Opening Remarks for Security Sub-Committee Consultation

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AMBASSADOR’S OPENING REMARKS FOR SSC 8/29/82

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will speak briefly, touching on two general areas of concern to this Security Sub-Committee consultation. First, I would like to make some general observations about the broader context within which we seek to strengthen US-Japanese defense cooperation. Secondly, I shall offer a few thoughts on the specific issues we expect to discuss in the next three days.

As you have all heard me say many times, I believe the US-Japanese relationship is the single most important bilateral relationship in the world. We share the world’s largest overseas bilateral trade. We share broad security interests, which affect not only our own security but also the security of the East Asian region. The US-Japanese security treaty is the cornerstone of stability in the Pacific. Close cooperation and coordination between Japan and the United States has become essential to maintaining a stable, free, and prosperous international economic system.

Any bilateral relationship of this magnitude engenders countless possibilities for conflicting interests, misunderstandings, and any number of problems large and small. It is one of the great achievements of postwar history that the United States and Japan, two countries with such vastly different cultural and geo-political perspectives, would
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I have succeeded in developing such a productive and mutually beneficial partnership.

I believe that this achievement is explained largely by the fact that both governments during the postwar period have maintained a very clear sense of purpose about the relationship and the mutual benefits to be gained from a solid US-Japanese alliance. Consequently, both governments have worked hard to make the distinction between major issues that deserve attention at the highest political levels and smaller short-term issues that are best resolved at a lower level of government.

Both governments as representatives of democratic political systems must, of course, respond to a great variety of domestic constituencies, many of which tend to view issues through the prism of a single-minded concern. In all too many cases, the voices of special interest groups and the attention of the press can cause otherwise secondary issues to cast a shadow over the entire relationship. In such an atmosphere it becomes vitally important for the governments themselves to keep their collective eye on the ball and, to the extent possible, insure that the negotiating process, or the bilateral dialogue, does not become unmanageable. This requires, in particular, that we maintain a sensitivity to the domestic context within which each of our governments must operate.
3.

It has been roughly 30 years since the foundations of this relationship were laid down, and the leadership on both sides is now passing to an entirely new generation. It seems to me that the major challenge we face in US-Japanese relations is to ensure that this new generation of leaders will be equally sensitive to the vital importance of this relationship—an importance which today is measured not just in terms of benefits to the United States and Japan, but also in its great significance to international economic stability and the security of the Pacific region.

The US-Japan Security Treaty is, needless to say, the major pillar of the alliance between Japan and the United States. It provides the basis for a strong US presence in the Pacific and Indian oceans, and it ensures the strategic defense of Japan. This security relationship has a number of unique features that have been forged to meet the special concerns and needs of both countries. At times it defies analogy to security arrangements the United States has with other major allies. But it has proven over the years to be a firm and adaptable basis on which to build an increasingly stronger security bond to meet a changing security environment.

The period we are passing through now in US-Japanese security relations will, I believe, ultimately prove to be one of the most significant periods of adaptation.
VERGENCE OF TWO MAJOR FORCES IS AT WORK. FIRST, A
SUBSTANTIAL SHIFT IN JAPANESE PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON DEFENSE
ISSUES IS OCCURRING. THIS IS GIVING RISE TO A MORE OPEN
AND REASONED PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF DEFENSE QUESTIONS IN JAPAN,
AND THUS PROVIDING A MORE FAVORABLE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO MAKE HARD DECISIONS ABOUT STRENGTHENING
THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES. THE SECOND FORCE IS THE INCREASING
PRESSURE ON THE US GOVERNMENT TO STRENGTHEN ITS STRATEGIC
AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND DEPLOY THEM MORE FLEXIBLY TO
MEET NEW THREATS, PARTICULARLY FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

MANAGING A SMOOTH TRANSITION FROM THE DEFENSE CONCEPTS
OF THE 1970s TO THOSE NECESSARY TO MEET THE SECURITY CHALLENGES
OF THE 1990s WILL BE DIFFICULT. IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO
MAINTAIN THE BROAD SUPPORT OF BOTH THE JAPANESE AND AMERICAN
PEOPLE FOR A STRONG SECURITY BOND. THIS IS NOT ONLY A MATTER
OF EACH GOVERNMENT BEING SENSITIVE TO THE OTHER'S DOMESTIC
PRESSURES. IT IS ALSO A MATTER OF EACH GOVERNMENT ENSURING
THAT ITS OWN ELECTORATE UNDERSTANDS THE IMPORTANCE OF STRONG
US-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS.

UNDER THESE CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES, WHAT IS THE UNITED
STATES IN FACT SEEKING FROM JAPAN IN THE DEFENSE FIELD AND
HOW DO WE IN THE UNITED STATES SEE OUR RESPECTIVE MILITARY
ROLES?

THE UNITED STATES IS ASKING JAPAN, AS WE HAVE OUR
OTHER ALLIES, TO IMPROVE ITS CAPABILITY OF DEFENDING ITSELF
So as to deter possible conflict arising from an increasingly serious and verifiable Soviet threat in this part of the world. I am talking about the major build-up in the Soviet offensive military capability in the Asia/Pacific region over the last decade. It is impossible to determine the intentions of the Soviets, or any nation for that matter. Intentions can change overnight. We must rather deal with Soviet military capabilities and these are formidable indeed.

In a military sense we regard Japan's principal role as being precisely the same as it has always been, to maintain forces capable of meeting and resisting a conventional attack on Japan. The United States does not expect Japan to play a regional military role in East Asia. We remain fully conscious of the constitutional and political constraints on the Self-Defense Forces and we understand that these constraints limit the SDF's activity to Japan's territory and, as Japan has stated, its sealanes to a distance of some 1,000 nautical miles.

Contrary to some reports I have seen, the US has not suggested specific defense spending levels for the Self-Defense Forces, nor do we anticipate doing so. We are well aware that many factors, both internal and external, must be considered in setting budgetary priorities and must always remain a sovereign decision for any country.

I am not altogether sure what constitutes "pressure." Certainly (in keeping with our status as allies under the
6. Mutual Security Treaty which provides for a continual consultative process) we have conferred regularly and frequently with the Government of Japan on defense matters. In general, we have found that its programs complement our own efforts in East Asia. In recent years, however, we have urged Japan to take the steps necessary to implement on an urgent basis the program goals it has set for itself.

Despite talk of "US pressure," the primary beneficiary of the achievement of Japan's defense plans will be Japan, not the United States. It is true, however, that enhanced Japanese defense capabilities will strengthen the overall deterrent value of our alliance.

Thus I believe that Japan's actions in the defense field, rather than being construed as a response to a "US request" should be viewed as its own response to a threatening international environment. We may have slightly different perceptions about the degree of the threat, but we agree that it exists and has increased.

I am occasionally puzzled by efforts to portray US-Japanese defense cooperation as sinister or underhanded. For example, the United States is depicted as having an ulterior motive in wishing to have access to Japanese defense technology or material, in spite of the fact that US technology defense production "know how" has flowed to Japan for over a quarter of a century now. Similarly discussions between us on a division of defense roles and our combined defense exercises, behavior which would seem natural, essential even, for mili-
TARY ALLIES, are sometimes portrayed as aimed at encouraging Japan to proceed once again down the path of militarism or to revise Japan’s constitution or the Mutual Security Treaty. Japan’s constitution is something for it alone to change or not to change as the people of Japan so desire. As for the Security Treaty, my government has made it absolutely clear that we see no reason for it to be revised.

Occasionally, efforts are made to link the defense question with some of our bilateral trade issues. I do not believe they should be connected. No matter how smooth our economic relationship might be, our two nations would still face a potentially fluid and unstable politico-military situation in this part of the world, and we would still need to attend to our defenses. I hope that both Americans and Japanese will therefore continue to separate the two issues of trade and defense.

Turning to the issues at hand in this 14th session of the SSC, I would like to begin by offering my compliments to our Japanese colleagues for the very serious and hard-working effort they have made over the past year to consolidate and gain approval for the new five-year defense plan, and to sustain Japanese defense growth in a domestic atmosphere of severe fiscal austerity.

Japanese defense spending has been held to a level of roughly one percent of GNP during the last 20 years.
Nevertheless, this defense spending has been characterized by steady growth rates for many years now, averaging about 8 percent real growth per year through the 1970s. The Japanese military budget has been the seventh or eighth largest in the world for many years now. However, for the Japanese Government to realize its stated aim of enhancing its military posture within the next five years it will most likely have to undertake annual budget increases considerably larger than last year's very creditable effort. The United States is doing precisely that in order to secure a stable balance of power.

High economic growth rates have, of course, allowed the Japanese government to maintain steady growth in defense spending, while staying below the political high water mark of one percent of GNP. With the levelling off of economic growth this will become more and more difficult to do. We are pleased that the public seems to accept that defense spending will eventually exceed one percent of GNP. To condition Japanese defense spending arbitrarily on one percent of GNP could mean an unacceptable lag in modernization of Japan's defense forces. I have long contended that it makes no sense to focus the defense debate and decisions on defense spending on an artificially contrived percentage of GNP. So I am pleased to see the movement away from this.

We are also pleased with the general direction of the new five-year program that the Japanese Government has
RECENTLY COMMITTED ITSELF TO. We realize that extensive modernization cannot take place overnight; nevertheless we still hope that there is room in the program for earlier achievement of some of its objectives, particularly those relating to sealane defense. At the same time, we hope that other defense needs which are equally important and which will require considerable resources to satisfy, will not be neglected. Let me cite some examples:

- Enhancement of the JSDF's command, control and communications structure;
- Making SDF bases, radar and communications sites less vulnerable to attack;
- Enhancing the training of SDF personnel, including increased flying time for pilots and shipboard experience for maritime personnel;
- Improving its logistics and support structure.

We are gratified by Prime Minister Suzuki's initiative in recognizing 1,000-mile sealane defense as a priority for Japanese self-defense. The rapidly growing Soviet naval threat in the Pacific is a reality that we must face together. To the extent that Japan can begin to assume gradually more of the task of defending its own vital sealanes out to 1,000 miles over the coming years, US forces can be deployed to other areas in an emergency without fear of leaving Japan exposed to Soviet intimidation.
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During the next few years, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces will undergo an impressive modernization, which will strain management and training resources. As this modernization occurs, there will be expansion of existing missions and the assumption of new missions, such as sealane defense, all within the constitutional limit Japan has placed on its military power. US forces will also be undergoing a major program of modernization and strengthening. These trends will place an increasing burden on the consultative mechanisms that underpin the US-Japan Security Treaty.

These annual Security Sub-Committee consultations, in particular, have become a very important part of the US-Japanese mutual defense planning process. Although the discussions are purposely informal and largely unrehearsed, the fact is that both sides do put a lot of effort into their presentations. The substance of our discussions in Hawaii each year has become increasingly important to both governments' working level deliberating. In Japan these talks have the added distinction of receiving wide press attention, which tends to give them an aura of authority far beyond what we all know is the reality!

Nevertheless, this year as in past years, I hope we shall continue to engage in a free, but fruitful, exchange of ideas on the defense challenges that face us—keeping in mind that we have been invested with significant responsibility for the smooth management of one of the world's most important alliance relationships.