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Scottish Devolution Referendum| Failure in 1979 and success in 1997

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
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THE SCOTTISH DEVOLUTION REFERENDUM: FAILURE IN 1979 AND
SUCCESS IN 1997

by

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B.A. Carroll College, 1997

presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Master of Arts

The University of Montana

1998

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The Scottish Devolution Referendum: Failure in 1979 and Success in 1997.

Director: Prof. Forest Grieses *F. Grieses*

Historically, Scotland has struggled against internal turmoil as well as having struggled to maintain its autonomy. The Union of 1707 was a political movement which brought economic prosperity to the elites and economic devastation to the working class of Scotland. Consequently, without political support from the larger parties in Scotland, devolutionists were unable to establish any form of local government other than the Scottish Office.

Attempts were made by home rule advocates to organize formally, but none were as successful as the Scottish National Party (SNP). As economic conditions declined, and oil was found in the North Sea, the SNP gained some credibility and threatened the position of the most powerful party in Scotland, the Labour Party. The Labour Party realized that it must deter the SNP's growing popularity by working for devolution.

Economics and nationalism were significant factors in raising Scottish political consciousness, but were unable to bring about successful devolution. Problems within pro-devolution parties as well as between these parties held back the devolution plan drafting process.

The passage of the Scottish Devolution Referendum in 1997 was due to the efforts of the Labour Party under the leadership of Tony Blair. Blair recognized the domestic and political advantages of Scotland having its own parliament. As a result, he used devolution as one of his key party issues on his 1997 platforms. Blair quelled the fractionalization of the Labour Party which had been a primary reason for devolution referendum failure in 1979. He harnessed Scotland's economic discontent and rising nationalism to draft successfully and pass the 1997 devolution referendum.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.	ii
PREFACE.	v
GLOSSARY.	vii
 I. DEVOTION IN SCOTLAND: AN INTRODUCTION.	1
Devolution World Wide	3
Scotland's Historical, Nationalist and Economic Claim for Devolved Power.	7
 II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW.	21
Historical Events Preceding the Act of Union.	22
England's Domination of Scotland.	26
Act of Union in 1707.	29
Eighteenth Century Scotland.	32
Nineteenth Century Scotland.	35
Twentieth Century Scotland.	43
 III. THE INFLUENCE OF NATIONALISM AND ECONOMICS ON THE DEVOLUTION REFERENDUM.	52
Scottish Nationalism and Economics.	56
The Act of Union's Influence on Nationalism and Economics.	60
 IV. THE INFLUENCE OF SCOTTISH POLITICAL PARTIES.	71
A Political Theory for Centralization and Decentralization.	73
The Politics of the Union of 1707.	75
The Political Catalysts of Devolution	77

The Early Devolution Movement.	80
The New Devolution Movement.	88
V. CONCLUSION.	101
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	109

PREFACE

During my junior year abroad in Scotland, I became aware of the differences in Scottish culture compared to that of British culture so heavily influenced by England. Like most Americans, I was completely ignorant of the differences between two distinct cultures, the Anglo-Norman English and the Celtic Scots, existing on one island and of the tension existing between them.

The Scots were dissatisfied with their representation in the British Parliament, as well as with the gradual stripping of their identity from them for the past two hundred and ninety years by the English. My friends from both sides of the border were more than willing to discuss the political, social, and economic tensions between England and Scotland. It was during this time that one friend declared that Scotland was going to have its own parliament before the beginning of the next decade. The first thought that came to mind was, "Is Nicola a Scottish Nationalist?" No, she was not a nationalist, for she did not want to cut all ties with England. Nic, like the majority of the

Scottish population, believed that Scotland should have more control over Scotland's affairs, and it was only a matter of time before devolution became a reality.

The right time and political arena for devolution was in 1997 when the Labour Party won the election. Having firmly committed themselves to devolution when they brought it to the forefront of its campaign platform, Labour wasted no time in producing a devolution plan. The plan was met with approval by the majority of the Labour Party and the Liberal Party, as well as a considerable portion of the Scottish Nationalist Party. The result of these efforts was the successful passage of the Scottish Devolution referendum on September 12, 1997, and a topic for my thesis.

Devolution is a complex development influenced by economics and nationalism. However, until the political mechanisms, meaning dominant political parties and political elites, harness these two components, devolution cannot occur. More specifically, without the efforts of the Labour Party, the devolution referendum would not have passed in 1997.

GLOSSARY

The Act of Union (1707). The disintegration of the Scottish Parliament and the joining of Scotland with England to create the Parliament of Great Britain.

Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA). Devolutionists formed this group specifically to create a directly elected legislative assembly for Scotland.

The Celts. The people originally populating Scotland. These people were barbarians who had their own distinct language, culture, and religion.

Conservative Party. The political party most consistently opposed to devolution and all it entails. The Conservative party is the party located on the right side of the political party spectrum.

Devolution. The transfer of specific powers of the central government to directly elected subordinate bodies.

European Union. An organization that European countries join in order to work towards economic stability and trade advantages.

Gaelic. Language spoken by the Celts in Scotland and in Ireland.

Irish Republican Army (IRA). The radical division of Irish nationalists who use violence in their fight for the unification of Northern Ireland and Ireland.

The Jacobites. Scots who fought for the return of the Royal Stuarts to the Scottish and English throne. Though mostly Highlanders, this group also included Catholics and Scottish Lowlanders who remained loyal to "Bonnie Prince Charlie" (Charles Stuart).

Scottish Labour Party. The political party in Scotland responsible for the occurrence of devolution. Its counterpart in England is the British Labour Party

which gave the Scottish Labour the support and leadership necessary for devolution to occur.

Scottish dialect. The accent, rhythm, and pronunciation of words in the English language, as well as slang and word use of the Scots. It is distinctly different than the dialect spoken by the English, being softer, with the words slurred together.

Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP). The political party who has working diligently towards separation from the United Kingdom. Some of its members favor devolution because it is popular with the majority of Scots and can be more easily realized than separation.

The Scottish Office. A form of ruling body created in the 1920's which is granted limited power to resolve domestic political, economic, and social issues in Scotland.

Sein Fenn. The organization of Irish nationalists who peacefully work towards resolving tension and violence between Ireland and Northern Ireland.

CHAPTER I

DEVOLUTION IN SCOTLAND: AN INTRODUCTION

Devolution is defined as the transfer of specific powers of the central government to directly elected subordinate bodies. Not to be confused with federalism, devolution is the process by which the central government transfers some specific powers without relinquishing its supremacy.¹ Devolution, therefore, allows local governments to have more control over their domestic affairs. Theorists contend that devolution is a natural result of social tension, economic change, and political evolution. Whether devolution has been occurring as a result of political manipulation of nationalism or economics, or to preserve unitary governments, it has been occurring all over the world. The revival of nationalism and economic development in countries has caused political upheaval, and devolution is the solution to instability and decline.²

The focus of this thesis is the Labour Party's key role in the success of devolution in Scotland through examining

Scotland's 290 year struggle for its own parliament.³ The historical role of Scotland's economic instability and nationalism was significant in bringing about devolution in Scotland. However, politics played the key role in the transition, utilizing the economic and nationalist movements to achieve devolution. Without the cohesion of the Labour Party and its leadership, the vote for devolution would not have passed.

A comparison between the economic and social conditions of 1979 and 1997 illustrates that there is very little difference between them. In both 1979 and 1997 there was high unemployment, a lack of attention paid to Scotland's domestic affairs, and a very strong nationalist movement in existence. The difference between 1979 and 1997 is the organization and cohesiveness of the Labour Party. Through Tony Blair's leadership, the organization and focus of the Labour Party changed. Realigning the intent and purpose of the Party by focusing on issues which would lead to an electoral victory compelled Labour to take devolution seriously.⁴

The 1979 Labour Party was split over devolution. Internal factions existing within factions made it difficult for party leadership to formulate a reasonable plan for devolution. In addition to internal factionalization, Labour's poor relationship with the Liberal Party and intense competition with the Scottish Nationalist Party made agreeing upon a devolution plan an almost impossible task. However, Blair's efforts to change the Labour Party to insure electoral success, as well as better to meet the domestic needs of the Scots, were the impetus for devolution.⁵

Devolution was an inevitable political movement in Scotland. It was essential for the effective resolution of domestic affairs, as well as a strategic move for the Labour Party. Devolution has occurred in Scotland, but it is not alone in political evolution. Countries in Western and Eastern Europe, North America, Asia, and South America are all devolving for the same reasons as Scotland, as well as for other reasons⁶.

Devolution Worldwide

Devolution is occurring worldwide for the same reasons it is transpiring in Scotland: political groups harnessing economic and nationalist movements to establish their own ruling body. Theorists argue that Scotland needs to have its own ruling body to resolve successfully its economic problems. However, another reason which is not central to this thesis, but nonetheless used as a counter argument for separatism's association with devolution, is that it is necessary to preserve the state. These theorists posit that devolution is essential for the preservation of the United Kingdom, and it has also become essential in preventing the disintegration of governments in other countries.⁷

Countries which have devolved governments include Spain, former countries of the Soviet Union, Sri Lanka, Canada, New Zealand, Italy, and Mexico.⁸ These countries have faced the reality that they must devolve in order to resolve issues of nationalism, economic development, and political differences. In countries such as Scotland, there have been protests, strikes, and rallies in which Scots have protested against the ineffectiveness of the British Parliament and to show their support for devolution.⁹

However, in other countries, such as the ones in the former Soviet Union, Sri Lanka, Spain, and Italy, devolution has not only become necessary for unity, but also to stop violent acts of war from occurring or continuing.¹⁰

Sri Lanka's colonial legacy has left it with a highly centralized political and administrative system. This strong tradition of a powerful centralized government has caused political discord among the three different ethnic sects in the country. Their religious and social differences, as well as economic jealousies, have created problems among these groups for hundreds of years.¹¹

The Sinhala Maha Sabha, the Tamil Congress, and the Muslim League have been violently feuding for a great period of time. The Sinhalese, the largest ethnic group in Sri Lanka, have the majority of power. They are unwilling to extend any of the considerable power they enjoy at the national level to people outside of their immediate circle. The Sinhalese ignore the Tamil's political and cultural demands. They refuse to work out language differences, to work on land development, or to address the needs for regions or districts brought to the attention of the Prime ministers by local authorities.¹²

Until recently, the Unitarian Sinhalese government has also refused to devolve adequate powers from the center to regions inhabited by the Tamils. Violent acts and Tamils' threats of separation from Sri Lanka have forced the Sinhalese to acknowledge the need for devolved power. The purpose of devolution is to ease Tamil alienation and keep intact a single nation through transferring power to local governments. Yet, at this point in the devolution process, several plans for power distribution have been rejected. Suggestions have included allowing the Ceylon Tamils more involvement in the economy, politics, and infrastructure of their society. As this transformation occurs, Sri Lanka will not only be preserving its central government, but it will also prosper.¹³

While Sri Lanka's need for devolution is based on nationalism, the devolution occurring in the former Soviet Union is based on both nationalism and economics, but with more emphasis placed on economics than nationalism. Countries such as Chechnya and Tatarstan have experienced devastating violence because of ethnic and economic inequality. The resolution of this devastating violence is devolution.¹⁴

Avoiding the emotionally charged rhetoric of self-determination and of Tatarstan's nationalist and historical claims to sovereignty, their leaders have instead used their vast oil resources and their industrial base as levers to secure political and economic concessions from Moscow. Consequently, wealthy republics secure greater rights and privileges than their poorer neighbors, and these greater rights and privileges may destabilize the federation. However, the very concept of devolving power and allowing its republics more authority over its domestic affairs is a step in the right direction if peace and unity are to be maintained. Devolution of power is one of the best tools at the central government's disposal to preserve its territorial integrity and ensure political stability in the medium and the long term.¹⁵

Scotland's Historical, Nationalist and Economic Claim for Devolved Power

The concept of devolved power has existed in Scotland since its aristocrats and rich elites gave Scotland to England to form the United Kingdom.¹⁶ Devolved power is not complete separation from the United Kingdom. Devolving power would allow Scotland to be an equal to England's

status in the United Kingdom rather than continue its current status as a the weaker member in the United Kingdom. Though initially promised a partnership rather than a province-within-a-state relationship, Scotland soon found itself subservient to England. As a result, the Scots first voiced weakly their need for more power over their own domestic affairs. As their confidence in their right to their own ruling body became stronger, Scotland's political, economic, and national voices became stronger.¹⁷

The Scots united with England in 1707, giving up their right to full control over their domestic affairs in exchange for an equal economic and political partnership in the United Kingdom. Even with the unequal power relationship, they managed to retain a separate and distinct identity from the English. Their speech, mannerisms, religion, literature, and culture differ significantly from the English. This retention of tradition and culture has long been a source of conflict between the two nations, with the English wanting the Scots to conform to their cultural identity.¹⁸

The Scots have resisted, keeping their own education system. Their education system has long been considered by

other European countries to be superior to that of the English system, having educated numerous famous writers, theorists, scientists, and inventors. The Scots have also been able to maintain their own legal system, as well as a separate religion.¹⁹ Nationalism has played a distinctive role in keeping the concept of devolution alive until it became a reality in September 1997. However, nationalism was not the deciding factor, nor was it the only factor.

Economics has played a key role in the campaign for devolution. In the beginning of the Union, the aristocrats and the Scottish elites were aware of the economic advantages they would gain from the unification of Scotland with England. A union would bring Scotland a share in the British East India Company, the English Colonies, the English System of Navigation Acts and mercantilism. These advantages were truly such for those Scots who were already affluent and had the money to invest in these endeavors. However, the average Scot, who was most likely a farmer eking out a living from the land, did not benefit from these advantages.²⁰

Industrialization of Scotland brought greater prosperity to more Scots, lasting until the mid-1950's when

Scotland experienced economic distress. Between 1954 and 1967, 90,000 Scots lost their jobs because the old, heavy industry of the previous and earlier part of the century had declined. Employment, which had once been found in shipbuilding, coal mining, and railways, was no longer to be found.²¹

As Scotland headed into the next decade, the Scots were no longer willing to experience passively a greater decline in their economic state. Consequently, when oil was discovered in the North Sea off the coast of Scotland, the Scots immediately claimed it as theirs, and resented sharing any of the income accrued from it with England. Yet, even the rush of economic vitality was singularly incapable of bringing about devolution.²²

Nationalism and economics alone were not enough to bring about devolution. Yet, when combined and manipulated by politics, these two movements played a significant role in devolution. Consequently, the political machine in Scotland brought about devolution just as it brought about the Union of 1707. The Union of 1707 was a political move based on the desires of the Scottish elites and aristocrats. This decision would have a significant impact on the socio-

economic conditions in Scotland, benefiting the affluent rather than the masses. The British Parliament soon recognized these poor conditions and reacted by establishing the Scottish Office in 1885 to handle the domestic affairs of Scotland.²³

The Scottish Office received the minimum amount of authority the British Parliament believed was necessary to meet the needs of the Scots. However, as social and economic problems changed or increased, the British Parliament was compelled to give it more power to resolve these problems. The Scottish Office used the increased power to the best of its ability, but their efforts were often fruitless, such as the time period between 1954-1967, when over 90,000 Scots lost their jobs. The compilation of bad housing, high unemployment, and low wages compelled the Scots to act instead of remaining passive. The action taken was a revival of nationalism by the Scottish National Party (SNP).²⁴

This radical nationalist group called for the complete separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom, basing their party platform on Scotland's weakened economic, social, and political conditions."²⁵ The Scottish National Party, which

before this time had very little credibility, began to win seats in the Parliament. The Scottish Labour Party, which had been the strongest party representing Scotland in the British Parliament, felt threatened by the Scottish Nationalists, and were compelled by Prime Minister Harold Wilson's government to take up the fight for devolution.²⁶ Home rule has consistently constituted the social and political thought of the Labour Party. However, during the 1970s, a combination of factions within the party and poor relationships with other parties supporting the devolution deterred the development of a feasible devolution plan.²⁷

The Scottish National Party, the Scottish Liberals, and the Scottish Labour Party, while all wanting some form of autonomy for Scotland, did not have the same immediate goals in mind. The Scottish Nationalists were not content with the mere state of devolved power, but wanted complete separation from England. They believed their argument was credible because the North Sea oil would make their economy a viable one.²⁸

The Liberals were in favor of devolution, but disagreed with the Labour Party's devolution plan. The parties refused to work together to form a cohesive and satisfactory

plan which all of the parties would support. Essentially, it was the lack of organization and ability to work together which constituted the failure of the devolution referendum in 1979. However, there were other reasons for the failure, such as determining who was part of the electorate in Scotland, and a single question rather than a multiple question referendum which led to resentment as well as a split in voting. Many Labour and Liberal Party supporters did not vote for devolution because the proposal was not radical enough, it did not include the type of change they expected in the referendum, or it did not promise enough autonomy for Scotland. As a result, the referendum failed.²⁹

There were also several fears and some confusion attached to devolution that prevented people from voting for it or caused them to abstain from the vote. The fear of complete separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom, which many people believed would be inevitable if Scotland were to have home rule, the fear of regionalism, and the fear of the disintegration of the United Kingdom were ones which caused the referendum to fail. These fears are not without basis, considering complete separation of Scotland

from the United Kingdom was exactly what the Scottish National Party advocated³⁰.

However, when considering the oil crises in the 1970's, as well as Scotland's dependency in areas such as foreign affairs, the military, and finance for Scotland's infrastructure, the actual occurrence of separation was not a plausible threat. These fears were not addressed by the 1979 referendum, and the lack of cooperation between the parties exacerbated these fears rather than alleviating them.³¹

Yet, these fears and the failure of the referendum did not stop the Labour Party from retaining devolution on their platform, the Scottish Nationalists from working towards separation, or the Liberal Party from advocating devolved power. Retention of devolution on these parties' platforms has several explanations. The Labour Party, whose division over devolution was reflected in the lack of consensus in the referendum vote, committed itself to a stronger form of devolution than the Scotland Act had contained.³² However, when the Labour Party lost power after the devolution referendum, devolution became less of a priority while addressing issues more pressing and more likely to win

elections became the focal point.³³ The Liberal Party and the newly formed Social Democratic Party remained focused on devolution, but the failure of the Scotland Act in 1979 had shaken their confidence. Consequently, their attentions shifted to other pressing matters.³⁴

Devolution was not dead. In fact, after years under a Conservative government headed by Margaret Thatcher, another revival of Scottish nationalism was inevitable. Thatcher's Conservative government was not interested in resolving Scotland's socio-economic problems. Her government made decisions which had adverse affects on Scotland. As a result, the Scots felt slighted, as though they had only a token voice in the British Parliament. Consequently, with the economic strain, lack of control over their domestic affairs, and a renewed sense of national identity, the political parties in Scotland saw their chance to bring a new, improved and cohesive plan for devolution back to the Scottish people.³⁵

Acknowledging the lack of unity among the parties in favor of some form of devolution, the Constitutional Convention was formed. The Labour Party, the Liberal Party, the Scottish National Party, and the Social Democratic Party

were all a part of this effort. Their combined efforts were essential in order to develop a devolution referendum that considered and resolved previously existing problems. Support for the Constitutional Convention increased as the popularity of the Conservative Party, led by Margaret Thatcher and then John Major, steadily declined. In 1995, Tony Blair saw devolution as a key component of the Labour Party's platform for the next election. Blair, as the leader of the Labour Party, made devolution a national issue rather than merely a Scottish one. With Blair's full support of devolution for both Scotland and Wales, the Constitutional Convention gained credibility and increased support.³⁶

It is undeniable that the socio-economic conditions were prime for devolution and played a significant role. However, without the Labour Party's use of devolution as a part of its campaign platform, it is unlikely the referendum would have passed. Therefore, it is the thesis of this study that the 1997 Scottish devolution referendum passed because of the endorsement of the Labour Party and the cohesion and agreement among the parties.³⁷

Devolution was necessary to give Scotland the authority it needed to resolve domestic problems. Chapter One asserts that devolution was a result of Scotland's economic and nationalistic need manipulated by a political machine (the Labour Party) to achieve devolution. Chapter Two is an historical analysis of Scotland's struggle for autonomy, illustrating how nationalism and economics were the tools the political machines manipulated throughout Scotland's history. Whether the decisions were made by the masses or by the elites, devolution and union were a political decision. Chapter Three analyzes the roles of economics and nationalism. It illustrates how extreme displays of nationalism, industry's support of devolution, and economic distress or prosperity alone were not enough to bring about devolution.³⁸ Chapter Four examines the role the Labour Party played in organizing the devolution movement. Changes in party focus were necessary to make devolution a reality as well as to give Labour an electoral victory. Chapter Five concludes the study with an analysis offered by the author from the evidence presented in the previous four chapters.

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²⁴Ibid., 65; idem, The Scottish Debate: Essays on Scottish Nationalism.

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²⁸Ibid., 1642; idem, "Lessons from the Scottish Referendum on Devolution," Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies.

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³¹Ibid., 88; idem, "Devolution and Celtic Nationalism in the UK," West European Politics.

³²James Kellas, The Scottish Political System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 159.

³³Ibid., 160.

³⁴Ibid., 161.

³⁵C. Rallings, et al., British Elections and Parties Yearbook 1995. (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1996), 91.

³⁶Willie Thompson, "One Party, Two Visions," New Statesmen, 7 March 1997, 16-17.

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CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Though Scotland is composed of people descending from various different cultures, such as the Scandinavians, the French, and others, it was originally populated by the Picts, and then later by the Scots who came from Ireland. These two groups of people, known as Celts, had their own distinct language, their own culture, and physical characteristics which made them far different than the Romans, and later the Anglo-Normans, who attempted to invade them throughout the centuries.¹

Through different phases in history, the Celts were both feared for their savagery and manipulated easily due to their indigenous state. Their savagery and innocence were mainly due to the violent struggle among the clans for control. Failed attempts at unification have repeatedly led Scotland into a state of vulnerability from first the Romans, and later the English. Throughout the centuries, the Celts have fought against each other for control over

land, and fought against outside forces to maintain their sovereignty.²

Historical Events Preceding The Act Of Union

The Celtic people of Scotland and Ireland are believed to have migrated from northern Italy to the British Isles sometime before 80 BC. While there is no documentation of the existence of the Celts before this date, there are a number of written descriptions from the Romans about them. The Roman's first documented encounter with the Celts was in 80 AD when Julius Agricola attempted to cross the River Clyde and was deterred by bands of warring Celts.³

The threat of Roman invasion forced the Celts to refrain from fighting each other and to unite against the Romans. So, in 84 AD, the Celts' first attempt at unification was under Calgacus to fight against the Romans. Calgacus, along with 10,000 Celts were killed when they met the Roman army at Ardoch. However, their lives were not given in vain as their efforts forced the Romans from Scotland. Their defeat, combined with the violence and lack of humane behavior exhibited by the Celts during battle, instilled fear in the Romans.⁴

Diodorus Siculus, a Roman historian described the Celts as:

...terrifying...They are very tall in stature, with rippling muscles under clear white skin. Their hair is blond, but not naturally so: they bleach it, to this day, artificially, washing it in lime and combing it back from their foreheads. They look like wood-demons, their hair thick and shaggy like a horse's mane. Some of them are clean-shaven, but others- especially those of high rank, shave their cheeks but leave a moustache that covers the whole mouth and, when they eat and drink, acts like a sieve, trapping particles of food...The way they dress is astonishing: they wear brightly colored and embroidered shirts, with trousers called bracae and cloaks fastened at the shoulder with a brooch, heavy in winter, light in summer. These cloaks are striped or checkered in design, with the separate checks close together and in various colors.⁵

He also describes their battle dress, which includes bronze helmets with figures picked out on them, even horns, which made them look even taller than they physically were.

Others covered themselves with breast-armor made out of chains, while others fought naked. Before entering battle, the Celts used intimidation tactics such as playing weird, discordant horns to create frightening noises in conjunction with their shouting in loud, harsh voices and beating their swords rhythmically against their shields.⁶

The Romans wore armor, carried shields, and cropped their hair, but these were civilized and accepted manners in warfare. They saw the differences in the Celtic culture and tried to conquer them because of these differences. Differences in religion, language, and the legal and authoritative systems which compelled the Celts to paint their faces, dye their hair, act like animals, and commit savage acts were beyond the understanding of the Romans.⁷

The Romans soon learned to be frightened of these noises, because the Celts not only sounded violent and demented, they acted violent and demented. The Celts cut off their enemies' heads and nailed them over the doors of their huts in the manner a hunter would do with the skulls of the animal he has slain. The unpredictable and frightening behavior of the Celts compelled the Romans to protect their empire rather than attempt to expand it into Scotland.⁸

This fear of the Celts compelled the Emperor Hadrian to build a wall in 120 AD which was intended to keep the Celts out of the empire. Extending from the Irish Sea to the North Sea, Hadrian's Wall measured approximately ten feet high, and as much as five feet thick in some parts. For a

time, the wall discouraged the Celts' attacks on the Romans. Though an estimable deterrent, the wall failed to stop the fierce Celts and Anglos from joining together and attacking the Romans in London in 368 AD. They were not successful, but the fact that they traveled to London to attack the Romans was enough to instill fear of the Celts in the Romans. Consequently, fear was the basis for Rome's decision to leave the Celts to their own culture and language.⁹

The Celts no longer had the Romans to contend with, but they still had each other. Renewed internal power struggles over land, and the need for control of the different tribes within Scotland contributed to the disunited turmoil of the Celts. Even with the advent of St. Columba, who christianized the Celts, the clans continued bitterly to dislike each other.¹⁰

Finally, in 843 AD, Kenneth MacAlpin united the two Celtic tribes, the Scots from Ireland and the Picts of Scotland. The unification process MacAlpin started was not completed until at least 1034 AD and perhaps much later. This unification process was not a peaceful one, with family members killing each other, such as Malcolm II killing

Kenneth III and becoming king in 1005. Duncan of Strathclyde killed his grandfather (Malcolm II) in 1034 to become king. MacBeth, in 1040, killed Duncan and became King, and Malcolm Canmore killed MacBeth in 1057 AD to become king. With fratricide prevalent in the ruling class of Scotland, there is little wonder that clans were continually at odds with one another.¹¹

England's Domination of Scotland

Yet, even with the existence of ruling-class violence, Scotland continued to remain united under the changing rulers and remained free of English rule. However, upon the death of Edgar in 1107, Scotland's unity was seriously threatened. Scotland was split into regions and ruled by two different kings. Alexander I became the King of Scots, but David I became King of Lothian and Strathclyde. Tenuous unity was restored upon Alexander I's death in 1124 AD. At this time, David became king of the Scots, and his reign was one of the most important in Scotland's history. His borders extended beyond Scottish borders to the River Tees and Northumberland in England. Scotland was a powerful

force to be reckoned with, but it was soon to be conquered by the English.

Scotland's unity was destroyed by England's annexation of Scotland in 1296. Clan conflicts and internal betrayal led to King Edward I's vanquishing the Scots. Scottish lairds were seduced by King Edward I's promises of lands and riches if they submitted to English rule. Edward's rule, though at times unfair to the lairds, was cruel and unjust to the peasants and middle-class Scots. High taxes and Edward's desire to remove Scottishness from the Scots worked to destroy Scotland's social and economic structure. A lack of identity, economic depression, and political helplessness almost destroyed Scotland. Embarrassing incidents, such as England's capture of its Coronation Stone, also added to the deterioration of their identity.

Known by the Scots as the "The Stone of Destiny" or "The Stone of Scone," the Coronation Stone was used for crowning Scotland's rulers. Stealing the Scots' Coronation Stone was another illustration of England's domination of Scotland. It was placed in Westminster Abbey as a slight to the Scots and as a show of dominion over them. Yet, even with this slight, the Scottish lairds did nothing to defend

Scotland against England. Scottish rebels, such as William Wallace, managed to inspire the Scottish masses to rebel against the English.

Wallace pushed the English out of Scotland, even going as far as to threaten military strong-holds in England. However, though Wallace had the support of the Scottish masses, he was betrayed by the Scottish lairds. Upon his capture, Wallace was tortured, hanged, and drawn and quartered. Wallace became a martyr, and his cause was taken up by Robert the Bruce, a laird who had sided with the English before Wallace's death.¹²

Once again unified under Robert the Bruce, the Celts routed the English in 1314 at Bannockburn. Scotland was recognized as being independent by both the Church and England. The marriage of James (Stuart)VI of Scotland to King Henry VII's daughter in 1502 was significant because it decreased the level of violence on both sides of the border. Eliminating the violence and joining the aristocracy of Scotland and England paved the way for the Union of Crowns in 1603, as well as setting the stage for the Act of Union in 1707.¹³

Act of Union in 1707

The joining of the Crowns was the first step towards Union. Other catalysts of the eventual union of Scotland and England were the differences in religion due to the Reformation in the mid-1500's as well as the economic condition of Scotland. Scotland's long history of internal turmoil was typified by the differences between the Highland Scots and the Lowland Scots. Internal turmoil did not lessen as time passed. The Reformation did nothing to alleviate the clash between them because the Lowland Scots quickly, and with very little resistance, converted to Presbyterianism while the Highlanders remained Catholic. Converting to Protestantism at first appeared to have resolved the religious differences between the English and the Scots, but later proved to be a false hope.¹⁴

In 1688, William of Orange asked the English Parliament to oust the current King James VI of Scotland (also known as James II of England). William pushed for displacing James II because James II's own rule stated that "...attending a Covenantee (a secret meeting of Scottish Presbyterians) was an act of worship considered as a capital crime."¹⁵ Many Scottish Presbyterians paid the penalty for this crime, and

James II succeeded in alienating all people upon whom he relied for support. He was forced from the thrones of England and Scotland in 1688, ending the rule of the Stuart Kings.¹⁶

James II accepted his exile peacefully, but many of his followers did not, resulting in terrible battles between the Scottish Protestants and English Protestants. Fighting also occurred between these two sects of Protestants and the Scottish Catholics, who still had strong ties with Catholic France. One side perceived William of Orange as the valiant champion of Presbyterians against the Scottish Catholics. However, this view is not commonly accepted by historians because of conflicting evidence that William of Orange was on friendly terms with the Pope and had many Catholics fighting in his army. The motivation behind William of Orange's action was purely a political maneuver against James II.

The religious wars eventually came to a halt, with the Highland Scots being forced to swear their loyalty to the anti-Catholic, anti-Stuart, anti-Scots, anti-Highlander, and anti-French English King from Holland. King William of Orange dealt with the Scots, but the betrayal and

humiliation suffered by many Scots at his hands would plant slowly growing seeds for the Jacobite Rebellion, which was an uprising between Stuart royalists and Scots and English loyal to the monarchs of England, in the 1700's.¹⁷

Other key factors for unification were the role economics and the possible military threat from the English. Scotland's economy was primarily agricultural, with little industry to bring prosperity to those who already were fairly affluent. Industrialization would increase the profits of the affluent from the efforts of the lower classes, persuading the upper class to embrace the union. The other factor was the constant military threat from the English. The English, who were constantly at odds with the French, feared the alliance still existing between France and Scotland. As a result, the English amassed a strong military force at its northern borders in the event the Scots, with their French allies, would attempt an invasion. Therefore, political and economic elites in the Lowlands saw the advantages a Union would offer. A union between the Crowns had existed successfully for years, and they presumed that it would not be very difficult to persuade the Scots to

sacrifice their sovereignty for the advantages a union would offer.¹⁸

Eighteenth Century Scotland

At first, the Union appeared to be accepted by the Scots. With Scots placed in the position of resolving Scotland's local problems, it seemed that the Scots were satisfied. However, clan rivalry and old feuds often were at the root of unfair actions taken by empowered Scots. As a result, corruption and abuse of the system were common occurrences. High taxes on Scottish goods and services, such as whiskey and woolens, as well as high rents on farmland were perceived as being another unfair act against them. As a result, cattle rustling and whiskey smuggling were common forms of rebellion which the Scots believed were totally within their rights.¹⁹

Unfair economic policies and situations, along with religious, social, and political differences were the water for the dormant seeds left over from previous conflicts for the Jacobites. Social problems, such as the breakdown of the clan system, played a significant role in the Jacobite rebellion. The clan chiefs increasingly behaved as lords

with absolute rights over property and people, rather than acting as family leaders with responsibilities and loyalties to their people. The Anglicization and intermarriages between the English and Scottish aristocracy destroyed the relationship between the lairds of the clans and their people.²⁰

The political forces behind Culloden and the Highland Clearances were the romanticism of the Stuart dynasty, who were actually arrogant and capricious political leaders. The Stuarts were firm believers in the idea of "the divine rights of kings," and were not always willing to treat commoners serving in their army with the respect they deserved. In fact, the whimsicality of Prince Charles lost him a great deal of support from Highlanders, Lowlanders, and Catholic Englishmen.²¹

While the majority of Highlanders supporting the Stuart cause were Catholic or Episcopalian, it was not a prerequisite for a Jacobite to be a Catholic. The Stuarts, however, were fanatical Catholics, and had had a long history of persecuting those people who did not share their religious beliefs. When in power, the Stuarts had consistently refused to allow any freedom of worship or

belief to Presbyterian Scots. The principle behind the Jacobite cause was to restore the Scots on their own throne and their own government. However, religious differences and the Stuarts' past history of religious intolerance combined to lose support for their cause.²²

The first battle occurred in 1715, with the English and loyal Scots defeating the Jacobites. What ensued was a time of terrible violence, with the English and clans loyal to the English crown hunting down the Jacobites led by the young Prince Charles Edward Stuart, also known as "Bonnie Prince Charlie." The Jacobites were persistent and hopeful, but they were finally defeated by the English and Scottish armies in 1746 at the Battle of Culloden.²³

The "pacification" of the Highlanders and others who were loyal to the Jacobite cause began with the intent of destroying the ancient life of the glens. The lands and titles of Jacobites were confiscated, and they were left in poverty. An iron fist and the spying by clans, such as the Campbells, controlled the Highlanders.²⁴

The bitterness of being controlled by the English and a few clans, as well as having their language and their culture repressed were part of the pacification process.

After Culloden, the Scots were no longer allowed to wear kilts, carry weapons, more specifically the Scottish Claymore broadsword, or play the bagpipes.²⁵ Standard English, rather than the Scottish dialect, was to be taught in schools, and Gaelic was not to be spoken in schools or socially. The Highlanders were viewed as barbarians or "wild Irish," and their culture was crude and unacceptable to the Lowlanders and the English. The Scottish were no longer working in Scottish industries, Scottish social conditions, or represented by a Scottish political body. These three forces worked to quell rebellious Scots and compelled the Scottish masses to conform to superior English standards.²⁶

Nineteenth Century Scotland

By the end of the 18th Century, the Jacobites had been defeated, impoverished, and humiliated to the extent where they no longer had the heart for rebellion. Economic prosperity for the merchant class, and later the middle class, brought about by the Union was due to heavy industry. The transition from a small farm, agricultural-based economy to an industrial-based economy was one which had a

devastating impact on the crofters and small farmers. The crofters and small farmers were pushed off their lands and replaced by sheep or by game stocked in the forests for recreational hunting by the aristocracy and the rich.²⁷

The Clearances of the 19th Century forced crofters into working in heavy industry, such as mining, steelworks, and other mass-producing industries which made the middle and upper class rich, but did nothing for the peasants working in the factories. Unfortunately, the Clearances, which covered the years from 1800-1850, could not have occurred at a worse time. The end of the Napoleonic wars brought economic upheaval and distress everywhere in Europe. With so many men coming back from the wars to a poor economy, which offered little opportunity for employment, thousands of people were living below poverty levels. The comforting and consistent opportunities for employment previously existing in the agricultural sector were gone. There was no money for soldiers' pensions, and thousands of men were going hungry or did not have the means to support their families. Consequently, the Highland Clearances, in conjunction with the overall economically depressed state of Scotland, had devastating results.²⁸

However, not all-modern perspectives of nineteenth-century Scotland were negative. One perspective offered by Lindsay Paterson is that the nineteenth-century was the building block for modern Scotland, asserting that the dominant theme of nineteenth-century Scottish politics was successful nationalism. He maintains that the Scots believed they were exercising national autonomy, even when they did not have their own parliament. He posits that the Scots believed they were capable of exercising their autonomy through various local institutions established to handle local problems.²⁹

The Scots were able to realize and maintain their sense of autonomy because of the widening of the franchise in the 1820's. The franchise was widened to give real power to the new middle class of the industrial revolution. It was also the significant state involvement in social policy in the 1840's which worked to transform Scotland into a liberal welfare state. The establishment of the Scottish Office in 1885 was a result of the increased autonomy of Scotland. This institution was inaugurated in response to nationalist complaints that the growing involvement of the London government in social policy threatened to leave Scotland at

a disadvantage because it did not have an administration of its own. The Scottish Office's power and influence grew in relation to Scotland's wants and needs. Consequently, it became the primary agency responsible for maintaining the Welfare State in Scotland. Paterson contends that Scottish nationalism, in this sense, earned Scotland the position of a full partner in an empire rather than a province.³⁰

England, however, did not perceive Scotland as an equal partner or even worth acknowledging because they did not believe the Scots were their social, cultural, or economic equal. As a result, the English largely ignored how the Scots ran their domestic affairs. How domestic affairs were conducted depended upon the leniency of the Home Secretary or the Lord Advocate of the Burgh.³¹ While some Scots were perturbed by the lack of acknowledgement, a great many of them took advantage of England's lack of attention and focused on establishing free trade, an education system superior to that of the English system, religious cohesion, and their own unique legal system. The Scottish social policy was governed by the system of supervisory boards that grew from the 1840's onward.³²

Board members were put in charge of administering all the subsequent social legislation that parliament produced in the nineteenth century. These supervisory boards consisted of local and national committees of lawyers, other professionals, and aristocrats. The boards also ran the poor law, the rudimentary system of public health, the insane asylums, as well as the prisons, and the industrial schools for juvenile delinquents. They also registered births, marriages and deaths. Eventually, the boards would regulate agricultural programs, development of the Highlands, the valuation of property, and housing regulations.³³ This system lasted until 1885 when the office of Secretary for Scotland was created.³⁴

Socially, Scotland's nineteenth century policies brought about beneficial changes. Its educational system produced some of the greatest thinkers, inventors, scientists and engineers of the century.³⁵ With professional success came an increase in philanthropic organizations, and Scotland's social programs began to benefit more than the upper classes. These organizations gave middle-class women a role in social policy that was substantial, but without challenging the male dominance in

formal social, political, and economic structures. One of the organizations that was backed by the crusading zeal of women was the National Vigilance Association, which was established to protect children from prostitution. Though a large number of these groups were founded on religious principles of the Church of Scotland, they were not adversely affected by the split in the church, acting as a key institution for socializing middle-class English immigrants into Scottish civil society.³⁶

Women's participation in social programs gave them power and influence that men did not have. By the latter part of the century, some middle-class women also gained the right to vote in local elections, such as the municipal councils in 1882 and school boards in 1873. A larger female-to-male ratio in some parts of Scotland gave women a greater influence in local electorates. From 1873 onward, women were also allowed to stand for election to school boards, and some of them achieved significant educational advances for women and the working class.³⁷

The revival of Scottish culture was due to the successful economic and educational advances for the upper and middle classes, as well as the death of Jacobitism.

Jacobitism, the practice of those who fought for the Stuarts to regain the Scottish throne, was quelled by the overwhelming British victory over the Scots at Culloden in 1745. Broken and poor, the surviving rebels no longer had the heart or the resources to continue to fight for the Stuarts.

A new definition of community was established because Jacobitism was no longer a threat to the political stability of Scotland. A newly unified national culture developed around the symbols of the Highlands and Gaelic. The romance of the Highlands and the lost cause of the Jacobites appealed to both the Lowland Scots and the Highland Scots. The new clan societies were very popular, and the sense of loyalty and camaraderie associated with the clan system played a national role in famine relief in the middle of the century.³⁸

The Scots of the late nineteenth century romanticized the past and believed themselves to be a unique society. They praised poets from the past century who wrote in the Scottish dialect, such as Robert Burns, and they praised novelists who wrote stories about Scottish bravery and heroism, such as Sir Walter Scott. Yet, for all the

celebration of Scottish culture, the Scots were still trying to eradicate any trace of the Scottish brogue from their dialect, and voluntarily refrained from teaching Gaelic in schools. This need to conform was only one contradiction to their celebration of Scottish culture. The other contradiction was "unionist nationalism," which will be discussed in the next chapter.³⁹

The nineteenth century had its difficulties. In the middle part of the century, the Church of Scotland split. The Church had played a significant part in creating and controlling local civil governments, and their instability resulted in an unstable local government. The Scots were able to rise above religious and governmental instability. By putting general Christian principles rather than ones specific to either church or state above everything else, the Scots resolved their religious problems.⁴⁰

The religious split was easily resolved in comparison to the on-going political struggle. Opinions vary on whether the struggle was solely between the Scots and the English, or whether it was between Scottish groups who were supported by the English, and those who were not. The relationship between Scotland and England has appeared to

have revolved around one ignoring the other, but the civil political strife has been a problem which has consistently weakened Scotland.⁴¹

Having illustrated that they were capable of separating Church from State, and emotion from reason, the English became lenient towards the Scots. Scots were once again allowed to dress in their traditional dress, carry weapons, and indulge themselves in other Scottish activities which had previously been forbidden.

Twentieth Century Scotland

The turn of the century brought more responsibilities to the local governments in Scotland. Consequently, the status of the Office of the Secretary for Scotland was enhanced in 1926 to that of Secretary of State. As the Secretary of State's responsibilities grew, St. Andrew's House in Edinburgh became the new home of The Scottish Office in 1939, and the functions of the Scottish Office in London were transferred to Edinburgh. Since this transference, increased power has been given to The Scottish Office to handle more effectively Scotland's domestic

affairs, such as industrial support, training, higher education, and the arts.⁴²

However, not all people were satisfied with the power given to them by the British Parliament. The incredible number of people who lost their jobs in the 1950's when heavy industry rapidly declined, the lack of attention the problems in Scotland were receiving from the British Parliament, and the under-representation of the Scots and their interests in the Parliament were grounds for discontent. Scotland's discontent with their economic situation made them feel powerless to do anything about it. A revival of nationalism during the late 1960's and 1970's was the result of discontent and helplessness. The discovery of oil in the North Sea off the Coast of Scotland led many Scots to believe that they could successfully separate from England and economically survive.⁴³ The Scottish Nationalists perceived the oil discovery as their chance to push for separation. After all, economics had had a significant impact on politics in the past, transforming Scotland from a free state to a pseudo-partner with England. Consequently, the SNP asserted that the oil was Scottish oil, and the profits should not be shared with the English.

Scottish nationalism was the key to creating a political force which would lead to Scotland's separation from the United Kingdom.⁴⁴

There are varying degrees of nationalism, and though the majority of Scots were frustrated with the current political and economic situation, they were not in favor of separation. Surveys and polls of the Scottish populace in the 1960's and 1970's resulted in a clear majority in support of some form of devolved government.⁴⁵

The Scots voted on a devolution referendum in 1979, but it failed. There are several events considered responsible for the referendum's failure, but none are as widely accepted as the impact party fractionalization had on the 1979 referendum. Due to the consistent lack of cohesion among the parties favoring devolution, the referendum failed. Separatists took away votes from the referendum because they were unwilling to settle for devolution. Others voted against the referendum simply because they feared devolution would lead to separation. The Labour Party in particular was so seriously divided over the referendum that it not only failed to pass it, but it also lost the next election.⁴⁶

The Conservative Party, led by Margaret Thatcher, won the 1980 election. Thatcher was not sympathetic to the Scots and their problems, and for the most part ignored their demands. She was, in fact, accused of using Scotland as a testing ground for unpopular measures, describing large areas of Scottish life as being "sheltered from market forces; an exhibit of cultural dependence rather than that of enterprise."⁴⁷

Mrs. Thatcher also earned the disdain of the Scots when she informed them that they were privileged to be subsidized by the "marvelously tolerant English."⁴⁸ In addition to Thatcher's disdain of the Scots, her Party's efforts to take control over the superior Scottish educational system and other domestic affairs angered the Scots. Thatcher's words and actions made the Scots feel that they were less than full partners with the English in the United Kingdom.⁴⁹

The effects of Thatcherism were carried on by the Conservative Party even after Thatcher was replaced by John Major. Major was regarded with less resentment, but he still was not able to change the Scots' opinions of the Conservative Party. The Conservative Party's failure to resolve problems existing in Scotland, their lack of

attention to devolution, and remnants of Thatcherism lost them the 1997 election to the Labour Party.⁵⁰

The Labour Party, led by Tony Blair, has long been known as Scotland's party. Blair knew the extent of discontent in Scotland, and persuaded the national Labour Party to add devolution to its campaign platform. The Scottish Labour Party, in conjunction with the Scottish Liberal Party, had long been working on a plan for devolution, and with the British Labour Party's endorsement of devolution, Labour was sure to win, and devolution was soon to be a reality. On September 12, 1997, the Scottish devolution referendum passed with seventy-five percent of Scotland voting in favor of devolution.⁵¹

Scotland has had a long history of nationalistic and economic strife. Yet, decisions about its internal unity and sovereignty were not made based solely on economic and nationalistic reasons, but due to political reasons. However, these two factors have played a strong and influential role in Scotland's history as it will be illustrated in the following chapter.

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CHAPTER III

THE INFLUENCE OF NATIONALISM AND ECONOMICS ON THE DEVOLUTION REFERENDUM

Nationalism throughout the world has evolved into in a new form known as ethnonationalism. This new form of nationalism has been defined as,

an extension and a continuation of past nationalist movements, borrowing from the same vocabulary, and, by and large, articulating the demands of distinct ethnic groups living within a state to emancipate themselves by asserting their identity and attempting to translate it into political autonomy or political sovereignty.¹

Ethnonationalism attempts to translate nationality into some form of statehood, and is the powerful political force behind the push for devolution in Scotland.

Modern nationalism is a powerful, unifying political ideology. It is a strong and emotional force which has been the basis and justification for wars, hatred, and intolerance of others since the beginning of the nation-state. Nationalism unites people through common ancestry, ethnicity, consciousness of common traditions and history. It also gives people a will to maintain their beliefs, religion, language, and territory.² Providing an identity

for people gives them a sense of security and belonging. Being a part of a group who share beliefs and cultural identity provides people with the confidence and strength found in acceptance. When no common territory exists, as was the case with the Jews, the Greeks, and the Poles, it was the memory of common territory they occupied in the past that kindles their desire to return. When no political body exists to take care of the needs of people, they begin to demand their right to have their needs met, just as when one nationality holds the power to make decisions for another.³

Nationalism has been linked with some terrible events. In the 1940's, the Nazis manipulated the identity of the German people to justify heinous acts. Nazism included the usual nationalist and racist themes but also promised social and economic reforms which attacked political and economic elites. The Nazis also identified the "domestic" and "outside" enemies of Germany as the victorious powers who must be defeated. These enemies were notably England, France, and the Jews.⁴ Exterminating millions of Jews, gypsies, Russians and Poles for the purpose of protecting the "pure" Aryan race from contamination was what the Nazis justified through nationalism.

Another more recent example of nationalism gone awry was ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. For years, Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims have fought over land, religion, and ethnicity. Violence has been a part of their lives for years, making them almost immune to the killing of another race just because their religion and ethnicity are different. Other violence linked to nationalism in Western Europe is embodied in the acts of the Irish Republican Army. Their acts have set back peace talks and negotiations between Northern Ireland and Ireland for years. The IRA's attacks upon the Anglo-Irish Protestant merited the radical Protestant group's retaliation against the Irish Catholics. The militia wing of the IRA is the most radical side of Irish nationalism justifying the use of violence to achieve their goal of a united Ireland. Other nationalist groups, such as Sein Fenn, do not advocate violence in their work towards peace between Northern Ireland and Ireland. However, all the peaceful efforts are ignored by the radical groups because of their conflicting goals of peace versus reunification. Yet, though violence has been associated with nationalism, a complete lack of nationalism can be just

as detrimental to the state as a radical form of nationalism is.⁵

Nationalism defines states. A state lacking a sense of nationalism has no culturally or socially defining features which makes it any different from any other country. Unfortunately, because of the past events which have used nationalism as a justification for violence, a bad connotation has been associated with it. Eastern Europe is riddled with examples of violent nationalism. However, not all forms of nationalism are violent or threatening. One such example is the nationalist movement in Scotland.

Since the Jacobite Rebellion, there has not been a violent, nationalist demonstration in Scotland against the English. Fierce football competition between the two countries is a mild display of nationalism in comparison to the bloodbaths of other examples of nationalism. The Scots have also taken great pride in having produced far more disciplined and courageous soldiers than the English, but this cannot be confused with the violent type of nationalism existing in other countries.

In fact, there are diametrically opposing views of the path of Scottish nationalism from the Union of 1707 until

the present. One side asserts that Scottish identity died and was replaced by a nation's need to mimic the identity of the superior English. The other side claims that Scottish identity has always remained strong and only needed to be reawakened by economic and social decline, as well as by the lack of attention they received from the British Parliament. However, until Scotland's economic situation had fallen into terrible, seemingly unrecoverable decline, very little attention was paid by the Scottish masses to Scotland's political authority. Thus, the economic conditions in Scotland have historically had a direct correlation with the level of nationalistic fervor.⁶

Scottish Nationalism and Economics

Historically, Scots have had a long tradition of having a strong national identity at different levels. National heroes such as Robert the Bruce, William Wallace and Robert "Roy" MacGregor have kept alive the pride of the Scottish tradition and its heritage. Other nationalities came to conquer the Scots but found themselves integrated into a unique Celtic culture, and now call themselves Scots. The Celts, which have remained the dominant ethnic group in the Highlands, have integrated with Scandinavian and French

people. This integration has brought cultural enrichment and strengthened already existing traditions in Scottish culture. Yet, not all Scots have the same ancestral background, and the lack of common ancestry has been a source of tension between them.⁷

Unlike the Highland Scots, the Lowland Scots are mostly a mixture of Anglo-Norman blood. While having Norman blood may not seem such a glaring defect in the eyes of the modern world, at one time having such tainted blood would have ostracized an individual from a Highland Clan. Nationalism existed not only as an identity for Scotland as a whole, but for individual clans as well.⁸ Consequently, feuding among the clans, whether because of competition for leadership over the other clans, ownership of land, or due to personal insult, was Scotland's largest weakness. More often than not, the Scots were defeated by the English because of betrayal from their own people rather than by the strength of the English.

Scottish nationalism not only worked for the Scots but also against them. For example, William Wallace attempted to unite Scotland against the English in the 1300's. Wallace had the support of the Scottish masses, but he was

betrayed by the Scottish lairds who were seduced by Edward I of England's promise of lands and wealth if they gave up their fight for a free Scotland. The Scottish lairds agreed, and Wallace was given to the English to torture and kill to set an example for those who sought to unite against them. Nationalism suffered in the short run with the loss of Wallace, but the guilt of betraying their leader, continued economic and social oppression, as well as broken promises by the English compelled some Scottish Lords, such as Robert the Bruce, to fight for a free Scotland.⁹

Nationalism played a key role in defeating the English at Bannock Burn in the 1300's. The Scots were fighting to improve their way of life, their heritage, and their culture. They had once again won the right to rule themselves. Once free, Scotland found itself constantly struggling to maintain their autonomy from England. As a result, Scottish nationalism went into decline, having been cast in the shadows compared to belonging to a certain clan, improving one's economic situation, or making a decent living. Betrayal and pacts with the English overrode national pride and loyalty.¹⁰

As a result, in 1603, when the Crowns of Scotland and England were united, there was very little resistance. After all, the man residing on the throne was Scottish, so the Scots had nothing to be concerned about. Yet, if the Scottish masses had been aware of how very little their Scottish king associated himself with Scotland, they would have been concerned. King James VI of Scotland, also known as King James II of England, cared very little for his Scottish heritage. He pandered to the superior English culture, whose manners and civilization were so refined that they made him ashamed of his Scottish heritage.¹¹

Eventually, these feelings of being economically and socially inferior were felt by Scottish elites and merchants. They felt the bite of English snobbery and economic superiority. These Scottish elites failed to recognize their own unique culture or their economic potential, such as mass export of their whiskey, salmon exports, or their woolen goods. Consequently, in 1707, when greedy merchants and opportunistic Scottish lairds sought an alliance with England, it was not surprising that their national pride was the farthest thing from their minds. Their desire for the economic affluence was so great that

they were willing to give up their right to rule themselves by abolishing their parliament and joining the British Parliament. This decision had nothing to do with nationalism. After all, only the upper echelon of Scottish society were the ones who made the decisions--the masses were not given the chance to voice their opinion on the topic. The Union of 1707 was an elitist political decision based on economic prosperity for the very few rather than the majority.¹²

The Act of Union's Influence on Nationalism and Economics

The Act of Union was a dark time for Scottish nationalism. Yet, there were writers, such as Sir Walter Scott who chose to glorify the Scottish people in his novels. He focused on their courage, loyalty and strength. Scott attempted to preserve Scottishness while still supporting the Union between Scotland and England. Though he meant well, Scott's work is thought by many current nationalists to be a romanticization of Scottish life which only added to the quaintness of Scotland. This quaintness gave the sophisticated English an edge over the barbaric Scots.¹³

Later in Scottish history, the Scottish poet Robert Burns attempted to revive Scottish nationalism. Burns' poetry was written in the Scottish dialect, which had almost been completely eradicated from schools, as had Gaelic, the original first language of the Scots. There were other poets and novelists who wrote realistic works about Scottish life and old traditions, and who were basically ignored until the twentieth century. They were ignored for basically two reasons: Scotland was in denial of its identity or because Scots enjoyed reading works by and about a culture other than their own.¹⁴

Economic prosperity and the large number of social programs the union funded were another significant reason for the lack of nationalism in Scotland until the twentieth century. Industrialization of Scotland, namely steel mills and ship building, employed thousands of Scots. Other industries, such as modern agriculture and manufacturing took root, employing a great number of Scots. Access to Indian markets, access to all the colonial markets, as well as modern ethnic nationalism and movements of regional decentralization were in essence the Scots' attempt to humanize the state.¹⁵

In Scotland's case, nationalism is in some respects extreme, such as in the desire of the Scottish National Party that Scotland be completely separate from England. There are also the unionist-nationalists, who are associated with the Conservative Party but still consider themselves strong advocates of Scotland.¹⁶

Unionist-nationalists equated unionization with nationalism because they felt it was in the best interests of Scotland to be a partner in a powerful empire, which would offer them many economic and social advantages. These advantages included trade access to the colonies, peace with England, greater position within Europe, preservation of Presbyterianism, preservation of the Scottish legal system, and avoidance of the restoration of the Stuarts.¹⁷ Unionist-nationalists believed that Scotland would enter the union to preserve the best that Scotland had to offer, economically, socially, legally, and religiously.

Conservative nationalists still exist, pushing not for devolution, but for more power to be given to the Scottish Office to resolve economic problems and to provide funding for more social programs. However, in the wake of economic and social problems that have not been sufficiently solved

through union, Conservative numbers have decreased. An increasing number of devolutionist-nationalists have replaced them. These nationalists are not in favor of complete separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom, just a devolved parliament that would allow them to solve domestic problems more effectively.¹⁸

Some theorists contend that the quasi-Scottish identity of the Conservatives caused the decline in Scottish nationalism and pride. While Scots were very aware of their history and the past that had separated them from being English, they no longer seemed to care about celebrating their own unique culture or preserving their sovereignty, as long as there was money to be made from giving up these qualities. Economic comfort and satisfaction with funding of social programs was far more important to the majority of Scots rather than any ancestral or traditional ties to any defining cultural features.¹⁹

The other view of Scottish nationalism contends that it never really existed in the first place. This school of theorists contends that speaking a different dialect, descending from different ancestors, celebrating different holidays, practicing different religions, and speaking a

different language (currently spoken by a minority of the population in Scotland) were not significant enough differences to justify the Scots demanding their own parliament. The Scots want a parliament to have more control over their economic programs and to have their own position in the European Union. Social program decline, rising social needs, and cultural differences are not taken into account by this group of theorists.²⁰

Consequently, nationalism in Scotland can either be defined as an instrument to protect Scottish interests or to establish a separate identity from the English.²¹ On the one hand, some argue that devolution would merely give Scotland a local government which would consist of people solely concerned with Scottish issues. This side does not believe the threat of separation is realistic. On the other hand, devolution would cause the decimation of the entire United Kingdom. If Scotland devolves, then Cornwall, Yorkshire, and other regions who have long complained of being ignored would have their own local governments as well. The demand to devolve by different regions would cause mass chaos, destroying the unitary state which has been a part of English culture since William the Conqueror

landed in England in 1066. With these two very different views of nationalism, it can be defined differently to fit the national psychology of the Scots at different periods.²² The different views of Scottish nationalism did not unite to form one view of nationalism supported by a majority of Scottish people until the mid-1960's. This was when Scotland's economic situation became so depressing and so dismal that the Scots no longer had any faith in their united government. Under these conditions, the radical call of the Scottish nationalists to fight for their own government and eventual separation from the United Kingdom inspired a response from the masses. The SNP's demands did not seem as foolish or as far-fetched as when Scotland was economically and domestically prosperous. The appeal of the Scottish National Party made sense and offered a solution to a government that was a failure.²³

Economics was one of the primary reasons the Act of Union passed in 1707. Economics has consistently kept Scotland in the Union because of the advantages it offered and has continued to offer. However, just as economics was used to moderate nationalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it has been used in modern Scotland to

awaken nationalism. With nothing to lose economically, and everything to gain through profits from the North Sea Oil, developed agricultural exports, fishing export, and whiskey exports, the Scots were willing to fight for what they now perceived as their right as a sovereign nation--the right to self-determinism.²⁴

Consequently, as long as the Scottish economy remained strong, the middle and upper classes remained prosperous, and the Scots were allocated the authority through the Scottish Office to resolve successfully their problems, they remained content. Economic prosperity was linked to social and cultural prosperity, even if it was not their own culture and their own society on which they were thriving.²⁵

Economic despair, conversely, brought about the switch from nationalist support of the British Parliament to nationalist support for, at the very minimum, a devolved government, and at the maximum, a separate country. The revival of devolutionist-nationalism restored interest in Scottish history, Scottish traditions, Scottish music, Gaelic, Scottish dialect, and everything else Scots have to be proud of in their culture. Twentieth century Scots thrived on being uniquely Scottish. They listen to their

own music, glory in their inventors and scientists, revel in the fact they have one of the best educational systems in the world, and celebrate their differences in character from that of their southern neighbor.²⁶

Economics and nationalism played a distinctive and important role in making the devolution referendum of 1979 a necessary action for Scottish economic and nationalist survival. However, the referendum failed because of fear of separation by one group and fear of too little devolved power by another. The Scots were unable to reconcile their different nationalist views in order to resolve their economic difficulties, and in the end, politics was the deciding factor.

Political parties who supported devolution could not put aside their differences to realize their common goal: a Scottish Parliament. However, in the eighteen years following the 1979 referendum Scottish parties, more specifically the Scottish Labour Party, worked to design a plan which was agreeable to all the parties, and which would appeal to the majority of Scots. The nationalist and economic conditions of Scotland were finally brought to the attention of the most powerful party in Scotland at the time

they were willing to act on it. After being out of power for eighteen years, the British Labour Party resolved to focus on any issues which could insure electoral victory. After extensive internal reorganization and reevaluation of party priorities, both sections of the Labour Party finally concluded that devolution was in the best interests of Scotland and of the Labour Party.

Notes

¹Roy C. Macridis, Contemporary Political Ideologies: Movements and Regimes (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), 199.

²Ibid., 194.

³Ibid., 192.

⁴Ibid., 160.

⁵Derek Birrell and Alan Murie, Policy and Government in Northern Ireland: Lessons of Devolution (New York: Gill and MacMillan, 1980), 308.

⁶Bernard Crick, ed., National Identities: The Constitution of the United Kingdom (London: Blackwell Publishers, 1991), 34.

⁷Louis L. Snyder, Global Mini-Nationalism Autonomy or Independence (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982), 26.

⁸H.J. Hanham, Scottish Nationalism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), 15.

⁹Francis Russell Hart, The Scottish Novel: From Smollet to Spark (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978), 1.

¹⁰Ibid., 40; idem, National Identities: The Constitution of the United Kingdom.

¹¹Michael Leapman, Great Britain (London: Dorling Kindersley Limited, 1995), 51.

¹²Vernon Bogdanor, Devolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 1.

¹³Ibid., 44; idem, National Identities: The Constitution of the United Kingdom.

¹⁴Ibid., 5; idem, The Scottish Novel: From Smollet to Spark.

¹⁵Ibid., 2; idem, Devolution.

¹⁶Ibid., 70.

¹⁷Ibid., 75.

¹⁸Ibid., 83.

¹⁹Ibid., 43.

²⁰Ibid., 27; idem, Global Mini-Nationalisms: Autonomy or Independence.

²¹J.N. Wolfe, ed, Government and Nationalism in Scotland: An Enquiry by Members of the University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1969), 177.

²²Gordon Pocock, "Nation, Community, Devolution, and Sovereignty," Political Quarterly 61 (July-September, 1990): 318.

²³Ibid., 45; idem, National Identities: The Constitution of the United Kingdom.

²⁴Philip Norton, The Constitution in Flux (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), 174.

²⁵Ibid., 90; idem, Devolution.

²⁶Ibid., 45; idem, National Identities: The Constitution of the United Kingdom.

CHAPTER IV

THE INFLUENCE OF SCOTTISH POLITICAL PARTIES

Scotland's eventual success in passing the devolution referendum was due in part to economics and nationalism. However, it was the political mechanism harnessing these two elements that made devolution a success. The referendum's successful passage was due to the Labour Party's recognition of Scotland's economic, domestic, and nationalistic needs. The Labour Party openly participated in the Scottish Constitutional Convention to draft a devolution plan which would satisfy the majority of political needs of the Liberal Party, the SNP, as well as their own needs. After seventeen years of negotiating and compromising, as well as its own internal reorganization and platform changes, the British Labour Party was ready to play an active role in devolution.¹

Under the leadership of Tony Blair, the "New Labour Party" was eager to endorse devolution officially by adding it to its campaign to win the 1997 election.² Up until the 1990's, Labour went through the motions of supporting

devolution because of its earlier commitment to it. The Party also went through the motions of supporting devolution to avoid the loss of voter support to the SNP. However, the reorganization of the Party attracted members who gave their full and sincere support to devolution.¹

Increased support within the Labour Party for devolution decreased the fractionalization within the Party, eliminating one of the primary factors which caused the failure of the 1997 referendum. A strong, united Labour Party needed a comprehensive devolution plan to illustrate their commitment to giving Scotland the power to deal effectively with its domestic affairs. The Labour Party drew attention away from the argument that devolution leads to separatism by asserting that devolution is necessary for the preservation of the United Kingdom. Giving the Scots the authority to handle effectively and efficiently their domestic affairs, as well as the power of taxation relieves the burden from that of the British Parliaments whose mediocre efforts have been unable to meet their demands.²

Devolution has taken a long time to come to fruition, and it is important to understand the economic and nationalistic influences which eventually sparked a reaction

from the most powerful party in Scotland and England. Therefore, it is necessary to examine theories for centralization and decentralization, the politics involved in the Act of Union, and the early and recent devolution movement. By examining the events preceding the success of the 1997 referendum, the correlation between the success of the referendum and the support of the Labour Party will be apparent.

A Political Theory for Centralization and Decentralization

Political theorists, such as Mark Rouseau and Raphael Zarinski postulate that a strong central power is necessary to preserve or to improve economic, social and political institutions. A strong central government takes control from local governments, making political, economic and social decisions for it. A central government limits citizen participation in the governmental process, setting the parameters for all the citizens inhabiting the state. All situations and conditions of all areas within a state are under the control of the central government. As a result, lack of participation and control at the local level is usually found acceptable by a state's citizens until

their social and economic conditions are no longer efficiently and effectively met by the central government.³

Rousseau and Zarinski also postulate that once a state has reached a level of technological advancement, economic achievement, and social cleavages, the state begins to demonstrate its lack of power to fulfill effectively the needs of its citizens. The citizens within the state begin to believe that their needs would be better met by a stronger local government. This reaction is fueled by fear and resentment of several existing factors. Some of these factors are military aggression, higher taxes, bureaucratic encroachments, fear of economic stagnation, cultural extinction, and enforced uniformity. Rousseau and Zarinski concluded that it is necessary to decentralize to meet the needs of complex, industrial or postindustrial societies.⁴

Decentralization, whether in the form of federalism or devolution, has to some extent acquired the "halo of efficiency" once attributed to the central government. Certain forms of decentralization allow for more citizen control over policy issues that relate to their vital interests, enhancing the communication between the local government and its citizens. In Scotland's case, devolution

was viewed as a necessary adjustment to control its postindustrial society.⁵

Advancements and change within the welfare state have made its citizens more demanding of the services the state promised them. As a part of an advanced welfare state, Scotland's citizens demanded more from the Scottish Office. Hindered by a lack of political power, as well as the funding that goes with it, the Scottish Office struggled to meet the needs of the Scots. The failure to meet these needs resulted in an increased resentment of the British Parliament and a demand for more local authority.⁶

The Politics of the Union of 1707

Though it has been disputed whether the Scottish masses wanted the Union, or if it occurred to satisfy the political desires of the Scottish elites, it is an indisputable fact that union was not voted on by the masses. It was a political decision made by Scottish politicians and merchants who stood to prosper from the Union. A union between Scotland and England promised economic connections for Scottish elites, as well as eventual social programs which would be beneficial for the masses. In most respects,

the Union was able to fulfill these two requirements for a period of time with very little to no political interaction.⁷

Politically, the Scottish elites were willing to sacrifice representation in a governing body for technological advancement, economic prosperity, and national unity. While unity resulted in culturally and economically disturbing events, such as the highland clearances and the banning of the weaving of traditional clan tartans and kilts, the union was also beneficial for Scotland.⁸

Technological advancements, the development of heavy industries, international trade, a strong united military, and a dominating, imperial force were the benefits Scots realized from the union. These developments were the catalysts for a strong union, persuading the Scots to accept not only the Union, but also to believe union essential for the economic and social prosperity of Scotland. However, some of these catalysts also led to a need for devolved power from the central governments to the local governments.⁹

The Political Catalysts of Devolution

The devolution movement regained power in the late 1880's. Economic decline, ineffective social program management and a rebirth of Scottish nationalism awakened the resentment of English dominance which had lain dormant for years. Thus, the Scots began to favor a form of government which would address its domestic problems more effectively and efficiently. A local government given the power to handle taxes, education, and social programs would eliminate the red tape represented by a plethora of jurisdictionally overlapping agencies working against each other to maintain control of local institutions. By devolving, Scotland would eliminate the overlap of agencies and powers within the Parliament, thus eliminating the barriers preventing the resolution of troublesome and controversial issues, domestic issues, and local concerns.¹⁰

Scotland's representation in the British Parliament was its only significant role in its national government. Scotland's representation consisted solely of the members elected to the House of Commons and those fulfilling their role in the House of Lords in the British Parliament. In the beginning of the Union, England's lack of attention to

Scottish affairs did not bother the leaders in local politics as long as they were given the authority to handle their domestic affairs. As local politics became more complex and the economic and social condition of Scotland became more demanding, the British Parliament met fewer of Scotland's domestic needs.¹¹

Upon uniting in 1707, Scotland's representation in the British Parliament was a one-sided compromise, with Scotland winning the right to forty-five seats in the House of Commons, and sixteen representative Lords. Originally, the Scots had requested fifty seats in the House of Commons, while the English had offered thirty-eight. Scotland's representation in the House of Commons, in comparison to the five hundred and fifty-eight plus members representing England in the House of Commons, was disproportional and unfair. Their limited representation gave them little voice, which no one heard or cared about in the large assembly.¹²

There were limitations other than the lack of proportional membership. One such limitation was that the House of Commons controlled bills which the Scottish Grand Committee reviewed for passage. Another limitation placed

on the Scottish representation was that it only required ten members of the English representation of the Parliament to veto any bills which were to be put before the Scottish Grand Committee, and six members of parliament could amend any aspect of a Scottish bill which they felt was necessary.¹³ With so many limitations placed on bills which involved Scotland, frustration with the Parliament and the lack of authority over Scottish affairs mounted.¹⁴

Scotland's political situation had become unbearable, lacking accountability and effectiveness. It became apparent to the masses that a more local and adequate structure of government was needed for Scotland, since the current arrangement for handling Scottish business, both at the executive and the parliamentary level, were now highly unsatisfactory. Thus, devolution had become an exigency to change the current lack of accountability as well as to improve the social and economic situation of Scotland. It had become essential in order to resolve economic and social problems in Scotland, just as a strong central government was at one time perceived necessary for the economic and social prosperity of Scotland.¹⁵

There is little dispute over the idea that the Union originally brought political stability and economic progress to Scotland, and the idea of political stability eventually brought about its acceptance by the Scots. Yet, even though the union had been accepted, there remained in Scotland "a persistent sense of loss, and a perennial sense of outrage at English condensation."¹⁶ This resentment grew when foreigners began calling Scotland "North Britain." The Scots had been willing to ignore this slur, as long as their economic and domestic needs were being met by the Scottish Office. However, as Scotland's economic and social conditions changed, the previously dormant political parties reacted to the declining state of Scotland.¹⁷

The Early Devolution Movement

Upon unification, there were basically two parties representing Scotland's interests in the British Parliament. The Conservative Party were strong advocates of the United Kingdom and Scotland's continuing successful economic, social, and political relationship with England. The Liberal Party's platform consisted of strong labor rights, continued success in industry, and a strong Scottish

identity, which was preserved through Scotland's retention of its separate legal and administrative system. Retention of these systems meant that institutions such as the poor law, the education system, and the Church remained intact.¹⁸ The Scottish Liberal Party favored federalism, believing that decentralized power would benefit the United Kingdom, but was later persuaded to support devolution.¹⁹

The Labour Party, which during the twentieth century became known as Scotland's Party, was established in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Initially, the Labour Party did not favor any form of decentralized power from the central government. It advocated strong Scottish labor, trade and social programs in order to take care of Scottish national and international interests. Preserving a strong sense of identity through strong social programs was the Labour Party's method of maintaining nationalism and some semblance of control over Scottish affairs. These strong domestic programs and efficient management of domestic affairs made devolution and federalism seem an illogical position for Labour to take in the political realm.²⁰

Economic decline, a decline in national identity, and failure to manage effectively domestic needs with authority given to the Scottish Office led to Scotland's first serious push for Home Rule in 1886. The first political nationalist movement was instigated by the Scottish Home Rule Association. It did not focus on the injustice of British rule after the fashion of the Parnellites of Northern Ireland, but the legislative neglect of Scotland, and the need to reform licensing laws, as well as land, game, and fishery laws.²¹

This first movement for Home Rule, which involved transferring power from the British Parliament to a Scottish Parliament, failed in 1886. Thirteen more proposals for Scottish Home Rule were brought before the House of Commons between 1890 and 1914. Home Rule was accepted on principle by the House of Commons on eight occasions and secured the support of a majority of the Scottish Members of Parliament on eleven occasions.²² Yet, even with this support, none of the Bills was successful in reaching the Committee stage. The lack of initiative behind Scottish bills reflected the low priority attached to Scottish Home rule. However, it made the Labour Party aware of a powerful movement which

placed the economic and national prosperity of Scotland above the prosperity of the United Kingdom.²³

Economic depression and the rebirth of nationalism triggered a reaction within a great many influential Scots as well as common Scots. Consequently, Labour's position was threatened when former Labour member John MacCormick established the Scottish National Party in 1934. The Scottish National Party (SNP) did not have a large following in the beginning. Economic decline during the 1950's increased its membership, and by the mid-1950's, it had won five percent of the Scottish vote. Its belief that Scotland should be given the right to govern itself was appealing to many Scots who believed they were being ignored by the British Parliament.²⁴

The authority of the British Parliament may at one time have represented increased industrialization, advancements in technology, and beneficial social programs; however, as present devolution models illustrate, the welfare state built through these advancements led to greater expectations of the government from the people. Without greater authority given to the local governing body, the Scottish Office was unable to meet the needs of the people. The

number of people who were disgruntled with the lack of local government by the British Parliament increased and the ideology of the SNP began to appear rational rather than ridiculous.²⁵

The SNP gradually grew in numbers and became more organized and better funded as a result of the inadequacies of the British Parliament. Still, even with the increasing number of Scots turning to the SNP in the 1960's, the Labour Party did not perceive them as a serious threat to their position in Scottish politics until the 1970's. The culmination of incredible unemployment in old industries, a rebirth of Scottish identity, and the hope that the discovery of oil in the North Sea that would rebuild the Scottish economy inspired the SNP. Encouraged by the enthusiasm and hope of their supporters, the SNP was compelled to push for, at the very minimum, a Scottish Parliament, and, at the most, complete separation from the United Kingdom. Having their own parliament appealed to the majority of Scots, but the idea of separation was a threat to many.²⁶

The focal point of the SNP's campaign for separation from the United Kingdom was the North Sea oil. According to

these nationalists, the oil was *Scotland's* oil, and the profits accrued from it should be used to support Scotland.²⁷ With oil as a viable economic source, Scotland could be independent from the United Kingdom. The SNP promised that with separation, Scotland would be far better off than if it were united with England. They would have complete control over their own taxes on goods and services, control over their money, their own parliament to make effective decisions regarding domestic problems, and their own national identity in the world affairs, more specifically, the European Union.²⁸

The increased support the SNP was getting for its plan to separate from the Union and its increased credibility as a party were due to the poor economic conditions which were to be resolved by the North Sea oil. This increase in support alarmed the Labour Party. To counteract the success of the SNP, as well as to appease the voting Scots, the Labour Party was the last party, other than the Conservative Party, to add devolution to its platform in the mid-1970's.²⁹

The three most powerful parties in Scotland in the 1970's advocated some form of devolved power. The Scottish

Liberals' platform was similar to that of the Labour Party's. It differed in that the Liberals preferred federalism over devolution because they felt devolution was too limited.³⁰ The SNP favored complete separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom, but the less radical members were willing to work towards the more realistic goal of attaining their own parliament. The Labour Party attempted to assuage any fears of separation occurring by strongly stating that its devolution plan did not support devolution and that it was only in favor of devolving power to a Scottish Parliament.³¹

The parties all agreed there needed to be some form of devolved power which would give Scotland the means necessary to resolve its domestic affairs. Differences in the types and degree of power which would be given to Scotland, as well as the threat of devolution leading to complete separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom, were barriers which proved to be detrimental to the devolution referendum at the time the vote failed in 1979.³²

Disagreements with the devolution plan put before the Scottish people for passage in 1979 were significant enough to defeat the referendum. Severe fractions within the

Labour Party, who was responsible for drafting and introducing the bill voted upon, were the cause for several restrictions to be placed on the bill which had adverse effects on its passage. One such restriction was the need for forty percent of the voting population to vote in favor of devolution for the referendum to become law. By placing this restriction on the bill, all abstainers and all people voting no, either because they were actually opposed to devolution or because they wanted more powers given to the Scottish Parliament, were setting the referendum up for failure. Also, there was some controversy over whose votes actually should be counted and those who should not have been counted. There is still a question of whether the referendum was lost by a two percent margin or an eight percent margin.³³

The lack of cohesion on the part of the Labour Party, as well as a lack of consensus on the devolution plan among the parties who favored it all contributed to the referendum's failure. This failure did not abolish devolution from any of these parties' platforms. Instead, the referendum's controversial failure insured that

devolution would be an issue for future discussion, planning, and development.³⁴

The New Devolution Movement

Labour lost power after the failure of the devolution referendum and was replaced by the Conservative Thatcher government. Undeterred by the failure, committed devolutionists formed the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA) in March 1980.³⁵ The sole goal of this organization of individuals and affiliated bodies was the creation of a directly elected legislative assembly for Scotland. Administrative devolution had been occurring for years, but had proved to be ineffective without the support of a legislative assembly.³⁶ The CSA attracted support from across the political spectrum, and in 1981, the CSA published a "Blueprint for Scotland."³⁷

This plan emphasized the need to achieve a broad consensus behind an Assembly scheme, as well as making reference to the United Nations Charter in proclaiming the right of Scotland to have their own parliament. The CSA also determined Scotland had the rights of a nation, and therefore should be able to determine its own political future. The CSA continued its policy of passive, uninspired

lobbying. It continued to draw praise for its persistent efforts, but in reality they achieved very little.³⁸

Frustrated with its lack of success, the CSA called for the establishment of a Constitutional Convention. Established in 1985, the Constitutional Convention would be composed of elected or delegated members to draw up an Assembly scheme, turn it into a Bill, and present it to Parliament as the democratically expressed wishes of the Scottish people.³⁹

This ambitious proposal was met with a mixed reaction from the parties, with Labour's being the most pronounced. The Labour Party had always maintained a careful distance from the CSA. Their official position in the summer of 1986 regarding the CSA was that a Constitutional Convention was unnecessary because Labour was going to win the next election. Electoral victory would firmly commit to establishing a Scottish Assembly.⁴⁰

However, Labour lost the 1987 election, and the CSA established a Constitutional Steering Committee chaired by Professor Sir Robert Grieve. Professor Grieve, a distinguished former chairman of the Highlands and Islands Development Board, and Jim Ross, the secretary of the

committee, co-authored the report for the committee. Published in 1988, "A Claim of Right for Scotland" referred to the two previous Claims of Right which the Scots issued against mis-government in 1689 and 1842. The report also established a third Claim of Right: Scotland had the right to declare directly its demands and grievances rather than have them articulated for them by a government utterly unrepresentative of Scots. The Claim's goals were to draw up a scheme for a Scottish assembly, mobilizing Scottish opinion behind the scheme, and persuading the government to approve the scheme or an acceptable modification of it.⁴¹

This uncompromising position on Scotland's status as a nation was not protected by the "British" Constitution, and the Scots were compelled to take matters into their own hands. Once again, a Constitutional Convention was suggested, and this time it was established with the support of the SNP, the Scottish Trade Union Congress, the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, and all the Scottish Churches.⁴² More importantly, the Labour Party was compelled to swallow its doubts and participate in the Constitutional Convention to prevent its exploitation by the SNP.⁴³

Labour, due to its larger membership, quickly became the stronger of the two parties. Feuds between the SNP leadership and the Labour leadership finally resulted in the withdrawal of the leadership of the SNP. Many members of the SNP remained in the Convention and in support of devolution, but the official position of the SNP was that it no longer supported devolution.⁴⁴

Having launched a successful "Independence in Europe Campaign," which overturned a large Labour majority to win the seat, the SNP believed their supporters would leave the Convention and follow them in their fight for separation. However, this was too radical a move for those in favor of devolution, and the SNP lost support to the Convention. Yet, it was not a complete loss. The SNP had managed to open the eyes of the Labour Party and the Liberal Party, convincing them that there was definitely a need for Scotland to have its own elected assembly with its own powers.⁴⁵

During the years between its establishment in 1988 and the 1992 general election, the Convention held a series of meetings to discuss the details of a plan for a devolved government. Deadlines for publication of a plan for

devolution were pushed back, which eventually began to raise the suspicions of many: had the Convention become a stalling device rather than a force for devolution?⁴⁶ While it is true that the Convention kept launching and relaunching what seemed to be the same proposals, they were in fact dealing with some difficult issues which took a great deal of effort and compromise to resolve. Tax-power issues, proportional representation, and gender representation were issues which took some time to resolve in the devolution plan.⁴⁷

In addition to difficult issues, Labour lost focus and stepped back from political devolution, contending that there were more pressing issues on which to focus. It was apparent that the Convention had lost momentum, and it was necessary for the Convention delegates to regroup and regain their focus.⁴⁸ The need for resolution of these issues escalated when the "New Labour Party," which had undergone internal policy and organizational change, recognized the support for devolution in Scotland and Wales. Seeking to win the 1997 election, Labour's leader, Tony Blair, persuaded his party to support the efforts of the Convention.⁴⁹

Convinced that devolution would be key in the 1997 campaign, Labour worked hard to organize the other delegates of the Convention. They pushed the other delegates from other parties and organizations, such as teachers' groups and civil servants' groups, to make decisions on issues which had hindered agreement for a devolution referendum in the past.⁵⁰

However, even though Labour managed to rejuvenate the Convention, it faced other difficulties. The Conservative Party, though weakened, was adamantly opposed to devolution. John Major denounced devolution as the worst possible threat in modern history, claiming it would lead to the disintegration of the United Kingdom, or at the very minimum, breeding an atmosphere of discontent. Discontent would lead to English regions clamoring for their own regional assemblies, and this would lead to utter chaos.⁵¹

With these considerations in mind, the Convention had to draft a devolution plan which would clearly outline the powers and responsibilities of the Scottish Parliament, as well as firmly stating that devolution would not lead to separatism. Devolution by definition will not lead to separatism, but another great concern was the Scottish

Parliament having the power to raise taxes. After much debate within the Convention, it was determined that the devolution referendum would ask two questions. The first question was whether Scotland should have its own parliament, and the other was whether it should have the right to raise taxes.⁵²

With these two considerations in mind, the Convention released The White Papers in July 1997. This document outlined the role of the Scottish Parliament, and all the matters over which it would have legislative power. The Scottish Parliament would have general responsibility for the National Health Service in Scotland as well as responsibility for public and mental health. It would also be responsible for the education and training of health professionals and the terms and conditions of service of NHS staff and general practitioners. Also, school education, including pre-five year-olds, primary and secondary education, the functions of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Schools and teacher supply, as well as the training and conditions of service were to fall under the jurisdiction of the Scottish Parliament. The Scottish Parliament would also be in control of higher education, including policy,

funding, the functions of the Scottish Higher Education Funding Council, and student grants. Other facets of education with which the Scottish Parliament would be involved were science and research funding, training policy and lifelong learning, vocational qualifications, and careers advice guidance.⁵³

The Scottish Parliament would also be responsible for local government, including local government finance and local domestic and non-domestic taxation, social programs, housing, and land-use planning and building control. It would also be responsible for economic development, financial assistance to industry, internal investment, trade and exports, tourism, and air and sea transport.⁵⁴

Laws and home affairs, such as criminal, civil, and electorate laws, judicial appointments, courts, tribunals, legal aid, parole, prisons, liquor licensing, and other domestic affairs would fall under the responsibilities of the new parliament.⁵⁵ Other responsibilities included environmental concerns, agricultural, forestry and fishing regulations, sport and the arts, as well as registration and records.⁵⁶

All the responsibilities the Scottish Parliament would assume were recorded in the White Papers, which were then approved by the British Parliament and deemed ready for the people's vote. On September 12, 1997, seventy-four point two percent supported the bid for a Scottish Parliament, and sixty-three point four percent supported limited tax-raising powers for the Scottish Parliament. Labour had managed to pass the devolution referendum, and Scotland's Parliament was scheduled to be functioning by January 1999.⁵⁷ The Scots had finally been given the right to govern themselves after relinquishing this right 290 years earlier.

There are still more decisions and preparations to be made. For example, who will become the first prime minister of the Scottish parliament? Where in Edinburgh will the Scottish Parliament hold their sessions? How will representatives from each district be elected? Scotland will have its own people from its own parties making these decisions for it.

Notes

¹Jonathan Bradbury and John Mawson, ed., British Regionalism and Devolution: The Challenges of State Reform and European Integration (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 1997), 5.

²Anthony King, eds., New Labour Triumphs: Britain at the Polls (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1997), 65.

¹Ibid., 67.

²Ibid., 163.

³Mark O. Rousseau and Raphael Zarinski, Regionalism and Regional Devolution in Comparative Perspective (New York: Praeger, 1985), 9.

⁴Ibid., 18.

⁵Ibid., 20.

⁶Bernard Crick, National Identities: The Constitution of the UK (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1991), 40.

⁷Vernon Bogdanor, Devolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 90.

⁸Ibid., 91.

⁹Ibid., 43; idem, National Identities: The Constitution of the United Kingdom.

¹⁰Ibid., 270; idem, Regionalism and Regional Devolution in Comparative Perspective.

¹¹John Kendle, Federal Britain: A History (London: Rutledge, 1997), 10.

¹²Ibid., 145; idem, National Identities: The Constitution of the United Kingdom, 145.

¹³Ibid., 85; idem, Devolution.

¹⁴Ibid., 36; idem, British Regionalism and Devolution: The Challenge of State Reform and European Integration.

¹⁵Ibid., 90; idem, Devolution.

¹⁶Ibid., 91.

¹⁷Ibid., 95.

¹⁸Ibid., 96.

¹⁹Patrick Seyd, New Labour Triumphs: Britain at the Polls (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1997), 50.

²⁰Ibid., 280; idem, Regionalism and Regional Devolution in Comparative Perspective.

²¹Ibid., 91; idem, Devolution.

²²Ibid., 95.

²³Ibid., 97.

²⁴Ibid., 51; idem, New Labour Triumphs: Britain at the Polls.

²⁵Bernard Burrows and Geoffrey Denton, Devolution or Federalism?: Options for a United Kingdom (New York: Federal Trust, 1980.), 3.

²⁶Ibid., 148; idem, National Identities: The Constitution of the United Kingdom.

²⁷Roger Levy, "The Search for a Rational Strategy: the Scottish National Party and Devolution 1974-79," Political Studies 34 (June 1986): 240.

²⁸Ibid., 242.

²⁹Jack Geekie and Roger Levy, "Devolution and the Tartanisation of the Labour Party," Parliamentary Affairs 42 (July 1989): 399.

³⁰Ibid., 7; idem, Devolution or Federalism? An Option for the United Kingdom.

³¹Ibid., 87; idem, Devolution.

³²Ibid., 150; idem, National Identities: The Constitution of the United Kingdom.

³³Jack Brand, "Scotland and the Politics of Devolution: A Patchy Past, A Hazy Future," Parliamentary Affairs 46 (January 1993): 40

³⁴Ibid., 45.

³⁵Ibid., 48; idem, National Identities: The Constitution of the United Kingdom.

³⁶David Bell and others, ed., Financing Devolution (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press: Hume Papers on Public Policy, Spring 1996), 65.

³⁷Ibid., 49; idem, National Identities: The Constitution of the United Kingdom.

³⁸Ibid., 43; idem, British Regionalism and Devolution: The Challenge of State Reform and European Integration (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 1997), 43.

³⁹Ibid., 44.

⁴⁰Ibid., 45.

⁴¹"A Claim of Right for Scotland," Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (Edinburgh, 1988).

⁴²G. Leicester, "Journey Without Maps: Scottish Devolution in the 1990's," Regional Studies 30 (October 1996): 612.

⁴³Isobel Lindsay, The Scotsman (2 February 1989), 10.

⁴⁴Gabriel Kikas, "Scottish Nationalists and 'Europe'," Contemporary Review 270 (March 1997): 113.

⁴⁵Ibid., 48; idem, British Regionalism and Devolution: The Challenge of State Reform and European Integration.

⁴⁶L. Paterson and D. McCrone, eds., The Scottish Government Yearbook (Edinburgh: Unit for the Study of Government in Scotland, 1992), 50.

⁴⁷P. Lynch, "Labour and Scottish Devolution: Securing Consensus and Managing Opposition," Regional Studies 30 (October 1996): 602.

⁴⁸John Arlidge, "Scotland's Own Goal," New Statesman (July 1996), 20.

⁴⁹J. Mitchell, "From Unitary State to Union State: Labour's Changing View of the United Kingdom and its Implications," Regional Studies 30 (October 1996): 611.

⁵⁰Peter Smart, "Reorganization of Local Government in Scotland: All Change for 300,000 Employees," Public Management 30 (July 1997): 13.

⁵¹Kirtsy Milne, "Centre of Discontent?" New Statesman (May 1997), 20.

⁵²"The Choice for Scotland and Wales," The Economist 6 September 1997, 56.

⁵³The Scottish Office, Scotland's Parliament (Edinburgh: The Stationary Office Publications, 1997), 3.

⁵⁴Ibid., 4.

⁵⁵Ibid., 5.

⁵⁶Ibid., 7.

⁵⁷Maureen Johnson, "Scots Parliament Signals Changes, Excites Nationalism," Missoulia (Missoula) 13 September 1997, A7.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

A Scottish Parliament has finally become a reality through the efforts of the Labour Party. Without Labour's agreement to support fully devolution, it is unlikely Scotland would be preparing for its Parliament in 1999. Devolution was a political movement manipulated by the British Labour Party to win the 1997 election. Economics and nationalism played an important part in devolution's success, but it would be a naïve assumption to cite them as the primary reasons for the devolution referendum's success in 1997. The British Labour Party was very aware that they needed to recapture the support and credibility the Scottish National Party had managed to accrue over the past three decades in order to win Scotland's support in the 1997 election.

Along with acknowledging the SNP as their main opponent, the British Labour Party also realized that Scotland's domestic affairs were not being given the attention needed to resolve successfully these issues. The

Party also recognized that the economic situation in conjunction with the rebirth in nationalism needed to be addressed. The Party ignored explosive catalysts, such as economic decline and a rise in nationalism, which had only added to the support of the Scottish Nationalists. The Party was forced to consider the increased support of the SNP as a threat to their power in Scotland.

Finally, the Labour Party had been completely reorganized by Tony Blair. All of these factors changed the feelings of the Labour Party from merely a token show of support for Scottish devolution to all-out support of a movement which would prove necessary for providing the Scots the means to resolve domestic problems, as well as to preserve the United Kingdom from the disintegrating influences of the Scottish National Party. These factors have been the primary forces for the devolution movement within Scotland. However, history, economic and social decline, as well as devolution theory, have also played an important role in Scotland's battle for its own parliament.

Historically, Scotland has been a country which has had a long history of fighting for independence from the English, as well as a history of turbulent relationships

among their clans. Fighting for freedom from the English was a uniting factor for years, but many times has proved insufficient as a unifying force. The reasons for remaining unified against England became less and less compelling. Economic prosperity for the political elites, along with the promise of social improvement became more important than unity, and the Scots became less concerned with maintaining their national identity.

The inferiority complex of the Scottish elites was a commanding force behind the need for the anglicization of the Scots. These elites perceived the English to be superior to them in culture, society, and economics. As a result, Scots buried their previously strong feelings of nationalism and capitulated under the force of anglicization. Even though they retained their legal system, their court system, and their education system, other aspects of Scottish culture changed. The manufacturing of traditional dress was outlawed, Scottish literary figures were dismissed as inadequate rather than celebrated, and the native language of the Scots, Gaelic, was no longer taught in school. These all combined to change the Scots.

Economically, the Scots no longer were an agricultural-based society. With the Highland Clearances in the 1800's, small acreage farmers were forced to work in the cities. They were employed in steel mills, on fishing boats, in woolen mills, in mass manufacturing, and other industries. These industries brought prosperity for the Scots, but also were a disappointment when they led to environmental damage and economic depression when they were no longer in demand. The early twentieth century saw the first severe decline in heavy industry in Scotland. Steel mills closed down, and mass manufacturing of goods suffered. The advent of World Wars I and II rejuvenated these industries because of the need for steel products, but at the end of the second world war, their industries went into severe decline once more. It was estimated in the 1950's that thousands of jobs were lost when mills closed. With unemployment high, and the Scottish Office lacking the power to aid Scotland's economic decline, people were upset with the lack of accountability and attention of the British Parliament to their situation.

This feeling of helplessness gave the Scottish National Party the support they needed to begin winning seats in Parliament. The SNP's increased popularity, along with the

discovery of oil in the North Sea, caused the Labour Party to take a position on devolution instead of merely opposing it or ignoring it. Consequently, when the push for devolution was at its strongest, the Labour Party half-heartedly threw its lot in with the devolutionists. The oil crisis and party fractionalization proved too difficult for advocates of devolution to overcome. As a result, the 1979 devolution referendum was lost due to the fractionalization of the Labour party and the economic instability caused by the oil crisis.

Though frustrated, devolutionists worked hard to keep home rule on the political agenda. Unfortunately, devolution was placed on Labour's less urgent issues list. Yet, devolutionists were not defeated, and formed the Constitutional Convention in the early 1980's to formulate a better devolution plan. The experience of Thatcherism compelled many Scots to support devolution. Treated as guinea pigs for Thatcher's new schemes and having their needs ignored by Thatcher's government, the Scots began to believe that devolution was the only way in which to gain the power to resolve their domestic problems.

A revised devolution plan and a reorganized Labour Party to handle more effectively the problems of Scotland in the 1990's led to the official endorsement of Scottish devolution by the British Labour Party. With the full support of the largest party in Scotland, the Constitutional Convention was able to resolve the conflicts delaying the presentation of another plan to the British Parliament. The Parliament agreed to allow the devolution plan to be put before the people for a vote on September 12, 1997, where it was passed by a large majority. It was obvious that the people of Scotland were willing to take on a huge political responsibility by once again having their own parliament.

Scottish devolution is a case among many cases existing in Western and Eastern Europe and Asia. It differs in that it was not a reaction to violence existing between ethnic groups, but because it was a peaceful recognition of national and economic problems which could better be resolved by a stronger local government.

In general, the main fear attached to devolution is that it would eventually lead to separation rather than a stronger union between the United Kingdom and Scotland. Devolutionists counter this fear by positing that devolution

by definition is the transferal of authority from a central power to a local government to preserve and strengthen unions rather than destroy them. In Spain, Sri Lanka, Russia, and other countries who are in the process of devolving, devolution was necessary to preserve their national governments and to preserve peace. Economic and nationalistic needs of these countries made it necessary for them to have the authority to handle them. Outbreaks of violence and protests in these countries increased the tension between ethnic groups in the nation-state. Meeting the sovereign demands of self-determination of the nation-state is necessary, and devolution is the means to realize this.

Devolution is a healthy solution to political and social growth, economic and political change, economic stagnation, or economic and social decline. Transferring authority from the central power to the local power is necessary to resolve the domestic problems of Scotland and to preserve and strengthen the union. With devolution being an acceptable means of resolving conflicts within a nation, the Labour Party's support of devolution was perceived as rational and necessary. Though it is difficult to determine

if the Scottish Parliament will be more successful in handling Scottish affairs than the British Parliament, it is evident that devolution has proven to be an effective way of resolving conflicts within the nation-state.

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