, it's certainly a lot when it is tied to a GNP which totals well over a trillion dollars.

CHARLES SMITH (Financial Times): My question is partly asked, but maybe there is a bit more to say on the subject. Do you think it is realistic to expect Japanese car manufacturers to produce passenger cars in the United States when it seems to be the case that they can produce cars more efficiently and more cheaply in Japan?

AMBASSADOR: Yes, I think it is. As I've told Mr. Ishiwara of Nissan and Mr. Goto--I think he's here this afternoon--of the same company, and Mr. Toyoda, I told them that it will be a good idea for them to invest in the United
States. Well, they raised questions about labor laws and this and that, and I pointed out the fact that Volkswagen came in, worked out a special deal I think for three years with the UAW. I'm sure it was probably given some tax concessions and maybe some land in the area in Pennsylvania in which they located their plant, and that the consensus was—that's a nice Japanese word (laughter)—the consensus was that the quality of the American auto worker in Volkswagen, Pennsylvania, was better than the quality of the German worker in the Federal Republic. Now they are going to build a second plant outside of Detroit.

What I told the Japanese when they raised the question—and their arguments were valid, after all, they have to look at not only those factors but profitability as well—I told them it was my impression that the Japanese reputation was so good, based on quality product they produce at a competitive price, the follow-through services which they furnish and the demand among the American people that they could go into any country in the world and compete with any auto company anywhere in the world and still come out even or on top. So they've got the reputation, they've got the capability, they turn out the quality, the price is right, the people want it, they follow through with service. I think they can do it anywhere.
ALAN GOODALL (The Australian): Mr. Chairman, I would like to give an opportunity to the Ambassador to answer a question that his boss, U.S. Secretary of State Muskie dodged yesterday, and that is how long can the United States continue to support an ally that lacks internal political support, namely South Korea?

AMBASSADOR: As long as necessary. (laughter - applause)

ROBERT NEFF: To shift back to more mundane questions, the U.S. Customs has recently announced that it is going to start imposing a 25 percent import duty on Japanese truck imports. There are reports that President Carter probably will reduce that duty significantly. What indeed are the prospects? At what level are those import duties likely to be set, and to what extent is that issue linked to U.S. efforts to persuade the Japanese to build car factories in the U.S.?

AMBASSADOR: To answer the last part of your question first, there is no connection between that and our efforts to get the Japanese to invest in the United States. As far as the fore part of your question is concerned, I read the same papers you have. I don't know too much about it
because we receive nothing in the way of an official dispatch. How do you like that for dodging? (laughter) But it's true.

KEN KONDO (Mainichi): On the defense spending issue, you said that the Japanese are doing the right thing at the right pace, but I wonder do you think your assessment is reflected on Washington policy?

AMBASSADOR: Let me get that again.

KEN KONDO: Your assessment on Japanese defense spending or what we are doing on the defense issue, is your assessment reflected on the Washington policy, Administration policy, or your advice or your assessment is rather not neglected but...

AMBASSADOR: Well, my advice that you so kindly referred to has been passed on many times to the people in Washington, and if they don't know the facts it's their own fault. (laughter)

LEE (Chosun Ilbo): I came from the trouble spot. (laughter) I heard from many Americans, including some officials, that
they feel no longer necessary to maintain American ground forces in Korea where American influence is decreasing. But you just a while ago stressed the strategic importance of Northeast Asia, including the Korean Peninsula. What is your evaluation, and do you still feel it necessary to maintain American ground forces?

AMBASSADOR: I approved of President Carter's view of withdrawing the Second Division from Korea in gradual stages, but when some of our intelligence agencies came up with new estimates...as to how strong North Korea actually was, I approved the postponement, announced in Korea last June I believe by the President, of the withdrawal of the Second Division. I think that postponement will be indefinite. They will be there for a long time to come, but I would like to see the South Koreans themselves, once they achieve a degree of normality--though one finds it hard to define what "normality" is in the Republic of Korea--that they would be able to upgrade their equipment, both in the air, on land and at sea, and I would hope that out of these talks intermittently conducted between the North and South Koreans, something substantial will develop, but there is no indication of that at the present time.
So we will just have to wait and see how events work out. It's a sad country. It's a tragic country. It had more than its share of sorrow and sacrifice, but it is a friend, and we intend to stick with them to the end.

UMAR KAHN: Mr. Ambassador, I own a small Honda Japanese car, and I think the secret of the Japanese car seen in America and everywhere was because they burn less fuel. I think that was the only trick that was working for them. Do you think the GM and other big companies in America, giants, whose fund is more than probably some of these big countries' total GNP, would they be sitting idle and not bringing out smaller cars to compete in technology and using lesser fuel than the Japanese plants that will be established there?

AMBASSADOR: Well, I would hope they're not sitting by idly because if they are it's just going to be a repeat of what has happened in years gone by because not only do you get better mileage out of Japanese cars, and some European cars as well, but you also have some excellent anti-pollution control devices and they are of better standards than the State of Califórnia, the strongest in
the country as far as the states are concerned, and they exceed the standards which the federal government has passed legislatively in the form of laws and which will go into effect I think in 1983 or 1984. If we are going to compete with the Japanese, we better compete and not just sit back or expect legislation to get us out of holes which we dig for ourselves.

MARY ANN MASKERY (ABC): You talked about talking to Japanese automobile companies, trying to encourage them to get into investment in the United States. Do you think there will be any more encouragement from the U.S. government for direct investment, or do you think the recent Japanese offer on auto parts will end the auto issue as such on the government-to-government level?

AMBASSADOR: No, it won't end the auto issue, and our government would still like to see Japanese car makers invest in the United States. But I think we should be honest about this and realize that even if all the things we ask the Japanese to do, except to reduce exports, wouldn't cure an unemployment problem which totals somewhere around 225-250,000 men at the present time. It will take two or three years for the changeover to occur, and
it's going to be a difficult period, and especially so in this election year.

CHARLES SMITH: Mr. Mansfield, you said that the United States intended to stick with South Korea to the end and to give full support to your friends in South Korea. In that case, I wonder what you feel about the policy of inhibiting South Korea's economic growth by restricting imports into the United States of products, such as Korean color TV sets.

AMBASSADOR: I wouldn't be in favor of it. I'm a free trader, I guess. (laughter)

NOBORU ONOKI (Sankei): Mr. Ambassador, after the meeting between Japanese Prime Minister and your President, your government official leaked that your President didn't satisfy the recent past popular movement in Korea, and I believe that must have influenced these days' unrest coming up in the country. On the other hand, it seems to me that during the past time, your government agency has been encouraging some anti-governmental group to do something. Thank you.
AMBASSADOR: I wouldn't think so, and I would imagine that Ambassador Gleysteen would know how to keep his hands clean and avoid getting too close to the fire. If you are referring to a postulate at the time of the Ohira meeting, the question of Korea came up between him and President Carter, absolutely not. Korea was not mentioned in any way, shape or form.

JEAN PEARCE (Free lance): A Japanese commentator in an article I read recently suggested that the real reason that the United States is interested in luring Japanese manufacturers to that country is that so they, the Japanese manufacturers, will then get strangled in negotiations with the United Automobile Workers Union, that's giving the American manufacturers an opportunity to catch up. I wonder if you could comment on that. (laughter)

AMBASSADOR: The Japanese auto manufacturers are not dumb. (laughter)