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Qazaqjylyq| Nationalism and revolution in Kazakhstan, 1900-1920

Lyn R. Fisher

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QAZAQJYLYQ:

NATIONALISM AND REVOLUTION IN KAZAKHSTAN,

1900–1920

By

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The purpose of this study was to analyze the development of modern nationalism by the Kazakhs of northern Central Asia at this time. The Russian empire conquered and colonized Kazakhstan in the 1800s. The Kazakhs were traditional pastoral nomads. They had developed a unique "nomad nationalism," a powerful self-identity as "free riders of the Steppe." Russian rule imposed modernization on the Kazakhs. By the late nineteenth century, Kazakh nomadism was declining rapidly. A small Kazakh educated elite arose due to the introduction of modern education. As the Kazakh nomad masses grew more desperate, the intellectuals sought to prevent the complete destruction of Kazakh culture. Russian colonization flooded the Steppe.

The Kazakh intellectuals were compelled to develop rapidly. Just as they were coalescing, the educated elite was confronted by the turmoil of Russia's revolutionary era. Between 1900 and 1920, the Kazakh intellectuals transformed from social reformists to democratic nationalists to revolutionaries. That transformation, and the dynamic relations between the Kazakh secular intellectuals, religious reformists, and traditional leadership, against the background of the Russian revolutions, is one theme of this study; the goal is to provide perspective on modernization of nomads, as well as to contrast modern and nomad nationalism.

This study is based on exhaustive research into English-language sources. Russian and Kazakh sources in translation were utilized extensively as well. The intention was to synthesize the scholarly findings in this field. The bibliography is intended as a detailed research tool in the study of pastoral nomads, particularly the Kazakhs, modernization, and nationalism.

The transliteration system is based on that of the Library of Congress, modified to achieve consistency due to the peculiar history of Kazakh orthography. All dates to 1917 are Old Style, thirteen days behind the modern calendar; New Style chronology begins with 1918.

This study of Kazakh nationalism in the revolutionary era provides useful perspective regarding pastoral nomadism in the modern world.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction .................................................. 1
Chapter 1. The Free Horsemen of the Steppe ................. 4
Chapter 2. Kazakhstan and the Tsars .......................... 11
Chapter 3. Russification as Modernization .................... 21
Chapter 4. Nomad Nationalism, 1800-1900 ..................... 31
Chapter 5. Qazaq Nationalism, 1900-1916 ..................... 48
Chapter 6. Steppe Aflame: Revolt of 1916 ..................... 75
Chapter 7. Revolutionary Nationalism, 1917-1920 ............ 95
Conclusion ...................................................... 118

Appendix

Figure 1. Physical Geography ................................. 125
Figure 2. Natural Vegetation ................................... 126
Figure 3. The Kazakh Hordes ................................. 126
Figure 4. The Kazakh Khanate ................................ 127
Figure 5. Tsarist Oblasts ..................................... 128
Figure 6. Tsarist Uezds ........................................ 129
Figure 7. Population Centers, 1911 ........................... 130
Figure 8. Population Statistics, 1896-1916 ................... 131
Figure 9. The Impact of Russian Colonization, 1896-1916 .... 132
Figure 10. The Revolt of 1916 .......................... 133
Figure 11. Portraits ........................................ 134
Figure 12. Ali Khan Bukeykhanov ...................... 135
Notes .......................................................... 136

Bibliography

Reference ..................................................... 160

History

General ....................................................... 161
Tsarist Era ................................................... 163
Soviet Era ................................................... 167
Travelers' Tales ............................................. 170
Documents ................................................... 171
Historiography .............................................. 172

Nationalism .................................................. 174

Related Works

Nomadism ..................................................... 180
Geography .................................................... 183
Demography .................................................. 185
Political ...................................................... 186
Cultural ....................................................... 188
Industrialization ......................................... 191
Agriculture .................................................. 192

Index .......................................................... 194
INTRODUCTION

Modern Kazakh nationalism arose in the latter 1800s, from the consolidation of tsarist rule, intense Russian colonization, and the influence of modern education and Western ideas. The Russians crushed armed resistance by the nomadic Kazakhs by the mid-1800s. Kazakh society was gripped by the forces of modernization. Kazakh thinkers were enveloped by Russian cultural developments and their world became ordered by Russian definitions. There arose naturally two clashing perspectives between bitter anti-Russian hostility and the desire for the opportunities of westernization.

Thus, from the outset, the Kazakh intelligentsia was split between those who opposed all Russian, thereby Western, socioeconomic changes, who are characterized as "traditionalists," and those who sought to advance the Kazakh nation via Russian, that is, Western, progress, who are termed "westernizers."

By the early twentieth century, this dichotomy developed into opposition between traditionalist nationalists and progressive westernists. A third element was Islam, itself split between reformists and conservatives, and the related pan-Turkist idealists. The Kazakh intellectual leaders were divided by perspective but all shared deeply
the goal of a modern Kazakh nation, Qazaqjylyq. These first Kazakh nationalists were few in number but very significant politically. In the dozen years prior to World War I, they matured swiftly in their nationalism. By the time of the Russian revolutions, the Kazakh intellectual leaders were divided between westernists who included class-struggle in their outlook and nationalists distressed by the ethnocultural struggle between Kazakh nomad and Russian colonist.

Yet another fracture-line appeared in this period, that between the Kazakhs of the northern steppe and those of the southern desert-mountain region. The northern Kazakhs were much more experienced with the Russian invaders. The southern Kazakhs were enmeshed in the sedentary culture of Turkestan. The northern Kazakhs tended to be more nationalistic and Russified, while the southern Kazakhs were much more anti-Russian and pan-Islamic. In cruder form, these characteristics applied to the general population as well as the educated elite.

During the revolutions, the Kazakh intelligentsia fragmented along these major faults and therefore they never presented a united front, but rather a complex amorphousness. The great majority of Kazakhs were barely aware of the ideological struggle in their desperate battle to survive the wrenching blows of modernization upon their nomadic culture and economy. The intellectuals were divided by too many variant forces -- inter-tribal rivalries, religious attitudes, class-consciousness, regionalism, educational differences -- that they shifted from camp to camp during the civil war in response to the complicated dynamics of Russians versus natives, Whites versus Reds, liberals versus extremists,
pan-Turkists versus national autonomists versus federalists, and, not least, nomads versus sedentes. In the end, those Kazakh intellectuals who resisted the Soviet triumph were destroyed, while those who compromised with the Bolsheviks for their people's sake were eliminated when their stewardship was no longer needed. Independent Kazakh nationalism flowered and withered within a single lifetime.
CHAPTER ONE

The Free Horsemen of the Steppe

Are your livestock and your soul still healthy?
   -- Traditional Kazakh greeting. 1

The Kazakhs were one of the last great nomadic peoples of the modern age. Pastoral nomadism evolved in relation to its natural environment, in contrast with the civilized pattern of conquering the land. Sedentary societies thus relegate nomads to the primitive world, desiring to save them by settling them. Pastoral nomads detest civilization with a fervent belief in the spiritual supremacy of nomadism. 2 These opposing prejudices have always colored the historical interactions of nomads with the civilized world, and even more so the study of nomads by scholars. The student of nomadism must seek to appreciate, as much as possible, the deep attachment of the nomad to his lifestyle. One begins with the bases of Kazakh life: their land and their traditional culture.

The modern Soviet Socialist Republic of Kazakhstan covers more than one million square miles, measuring two thousand miles east to west and one thousand miles north to south. 3 Roughly the size of the American West or western Europe, it sprawls between China and Europe, stretching from the 55th to the 40th parallels. It is the domain of the Steppe.
The physical boundaries of the Kazakh domain were the Volga River and Caspian Sea, on the west, the Siberian taiga to the north, the Turanian desert lowlands of the south, and on the east, the uprearing mountain systems of the Tien Shans and Altais. Within this area one discerns three broad vegetative zones and five physiographic provinces. The severe continental climate of inner Asia dominates Kazakhstan and largely determines its soil-regions. The northern third is covered with Siberian taiga, wooded steppe (on black-earth soils), and feather-grass steppe (on chestnut soils), the middle third is semi-desert scrub grasses and the saksaul tree (on chestnut and brown soils), and the southern third is true desert (clay, sand, stony brown soils). Alpine vegetation occurs only on the eastern and south-eastern margins.

The northern plains form the first topographic region. Because of its fertile soils, the Russians came to call it "the Virgin Lands." The central part of Kazakhstan is formed by an uplands region larger than Texas or Britain and France combined. It is a picturesque land of rugged hills and tablelands, rolling grass, numerous lakes and small, intermittent streams, and low, isolated, pineclad mountains. Varying in elevation from one to four thousand feet, it is the eroded remnant of an extensive mountain system, and is enormously wealthy in nonferrous minerals. Perhaps the historic heartland of central Eurasia's nomads, it has borne many names: Desht-i-Kipchak by early Arab writers, Kirghiz Steppe by Western cartographers after the tsarist style, the "Low Hills" or "folded country" or "undulating plain" by Soviet geographers, and Sary-Arka by the Kazakhs themselves.
The western lowlands are the desert plains rising northward from the desolate Caspian into the Uralian uplands, from which descend the Volga and Ural rivers. These lowlands merge into the vast southern deserts which sweep from the Ust-Urt, between the Caspian and Aral seas, to the sands of the Kyzyl-Kum, embracing the Syr Darya river, to the Bet Pak Dala, "Steppe of Misfortune," west of Lake Balkhash, and the deserts of Dzungaria between the Altai and Tien Shan, giving onto the Gobi wastes.

The highland systems of the south—the Tien Shan and Pamir Knot beyond—and of the east—the Altai and others—are vast. They nourish the major rivers of Central Asia, the Syr and Amu Daryas, and the Ili River, which descends from the Tien Shan with numerous other streams to fall into Lake Balkhash. On the fertile piedmont soils of this region arose the extremely ancient sedentary cultures, the so-called oasis civilization of (western or Russian) Turkestan. The great deserts separate the northern nomads from the southern sedentes, both physically and culturally. However, the Ili basin is situated both between the steppe and mountains, and athwart the ancient east-west passages in the Altai-Tien Shan barrier. Because of its fertility it attracted farmers and towns, but its location attracted migrating nomad tribes and marching armies. This region was very important to the Kazakhs, who called it Dźheti Su (Jetisu), or Seven Rivers; the Russians translated this into Semirechye.

It is apparent that Kazakhstan is the central sector of the Steppe, which stretches from the plains of Hungary to Manchuria. This vast,
semi-arid, isolated wilderness created and nurtured pastoral nomadism. Civilization first appeared in Central Asia some five thousand years ago, on the southwest border with Iran. Pastoralism arose a few millennia later, and pastoral nomadism itself only developed some time between 2000 and 1000 B.C. The origins of nomadism are still disputed, but the obvious pre-requisite was the development of animal husbandry and particularly the domestication of the horse. The most likely scenarios (for nomadism probably developed independently in several areas) involved sedentary herdsmen exploiting the vast pastures of the Steppe until some catalyst urged them to abandon their settled villages for the mobile life of the stepnik. Once it appeared, the pastoral nomadic culture swept the Steppe with a distinctive lifestyle and spiritual character which, in its broadest form, has dominated the grasslands throughout history, until the modern day. Specific customs varied, but not the environmental realities (or "subsistence factors") of their nomadic life. The Scythians are more like the Kazakhs than unlike; even the Cossacks were transformed by the Steppe.

The nomads lived entirely on their herds. Pasture, water, and shelter were their basic necessities. Despite the vastness of the Steppe, grass was sparse and seasonal, water scarce or absent, and shelter on the treeless plains was found only in stream-valleys. Drought and blizzards were catastrophic. Most dreadful was the dzhut, in Kazakh, the thaw which melts the snow and the freeze which ices the grass. Entire herds, and the people who lived by them, were wiped out.

Pastoral nomadic migration implies neither footloose wandering nor
"voortrekking." Herding large numbers of grazing animals upon whom one's existence absolutely depends is a crucial calculation of the benefits of new pasture versus the debilities of exhaustion and weight-loss, storms, predators, and wastelands. The Steppe could provide only so much pasturage, it had a very finite and fluctuating carrying capacity, and this had to be parcelled out in large areas to small groups. Dramatic notions of mobs of nomads thundering over the plains like a flood are thus purely romantic. The stark exigencies of natural environment always precluded great numbers or density of nomadic herdsmen; the extensive nature of their lifestyle accounts for much in the pastoral nomadic economy, culture, and psychology.

During the summer, the nomads divided into small family groups which scattered the herds over the available pasturage. In winter, the groups gathered into extended family-communities which settled in one (usually) traditional locale for the long season. Their herds consisted of horses, sheep, goats, and camels. Horned cattle were poorly fit for nomadic living, and were insignificant in the "pure" nomad economy.

The Kazakhs were horsemen par excellence. They never used horses as draft animals (though they sometimes rode cattle), whereas the relatively few "snow" camels they had were strictly beasts of burden. Oxen (and yaks) hauled the heavy, two-wheeled carts which carried the nomads' home and possessions when moving from camp to camp. The nomad dwelling was the ingenious yurt (Russian kibitka, Kazakh ui), wind-proof, dry, portable, yet comfortable and even elegant in simplicity. This conical-roofed, round-walled felt tent symbolizes the entwined practicality and
artistry that distinguish nomad culture. The Kazakh nomads' basic foodstuff was milk: they milked all their animals, making various milk products, including cheeses; a staple was kumiss, fermented mare's milk. Meat and vegetable products, the latter acquired from the non-nomadic world typically, were important but secondary. The men wore trousers, boots, heavy shirts, made of leather, felt, and skins. The women wore long, many-layered skirts and headpieces often described by Western observers as looking like the headdress of nuns. They acquired metals, textiles, and grains from settled peoples, through trading and raiding, while itinerant craftsmen lived among the herdsmen making artifacts to nomad tastes.

The differences between civilized folk and nomads in terms of character and spirituality are many and well-known. The stress here is that while the townsman has been separated by his culture from the natural world, thereby becoming "advanced," the nomad (like other "primitive" peoples) remains awed by the mysteries of life and calloused by its hardships. The spiritual quality of nomadic life is the most important feature of it, to the nomad, yet it is the least tangible, to the modern mind.

The intense love of their land and animals permeates Kazakh nomadic culture, and is most apparent in their oral art. It is difficult to quantify spirit, a major dilemma for the student of non-Western nationalism trying to separate primitive faith from modern ideology. The nature of Kazakh identity particularly reveals this problem, with its fusion of nomadic culture and historical molding, the latter process to
be described next.

To overlook the nature of the pastoral nomadic character is misleading; a similar flaw of "anti-primitivism" is often found in the study of American Indians, particularly the mounted hunter-nomads of the Great Plains. The essence of nomadic life is mobility, kin/communal mutual aid in a "frontier" milieu, and aggressiveness. The first creates a powerful notion of freedom, the second one of egalitarianism, and the last has captured the historical imagination of the civilized world, as the following scholarly comments testify.

Nomad life required a more robust physique than that of the sedentary oasis-dweller. It also demanded a more independent mind which might, in times of crisis, be called upon to make swift judgements and take the initiative in a way scarcely conceivable to the cultivator bound to the ceaseless routine of the farming calendar. In the struggle for pastures, in inter-tribal warfare and in pursuance of the blood-feud the nomad naturally developed aggressive instincts which, taken with his need for the products of sedentary society, often led him to prey upon his settled neighbors. . . . He invariably held in contempt the settled population of the oases. . . . The historian who regards pastoral nomadism as an inferior activity to agriculture is likely to be misled in his reading of the Central Asian past since he will certainly fail to appreciate the immense prestige (based primarily upon superior military prowess) which the nomad has usually enjoyed among the oasis-dwellers.17
CHAPTER TWO

Kazakhstan and the Tsars

The Kazakhs evolved from the Turkic and Mongol nomads of the central Eurasian steppes who chose the free life of nomadry over the comfort of civilization.¹ Chingiz (Genghis) Khan, upon conquering Central Asia, tore asunder the tribal groupings of the steppes and rearranged them for military purposes.² The Chingizid dynasties which inherited the vast conquests of the 1200s had disintegrated into "hordes," tribes, and clans by the 1400s. (Despite modern parlance, "horde" actually implied "government.")

The White Horde, a remnant of the Golden Horde, in Central Asia, had broken up, partly due to the pressure of Muscovite expansion into the European steppes. One group of Moslem Turks formed the Uzbek Khanate, which established hegemony over Central Asia under several strong leaders. However, many nomads resented Uzbek domination or preferred the free Steppe to civilization (or both). When the Uzbeks moved south to rule over the oases-states (called Mawaraunnahr), those tribes and bands preferring the steppe life returned to the northern grasslands.

These nomads--individuals, families, parts of clans and tribes, adventurers and indigenous remnants--came to call themselves and to be
called "Kazakhs." A Turkic word of disputed etymology, kazak (qazaq) referred from early times to those who defied imposed authority to live free on the Steppe—freebooters, raiders, rebels, mercenaries, and those who defied their hereditary leaders.³ The Russians adopted the term for their own unruly frontiersmen, the Kazaks—Anglicized as "Cossacks."

Though the name was originally functional or descriptive, that is, "the free riders," it quickly and imperceptibly became a national appellation. The Kazakhs are often described as traditionally tribal; in fact, there were Kazakh tribes, some left from indigenous peoples and some self-formed in the turmoil of the medieval era, but cutting across the various tribal and subtribal identities was the all-encompassing notion of "Kazakhness," or Qazaqjylyq.⁴ Within the pre-modern, nomadic milieu, this notion of over-arching unity was institutionalized by the mechanism of geneology: non-Kazakhs became Kazaks by geneological adoption, often done blatantly, with the goal being to unite all the Kazakh persons and kin-lines into descendants of the mythical Alash, literally the "father" of his country.⁵ Thus, the clans, families, and tribes of Kazakhstan were constantly modifying elaborate geneologies linking themselves all to eponymous ancestors, so that by the time the nineteenth-century ethnographers reached them, the Kazakhs formed a distinct nation.

The origins of this nation were political, not ethnic. By the 1500s, the Kazakhs constituted a single people with a single language, a definite territory, and a common economy. As they expanded from the core area of Semirechye into the vast Desht-i-Kipchak, growing in both
numbers and territory, they developed a typical medieval Eurasian nomadic khanate state. Soviet historians, working within the theoretical framework of primitive-patriarchal-feudal-capitalist-socialist stages, have long grappled with the categorization of Kazakh society and economy. The elimination of the traditional Kazakh leadership after the Civil War was justified by their feudal nature, and by extension, the Khanate was typical "nomad feudalism." The lack of truly "feudal" characteristics frustrates this scheme. The Kazakhs owned their herds privately, for instance, while the land (pasture) was owned communally. Kin and communal mutual aid customs which provided community support for the poor and misfortunate were not serf-master or exploiter-producer relations, though portrayed as such in Soviet literature.

Two fine Soviet scholars of the modern era are S. E. Tolybekov, a Kazakh historian, and A. M. Khazanov, expert on pastoral nomadism. Their delicate compromise describes nomadic culture as "transitional patriarchal-feudal." This grants Kazakh culture its traditional basis while maintaining class-exploitation; it also criticizes nomadic socioeconomy as basically stagnant or oscillatory.

The great majority in Kazakh nomadic society were neither rich nor poor, even in pastoral terms of herd-size, the likely result of the precarious nature of their steppe-life, when drought and dzhuts were constant levellers. Life revolved around the community of mobile camps, the auls, extended only somewhat by greater clan and tribal relations. Authority at this level resided in the aksakal, "white
beard," and the bii, later formerly a judge. The Kazakh "masses" were called kara suiuk, "black bone."

Dwelling amongst them, undistinguished in lifestyle save for the whiteness of their yurts, were the ak suiuk, the "white bone." Their blood was "noble" in that they were descended from Chingis Khan. They only were eligible for election--by the biis--to be khan or "sub-khan" (sultan). The biis were chosen by the aksakals to represent the auls. The wealthy strata, who included both white bone and black bone, were called bais, "rich." To be a wealthy nomad was a position more of responsibility than privilege, for not only did the bai have larger herds but also he helped support poor relatives and others, such as the baigush, hired hands. The goal of the poor nomad was to have his own herd, which hiring out provided; the dreaded alternative was to have no animals and be forced to settle down to grow crops.

During the 1500s, as the Kazakh Khanate expanded, three "hordes" emerged. Orda referred to the court or retinue of a prince or khan. The Kazakhs used a different term, zhuz (juz), literally "hundred, a great many." Its use implies an essentially military connotation. The Hordes represented a practical, even strategic occupation of the vast steppe. The Ulu Zhuz (Elder or Great Horde) occupied Semirechye and the southern deserts, the Orta Zhuz (Middle Horde) migrated from the Aral area across the central uplands to the northern plains, and the Kishshi Zhuz (Little Horde) dwelt in the western lowlands. Each of these territories represented three natural "orbits" of seasonal migration within the physiography of Kazakhstan. The division by zhuz
merely institutionalized the Kazakh adaptation to environment, and given
the legacy of Chingisid authority, the result was three political-
military unions within the Kazakh (proto)nation.

Each horde was nominally led by a khan; exceptionally strong military
leaders, notably Kasym (1509-18), Tauke (1680-1718), and Kenesary Kasymov
(1840s) united the hordes under one khan, but otherwise each horde's
khan ruled separately. The Kazakhs were notoriously independent, as
evidenced by their very origins, and individuals, auls, even clans
might leave one horde's orbit for another, to escape oppressive
leaders or find stronger, richer ones, as well as to escape rivalries and
find better pastures. This essential attitude towards authority caused
Russian bureaucrats much grief. This seeming instability of Kazakh
society is difficult for the sedentary to grasp, but within the frontier
or wilderness context and given the atomistic nature of seasonal pastoral
migration, it was perfectly reasonable. Kazakhs rustled and raided other
Kazakhs a great deal, violence and usurpation of pasture mitigated by
the authority of the aksakals, biis, and khans; they did not, however,
wage war between the hordes. A Kazakh considered all Kazakhs his kin.

The Khanate flourished in the 1500s and early 1600s. Its neighbors
were weak or occupied elsewhere; the great shift in the Oriental trade to
European shipping had left Central Asia immensely isolated. The Kazakhs
conquered some of the major towns of northern Syr Darya, exposing them to
Turkestanian influence. This, as well as the growth of trade with the
settled states, helped create wealthy, powerful Kazakhs with interests
other than the simple prestige-oriented nomad values.12
Calamity crashed upon the Kazakhs in the mid-1600s. Mongol nomads of the Oirot nation called Dzungars (Jungars), to the east of the Great Horde, had threatened Central Asia before, toppling the Uzbek khanate in the 1450s in the troubled period of Kazakh origins. In 1620, the non-Dzungar Oirots called Torguts fled Dzungaria, cutting a bloody swathe through Kazakhstan to occupy the lower Volga steppe. From 1650 to 1700, the Dzungar armies ravaged Central Asia repeatedly, attacking nomads and oases alike. After briefly turning eastward to battle the rising Manchu power of China, the Dzungars turned west again in deadly earnest.

The Kazakhs called the troublous times of the Dzungar wars the "Great Disaster," aktaban shubirindi. The Dzungars waged seven major wars on the Kazakhs from 1698 to 1757. They seized Semirechye, some of the Syr Darya region, and most of the eastern segment of the central uplands and northern plains. In this period, the Russians inaugurated the so-called Ishim line, fortresses between Siberia and the war-torn Steppe. In 1723, the Dzungars devastated the beleaguered Kazakhs gathered in the old heartland of the Chu-Talas region of Semirechye, which proved the ebb in the history of the Khanate.

The Dzungar threat led numerous Kazakh leaders to seek Russian help. Although the tsarist empire provided no help, in fact, various leading Kazakhs swore oaths of allegiance and mutual protection. This was Russia's legal pretext for conquering the Kazakhs. The Manchus eventually exterminated the Dzungars, and the Kazakhs reoccupied their lands and even migrated into vacated Dzungaria. The khan of the Little Horde took oath in 1731, several Middle Horde leaders followed
suit in 1740, and a few leading Great Horde Kazakhs gave nominal obeisance in 1742. In fact, the oathing of the khans meant no more to most Kazakhs than treaty-signing by chiefs meant to American plains nomads, given the fierce independence and scorn for imposed authority in their character. Russian authority, like American, ignored this in determination to enforce law and order, meaning only domesticating the free riders within the Empire.

The Tsarist conquest of Kazakhstan falls into two phases, the initial period of gradual penetration and nominal rule, followed by full-fledged military, economic, and political domination. Tsarist expansion to the Volga and Siberia placed the Kazakhs between Russia and the Orient's wealth. Cossacks were settled along the Ural and Irtysh rivers in the 1600s and 1700s, while fortified lines edged southward across the wooded steppe, sheltering "illegal" Russian peasants. Already suffering from too little pasture, the Kazakhs resisted Russian encroachment. Russian concern turned to alarm in the 1770s, when large numbers of western Kazakhs joined in the Pugachev revolt.

The Russians attempted a carrot and stick approach, installing "their" khans in Orenburg, the Steppe frontier capital, paying them salaries and presumably controlling them, while in the Steppe itself, brute military force was used against the "wild" Kazakhs who persisted in raiding and defying authority. The "kept" khans were worthless, for the Kazakhs generally ignored them as much as their Russian masters. However, a new element was introduced with Kazakhs who benefitted from Russian rule.
This developing internal conflict as well as resistance to the Russians reached dramatic proportions by the turn of the nineteenth century, with Kazakhs fighting each other as well as the Russians.\textsuperscript{18} The Little Horde erupted in the 1780s and 1790s with the great rebellion of Batyr Srym. After its suppression, the tsar "authorized" a segment of the Little Horde, under Khan Bukei, to cross the Volga to occupy pastureland there; the creation of the "Inner" of "Bukei Horde" in 1801 proved ominous.\textsuperscript{19}

In 1802, Kenesary Kasymov (Kine Sari Kasym-uli) was born to a noble family of the Great Horde.\textsuperscript{20} He was attracted to the material advances of Russian-borne westernization, initially. Yet his youth saw hard years for his people: in 1819 and 1823, some Great Horde leaders took oath with the Russians; the Tsar "abolished" the Middle Horde Khanate in 1822, and the Little Horde in 1824. Russian military pressure and the tensions of socioeconomic changes only increased through the 1830s.

In 1837, Kenesary launched the last great Kazakh revolt. Russian sources themselves describe the revolt as massive, popular, and widely supported, bitterly anti-Russian, with its goal independence. Large numbers of Kazakhs from all the hordes joined, and Kenesary was elected Khan of all the Kazakhs (the first since the early 1700s). In 1841, he issued a declaration of grievances decrying Russian massacres, injustice, and land-expropriation. The revolt was crushed in 1846-47; the Kazakhs lacked the discipline and modern armaments of the tsarist military as well as reserves of manpower or wealth to maintain prolonged war. The last Khan was killed in 1847, by Kirgiz nobles allied with the state of
Kokand, then encroaching on the southern Kazakhs. The Great Horde Khanate was abolished in 1848; since the Inner Horde was abolished in 1845, no even nominal independence remained in Kazakhstan.

The second phase of Tsarist rule was military colonial occupation and administration. The Russians captured Tashkent in 1865, gaining effective control over all Turkestan. A Steppe Commission was created which studied the region until 1867. The government then divided all of Central Asia into an array of administrative units. The emirates of Bokhara and Khiva retained semi-independent status as tsarist vassals. The remaining lands of the south were organized as the guberniia or Governorate-General of Turkestan.

Kazakhstan was divided into six oblasts (provinces): Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk, the northeastern and central regions; Turgay and Uralsk, the western and northwestern regions, and Syr Darya and Semirechye, the southern and eastern regions. All except Syr Darya, in the Turkestan guberniia, were governed by the Steppe Polozhenie (law code), while the four northern oblasts (excluding Syr Darya and Semirechye) were under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. Uralsk, Turgai, Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, and Semirechye constituted the guberniia of the Stepnoi Krai ("Steppe Region"); Semirechye was transferred to the Turkestan guberniia in 1897. The Steppe governor-general resided at Omsk, with military governors in Semirechye and Uralsk. The Russians further split up the Kazakh lands at the uezd (county), volost (district), and aul levels.

This deliberate gerrymandering had a profound impact on Kazakh
economy and thus their traditional culture. Herdsmen who once roamed the unbounded Steppe now confronted internal barriers across their accustomed routes. For nomads who depended on their pastures for survival, this administrative ripsawing was calamitous. Some auls of the Middle Horde, for example, had "nomadized" between the Irtysh, in summer, and the Syr Darya region in winter, distances of many hundreds of miles, which they could no longer do, crowding the poorer central and southern pastures while the Russians took the fertile north. Economic hardship was accompanied with cultural change as well. The Russians countered the traditional authorities, the aksakals and biis, by abolishing nomadic elections and appointing the native officials themselves, even paying salaries. This led to a serious decline in quality of the Kazakh leaders and social relations. Many of these drastic changes were instituted with the Steppe Statute of 1868, including the outright expropriation of all Kazakh land as "crown land." Naturally, the last Kazakh revolt until 1916 occurred in 1868-70.
CHAPTER THREE
Russification as Modernization

The 'Kirghiz' [Kazakhs] are animals, nothing more. The Russians are men. The 'Kirghiz' are going to China. God be with them! Let them go! Are they not pagans? We should be well rid of them! . . . If they want to stay with us, let them remain in one spot, become civilized, and obtain proper passports; then their land will be secured to them. But if they must wander about like wild animals, here to-day and the other side of the mountain tomorrow, then they must pay for their liberty and wildness.

— Peasant land-surveyor, 1914, in Semirechye.

The Russification of Kazakhstan is best reviewed in four categories: colonization, industrialization, socioeconomic change, and education. The Russians migrated into Kazakhstan as permanent settlers forcefully displacing the natives from their land, much the way Americans tamed the Wild West. They were there to carve civilization from the wilderness. The Kazakhs could "choose" annihilation, exile, or assimilation. The physical presence of the Russians with their modern advances was accompanied by cultural influence as well. With the advent of modern education, imposed for Russian purposes, a small Russian-educated intellectual elite developed and with them the powerful phenomenon of modern nationalism.

Initially, Russian colonization had been limited to the imperial
frontier with the establishment of Cossack settlements and fortified lines, with the strategic purpose of encircling and dividing the Kazakhs. The irony of the Cossack role is their origins as free stepniks like the Kazakhs. Indeed, the very name of the Kazakhs was expropriated by the Russians; "Cossack" and "Kazak" are identical in Cyrillic, so to distinguish them, the Russians changed the Kazakhs to 'Kirghiz' (while the real Kirghiz, related nomads of the Tien Shan alpine pastures, had their name changed to Kara-Kirghiz).

The nature of colonization changed radically in the mid-1800s. Russia's land-hungry serfs were set free by the Great Reforms of the 1860s-70s, and the government opened Kazakhstan to peasant immigration in hopes the vast Steppe could alleviate pressure in Europe. Peasant colonization turned from a trickle to a flood in the 1890s, because of the great famine of 1891-92 and also due to the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, which greatly facilitated transportation.

In 1896, the Resettlement Administration, Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie, was created within the Interior Ministry. Numerous surveying expeditions were sent to determine which lands were "surplus" to the nomads' needs and could be turned over to Russian colonists (through the Public Land Fund). Colonization reached a crescendo following the Stolypin reforms of 1906, which created the first official Virgin Lands project in Kazakhstan. The influx decreased sharply with World War I and the following years of civil war, but by then a massive Russian population dwelt in Kazakhstan. About 1.5 million European settlers had flooded Kazakh lands occupied by only about four million Kazakhs, in a span of roughly two decades.
Industrialization was only in its infancy during the tsarist period; the Trans-Siberian Railroad was the first significant step, and it came late. The mineral treasures of Kazakhstan were largely unexplored, but several major mining operations were undertaken, with lead, copper, and silver mining in the Altai in the 1700s, lead and silver mining in the central uplands in 1834, coal mining in the Karaganda region by 1855. By 1914, some 1,400 industrial workers labored in the Karaganda area; the workers were overwhelmingly Russian, with Kazakhs working as laborers and tending to leave with the herds in winter or when they had accumulated enough to pay the kalym, the bride-price.

Urbanization is one of the strongest factors of industrialization. By 1911, seventeen towns in Kazakhstan contained 10,000 or more people. Omsk was largest, by far, with 127,000 people, located in the northeastern Virgin Lands. These cities served primarily as regional commercial and administrative centers, as manufacturing was scarcely begun. The towns along the Trans-Siberian Railroad grew largest and fastest.

The urban population was also mostly European (Slavic); it numbered about half a million in 1916 (compared to the total rural population of about five million). Its presence was doubly significant. It symbolized how far Kazakhstan had come since its origins as simply the Steppe, home of the free riders. It also determined the course of events during the revolutionary era. In the country, Kazakh nomad faced Slavic peasant in the ancient duel of horseman versus farmer, but in the
city, the "pre-modern" Kazakh world-view confronted the truly alien "modern world." Because their cultural character was rooted in pastoral nomadism, which is utterly anti-urban, the socioeconomic effects of modernization were particularly stressful.

The primary socioeconomic effect of Russian rule and its concomitant modernization was the extinction of the economic viability of Kazakh pastoral nomadism. The Kazakh livestock-breeding economy had never been utterly self-sufficient, but it had proven to be the most efficient human exploitation of the arid grasslands, evidenced by the persistence of pastoral nomadism through time. The struggle of nomads for pasture has influenced Eurasian history, as is well known. The Dzhungar-Kazakh wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had been a sort of nomad armageddon which left both sides at the mercy of the empires of the civilized world. Against the inexorable economic forces of modernization the Kazakhs could not maintain their traditional economy, nor the culture which was based upon it.

Sedentarization was not new in Kazakh history. Given the harsh nature of the Steppe and its history, the individual fortune of each herdsman and aul varied considerably over time and space. The great nomad chieftain with countless herds one summer could be struck by the dzhut next winter, or his rivals could carry off his livestock, leaving him a poor man dependent on his wealthier kin. By working for them, he could attain animals for himself, or he could let his kin pasture what livestock he had left, while he grew millet and harvested wild hay for them. The ex-nomad's goal was always to regain his herds.
Sedentarization in terms of modernization was a very different phenomenon. The civilized attitude that the only good nomad was one planted in the ground—as either corpse or farmer—was reflected and engendered both by government policies and officials, and also by the structural impacts of industrial economics itself. Thus, the district gerrymandering and the Resettlement Administration represent the former, while the latter aspect manifested itself in the seizure of the best pasture lands for farming. In farming areas, pastoral extensive land use was replaced by intensive farming, deep plowing, and a typical grain-livestock rural economy. Even in pastoral areas, the pressures to supply the Russian market with meat and hides changed the composition of the Kazakh herds, with horned cattle paramount and the noble horse secondary. In fact, Kazakh livestock numbers flourished: from 1906 to 1916, the total herd size increased by five million head (76%).

As available pasture declined due to Russian constriction, the Kazakh economic situation changed. In the north, close to the Russian markets and transport, the wealthy Kazakh was Russian-oriented. In the remote east, the traditional milieu was least affected. In the south, due to the influence of Kokand, the Kazakh elite was incorporated in the Turkestani world; however, there also developed large numbers of nomadic Kazakhs who had drifted southward as the Russian pressure in the north forced them to seek other pasture. Finally, in the west, those near Russia were much affected but the tribes in the Ust-Urt and Turgai regions remained much more traditional.

The modern sedentarization not only forced many Kazakhs to take up
subsistence farming because they could no longer maintain adequate herds; it ironically increased the power of numerous other Kazakhs. It was noted that at least by the early 1800s, a rift was developing between Kazakhs who benefitted from Russian rule, and those who suffered. The economic impact was to make many moderate and poor Kazakhs abandon nomadism, while wealthy Kazakhs often increased their wealth. By the revolutionary era, over 80% of the Kazakh population utilized some agriculture, while only about a third had done so merely 40 years earlier.\footnote{13}

Wealthy Kazakhs in Russian areas preserved and extended their power by allying with the Russians, that is, they remained nomads because their poorer kin could not. Wealthy Kazakhs in traditional areas remained nomads by maintaining their kin as nomads. This dichotomy of tangled interests proved a powerful tool of Russian rule.

Pastoral nomads have sophisticated systems of land-use, enforced by custom (through trial-and-error) much more than by violence. Kazakhs had regarded the land (specifically, the pasture) as common to all, with traditional rights of usufruct for each family within its extended group's territory. In some places, the best sites were reserved for specific families, in others, it was first-come first-serve; in still others, usage rotated in a customary fashion between families. Relations over pasture and water were vital to the Kazakh culture, which stressed peaceful resolution over bloodshed.

The pressures of Russification replaced the nomad concept with that of private property. The government had seized all Kazakh land as crown
property with the Steppe Polozhienie. The best lands were determined to be surplus to the nomads' needs and were given to the ministry of Agriculture for distribution to the peasants. The Kazakhs were left to compete among themselves for the marginal lands left them. Those most amenable to modern changes benefitted, but those most traditional were more likely to be impoverished.¹⁴

The process began with the semi-private property of each nomad family, the winter quarters (kstau). Under Russian pressure, the group would lay claim to that land. The Kazakhs had traditionally not laid up fodder for their herds in the winter, a practice roundly condemned by civilized observers and seemingly illogical; in fact, Khazanov points out that the natural grasses recovered quickly when grazed but much more slowly when cropped.¹⁵ As the civilized practice of fodder-storage spread, Kazakh families would claim hay and meadow lands also. Wealthy Kazakhs could use money to buy or rent the lands of poorer families. There thus developed rich Kazakh landowners and jataks, "lie-abouts" without herds, baigush, hired hands, and eginshi, grain-growers or ex-nomads.¹⁶ As never before in Kazakh history, the nomad society was being stratified into classes.

The fourth major aspect of Tsarist Russification is education.¹⁷ "Universal" schooling is a well-recognized component of modernization, given the industrial society's need for trained workers and skilled technicians. Also, colonial administrators need educated natives both for clerical aid and to stabilize control of the indigenous population. This education is a two-edged sword, for the native with the training to work and obey usually recognizes his inferior status and his superior
opportunity. He is caught between the modern and the traditional, but only he—not his colonial rulers nor his fellow people—can bridge the gap between the two. The Russian term *intelligentsia* can be applied to these intellectually emancipated critics of the existing order.

As early as the 1780s, Empress Catherine II had encouraged Kazan Tatar mullahs and merchants to proselytize Islam among the Kazakhs; it was hoped that this would civilize the Kazakhs. Although the Kazakhs were nominally Moslem, they retained much of their pre-Islamic culture and beliefs, merely overlaying them with an Islamic veneer. But through the nineteenth century, Kazakh Islamicization deepened, partly due to proselytization of the Tatars in the north and the Turkestanis in the south, and partly due to the increasing hardship of Kazakh life, which increased religiosity.

The Tatars proved troublesome, spreading not only Islam but anti-Russian sentiments, while using their intermediary position for their own profit. Following the establishment of colonial rule in the mid-1800s, the Russians ended Tatar influence and inaugurated government schools. Three types developed: two-year aul schools, taught in Kazakh, providing a minimal learning; four-year volost schools that taught Russian, and advanced six-year schools. From the latter, Kazakhs could go on to the Russian gymnasia in Orenburg and Omsk. The graduates either entered government service or became teachers themselves.

The Russian-Kazakh secular schools represent direct Russification. But the impacts of modernization rippled more subtly, also. Another education system competed with the Russian, the Islamic. "Secret"
Islamic schools spread through the Steppe. From the south came a very conservative Islam, providing the traditional Koranic instruction. But modernization had created a new Islamic educational movement among the Crimean and Kazan Tatars. The "new method" (usul-i-jadid) movement was a westernized, progressive, yet overtly Islamic educational program which was very popular in the Russian Moslem world. It sought to bridge the gulf between the umma (Islamic society) and the modern world. Linked with this modernization of Islam was the Tatar-led movement which envisioned a great nation of Turkish Moslems. Known variously as Pan-Turkism or Pan-Islam, depending on the emphasis of the reformer, it sought to gloss over regional, national, and cultural divisions by focusing on the shared ethnic, linguistic, and religious aspects of Russia's Turkish-speaking Moslems.

The actual number of graduates of all of these schools was very small; government-school graduates with a secondary education numbered only in the hundreds, while only at most 2% of the Kazakh population was literate by the revolutionary era. Nevertheless, their very existence reveals the extent of the modernization by Russification of the Kazakhs.

Modern nationalism among the nomadic Kazakhs sprang forth in the beginning of the twentieth century. Because of the anomaly, civilized historians have sought to downplay its significance in the revolutionary era as well as to deny its existence in the pastoral nomad milieu. But the history of the Kazakhs reveals a fundamental sense of national identity that transcends "tribalism."
The Kazakhs were a polity before they were an ethnicity. From the beginning, they have been characterized by a strong self-conception of being a nation. The pastoral nomadic milieu must be analyzed on its own terms. Sedentary scholars have strict conceptions of nationalism which are based on sedentary history, so Kazakh traditional nationalism fails these modern criteria. To appreciate Kazakh nomadism on its own ground, one must recognize this "nomad nationalism."
CHAPTER FOUR
Nomad Nationalism, 1800s-1900

We the children of the Kazakhs,
What would be if we had unity?
--Kenesary Kasym-uli, 1840s

Farewell forever,
Cool mountain heights,
Green carpet of grass.
Never would we have left you,
But the enemy is pressing us.
--Dosqodzha, mid-1800s

Nationalism is one of the most potent yet protean forces of modernization. Central Asia, like so many other non-Western cultures, underwent a heightened nationalistic evolution due to the westernizing influences of colonial rule. It was typical of pre-industrial culture-areas, composed not of ideological nation-states, but rather of entwined yet contrasting ethno-cultural groups identifying themselves by language, lineage, and lifestyle. Inner Asia was distinctly divided, from ancient times, between the nomads and the sedentary cultures, a division reflected in the widespread term "Sart" for the settled peoples whether of Turkish or Iranian ethnicity, even as "Kazakh" had been applied to the steppe people.

The growth of modern nationalism was one of the nineteenth century's
strongest historical forces. It influenced the Kazakhs through the medium of Russia; as Russian culture experienced its impacts, nationalism thereby developed among many of the non-Russian peoples as well. The following summary of the evolution of nationalism in tsarist Russia is provided by Richard Pipes in his study of nationalism and Communism in the revolutionary period.\(^4\)

Minority nationalism awakened due to romantic philosophy in the 1820s, which stirred in non-Russians an interest in their own cultures. This led to "cultural nationalism" and the first national movements in the "borderlands." The spread of Russian Populism, in the 1860s-1870s, brought non-Russian intellectuals into contact with their own "masses." By 1900, national parties were forming with liberal and socialist programs, affiliated with Russian counterparts, except that while the Russians stressed empire-wide concerns, the minorities were "localist." Pipes notes the failure of the tsarist regime to heed the clamor for basic reforms, including the suppression of non-Russian cultures and minority desires. He also observes that "The fact that [Russian] minorities . . . developed a national consciousness before their fellow-nationals across the border . . . was a result of the more rapid intellectual and economic growth of the Russian Empire.\(^5\)

Particular developments fostered non-Russian nationalism. The growth of Russian nationalism led to "Great Russian chauvinism" which, by the latter 1800s, had become an official policy of Russification of the non-Russian peoples. This "Official Nationality" deliberately suppressed minority cultures, obviously encouraging the reaction of anti-Russian
"minority" nationalism. The Russo-Japanese War and consequent Russian Revolution of 1905 encouraged reformers and nationalists throughout the Empire: Russia was not invincible. Lastly, the years after 1905 were marked by unrest and hard times; the Kazakhs suffered the worst colonization and expropriation of the tsarist era at this time.

Observers have noted that nationalism developed more swiftly among the nomads than among the Sarts; the implied surprise derives from the civilized prejudice which ranks pastoralism inferior to settled society. Aside from the basic question of what constitutes nationalism, as the discussion of "nomad nationalism" above indicated, it should not be unexpected that the homogenous Kazakhs, who were very mobile and gregarious, travelling great distances empty of any others but themselves, were characterized by stronger national ties than the settled peoples, splintered as they were by intricate, ancient political, social, economic, ethnic, religious, and historical divisions.

Only 2% of the Kazakh population was educated by the time of the Revolutions. Among the vast majority of Kazakhs, notions of nation-states, Pan-Islam, or Pan-Turkism were practically non-existent. Up to 1917, except for those settled near or among Russians, the Kazakhs were primarily conscious of their tribal and sub-tribal identities. However, from the 1770s on, the Kazakhs had been struggling against Russian expansion and then administrative redistricting, both of which helped break down tribalism. The great revolt of Kenesary Kasym-uli, which had been a powerful "pan-Kazakh," anti-Russian independence struggle, was evidence of this change.
Scholars, products of civilization, have argued lengthily about how, when, and why nationalism developed among the Kazakhs. Nearly all agree that it occurred very late and was only a minor factor in the tsarist era. This negative view is clearly expressed by Geoffrey Wheeler, long-time editor of the British Central Asian Review, in his Modern History of Soviet Central Asia.

Wheeler states that "... no coherent desire for separation was ever expressed by the Muslims of Central Asia." He suggests that what is called nationalism "may not be so much a desire for self-government and civic freedom as simply an age-long addiction to lawlessness and a chronic dislike of any kind of regular government." By 1917, "the idea of a nation or even of a nationality had barely penetrated among the people of Turkestan." The extent of pre-revolutionary aspirations "did not include political independence or self-determination but were confined to such matters as the cessation of peasant colonization, freedom of religious teaching, freedom to publish books and newspapers, and the right to elect deputies." Finally, following the argument of Elie Kedourie, Wheeler states, "In speaking of nationalism in Central Asia there is a tendency to confuse nationalism with national consciousness. ... There is no direct evidence available of the existence of ... particularist national consciousness in Central Asia ..." But he does admit that "the existence of nationalism in Central Asia cannot be finally proved or disproved."

The negative view is widely shared among Western historians. A British mining operator in central Kazakhstan in the early 1900s, E.
Nelson Fell, not a historian but a sympathetic contemporary, perhaps expresses the negative sentiment: "Self-government is too hard a nut for our gentle, milk-drinking [Kazakh] to digest, who have no political genius and whose ideas of government do not stretch beyond the patriarchal Aool.""^16

Tsarist and Soviet opinion has generally agreed with the negative view, but has been complicated by shifting interpretations; for the Russians, Kazakh nationalism is burdened by connotations of Russian imperialism. The official tsarist version of 1914, Aziatskaia Rossiia, acknowledges Kazakh resistance to maintain an independent existence.^17 The Russians conquered Kazakhstan for their own imperial purposes.

Soviet historiography has fluctuated with the dictates of ideology.18 In the early years, Pokrovskii's "absolute evil" theory dominated: tsarist imperialism and capitalism had exploited the nomads with absolutely no benefits for the Kazakhs, who (save for the rich feudal leaders) vigorously resisted the Russian conquest. Growing Soviet (Great Russian) chauvinism and the patriotic demands of World War II led to the "lesser evil" interpretation. While the Empire had exploited the Kazakhs, at least the Russian people had brought enlightened civilization to the backwards nomads, who otherwise would have been conquered by Kokand, China, Turkey, or even the British.

The Russian incorporation of Kazakhstan was an "absolute good" by 1957, as expressed by the Kazakh scholar Tolybekov:

... the Kazakh Steppes were not conquered by the Russian state, since the incorporation of the Lesser and later of the Middle and Great Hordes was carried out of their own free will. ... the union of the Little Horde
with the Russian empire did not involve the restriction of its territory or of its nomadic practices. The isolated punitive expeditions carried out by Russian frontier troops in reply to the marauding expeditions of the Kazakh batyrs (warriors) in the course of which many innocent Kazakh villages also suffered, cannot be regarded as a general campaign of conquest against the Kazakhs carried out by the Russian state.\textsuperscript{19}

The "official" histories of Kazakhstan of 1943 and of 1957 reveal the Soviet negative view in their variant interpretations of the great revolt of Kenesary Kasym-uli (1830s-40s). In the earlier history, the revolt occupies an entire chapter, entitled "The Struggle of the Kazakh Hordes to Preserve Their Independence." It described "the freedom-loving and fighting spirit of the Kazakh people, who were not easily to be parted from their national independence." By the 1957 history, only two pages on Kenesary are provided, and the revolt is described as:

\textldots a reactionary feudal-monarchical movement which dragged the Kazakh people back to the consolidation of patriarchal and feudal conditions, to the restoration of the medieval rule of the Khan, and to the isolation of Kazakhstan from Russia and the Russian people.\textsuperscript{20}

The Great Soviet Encyclopedia (3rd edition) says merely, "The most protracted feudal-monarchist movement . . . was that of Sultan Kenesara Kasymov, who strove to become the absolute feudal ruler of Kazakhstan."\textsuperscript{21}

The negative view, as mentioned, prevails among scholars, who are the product of civilization. "Nomad nationalism," the positive view, may be equally too extreme from reality, but at least it seeks to understand the Kazakhs by their own values, which attributed great spiritual meaning to their pastoral nomadic culture. Fell provides some insight when he states, "the only conclusion which I ever drew from a study of the [Kazakh] mind, with any confidence in its correctness, was
that neither our formulae, nor our classifications, nor language could be
applied to it in any intelligent manner.\textsuperscript{22}

Nomad nationalism, for the Kazakhs, meant the intense association
of their self-identity with pastoral nomadism, as "free riders of the
Steppe." This identity originated in the 1400s, consolidated in the
1500s and 1600s, and then was assaulted by the \textit{aktaban} \textit{shubirindi} and
the Russian conquests of the 1700s and 1800s. Economically and
culturally, Kazakh self-identity was threatened.

The Kazakhs are famed as a people of song; lacking written records,
their oral art and literature encapsulated their culture, preserved their
history, and expressed their desires. Whether he was the \textit{jyrau} who
served the powerful or merely the \textit{akyn} who shared the life of the humble,
the Kazakh bard communicated Kazakh thought. When Kazakh national
identity was transforming in the nineteenth century, the bards reflected
and transmitted the change.\textsuperscript{23}

The earlier poets of the Kazakh "classical" period were anonymous
and worked within well-defined traditions, such as the \textit{dzhooqtau} (songs of
mourning), \textit{qostasu} (farewell songs), and heroic epics (e.g., \textit{Qoblandy-
batyr}). The bards of the era of resistance to Russian annexation are
identified along with the leaders they memorialized; from the latter 1700s
to middle 1800s, famous akyns fought beside great war-leaders and with
their fighting poetry encouraged the masses.

Thomas Winner, whose work \textit{The Oral Art and Literature of the Kazakhs}
(1958) is indispensable for understanding Kazakh cultural development,
describes the significance of the early-middle nineteenth century poets:
"Their poetry, simple in style and language, was filled with a great popular energy, a feeling for the justice of the national cause, and an undying hatred of the Russians and their Kazakh collaborators."24

The role of the intellectual in leading modernization is to be seen in the pre-literate akyns of the early 1800s, who sought to mobilize the Kazakhs to the challenges of the new age. The literate, bourgeois intellectuals followed their example, when modern education came to the Steppe. The influence of the first generation of Kazakh intellectuals is discernible in the instance of the akyn Makhambet Utemisov (1804-1845), who played a major role in the revolt of Isatai Taimanov. Makhambet was Isatai's counselor and intermediary with the Russians. Two themes emerge in Makhambet's surviving songs which foreshadow the development of modern Kazakh nationalism.

One theme is that of encirclement by the enemy, really an old theme for the Kazakhs, apparent in the aktaban shubirindi. The other is a new theme in traditional Kazakh society, that of social oppression within Kazakh culture itself. The following lines illustrate these concerns.

We cannot now take that which is ours,
We cannot now, in great expanse,
Camp in our own fields--
A high-handed enemy has gripped us all around
In a tight vise.
Oh, men, we all are cursed
Cursed by our unhappy life.
Like free deer we went
To drink from the clear spring; like the wild horse
We grazed on the plains--
And now again we are hemmed in by an enemy.

And from another song:
What good are golden thrones to the people,
What good are dashing khans to the people,
If there is no justice
For the weak and the poor? 25

The defeat of the resistance in the middle 1800s ushered in an era of bitter resignation. The last major uprisings, those of Iset Kutebar-uli and Jan Khoja, put down in 1857-58, and of the Adaev Kazakhs following the implementation of the 1868 Steppe Statute, were suppressed and Russian control was complete. Because military resistance was now fruitless, the Kazakh poet-intellectuals of the mid-1800s could only bemoan the situation and they withdrew into resentment.

The leading poets of this second generation included Dulat Babatauli (1802-1871), Abubakir Kerderi (1858-1903), Murat Monke-uli (1843-1906), and Shortambai Kanai-uli (or Qanaev; 1818-1881). 26 Murat's famous "Three Epochs" contrasts the Kazakh golden age with the misery of Russian rule, concluding with the unanswered question, "How shall we heal this epoch?"

Shortambai is most famous of these men. His poem "Zar Zamad" ("Time of Trouble" or "Age of Misery") gave name to this entire period. 27 Another famous work, "Opasiz Jalghan" ("Faithless Lying" or "Traitorous Slander"), cries:

0 unfortunate good people,
0 ill-starred times,
God's anger, it seems, has
Struck you, my native land.
...
Everywhere the enemy sets nets for us,
There's no freedom, wherever you may look. 28

Winner describes Shortambai as "the first Kazakh poet able to analyze the sweep of history and its effect on the people in something
more than an immediately subjective way ..." Well-educated, travelled, and strongly Islamic, Shortambai represented the new age as one of loss of tradition. The Zar Zamanists emphasized the good of the old days, free nomadic living, over the travails of the new age, with the encroachment of the modern world disintegrating the traditional values. Only a return to the old ways could save the Kazakhs, and because it was so obvious that this was impossible, deep resignation permeates their works; in their call for invigorated Islamic culture, they revealed the growing power of Islam among the Kazakhs, who were noted for their lack of Moslem religiosity. Mysticism and despair was their reaction to modernization. The Zar Zamanists could not answer Murat's question.

The Zar Zaman poets were strongly traditionalist and nationalist. They perceived the decline of the Kazakh nation in terms of the decline of nomadism. A crucial cleavage thus appears in Kazakh national thought, based on the support or rejection of pastoral nomadism as fundamental to Kazakh national character. Because the very origins of the Kazakh nation arose from the self-identification as "free riders of the Steppe," this was a serious cleavage indeed. Amidst the death-throes of nomadism as a viable lifestyle overthrown by modernization, Kazakh thinkers argued over the future of their national self-identity. The Zar Zamanists clung to the past glories and the ideals of nomad nationalism.

A different outlook characterized the so-called Enlighteners. This group also flourished in the latter 1800s, thus must be considered to be of the same "generation" as the Zar Zamanists. They, however, were the
product of the modern education system, installed by the Russians and described above. As their name implies, the enlighteners were Kazakhs who sought to uplift and advance—modernize—their people via Russian language and culture. They were fully as dedicated to the Kazakh nation as the Zar Zamanists, for they wanted to improve Kazakh life. They opposed Russian exploitation of Kazakhstan for this reason. But they recognized that to preserve the Kazakh nation, it must adapt to the modern world, and thus, they regarded pastoral nomadism as backwards, as a brake on modernization which had to be removed. They thus typified the same dichotomy that developed in Russian culture, between the traditionalist Slavophiles and the modernizing Westernizers.

Three Kazakhs are reknowned as enlighteners. The first was Chokan Valikhanov (Shoqan Valiqan-uli; 1837?-1865). The grandson of the last Khan of the Middle Horde, great-grandson of Khan Ablai, Chokan was a Russophile, a graduate of the Russian War Academy, and a close friend of Dostoevsky. An Orientalist, his admiration for Russian culture was balanced by his love of the ancient Turkish epics. He penetrated as a Russian spy into the Khotan emirate in Sinkiang; he wrote innumerable works on the history and culture of his people; he accompanied the Russian army in its conquest of the Great Horde, in Semirechye. This last experience, in which he witnessed outrages against the Kazakhs by the Russian troops (reminiscent of the American war against the Plains Indians), soured his faith in Russian superiority, but only at the very end (he died very young, of exhaustion and tuberculosis, withdrawing to his people's aul to do so).
Chokan was typical of the well-born Kazakh educated in the Russian system. Indeed, he was famous only to the Russians and to those Kazakhs who came later. His significance was in interpreting Kazakh culture to the Russians, not vice-versa. Yet, Chokan's pursuit of modern knowledge was based on his desire to preserve his people as a nation. His goals for the Kazakhs were "Self-development, self-defense, self-government, and self-justice;" he dedicated himself "to the useful work of serving his compatriots and defending them from Russian officials and wealthy Kazakhs."  

The second great enlightener was Ibrai Altynsaryn (1841-1889). Modern education was his primary concern, and he is remembered as the "Kazakh pedagogue." He was author of the first Kazakh-Russian dictionary and first Kazakh grammar; he introduced secular prose into Kazakh literature; he created a new Kazakh script, replacing the Arabic with a Cyrillic-based alphabet. He translated numerous Russian literary works into Kazakh, and was greatly influenced by Pushkin.

Altynsaryn, of the Qypchaq tribe, Middle Horde, attended a Russian school for interpreters in Orenburg, from 1850 to 1857; he met the noted Russian educator N. I. Ilminsky in 1859, who greatly influenced him. He was appointed school inspector of Turgai oblast in 1879, and did much to expand the Turgai education system for Kazakh benefit. In 1887, he tried to introduce modern education for Kazakh girls; he also sought to create an agricultural school for Kazakhs. For his reformist efforts, Altynsaryn achieved the distrust of his Russian overseers, who feared the power of his reforms, inasmuch as their goal was subservient Kazakh interpreters.
and not truly educated Kazakhs; he also gained the enmity of the traditionalists, who opposed Russian contamination, and of the elders, who opposed secular education generally.

Although Altynsaryn initiated Kazakh prose, the milieu of mass appeal was poetry. The following lines come from "Children, Let's Study."

My child, when you start to learn,  
Knowledge, brighter than a lamp,  
Will light your way through darkness.  
Therefore, children, let us start to learn,  
And let us weave forever into our grateful memory  
The bright thread of knowledge.\textsuperscript{35}

The most significant of the enlighteners was Abai Kunanbaev (Abaj or Ibrahim Qunanbay-uli; 1845-1904).\textsuperscript{36} Abai was born in a remote area of the Kazakh uplands, shortly after his people accepted Russian rule. Son of a traditional patriarchal chief, Abai first was taught by local mullahs; he eventually attended an Islamic secondary school (madresse) in Semipalatinsk, and then a Russian school. He broke with his family when he was 28, choosing to pursue education over administering his tribal group. Versed in Kazakh, Islamic, and Western thought, Abai was the greatest Kazakh intellectual of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{37} Winner describes him: "He was at once an educator, a humanist, and philosophical internationalist, as well as a poet, prose writer, and translator."\textsuperscript{38}

Abai wished to modernize the Kazakhs through the medium of Russian culture. His translations of Russian works were well known in the Steppe. He sought to synthesize Western, Moslem, and Kazakh traditions, and he popularized prose as a literary medium. Like Altynsaryn, he wished to
bring education to all Kazakhs, wealthy or not, male and female. Even more so than Altynsaryn, Abai's enlightenment brought him rejection from conservative Kazakh leaders as well as the distrust of the Russians, who regarded him as revolutionary. Abai withdrew to his people's aul in the end, bitter and lonely, yet his efforts proved widespread and long-lasting.

The following quotes from Abai best typify the role of the enlighteners:

Study Russian culture and literature. This is the key to life. If you learn it, your life will be easier. . . . However, at the present time, people giving their children a Russian education are training them, with the help of the Russian language, to exist at the expense of other Kazakhs. Don't take this view. 39

I want to sow the seed of truth and put wings to the tongue,
So that the light will enter not only the eyes,
but also the soul.40

Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, Kazakh nationalism seemed to be diverging. The Zar Zaman poets saw no hope but in the preservation of pastoral nomadism and the traditional culture based on it. They were strongly Islamic and passionately anti-Russian. Their goal was maintaining the traditional nomad nationalism that had marked the Kazakhs from their origins.

The enlighteners, on the other hand, saw no hope in nomadism to protect the Kazakh nation in the modern world. They wished to modernize Kazakhstan via Russian culture, not to Russify the Kazakhs, but to give them the tools and understanding to prevent Russification. While their path was to prove dominant, they lacked the nationalist passion of the
Zar Zamanists. Precisely because the Kazakh masses remained traditional and uneducated, the enlighteners failed to broadly elevate their people into the modern age. Yet, because the nomadic economy was crumbling due to modernization, the Zar Zaman thinkers offered only a sterile pessimism and no solutions.

The late 1800s and early 1900s, as previously indicated, witnessed a significant change in the Steppe. The incredible flood of Russian peasant colonists in those decades transformed the Kazakh problem. The Zar Zaman poets and the enlighteners seemed much less relevant; the latter based their uneasy alliance with Russia on the premise that the Kazakhs would have the precious time necessary to gradually modernize, which meant de-nomadize. When the deluge of colonization crashed over the Steppe, Kazakh thinkers of the third "generation" faced crucial choices to be made in the storm of revolutionary changes. Their path proved to be a melding of the fervent nationalism of the Zar Zamanists with the westernized outlook of the enlighteners.

This melding was visible by the late 1880s. In 1870, the Russian military's official Central Asian bulletin was begun, the Turkistan Vilayet Gazeti. Published in Tashkent, up to 1888 it alternated between Uzbek "Turki" and Kazakh; this was the first appearance of what was to become the Kazakh press. As with other official papers of the 1880s, such as the Akmolinskii Listok and Orenburgskii Listok, there was not expression of dissent, but they did bolster Kazakh writing. In 1888, a separate Kazakh-language bulletin was begun, Dala Vilayeti, published dually with the Russian Kirgizskaia Stepnaia Gazeta, in Omsk; they were
supplements of the *Akмолинские Ведомости*, and existed up to 1906. The Kazakh writers who appeared in *Dala Vilayeti* wrote cultural, technical, and historical pieces which would not offend Russian concerns, such as criticism of Islam.

However, as the hardships of the Kazakhs worsened, the Russian-controlled press was the only outlet for the educated Kazakhs to express dismay. Martha B. Olcott, foremost modern American historian of the Kazakhs, notes that as early as 1890, a series of articles entitled "Hunger in the Steppe" appeared. The 1890s proved exceptionally harsh on the Kazakh nomads, with very severe winters and droughts. The great Russian famine of 1891-92 sent waves of peasants in search of land to colonize, aided by the Resettlement Administration and the beginning of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Time was running out for the traditional Kazakh lifestyle, time the enlighteners had hoped to use gradually to settle the nomads while holding Russian cultural assimilation at bay.

At this time, a writer named "Qyr Balasy" or "Child of the Uplands" appeared in the *Dala Vilayeti*. These articles, including scholarly studies of epics as well as poetry, appealed to the Kazakhs to revive their patriotic nationalism, revealing the influence of the Zar Zamanists. Yet, partly because they appeared in an official Russian publication, they also encouraged the elevation of Kazakh culture within the Russian context. The fusion of nationalism and enlightenment had begun.

Qyr Balasy was the pen-name of Ali Khan Bukeykhanov (Aliqan Bokeyqan-uli; 1869-1932), destined to be one of the greatest nationalist Kazakh leaders. Like most Kazakh intellectuals of the turn of the
century, Bukeykhanov came of wealthy background: born in Samara, he was the grandson of Khan Baraq of the Bukey Horde. Educated at several Russian schools, he graduated from the Omsk Higher Institute of Forestry in 1894. It was while still a student that he began writing as Qyr Balasy (he was 21 in 1890).

Bukeykhanov was inspired by the Zar Zaman poets in his nationalism, yet he lacked their Islamic and conservative tendencies; he was produced by the same Russian educational system as the enlighteners, but he was far more critical of Russians and Russian culture. As the Kazakhs prepared to enter the twentieth century, the first truly "modern" nationalists were arising from the nomad masses.
CHAPTER FIVE
Qazaq Nationalism, 1900-1916

But what unity is and how to achieve it the Kazakhs do not know.

--Abay, 1891.

Our newspaper is named Qazaq, our slogan is the preservation of our national character.

--Ahmed Baytursun, 1913.

Kazakh nationalism transformed in the early 1900s. A full-fledged nationalist intelligentsia emerged, Kazakh written literature gained great influence, and Western political ideas developed Kazakh form and content. The Russian flood of colonization and the decline of traditional pastoralism placed great strains on the Kazakh masses and their local leaders, while the hierarchy of sultans crumbled as that of the khans had. The early twentieth century nationalists, like their predecessors, were concerned primarily with the cultural preservation of their people. Their dilemma was not to create nationalism where it did not exist, rather, it was to transform the Kazakh nomad nationalism into modern nationalism.

The fundamental cleavage in Kazakh nationalism always remained the tension between modernization and traditionalism. This dichotomy appears in the differences between the elite intellectuals and the illiterate masses, between the secularists and the clergy, between the Jadids and
the Kadimists (conservative clergy), between Northern and Southern Kazakhs, and between 'pro-' and 'anti-Russian' factions. Nevertheless, these cleavages were not enough to prevent the Kazakh nationalists of all persuasions from working together in the pre-revolutionary era. The crisis facing the Kazakh nation in the early 1900s overwhelmed the differences in outlook.

As early as the 1860s, a Russian observer noted, "The steppe was then divided into two parties, the pro-Russian and the pro-national. . . . The most convinced supporters of the latter roamed the south . . . . The antagonism between these two parties manifested itself in every thing, even in the songs of Kazakh bards." Northern Kazakhs had a longer history of relations with the Russians and they were less Islamicized, more likely to be educated in modern schools. Southern Kazakhs were enmeshed in the Turkestanian milieu, their nobles and wealthy being under sway of Kokand and Bokhara, their masses much more Islamic. Many Kazakhs in the south, also, had fled Russian expansion over the northern pastures and thus were both poorer and more resentful. It is notable, however, that two cleavages one might expect did not manifest themselves: inter-Horde and inter-class struggle was absent. The former was no longer relevant, and the latter was developing potency but still minor.

In the context of pre-1905 Russia, Kazakh dissent and agitation for change was extremely limited. The writings of Bukeykhanov and other Zar Zaman heirs in the 1890s and early 1900s urged cultural preservation and historical pride. Abubakir Kerderi, for example, recognizing the need for drastic change, urged the spread of Jadid education so that the
Kazakhs could effectively compete with the Russians while remaining Moslem. Early twentieth century Kazakh writers who followed Abubakir's example included Mashur Zhusup Kopeyev (1857-1931) and Nurzhan Naushbayev (1859-1919).

Despite censorship and police surveillance, Kazakh dissatisfaction apparently was spreading in the early 1900s, though Western and Soviet research on this is sketchy. Pamphlets appeared which, addressed to the "Children of Alash," urged resistance to Russian efforts to limit Islam. Clandestine meetings in the steppe spread anti-Russian sentiments. The regime reacted quickly to these threats, for the first time arresting Kazakh leaders and searching Kazakh auls to seize seditious materials. The extent of this activity is unknown; but the Russian authorities did respond with further restrictions against Moslem clergy and "secret" schools.

The 1905 revolution changed the rules of national resistance, and the Kazakhs responded swiftly. 'Revolutionary' unrest and violence was restricted to the Russian industrial workers, in the cities and along the railways; the size of the proletariat in pre-revolutionary Kazakhstan was small, a few tens of thousands, and while several thousands of Kazakhs worked in the mining industry, they provided unskilled labor. The real significance of the 1905 revolution for Central Asians was psychological. The defeat of the tsarist regime by an Asian power reversed the sense of hopelessness regarding the immutability of Russian rule. Just as important, the reformist agitation that swept the empire forced the government to permit native publishing, and the creation of the Duma
meant the opportunity to elect representatives and to openly discuss politics, for the first time within the modern context.⁷

Modern Kazakh political development began with the proclamation of the tsarist Manifesto of February 18, 1905, which permitted political meetings at the various Steppe fairs.⁸ The initial agitation was led by the Islamic clergy, which sponsored mass rallies in early and middle 1905. In response to their mostly religious demands, the government allowed Islamic Kazakh-language teaching in the aul schools, on April 17, and recommended the creation of a separate Steppe muftiate (official jurisdiction) in June, which followed the next year.⁹

Wholly religious concerns quickly came to include secular problems as the mood of potentiality spread. A "bais' congress" was held in the summer in Karkaralinsk, attended by over 14,000 people in response to a clergy-sponsored petition.¹⁰ This meeting petitioned the tsar to grant more freedom to the Moslems: to make Islam legally equal to the Orthodox church, to employ the Shariat (Islamic law) in civil court, to allow more mosques and the right of pilgrimage. But it also directly addressed the fundamental issue of the Kazakh nation, what Olcott calls "the land problem." The petition called for the end of land-expropriation and the return of already-seized lands, with the Kazakhs to control their natural resources as well.

A similar gathering occurred in October, in Kazalinsk.¹¹ It also petitioned the government to ease restrictions on Islam, but even more forcefully these Kazakhs called for just land distribution and restoration of nomadic access to the Steppe's water and pasture resources. The
regime did nothing to respond to these requests. When the fervor of the 'spirit of 1905' had initially swept Central Asia's Russian population, the government had been relieved at the quiescence of the Moslem urban natives. In the country, however, in middle and latter 1905, a wave of brigandage swelled against the Russians, becoming anti-Russian violence, that lasted at least to 1910. Among the southern Kazakhs (Syr Darya and Semirechye), nomads resisted the seizure of their lands for colonists, refusing to cooperate with Russian authority.

The Moslem clergy was always closer to the Kazakh nomad "masses" than the secular elite, for Islam was part of the Kazakh traditional culture. The Kazakh clerics, save for those of the settled south, seem to have placed their religious goals secondary to the preservation of Kazakh culture, and therefore they more readily allied with the secular elite in this era. As time passed, then, Kazakh demands shifted from the religious focus to the socioeconomic, yet even as the earliest demands mentioned the latter, the later nationalist demands always mentioned Islam. The alliance of Moslem and secular elites was crucial.

The secular Kazakh intellectuals of the north were also active in 1905. A delegation of reformists and tribal elders travelled all the way to St. Petersburg to seek cessation of colonization and the use of Kazakh as well as Russian in Steppe government; rebuffed, they used the opportunity to associate with the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets), which association proved significant in the coming years.

The promulgation of the October Manifesto which included the announcement of a true legislative Duma allowed the Kazakhs to prepare
their first modern electioneering and democratic politics. The leading reformists and nationalists convened two "Congresses of Intellectuals" in December, that of the East in Vernyy (now Alma Ata) in Semirechye, and that of the West in Uralsk. Both congresses resolved that the Kazakhs needed to ally with the Kadets for effective Duma representation.

The Congress of the East was presided over by Mokhaledzhan Tanyshbayev (Tynyshpaev; 1879-1920s?), a Semirechye Kazakh nationalist who was a road and bridge engineer, and who played a major role in the revolutionary era. This congress was dominated by the 'ideologist' of Kazakh nationalism, Ahmed Baytursun (1873-1937). Baytursun was born in Sartubek, Turgay oblast, into an aristocratic family of the Argyn tribe. First taught by local Tatar mullahs, he went to the Russian-Kazakh school in Turgay (town), then attended the Orenburg Pedagogical Institute from 1891 to 1895. Thereupon he became a teacher in Kazakh schools from 1895 to 1909, teaching in various villages and the towns of Aktyubinsk, Kustanay, and Karkaralinsk. A poet and linguist, Baytursun developed a Kazakh script based on Arabic, rather than utilizing Altynsaryn's Cyrillic-based alphabet. By 1905, he was generally regarded as one of the secular elite's leading thinkers.

Ali Khan Bukeykhanov was president of the Congress of Intellectuals of the West. Attending were important intellectuals, elders, and aristocrats of five oblasts; absent were the westernmost Kazakhs of the old Inner or Bukey Horde, who generally kept apart from the other northern Kazakh elites. It was at this meeting that the group later called "Alash Orda" was formed.
The Congress of the West, besides approving the alliance with the Russian Kadets, also proclaimed the following:

In the Kirghiz [Kazakh] Steppe no one other than the Kirghiz has any rights; the laws which declare that the Kirghiz Steppe belongs to the Crown, and that peasants and cossacks can be settled on it at no cost need to be revoked.\textsuperscript{19}

From 1905 on, the secular elites dominated the nationalist struggle, particularly Baytursun and Bukeykhanov. This dominance is evident in both the pan-Islamic 'all-Russian' Moslem congresses of 1905-06 and the Dumas, as well as in the Kazakh press and publishing of 1905 to 1916. While the Islamic clergy remained important at the local level, the secular reformists led the movement Steppe-wide, and their alliance remained mutually beneficial.

In Moslem Russia generally, the 1905 revolutionary era allowed the pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic reformists, predominantly Tatar, to organize several "All-Russian Moslem Congresses."\textsuperscript{20} The First Moslem Congress was held secretly in Nizhnii Novgorod in August, 1905; the Second, also unsanctioned, occurred in St. Petersburg in January, 1906. Neither the Kazakh nor Central Asian Moslems participated in the first two congresses.

The Third Moslem Congress, this time legally convened, occurred in August, 1906, again at Nizhnii Novgorod. A mass meeting was held in Kazalinsk in January, representing much of the Steppe, in order to draw up a list of demands for the congress.\textsuperscript{21} Both socioeconomic and Islamic concerns were expressed, as previously. The Kazakhs continued to practice modern politics; despite their great geographical and ideological diversity, the Kazakh elites were developing the arts of compromise and
concerted action which they needed to face the overwhelming Russian and strong Tatar forces blocking their nationalist goals.

The Kazakh presence at the Third Moslem Congress was significant. Shah Mardan Koshchegulov was elected to the presidium; Koshchegulov was a mullah, of the Bukey Horde, Astrakhan province. The relative lack of relevance of the Moslem Congresses, dominated by Tatars with their goals of pan-Turkism and pan-Islam, emphasizing the "middle dialect" reformism of the Tatar leader Gaspirinsky, is indicated by Koshchegulov's presence.

The Kazakh nationalists emphasized Kazakh language over any other, and the long antipathy of the Kazakhs to their Tatar mentors meant that the Kazakhs offered no support to pan-Turkism. Koshchegulov, though a nationalist, was not part of the northern Kazakh intellectual circles that became the Alash Orda. While the Tatars sought to unify all the Turkic Moslems of Russia, the Kazakhs sought to modernize their own unique nationalism. Likewise, they were not interested in pan-Islam due to the secondary importance Islam had in the structure of Kazakh nationalism.

The most significant 'laboratory' of modern Kazakh nationalism was the State Duma. Although the Kazakhs participated fully only in the Second Duma, the experience of holding meetings to elect representatives and sending these delegates to St. Petersburg elevated political awareness across the Steppe. Communication is an elemental force of modern nationalism; the Duma, especially the journalistic reporting of its deliberations and the new press's discussions and editorials, proved the catalyst of modern Kazakh nationalism.
The elections to the First Duma occurred in spring, 1906. Though Turkestan was prevented from participating, and the limited franchise excluded many Kazakhs, the electioneering in the Steppe was exuberant. Richard Pierce describes it best: "Speaking in the open air, often from horseback, candidates in the Steppe discussed land reform and urged the abolition of the Steppe [guberniia] and the establishment of self-government." Russians and Kazakhs voted separately; the Russians sent leftist representatives (Social Democrats, Social Revolutionaries, Trudoviks), five altogether.

The Kazakhs sent four delegates to the First Duma, which was held from April to July, 1906. Ali Khan Bukeikhanov represented Semipalatinsk oblast, the northeastmost Steppe (though he was of the Bukey Horde, and had presided over the Congress of the West, revealing his broad support). The mullah Bahit Kirei Kulmanov represented Akmolinsk; the bii Alpyspay Kalmenev, Uralsk; and Akhmed Beremzhanov, a justice of the peace, Turgay. The Kazakhs cooperated with both the Moslem 'fraction' (largely represented by the Ittifaq-al-Muslimin, or "Muslim Union," created at the Second and Third Moslem Congresses) and with the Kadets. However, the First Duma ignored the concerns of the Kazakhs.

Due to transportation difficulties, Bukeykhanov did not reach St. Petersburg until July 9, 1906. On that very day, the Duma had been dissolved by Tsar Nicholas for being too liberal. Bukeykhanov went with the other delegates who travelled to Viborg to sign the protest manifesto. For this act, he was arrested, tried, disenfranchised, and sent to a Semipalatinsk jail for three months.
The Second Duma convened from February to June, 1907. The Steppe sent eight Russians and four Kazakhs; the Turkestan guberniia was able to participate in this election, sending a fifth Kazakh. Shah Mardan Koshcheugulov represented Akmolinsk, Beremzhanov again represented Turgay, Khadzhi Narokonev, Semipalatinsk, and the lawyer Bakhitjan Karataev, Uralsk. Tanyshbayev represented Semirechye oblast.

Karataev, an examining magistrate and member of the government land commission, was able to address the Second Duma upon the Kazakh plight. He called for a commission, including Kazakhs, to investigate the land problem; the Octobrists, Kadets, and Moslem fraction supported him, but the Council of Ministers refused. The Kazakhs then petitioned Stolypin directly, to curtail further Russian colonization and to study the land problem, but were rejected again.

In 1907, the "Stolypin reaction" brought to a halt the budding political process. The Kazakhs, with most other Moslems, were denied further Duma representation. Many Jadid schools were closed, some leaders arrested, and the incipient Kazakh press was stillborn. However, the Kazakh leaders continued to organize and to lobby the remnant Moslem fraction and the Kadets. Thus, in late 1907, they organized meetings in various towns of the Steppe, including Troitsk and Kustanay, to gather material for a Moslem fraction report presented to the Third Duma. The Kazakhs demanded the end of peasant colonization, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and Duma representation. The Kazakhs proposed reform of the granting of land to the Third Duma, also, and though sixty delegates supported the legislation, it failed.
During the Third Duma, the Kadets prepared a volume of reports on the nationalities of Russia. Bukeykhanov prepared the essay on the Kazakhs in 1910, which clearly details the Kazakh plight and harshly criticizes the government's policies and practices. Bukeykhanov noted that Russian oppression had created such economic hardship that the Kazakh people had been forced to overcome their old divisions and unite, creating an intellectual transition from passive to active national consciousness. He recognized that nationalism usually arose to safeguard territorial integrity, but that the Kazakhs, being pastoral nomads, were concerned with preserving their way of life, not geography. With the decline of the economic viability of nomadism, Kazakh nationalism had to be based on the traditional culture of the Kazakh heritage, not on pastoral nomadism itself.

The goal of Russian policy, Bukeykhanov argued, was not merely the sedentarization of the Kazakh people, but the destruction of their unique Kazakh culture. Therefore, Russian rule was actually antagonistic to the Kazakh nation, even having seized Kazakh ownership of the land to give to the tsar. The Kazakhs must launch a political struggle to preserve their culture, and to remain a unique people they must unite despite many differences.

... in the Kirghiz [Kazakh] Steppe a policy of Russification has from time immemorial been conducted by those who shine neither in educational qualifications nor in knowledge of the local population. The customary attendant of this Russifying policy is coarseness, rudeness, and the unceremonious slighting of us by those who constitute the sacred population.

Bukeykhanov's essay provides an introduction to the role of the Kazakh press and publishing in the development of Kazakh nationalism in
this period. The Kazakh press was the mode whereby the Kazakh leaders communicated, with each other and with the masses, their frustrations, perceptions, and goals. In articulating these factors, the Kazakh intellectuals continued to thrash between modernization and traditionalism. The revolutionary-era Kazakh press was the single most influential element in the swift maturation of Kazakh nationalism between 1900 and 1920.

The Kazakh press went through four 'waves' in that time. The first occurred in 1905-07, and was reformist (Jadidist). The second came in 1911, following the Stolypin reaction, and was therefore radicalized. The third arose in 1913; the last, in 1917-20, will be discussed later.

The initial Kazakh press proved ephemeral, partly due to the paucity of printing technology and the newness of the concept of journalism, but mostly due to the police repression which closed down on it. The first Kazakh newspaper was Qazaq gazeti, published in Troitsk in March, 1907, and immediately suspended. Bukeykhanov appeared regularly in the Russian opposition press Irtysh (1905-06), Omich, and Golos Stepi (both 1907), all in Omsk. Kazakh writers also appeared in 1906 in Tatar papers such as Fiker (Uralsk), Vaqt, and Shura; in 1907, in Sirke (St. Petersburg).

The Stolypin reaction drove underground much activism. The Kazakhs continued to hold clandestine meetings, where Kazakh writings were read and discussed, while numerous 'youth groups' were organized, especially in the northern towns where there were many Kazakh students. The activities of these groups were significant in developing Kazakh nationalism, but their secrecy hinders evaluation to this day.

The nationalist press had justified itself to the regime by reporting
on the Dumas; when the Central Asians were denied Duma representation, their journalist press was forbidden as well. However, Kazakh literary publishing was developing as well, and managed to continue the reformist and nationalist development throughout this period. Winner's *Oral Art and Literature of the Kazakhs* amply details much of the writing of this time; the following discussion is intended only to indicate the diversity and depth of Kazakh publishing between 1905 and 1916.

Perhaps the greatest Kazakh poet of the revolutionary nationalist era was Mir Jaqib Dulatov (Duwlat-uli; 1885-1937). Born in Turgay uezd, he was educated by Tatar mullahs, in aul schools, and at the Turgay Russian-Kazakh school. He was a qualified teacher at both the Gaurgan Russian-Kazakh school and the Galiyeh madresse in Ufa. He was close friends with Tatar reformers, was a prolific poet, and wrote one of the first Kazakh novels, *Bahtyz Jamal* (1910), criticizing traditional marriage customs. A close confidante of Baytursun and Bukeykhanov, Dulatov is usually included with them as the three great leaders of Kazakh nationalism. Vilified in Soviet historiography, yet he was described in the *Literaturnaya Entsiklopediya* (Moscow, 1928) as "the leader of the revolutionary Kazakh masses" in 1905.

In 1909, Dulatov published a collection of poems entitled *Oyan Qazaq*! (Awake, O Kazakh!). The work was so popular it quickly went through two editions, before the Russians banned it as inflammatory. The poem "Kazakh Lands" is worth quoting at length.

Noble, influential men, pay attention to this! They say "Strike while the iron is hot;" by not following this proverb,
You take responsibility on yourselves for the tears of
future generations.

Oh, dear native land, you have gone entirely to the
[Russian] settlers!

The sacred graves of our forefathers are now amidst
village streets.

The tombstones over them will be used by the peasants
for bathhouses,

The wooden fences [around them] will go for firewood.
Then, finding no signs of our old graves, we shall
pour out streams of tears.

The huge lakes and flowing springs, like the summer
pastures and forests, are all alienated.

When I think about all this I go out of my mind and
burn (as in a fire) from grief.

But we accepted citizenship without giving up our land,
We hoped to live under the shelter of justice.
If now we give up the last land, the cattle will have
to be pastured on sand.

The simple people are stunned. . . .

Kazakhs, now where is the land on which you have lived
since the Kazakh tribe was formed?

They drove you off and put the land under Little
Russian settlements. . . .

Only the salt lakes and the waterless plain, useless for
agriculture, are left to us.37

Shangerei Bukeev (1847-1920) was a poet from western Kazakhstan,
born into an aristocratic family and educated at a secondary school in
Astrakhan. Of Russian gentry rank and a justice of the peace, Bukeev
concentrated on lyrical love poetry and literary artistry.38 Sabit
Donentaev (1894-1933), born in rural Semipalatinsk, was a satirist and
journalist. He was first published in 1913; his satires strongly
attacked the old aristocracy and the nationalists.39

Omer Karasy (Qarashev; 1876-1921) came of a poor nomad family in
the Bukey Horde; he went to a Tatar madresse and to secondary school in
Istanbul. He became an ishan (cleric), and was widely versed in Islamic
literature. However, the 1905 revolution caused him to become a social
agitator and he was dropped from the clergy. His poetry was steeped in
Kazakh tradition, yet he criticized not just the Russian oppressors, but also the Kazakh aristocracy. His social and nationalist protest was modern in content, but often traditional in form.\(^{40}\)

Ispandiar Kobeyev (1878-1956) published the first Kazakh novel, *Qalym*, in 1908. It not only criticized the tradition of the bride-price, one of the strongest Kazakh customs, and the general inferiority of women in society, it actually advocated marriage for love.\(^{41}\)

Beimbet Mailin (1894-1939) was born in Kustanay to poor nomads; he studied at an Ufa madresse from 1913 to 1915, when he published his first work, concerning the tragic love of a Kazakh girl. Mailin eventually became a Communist (1925) and was considered a "founder" of Kazakh Soviet literature.\(^{42}\)

Sultanmakhmut Toraygyrov (Toraighir-uli; 1893-1920), born in Semipalatinsk oblast, was one of the first Kazakh writers to emphasize social protest in revolutionary terms. Though he only received a madresse education, by 1913 he was working in the Kazakh press; he was also a teacher. Toraygyrov's social protest was striking; the metaphors and imagery of traditional Kazakh poetry he replaced with unflinching directness, as the following lines, from "The Pauper," reveal.\(^{43}\)

Autumn's hand has endowed the grass with a silvery hue;
Over the nocturnal earth clouds are floating.
Dark is the night. I am guarding the sheep with my dog;
Not even a little fire lights up the darkness.
My clothes are in rags, I am almost not clad,
And these are the only clothes I've ever had.

. . . . . . . . . . . .
From the day of birth, only hunger I've known;
Crying I would ask my mother for food . . .
From earliest childhood I had but one dream:
Once only to fill my stomach with good food.

. . . . . . . . . . . .
All my life, like an ox, I have worked day and night,  
And yet this dream has remained but a dream.44

Despite Toraygyrov's emphasis as a social protester, regarding the  
Kazakh aristocracy as no better than the Russians, he still fulfilled  
the role of Kazakh educated elite as enlightener, evidenced by the  
following lines:

I do not live in order to sow flowers,  
And see them bloom into live beauty;  
I live to help my descendants with my song,  
So that their paths may be easy and simple.45

Magzhan Zhumabayev (1894-1937?), born in remote northwestern  
Semirechye, was reknowned as a leading nationalist poet. He studied  
first at a Tatar madresse then the Omsk gymnasium, and eventually at  
the Institute of Artistic Literature in Moscow. His poems first  
appeared in 1913, and he was a leading contributor to the Kazakh press.46

Saken Seifullin (1894-1939) came to be regarded as the first Kazakh  
"proletarian writer." Born into a moderate nomad family, in Akmolinsk,  
he was taught first by the aul mullah, then he attended a nearby Russian  
factory school for three years, before going to school in Akmolinsk (town).  
He went to the Omsk Teachers' Seminary from 1913 to 1916. Here he was  
exposed to Russian socialism and even Bolshevism; he was active in the  
Omsk student group Birlik. In 1916, Seifullin became an aul teacher in  
Akmolinsk uezd. As will be seen, Seifullin's significance actually  
concerns his role as the first Kazakh Soviet writer and opponent of Alash  
Orda; but his early biography provides another example of the development  
of the Kazakh intellectuals of the period 1900-1916.47

The years 1908 to 1911, despite the suppression of the Kazakh press,
were by no means quiet. Rather, Kazakh nationalism intensified, as the Russian peasantry swarmed over the best lands at the peak of colonization, while the government not only facilitated their invasion, it arbitrarily denied the Kazakhs the newly-found freedom to criticize it.

Just as in the days of Abay, when activists gathered at his aul for discussions, the intellectuals and youths continued to meet in camps and in towns. Baytursun himself was imprisoned in 1909-1910 for anti-Russian agitation among clandestine revolutionary groups. As he had been a teacher until this, one can surmise that the Kazakh tradition of enlightenment was now utilized to spread nationalism among the students and through them their traditionalist nomad families scattered across the Steppe.

Thus, M. S. Kashatov wrote in 1908, "Let us study sciences, religion and trade, and lead our people out into the world." The result is revealed by the Kazakh Communist G. Togzhanov, writing in 1927:

In the prerevolutionary period the only political education we received was from the nationalists. We saw and knew only Ali Khan Bukeykhanov, Ahmed Baytursunov, and Mir Yakub Dulafov. They were the example for us. From them there was one road, nationalism, and by this nationalism we came to the revolution. Nationalism did not come from the head of Ahmed and Ali Khan. Nationalism was the general desire of the Kazakhs. Nationalism was directed against tsarism and the Russian bourgeoisie.

By this time, the upsurge in education that had begun in the 1890s had led to many more educated youths. By 1905, there were over 2,000 Russian schools in Kazakhstan, almost 130 Russian-Kazakh schools, and 135 Islamic mekteps (primary schools). Literacy was increasing, though the actual numbers of literate Kazahks was small (perhaps only
100,000 by 1920, in a population of about 4 million). A measure of the increase is that while only 75 books were published in the 1800s, mostly in the latter decades, over 200 were published from 1900 to 1917.54

The absolute numbers of educated Kazakhs and published materials seem comparatively small, but their influence was much more widespread than available Russian statistics might indicate. The governor-general of Turkestan, Samsonov, stated in 1910:

A great many publications are being issued in the native languages continuously, [and] . . . are sold at extremely low prices, being distributed quickly without leaving a trace (as a consequence of which a majority of such publications remain) completely unknown not only to Russian scholarly institutions but also to the local administration.55

And Bukeykhanov, writing in 1924, recalled that:

Before the revolution, not a tiny spot in the plains was unacquainted with Kazan's publication of Kazakh books. . . . The Kazakhs who had studied in the Tatar schools of Kazan, Ufa, Orenburg, Troitsk, and Petropavlovsk were themselves the suppliers of Kazakh books. . . . Judging by the fact that one meets the old Kazan publications throughout the plains even today, it must be concluded that the merchants organized the distribution of their publications efficiently.56

The third and most significant surge of the Kazakh periodical press rose up in 1911-12. Despite police repression, Kazakhs started up several journals and newspapers, some of which were as short-lived as previously, but others were significant through the civil war era. The nationalist group Alash Orda coalesced in 1912.57 Writing in 1920, Manab Shamil noted:

... the spreading of revolutionary ideas, that is, rather, the ideas of national equality and liberation, was observed especially among the student young people from 1912 on. Those who inspired the awakening of the young Kazakh intelligentsia
were 'revolutionary' Kadets prominent at that time, the journalists Bukeykhanov, Dulatov, and Baytursun.\(^8\)

Among the briefer journals appeared Qazaqstan, four issues published in Urda (Khangsaya Stavka) in 1911, and fourteen issues in Ural'sk in 1913. Its circulation was a few hundred, its program pan-Islamic and anti-Russian, and it was published by Shangerei (Shahin Girey) Bukeev. Among its contributors was Omer Karasy.\(^59\) It did not survive the tsarist censors. Another paper was Ishim dalasy, published in Petropavlovsk by the Russian daily Ishimskii kray in latter 1913; one of the very few socialist-inclined papers in the Steppe, it was quickly suspended; its focus was the land problem.\(^60\)

The journal Ay qap began in January, 1911, published in Troitsk.\(^61\) It was a modernist literary and cultural review, its editors being poets and writers, teachers, and historians. Its chief editor was Mukhammedzhan Seralin (1872-1929), a poet and intellectual activist who had been a teacher from 1891 to 1902.\(^62\) Contributors included Bukeykhanov and Baytursun, Koshchegulov, Bukeev, Naushbayev, Toraygyrov, Donentaev, Zhumabayev, and Seifullin. Ay qap emphasized the revival of Kazakh culture and language, revealing the unbroken line from the enlighteners to the reformists to the nationalists. Eighty-eight issues (monthly, then bimonthly) appeared before it was suspended by the government in 1916, with 900 to 1,200 copies per issue.

With such a diversity of contributors and its focus on cultural preservation, Ay qap presented the entire spectrum of Kazakh nationalism. It was both bourgeois liberal and pro-Islamic; its contributors were
nearly all from the aristocratic or clerical elite. It supported the pan-Turkist movement of Gaspirinsky, it criticized the outmoded patriarchal customs and especially the position of women in society, and it supported the spread of Islamic education. Indeed, Ay qap argued for the use of the Shariat or Islamic law, and it regarded the Moslem clergy as the needed ally of the secular elite.

The editors of Ay qap viewed pastoral nomadism as a brake on the modernization of the Kazakhs; sedentarization was a necessity in order to create a nation able to resist the physical and cultural invasion of the Russians. But settlement needed to take place at a pace that would not destabilize Kazakh society, or it would be as destructive as Russian colonization. The tsarist regime's policy of sedentarization was for Russian, not Kazakh purposes. When Ay qap sought a pan-Kazakh congress for the winter of 1913/14, to work out the best method of settlement, the Steppe governor-general refused to allow it, arguing that Russian policy was not within their purview. Russian denial of the nationalists' involvement in shaping a sedentarization plan remained a constant of Kazakh history throughout this period.

The editors of Ay qap believed that the material decline of Kazakh life was due to the economic decline of nomadism. They felt that, while pastoral nomadism had been the foundation of the unique Kazakh culture, it was no longer relevant to a modern Kazakhstan. The inevitable first step as a modern nation required sedentarization, as Omar Karasy implied:

Eternal nomadic livestock breeding was not ordered as the eternal Kazakh fate. There comes a time when we are able to live as agriculturists and as traders. The present-
day Russians and Tatars and other settled peoples first led nomadic lives, raising livestock. How they are occupied in the present day is known by all. We are no worse off than they are and we are the children of humanity. We are also able to live as they do.64

On February 2, 1913, the bi-weekly periodical Qazaq appeared.65 This was the vehicle of the leading nationalists who formed the group called Alash Orda, "Horde of Alash." Published at Orenburg by Mustafa Urazayev, with chief editor Baytursun, its staff and contributors constituted the core of the secular intellectual activists of the prerevolutionary and revolutionary periods: Bukeykhanov, Dulatov, Zhumabayev, Tanyshbayev, Halel Dosmukhammedov, and others. Within a year, its circulation rose from 3,000 to 8,000 copies per issue.66 Qazaq ceased in 1918.

Like Ay qap, Qazaq emphasized the preservation of Kazakh culture. Folklore, literature, and above all, the Kazakh language occupied its pages. Unlike Ay qap, however, Qazaq was much more overtly political in nature, and it disdained Islam. It was suspended by the Russian censors over two dozen times in its first two years alone.

For the writers of Qazaq, the preservation of their language was as crucial as the land problem. The lead editorial of the very first issue, written by Baytursun, explains this position and deserves quotation at length:

For centuries the Kirgiz [Kazakh] people occupied its own territory and lived its own life; but now a flood of colonists is inundating our steppes. What is our future to be? History teaches us that when a foreign element shows itself to be culturally stronger than the native population, it inevitably absorbs the latter. By contrast, if the two elements balance each other culturally, they can develop side by side enjoying their own rights and preserving their national characteristics. The ultimate transformation of
the economic life of the Kirgiz seems to be inevitable. Peasants are settling on our arable land, our lands are being requisitioned . . ., in short foreigners are penetrating into our midst. The problem of the very existence of the Kirgiz people is facing us in a most acute form. In order to preserve our autonomy we should struggle with all our strength in order to acquire education and culture. We must in the first place develop our national literature. We should never forget that only a people who has been able to create its own literature in its national language has the right to an independent existence.67

In general, Qazaq advocated expanded Kazakh-language education, emancipation of women, and equality of rights for Kazakhs with Russians. It perforce tread carefully regarding the regime, but forcefully argued against Russian economic and social policies harmful to the Kazakhs. Its contributors criticized the traditional leadership for failing to preserve, much less advance, Kazakh culture, they chastised those intellectuals who placed Russian knowledge before their own, and they regarded Islam as a hindrance to modernization.

Whereas Ay gap wanted Shariat law, the editors of Qazaq were against increasing Islamic power, given Tatar domination of the Islamic reform movements. They upheld adat, customary law, as Bukeykhanov explained:

The Kazakhs are non-Muslims, at very most half-Muslims. The preservation of customs and traditions is useful to the Kazakhs. The Shariat is harmful to the Kazakhs.68

The Qazaq writers regarded pastoral nomadism as no longer viable, and that clinging to it was dragging the nation to ruin, because the Russians grew stronger while the Kazakhs weakened. The fear of alien blood swamping their nation, and the rational realization that economic advancement was vital for its survival, impelled the intellectual nationalists to advocate sedentarization, which was the antithesis of
Kazakh self-identity as free riders of the Steppe. The nationalists could accept settlement, but only if the Russian colonization ceased, in order to provide the time and space the Kazakh masses needed to become modern. In this regard, Qazag was much more bitter towards the regime and its policies than Ay qap, and more specific in its analysis:

... the transition of the local population to a sedentary way of life means the voluntary giving over of land to the settlers from the central gubernias of Russia. In order to maintain in their hands sufficient land masses the local residents ought to receive land parcels according to the so-called 'nomadic norm' and so land parcels in that norm would be twice as great as according to the sedentary norm ... 

The opinion of the newspaper Qazag on the agricultural question is to support the position of seizing the Kazakh land according to order and law. The expropriation of land according to order means not to destroy the existing economic order of the Kazakhs: that is, if the Kazakhs live by agriculture, then give them land according to livestock breeding norms and take the remaining surplus. To take away land means to have some sort of legal position, published so that the resettlement officials do not get out of hand. When the resettlement officials take away Kazakh land, they are unable to depart from this legal position. 69

As indicated by the quote from Baytursun at the opening of this chapter, the founders of Qazag deliberately chose to name their journal "Kazakh" and not "Kirghiz." The utter lack of regard for the Kazakhs by their Russian conquerors was proven every time a Russian called a Kazakh by the other name. The Kazakhs themselves always used "Kazakh" (or "Qazaq" in the contemporary orthography). 70 To use the title Qazag was a fundamental revolutionary statement. Unlike the enlighteners of the past, the Qazaq nationalists did not wish to emulate the Russian culture, they only wanted to acquire the modern technological skills of the Russians so they could better oppose them. Tsarist imperial rule was antithetical to Kazakh existence. The secular intellectuals were
realists, and knew that overt demands would only rouse overt Russian resistance. Nevertheless, their ultimate goal was the creation of a wholly Kazakh nation—Qazaqjylyq.71

Ay gap and Qazaq were allies, not rivals; the overlapping lists of contributors prove that. The former focused on cultural preservation, the latter on economic and political. They represented the main stream of Kazakh intellectual development, and dominated the politics of the Steppe. However, two much weaker intellectual currents opposed them, the southern Kazakhs of Syr Darya and a scattering of socialist-leaning Kazakhs found in the larger, Russian-dominated towns.

In late 1913, a group of southern Kazakhs formed "Ush Zhuz," or "The Three Hordes." They began a periodical, Ush Zhuz, at first published in Tashkent. The Kazakhs of Syr Darya were distinctly more anti-Russian than the northern Kazakhs, and much more Islamic in outlook. Some were aristocratic and pro-Bukharan, given their long relations with the emirs of Turkestan; others were poor or even destitute, driven out of the Steppe and Semirechye by the Russian exploiters and expropriators. They were a combination of very conservative Islamic clergy, reformist intellectuals who looked to pan-Islam or even Istanbul for rescue from Russian rule, and angry young nomads or ex-nomads hating Russia. The leader of the Ush Zhuz was Kolbay Togusov, himself left-leaning and also personally antagonistic to the leadership of the Qazaq group.

After 1914, Ush Zhuz found supporters in Semirechye, Turgay, and in the Russian towns of the north, particularly Omsk. It advocated armed resistance to the Russians. As time passed, it grew more radical, which
drained its support among the southern Kazakh clergy but increased it among the poor north and south.

The second strand of opposition to the Qazaq intellectuals was that of the few socialist Kazakhs found in the towns, and especially among the students exposed to Russian radical thought. Though very few in number, given the lack of a Kazakh proletariat, the leftists have ever since been lionized by Soviet historiography as the true leaders of the Kazakh masses, while the Qazaq writers are scorned as "bourgeois-nationalists" and the conservatives as "feudal reactionaries." Ironically, the Kazakh leftists had the least prerevolutionary significance, but the longest history of Kazakh intellectuals: in 1849, the tsarist government had exiled to Vernyi, Turgay, and Semipalatinsk members of the radical group called the Petrashevtzy; in the Steppe, these radicals met and influenced Kazakh intellectuals of the incipient national movement.

From 1900 to 1916, Kazakh nationalism developed rapidly and deeply. But modern nationalism existed only among the intellectuals, who were very few in number, widely scattered, and divided by upbringing and outlook. The nomad (rather, by now, semi-nomad) Kazakh masses were not antagonistic to the intellectuals, though often their elders were; the intellectuals' tradition of enlightenment spurred their efforts to communicate with the general population, and despite difficulties of terrain, class status, and limited technology, the intellectual elites were not separated from their people in comparison to the gulf between the Russian intelligentsia and the peasantry. Kazakh traditional society consisted, at least ideally and to some extent in reality, of harmony
between aristocrats and commoners, white bones and black, bails and baigushes. The overwhelming threat of Russian annihilation of their culture was a powerful bond of unity among a people whose national identity had always been strong.

The Kazakh masses lacked comprehension of the Westernized political system of thought that modern nationalism implies. Up to 1916, even the Kazakh intellectuals apparently sought only cultural autonomy and the political rights to preserve that autonomy. The absence of any overt demands for political/territorial independence by the nationalists is justification for the view of modern experts that the Kazakhs did not experience 'real' nationalism.

However, when one considers the day-to-day context of prerevolutionary Kazakhstan, it becomes apparent that such demands for independence would have only set back the intellectuals' struggle even more. The political and cultural repression of the Kazakhs was based on the overwhelming material superiority the Russians possessed. Also, the Kazakhs lacked accessible models of nation-states, surrounded as they were by empires like the Russian, Chinese, and Ottoman. The intellectual nationalists were desperately seeking time to coax the Kazakh masses into the modern world; calls for full independence would have been suicidal.

The prerevolutionary Kazakh nationalists acknowledged that the Kazakh people had ceded their sovereignty to the conquering Russians. They therefore worked with the basic assumption that they were part of a huge multinational empire with a favored overclass, the Russians. In that framework, the intellectuals demanded a great deal of independence,
from land expropriation, cultural assault, and population inundation. To seek to lever the Kazakh millions into the twentieth century while advancing their culture, to try to sedentarize a people whose very identity was the antithesis of settlement, was an awesome task in itself; they needed to modernize first, and regain their independence from a position of strength later.

In early 1916, had one asked a leading Kazakh intellectual, he would have been dismayed at the thought of attempting full independence from Russia. The intellectuals needed to modernize; Russia was the avenue of that modernization. Looking about him at the typical Kazakh herdsman, peaceful, friendly, even meek, lacking all but rudimentary hand weapons, the intellectual would have predicted the obvious: if the Kazakh people took up arms against the Russian Empire, they would be slaughtered. The goal of Qazaqjylyq would be delayed greatly, if not forever. To seek full national independence, in the context of his world in 1916, would only result in a terrible, avoidable tragedy.

The events of 1916 were very tragic.
CHAPTER SIX

Steppe Aflame: Revolt of 1916

The times have become evil,
Under the heaviness of the tsar's hand.
What can we expect from the authorities,
Since for them we are but beasts of burden?
Hearts have become inflamed in anger against them,
The dzhigits (warriors) are eagerly awaiting the rising.
They will not submit to the decree,
But are going into battle.

—Qulbash, 1916.

Rumors are flying across the steppe,
Rumors about human misery.
Aytkhodzha dies under the whip,
And Uzakh under the bayonet.
Above the blue waves of the Issyk-Kul,
A hot battle took place,
And from the deadly bullet of the tsar,
Many a dzhigit laid down his life.
And in the bloody Karakul
Over their captive victims
The authorities have avenged themselves
Behind the steel of prison doors:
Submissively here soldiers were shooting
In prisons, among stone walls,
And our delegates were falling,
Washing the courtyards with their blood.
By night the prison had almost emptied;
They rolled the bodies into ditches and
Ending this bloody business,
The enemy raced towards our auls.

World War I transformed the modern age. Its relationship to the fall of the tsarist empire and the rise of the Soviet Union is axiomatic for historians. The great 'native' uprisings in Central Asia in 1916 have been oddly overlooked, however, despite their significance as a massive mid-war diversion of Russian military resources, as part of the rise of 'third-world' nationalism, and as a crucial precursor of the Bolshevik-White struggle in this arena. This bitter vosstanie or popular revolt rocked Russian Central Asia from July through the end of 1916, involving, though very separately, the civilized peoples of Turkestan and the Turkomans of the desert, the Kirghiz of the mountains, and the Kazakhs of the steppe. When finally suppressed, the revolt had cost the Central Asians dearly in destroyed and plundered property, as well as in lives. Hundreds of thousands were killed, out of a total population of eight million, while about four thousand Russians were lost, with over 90% being settlers and the rest officials, out of nearly two million residents.

The Kazakhs fully participated in the turmoil of 1916. The secular nationalists, however, withheld public support in their publications and meetings, while doing everything they could do mitigate the uprising. The traditional local leaders, the elders, as well as the anti-Russian Islamic clergy were everywhere in support of the rebels, who were gangs of youths hiding in the steppe. The Russian suppression of the uprising devastated the innocent herdsmen as much as or more than the marauding youths. The social and economic havoc that resulted weakened Kazakh national resources, but left the secular intellectuals as the only real
focus of opposition to the Russians in the revolutionary era to follow.

The spark of the uprising was an imperial ukase of June 25, 1916, which decreed that a half-million Central Asians, aged 19-43, were to be mobilized for labor brigades in the war effort. The immediate cause, then, was the hardships of World War I on Russia's Central Asian colonies. However, the underlying reason for the desperate, doomed uprising of the Kazakhs in 1916 was due to Russian colonization and the usurpation of their land. Therefore, a summary of the impact of that expropriation is appropriate.

By the census of 1897, about 600,000 Russians dwelt in Kazakhstan. In the next twenty years, over 1.5 million emigrated to Kazakh lands, so that by 1916, four million Kazakhs shared the six oblasts with nearly two million Russians. The ratio of Kazakhs to Russians fell from 5.5:1 in 1897, to 2:1 in 1916. The heaviest influx occurred in the five uezds of the northern plains called the Virgin Lands, where the Russian population jumped from 230,000 to 900,000. Semirechye was heavily inundated as well, with a quarter-million Russian colonists, and over 11 million acres seized. By 1915, the Russians had taken 67 million acres from the Kazakhs. The invasion peaked just before World War I (when immigration was suspended): while the Russian population increased by 400,000 from 1897 to 1905, it grew by 900,000 between 1905 and 1916.

The Kazakhs were not only crowded off the best pasture-lands by this invasion, they were increasingly impoverished as nomads. In the early 1700s, an 'average' Kazakh household of the Middle Horde possessed about 100 sheep, 30-50 horses, 20-25 goats, 15-25 cattle, and several camels
(while a wealthy nomad might own ten to twenty times as many.) By 1915, the average nomad household owned a total of 26 animals, while only one in twenty families owned more than 50 animals in 1917; yet the size of the Kazakh herds increased from 17 to 30 million from 1885 to 1917. Obviously, some Kazakhs did benefit from Russian rule, perhaps one-tenth to one-fourth; in 1910, Bukeykhanov estimated that 61% of Kazakhs were poor, and 22% were rich.

Nomadism declined greatly. At least one in five Kazakhs received some sort of wages in 1914; over 18,000 Kazakhs worked in the coal and copper industries by 1916. By 1911, the majority of Kazakh families did some farming, with 70% combining agriculture and herding by 1917. Only one in four Kazakhs was wholly nomadic, while 18% of the Kazakhs of the Steppe and Semirechye lacked sufficient livestock and 40% had no sown land whatsoever. The amount of land farmed by Kazakhs increased from 1.2 million to 1.65 million acres between 1906 and 1916; by 1917, 50-75% of farmers in Kazakh areas were Kazakhs, but they tilled only 20% of all sown lands.

World War I exacted further hardships on the Kazakhs. Central Asians had always been exempted from Russian military service, and during the war the government expected whole-hearted economic support to 'pay' for this exemption. The Kazakhs already paid the so-called 'kibitka' tax; other special taxes and 'requisitions' were added on, greatly burdening the nomads, who paid a flat per-household rate that harmed the poor, obviously, more than the rich. Besides the special war-taxes and contributions required of all Central Asians, the nomads also had to pay
an added kibitka tax, a local tax, and a war-tax. The government forced them to give supplies to troops through their areas, to transport goods, perform other war-related labor (ditches, etc.), and to contribute huge numbers of livestocks and yurts. Despite the huge price-spiral in food and price-fixing by Russian merchants, Kazakh animals were seized for a fraction of their value, or for nothing at all. Corrupt and partisan officials, Russian and Kazakh, often profited greatly, by pocketing what funds the government did pay, and by skimming the nomads' tax payments and contributions. In the Steppe and Semirechye, where many peasants had gone to war, the nomads were forced to work their farms for them.\(^\text{17}\)

As the war lurched disastrously in 1915-16, the Russian government considered the mobilization of Central Asians and other exempted inorodtsy (non-Russians) for military or at least labor service.\(^\text{18}\) Huge losses in manpower in late 1915 initiated the debate, and by mid-1916 the situation seemed critical: the army needed a half-million replacements per month, and there was only a three-month reserve. The regime decided to mobilize the Central Asians for rear-line labor (supply transport, wood-chopping, guarding horses, digging ditches) throughout the empire, freeing Russian soldiers for the front.

Tsar Nicholas signed the mobilization decree June 25, 1916. The decree called for 243,000 natives of the Steppe oblasts (250,000 from Turkestan). The Steppe natives were nearly all Kazakhs, so using statistics for the Steppe oblasts only, the following calculations show that the government requisitioned the vast majority of eligible Kazakhs.\(^\text{19}\) Half of all Steppe Kazakhs were male; of these, 70% were aged 10 to 59
(that is, 20% were 10-20, 50% were 20-59). Assuming that half of these were aged 19 to 43, some 300-350,000 Kazakhs were eligible to be drafted. Thus, while about 8% of the total male population of Turkestan was to be mobilized, some 25% of the Steppe was to be.  

The date for the call-up was set for July 15. The decree was hastily drawn up and poorly thought out. Kuropatkin, the Russian general who suppressed the revolt, wrote that the Prime Minister and the Minister of War "did all that was possible to stir up the population," and that the decree was written "in such a hurried and indefinite form that it caused utter confusion in the minds of the population." The Russian officials in Central Asia gave scant attention to educating the natives as to the purpose and nature of the mobilization. They briefly considered that the Central Asians might misconstrue the military-style call-up (by age-brackets), but dismissed the concern. The decree reached Tashkent and Semipalatinsk on June 28, Akmolinsk on June 29. Governor-General Erofeev of Turkestan held a meeting July 2 to work out the mechanics; it was decided to establish regional quotas to be met by conscription based on lists drawn up by local officials and village elders. Governor-General Sukhomlinov of the Steppe announced his order for June 30, 1916, and tried to explain the decree:

The requisition order does not call these persons as soldiers into the army but for work necessary for the army in return for pay and provisions from the Treasury.  

Despite the vastness of the steppe, word of the conscription order spread swiftly. A Semirechye Kazakh intellectual, Turar Ryskulov (1894-1937), hurried home from Tashkent to spread the word. Kazakhs working
on Russian farms immediately returned to their homes. It was summer in
the steppe, and the Kazakh auls were widely scattered. Rumors and the
lack of government explanation fanned worry into panic and anger. Some
Kazakhs began to flee immediately, fearing the worst. It was rumored
that the government was taking the Kazakh youths away to dig trenches
under enemy fire. In Semipalatinsk, the story spread that the conscripts
would be forcibly Christianized. Semirechye nomads believed it was a
ruse whereby the Russians would seize the rest of their lands. Many in
Turgay thought the order came not from the tsar, but was a plot of the
bais and volost (district) elders to benefit at the expense of the poor.
Everywhere, the Kazakh youths fled into the wilderness in bands. Adding
to the confusion, the Kazakh interpreters had difficulty translating the
decree into Kazakh terms. 23

The government's response to the first troubles was to send Cossack
detachments through the Steppe. An official report from early August
indicates the result:

The appearance in the steppe of the Cossack units brought
terror to the peaceful population of the great area. The Kazakhs
up to this time peacefully awaiting the call of the subject
workers, became agitated: in places leaving all of their property,
selling the land for a song, they went away to the south. The
youths left the auls, went into the steppe, and it's unknown
where they are. Everywhere the Kazakhs left the ripening grain;
the cut hay remains in heaps, rots, and is carried away by the
wind. The economy is dealt an irreparable blow seeing that from
the time of the announcement of the call no one has been
occupying himself with agricultural matters. In the Urzhavsk
volost of the Lepsinsk uezd of the Semirechye oblast the Kazakhs,
going no one knows where, poisoned their grain and hay for the
cattle. 24

The first outbreaks of violence occurred in early July, in Samarkand
among the Sarts, and among the Kazakhs, in all the Steppe oblasts. By mid-July, the disturbances were severe in Turkestan and widespread in the Kazakh areas. Semirechye nomads began fleeing east and south into Chinese Sinkiang. Finally, on July 30th, the tsar postponed the call-up to September 15, which had the desired effect of cooling the uprisings. But by latter September, violence flared anew; however, the government had by this time gathered the military force to suppress the revolt, which consisted now of stomping out local fires.  

Popular reaction in the revolt of 1916 was split between flight and resistance. Bands of youths up to 1,000 strong roamed the countryside, armed with crude implements, where they assaulted the officials to seize their conscription lists. Sometimes the native officials were killed as well; when Russian troops were sent to protect the officials, the Kazakhs fought them. The decree became the tool of numerous corrupt officials to extort and harass their rivals, and many of the wealthy simply bought their way out of conscription (the decree exempted mullahs, some bais, and local officials, but rather than mollify popular resentment by not taking the local leaders, this further inflamed the anger of the poor). The greatest amount of violence was not between Kazakhs, however, it was directed against the Russians, especially the settlers.  

The following regional summary of the revolt among the Kazakhs is intended to show its variability of intensity as well as its widespread character.  

In western Kazakhstan, unrest began in Temirtau and Guryev areas. On July 8, a volost starshina (headman) was killed in Uralsk uezd; soon,
the entire oblast was in disorder. Volost officials were beaten and their lists seized by gangs of youths. The unrest was scattered and sporadic, however. The Russians had long been established in Uralsk, especially the Cossacks, and punitive detachments had quelled the uprising by November.

Neighboring Turgay, on the other hand, witnessed the fiercest resistance of the Steppe oblasts, from Kustanay and Aktyubinsk in the north and west to Irgiz and Turgay in the south and east. Turgay oblast had received many poor nomads driven from the northern plains and the southern deserts by the Russian settlers, and its tribal groups remained some of the least 'tamed' of all Kazakhs. Under Khan Abdul Gafar Dzhambusynov, the warrior Amangeldy Imanov (1873–1919), and the revolutionary Alibai Dzhangildin (1884–1953), the Kipchaks allied with the Argyn and Naiman tribes to form the best-organized rebel force in the steppe. On October 23, they attacked the town of Turgay with some 15,000 men, and beseiged it for three weeks. They assaulted the town on November 5, but failed to take it due to dissension and lack of arms. The Russian relief expedition under Lieutenant-General Lavrentiev raised the siege on November 16, scattering the rebels with heavy casualties. By the end of November, only 6,000 Kazakh warriors remained; Amangeldy held out in the Batlakkara desert until the following February when the Provisional government passed a general amnesty. 28

The resistance in Akmolinsk began in mid-July and was widespread. A group of central steppe elders met in Atbasar uezd on July 16. Violence had occurred in Petropavlovsk a week before, in Akmolinsk July 11. The
most serious fighting was in the Bayan-aul region; Akmolinsk officials sent the following message to Petrograd (formerly St. Petersburg) on August 1:

The Kazakhs are acting in a very provocationary manner, ride about only in large parties and threaten the population of the Russian settlements that they will kill and burn in all directions, especially the very new settlements. The Russians cannot defend themselves as the men of the Russian settlements have been taken away for the war. The Kazakhs attacked the Russians working in the fields, and took away all their draught animals, machines, carts and harnesses. . . . In place of the usual 25-40 kibitkas the Kazakhs began to group themselves into 300-400 kibitkas. The Kazakhs gathered into a group of 15 thousand around Lake Kurgalajin.

By September, Omsk authorities reported nearly 30,000 Kazakhs near Akmolinsk. The town itself, with a population over 60,000, was attacked September 26-7, October 3-4, and October 6. The Lavrentiev forces began pacification of Akmolinsk oblast then, and the disorders were over by late November. The Cossack sweep of the Kenderlinsk region indicates the method: over forty armed Kazakhs were killed here on October 25, then the Russians killed twenty more nearby, and stormed through the area attacking auls, seizing herds and food, burning winter camps, and killing.

The first violence in Semipalatinsk was in mid-July along the Chinese border. At their height, the Kazakh bands numbered several thousands, with several such bands in all four uezds. In the central steppe, a large number of Kazakhs gathered in Karkaralinsk. They refused to listen to those urging submission. The Governor himself came to calm the area, after the murder of several officials; an angry Kazakh mob slew two native officials right in front of him. The uprising was
put down in Semipalatinsk region by region, though Zaisan was not pacified until early January, 1917.

Syr Darya was least disturbed by the revolt, which began here in mid-August and had ended by late September. Many Kazakhs fled, fearing Russian reprisals. Syr Darya had the least number of Russian settlers, primarily because most of its arable land was already farmed by the Turkestanis.

The revolt in Semirechye was most violent of all. The nomads here, both Kazakh and Kirghiz, had suffered the most recent and devastating colonization. General Folbaum, aware that the uprising was imminent, took measures in July to suppress it, including the placement of troops throughout the oblast, and also made efforts through intermediaries to persuade the nomads to stay calm. The revolt came later to Semirchye, perhaps due to this, but it was the fiercest. On July 10, delegates of eleven districts met at ancient Otrar to plan the resistance; thousands of youths were ordered to hide in the wilderness along Lake Balkhash. The Tashkent-Vernyi road was assaulted, and by August 10, the oblast was in general revolt.

The Russian settlements, strung along post-roads and river-valleys, were attacked by Kazakh and Kirghiz marauders, some of whom had seized a shipment of Russian arms. Thousands of Kirghiz beseiged Tokmak in mid-August, dying with amazing bravery against Russian machine-guns. In the mountains, settlers were attacked mercilessly, so that entire regions were depopulated of Russians, the farms in ruins. The arrival of the Lavrentiev expeditionary force in mid-September turned the tide; soldiers
and settler militias had pacified Semirechye by the end of the year. One of the great tragedies of the revolt was the 300,000 nomads who fled into Sinkiang during the revolt. Unwanted by the Chinese and attacked by the locals, afraid to return to Russian vengeance, these refugees perished in great numbers; eventually, about 30,000 returned.

A more typical tragedy is found in the story of the Kazakhs of Belovodsk, in Semirechye, in mid-August. Here, two Russians were found murdered. The settlers formed a militia which rampaged through the Kazakh auls indiscriminately. After several days, the local police chief persuaded more than 500 Kazakhs to come to Belovodsk to discuss the awful situation. Upon arrival, the Kazakhs were arrested and locked up, and then the Russian colonists were allowed to slaughter them.

When Kuropatkin toured Semirechye in September, he passed through Belovodsk and recorded this:

At the entrance to the settlement . . . the widows of the murdered men stood on both sides of the road in [Kazakh] mourning clothes, and as if at a command they raised a cry, asking me to return their men. . . . Follbaum, the military governor of Semirechye . . . believes that this cruel punishment served a purpose, as it stopped the wavering [Kazakhs] of other volosts from joining the rebellion, for which they made preparations. I strongly warned the population that anyone who now takes it into his head to plunder, whether Russian or [Kazakh], will be given over to court-martial and the gallows.

Estimations of Kazakh losses in the revolt are difficult to make. The Russians compiled statistics on their own losses in Turkestan and Turgay, but not for the rest of the Steppe, and not at all on native losses. If one includes deaths through the consequent famine in much of the area, the casualties were staggering. The Russians lost about 4,000
people, over 3,000 of whom were in Semirechye alone, and about 9,000 farms. In Turgay, 45 Russian civilians and 3 officers died.

Central Asian losses numbered in the hundreds of thousands. Later Soviet calculations estimated that Semirechye alone lost 300,000; the number of nomad households there fell by two-thirds (62,000 to 20,000); losses here amounted to 20% of the people, 50% of the horses, 40% of the cattle, 60% of the sheep and goats, and about 400,000 acres of cropland. The heavy-handed peace imposed by Kuropatkin in Semirechye, which forced thousands of nomads to resettle in barren mountain regions, took its toll. The population of Turkestan fell by one million from 1914 to 1918.

The Kazakh revolt of 1916 was spontaneous and sporadic. The leaders were mostly local elders and headstrong youths; the majority of Kazakhs did not participate in the revolt, seeking only to protect their families and herds. No upper class Kazakhs were associated with the revolt except in Turgay and Semirechye, where it was the fiercest. The 1916 uprising was the desperate act of impoverished nomads and angry youths, while the settled Kazakhs of north and south, and the established, wealthy bais, mostly kept apart from the revolt. The Kazakh secular nationalists also did not openly support the uprising.

When the Russian government, including the Duma, first began to consider mobilization, the nationalists carried on heated discussion of the issue, particularly in the pages of Qazaq. In the January 24, 1915 issue, for example, three writers made the same points. Ahmed Jantaliev wrote:

... in case Kazakhs are taken to military service, then
it is necessary that they be given the same advantages which those people who have always served in the army already have. Kazakhs must also be given the rights which Cossacks enjoy and they should serve in the cavalry. Furthermore, Kazakhs should be allotted lands equally with the Cossacks.

Mustaki Maldybayev noted that, "as a result of the absence of birth certificates and other documents among the Kazakhs, it is very difficult to determine their ages and clarify who is liable for call." And Salmak bey Kesmetov argued:

It is impossible to assume that Kazakhs will forever be free from military service. But if the question of military service is to be decided, then it would follow that this decision come with the participation of the Kazakhs themselves. If Kazakhs must be called, will they serve in the infantry or the cavalry? . . . We think that it would be very opportune to raise simultaneously with the question of military service, the question of Kazakhs' participation in the Duma and the distribution of their lands.

Other Kazakh writers discussed the issue in various other papers as well. All linked military or labor service with restored Duma rights and the land problem. The Kazakh nomads discussed the issue among themselves as well, as a Semirechye nomad described a meeting in the fall of 1915.

From January, 1916, right up to the decree itself, the writers in Qazaq argued that mobilization should be as cavalry troops, with rights equal to the Cossacks, and Duma representation restored. Tanyshbayev, later testifying about the revolt of 1916, said this:

In December 1915 this project was discussed in the press. On Jan. 24, 1916 the paper "Kazak" (no. 166) gave the opinions of some influential Kirghiz (Kazakhs) as to the question of the expected placing of military service on the Kirghiz; the question of the desire or lack of desire to serve in the army was not discussed at all; all interested themselves in the question of how the Kirghiz would serve—in the infantry or in the cavalry, the question being thrashed out on the pages of the "Kazak"
Nos. 166, 168, 177, 179, 184—the last of June 9. . . . In general the articles of the said numbers may be summarized thus: 1) the majority of the Kirghiz prefer service in the cavalry (including myself), the minority stood for service in the infantry. 2) It is proposed that in view of the absence of birth certificates among the Kirghiz the call for military service in the near future will be beset with many difficulties.

Bukeykhanov, Baytursun, and N. Begymbetov travelled to Petrograd in early February, 1916, to discuss mobilization with tsarist officials. Among the Russians they met was the Minister of War, General Polivanov; apparently satisfied, the Kazakh leaders returned to the steppe and continued to argue for rights in return for service. They had gone to the capital in order to bring "to the attention of the Government and the Duma the general opinion of the Kazakh nation," that "in the event of an ineluctable call—to be placed in the cavalry and not the infantry with an equalization of the Kazakhs with the Russian Cossacks in land utilization."

When the mobilization decree came, the Kazakh leaders must have been bitterly disappointed. Their goal of modernizing the Kazakh nomads required time and exposure to modern institutions; appropriate military service would have provided both in good measure. But they realized that the Kazakhs were in no bargaining position, and therefore sought to ameliorate the distress which the order caused among their people. Qazaq stressed cooperation with the order and urged calm: "The order of the tsar should be carried out without question. To serve the tsar, that must be our duty." "Restrain yourselves, submit to law. Away with ill-intentioned provocators. Guard the people of Allah from a calamity inspired by an evil spirit."
Tanyshbayev, an Alash Orda leader in Semirechye, and the guberniia interpreter I. Dzainokov travelled the oblast, seeking to calm the nomads and convince them to cooperate with the decree. They distributed issues of Qazaq, which argued that the tsar's order must be obeyed, and perhaps the Kazakhs would be rewarded with military status thereafter. Later, Tanyshbayev described his experience:

I, myself, though personally understanding the essence of the whole matter of conscription found myself in a difficult position: at the gatherings of Kirghiz [Kazakhs] I explained that the term military work included work on the construction and operation of the railway, lading, the carrying of provisions, the guarding of horses, the chopping of trees for fuel, etc., but was told sharply that in the telegrams and newspapers nothing was said about this but only about emplacement work and that I do not speak accurately at all and that they had been told this by peasants they knew in the settlements, among whom there were relatives at the front . . .

In late July, two delegations of Kazakh intellectuals passed through Astrakhan, going to Petrograd to petition for recission of the order. The first was led by Kalmenev, Uralsk representative at the First Duma; the second was led by a former official, G. Nukashev. Though unsuccessful, their journeys reveal the growing sophistication of the nationalists, willing to travel the vast distance to the capital to deal with the Russian regime directly.

On August 7, 1916, the Kazakh secular nationalists convened a meeting of Kazakhs from across the Steppe and Semirechye. The conference was held in Turgay with the participation of the oblast governor, who announced the decree and asked for their help. After he left the hall, the conferees elected Bukeykhanov president of the assembly, with Dulatov and O. Almasov as secretaries. The informal
protocol of the meeting reveals the position of the moderate nationalists of Alash Orda during the crisis of 1916. The assembly recommended that the mobilization proceed, but only after modifying it and delaying it. It should be postponed to January 1; the first to be called should come from the youngest age-group, who had the fewest families; workers should be kept close to home, one worker should be left per family, and workers should be able to substitute others. Mullahs and teachers should be reserved for each aul, and the medressa teachers should be exempted. The old lists must be discarded, and new lists drawn up by committees of one representative per 10 households. Each volost was to have two delegates, and workers in towns should participate in city and zemsky voting. The workers should form artels, each with a translator and every ten with a mullah; transportation and passes must be provided for the conscripted workers.

These Kazakh demands were ignored by the government, and the mass of Kazakhs ignored the intellectual elites generally during 1916. The secular nationalists, most of whom came from upper and middle class backgrounds, supported the regime out of practical necessity. However, given the situation Qazaq faced, skirting the Russian censors amidst the turmoil of World War I (it was suspended 26 times in 1913-14 alone), the nationalists could hardly have advocated any other course and remain with any voice or influence at all. Apparently, in private, even the Alash Orda moderates supported the rebels, or at least their goal of defending the poor nomads.

The revolt of 1916 was a powerful radicalizing experience for many
Kazakh intellectuals. Not all equivocated as Qazaq did: in September, 1916, the journal Ay qap was suspended for advocating support for the rebels. It was during this time, also, that the more extreme Ush Zhuz group spread its support into Semirechye and northern Kazakhstan; it also supported the revolt whole-heartedly.

The Duma sent a special investigating committee to Central Asia at the height of the revolt. The committee, led by Alexander Kerensky and including the leader of the Moslem fraction, Tevkelev, reported in secret on September 10, 1916. After discussions, the Duma in December issued three questions to the government, never satisfactorily answered, which blamed it for the revolt. The Duma did not sympathize with the native victims.

The 1916 rebellion was truly a popular insurrection. The elites did not openly participate, a factor noted by an official report later:

But what was noticed was that the [Kazakh] youth searched for a leader but did not find him, therefore the agitation took the character of disorganization not different from the usual friction caused by every new development in the national life. This did not comprise a sign of rebellion or of agitation with the aim of separation from Russia.

Another report found that, "in almost every volost the leaders of the revolt were the volost starshinas."

A description from early January, 1917, describes the climate of terror that followed the Russian retaliation:

The population has so suffered from the punitive units and is so frightened that not only is it afraid to talk of any sort of attack but even to think of one. . . . The former local bais in the village do not, at present, appear as bais but as destitute persons, ruined completely by the late disorders.
In 1916, the wealthy and the nationalists remained on the side of the establishment, while the poor and the young rose up in reckless rebellion, and the majority of Kazakhs simply tried to survive. As Dulatov wrote in Qazaq: "Kazakhs have been ruined by this senseless disorder. The cause of this terrible disaster lies in the Kazakhs' backwardness and their lack of culture." The Kazakh nation had not recovered materially or in spirit, when the revolutionary and civil war period crashed over the steppe. The nationalist leaders were in place to guide the Kazakhs through the trauma of war and famine, because to some extent the traditional leaders were discredited by the disaster of 1916.

But the passion of the desperate Kazakh nomads who struggled in the steppe in 1916 is still echoed in the following rebel song, by the fighting akyn Byzaubaq:

Tsar Nikolai is perplexed and upset:
The enemies' armies are closing in from all sides.
There are also not a few internal enemies,
Enemies are everywhere, and he's in despair.
And the miserable courtiers cry,
Give him advice, but it's all in vain.
They want to take all our youth,
Since they've not enough soldiers of their own.
But even if we give into them now,
And send our men far to strange shores,
What will it matter--the tsar will continue to oppress,
Even if we offer our lives for him.

.....
But if, as one, we rise against them,
They will not be able to destroy us all, my people!
No, a tsar's heart knows no compassion.
Kazakhs, give your answer now to the tsar!
Is it worthwhile to live the life of a slave,
Only to reach a ripe old age?
Listen to what the akyn sings to you:
Misery awaits you from the tsar's hands
Even if you offer your son to him.
Go then, my people,
Go then, in war against the tsar!
Where now are the aksakals and wise leaders?
Or do we no longer have strength in our hands?
Look!
They are leading your most beautiful ones to the tsar!
Why are you silent? Is there no heart in your breast?
O youth! You are the beauty of our land!
The time has come! Just listen to the thunder of the storm!
To horse, then, and let your steel shine in the sun,
Like a deadly scythe in your hands!
The day of sharp suffering has dawned.
O come you all! Close your ranks, my people!
O place no faith in cowards who speak sweetly to the foe.
To arms! Our land is calling to us!
O my people! You are so strong, so proud, so much alive!
O listen to my battlecry, to my fiery call!
You will be happy after bloody fight,
After defeating the enemies of your liberty.
The [Kazakhs] received the first revolution with joy and the second with consternation and terror. It is easy to understand why. The first revolution had liberated them from the oppression of the tsarist regime and reinforced their perennial dream of autonomy. . . . The second revolution was accompanied in the borderlands by violence, plundering, exactions and by the establishment of a dictatorial regime. . . . In short, it was a period of sheer anarchy. In the past, a small group of tsarist bureaucrats oppressed the [Kazakhs]; today the same group of people, or others, who cloak themselves in the name of Bolsheviks perpetuate in the borderlands the same regime. . . . Only the politics of Kolchak which promised to return to the tsarist regime forced Alash Orda to turn itself toward the Soviet regime, even though, judging by the local Bolsheviks, it did not appear to be a very attractive alternative.

Baytursun, 1919.

Modern Kazakh nationalism peaked during the crisis of 1917-1920, when famine, anarchy, and civil war stalked Kazakhstan. The Kazakh masses struggled simply to survive the hunger. The traditional leadership had failed them in the 1916 uprising. The intellectual leaders, though not united, organized the only modern independent nation the Kazakhs would ever know, the Alash in 1917, but they could not defend it during the war years of 1918-19. With no other choice, the nationalists submitted to the Communists in 1920. They hoped only to intermediate between that
brave new Russian world and the desperate Kazakh people. The dream of Qazaqjylyq was over.

Famine ruled the Steppe during the entire revolutionary era. The Kazakh nomads had always faced the calamities of dzhut and drought, but now they suffered the mass starvations of the modern age. Russian colonization had created great numbers of impoverished Kazakhs; then the stress of war-time exactions and the collapse of distribution systems in the empire during World War I had pushed them to the edge of disaster. The revolt of 1916, which ruined the harvest of that year and prevented much of the next's, which created hundreds of thousands of refugees, and which caused the destruction of much livestock, led directly to the famine which lasted until 1923. The ravages of the Civil War, 1918-19, ensured that starvation oppressed the Kazakh masses during this critical time.

The Kazakh intellectuals received word of the fall of the Empire in late February, 1917, with guarded optimism, while the educated youth were more enthusiastic. The influence of 'youth groups' among Kazakh students, especially in the northern (Russian) areas, grew ever more significant as their numbers grew and as they experienced the dramatic events from 1905 on. The group "Birlik" ("Unity"), which formed in 1915 in Omsk, was one of the most important. It included both Seifullin and Togzhanov, later Communists, as well as other Kazakhs, who represented the more radical or class-conscious intellectuals. Another major group was "Jas Qazaq," or "Young Kazakh," in Uralsk, which was closely tied to the moderate Qazaq nationalists. The formation of some twenty such groups in early 1917 indicates the fervor of the young intellectuals.
The leading Kazakh nationalists regarded the February revolution as the chance to return to the path of a federated Russian multinational state which the early Duma era had promised. However, the dominant issue for the Kazakh nation remained the land problem, which solution was necessary before they could hope to modernize the Kazakh herdsmen. The Provisional Government seemed more amenable to Kazakh concerns, but proved too weak to fulfill its potential.

Its early actions were promising. The mobilization decree which had sparked the 1916 revolt was rescinded March 9; Bukeykhano was appointed commissar of Turgay oblast, center of Kazakh resistance, on March 19. The Provisional Government declared general amnesty for the rebels, and ordered the return of over six million acres of nomad land seized but not distributed to Russians in Semirechye. However, the new Russian regime would not install Tanyshbayev as agriculture minister, which would have greatly increased Kazakh participation in solving the land problem. In early April, the Provisional Government created the Turkestan Committee to administer the southern oblasts, while the Steppe region was under direct central control (as in tsarist days). Its presidium of five Russians and four Moslems included both Bukeykhanov and Tanyshbayev. Finding itself impotent, this committee resigned in the summer.

For the Kazakhs of Syr Darya and Semirechye, the situation in Turkestan was chaotic. The authority of the Provisional Government was minimal; many tsarist officials remained in charge until April, with old Kuropatkin himself only removed by arrest on March 31. The Russian workers and soldiers formed the Tashkent Soviet March 5-6, which held
the revolution was for Russians only, openly declaring itself anti-Moslem at the Third Congress of Turkestan Soviets in mid-November, 1917. The Moslems, meanwhile, also convened congresses in Tashkent, creating the Shura Islamiyeh or Moslem Central Council to represent the natives of Turkestan. Chairman of the Council was Mustafa Chokay (1890-1941), the brilliant young lawyer from the Kipchaks of Ak Mechet, Syr Darya. Chokay (Chokaev) had represented Kazakh interests while working for the Moslem fraction in the Fourth Duma, and he maintained contact with the Qazaq nationalists. Among his associates in the Council was Tanyshbayev, representing Semirechye.

In the Steppe itself, the Kazakhs held various councils and meetings in early and middle 1917, wherein the nationalists, the clergy, and the elders sought common ground to unify the beleaguered nation. The weakness of the Provisional Government was apparent, but the Kazakh leaders still placed their hope in a democratic, federated future. However, the Qazaq moderates were opposed both by southern, anti-Russian Kazakhs and by more radicalized, quasi-socialist educated youths.

In mid-March, 1917, Kolbay Togusov of the Ush Zhuz held a meeting in Tashkent. By this time, Togusov had split with the anti-Russian southern Kazakhs, the meeting including Turar Ryskulov, already supporting the Tashkent Soviet and soon to join the Communist Party. Two weeks later, Togusov had moved north to Kazalinsk, where he led a meeting of over 5,000 Central Asian workers.

A large conference held in Uralsk about this time exemplifies the character of Kazakh nationalism in the early revolutionary months.
attending clerics, who refused to allow women to be present and who protested the Western dress of the secular nationalists, joined with the conservative leadership to resist the proposals of the secularists. But though the Kazakh leadership continued to be divided, the very process of organizing meetings increased their political skills and maintained contact with the Kazakh masses.

During March and April, the nationalist group centered about the journal Qazaq created the political party called Alash Orda. The founders included Bukeykhanov, Baytursun, Dulatov, H. Dosmukhammedov, Tanyshbayev, O. Omerov, and A. Zhuzhdybayev. At a major conference held in Turgay and at the so-called "Pan-Kirghiz Congress" in Orenburg, the moderate Alash Orda leaders limited their demands to the return of lands seized illegally, mandatory universal education, the use of the Kazakh language in schools and government, and limited self-government. They sought greater religious freedom; they also supported continuing Russia's involvement in World War I, including renewing the labor mobilization. The nationalists were clearly opting to remain within the Russian state.

In early May, the First All-Russian Moslem Congress was held in Moscow. Leading members of the Alash Orda attended, and Dosmukhammedov was elected to the executive all-Russian Moslem Council, the Milli Shura. The Congress had been convened on Tatar initiative with a goal being to create a pan-Turkic, pan-Islamic political movement in Russia. However, the Kazakhs maintained their antipathy to Tatar-led pan-Turkism, and the congress foundered on the question of whether the Moslems should seek a unitary state with cultural autonomy, or a federative state with full
territorial autonomy. The delegates voted for the latter, 460 to 271.

Dosmukhammedov attacked the unitarian position and Tatar-dominated pan-Turkism, expressing the Kazakh understanding of a unique nationalism:

Do you have any idea what a nationality is? It is the unity of blood, spirit, culture, traditions, language, customs, and territory. You cannot create a 'Moslem' nation on the basis of a non-territorial, centralized autonomy.16

Thereafter, the Kazakhs rejected the pan-Islamic, unitarian efforts of Russian Moslems to focus on strengthening Kazakh nationalism. In June, 1917, two journals began which revealed the opposing currents of that nationalism. The first, Sary Arqa, which began in Semipalatinsk, was the paper of the Jas Qazaq group, and thus was an extension of Qazaq.17 These papers urged political autonomy for the Kazakhs, and carried the debate over its potential form:

... if it is decided that autonomy is needed, what form is more acceptable to the Kazakhs; state autonomy or regional autonomy? If we come to a formula of regional autonomy what shall be its basis, territoriality or the peculiarities of culture (nationality)? Can the Kazakhs lay claim to an independent autonomy or establish it in unity with other peoples?18

The other journal, Birlik Tuuy ("Flag of Union"), was begun in Tashkent, and it represented the more radicalized, anti-Russian southern Kazaks.19 Its editor-in-chief was Mustafa Chokay, and its contributors included S. Khodzhanov and Dulatov of the Alash Orda. This paper was much more influenced by pan-Islam; its Turkestani proclivity was shown by its nickname, Kurama gazetasy, or "Half-breed," because its language was Kazakh thoroughly mixed with Uzbek.

The Second "Pan-Kirghiz" Congress was held in Orenburg July 21-28.20 It was led by Bukeykhanov, Baytursun, Dulatov, and Dosmukhammedov. It
reaffirmed and strengthened the resolutions of April, calling for the end of colonization and the return of seized but unused lands, mandatory education, the use of the Kazakh language, an independent Kazakh muftiate, and non-clerical courts. The rights of women were affirmed and the kalym abolished, indicating the decline both of traditional and Islamic custom was a goal of the secular nationalists who now led the intellectual elite.

At this congress, Baytursun advocated complete independence, while Bukeykhanov argued for national autonomy within a democratic, federated Russian state. Bukeykhanov's position dominated. The congress created the Alash Orda political party, and worked out the procedures for broad-based representation for an all-union congress to be held in November, when the autonomous government would be proclaimed. The Kazakh moderates still sought only the economic and cultural protection of autonomy within the stronger, modernizing Russian state. Between July and November, a number of regional conferences supported the results of the Second Congress. In the Steppe, the majority of Kazakhs supported the Alash Orda.

However, a congress of Syr Darya Kazakhs held in Tashkent in early August was much more radical. During the summer, the 1916 refugees began returning to Semirechye. A 'peasants' congress' in Vernyi in July had resolved to suppress the nomads, and Russian militias had engaged in such massacres that protest riots broke out in Tashkent in August. The Tashkent Kazakh congress called for protection of the Semirechye nomads, proposed greater autonomy than Alash Orda, and resolved that Birlik Tuuly become the official journal of the Kazakh nation (even as Qazaq had been
designated in April by the Alash Ordists). Responding to the Tashkent protests, the Provisional Government placed Semirechye under martial law in September and sent an investigating committee. Like so much of its efforts, the Provisional Government's involvement consisted of promises it was unable to keep, due to the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution.

The October revolution brought even greater chaos to Central Asia. The Russian colonists seized the Bolshevik platform of a proletariat dictatorship to justify complete suppression of the native efforts for autonomy. Because Central Asia lacked a native proletariat, only the Russians could lead the revolution, and only for Russian benefit. The Civil War which barred the European Bolsheviks from Central Asia gave the local Bolsheviks free rein. The result was an anarchic struggle between native autonomists such as the Alash Orda, roving White and Cossack armies, bands of peasant Greens, and Red troops made up both of settler militias and European Bolsheviks.

The long-planned pre-congress planning sessions convened by the Alash Orda in Orenburg occurred only two weeks after the October revolution. The Tashkent Soviet had immediately overthrown the feeble Provisional administration. Bolsheviks seized control of the Orenburg Soviet. Whereas the Kazakh nationalists had been developing their program within the Russian federative context, the October revolution completely overturned that goal. The Kazakh leaders now faced the necessity of independence; the alternatives were alliance with the local Bolsheviks, their Russian tormentors in new clothes, or with the Whites, who sought to reestablish the system the Kazakhs had been fighting.
The mid-November conference in Orenburg was designed to organize the framework of the crucial Third "Pan-Kirghiz" Congress set for December.22 The creation of an autonomous Kazakh government was necessary because of the vacuum of authority in the Steppe. The delegates from across Kazakhstan, whose familiarity with the Bolsheviks was as yet minimal, wished to create a "Kirghiz Provisional Government" which would be an autonomous republic within a democratic Russian federation. This Kazakh-Kirghiz government would control internal affairs to protect the native nations, but would provide free speech and assembly for all. The state would manage political and criminal affairs, including an independent militia and graduated taxation; an Islamic clerical administration would control religious affairs (including marriage). Universal education would be run by the state. Of course, the primary concern of the land problem was prominent: the conferees demanded the return of all lands seized by the Russians, as part of the priority to be given henceforth to the Kazakhs in the land issue.

Latter November, 1917, witnessed a great deal of revolutionary activity in Central Asia. Togusov formed the Ush Zhuz political party in Omsk. By now the Ush Zhuz was still pan-Islamic but veering left to socialism, and eventually its members joined the Bolsheviks during 1918-19. The Ush Zhuz, arisen in anti-Russian Turkestan, had taken hold in the Russian-dominated northern towns; its combination of Islam and socialism was not unique in the Russian Moslem world during the revolutionary era, but it guaranteed that the Ush Zhuz would remain small and isolated from the traditional masses much more than the moderates.
The Ush Zhuz party was headquartered in Omsk, with Mikhay Aytpenev as president, and Togusov and Shakhmardan Elzhanov as vice-presidents. It included Shaimerdin Alimzhanov and former Birlikers like Seifullin. The Ush Zhuzists had participated in the "pan-Kirghiz" congresses and other meetings during 1917 and represented the leading opposition to the Alash Orda, which they regarded as too willing to collaborate with moderate and conservative Russians.  

Also in late November, the Moslem nationalists of Turkestan held the "Fourth Extraordinary Regional Moslem Congress" in the ancient city of Kokand. They declared the Moslem Provisional Autonomous Government of Turkestan, which news was wildly received by Tashkent's Moslems, where the Tashkent Soviet ruled. Two Kazakhs were named to head the Kokand government: Tanyshbayev, and in January, Chokay (due to the former's ill-fated attempt to float a loan to protect the fledgling regime). The fluid nature of the times is shown by Tanyshbayev's many roles as an appointee of the Russian Provisional Government, leading member of the Alash Orda, and first president of the Turkestan Autonomous Government.  

The Third "pan-Kirghiz" Congress met December 5-13, 1917. The congress established the Kazakh-Kirghiz government, to be called Alash. The delegates, who represented all four Steppe oblasts, both Turkestan oblasts with Kazakh-Kirghiz populations, Samarkand, and the Altai, resolved that only a Kazakh-run government could effectively administer Kazakhstan in the crisis of anarchy and famine. The government of Alash Orda would control all "state land" and manage it for the best interests of all residents, with Kazakh needs to be first. Alash would encompass
the oblasts of Uralsk, Akmolinsk, Turgay, Semipalatinsk, Semirechye, and Syr Darya, as well as the Kazakh regions of Transcaspia and the Kirghiz regions of Turkestan. The capital would be in Semipalatinsk.

The congress declared that "Kirghizia" would be an autonomous republic within a federated Russian republic. The government would consist of an executive soviet (sic), as well as oblast committees. It would organize and maintain a Kazakh militia raised from each oblast and supported by central taxation. The government would tax and regulate fiscal affairs. It would also organize local elections to a constituent assembly, draft a constitution, and directly negotiate with its neighbors.

The presidium of this congress was chaired by Kulmanov, and included Bukeykhanov, Dosmukhammedov, Azim Kenisarin, and O. Karasy, with D. Galiev, Seid Kadirbayev, and Dulatov as secretaries. The government of Alash Orda was to be run by a provisional popular soviet with twenty-five members, of whom ten were to be non-Kazakh to ensure minority rights. The congress then came to the issue of declaring autonomy, and here developed a controversy which nearly broke up the conference. The majority of delegates wished to delay announcement until a militia could be formed and negotiations with the Syr Darya and Semirechye Kazakhs for annexation could be conducted. All the nationalists realized that, without military power, the Alash Orda was futile. But the minority, led by Bukeykhanov and including the Uralsk, Bukey Horde, and Syr Darya representatives, demanded immediate announcement. The factions compromised by delaying the actual inauguration of the autonomous government until January, and Bukeykhanov was elected chairman of the new government. For a moment, the dream of Qazaqjylyq seemed to be realized.
The Civil War began in earnest in early January, 1918. The Tashkent Soviet sent Red troops which sacked Kokand in early February; thousands were killed and the Turkestan Autonomous Government was destroyed. Red troops seized much of northern and western Kazakhstan's major towns during January. The Cossack troops of the Ural, Irtysh, and Semirechye Hosts established "White Guard" counter-revolutionary armies to battle the Reds in northern, western, and southeastern Kazakhstan. The Czechoslovak Legion, tsarist POWs being shipped home, seized control of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The anti-Bolshevik Komuch government was created in Samara in June, and the All-Russian Directory in Omsk in September. Armies of Russian Reds, Whites, and Greens struggled against each other, while Kazakh and other Central Asian militias surged on the peripheries. The Kazakh masses, already hard-pressed merely to survive the famine, were forced to pay taxes and requisitions of food and clothing to whoever currently held sway in their region. During 1918, the fortunes of war favored the Whites (Dutov in Western Kazakhstan, Kolchak in Northern). But by 1919, the Bolsheviks were clearly in the ascendancy.

During 1918, the influence of the Ush Zhuz group declined. However, the Kazakhs of Turgay, Uralsk, and Transcaspia who had played a major role in the 1916 revolt now rose up against the Whites and their allies. Dzhangildin, now a Bolshevik himself, was sent to the Steppe to agitate among the fiercely anti-Russian southwestern tribes, the Adai (Adaev) in particular, as well as the Bukey Horde intellectuals who had usually resisted alliance with the Alash Orda nationalists. Like the Ush Zhuz, these intellectuals were not so much pro-Bolshevik as they were
anti-Alash Orda. During the critical years 1916 to 1920, the dynamic cleavages of the Kazakh intellectual elites meant that a great majority of Kazaks supported the moderate or "bourgeoisie" Alash Orda, while small but significant minorities who opposed the Alash Orda for its upper-class leadership (Ush Zhuz), its compromise with Russian liberals over full independence (the southern Kazaks), its individual leaders (the Bukey Horde intellectuals), and its role in the 1916 revolt (the Turgay tribes), allied themselves with the Bolsheviks or otherwise refused cooperation.

In early 1918, the Alash Orda leaders sought to ally themselves with various neighboring groups. Initial contacts with the Kokand Government, itself run by Alash Orda Kazaks, were aborted by the vicious February massacre (which Chokay escaped). The Turkestan Bolsheviks and the Semirechye peasants were violently anti-native and anti-nomad. The Cossacks had long been the neighbors of the Kazaks, but the suppression of the 1916 uprising was too recent. Thus, in March, 1918, in response to an invitation from Moscow, the Alash Orda met with Lenin. 28

The Bolshevik nationality policy has been thoroughly examined elsewhere. 29 In practical terms, the policy during the Civil War was designed to entice the regional native autonomists to ally with the Bolsheviks, promising national "self-determination" in contrast to the reactionary Whites. The Commissariat for Nationalities' Affairs, or Narkomnats, was created in November, 1917, with Stalin as head. It sent Dzhangildin to organize western Kazakhstan, forming a special "Kirghiz" bureau in May. In December, 1917, Lenin and Stalin had issued the famous Appeal to Moslems. Although the Alash Orda rejected
the Bolsheviks for usurping the Provisional Government, in early 1918, the Kazakh nationalists recognized the precariousness of their situation.

Halel Dosmukhammadov and his brother, Muhammadjan, Alash Orda leaders of Uralsk, were dispatched to Moscow in March, 1918, to confer with Bolshevik leaders. They were promised that the Bolsheviks adhered to national self-determination and that Kazakh autonomy was achievable under Communist rule. Halel Gabbasov, one of the top Alash leaders, went to Moscow in mid-April to meet Stalin. Gabbasov broke off the talks shortly, however, and returned to Kazakhstan rejecting Bolshevik rule. By May, the Alash Orda was firmly anti-Bolshevik. By this time, the Bolsheviks had instituted mass conscription and their nationalization decrees, both of which caused great hostility among the Central Asians and cemented their opposition to the Communist regime.

In May, the so-called White Congress witnessed formal military alliance between the Ural Cossacks and the Alash Orda; on May 18, the first Kazakh militia fought along side the Semipalatinsk Cossacks; by June, Cossack-trained Kazakh units were fighting in Semipalatinsk, Akmolinsk, Semirechye, and Turgay (Uralsk being firmly in Red hands); in early August, a formal military alliance was created by Bukeykhanov and Dutov. The great vastness of Kazakhstan hindered Alash Orda communications from the start, so that in practical terms the Kazakh government had two foci, the "Alash Orda center" in Semipalatinsk, under Bukeykhanov, and the "Alash Orda West," located in the Uralsk town of Dzhambeity, which was under Halel Dosmukhammadov. Thus, during the Civil War, the central (or
Eastern) Alash Orda allied itself with the Siberian government in Omsk, while the Western cooperated with the Ural Cossacks and the Komuch government. The Alash Orda was forced to ally with the Whites despite their blatant rejection of autonomy for non-Russians.

In September, 1918, the Alash Orda joined with the Komuch and other regional governments in a conference in Ufa to form an anti-Bolshevik provisional government. The conference formulated a future federative Russian republic composed of autonomous regions, and rejected the Bolshevik regime. The delegates elected a presidium of twenty, with six Turkic leaders among them, including Chokay (representing Turkestan) and Dosmukhammedov (Alash Orda West). The declaration was eventually signed by Kazakh, Bashkir, and Tatar leaders. Kazakh signatories were Bukeykhanov, Chokay, A. Alimbekov, G. Alibekov, Beremzhanov, and Baytursun. Although the Komuch failed, the following speech by Bukeykhanov indicates how the moderate Alash Ordists still hoped to create a federative Russian republic:

Citizens! I have been sent here by the Moslem members of the Consituent Assembly, by the governments of the autonomous regions of Turkestan, Bashkurdistan, Alash-Orda, and by the National Administration of Turko-Tatars of the Interior of Russia and Siberia. Until the February Revolution, Russia was an autocracy. The February Revolution promised to give us a government by the people . . . and to realize the age-old ideals of the Russian intelligentsia. The non-Russian peoples of old autocratic Russia joined the democratic part of Russia, republican Russia, in the hope that the All-Russian Constituent Assembly would establish popular government . . . , but our hopes . . . were defeated. Power was seized by demagogues who wished to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat . . . [but actually] introduced a reign of anarchy, disruption, and the absence of all government. It was under such conditions that regional governments began to appear. These governments were absolutely necessary; without them it would have been
impossible to govern the region liberated from the Bolsheviks. There are those who ascribe the organization of regional governments to separatism, but they are wrong. The organizations in the name of which I now speak do not adhere to the separatist point of view. They consider themselves to be parts of an undivided Russia and believe that the autonomous regions could have played no role in the concert of Powers had they formed independent states. We are at one with a democratic federated Russian republic . . . and shall go hand in hand with the Russian people to create a great and happy Russia.  

Despite such expressions of fealty, the Alash Orda was not treated as an equal partner by the Siberian anti-Bolshevik government in Omsk. The growing disarray among the anti-Bolshevik forces had led Admiral Kolchak to overthrow the Directory in November, 1918. The White leaders regarded the national autonomists as distractions in their goal to revive the Empire. On Nov. 4, the Kolchak government ordered the suppression of Alash Orda and commanded its militia units to subordinate themselves to the White Guards. The increasing hostility of the Whites to the nationalists led to the situation described by Baytursun in the quote at the beginning of this chapter. By late 1918 and during early 1919, the Kazakh nationalists, witnessing the military decline of the Whites, had turned again towards compromise with the Bolsheviks.

The height of the Alash Orda government, then, was 1918. Soviet historiography has long vilified the Alash Orda group as reactionary feudal-patriarchs and bourgeois nationalists, and documentary materials are virtually unavailable. Olcott, who had access to some archival Alash materials, provides the details of three Alash Orda government sessions in 1918.

The session of June 11-24 was concerned primarily with the land question; it issued the Statute "On Provisional Land Utilization on the
Territory of the Autonomous Alash." All Kazakh lands that had been seized for Russian colonization but not allotted were to be returned to the original owners; disputes over land between Kazakhs would be settled by aksakals, between Kazakhs and Russians by elected zemstvo committees. Both Russians and Kazakhs who lost lands were to receive compensation from the government. It declared private ownership of land but state control of water resources, it urge. This session also nullified all Soviet decrees and stipulated treason trials for Kazakh Bolsheviks.

The session of July 24, 1918, concentrated on regularizing local government (with uezd soviets), forming the militias (thirty horsemen per volost), and taxation. Some indication of the support of the Kazakh masses for the Alash Orda is revealed by the 3 million rubles which Alash Orda collected in Akmolinsk alone, in 1918. The class differences of Kazakh leaders emerged in the political battle between G. Alibekov and Dosmukhammedov over graduated versus flat taxation. Dosmukhammedov was the victor (each Kazakh household was to pay a flat 100 rubles per year); thereupon, Alibekov and his group, called Ak Zhol (White Road), left the Alash Orda to join the Bolsheviks.

The session of September 11, meeting in Ufa, formally recognized the East-West split of the Alash government. The Alash Orda West was to be led by the Dosmukhammedos, Kulmanov, Turmuhammadov, and two Russians; its sphere was Uralsk, Turgai, the Bukey Horde, Mangyshlak (northern Transcaspia), and Aktyubinsk. The central Alash Orda would retain basic control.

In December, 1918, disaffection for the Whites permeated the Kazakh
leadership and ranks. The Alash Orda West had to suppress a pro-Bolshevik protest on Dec. 7. At the same time, the Bashkir nationalists led by Vakhitov were abandoning Kolchak, and they met with Alash Ordists to discuss joining the Bolsheviks. The willingness of the Kazakhs to go over to the Reds by middle 1919 contrasts with the situation a year earlier: in March, 1918, Dzhangildin had convened a "Turgay Congress of Soviets" at which only one (then, three) of the delegates was a Bolshevik.

In January, 1919, General M. V. Frunze, commander of the Red armies of the Eastern Front, called on the Kazakh nationalists to join the Bolsheviks, and he promised a general amnesty. In February, the Bashkir nationalists had gone over to the Communists, and their troops were taken into the Red Army. Dzhangildin managed to convene a meeting with an Alash Orda delegation in March; using the Bashkir example, he managed to convince Baytursun himself that by joining the Bolsheviks, the Alash Orda would be serving the best interests of the desperate Kazakhs.

On March 22, Dzhangildin telegraphed Moscow: "Unification is now completed of all the laboring Kirghiz [Kazakh] people under the Red banner of the worker-peasant government."

In June, Baytursun met with Lenin, Stalin, and Dzhangildin in Moscow. As a result of their discussions, Lenin signed the order creating the "Kirghiz Revolutionary Committee," or Kirrevkom, on July 10. This embryonic Soviet Kazakh government was chaired by the Russian S. Pestkowski, with principal Russian member S. Dimanshtein, ally of Stalin on the Narkomnats; Kazakh members, though actually mere figureheads,
included Dzhangildin as well as Seitkali Mendeshev (Mindash-uli), A. Aitiev, A. Kulatov, and A. Adveev. The authority of Kirrevkom held only in the so-called Inner Side (Bukey Horde), though it claimed to control the entire Steppe region. The creation of Kirrevkom in mid-1919 signalled the end of Alash Orda.

The rapid retreat of White forces in latter 1919 allowed the direct intervention of Moscow in Central Asia for the first time in two years. The so-called Turkestan Commission (Turkommisyya), created in October, reached Tashkent in November.\textsuperscript{45} Composed of Bolshevik Russians like Frunze, V. Kuibyshev, Ia. Rudzutak, and F. Goloshchekin, the Turkommisyya included the Kazakh Communist Turar Ryskulov, who was head of the Musburo or Moslem Bureau. Ryskulov's role in the struggle of the Turkestanis to create a Turkic Communist Party and Turkestan Soviet Republic is properly outside the scope of the purely Kazakh nationalism of Qazaqjylyq.\textsuperscript{46} However, Ryskulov was one of the most important Kazakhs of the entire revolutionary era, and his contribution to the development of "Moslem National Communism" was significant in both Communist and Third-World history. Regarding the Alash Orda nationalists, Ryskulov represented those southern Kazakhs who were both pan-Turkic and socially radicalized.

By late 1919, the Red forces were mopping up resistance in Siberia and the Steppe; the last battles for Semirechye were won by early 1920. The Alash Orda government, always thinly-spread and never well-defended, more or less disintegrated. The journal Qazaq had disappeared in 1918, its Orenburg presses destroyed; Sary Arqa, which had carried on for Qazaq, also was discontinued.\textsuperscript{47} Most of the nationalist writers
joined the staffs of various early Bolshevik papers, such as Durystyk zholy (Path of Truth, Urda), Ushqyn (The Spark, Orenburg), Qazaq tili (Kazakh Word, Semipalatinsk), and Izvestiia Kirgizskogo kraia (News of the Kirghiz Region). The last anti-Bolshevik Kazakh nationalist paper was Qazaq sozu (Voice of the Kazakhs), by A. Bulatov, which began in Semipalatinsk and moved eastward with Kolchak's retreat, from September 1919.

By the fall of 1919, the Communists were sufficiently certain of their hold on Kazakhstan to convene a Kirrevkom conference to prepare for a constituent congress of Kazakh soviets. The Bolsheviks sought to deny suffrage to all clergy, former tsarist and Alash officials, bais, and village elders. Baytursunov was able to battle this plan, which he declared amounted to "depriving the Kazakh people of its representation, and suspension of its rights to express its own will through its most capable representatives."48

The majority of Alash Ordists crossed to the Communist side in late 1919 and early 1920.49 The Military Revolutionary Soviet (Revvoensovet) declared a general amnesty for Alash Orda on November 5, and the Alash leaders formally recognized the Communist Party on November 10. A conference between the Alash Orda and Revvoensovet took place December 10-24 in Orenburg, during which the Kazakh nationalists negotiated their surrender to the Communists.

The Alash Orda officially ended at the second conference, held January 11-20.50 Kirrevkom liquidated the Alash and disbanded its militia. Baytursun was placed on the committee, while Tanyshbayev was
made commissar of Semirechye, and Bukeykhanov of Turgay. The apparent harmony of this momentous change, however, was disturbed by Pestkowski's insistence on Russian domination and his antagonism to the nationalists-turned-Communists. Baytursun, along with the former Social Democrat Sedelnikov, a Russian, sought to create a locally-controlled Communist apparatus in Central Asia, to "give effective and real guarantee for the self-determination of the peoples of the Kazakh, Bashkir, and Turkestan autonomous republics." Baytursun and Sedelnikov carried their arguments with Kirrevkom all the way to Lenin, with secret telegrams and personal visits, in the spring of 1920. Although their efforts failed, they encouraged the young Kazakh Communists with their example; as a Kazakh Orgburo (Organizational Bureau) report stated, "Sedelnikov has become the leader of Kazakh nationalism and is conducting an open chauvinistic fight against Communism."52

During the spring and summer, while the nationalists discovered what their role in the Communist government was to be, leading Kazakh, Bashkir, Tatar, and Turkestan-i nationalists may have met clandestinely to form the secret organization Ittihad ve Taraqqi (Union and Progress).53 Although very little is known of this group, which could be a Soviet fabrication, it apparently sought to maintain an anti-Russian, anti-Communist movement alive within the Party itself. Baytursun and Bukeykhanov were reputed members, as well as Ryskulov.

On August 26, 1920, the "Kirghiz" Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was formed, within the RSFSR.54 At this time, Baytursun and Sedelnikov were removed from Kirrevkom. The capital was Orenburg, and
the KASSR included the former tsarist regions of Uralsk, Turgay, the Inner Side (Bokey Horde), Mangyshlak, Akmolinsk, and Semipalatinsk. Although the Kazakhs of Syr Darya and Semirechye agitated for inclusion in the new autonomous republic, they remained part of the Turkestan SSR (created in April, 1920).

The last major role of Alash Orda occurred at the constituent assembly which met in Orenburg on October 4-12, 1920. Over 700 delegates participated, with some 270 eligible to vote (including 197 Communists). The Turgay and Uralsk representatives were strongly Communist, recalling the roles of Amangeldy and Dzhangildin, and formed over half the delegation. The other half grouped around the Alash Orda leaders Baytursun and Bukeykhanov. The congress banned further Russian colonization, it elected a central committee and Council of People's Commissars, and it published the manifesto of the Kazakh constitution, "Declaration of the Rights of the Laboring Kirghiz (Kazakh) Autonomous Republic." By this time, the Kazakh nationalists were all too aware that their position was precarious. However, they had joined the new regime out of the deep desire to protect the Kazakh people as best they could, and despite their failure to create a true autonomous republic, they did not abandon working for the Kazakh cause from within the system.

A delegate to the constituent congress, A. Nakhimjan, one of the young new Kazakh Communists, recalls the words of Togzhanov, quoted earlier, when he described the assembly in his memoirs thusly:

We came to the first all-Kirghiz (Kazakh) congress . . . united with the Alash Orda intellectuals, many of whom, under Baytursunov, were delegates. Hence, it is not surprising that we joined the [Communist] party still dominated by an Alash
Orda ideology . . . Before going to the [Communist] faction's conference, we usually received directions from our Alash Orda leaders, and after the faction gathering we would report what had happened at the meeting of RKP(b).56

The Kazakh nationalists between 1917 and 1920 were thrust too quickly into the revolutionary world, while the Kazakh people were too desperate to survive the great famine to participate in determining their own future. The Alash Orda moderates had struggled to conceptualize and formalize the first modern Kazakh national government, and they succeeded much better than one might have supposed beforehand. A nation-state is created not just by intellectuals, however, and the twin hammer-blows of the 1916 uprising and the great famine deprived them of the full support of the several million Kazakhs they represented. The dream of Qazaqjylyq had required adequate time and education, as well as full bellies the Kazakhs needed full minds. Anything was possible, in the revolutionary flush of 1917; it seemed probable, in the days of 1918 when the Alash Orda ran the country; but it faded with the military decline of 1919, and by 1920, it was a half-forgotten dream amidst the sad, grim necessity of submitting, yet again, to the Russian masters.
CONCLUSION

Settlement is collectivization. Settlement is the liquidation of the bai semi-feudals. Settlement is the destruction of tribal attitudes... Settlement is simultaneously the question of socialist construction and the approach of socialism, of the socialist reconstruction of the Kazakh mass without divisions by nationality under the leadership of the vanguard of the proletariat and the Communist party.

--Goloshchekin, 1932.¹

Those who used to be slaves and serfs,
Have now been made heroes by the Turksib
[Turkestan-Siberian Railroad].
The simple shepherd, tempered by work,
Has now become dispatcher of the train,
And thus gained batyr-like power.
He used to herd the sheep, and beat them
with the whip,
But now with steady hand,
He draws the diagram of railroad traffic.

--Anonymous, c. 1930.²

Modern Kazakh nationalism blossomed and withered in one generation. The Kazakh intellectual nationalists arose from the modernization of Kazakhstan under Russian rule, they matured swiftly under difficult conditions, and they were destroyed by the Sovietization of Kazakhstan.³

Nearly every single significant Kazakh nationalist and most of the early Kazakh Communists were purged from the mid-1920s to 1938. In the same
period, the regime destroyed the Kazakh traditional elite with a series of "reforms" intended as a cultural revolution. Finally, just as the Kazakh people were recovering from a decade of famine, civil war, and desperation, with a resurgence of (at least partial) nomadism, the Soviets collectivized them with a tremendous toll of Kazakh life. By 1938, the Kazakh nation had been broken on the Soviet Union's wheel of modernization.

When the Communist Party created the "Kirghiz" ASSR in 1920, they made Orenburg the capital. By 1924, the republic had incorporated Syr Darya and Semirechye, and the capital was moved to Kzyl-Orda ("Red Horde;" formerly Perovsk); Orenburg and Omsk were transferred to the RSFSR. In April, 1925, the First Kazakh Congress of Soviets officially changed the designation "Kirghiz" to "Kazakh;" for the first time in their Russian history, the Kazakhs could use their own name. In mid-1929, Alma Ata (formerly Vernyi, in Semirechye) became the capital of Kazakhstan. Finally, with the "Stalin constitution" of 1936, Kazakhstan was elevated to full republic status, becoming the second largest SSR in the Soviet Union.

During this period, the Alash Orda nationalists struggled within the Party and state organizations to preserve Kazakh culture. The famine was exceptionally severe in 1921 in Kazakhstan, where an estimated one million people starved to death; hundreds of thousands of destitute Kazakhs lined railways hoping for food-aid, while the estimated herd-size in 1923 was only one-third of the pre-1916 level. The regime had no choice but to allow the New Economic Policy in Kazakhstan, given its dire condition,
while the (ex-)nationalists had to accommodate the Party's control to ensure as much aid was given the people as could be. The masses, of course, could hardly resist or participate in any way with the changes.

In the early 1920s, the government instituted a series of land-reforms that redistributed over one million acres in southern Kazakhstan; however, the Kazakh nationalists suffered a bitter defeat when Lenin backed the Russian Communists in not allowing the return of lands seized before 1918. In mid-1921, the Party purged many ex-Alash Ordists, though their leaders remained, isolated; in early 1922, Baytursun was dismissed from his post as minister of education (recalling his trouble as a teacher in the tsarist era). Within the Communist party, the pro-nationalists ('rights') and the 'lefts' debated the role of the Alash Ordists; by 1923, they were disgraced, and their opposition to Soviet policies was labelled "national deviationism." By 1926, all the Alash Ordists were removed from government and party; Bukeykhanov was publicly condemned at this time.\(^5\) At the same time, however, the Soviets implemented their "nativization" policy (korenizatsiya) to greatly increase the role of Kazakhs in the Party and state.

In the mid-1920s, the economic situation of the Kazakh masses slowly recovered, so that their herds had returned to prewar levels by 1927.\(^6\) The unforeseen result of this recovery was the resurgence of the Kazakh traditional leadership (mullahs, bais, aksakals) to authority among the masses. The first Soviet elections in Kazakhstan, in early 1921, and despite disenfranchisement of the "ruling class," the Party suffered humiliation as the Kazakhs placed their non-Communist traditional leaders
over the Communist candidates. The results of the 1925-26 elections were even worse (88% of those elected being herders or farmers, not poor). By 1927, rather than improved, the situation was worse, so that the elections of '28 were postponed; and a popular slogan of the 1930 campaigns was "Soviets without Communists." Clearly, the traditional leaders were challenging the regime.

The atomization of Kazakh society in the early 1900s, with the breakdown of larger Kazakh authority and the growth of "aul-communes" that were small groups much more associational than consanguineal, had promoted the local leader to great importance. With the recovery of Kazakh nomadic herding, the traditional leaders were the primary obstacle to Soviet control of the common Kazakh. Therefore, the regime launched various confiscation, education, and cultural campaigns designed to eliminate traditional authority. The Koshchi (Poorman) Union was created, Red Caravans and Red Yurts travelled the Steppe with teachers and doctors, a mass literacy campaign was begun, and several waves of livestock-confiscations emanated. Perhaps the least-known but most wrenching Soviet effort was the so-called khudzhum ("assault, storm") of the late '20s; this Soviet effort to crash-emancipate Central Asian Moslem women created a tremendous Islamic male backlash that resulted in the killing of thousands of women and their male supporters. Though many individuals suffered, these campaigns all failed to liquidate the traditional leadership (e.g., the Koshchi Union was controlled by local leaders, becoming in effect anti-Communist; and the repeated waves of purges of Kazakhs in the Party showed how the traditionalists were even becoming "Communist" to preserve their authority). Even the policy of
"Sovietization of the Kazakh Aul," a unique Soviet effort to substitute loyalty to the regime for loyalty to the aul, failed, though in its development, the Party debated and rejected the Kazakh argument (by both right and left) that Kazakh nomadism was different from settled agriculture and ought to be treated as such.\(^\text{10}\)

Ultimately, the Soviets were only able to eliminate the traditional leaders by destroying their very society. The rejection of the unicity of Kazakh culture was ominous. In 1929, the collectivization of Kazakhstan was begun. Of all the tragedies of Kazakh history, this is the most awful. Simple statistics overwhelm. Over one million Kazakhs died—in a population of perhaps four million. Having barely recovered by the late '20s, Kazakh nomadic socio-economy was shattered; the traditional elites and the stubborn masses were broken.

The details of the collectivization drive of 1929-38 in Kazakhstan are related at length by Olcott and Robert Conquest, as well as many others.\(^\text{11}\) The following facts are provided only to dramatize that story. The Soviets had undertaken numerous livestock, grain, and other requisitions and confiscations from early 1918 onward. The Kazakh herdsmen therefore responded immediately and drastically to the last, greatest assault. The Kazakhs were rounded up and compressed, herds and all, into hastily-erected collectives in the Steppe. Rapidly, the overcrowded animals perished as the scantly pasturage disappeared. The Kazakhs lived—and died—by the fate of their herds. Those who resisted—and such resistance was widespread, violent, and organized—were killed. Special OGPU/NKVD forces operated in the Steppe as late as 1938.\(^\text{12}\)
The Kazakhs fled in vast numbers, tens to hundreds of thousands to China and Turkestan; many perished of hardship. Kazakh herdsmen slaughtered their animals wholesale to keep them from the confiscators and collective camps. Considering the special, loving relationship between the Kazakh people and their animals, one can only imagine the suffering this caused them. By 1930 only, one-third of the Kazakh herds had been killed (meaning ten million sheep, over two million cattle); though the slaughtering abated after 1932, herd size did not recover until the 1960s. The number of Kazakh households fell from over 1,200,000 in 1929 to 565,000 in 1936; 400,000 households were settled from 1930 to 1937 (the remainder were wholly nomadic families wandering the central Kazakh Steppe); the seven-year age group was but 40% in size of the 11-year olds, and could have been 160% without this tragedy. Of those Kazakhs who were "settled" by 1933, over 100,000 were otkochevniki, "former nomads" who had fled the collectives to wander the Steppe in utter destitution; this return of Kazakhs to the Steppe to escape civilization recalls the very origins of the Kazakhs as "free riders of the Steppe"--and they can be regarded as the ironic end of Qazaqjylyq.

The period 1928-1938 encompassed the destruction of the Kazakh masses, the traditional leadership, and the nationalists. Whereas collectivization itself physically liquidated the former two, the latter were destroyed in a series of purges, especially in the years 1928, 1932, and 1937-38. The failures of the '20s campaigns and the persistence of Kazakh nomadism, as well as Stalin's attacks on "national deviationists" and especially on Moslem national Communism, provided the regime with the excuse to eliminate the nationalists once and for all.
The following list of executed Kazakh leaders is merely partial, to provide the end of the story of their lives and struggle: Ahmed Baytursun, killed in 1937 (aged 64); Ali Khan Bukeykhanov, 1932 (63); Mir Jaqib Dulatov, 1937 (52); Turar Ryskulov, 1937 (43); Saken Seifullin, 1939 (45); Magzhan Zhumabayev, 1937 (43). Hundreds of others, the first Kazakh Bolsheviks and earliest Communist cadres, were purged during this period also. Thus, by 1939, the Soviet regime had thoroughly crushed all Kazakh opposition—Kazakh herdsmen, aksakals, and nationalists all met the same violent fate.

Modern Kazakh nationalism was the development of Kazakh nomad nationalism under the influence of modernization. The "free riders of the Steppe" from beginning to end, traditional or modern, clerical or secular, northern or southern, moderate or radical, always identified themselves as a proud, unique nation. The nature of Kazakh nationalism is constant; only its manifestation is transitory. Kazakh nomadism itself has survived in the so-called "roving economy" (otgon or otgonnoye zhivotnovodstvo), though no longer, of course, free. And recent unrest in Kazakhstan (student riots in 1987 in Alma Ata, anti-minority violence in 1989 in Mangyshlak) indicate that nationalism still exists also.

Kazakh history is symbolic of the history of pastoral nomadism in the modern world. The inexorable mutation of society by modernization, in the case of the Kazakhs, has meant denomadization but not annihilation. The dream of Qazaqjylyq goes on.

"The Steppe is cruel, and Heaven is far." 

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *
APPENDIX
Wooded Steppe
Steppe
Semi-Desert
Desert

NATURAL VEGETATION

Figure 2.

THE KAZAKH HORDES

Figure 3.

126
THE KAZAKH KHANATE

1468-80 Janibek (son of Barak, Uzbek Khan)
1480-88 Kirai (brother of Janibek): first elected Khan
1488-1511 Buyunduk (son of Kirai)
1511-23 Qasym (greatest Khan)
1523-33 Tahir (Qasym's nephew)
1533-38 Buidashe
1538-80 Haq Nazar (son of Qasym): formation of Three Zhuzes (Hordes)
1580-82 Shigai (Tahir's nephew)
1586-98 Taulkel (son of Shigai)
1598-1628 Esim
1643-80 (?) Jangir (Esim's son)
1680-1711 Tauke (Jangir's son): codified Kazakh law (Jhety Jharga)
1718-49 Abulkhair (Abu'l Khayr): Middle and Little Hordes only
1723 aqtaban shubirindi
1731 Abulkhair's oath to Russian tsar: end of independent Khanate
1732 Middle Horde's Semeke's oath to tsar
1740-81 Sultan Ablai (Middle Horde): last great Kazakh Khan
1740 Ablai's oath to tsar (resurgent Dzhungar threat)
1756/59 Great Horde claimed by Manchu China (occupying Dzhungaria)
1801 Bukey or Inner Horde created by Tsar Paul
1808 Kokand conquers Tashkent and western Great Horde
1818, 1824, 1847 remaining Great Horde leaders' oaths to tsar
1822 Middle Horde Khanate abolished
1824 Little Horde Khanate abolished
1837-48 Kenesary Kasymov's revolt: last pan-Khanate independence revolt
1845 Inner Horde Khanate abolished
1848 Great Horde Khanate abolished
1865 Russian conquest of Tashkent: Russian rule of all Kazakhs
1868-70 last 19th-century Kazakh mass uprisings, against Steppe Statute

Figure 4.

127
Figure 5.
Figure 6.
Figure 7.
### POPULATION STATISTICS FOR TSARIST KAZAKHSTAN, 1897-1916*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Kazakhs</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ural'sk Oblast</th>
<th>Turgai Oblast</th>
<th>Akmolinsk Obl.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>3,312</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>4,413</td>
<td>460 (164)</td>
<td>411 (35)</td>
<td>427 (226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>3,564</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>4,551</td>
<td>477 (268)</td>
<td>440 (120)</td>
<td>488 (374)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>3,768</td>
<td>1,868</td>
<td>6,471</td>
<td>480 (278)</td>
<td>507 (305)</td>
<td>527 (765)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Steppe Oblasts**
- By Uezd:
  - Irgiz: 97 1
  - Atbasar: 117 4
  - Lepsinak: 156 22
  - Chimkent: 225 6
  - Chimgan: 2577

**Ural'sk Oblast**
- By Uezd:
  - Irbishchenk: 77 165
  - Pavlodar: 104 58
  - Kopal: 139 78
  - Perovsk: 225 6

**Turgai Oblast**
- By Uezd:
  - Qur'oyev: 151 126
  - Omsk: 133 70
  - Dzharkent: 75 11
  - Pavlodar: 104 58

**Akmolinsk Oblast**
- By Uezd:
  - Temir: 97 1
  - Kystanay: 110 15
  - Akmolinsk: 154 200

**Semirechye Oblast**
- By Uezd:
  - Ust-Kamengorsk: 156 22
  - Zaisan: 151 35

**Semipalatinsk Oblast**
- By Uezd:
  - Pishpek: 139 78
  - Aulie-Ata: 225 6

**Total Kazakhs in Russia or USSR**
- 1897: 3.8 million
- 1911: 4.0 million
- 1926: 4.0 million
- 1939: 3.1 million
- 1959: 3.6 million
- 1970: 5.2 million
- 1979: 6.6 million

*Based on Demko, Russian Colonization, & Krader, Peoples (statistics passim). The statistics do not include Kazakhs of Astrakhan, Transcaspia, Orenburg, Siberia, or China. Semirechye stats, exclude Przevalsk uezd; Syr Darya excludes Tashkent & Petro-Alexandrovsk uezds. All numbers in thousands. Totals include Kazakhs, Russians (incl. Ukrainians & Byelorussians), and "others" (Dungans, Uzbeks, Jews, Tatars, etc.)*

Figure 8.
The Impact of Russian Colonization, 1896–1916

Figure 9.
THE REVOLT OF 1916

- Main areas of revolt
- Lesser Disturbances

Figure 10.
Figure 11 PORTRAITS
ALI KHAN NURMAGOMET-ULI BUKEYKHANOV
(1869-1932)
NOTES

Introduction


Chapter One: The Free Horsemen of the Steppe


3. The main sources on geography are listed in the Bibliography.


5. In Russian, Tselinnyi krai.
6. The central uplands are described in Sergei P. Suslov, The Physical Geography of Asiatic Russia (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1961), 175ff.


11. Khazanov, Nomads, pp. 86-88, 94-95, argues persuasively that the climatic change recorded in the 1000s B.C. was primarily responsible.

12. Khazanov, an expert on the Scythians, uses this fact of 'pan-historical' similarity to prove that pastoral nomadism is basically stagnant economically and culturally (pp. 69ff).

13. The numerous sources on pastoral nomadism, especially of the Kazakhs, detail this dependence at length; e.g., Khazanov, Nomads, p. 38. Also, one finds ample descriptions of Kazakh diet in various travellers' works; e.g., E. Nelson Fell, Russian and Nomad: Tales of the Kirghiz Steppes (New York: Duffield, 1916), pp. 49-51.

14. Khazanov, Nomads, pp. 73-4, notes that 19th century Kazakhstan suffered major dzhuts, with losses of 50-75% of the herds, every 6-11 years, and local dzhuts annually, and quotes the Mongol proverb, "One jute [dzhut] suffices the rich man, and one arrow the hero." Richard A. Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917: A Study in Colonial Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), p. 154, mentions the disastrous winters of 1879-80 and 1891-92, in Turgay oblast; in the first, one-half of the 3½ million livestock perished, and in the second, 47% of the horses, 32% of the cattle, sheep, and goats, and 22% of the camels were lost. Olcott, The Kazakhs, p. 92, states that the 1879-80 winter was called "The Great Jut," and besides the Turgay losses, notes that 800,000 cattle died in Akmolinsk oblast. Also cf. P. Alampiev, Soviet Kazakhstan (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958), p. 30; Geoffrey Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia (New York: Praeger, p. 34.


Chapter Two: Kazakhstan and the Tsars

1. Major historical sources are listed in the Bibliography.


8. An example of this is the custom of saun. As part of the duties
of wealthier Kazakhs to support poorer kinsmen, saun was the free loan of milk-animals for sustenance. Eventually, the recipient was expected to repay the loan with labor. Soviet critics thus portrayed saun as a system of economic exploitation. E.g., Central Asian Review, "Social Structure and Customs," p. 7.


10. Ethnographic sources are listed under "Nomadism" in the Bibliography.

11. Orda and zhuz are discussed in Hudson, Kazak Social Structure, pp. 14-15; Krader, Peoples of Central Asia, p. 92; and Hambly, ed., Central Asia, p. 143; and Olcott, Kazakhs, pp. 10-11.


15. Lattimore, High Tartary, p. 113; Hambly, ed., Central Asia, p. 144. The Dzungarian population, perhaps 600,000, was literally slaughtered by the Manchus, in 1759; only a few escaped. (Zlatkin, Dzungaria, 29-30.


22. Bacon, Central Asians, pp. 92-102; Hudson, Kazak, p. 16.

Chapter Three: Russification as Modernization


4. Demko, Colonization, p. 121.


7. Statistics from Demko, Colonization, 141.


10. Description of such relationships abound in the ethnographic sources; Lattimore witnessed it in the remote areas of Sinkiang he visited in the 1920s-30s (Tartary, pp. 241, 244; Pivot, pp. 130, 156).

11. Demko, Colonization, p. 179. In the four northern oblasts in 1916, the herds totalled 2,200,000 horses, 2,400,000 cattle, 500,000 camels, and 9,200,000 sheep and goats (Demko, Appendix Table H, p. 223).


13. Ibid. p. 93

14. Soviet scholars attributed the change in land tenure to the usurpation by the "feudal nobility" of the land for their own gain; however, land ownership among the Kazakhs was a symptom of modernization and Russian economics, not of Marxist feudalism.


Chapter Four: Nomad Nationalism, 1800-1900

1. Quoted in Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 65.

2. Quoted in Winner, Oral Art and Literature, p. 92.


5. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

6. The non-Western and Islamic world was growing active elsewhere at this time; the Young Turks movement in the Ottoman Empire is an example.


12. Ibid., p. 97.

13. Ibid., p. 91.


15. Ibid., p. 153.


24. Winner, Oral Art and Literature, p. 90.

25. Ibid., pp. 90-1. Shortambay's dates are sometimes given as 1808-1871.


33. Quoted in Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism, pp. 61-2.


35. Winner, Oral Art and Literature, p. 110.

37. Allworth, "Intellectual," p. 388: in the '30s, the Soviets called Abay "semi-feudal," by the '60s he was the "greatest 'progressive' poet of 19th-century Kazakhstan."

38. Winner, Oral Art and Literature, p. 112.


40. Winner, Oral Art and Literature, p. 114.


42. I use this term the same way as Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, to encompass all Kazakh writing but especially that commenting on the contemporary situation (including fiction).


46. Ibid., pp. 92, 94, 108.


Chapter Five: Qazaq Nationalism, 1900-1916


2. Quoted in Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 118.


4. Olcott, Kazakhs, pp. 108-9; Sarkisyanz, p. 255.


10. Ibid., pp. 111-12; Olcott, "National Identity," p. 293.

11. Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 112.


13. Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 112.


Tanyshbayev is similarly difficult, appearing as Tynyshbay-ulii, Tyneshpaev, Tanyshbaev; biographical sources include Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Kazakh Press," pp. 160-1; d'Encausse, pp. 213, 217, 222, 226-7; Olcott, Kazakhs, pp. 131-2, 144, 147, 155, 294n; Pierce, Russian Central Asia, pp. 257, 287; Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism, pp. 65-68, 154, 212, 227, 235; Sokol, Revolt of 1916, pp. 103, 105, 117, 123.

19. Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 112.
20. Pierce, Russian Central Asia, pp. 255-56; Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism, pp. 41-51.
24. Pierce, Russian Central Asia, p. 256.
26. Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 113; Pierce, Russian Central Asia, p. 257; Levin, Second Duma, p. 190.
27. This is also known as "the 3rd of June state revolution."
28. Pierce, Russian Central Asia, p. 258.
29. Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 113.
32. Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Kazakh Press," is the single best treatment of the subject; Olcott, Kazakhs, passim, focuses on the most important journals in depth.


45. Ibid., p. 124.


49. Allworth, "Literature," p. 410; Bennigsen and Lemercier-
Quelquejay, p. 154n; Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslim National Communism, pp. 192-3; Winner, Oral Art and Literature, p. 131.

50. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism, p. 65.

51. Quoted in Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 218.


53. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism, p. 64.

54. Allworth, Central Asian Publishing, pp. 13, 22. Over 200 of these titles were religious in character (Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 104).


56. Ibid., pp. 29-30.


64. Quoted in Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 116.


69. Quoted in Olcott, Kazakhs, pp. 116-7.

70. That is, Kazakhs referred to themselves orally as Kazakhs; the intellectuals used both Kirghiz and Kazakh in print, the former being most common, no doubt due to its Russian official status.


74. Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslim National Communism, pp. 9, 221; Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism, pp. 60-1.

75. An example of this recognition is the line from DulaBotov's "Kazakh Lands," quoted from Allworth, "Literature," pp. 411-12: "But we accepted citizenship without giving up our land, / We hoped to live under the shelter of justice."

Chapter Six: Steppe Aflame: Revolt of 1916


2. Quoted in Winner, Oral Art and Literature, p. 149.

3. The essential work on the revolt is Sokol's Revolt of 1916; See also d'Encausse, "Fall," pp. 208-13; Olcott, Kazakhs, pp. 118-26; Pierce, Russian Central Asia, pp. 271-96; Wheeler, Modern History,


5. Statistical sources include Krader, *Peoples*, which has extensive Appendices, and Demko, *Russian Colonization*, also replete with data throughout. It should be noted that, where the data and the Kazakhs are concerned, "Russian" broadly refers to all European Slavs; Kazakhstan was heavily settled by Ukrainian peasants and Cossacks.


9. Ibid., pp. 173, 98.


17. Many peasants had draft exemptions for taking resettlement land, so there were many peasants in Semirechye to participate in the violence.


27. This account is based on relevant passages (cited above in note no. 3) in Olcott, Pierce, Sokol, Zenkovsky, and d'Encausse.


31. Ibid.


33. Ibid., p. 123.


40. Ibid., p. 103.
41. Ibid., pp. 103-04; Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism*, p. 132.
46. Ibid., p. 105.
49. This summary is based closely on Sokol, *Revolt of 1916*, pp. 107-08.
53. Ibid., p. 160; Sokol, *Revolt of 1916*, p. 70.
55. Ibid., p. 110.
56. Ibid., p. 171.
57. Ibid., pp. 160-61.
Chapter Seven: Revolutionary Nationalism, 1917-1920


2. H. H. Fisher, The Famine in Soviet Russia, 1919-23: The Operations of the American Relief Administration (New York: Macmillan, 1927), although containing little on the Kazakhs, indicates the vast scale of the famine following the Civil War. Also, see Olcott, Kazakhs, pp. 149-50.

3. Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 130.


7. Pierce, Russian Central Asia, pp. 300-01; Golder, ed., Documents, p. 419.

8. Pierce, Russian Central Asia, pp. 299-300; Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, Islam, pp. 72, 84; d'Encausse, "Fall," p. 216; Park, Bolshevism, pp. 12-14; Pipes, Formation, p. 91.


21. Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Kazakh Press," p. 161; Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism, pp. 212-13; Pipes, Formation, p. 85; Hambly, ed., Central Asia, pp. 230-1. Park, Bolshevism, p. 14, quotes the following resolution from a 1917 Vernyi peasants' congress: "National antagonism ought to be overcome through agitation. In those localities where a complete reconciliation cannot be achieved the Kirghiz population must be isolated from the Russian. If necessary, recourse must be had to the removal of the Kirghiz to other localities. In order to prevent a possible collision . . . the staff of the bodyguards, companies, and Cossack troops must be augmented and outposts established in the passes."

22. Olcott, Kazakhs, pp. 137-8; the agenda appeared in Qazaq No. 251, Nov. 21, 1917.


29. Soviet nationalities policies and problems are discussed at length in the works listed in the Bibliography under "Nationalism." The best studies of Bolshevik nationalities' policy in this era are Pipes, Formation; Park, Bolshevism; Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism; and Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslim National Communism.

30. Dulatov, the most anti-Russian of the three leading Alash Ordists, published "Who is a Friend, Who is an Enemy?" in the March 3, 1918 issue of Sary Arqa, which argued that the Bolsheviks were as anti-Kazakh as the tsarist regime had been (Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 144).

31. Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 146.

32. Ibid., pp. 147-8.


34. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism, p. 307n.


37. Olcott, Kazakhs, pp. 147-8.

38. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism, p. 216.

39. Ibid., p. 199; Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, Islam, p. 96.


41. Pipes, Formation, p. 172.


43. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism, p. 217.


51. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism, p. 220.

52. Ibid., p. 221.


55. All ibid.

56. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism, p. 222.
Conclusion

1. Quoted in Olcott, Kazakhs, p. 183.

2. Quoted in Winner, Oral Art and Literature, p. 165.

3. The intention is only to summarize Kazakh history to 1939. By Sovietization is meant the combination of industrialization, Russification, and Soviet Communism. Major sources for the period 1920-39 include many of the comprehensive works already cited, and others found under "Soviet Era" in the History section of the Bibliography.


5. Olcott, Kazakhs, pp. 211-12.

6. Ibid., 173.


13. Ibid., pp. 181-7; Conquest, Harvest, 296-7.

14. Sources for nationalists' fates listed in their notes above.


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Abaj 43
Ablai 41
Adai (Adaev) tribe 39, 106
Adat 69
Adveev, A. 113
"Age of Misery" 39
Aitiev, A. 113
Ak Mechet 98
Akmolinsk (uezd) 63, 83
Akmolinsk (town) 63, 80, 84
Akmolinskii listok 45
Akmolinskie vedomosti 46
Aksakal 13, 15, 20
Ak suiuk 14
Aktaban shubirindi 16, 37-8
Aktyubinsk 53, 83, 111
Akyn 37-8
Ak Zhol 111
Alash (ancestor) 12
Alash (magazine) 95
Alash (government) 104+
  session, 6/11-24/18 110-11
  " 7/24/18 111
  " 9/11/18 111, 113
Alash Orda 53, 55, 63, 65, 68, 90-1, 99-114, 116-7, 119-20
Alash Orda Center 108-9, 111
Alash Orda West 108-9, 111-2
Alibekov, G. 109, 111
Alimbekov, A. 109
Alimzhanov, Shaimerdin 104
All-Russian Directory 106, 108, 110
All-Russian Moslem Congress ('05-'06) 45, 55
All-Russian Moslem Congress ('17) 99
All-Russian Moslem Council 99
Alma Ata 53, 119, 124
Almasov, O. 90
Altai Mountains 5, 6, 23, 104
Altynsaryn, Ibrai 42-4
American Indians 10, 41
Amu Darya (river) 6
"Appeal to Moslems" (Bolshevik) 107
Aral Sea 6
Argyn tribe 53, 83
Astrakhan (province) 55
Astrakhan (town) 61, 90
Atbasar 83
Aul school 28
"Awake, O Kazakh!" 60
Ay gap 66, 68-71, 92
Aytkhodzha 75
Aytpenev, Mikhay 104
Aziatskaia Rossia 35

Babatai-uli, Dulat 39
Bahtsyz Jamal 60
Bai 14, 72
Baigush 14, 27, 72
Balkhash, Lake 6, 85
Baraq, Khan 47
Bashkirs 109, 112, 115
Batlakkara Desert 83
Batyr 36
Batyr Srym 18
Bayan-aul 84
Baytursun, Ahmed 48, 53-4, 60, 64, 66, 68, 88, 95, 99-101, 112, 114-6, 120, 124, 134, 147
Begymbetov, N. 89
Pan-'Kirghiz,' Second ('17) 100-1, 103
Pan-'Kirghiz,' Third, pre-session ('17) 103
Pan-'Kirghiz,' Third ('17) 103-5
Syr Darya ('17) 101
Soviets, Turgay ('18) 112
All-'Kirghiz,' First Communist ('20) 116
Soviets, First Kazakh ('25) 119
Moslem:
  First All-Russian ('05) 54
  Second All-Russian ('06) 54, 56
  Third All-Russian ('06) 54-6
  First All-Russian ('17) 99
  Fourth Extraordinary Regional ('17) 104
Russian:
  Third, Turkestan Soviets ('17) 98
  Vernyi peasants' ('17) 101, 156
  White ('18) 108
  Ufa, anti-Bolshevik ('18) 109
Conquest, Robert 122
Constitutional Democrats 52
Cossacks 7, 12, 17, 81, 83-4, 88-9, 102, 106-9, 138
Council of Ministers (Russian) 57
Crimean Tatars 29
Czechoslovak Legion 106
Civil War, Russian 13, 106-14, 155

Dala Vilayeti 45-6
"Declaration of the Rights of the Laboring 'Kirghiz' (Kazakh) Autonomous Republic" 116
Dasht-i-Kipchak 5, 12
Dimanshtein, S. 112
Donentaev, Sabit 61, 66
Dosmukhammedov, Halel 68, 99-100, 105, 108-9, 111
Dosmukhammedov, Mukhammedzhan 108, 111
Dosqodzha 31
Dostoevsky, F. 41
Dulatov (Duwlat-uli), Mir Jaqib 60, 64, 66, 68, 90, 93, 95, 99-100, 105, 124, 134, 151, 157
Duma  52-3, 55, 60, 88-9, 92, 97
   First  56, 90
   Second  55, 57
   Third  57-8
   Fourth  98

Durystyk zholy  114
Dutov, Ataman  106, 108
Dzhainokov, I.  90
Dzhambéity  108
Dzhambusynov, Abdul Gafar  83
Dzhangildin, Albai  83, 106-7, 112-3, 116
Dzheti Su (Jeti Su)  6, 138

Dzigit  75
Dzhogtau  37

Dzhungaria  6
Dzhungars (Jungars)  16, 24, 140
Dzhut  7, 13, 138

Eginshi  27
Elzhanov, Shakhmardan  104
Enlighteners  40-1, 44-7, 63
Erofeev, Gen.  80

"Faithless Lying"  39
February Revolution  95, 97
Fell, E. Nelson  34-6

Fiker  59
"Flag of Union"  100
Folbaum, Gen.  85-6
Frunze, M. V.  112-3

Gabbasov, Halel  108
Galiev, D.  105
Galiyeh madresse  60
Gaspirinsky, I.  55, 67
Gaurgan Russian-Kazakh school 160
Genghis (Chingiz) Khan 11
Gobi 6
Golden Horde 11
Goloshchekin, F. 113, 118
Golos Stepi 58
Governorate-General 19
"Great Disaster" 16
Great Horde 14, 16-9, 41
Great Plains 10, 41
"Great Reforms" 22
"Great Russian chauvinism" 32, 35
Great Soviet Encyclopedia 36
Greens (Russian peasant partisans) 102, 106
Gubernia 19
Guryev 82
Gymnasia (Russian school) 28

"Half-Breed" 100
Higher Institute of Forestry, Omsk 47
"Horde" 11, 14
Bukey 18, 47, 53, 55-6, 61
Golden 11
Great 14, 16-9, 41
Inner 18-9, 53
Little (Small) 14, 16, 18, 35
Middle 14, 16, 18, 41-2, 77
"of Alash" 68
Three 71
White 11
Hungary 6
"Hunger in the Steppe" 46

Ili River 6
Ilminsky, N. I. 42
Kara Kirghiz 22
Karakul 75
Kara suiuk 14
Karasy, Omer 61, 66-7, 105
Karataev, Bakhtijan 57
Karkaralinsk (uezd) 53, 84
Karkaralinsk (town) 51
Kashatov, M. S. 64
Kasym Khan 15
Kasymov (-uli), Kenesary 15, 18, 31, 33, 36
Kasym-ul, Kine Sari 18
"Kazakh," kazak 12, 22, 68, 118, 138-9, 151
Kazakh Khanate 13-4, 16, 127
Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) 119
Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (KSSR) 119
"Kazakh Lands" 60-1, 151
"Kazakh Word" 114
Kazalinsk (town) 51, 54, 98
Kazan, Kazan Tatars 28-9, 53-4, 59-61, 63, 65, 67, 69
Kedourie, Elie 34
Kenderlinsk 84
Kenisarin, Azim 105
Kerderi, Abubakir 39, 49-50
Kerensky, Alexander 92
Kesmetov, Salmakbey 88
Khanskaya Stavka 66
Khazanov, A. M. 13
Khiva 19
Khodzhanov, S. 100
Khoja, Jan 39
Khotan 41
Khudzhum 121, 158
Kibitka 8
Kibitka tax 78
Kipchak tribe 42, 83, 98
Kirghiz 18, 70, 76, 85, 105, 118, 138, 151
'Kirghiz' ASSR 115-6, 118
'Kirghizia' 105
'Kirghiz' Provisional Government 103
'Kirghiz' Revolutionary Committee (Kirrevkom) 112-15
Kirghiz Steppe 5, 54, 58, 138
Kirghizskaia Stepnai gazeta 45
Kobeyev, Ispandiyar 62
Kokand 19, 49, 104, 106-7
Kolchak, Alexander 95, 106, 110, 112
Komuch government 106, 109
Kopeyev, Mashur Zhusup 50
Korenizatsiia 120
Koshchegulov, Shah Mardan 55, 57, 66
Koshchi (Poorman's) Union 121
Kstau 27
Kuibyshev, V. 113
Kulatov, A. 113
Kulmanov, Bahit Kirei 56, 105, 111
Kunanbaev, Abai 43-4, 48, 64, 146
Kurama gazetasy 100
Kurgalajin, Lake 84
Kuropatkin, A. 80, 87, 97
Kustanay (uezd) 53, 62, 83
Kustanay (town) 57
Kutebar-uli, Iset 39
Kyzyl-kum 6
Kzyl-Orda 119
Lavrentiev 83-5
Lenin 107-8, 112, 115, 120
Lepsinsk (uezd) 81
Literaturnaya Entsiklopediya 60
Little Horde 14, 16, 18, 35
Low Hills 5
Madresse 43
Mailin, Beimbet 62
Maldybaev, Salmakbey 88
Manchuria 6
Manchus 16, 140
Mangyshlak 111, 116, 124
Manifesto of 2/18/05 51
Manifesto, October ('05) 52
Manifesto, Viborg ('06) 56
Manifesto of 6/25/16 77
Mawaraunnahr 11
Mektep 64
Mendeshev, Seitkali 113
Middle Horde 14, 16, 18, 41-2, 77
Military Revolutionary Soviet 114
Milli Shura 99
Mindash-uli 113
Ministry of Agriculture (tsarist) 27
Ministry of the Interior (tsarist) 19, 22
Modern History of Soviet Central Asia 34
Moghulistan 138
Mongols 11, 16, 138
Monke-uli, Murat 39-40
Moscow 63, 99, 107-8, 112-3
Moslem Bureau 113
Moslem Central Council 98
"Moslem fraction" 56-7, 92, 98
Moslem national communism 113, 123
Moslem Provisional Autonomous Government of Turkestan (Kokand) 104, 106-7
Musburo 113
Muscovy 11
"Muslim Union" 56
Naiman tribe 83
Nakhimjan, A. 116
Narkomnats 107, 112
Narokonev, Khadzhi 57
"Nativization" 120
Naushbayev, Nurzhan 50
New Economic Policy 119
"New Method" schools 29
"News of the 'Kirghiz' Region" 114
Nicholas, Tsar 56, 79, 93
Nizhnii Novgorod 54
NKVD 122
"Nomad feudalism" 13
"Nomad nationalism" 30, 33, 36-7, 48
Nukashev, G. 90
Oblast 19
October Manifesto 52
Octobrists 57
October Revolution 96, 102
"Official Nationality" 32
OGPU 122
Oirots 16
Olcott, Martha B. 46, 110, 122
Omerov, O. 99
Omsk 23, 28, 45, 58, 63, 71, 84, 103-4, 106, 109, 113, 119
Omsk Higher Institute of Forestry 47
Omsk Teachers' Seminary 63
Omych 58
Opasiz Jalghan 39
Oral Art and Literature of the Kazakhs of Russian Central Asia 37, 60
Orda 14, 140
Orenburg 17, 28, 42, 53, 65, 68, 99-100, 102, 114-6, 118
Orenburg Pedagogical Institute 53
Orenburgskii listok 45
Orgburo (Organizational Bureau) 115
Orta Zhuz 14
Otno (otgonnoye zhivotnovodstvo) 124
Otkochevnik 123
Ottoman Empire 73
Oyan Qazaq 60

Pamirs 6
Pan-Islam 29, 33, 54-6, 67, 99-100, 113
Pan-'Kirghiz' Congresses: see Congresses
Pan-Turkism 1, 29, 33, 54-5, 67, 99-100, 113
"Path of Truth" 114
"Patriarchal-feudal" 13
"The Pauper" 62
Pereselencheskoe Upravlenie 22
Perovsk (town) 109
Pestkowskii, S. 112, 115
Petrashevzty 72
Petrograd 89-90
Petropavlovsk (uezd) 83
Petropavlovsk (town) 65-6
Pierce, Richard 56
Pokrovskii, M. 35
Polivanov, Min. 88
Provisional Government (Russian) 83, 97, 102, 104, 108
Public Land Fund 22
Pugachev Revolt 17
Pushkin, A. 42

Qalym 62
Qarashev 61
qazaq 12, 139
Qazaq 48, 68-72, 87-93, 96, 98-99, 101, 113
Qazaq gazeti 58
Qazaqjylyq  2, 12, 71, 74, 96, 105, 113, 117, 123-4
Qazaq Sozu  114
Qazaqstan  66
Qazaq tili  114
Qoblandy-batyr  37
Qostasu  37
Qulbash  75
Qunanbay-uli, Ibrahim  43
Qypchaq tribe  42, 83
Qyr Balasy  46-7

Red Army  112-3
Red Caravans  121
Red Yurts  121
Resettlement Administration  22, 25, 46
Revolution of 1905  33, 50, 61
Revolt of 1916  75-94, 107
Revvoensovet  114
Rudzutak, Ia.  113
Russian-Kazakh schools  28
Russian Populism  32
Russian Revolution  2, 95-117
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR)  115, 119
Russian War Academy  41
Russification  21, 26-7, 32, 44, 58, 159
Russo-Japanese War  33
Ryskulov, Turar  80, 98, 113, 115, 124, 134

St. Petersburg (Petrograd)  52, 54-6, 89-90
Samara  46, 106
Samarkand  81, 104
Samsonov, Gov.  65
Sart  31, 33, 82
Sartubek  53
Sary Arka  5, 138
Sary Arqa 100, 113, 157
Saun 139-40
Scythians 7, 138
Sedelnikov 115
Seifullin, Saken 63, 66, 96, 104, 124
Semipalatinsk (oblast) 19, 56-7, 61, 81, 84-5, 105, 108, 113, 115-6, 118, 152
Semipalatinsk (town) 43, 56, 72, 80, 100, 105, 114
Semirechye 6, 14, 16, 19, 21, 41, 52-3, 57, 63, 71, 77-82, 85-8, 90, 92, 97-8, 101, 105, 107-8, 113, 115-6, 118, 152
Seralin, Mukhamedzhan 66
Shamil, Manab 65
Shariat 51, 67, 69
Shura 58
Shura Islamiyeh 98
Siberia 5, 16-7, 110, 113
Sinkiang 41, 82, 86
Sirke 58
Social Democrats 56
Social Revolutionaries 56
Sovietization 118, 159
"Sovietization of the Kazakh Aul" 122
Soviet Union 3, 76, 119
"The Spark" 114
Stalin 107, 112, 123
"Stalin Constitution" (1936) 119
Starshina 82, 92
Statute "On Provisional Land Utilization on the Territory of the Autonomous Alash" 110-11
Stepnoi Kray 19
Steppe Commission 19
Steppe muftiate 51, 101
Steppe Region 19, 57, 97
Steppe Statute (polozhenie) 19-20, 27
Stolypin, P. 57
"Stolypin Reaction" 57, 59
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stolypin Reforms</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukhomlinov, V.</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sultan</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syr Darya (river)</td>
<td>6, 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syr Darya (oblast)</td>
<td>19-20, 52, 71, 85, 97-8, 101, 105, 116, 118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taimonov, Isatai</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talas River</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanyshbayev (Tynyshpaev), Mokhamedzhan</td>
<td>53, 97-9, 104, 114, 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tashkent</td>
<td>19, 45, 71, 81, 85, 98, 100-2, 104, 113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tashkent Soviet</td>
<td>97-8, 102, 104, 106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>28-9, 53-4, 59-61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 99-100, 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tauke, Khan</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temirtau</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tevkelev</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Three Epochs&quot;</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Three Hordes&quot;</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tien Shan (mountains)</td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Time of Trouble&quot;</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togusov, Kolbay</td>
<td>71, 98, 103-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togzhanov, G.</td>
<td>64, 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokmak</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolybekov, S. E.</td>
<td>13, 35, 140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toraygyrov (Toraighir-uli), Sultan Makhmut</td>
<td>62-3, 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torguts</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Traitorous Slander&quot;</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcaspia (oblast)</td>
<td>105-6, 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-Siberian Railroad</td>
<td>22-3, 46, 106, 118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troitsk</td>
<td>57, 59, 65-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trudoviks</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tselinnyi Krai</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turanian desert</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turgay (oblast)</td>
<td>19, 25, 42, 53, 56-7, 81, 83, 86-7, 105-8, 111-12, 115-6, 138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turgay (uezd)</td>
<td>60, 83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turgay (town)</td>
<td>53, 60, 71-2, 83, 90, 99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Turkestan 2, 6, 15, 19, 34, 49, 56-7, 65, 71, 76, 79-80, 82, 85-6, 100, 103-4, 107, 113, 115, 122

Turkestan ASSR 116
Turkestan Commission 113
Turkestan Committee 97
Turkestan Soviet Republic 113
Turkestan Vilayeti gazeti 45
"Turki" 45
Turkic Communist Party 113
Turkic language 11
Turkkomissiya 113
Turkomans 76
Turmuhammedov 111

Uezd 19
Ui 8
Ufa 60, 65, 106
Ukase of 6/25/16 77
Ulu Zhuz 14
Umma 29
"Union and Progress" 115
Ural River 6, 17
Uralsk (oblast) 19, 56-7, 82-3, 90, 105-8, 111, 116
Uralsk (uezd) 82
Uralsk (town) 53, 58, 66, 96, 98
Urazayev, Mustafa 68
Urda 66, 114
Urzhavsk 81
Ushqyn 114
Ush Zhuz 71, 93, 98, 103-4, 106
Ust-Urt 6, 25
Usul-i-jadid 29
Utemisov, Makhambet 38
Uzakh 75
Uzbek, Uzbek Khanate 11, 16, 45, 100
Vakhitov 112
Valikhanov, Chokan (Shoqan Valiqan-uli) 41
Vaqt 58
Vernyi 53, 72, 85, 101, 119, 156
Viborg Manifesto 56
"Virgin Lands" 5, 23, 77
"Voice of the Kazakhs" 114
Volga River 5, 16-18
Volost 19, 81
Volost school 28
Vosstanie 76

Wheeler, Geoffrey 34
"White bone" 14, 72
White Congress 108
White Guards 106, 110
White Horde 11
"White Road" 111
Whites (anti-Bolshevik Russian forces) 102, 106-7, 110-11, 113
Winner, Thomas 37, 39, 43, 60
World War I 22, 76-8, 99

"Yellow Back" 138
"Young Kazakh" 96
Young Turks 143
Yurt 8

Zar Zaman, Zar Zamanists 39-41, 44-7, 49
Zhumbabayev, Magzhan 63, 66, 68, 124
Zhuz (juz) 14, 140
Zhuzhdybayev, Abdul Hamid 99