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Sir Richard Fanshawe, British ambassador to Spain and Portugal, 1662-1666

Joe Sanford Wolff

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SIR RICHARD FANSHAWE
BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO SPAIN AND PORTUGAL
1662-1668

by

Joe Sanford Wolff
B. A., The Principia College, 1940

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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Dear Graduate School

Dr. [Signature]

Chairman, Board of Examiners

This thesis has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.
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I

THE BACKGROUND OF ENGLAND’S DIPLOMATIC POSITION IN 1660

With the Restoration Charles II found himself in a position unique among European rulers. He had not regained his throne with the assistance of foreign money or foreign arms, for the Restoration was the result of a political compromise within England. While Charles might have reason to be beholden for the shelter and sustenance which Spain, France and Holland had provided during his years in exile, he need not feel grateful to those countries or to any other for his crown.

Another unusual aspect of the situation in which Charles found himself was the financial condition imposed upon the restored monarch. Charles II, even more than the early Stuarts, was perennially short of money. In the Restoration settlement Charles financially was left to the mercy of Parliament. Feudal dues and purveyance were abolished. Permanent taxes were levied which were intended to raise £600,000 to provide an income in lieu of feudal dues. In addition Charles was granted for his lifetime taxes which were supposed to yield another £600,000. But receipts from the taxes produced only about three fourths of the promised amount. As a result the King was dependent upon Parliament more than had been intended and, Parliament failing, on
whatever loans he could raise. While the King and his officials found themselves in constant financial straits, however, England as a nation was wealthy and prosperous owing to the enterprise of her merchants, to the empire which they had won and to the trade which they carried on in every corner of the earth. It was this merchant class and the support given to the mercantilistic theory of government that shaped England's foreign policy and, indeed, her domestic as well. Any levies made by the government must have the support of this middle class merchant group. If such backing were not forthcoming, then the crown could go begging.

By necessity and not by choice Charles II had to depend upon and follow the lead of many who had influenced Cromwellian foreign policy. He needed the experience, the cooperation and above all the wealth of the Puritan leaders who had joined in bringing him back to England. Ex-Puritans such as Monk, Thurloe, Montague, Cooper, Downing, Pepys and many others continued to hold important posts and to promote a continuation of the Cromwellian policy of friendship with France and hostility to Spain and Holland.

Elizabeth had broken the traditional Anglo-Spanish alliance by forming with France and the Protestant states in Germany an anti-Hapsburg bloc. Over a period of years
Holland, Sweden and Portugal were added to the list of England's allies, but by the end of the Thirty Years' War a tremendous shift in the alliance pattern had taken place. The Peace of Westphalia and Turkish pressure on her southeastern frontier left Austria crippled, and she was no longer able to support Spain against France. Holland became terrified by the increased power of France and broke with her in an attempt to limit her rapidly growing strength. Rivalry over trade monopolies in the Baltic and East Indian areas drove Holland and England to war. The Dutch won new wealth and new enemies by picking off bits of the Portuguese empire, a policy continued even after Portugal recovered her independence from Spain in 1640.

On a more personal level England had old grievances against Spain. The hope that England might be recovered for the Catholic Church was axiomatic policy with Spanish rulers. But James I had allied England at least morally with Protestant Germany by consenting to the marriage of his daughter to Frederick, Elector of the Palatinate, the leader of the German Protestants. To weaken this alliance was an integral part of Spanish policy.

In the religious trouble that was threatening to break out in the early seventeenth century, the Hapsburgs of Spain and Austria would, as a matter of course, support the Catholic cause. If England could be won over to that cause,
Protestantism would lose its most powerful defender. Since Philip II's war against Elizabeth had failed to make England Catholic again, Spain tried another approach. She offered to England an alliance based upon the marriage of the Prince of Wales to the Spanish Infanta. The terms of the marriage treaty which Spain proposed would assure the allegiance of future English kings to the Catholic Church. James was mildly interested and negotiations began.

The Bohemian Protestants had rebelled against their Hapsburg ruler in 1618. If this should precipitate a general European war Spain, her rulers knew, must stand behind Hapsburg Austria and Catholicism. In the hope of preventing the conflict from spreading, Spain asked James of England to mediate between the Bohemian rebels and their Austrian ruler. James was flattered and took up the assignment with some enthusiasm. In the meantime, however, the Bohemian rebels invited Frederick of the Palatinate to accept the throne of Bohemia, declaring it to have been vacated by the Hapsburgs of Austria. In accepting the Bohemian crown Frederick, the son-in-law of James I of England, assumed the leadership of the Protestant cause in Germany. All hope of localizing the conflict now vanished. Spain immediately joined Austria against Frederick, Elector of the Palatinate and now King of Bohemia, and sent Spanish troops into the Palatinate to open the Thirty Years' War.
The English King had been duped by Spanish policy and Gondomar, the Spanish ambassador to England, sought diligently to use him to further Spanish ends. James was led to hope that Spain would withdraw her troops from the Palatinate in return for a marriage alliance between the two countries. But, since James showed no indication of wavering in his loyalty to the Church of England, Spain gave up serious consideration of such a marriage. And James I, spurred on by hotheads in the English Parliament, closed his reign of a generation of peace by embarking upon a war with Spain to avenge the insulting refusal to ally the English and Spanish royal houses by marriage and to punish Spain for siding with Austria in the war against Frederick of the Palatinate. Then in 1626 England turned to France, with whom an alliance was arranged and sealed the following year by the marriage of Prince Charles to Henrietta Marie, the sister of the French King. 1

In the religious wars in France, the once powerful Huguenots had lost repeatedly to royal power. James I had expected France to aid in supporting his son-in-law in the Palatinate, but the only assistance France might provide hinged upon a change of policy toward English Catholics. Since the penal laws against English Catholics could never

for long be relaxed without vigorous protests in Parliament, and since the meddling of the French Catholics who had come to London in the train of the new Queen provoked even Charles I, the possibility of French cooperation with England against Spain in the Palatinate fell through. Partly in an attempt to force French action against Spain in Germany, Charles I, again impelled by vociferous action in the House of Commons, went to war against France in support of the French Huguenots at La Rochelle. Because of the sad condition of the navy and the low morale of the troops hastily recruited for the service, the first expedition to relieve the Huguenots at La Rochelle failed miserably. Parliament refused to finance the wars with Spain and France, and in 1629 Charles I made peace with both France and Spain for the simple reason that he had not the wherewithal to oppose them in war.²

Cromwell later returned to the French-oriented policy which had been momentarily interrupted by the war of 1628–1629 and again by the commercial hostilities between the two nations which had developed after 1649. In 1655 he signed a treaty of peace with France in order to be free to attack Spain, whom Cromwell held to be the arch-enemy of Protestantism in Europe. The Protector demanded of the Spanish ambassador in England that Spanish ports in the West Indies should be opened without

² Gardiner, VI, 24-58, 122-200, 343-76.
restriction to English trade. The ambassador answered that this was to ask "for his master's two eyes." Cromwell did not bother to declare war but sent a fleet and army into the West Indies to assault the center of Spanish power in the Caribbean. The expedition was not entirely successful, but did manage to capture Jamaica. In 1657 England and France joined together for the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands. A year later the allies defeated Spanish and Royalist forces and captured Dunkirk which was turned over to England by the Peace of the Pyrenees. Louis XIV's chief minister Mazarin seems to have been disturbed at English success at Spanish expense. A secret clause in the Peace of the Pyrenees between Spain and France pledged France not to support England in case of an Anglo-Spanish war.

In 1580 the Spanish ruling house had succeeded to the throne of Portugal, and the rich Portuguese empire in the East Indies was added to that of Spain in the New World. But in the closing years of the sixteenth century the Dutch won their independence from Spain, and continued their war against their former oppressor by attacking the Portuguese possessions in the East Indies which had recently come under Spanish rule. Indeed, the Dutch continued their pressure in the East Indies even after the Portuguese recovered their independence from Spain in 1640. Spain did not acquiesce in Portuguese independence, and campaigns against Portugal were
By the conversion of Portugal's resources to war with Spain, Portugal found it necessary to rely on its own forces, without the support of British power. Portugal, whose resources were drained by the perennial war with Spain, could do little to protect her frontiers against the incursions of her European neighbors. The resources of Spain, on the other hand, were vast and varied, and the British navy was able to maintain a strong presence in the Mediterranean.

The treaty of Princess Margaret, which formally ended the war in 1668, provided for the exchange of concessions between Portugal and England. Portugal agreed to cede certain territories in Africa and the East Indies to England in return for a promise of protection against future aggression. The treaty was signed on behalf of England by Charles II, and on behalf of Portugal by João V, King of Portugal.

The treaty was a significant victory for England, as it gave the British navy access to new trade routes and territories. It also strengthened the position of the English East India Company, which had been established in 1600. The treaty was seen as a symbol of England's growing power and influence in the world, and it paved the way for further expansion and conquests in the centuries to come.
breach of good will to wring further concessions from Portugal: Englishmen were freed completely from the jurisdiction of the Inquisition, not only aboard their ships but in their houses on shore; customs duties were limited to agreed rates which were not to be augmented; English ships were allowed to trade freely in Portuguese Africa and India, and with Brazil under certain restrictions; and Portuguese merchants might hire English bottoms but not those of any other nation. England in a sense became the heir of the Portuguese empire, and the Dutch received a severe blow to their commerce.

In the closing years of the Protectorate Portugal was engaged in wars with Spain and Holland. France had deserted her and the Pope still had not recognized her independence from Spain. Her only possible source of support was England. On April 15, 1660, the English Council of State agreed that 12,000 troops might be recruited in the British Isles for service against Spain. But before the terms of the agreement could be carried out Charles II was restored to the throne of England and the treaty was shelved.

For two reasons Charles II began his reign in 1660 with carte blanche in foreign affairs. In the first place,

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5 Ibid., p. 414.
with the change of government in England there could be no compulsion upon the new government to accept the commitments of the old. The fiction was maintained that there had been no Commonwealth and Protectorate, for it was announced that Charles II was ascending the throne in the twelfth year of his reign which had begun the moment of his father's death. In the second place, the Restoration settlement left foreign affairs beyond the control of Parliament and completely in the hands of the king. Practically, however, Charles was limited in his conduct of foreign affairs by the fact that he was financially hard-pressed and by the added fact that he had no army or navy. One of his first official acts was to reduce the fleet and disband the army as an expense-saving device. For some time thereafter no financial support for the armed services was available. Clarendon expressed the belief that during the first years of the reign it would have been impossible to equip any more than three battalions or five men-of-war.⁶ The situation in which Pepys found the navy and the handicaps under which he worked to restore it are well known.⁷ This financial limitation imposed upon the restored King influenced the moves he made in foreign relations.


One means of easing financial pressure that suggested itself was for Charles to marry someone who would bring him a sizeable dowry. Several prospects were considered: a French marriage proposed by the Queen-Mother and the English Catholics for whom she spoke, a marriage supported by Spain, and a marriage to a Portuguese princess.

Any proposal originating in St. Germain and backed by English Catholics was suspect. All of England, including Charles himself, had had enough of the meddling of the Queen-Mother, Henrietta Marie, and her coterie. Spain had no princess of her own to offer, but could sponsor a princess found elsewhere in Europe. The Spanish ambassador in London made public a letter with Spain's proposal. After reminding the English King of "the dangerous consequences" of a Portuguese marriage, the Spaniard reviewed other candidates whom Spain was willing to back.

The Ambassador finds he is obliged to demonstrate to your Majesty, according to the last order he hath received from the King, his Master, that over and above the offers he hath already made, for the Princess of Denmark and for the Princess of Saxony or any other Princess that may seem pleasing to your Majesty, he doth now propose the Princess of Orange, whom his Catholic Majesty will adopt and endow with the same advantages which have been proposed with the Princesses of Denmark and Saxony, in case she is more pleasing to your Majesty. . . . And as for what belongs to the dowry, which some of your Majesty's ministers have looked on, whether it be sufficient or proportionable to your Majesty: the Ambassador saith that it is the same which hath been demanded, and that with which other Kings have been contented. But if your
Majesty, instead of the ordinary dowry, doth desire at present other things more proportionable to your convenience, your Majesty may be pleased to declare them.

Wary of Spain and of possible future obligations that might grow out of Spain's generosity, Charles took the Portuguese Infanta for the simple reason that by so doing he would gain the most and commit himself and England the least.

The intrigues of the courts of Europe revolved for a time around this proposed marriage of Charles II to a Portuguese princess. France was delighted at the prospect, for Charles's decision meant a rebuff to Spain. In fact, to show her approval of the marriage France promised financial aid to Portugal in the latter's war against Spain. Louis XIV of France had married the Infanta Maria Theresa of Spain, the daughter of King Philip IV. The Spanish king lingered near death for years, and his heir was a sickly boy whose death was expected before that of his father. Louis XIV was already intending when the Spanish succession died out to claim the Spanish Netherlands through his wife. This was the cause for his friendly interest in the Anglo-Portuguese


9 The match had been proposed as early as 1644. Shortly after the execution of Charles I the Portuguese ambassador at The Hague again approached Charles II on the subject and found him sympathetic. See James, p. 410.
rectorates in Portuguese territory. The covenants remained
newly made, together with the right of her merchants to
rectorates in Portuguese territory. The covenants should also be free to trade
purified and purposed in the covenants of submission and surrender of Rio de Janeiro.
(b) The放弃了 in money and for the cession of Faro, Bombay,
offered in a committee-proposed for the cession of the said
Cession, the need for an English base or operations in the
never war in Peruvian waters suspected to

Bombay was made.

To be drafted between Portuguese and English. The latter was
with the exception of Macao and Canton. The former Portuguese possessions they captured from the Dutch.

Best Indies. The English were to be allowed to retain any
was to evidence in an offensive war against the Dutch in the
For the terms of the Portuguese offer censure of

France might ultimately gain.

Since it would partially isolate and weaken Spain,
at the figure offered in the initial Portuguese proposal. In return for the trading concessions in India and Brazil, the cession of territory and the large dowry, England would engage the Dutch in open war and give military aid to Portugal against Spain.\textsuperscript{10} By accepting the Portuguese marriage and the commitments that it involved, Charles II had embarked England upon a definite foreign policy.

The King in Council controlled the foreign affairs of England. Membership of the Council, which always included the two secretaries of state, fluctuated at the will of the king. It was to the Council that the ambassadors addressed their letters, usually to the secretary who supervised English affairs in that part of the world in which the ambassador served. Sometimes letters were addressed to both secretaries and to the King as well. Often the secretaries begged not to have the despatches sent in foreign languages since there was no one on their staff who could translate them. Frequently, as in the case of Sir William Morice and Sir Henry Bennet, secretaries under Charles II, personal enmity hampered government operations and an ambassador might

\textsuperscript{10} Edgar Prestage, \textit{The Diplomatic Relations of Portugal with France, England and Holland, 1640-1668} (Watford, 1925), pp. 145-49.
find himself not knowing what official policy was because
his despatches had not been shown to the proper authorities.
Sir Richard Fanshawe complained of the handicaps under
which he worked when he wrote to congratulate Sir Henry
Bennet upon his appointment as secretary of state.

The nature and scene of my present negotiations
require a Spanish patron, i. e., a minister in
that place [London] who is a master of the
language, as many important documents pass in
it, which lose much by translation, and this of
the kingdom in which I now am would lose its
force and sense if translated into any other but
that; whereof his Majesty himself also will be
fully apprehensive, when you shall only read the
papers therein distinctly unto his Majesty with
never so little explanation thereupon. I much
prefer to have my despatches disapproved than not
taken notice of, since I may mend my faults by
proper direction and failing thereof ought to be
called home.\textsuperscript{11}

With the final decision in foreign policy matters a
prerogative of the King, secretaries and ambassadors
frequently did not know the King's attitude or intention
on a certain matter. During his Portuguese embassy
Fanshawe was apparently kept in ignorance of the foreign
office attitudes with regard to the over-all policy con-
cerning the affairs of England, Spain and Portugal.

Another difficulty an ambassador had to face was the
matter of receiving instructions and getting his despatches
home. Sometimes as much as five months elapsed before a

\textsuperscript{11} Fanshawe to Bennet, Dec. 9, 1662, Heathcote MSS.,
Historical Manuscripts Commission Reports (hereafter cited
as Heathcote MSS., H. M. C.), p. 50.
letter from England reached Fanshawe in Portugal. This element of time was a major factor in Fanshawe's later dismissal as ambassador to Spain. One of Fanshawe's messengers was beaten and robbed at Alicante, and the treaty that Sandwich concluded at Madrid in May, 1667—the same that Fanshawe had worked on for three years—reached England only after the fourth try. One copy was lost en route, a second flung overboard in the Channel to prevent it from falling into French hands, a third stuck at Cadiz, and the fourth sent off to Ireland which finally reached England and the home government.  

Sir Richard Fanshawe suffered one serious handicap that was self-imposed. His weakness in filling pages of his correspondence with details of court functions and formalities bored the King. The secretary of state wrote Fanshawe, "I have received both your packets, and abridged the first sixteen pages for his Majesty, who else would never have patience or given the time to have heard one quarter thereof."  

With all the handicaps under which he labored—whether the result of his own weaknesses or growing out of the peculiar nature of Restoration politics—no one

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13 Morice to Fanshawe, Nov. 19, 1662, Heathcote MSS. (H. M. C.), p. 48.
ever accused Fanshawe of disloyalty. Indeed, the Stuart family was served by no one with more devotion than that shown by Sir Richard Fanshawe.14

FANSHAWE'S EARLY SERVICE TO THE STUART KINGS

Richard Fanshawe was the fifth and youngest son of Sir Henry and Elizabeth Fanshawe. The family seat was Ware Park in Hertfordshire, and it was there that Richard was born early in June, 1608. Both sides of his family came from the class who served the Crown. His father held the office of Remembrancer to the King and his maternal grandfather had been Farmer of the Customs to Queen Elizabeth. With such a background in a land where the law of primogeniture was observed, it was only natural that Fanshawe, a younger son, should seek a place for himself in government service.

Fanshawe's father died when he was seven and his mother soon after placed him with the most famous London school-master of the time, Thomas Farnaby. Among the well-known men Farnaby taught, Richard Fanshawe was one of the most gifted. At the Farnaby school this future Latin secretary to Charles II was grounded in the classics. Here he developed a lasting taste for poetry which prompted him to translate Horace and to compose several lyrics which won him some attention.

Thomas Farnaby (1595?-1647) was a classical scholar and one of the chief school-masters of the time. He was best known for his editions of the classics which were extremely popular in the seventeenth century. See The Dictionary of National Biography.
In November, 1623, Fanshawe was admitted a fellow-commoner of Jesus College, Cambridge. He was intended for the bar, and entered the Inner Temple in January, 1626. But the study of law excited no interest in the young man, and in 1627 he went abroad with the view to studying foreign languages. After a year in Paris he spent a twelvemonth in Madrid learning the Spanish language, and in 1629 he returned to England.  

His knowledge of Spain and his command of the language won Fanshawe an appointment as secretary to the English ambassador to Spain, Lord Aston, in 1635. When Aston was recalled to England Fanshawe remained in Madrid as chargé d'affaires until the new ambassador, Sir Thomas Hopton, arrived. The then secretary of state, Thomas Windebank, commented warmly upon the diligence and solicitation with which the chargé d'affaires acquitted his responsibilities. This was high praise, indeed, from one whom Fanshawe's wife insisted was her husband's enemy. "Secretary Windebank called him a Puritan, being his enemy, because himself was a Papist."  

Fanshawe returned to England in 1636 to seek the office of Remembrancer to the King which had been in his family for some time. He was in the midst of arrangements to buy this office from his brother when the Civil War broke out. Fanshawe left immediately for Oxford to join the Royalist forces. While at Oxford he met Anne Harrison, whose father was to sacrifice his fortune for Charles I, and the two were married at Wolvercote Church in Gadsdow near Oxford. Among the groomsmen was Edward Hyde, later to become the Earl of Clarendon and Lord Chancellor.

According to Lady Fanshawe, a devoted wife and naturally a prejudiced reporter:

He was of the highest size of men, strong, and of the best proportion; his complexion sanguine, his skin exceedingly fair, his hair dark brown and very curling, but not very long, his eyes grey and penetrating, his nose high, his countenance gracious and wise, his motion good, his speech clear and distinct. He never used exercise but walking, and that generally with some book in his hand, which oftentimes was poetry, in which he spent his idle hours; sometimes he would ride out to take the air, but his most delight was to go only with me in a coach some miles, and there discourse of those things which then most pleased him, of what nature soever.

He was very obliging to all, and forward to serve his master, his country, and friend; cheerful in his conversation; his discourse ever pleasant mixed with the sayings of wise men.

... This I thank God with all my soul for, that he never discovered his troubles to me,
but went from me with perfect cheerfulness and content. . . . I never heard him hold a disputation in my life, but often he would speak against it, saying it was an uncharitable custom, which never turned to the advantage of either party. He would never be drawn to the fashion of any party, saying he found it sufficient honestly to perform that employment he was in; he loved and used cheerfulness in all his actions, and professed his religion in his life and conversation. He was a true Protestant of the Church of England, so born, so brought up, and so died; his conversation was so honest that I never heard him speak a word in my life that tended to God's dishonor, or encouragement of any kind of debauchery or sin. He was ever much esteemed by his two masters, Charles the First and Charles the Second, both for great parts and for honesty, as for his conversation in which they took great delight, he being so free from passion, that made him beloved of all that knew him, nor did I ever see him moved but with his master's concerns, in which he would hotly pursue his interests through the greatest difficulties.

He was the tenderest father imaginable, the carefulest and most generous master I ever knew; he loved hospitality, and would often say, it was wholly essential for the constitution of England; he loved and kept order with the greatest decency possible.5

Early in 1644 Fanshawe was named secretary of the Council of War. Charles I seems to have intended that Fanshawe should continue on as secretary to the Prince of Wales, who was appointed generalissimo of the royal forces in March, 1644, with his own headquarters at Bristol. "But the Queen," wrote Lady Fanshawe, "who was then no friend to my husband, because he had formerly

5 Ibid., pp. 35-37.
made Secretary Windebank appear in his colors, who was one of her Majesty's favorites, wholly obstructed that then, and placed with the Prince Sir Robert Long, for whom she had a great kindness. Fanshawe attended the Prince of Wales, but became his secretary only after the defection of the Queen's nominee. "My husband grew much in the Prince's favor; and Mr. Long not being suffered to execute the business of his place, as the Council suspected that he held private intelligence with the Earl of Essex, which when he perceived he went into enemy quarters, and so to London, and then to France, full of complaints of the Prince's Council to the Queen-Mother, and when he was gone your father [i.e., Fanshawe] supplied his place."

This instance is typical of the numerous set-backs Fanshawe suffered by not currying favor in the proper quarters. His anti-Catholic sentiments naturally did not ingratiate him with Henrietta Marie. Her influence and that of the Catholic party diminished as time went on, and Fanshawe seems to have won her grudging approval in later years.

6 Ibid., p. 61.
7 Ibid., p. 67.
Fanshawe had accompanied the Prince of Wales to Bristol where they found nothing but chaos. There were no resources or stores and the promised subsidies never came. Prince Charles for the most part was commanding a non-existent army in the West.

The news of the defeat at Naseby in June, 1645, and the approach of the Parliamentary forces near Oxford made it obvious that if the Prince of Wales remained in England he would be taken prisoner. The Queen, Henrietta Marie, already had fled to France and with Cardinal Mazarin, the French King's chief minister, had begun to scheme at getting the Prince of Wales into that country. Once safely there he might be used, the Queen hoped, as a means of bargaining with the English Parliament.

Edward Hyde, a leading adviser to Charles I during the Civil War, disliked the French and distrusted the Queen. So, when Charles I issued an order to remove the Prince from England, Hyde suggested Scotland or Ireland. With still another Royalist defeat in February, 1646, immediate action was imperative, and in March the Prince and his court landed at St. Mary's in the Scilly Isles, a territory not yet under Parliamentary control. Fanshawe's voice seems to have been the determining one in the choice of a refuge.
It was resolved to send Mr. Fanshawe to the army, to receive the lords' opinion and advice what was best to be done with reference to the person of the Prince, and whether it were fit to hazard himself in Pendennis; which was accordingly done. And their lordships, according to the former agreement between them, returned their advice that it was not fit to venture His Highness in that castle, which would not only not preserve his person, but probably, by his stay there, might be lost (which by his absence might defend itself), and that he should remove to Jersey or Scilly. Which upon Mr. Fanshawe's report was unanimously consented to by the whole council.

The Prince and his entourage moved to Scilly and then on to Jersey a month later because the large number of followers of the Prince could not be accommodated in the Scilly Isles. The near proximity of the Channel Islands to France made it possible for the French party headed by Queen Henrietta Marie to persuade Prince Charles to come to Paris. Charles gave in to his mother's pressure and moved to the French capital, but only over the protests of Hyde.

Fanshawe did not accompany the Prince to France. According to the custom of the time his employment ceased when Prince Charles left England. However, the Fanshawes did go to Caen to visit Lord Fanshawe, the older brother of Richard. They were soon back in England where they lived quietly and tried to raise money to finance their

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return to the court of the Prince of Wales. Prince Charles could not maintain Fanshawe at a salary, and so private funds had to be raised to provide for the Fanshawes if they were to be in attendance. Before leaving for France Fanshawe and his wife enjoyed a last audience with Charles I. Lady Fanshawe's account of the visit to Hampton Court indicates the deep affection and trust Charles I reposed in her husband.

During his stay at Hampton Court my husband was with him [the King], to whom he [the King] was pleased to talk much of his concerns, and gave him there credentials for Spain, with private instructions, and letters for his service; but God for our sins disposed of his Majesty's affairs otherwise. I went three times to pay my duty to him, both as I was the daughter of his servant and the wife of his servant. The last time I ever saw him, when I took my leave, I could not refrain from weeping; when he saluted me, I prayed to God to preserve his Majesty with long life and happy years; he stroked me on the cheek and said, 'Child, if God pleaseth, it will be so, but both you and I must submit to God's will, and you know in what hands I am.' Then turning to your father [i.e. Fanshawe] he said, 'Be sure, Dick, to tell my son all I have said, and deliver those letters to my wife; pray God bless her! I hope I shall do well;' and taking him in his arms, said, 'Thou hast ever been an honest man, and I hope God will bless thee and make thee a happy servant to my son, whom I have charged in my letter to continue his love and trust to you;' adding 'I do promise you that if ever I am restored to my dignity I will bountifully reward you both for your service and sufferings.' Thus did we part from that glorious sun, that within a few months after was murdered to the great grief of all Christians that were not forsaken by God. 9

9 Lady Fanshawe, Memoirs, pp. 75-76.
The instructions issued by Charles I to Fanshawe as the King's ambassador to Spain were signed October 9, 1647, at the time when the King was allowed to meet with his council for the last time. It was perhaps one of the last official acts of the King, for within a month he had fled to Carisbrook.

The way in which the instructions provided for the Fanshawes' maintenance in Spain is particularly interesting. At this time, of course, the Crown had not even the funds necessary for its own support, let alone that of ambassadors. A shipload of salted Irish fish had been consigned some years previously in the King's name to one Philip Jackson, an English merchant at Bilbao in Spain. The fish had obviously been sold, but the money due the King had neither been paid nor accounted for. Fanshawe now was empowered by warrant to "demand and receive from him [Jackson] in our name all such sums of money and other proceeds of the same fish which shall be found due unto us by the said account." The warrant went on to state that if Fanshawe judged the sum adequate to maintain him until the Crown was in a position to send him funds, he was to present his credentials "unto our brother of Spain, expressing in our name the high and particular value we have of his Majesty's person and

friendship, and our earnest desire to continue the peace and good correspondence established betwixt the two Crowns. The instructions offered a further suggestion to Fanshawe for raising the money—literally to beg, borrow or steal it. "We shall account the procuring and furnishing of the same for such a purpose a testimony of great zeal to our service both in you and in any that shall assist you therewith." If such measures bore fruit Fanshawe was assured that he would be reimbursed at forty shillings a day, a sum allowed for all ambassadors, "it having never been our intention to allow you less than we had done to other men for the same service." If Jackson would not pay his debt to the English king, Fanshawe was to take the case to the King of Spain and his ministers for justice. The instructions closed with further admonitions for Fanshawe to work to maintain the peace between the two countries and to protect the rights of English merchants in Spanish waters and ports.

Needless to say a mission based on such a house of cards structure as this one was could only be doomed to failure. Indeed, the mission was never carried out, for the monarchy in England came to an end soon after, and

11 Ibid., p. 2.
12 Ibid., p. 2.
Cromwell came to power. The one value Richard Fanshawe did receive from the appointment was that, when at a later date royal contact was reestablished, he was immediately drafted by Charles, then in exile, to represent him in the peninsula.

The Fanshawes went to France in 1648 carrying the messages from Charles I to Queen Marie and the Prince of Wales. In September of that year Fanshawe was ordered by Prince Charles to act as treasurer to the fleet under Prince Rupert which was then gathering off Ireland. Prince Rupert was in command of that part of the fleet loyal to the Crown and was engaged in a series of attempts, none of them successful, to raise armies or funds for the Stuart cause. Within a few months the plan for rallying Ireland failed and the Fanshawes along with other Royalists fled in the advance of Cromwell's army. The importance of Fanshawe's work as viewed by Cromwell is intimated by Lady Fanshawe in her memoirs. "But when the rebels went to give an account to Cromwell of their meritorious act, he immediately asked them where Mr. Fanshawe was? They replied, he was that day gone to Kinsale. Then he demanded where his papers and his family were? At which they all stared at one another, but made no reply. Their general said 'It was as much worth to have seized his papers as the town; for I did make account to have known by
them what these parts of the country are worth."

There was hardly a court in Europe from which Charles II did not beg assistance at one time or another. An account of the prospects and hopes for help was sent by Secretary Nicholas to the Marquis of Ormonde:

1) From the M. of Montrose’s endeavors in Denmark, Germany and other parts therabouts, where (it’s said) he will raise 3,000 men and these (it’s hoped) are in good forwardness. 2) The King of Poland hath promised to send the King 4,000 men at his own charge to any place; but in this I have no great belief. 3) The Emperor of Muscovy (it’s hoped) will supply the King with about £5,000 which not long since was lent him by the late King’s means. 4) There is likewise hopes that the King of Spain will lend his Majesty a good sum of money. 5) From France there is nothing to be expected. 6) From Holland, all is rather against than for the King. 7) The Queen of Sweden hath furnished the King with 10,000 arms and munitions proportionable; whereof one half is assigned to the M. of Montrose; the other is designed for Ireland, but these are engaged for above £1,000.

Nicholas’s asides and comments on the poor possibilities of some of these prospective succors to the exiled King were prophetic. One by one they failed to materialize, but Charles only raised new hopes and sent his envoys to plead in another place.

13 Lady Fanshawe, Memoirs, pp. 84-85.

In 1649 Richard Fanshawe was sent on a special mission to Spain to ask for more money and for any material aid Philip IV might be willing to offer the exiled Charles II. Letters were also sent in Fanshawe's care to Sir Edward Hyde and Lord Cottington, then resident in Madrid as ambassadors. Fanshawe was to act as secretary to their embassy. Hyde wrote to Secretary Nicholas in a tone of irritation, indicating that the embassy could have managed well enough without an added secretary.¹⁵ Hyde may have suspected that Fanshawe might have different instructions and would consequently act as a check upon Cottington and himself. Later Hyde informed his wife from Madrid of the arrival of the Fanshawes:

That thou mayst see how ill a husband I am in comparison of others, we have a whole English family coming to this town. Dick Fanshawe, whom I gave over for lost in Ireland, this last night wrote to me, that he and his wife are landed at Malaga, twelve days' journey from hence, and are coming hither as fast as they can. What they will do here, or how they will be able to live, God knows; that woman will undo him; if he had come by himself he should have been with us, and wanted nothing, but he need have brought good store of money with him to keep such a train.¹⁶

¹⁵ Hyde to Nicholas, May 4, 1649, Clarendon State Papers, III, p. 4.

¹⁶ Hyde to Lady Hyde, Mar. 25, 1650, Calendar of Manuscripts of the Marquis of Bath (H. M. C.), II, p. 89.
It was not long until the ambassadors as well as Fanshawe were aware that there was nothing to gain in Spain. The Spaniards put off the envoys with polite phrases, indicating that ready cash was as short with them as it was with Charles. All that the Englishmen could obtain was more words and good professions given in the greatest solemnity by the Spanish King and his ministers.

So Fanshawe left Spain to bring the dismal news to the hopeful Charles. Lady Fanshawe hurried ahead to England to raise money for their own expenses, for the stay in Spain had cost them all they had. Of these money problems she wrote later to her son: "Yet this I will tell you, praise be to God for his peculiar grace therein, that your father nor I ever borrowed money nor owed for clothes, nor diet, nor lodging beyond sea in our lives, which was very much, considering the straits we were in many times, and the bad custom our countrymen had that way, which did redound much to the King's dishonour and their own discredit."  

In September, 1650, Fanshawe was created a baronet, and soon thereafter was appointed secretary to Charles II. Charles had been declared King in Scotland, and immediately set about raising an army there. To placate

the Scots he even took the oath to support the Solemn
League and Covenant, a thing Sir Richard refrained from
doing. But the King found it impossible to unite the
Royalist and Presbyterian factions of Scotland toward a
single purpose. Indeed, there were not enough Scots
who could set aside their personal and party jealousies
in the King's interest to form a dependable council. 18

By the end of August, 1651, however, Charles decided
to march his army to meet the Parliament forces under
Cromwell. He had no more than fifteen thousand men while
Cromwell was approaching with thirty thousand. 19 The
Scots matched the Roundheads in gallantry but in nothing
else. The battle began outside the city of Worcester and
finally ended in the city streets. The King's army was
outgeneralled and outfought. The last battle of the
Civil Wars was over and the Royalist army destroyed.
Among the higher officials captured in the battle was Sir
Richard Fanshawe, the King's secretary. 20

18 John Drinkwater, Mr. Charles, King of England (New
York, 1926), p. 119.

20 C. J. Lyon, Personal History of Charles II (Edinburgh,
1851), p. 224.
Sir Richard was brought with other prisoners to London, where Lady Fanshawe managed to see him and where she at once began to address Cromwell in an effort to effect a release. Cromwell, she said, "had a great respect for Sir Richard and would have bought him off to his services upon any terms." Finally, Fanshawe was released under house arrest on a bail of £4,000.

The Fanshawes lived in Hertfordshire and Yorkshire for several years, and finally moved near London where Sir Richard had to report each month to the Court of Justice. In 1655 the Fanshawes were allowed to return to Hertfordshire, and there in October, 1658, they learned of Cromwell's death. During that seven years Sir Richard had his estates confiscated for treason. He spent the time at literary work, and stayed scrupulously away from the plots and counterplots and useless attempts made from time to time to bring Charles II back to England.

While a prisoner on parole in England, Sir Richard had not been able to communicate with his friends abroad. Upon the Protector's death the Earl of Pembroke secured his bond and Fanshawe went to France as tutor for Pembroke's son, Lord Herbert.

Fanshawe's first action upon landing on the continent was to write to Hyde, then in Brussels, asking to be remembered to the King and to make arrangements to go to him if Charles so desired. Lady Fanshawe insisted that at some previous time Charles II had assured her husband that he would be one of the secretaries of state. Now Fanshawe hinted to Hyde about the possibility of the appointment, since there was more than a chance that England would welcome back the King. In the course of their correspondence Hyde chided Fanshawe for his long silence, saying that while he was on parole he must have passed up several opportunities to write to the King or himself to refresh their memories of his ambition.

I enlarge myself the more upon this, because by that omission, and for want of your friends knowing your mind and your right, one thing hath passed to your prejudice to the old resident here, and when I read your letter to the King, he was the most out of countenance I ever saw him, and had as absolutely forgot, indeed remembered no more of his engagement to you than of anything was done the day he was born; and I must again tell you, it cannot be enough wondered at that you would not, during the time of your stay in England, when you had frequent opportunities, or at your first coming over, be sure that the King should be put in mind of your presence, which had determined all other.

Your master is as kind to you as you can wish, and what is at present gone will quickly again be yours; all the rest you have for the asking, though nothing shall be done in it till we meet, because I think we have somewhat better in view for you.

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23 Hyde to Fanshawe, April 30, 1659, Heathcote MSS. (H. M. C.), pp. 7-8.
The secretaryship went to a Mr. Norris, a Presbyterian and one not known to the King. Sir Richard had to
content himself with two offices, one the Master of
Requests and the other an honorary place as Secretary
of the Latin Tongue. In the latter office Fanshawe
could expect only prestige, but in the former Hyde
assured him he would have the King's ear for three
months of the year and that the position was second
only to that of secretary of state. He could easily
make six or seven hundred pounds a year, said Hyde,
even if he never offered any suit for himself. 24

When Charles II made his entry into England, Fanshawe
at the King's request crossed the Channel in the royal
ship. Almost as soon as the entourage reached London,
Lady Fanshawe appeared at court "to congratulate his
Majesty's happy arrival; (the King) who received me
with great grace, and promised me future favors to my
husband and self. His Majesty gave my husband his
picture, set with small diamonds, when he was a child;
it is a great rarity, because there never was another." 25

And so the Fanshawes, along with thousands of others,
began to devote themselves to the serious task of

24 "I received the New Year's gifts belonging to his
places (Sir Richard), which is the custom, of two tuns
of wine at the Custom House for Master of Requests, and
fifteen ounces of gilt plate at the Jewel House, as
Secretary of the Latin Tongue." Heathcote, iii, ftn.

25 Lady Fanshawe, Memoirs, p. 122.
constant attendance at court in order to keep fresh in the King's mind that they were ready for any marks of favor that Charles might show them.

Sir Richard occupied a conspicuous post in the coronation procession, riding "upon his Majesty's left hand with very rich footcloths, and four men in very rich liveries." \(^{26}\) A short time later he was elected to represent Cambridge University in the House of Commons. But his greatest honors were yet to come. As soon as Charles II announced his intention to marry, Fanshawe entered upon the most important phase of his service thus far to the Stuart Kings.

When the Portuguese proposal for a marriage of the Infanta Catherine to Charles II was put forward, two chief protests to such an alliance were voiced in England. In the first place a great many of the ministers and advisors objected to the Catholic princess because of her religion. The Portuguese ambassador hastened to point out that she was "totally without that meddling and activity in her nature, which many times made those of that religion troublesome and restless when they came into a country where another religion was practiced; that she had been bred under a wise mother who kept her from affecting to have any hand in business, and which she had never been acquainted with; so that she would look only to enjoy her own religion, and not at all concern herself in what others professed." English Catholics also thought that a Protestant queen who owed her position to Spain would be more useful to them than a Catholic queen from a country whose independence was not recognized by the Pope. In the second place, other advisors of the King pointed out that a Portuguese marriage would make a war with Spain inevitable. Charles knew that his kingdom was not prepared for a war with that power, but when the

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terms of the marriage agreement were made known with regard to the size of the dowry and the added cession of Tangier and Bombay, Charles determined to run the risk of a war. He thought, and reasonably so, that the value of Tangier and Bombay was worth even more than the dowry, and that the control of these two strategic places would allow England to recover an influence in the Indies and the Mediterranean which she had lost during the Civil Wars. England's position in her competition with the Dutch in those areas would certainly be strengthened by the acquisition of Tangier and Bombay. For this reason chiefly Charles II stood firm in rejecting any of the other marriage possibilities offered to him. Even the fact that English troops in the service of Portugal would be expected to be used against Spain did not alter his views. He felt that he could support his brother-in-law of Portugal and still maintain peace with Spain. But if Spain wanted war, then it must come. If England went to war with Spain, Parliament would have to finance it. On that score Charles could be sure of himself, for a war with Spain had always been popular in England since Elizabeth's time.

Ambassadors began to hurry back and forth between London and Lisbon. Among those sent from London was Sir Richard Fanshawe, who carried letters to Catherine of
Braganza and also brought her a portrait of Charles II.

The letter from Charles to his affianced read in part:

The bearer of this, Sir Richard Fanshawe, who has served me for many years faithfully and honourably, ... is going ambassador extraordinary to yourself, to assure you of my infinite affection and to arrange for your arrival here with all possible speed. He would attend you on your journey, were it not that being appointed to our common service, he must, as matters now stand, fit himself at once for the office of resident ambassador at the court of Lisbon, when he has, with all due respect, seen you embark and under sail in my fleet, which the Earl of Sandwich will soon bring to anchor in your port. He is the bearer of orders and all that is needful for the performance of my wishes with regard to the marriage ceremonies deemed necessary before we see each other, as also in regard to your coming hither, and I pray you to give entire faith and credit to what he says in my behalf. 2

Beside the prosaic task of carrying letters and a portrait, Fanshawe had other duties to carry out. After the exchange of ratification, he was to arrange for the surrender of Bombay to the English fleet that would sail in November, and to ask that the Portuguese factory at Bassein should go with it; to urge more concessions regarding English factories in India; and to suggest that Goa be given to England to prevent the Dutch from having it. Discussions were to be opened which would seek for England the monopoly of purchasing and shipping the Brazil sugar crop and at which Fanshawe was to register a protest against

2 Charles II to Catherine of Braganza, Aug. 21(?), 1661, Heathcote MSS., (H. M. C.), p. 17.
a clause in a newly signed Portuguese-Dutch treaty which gave Holland equal privileges with England in the South American trade. 8

Fanshawe could accomplish little in 1661 in the way of carrying out his assignment. Ordered to see the Queen aboard her ship and to stay on in Lisbon as resident ambassador, Sir Richard took matters in his own hands and returned to England for the Christmas holidays. It was useless to stay on, he felt, and work on these new tasks when there was so much to do concerning the dowry and Tangier. 4 Catherine was delayed because the dowry had not been paid. The treaty provided that before she sailed one half of the dowry should be paid in specie, sugar, diamonds and merchandise. Portugal was unable to raise the money and on the plea of Catherine Sandwich accepted a great quantity of sugar. But then the Earl was delayed as he tried to find bottoms to ship it in.

3 Feiling, pp. 49-50.


5 Prestage, p. 151.
Catherine of Braganza, accompanied by the Earl of Sandwich, finally sailed on April 15, 1662, and arrived at Portsmouth where the marriage took place on May 21st.

Returning to Portugal in September, 1662, Sir Richard found the war between that country and Spain at its height. King John IV had died in 1656 and his wife Luisa de Guzman was regent for their son, Alfonso. By arranging the English marriage for her daughter the Queen-Regent had enlisted the sympathies of England and welcomed the army sent by Charles as assuring the salvation of Portugal. Concerning the arrival of the troops—three thousand foot and one thousand horse under Inchiquin, she wrote to Charles II: "They come at a very opportune time, for most people declare that the enemy will go to war this year as they have done in all former ones. May your Majesty live a thousand years for your remembrance of me and the troubles of this kingdom. The Earl [Inchiquin], the troops and the ships shall all have good entertainment, not only as regards the payment which you demanded, but in everything, as the ministers of the King, my son, will not be wanting in anything they believe to be for the service and pleasure of your Majesty." As long as the Queen—

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6 Before leaving for Portugal, Sir Richard was also made Privy Councillor for Ireland. In the short period that had elapsed since Charles II was restored, Fanshawe had managed to secure for himself several important and lucrative posts which must have compensated for any loss he had suffered during the period of the Civil Wars.

7 Luisa to Charles II, June 22, 1662, Heathcote MSS.
Regent Luisa held power, English interests would not suffer. By arranging the English marriage the Queen-Regent of Portugal incurred the hatred of her unstable son and the anti-English party in Lisbon. During Fanshawe's mission Alfonso took over the government and sent his mother to a convent. There followed a reversal of policy which almost wrecked the alliance of Portugal and England.

One month after Fanshawe's return to Portugal King Alfonso summoned the English ambassador and announced his acceptance of an offer made by Charles II to act as mediator to end the Spanish-Portuguese war. Alfonso insisted that the treaty should be between the two Kings of Portugal and Castile; second, that the King of England should be mediator; third, that there be a cessation of arms; and fourth, that plenipotentiaries were to meet at some place on the border of the two countries.

Fanshawe reported to Lord Clarendon that the Spaniards wanted the Pope to mediate, but that they would accept Charles II. Portugal insisted on the English king and not the Pope, for the simple reason that the Pope had never recognized the independence of that country, and it was felt that the power of England and the display of military support to Portugal would be effective in bringing peace and improving the condition of Portugal. Spain, however, refused to accept the conditions, chiefly the one which
referred to the ruler of Portugal as King. To admit that term would be to recognize the independence of Portugal. 8

While the truce negotiations dragged on Fanshawe reported to his government on a matter of immediate concern to England. Sir Richard wrote that the Portuguese King could not support the English troops serving him, and yet offered "no ports, either as pawns in repayment or as safe landing places for our men." 9 By the terms of the marriage treaty Alfonso was committed to pay and maintain the English forces, but the responsibility often was shirked and fell to Charles II. This naturally caused strained relations between England and Portugal. One of the possibilities mentioned for bringing about peace between Spain and Portugal was the payment of a tribute by Portugal to Spain. Fanshawe concluded: "One useful argument we may draw from this, that if Portugal can pay Castile she can also pay our Queen's dowry and reimburse the King for what he spends in a quarrel in which he has no personal concern." 10 This question of the dowry was not a deep concern of the Portuguese prime minister, who pointed out to Fanshawe that "after-payments of Queens' portions are not usually exacted with rigour in all

10 Fanshawe to Clarendon, Oct. 28, 1662, ibid., p. 40.
8 Fanshawe to Clarendon, Oct. 20, 1662, ibid., p. 36.
points, for that he thought the Queen-Mother's of England was never all paid, or not till very late. By 1668 not over £157,000 of the dowry had been paid to England.

French activity in Portugal during the period of Fanshawe's service there was designed to win Portuguese support for Louis XIV's ambitions in Spain. French spies and agents were very active, and rumors of their machinations were passed on to England as soon as Fanshawe learned of them. One such rumor had it that France was offering to lend Portugal twenty thousand troops in case a treaty of peace could not be obtained from Spain.

To apply which, though twenty thousand men be too great a number to believe at once, either for France to spare or much less for Portugal to accept, considering that whenever the French King could have a title to the Crown of Spain he would consequently have a pretence to this of Portugal, and in truth methought this gentleman [a French agent] looked today so wistfully upon and talked so concernedly of the great beauty and commodious-ness of this desert port [Lisbon]—of which I have a perfect and close view from my house—as if he thought his master—if it were his—could find money enough in France to people it with ships; yet something considerable of that kind is undoubtedly either intended or pretended by the French to stop their proceedings in the peace.

The French plan was to support Portugal in order to prolong the war and bleed Spain as much as possible. France

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12 Felling, p. 51.

13 Fanshawe to Clarendon, Nov. 6, 1662, Heathcote MSS. (R. M. C.), p. 41.
even proposed a marriage, Fanshawe heard, between the
King of Portugal and a daughter of the Duc d'Orleans
in an attempt to bind Portugal to French policy.

The position of British interests in Portugal in
1662 was precarious. The country was ruled by a madman
whose pro-English subjects despised him; France was
working to supersede English influence at the Portuguese
court as part of her plan to upset the balance of power
in Europe, a fact that Clarendon persistently ignored
until too late; and, perhaps most important at the time
to Charles, the dowry that made Catherine so attractive
was still unpaid.

A matter of some concern to England during Fanshawe's
embassy was the condition of the English troops stationed
in Portugal. By the terms of the marriage treaty Alfonso
and not Charles was responsible for their support and
maintenance. The soldiers were misused and starved and
many deserted because they would not serve under Inchiquin,
an Irishman. These "Cromwell's whelps" insisted that "if
Jesus Christ were an Irishman they would not obey him."14
Fanshawe found the English troops in a state bordering on
mutiny because of their treatment by Alfonso and because
their pay was frequently in arrears as much as six months.

14 Feiling, p. 170.
To encourage the troops in Portugal Charles II frequently paid them part of their arrears with the dribbles of dowry money that from time to time were extracted from Alfonso. But such palliatives could provide only a temporary relief to the problem of maintaining morale among the troops. "The English troops are yet together by reason of one month's pay at this present coming unto them in the frontiers, but in such a mouldering, perishing, discontented fashion as gives me no confidence of their continuing so a fortnight longer." 15

The English commander in Portugal, the Earl of Inchiquin, reported to London that, owing to the change in Portuguese policy under Alfonso and to the type of ministers with which the English ambassador must deal, Fanshawe should not be held responsible for any reverses which England might suffer. Fanshawe was assured that this was clearly understood in England and that he should not be discredited as a result of the course affairs might take. 16 Nevertheless, Sir Richard sent a request to England for more troops and for naval support. Clarendon answered at length on the subject of further aid to Portugal, and pointed out concretely why it was impossible:


16 Inchiquin to Fanshawe, Dec. 29, 1662, ibid., p. 54.
I assure you I have been as solicitous both in sickness and in health for the good of Portugal as I could possibly be, and I endeavour nothing effectually but by secret and underhand treating with France, for which I have had a good opportunity and of which you will find very good effect. I do very freely confess to you that the prospect you presented to us was very dismal, and the expedients you proposed very unpracticable. We never had the least imagination that there could be any reality in the treaty from Spain, and had all moral assurance to the contrary, and by this time I hope you are all undeceived. All the overtures made by you did suppose us to be in a condition very different from what ours is, and from what I did conceive you could imagine it possible to be. Alas, my Lord, we have no money to send fleets or troops upon adventures; nor can anybody imagine that the burden of a war with Portugal can be sustained upon the weak shoulders of the Crown of England. The King hath—with difficulty enough—been able to set out a fleet now to assist that kingdom, but if care be not taken there for the payment of the remainder of the portion, the King will have little encouragement or—in truth—ability to continue that expense, and if Portugal doth not manage their war—in the order and the conduct of it—more to the satisfaction of their neighbors they will not long be able to draw help from them. I hope they will gain more reputation this next campaign than they have done; you will easily believe the news of the treatment our English troops have had there is very small encouragement to make new levies here, and to imagine that the King can send troops from hence and take care for the payment of them there is ridiculous, so that they/the Portuguese/ must either resolve to have no need of foreign troops or to provide to have means to pay them punctually. For the present the King is contented, out of compassion to his poor troops, that out of the money due to him you do procure so much as may make up the pay allowed there to amount to our own establishment, which we suppose is a third part more than they allow there, so that you must
press so much of the King's money as may raise the payment of Portugal to our own establishment of three months, and if in that time they do not take care to make effectual provision for the troops, the King must provide to bring them away, which will put an end to all possible expectation of ever raising a man for that service.17

The Portuguese army was successful in an engagement in which the English troops under Schomberg played a conspicuous part. In reply to the chiding that had come from Clarendon, Fanshawe excused himself by saying that the Comte de Schomberg, a French marshal now in command of the foreign troops in the service of Portugal, had been of the same mind and added: "I did not discern that powerful succour to be already here whilst I was soliciting for it, or believe it possible that a beheaded remnant with so many discouragements to boot could have proved such instruments of good, for which infidelity of mine I humbly crave his Majesty's pardon and theirs."18

In the last successes of the campaign the English troops proved themselves to be the backbone of the Portuguese army. Fanshawe only echoed Clarendon when he expressed doubt to Schomberg that the English would stay, let alone have reinforcements arrive, unless some developed in Portuguese attitude. "Some gallant officers have expressed

17 Clarendon to Fanshawe, April 12, 1663, ibid., pp. 75-76.
18 Fanshawe to Bennet, June 5, 1663, ibid., p. 110.
fear that when our troops know that I am leaving the country, they will ask my leave to return to England also; but to this I have answered that 'they came not hither because I was here, for I was not then here; why should they quit because I went, especially since it was to serve them better.' Moreover, not one of them who have gone asked my leave, knowing that I had no authority to give it.\(^\text{19}\)

Clarendon's misunderstanding of England's position in foreign affairs stands out clearly in his long indictment of Fanshawe for asking more troops for Portugal. Physically the King's chief minister was on the point of collapse. For weeks at a time he was bed-ridden with gout, and on this score alone his contact with his envoys abroad grew less intimate. His fear of another rebellion in England was constantly foremost in his mind, and certainly no one knew more of the jerry-built nature of the Stuart political structure than did Clarendon. But he made the mistake of looking to France for support, and was dead wrong in overlooking the importance of French meddling in Portuguese affairs. He could not foresee that France and not Spain soon would prove England's real enemy.

\(^{19}\) Fanshawe to the Comte de Schomberg, July 24, 1658, \textit{ibid.}, p. 126.
There could have been no doubt in Fanshawe's mind after receiving Clarendon's vitriolic letter that English resources were very limited and English patience exhausted with the dealings of Alfonso. Apparently Fanshawe had been gullible, or at least he had so convinced himself of the importance of his mission that he looked upon his work in Portugal as of cardinal importance in the development of British foreign policy. Clarendon had indicated clearly that if there were any more trouble with Portugal, that nation would find herself deserted by her one and only friend. But it was also obvious that Fanshawe had never been given all the facts and interpretations that were being used by Clarendon. It was a clear example of the lack of understanding on principal aims that frequently muddled the diplomacy of the Clarendon years.

Meanwhile, the French were becoming more involved than ever before in Portugal, and Sir Henry Bennet, the secretary of state, suggested that Fanshawe watch and report on every movement they made in Lisbon. But Bennet's suspicions were not shared by the Lord Chancellor, Clarendon. In another long communication from London Fanshawe was informed how much Clarendon discounted French meddling. The Lord Chancellor tried to calm Fanshawe by urging that
no matter what course France took England must still benefit. If the French thought they could mediate and umpire the proposed peace, let them do it. They could have the glory and the trouble that went with it. All England wanted was to have Portugal supported against Spain and if France chose to help, England would be grateful. Trade was excellent with Portugal and her colonies and would continue to be so as long as Spain did not dominate Portugal. 20

Clarendon's impatience with Portuguese duplicity appeared on another occasion involving the fulfillment of the marriage treaty. Lord Marlborough had been sent to India to take possession of Bombay, but the viceroy of Goa refused to turn it over to him as the official representative of England. Clarendon was bitterly incensed at this.

The act is so foul that less than the head of the man cannot satisfy for the indignity, and for the damage his Majesty will expect and exact notable reparation; and if some sudden satisfaction be not given there will be an end of our alliance with Portugal, for the King hath no patience in the consideration of it; and must conclude that this viceroy, transported on our own ships from Lisbon, must carry the instructions with him which produce this foul act, of which the excuses are so childish. If the King of Portugal be in truth offended with what is done he will immediately send away and take care that the first news we hear from thence is that

20 Clarendon to Fanshawe, May 16, 1663, ibid., pp. 89-90.
Sir Abraham Shipman [designated English commander of the island of Bombay] is in possession of the island. If this be not done with all the circumstances of reparation, farewell the friendship with Portugal, and they are not to wonder if they hear that we and the Dutch are united in the East Indies, and that we do all to their prejudice.

This breach of the settlement treaty was taken up with the Conde de Castelmelhor, the Portuguese secretary of state, who asked Fanshawe what should be done to satisfy England. Fanshawe insisted on no less punishment than had been suggested by Clarendon, and added that the Portuguese might as well turn over to England the city of Bassein as well as the island of Bombay. Alfonso "ordered fresh letters to be sent with all speed," but declined to turn over another port.

Negotiations for a treaty between the warring peninsular powers were reopened, and Fanshawe received instructions from England to be present as the representative of Charles II so long as he was treated by the Spaniards with the respect due his position. This posed a problem to Fanshawe. "Then shall I be in a dilemma, whether to go or stay, or how to carry myself if I do go, as I have in my former discourse to your Lordship, having commission and credentials to the King of Spain sufficient,

22 Castelmelhor to Fanshawe, June 10, 1663, ibid., p. 116.
21 Clarendon to Fanshawe, May 16, 1662, ibid., pp. 51-52.
but no instructions thereupon. Of the possible treaty Fanshawe observed: "No clocks in a great city do differ so much from one another as opinions concerning a peace do here in several frontiers."23

The English ambassador in Lisbon faced a personal problem not unlike the one facing his King to which he was seeking a solution. The King was demanding in abrupt terms the dowry due from Portugal. Fanshawe, in a series of letters addressed to his brother-in-law, Sir Philip Warwick,24 pressed his own need of money. He wanted the salary due him from his offices of Latin Secretary and Master of Requests, and the salary, long in arrears, due him as ambassador. He noted the amount owed him as totalling £1,260, adding, "I could not have thought it possible for me to have subsisted so long without any of the moneys due me from the Exchequer." If he had solicited the place or had expected title or preferment from it, he would not complain. When influential people in both England and Portugal had shrugged it off as impossible, he had succeeded in getting much of the dowry paid. It was his final triumph that the Portuguese King "hath expressly owed and given earnest for the whole

24 Sir Philip was secretary to the Lord Treasurer, the Earl of Southampton.
remainder of the portion, with many obliging expressions
to boot in reference thereto, which I have to shew in
black and white. Of one thing, however, I must warn you,
yig., that this King having raised the value of gold and
intending to raise that of silver will probably wish to
pay it at the raised value, which would defraud us of a
fourth, to which I will never consent without his Majesty's
express orders. I do assure you without vanity, if either
a rougher fellow or a tamer fellow than myself had had the
soliciting of this matter, he might well have been a great
while longer at it without any token either of earnest or
acknowledgment. 25

To pay his bills and meet the expenses of his embassy
Fanshawe followed the orders given him in his instructions.
Charles had authorized him "to receive and detain in your
hands, out of the dowry monies, the sum of £____ sterling
by way of advance for the ordinary allowance of the first
half of your embassy at £3 per diem." When all attempts
to get his salary paid failed, he resorted to this means
to meet his pressing debts. 26

25 Fanshawe to Warwick, March 20, 1663, ibid., pp. 68-69.
Like most others in Restoration England, Sir Richard was not
overly modest. While he claimed he had not sought the
position as ambassador, Fanshawe had spent his life seeking
first one preferment and then another.

26 Charles II to Fanshawe, August, 1661, ibid., p. 21.
By the end of summer, 1663, Fanshawe had accomplished all that was possible in the way of speeding up payment of the Queen's dowry, and felt the need to consult with the King and Clarendon about his role as mediator in the approaching negotiations between Portugal and Spain. As soon as he returned to England he addressed the King about the forthcoming peace conference, and took the opportunity to add a plea for payment of the arrears owed him:

My payments may be large and punctual as the weight of the negotiations require, since if I am not well paid I am ruined, whereas if I am, I am not enriched, being obliged for your Majesty's honour and service to live up to it. And to live splendidly in a remote country whilst I am representing my master can only serve me—without God's mercy—to endanger me to a habit or expectation of spending beyond a slender estate another day, creating in one a vanity just enough, but which will no more feed me hereafter than I have done that hitherto; my present fortune in the meantime lying fallow and neglected, and my domestic relations perhaps either dying away or forgetting me, or at least the present comfort of them—and above all, that of your Majesty's presence denied me.27

Fanshawe came back to England with an apology from Alfonso for the arrears of the dowry payment, but insisting that conditions in Portugal made it impossible for further payment at the time. The Portuguese king praised the talents of Sir Richard and asked that he be employed to negotiate a peace with Spain. Five months later Fanshawe was on his way to Madrid.

27 Fanshawe to Charles II, September (?), 1663, ibid., p. 131.
IV
EMBASSY TO SPAIN

Sir Richard Fanshawe's embassy to Spain from 1664 to 1666 was most frequently concerned with the attitudes, policy and influence of France. In the tangle of European politics Holland, Spain and England all hedged on foreign policy decisions until France's stand or action became clear before committing themselves to a policy or program geared to France's ambition and determination to upset the balance of power.

Clarendon had closely allied England with France. The Portuguese marriage had antagonized Spain, and the sale of Dunkirk back to the French had further weakened the relations with both Spain and Holland. In spite of his diplomatic moves favoring France, however, Clarendon found that nation associated in a defensive league with England's commercial rival, Holland.

Sir Henry Bennet, later Lord Arlington, had succeeded Sir Edward Nicholas as secretary of foreign affairs. Clarendon found him an enemy to his French policy, since Bennet was pro-Spanish and was widely known as such in European courts. Bennet had under his jurisdiction the English relations with Spain, France, Portugal, the Dutch, Flanders, Italy, Savoy, Turkey, Barbary and the Indies.
Consequently he was in a position to influence British foreign policy decisively in western Europe, the Mediterranean and the Far East. Since Bennet was in high favor with Charles II and his court, he had added power which the other secretary, Morice, lacked. Clarendon could do little but accept the change which Bennet brought, and attempt to cover his personal dislike for him.

Bennet was willing to extend the protection of England to Spain against possible future aggression of France, but the price he exacted was high, as the instructions to Fanshawe for his embassy to Spain clearly indicate. It was impossible to expect Spain to throw open her closely guarded empire to British enterprise as long as England gave military assistance to the Portuguese; on the other hand it was equally impossible for Charles II to renounce the treaty by which he had promised that assistance. Bennet saw a peace or at least a truce between Spain and Portugal as the only way out, while Spain insisted that before any further mediation was possible, Portugal must be abandoned and Tangier and Jamaica restored to Spain.¹

As to France, however, Bennet found himself in difficulties. Charles II's every inclination was toward that nation. Louis XIV was bound by treaty to aid the Dutch in a defensive war, but in the Anglo-Dutch wars that followed,

both countries claimed the other the aggressor, and the French engagement to the Dutch was not difficult to evade. So Bennet set aside his Spanish policy and turned to France. England hoped first to arrange a commercial treaty and then to offer to abandon Spain in any contest between that crown and France for the Spanish Netherlands. In return, Louis XIV was to renounce his league with the Dutch. Much as Louis XIV wanted a treaty of alliance with England, his intentions toward Flanders caused him to give sufficient support to the Dutch so as to satisfy the terms of their treaty. Bennet turned again to Spain.

By such maneuvering Bennet found he had no alliances on the continent with the exception of the Bishop of Münster who promptly attacked the Dutch. This effort would last, Bennet and all Europe knew, only until France sent troops to aid the Dutch. Such, briefly, was the state of affairs in Europe during Fanshawe's embassy to Spain. He first found himself in a strong position to dictate England's terms, but as the months went by he lost the initiative and the embassy degenerated to a muddle of affairs that could only be cleared by a fresh policy and a new ambassador.

Fanshawe departed from Portugal in August, 1663, leaving the Consul Waynard to fill the gap until Sir Robert
Southwell arrived in January, 1666. What little had been accomplished by Fanshawe was quickly undone by Maynard, who made himself so unpopular in Portugal that Castelmelhor, the chief Portuguese minister, asked for and obtained his recall. When Sir Richard arrived in Madrid in June, 1664, he had not only the Spanish embassy to see to, but he was responsible for the affairs in Portugal as they related to England. Since the existence of Portugal was dependent on foreign aid, and principally aid from England, the affairs of Portugal were foremost on Fanshawe’s agenda. Sir Richard’s presence in Spain was partly the result of a Portuguese request, so he was obliged to continue his effort to untie the knot of Spanish Portuguese relations.

His instructions were long and specific in detail. Fanshawe was to impress the Spanish court with the view that France only waited an opportunity to fall upon Spain, to which end she had made advances to England, and was attempting to prolong the Portuguese war by granting subsidies and military support to Alfonso. Sir Richard was instructed to attempt to force an end to the war by threatening to withdraw support from Portugal if she refused reasonable terms. No terms of an Anglo-Spanish treaty were to be discussed unless a Spanish ambassador was sent to London, but he was to sound out the Spaniards on such points as free trade, English monopoly in the West Indies, an assiento for the African
Company, to discuss a renewal of a permit to coin Spanish bullion in the English mint, and to gain a pre-emption on Spanish wool.  

In his discussions with the Spaniards Fanshawe was to use the dominant position of England in the commercial world for all it was worth, and upon fitting occasions represent to them that the monarchy of Spain is fallen to a great declination, more especially in all maritime strength, not only by having the whole kingdom of Portugal dismembered and separated from it, with all its dependencies, but into such a decay of shipping, mariners and indeed all means of entertaining their navigation and commerce with the West Indies, and the monarchy of England is proportionably elevated and raised to a strength and power infinitely superior to what it ever was, and consequently in a state of demanding not only the advantages to the fullest extent which were granted to the French, Hollanders or any other nation whatsoever.  

The wording of the lengthy "Instruction of Sir Richard Fanshawe Going Ambassador to the Catholic King" clearly indicated that England no longer sought certain privileges; she demanded them. Fanshawe had no more than present


3 Ibid., p. 4.
England's express wishes and wait for Spain to comply. If Fanshawe had been in such a position, or if England could have maintained her authoritative position, affairs would no doubt have gone as Bennet and Charles had planned. However, in the course of events England abandoned France before she had secured Spain, and the result was the Dutch war supported by Louis XIV and the eventual Anglo-French war.

The Fanshawes arrived in Spain in February, 1664 and were received and welcomed with all possible splendor at Cadiz. It was the custom of the time that when a foreign ship approached a harbor the ship fire a salute. To honor Fanshawe the more Philip IV ordered a reversal of the custom, "that the sea do first salute the land," and the port of Cadiz fired the first guns to welcome the English ambassador and his suite, "giving him to understand that only for him and the esteem I have of his person, the new things is done in this particular, and in all others which follow of entertainment and demonstration." This was only the beginning of a long series of ceremonial greetings extended to the Fanshawes. Each stop they made on their slow journey to Madrid exceeded the last in magnificence. Lavish gifts were presented to the English ambassador and his wife, who in turn gave liberally to their hosts and those who honored

4 The King of Spain to the Duke of Medina Celi, no date, Fanshawe, Letters, p. 71.
them. Fanshawe's first letters to England were rapturous of the honor and civility extended to him and his wife. The enthusiasm of the welcome gave some hint of Spain's eagerness for the friendship of England and of the ease with which Fanshawe might accomplish his mission. And the British government made capital of the welcome. Clarendon reported that the news of Fanshawe's reception had been widely publicized in England and "have made a great noise in all the Gazettes of our neighbors."5

The French ambassador seems not to have been pleased at the cordiality with which Sir Richard was welcomed. He made so bold as to ask Philip IV what need Spain had of any friend but France, and voiced "other expressions of like resentment, not without something of menace to this court [i.e., Spain]."6 However, the French ambassador was correctly polite to Fanshawe. He was civil if not cordial. Denzil, Lord Hollis, the English ambassador to France, expressed himself as "glad the French ambassador was so civil at your entry, I will also hope it was cordial; and if the Spaniards be not so in all their negotiations, I will conclude them mad and out of their wits, and the

5 Clarendon to Fanshawe, June 15, 1664, ibid., p. 161.
6 Fanshawe to Bennett, Sept. 22, 1664, ibid., p. 252. See also Cornaro to the Doge, Jan. 23, 1664, Allen B. Hinds (ed.), Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice and in other Libraries of Northern Italy (hereafter cited as Calendar of State Papers Venetian), 1661-1664 (London, 1982), p. 278.
decree gone out for their ruin, which is certain if they keep not those few friends they have, and if they disoblige any. 7 Spain's need of friends was recognized by everyone but by the Spaniards themselves, who continued to act as though Spain was the dominant power of Europe to whom all other countries must bow.

In the early days of his embassy Fanshawe was often embroiled over nice questions of diplomatic privilege. There was a long argument with the Venetian ambassador over a house which the Venetian was supposed to vacate and turn over to Fanshawe. 8 There was another drawn-out misunderstanding over whether the coaches of other ambassadors were to parade when Sir Richard was formally presented at court. 9 To Fanshawe the privileges and prerogatives of his position were sacred. His letters abound with accounts of some slight or affront to him or his servants. Bennet and Clarendon referred to this


8 See Fanshawe to Bennet, July 2, 1664; Clarendon to Fanshawe, June 15, 1664, Fanshawe, Letters, pp. 127-50, 161; Lady Fanshawe, Memoirs, p. 171.

9 See Hollis to Fanshawe, July 29, 1664; Bennet to Fanshawe, Aug. 25, 1664, Fanshawe, Letters, pp. 206, 283.
weakness frequently and in polite and diplomatic ways tried to calm Fanshawe. Bennet wrote: "Your former contained your complaints upon the breach of your privileges as ambassador, in which I hope you have received satisfaction before now; it were an unhappy thing if anything of that kind would now fall out to discompose us in our greater business." Always more abrupt, Clarendon pointed the matter more sharply:

But I am as glad to find that your disputes of privilege are laid asleep, which I must tell you the King believes were prosecuted with more passion and earnestness than was necessary in a conjuncture when more serious matters were to be intended; and though the privilege of ambassadors is a more tender point at Madrid than in any other court, because of the joint concerns that all of that function appear to have in any particular accident that arrives, yet if the wisdom of the masters be not very vigilant to prevent and reform the impertinence and insolence of their servants, those pretences to privilege are introductive to the greatest irregularities and extravagances and to the highest dishonour and affront to the government that can be imagined; and without doubt are founded without any colour of right and are induced in no other court."

Fanshawe's recall two years later was hastened by the fact that, in spite of frequent rebukes or hints to the contrary, he persisted in pressing his ambassadorial privilege to the detriment of the more serious tasks to which he had been assigned."

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10 Fanshawe to Arlington, Nov. 4, 1665, Fanshawe Letters, Harleian MSS. 7010 (British Museum), fol. 428b.

11 Clarendon to Fanshawe, Nov. 25, 1665, ibid., fols. 439-41.

12 Feiling, p. 176.
For the first seven months Fanshawe accomplished little other than whatever he might have won over his diplomatic prerogatives. Spain had not yet sent an ambassador to England. The secretary of state, Bennet, tried to assist Sir Richard by forwarding precise instructions on matters of detail.

As to the question your Excellency asks, whether in rigour you are to insist upon having an ambassador from Spain, actually on his way, before you enter upon your negotiations, it is not meant of the former part of it, which relates to the complaints you are to make, but of the latter, when you came to treat of Portugal, and opening the trade into the Indies. In fine, the meaning of that article is, that you should not make any considerable progress with them, till you are morally assured that they proceed in good earnest with us, of which one principal evidence must be their sending an ambassador hither. 13

This matter of a Spanish ambassador to England continued to hang fire, in spite of Bennet's precise instructions. Fanshawe's audiences always brought up the point, for he was being pressed from England on the matter. "I did hope to have heard," wrote Clarendon, "even from your arrival upon Spanish ground, that they had already designed an ambassador for this kingdom, according to promise, and you may press it upon that account, and complain if they do not give you instant satisfaction, since the King our master must look upon it as a dis-

13 Fanshawe, Letters, p. 29.
respect. I can make no doubt but they will pick upon
a man fit for the truth, and who will live better towards
us than some of their friends have lately done. 14

With England awaiting the arrival of a Spanish
ambassador, and Fanshawe's instructions reading as they
did, he could but wait. But while he waited the political
situation changed and Fanshawe was no longer in a
position to secure for England her original demands.
French activities at the Spanish court, and the advertised
success of the Dutch against the English at sea caused
Spain to dally and procrastinate with Fanshawe.

One of the perplexing problems that faced Fanshawe
during his embassy to Spain concerned Tangier. Portugal
had first captured it from the Moors in 1471. Spain took
it away in 1580, and in 1656 the Portuguese regained
control of it. At the time it was transferred to England
it was one of the principal causes for the Spanish-
Portuguese wars. England's acquisition had not settled
anything as far as Spain was concerned. The strategic
location of Tangier guarding the entrance to the Medi-
terranean made it a place of considerable importance to
any power, and especially vital to Spain.

14 Clarendon to Fanshawe, June 12, 1664, Fanshawe,
The instructions given to Fanshawe upon his assignment to Spain had included a paragraph relating to Spain's aid to the Moorish chief, Gaylan, against the British forces occupying Tangier. England knew of the relation, and while Fanshawe was not to make a point of the matter, if the opportunity arose he was to mention that England was aware of the moves Spain was making in that direction.  

Spain wanted Tangier; the Moors wanted it; the Dutch had more than a passing interest in it; the French offered to buy it; and England owned it, although her hold upon it was not yet secure. Picking up every rumor that came to him, Fanshawe reported to Bennet:

It is here strongly rumored that England will break with Holland; a person related to me, mentioning yesterday this report to the Duke of Medina de las Torres (the chief foreign policy adviser to the King of Spain), the said Duke (as likewise a very near confident of his) seemed much disturbed thereat; if these matters of fact are true, there seems the more reason to keep three eyes upon Tangier, there being two hands laid upon it already; one indeed covered, but not hid. The Earl of Clarendon may make farther guesses from the sudden discomposedness (if it were so, and upon that ground) as for one, that Spain may have already contracted secretly for those offices from Holland, which we think (and certainly with much reason) none is so able (if at all) to perform, as England.  

Whitehall was concerned. The Dutch War was brewing and any sign of an alliance between Spain and Holland would be unfortunate for England. The commander at Tangier was

15 Fanshawe, Letters, p. 20.
16 Fanshawe to Bennet, May 11, 1664, ibid., p. 79.
the Earl of Teviot whose efforts to construct a fort and mole were being obstructed by Gaylan. In order to have constant news from Tangier, Bennet ordered Fanshawe to establish some correspondent at Cadiz where news from Tangier would first reach Spain, because "Your Excellency is not ignorant of his Majesty's value and concernment for that place, so your letters cannot contain things more acceptable to him, than any news of it." 17

Calamity struck when Teviot with thirty-five officers and three hundred and ninety-six soldiers was ambushed by Gaylan a few miles from the fort of Tangier. When Gaylan appeared the next day before the garrison the English were able to drive him back. The work on the fortifications and mole continued. "Our lines and fortifications are so far from being raised—as the report goes in Spain—that we are still in possession of all we ever had and are actively proceeding with them." 18 By October the commander of the fort at Tangier reported that all the outworks were finished and that he did not care if the Moors chose peace or war, but as a step in the former direction he had entertained Moorish chieftains and bought cattle from them. 19 Trouble with the Moors was under control, although it was reported

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17 Bennet to Fanshawe, April 21, 1664, Fanshawe, Letters, p. 84.
19 Fitzgerald to Fanshawe, Oct. 8, 1664, ibid., p. 167.
that Gaylan was building a new town and fortifications, *and that it is not only on the advise from the King of Spain but at his proper charge, or at least wise, that he contributes very liberally thereunto; for that the workmen are paid with Spanish money, and that a Spaniard in Moorish habit is engineer, having five or six other Spaniards in Moorish habit to assist him, daily expecting great guns likewise out of Spain.*

Spain continued to trouble the English occupation of Tangier. Some Englishmen sent to Cadiz to buy lime for Tangier were imprisoned. Fanshawe demanded an explanation of the outrage and requested the release of the prisoners. When the matter was reported to London Fanshawe was instructed to stop all work on the treaty unless the prisoners were given their freedom.

Holland, too, worried the British occupation force. A Dutch fleet of twelve to eighteen vessels appeared before the harbor of Tangier and hovered about the area for a year's time. Consul Westcombe drew up a list of prizes they had taken and sold in Cadiz over a year's time. An estimated value of 332,500 pieces of eight was placed upon the goods taken from the English, but the cost to the Dutch of taking the prizes amounted to 540,000 pieces.

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20 Fitzgerald to Fanshawe, July 17, 1664, Fanshawe, Letters, p. 181.
21 Fanshawe to Bennet, Aug. 15, 1664, ibid., p. 189.
of eight. Westmore commented that "they need not brag much of the profit made upon the English nation on this coast."22

The actual enemy at Tangier was the Spanish-Dutch combination. English ships were often denied Spanish harbors, the reason given being that Spain feared the plague. Fanshawe dealt with the problem as it frequently recurred, and was finally able to report that Spanish ports were opened to both Dutch and English, although the Spaniards still allowed the Dutch to sell their English prizes in Cadiz and other port towns, contrary to the good will they professed for England.

The dealings over Tangier were some of the most successful of Fanshawe's accomplishments. This was the one field of activity where he was able to dominate with some success in England's relations with her rivals.

England abandoned Tangier in 1636, long after Fanshawe was dead, but during the time of his embassy Fanshawe did much to secure Tangier for England.

Fanshawe made his report to Bennet of his first audience with Philip IV of Spain. It was a brief meeting, for the King was ill and Fanshawe cut short the usual protestations of good wishes from his Majesty of England.

and brought up several matters which should be on any agenda for discussion. These matters concerned unfair Spanish practices toward English merchants, and to piracy by which England lost more shipping than she did in war. Fanshawe was asked to "reduce my discourse into writing," and the audience was over.23

Before any commercial treaty could be drawn up, Fanshawe and the Duke of Medina de las Torres were to review all previous treaties, even going as far back as the reign of Henry VII. Medina de las Torres thought the two countries would have no difficulty except in the case of the West Indies. "Why should his Majesty of Great Britain (to the unspeakable prejudice of the Spanish crown and nation) offer at concessions there, without the which his predecessors, and all the world beside, have contented themselves, even since the discovery thereof?" Fanshawe came to the crux of the matter when he said: "These were only half words by the by; the Duke intending nothing of treaty to begin at that time, farther than to chalk out the future method for one."24 There, as appeared numerous times later, was the axis on which the entire Anglo-Spanish negotiation turned. Without the concession of Jamaica, Spain intended to do nothing. Added to Jamaica was Tangier.

23 Fanshawe to Bennet, June 15, 1664, Fanshawe, Letters, p. 11
24 Fanshawe to Bennet, July 1, 1664, ibid., p. 125.
If these two places could be bargained for, Spain would listen to other requests from England. If England insisted upon holding these territories Spain would not negotiate. "I must beg leave hereby," wrote Fanshawe, "to prepare his Majesty not overmuch to expect free trade with the West Indies (whether general or limited) to be the issue of such a treaty, or recompense of such offices of favor and friendship as his Majesty may think fit to do the Spaniard." Fanshawe knew almost at once that England would get nothing from Spain, and wrote Bennet to that effect. The foreign office was not willing to accept Fanshawe's first hand observations. Almost from the beginning there was a feeling of futility on Fanshawe's part and an attitude of impatience from Whitehall.

Sir Richard thought he discovered no desire upon the part of Spain to make certain a strong alliance with England against a time of need. "The more I see of Spain in these times, the more strongly I am of opinion it will be hard for their monarchy to subsist long without England; and, against it impossible." As for accommodation with Portugal, "I mention not as a necessary condition (for treaty), it seeming something harsh to impose upon them a thing so much against their stomachs (tho' there are sober

25 Fanshawe to Bennet, May 27, 1664, Ibid., p. 96.
men of opinion, not a few, that they would be secretly contented to suffer a rape in that particular, whereby to save their honour, and yet comply with their necessities) unless the King our master should find it more his interest to keep the Spanish monarchy from breaking to pieces, than themselves consider it to be theirs; and withal, that this is their primum necessarium.27

The Spaniards insisted, however, that unless English aid was withdrawn from Portugal, Spain would consider no treaty with England.

Fanshawe could make any conjecture he wanted; the question of a treaty remained unsolved. Bennet complained to Fanshawe that adequate information was not arriving from him and that all England was waiting for his despatches.

He added, however:

If I were obliged to make any judgment, or to discover what I think will be the success of your negotiations, by what hath passed since your arrival at Madrid, and since your being within a small distance of it; your whole treatment since you have been upon the matter, at the end of your journey, hath been so monstrously different from the caresses you received in the way; I should think the latter proceeded only from some poor strateg to amuse the world, without the least good will, and that they yet lie to take full vengeance upon you in their future carriage, and now they have got an ambassador from us, to use him and our master with disrespect enough. If you discover that, you know, that the

27 Fanshawe to Bennet, Aug. 12, 1664, Fanshawe, Letters, pp. 189-90.
the promise they made the King was that an ambassador should come hither as soon as you arrived, and that they made him believe that they had nominated him; and you must take frequent occasions to tell them, that you have orders to leave them as soon as you find that they are weary of you. Since they have reworded your overtures so coldly, I wish that you had left it to them to have made the advance toward a treaty, and a desire of our friendship of which they will have need enough. Nor must they imagine that we will ever proceed from the foot of the last treaty, I mean that of 1630; which was never observed by them, but at last violated to that infamous degree by their alliance with Cromwell, by their refusing to renew it after the murder of our last master, and by driving us out of Madrid, and buying so many of the goods of the crown from the murderers, which they should think of honor of returning, before they should imagine it possible that we can ever hearken to an overture of restoring what we never took from them, but found the Island possessed of upon a very dear purchase; and therefore when they shall, how courteously soever, make any approach towards such extravagant demands, you will easily give them cause to believe that it will be to no purpose.

The past could not be forgotten. It was the Spaniards who had rejected the Royalists' offer in favor of the Cromwellian, and they paid the price for betraying the Stuarts by having Cromwell seize Jamaica. As long as it was Cromwell who had done so, it was not possible for the Royalists, now that they were in power again, to give it back. There was no possibility of concluding negotiations as long as Spain demanded Jamaica, Tangier and a treaty based upon those terms granted in 1630. England would not sacrifice her possessions, and since the 1630 treaty had not been favorable, she was not going to have it be the basis of a

new treaty. Medina de las Torres and Fanshawe met
frequently, only to bog down in recrimination against
each other for slights done by Englishmen to Spaniards
and vice versa. It was a hopeless situation in which
reason and common sense played no part.

Bennet planned something of a ruse to arouse Spain
from her lethargy. First, he directed some questions to
Fanshawe:

Do they not see and feel their own weakness? Have
they not had peace with all Christendom besides, for
five years past, only to intend with more vigor the
conquest of Portugal? What progress have they made
in it? Do they not see and feel the dying condition
of their King, and the young, tender and uncertain
health of their Prince? Do not they see France
with their swords drawn, ready to invade them on all
sides? What friends have they to stand by them, if
the Emperor hath made peace with the Turk; is there
not fire already kindled in Germany, in their disputes
between the Elector of Hainz and the City of Erfurt?

If, I say, to sum up, all these reflections do not
aweaken them and oblige them to turn themselves other-
wise than they do, to cultivate the King our Master's
friendship, it must be concluded, some irresistible
fate of judgment from Heaven attend that monarchy,
which their own skill cannot divert; therefore it
would become your Excellency to awake them the best
you can, and if you cannot bring them to points, in
which we can endure no delay, as the establishing the
commerce free from all trouble, and that of Tangier,
and the good usage of our fleet; you must frankly
tell them you will be gone, and to make this resolution
of yours the better believed, you must make some
seeming preparations for it, whatever it cost you, but
not finally execute it till you have an express leave
to come home.28

The Venetian ambassador passed on to his home govern-
ment an observation on Fanshawe's next move:

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28 Bennet to Fanshawe, Aug. 25, 1664, ibid., pp. 286-87.
The English ambassador is speaking to everyone about his approaching departure, but there is no sign of his doing anything definite to carry it into effect. This report which on a sudden has been spread abroad gives cause for many opinions. It is believed that he aims at arousing jealousy, at expressing dissatisfaction, at feigning grievances so that they here may decide by various means to mollify him, so that these may redound to the advantage of himself and his King. He has complained many times of the lengthy formalities with which they proceed. He has asked for a decision with some impatience. But pleasures do not suffice to live on. It may be that by protesting that he will go he is making his final effort. An important minister has said that the more the English press to obtain trade the more firmly the King should stand fast in refusing it. If the ambassador says definitely that he will go it is certain that everything possible will be done so that he may leave content. At present the objective of this crown is to avoid stirring up trouble and to preserve a clear sky in the mind of the great powers, with all diligence. 30

No one was fooled by Sir Richard's reports, and nothing was furthered to England's benefit.

Sir Richard found it difficult to impress Bennet's attitude of affairs concerning the duplicity of France upon the Spaniards. He next attempted to bring over to that view a Father Patrick O'Duffy, an Irish Franciscan, who came from Medina de las Torres. The priest and Fanshawe began all over and ran the entire gamut of the differences between the two countries. The argument became heated, and O'Duffy said: "Spain had no enemy nor expected any other. I admitted it would need no friend neither but itself; he returned, what enemy could it have considerable to the

30 Zorzi to the Doge, Dec. 16, 1664, Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, 1664-1663, p. 60.
power and greatness of Spain? I named a country not far off; that, he said, is a mere scare-crow." Fanshawe even told the priest that the French ambassador was intimidating Philip IV so that orders given were changed to please the French. 31 Medina de las Torres summoned Fanshawe and asked him in good humor if he had cooled down any since his meeting with Father O'Duffy. "I answered that at all times when at the hottest I was cooler than my instructions." 32

Fanshawe's effort to convince the Spaniards that he was leaving was wholly unsuccessful, and the Duke of Medina de las Torres recognized it for the threat it was. But Sir Richard was not happy at the prospect of leaving Spain without having fulfilled his instructions. He questioned if the foreign office was fully aware of what had been accomplished: free trade with Tangier, release of English prisoners, right of English ships to restock in Spanish ports, and above all the hope for more concessions for which the spade work had been done. He admitted that what Don Patricio Omuldei, the Spanish agent in London, promised there and what Fanshawe received in Spain were two different things, but he had hope that Spain would accept his proposal. The treaty, of which he submitted a draft to Medina de las Torres, would permit English merchants to trade in Spain.

31 Fanshawe to Bennet, Nov. 4, 1664, Fanshawe, Letters, p.308.
32 Ibid., p. 311.
and her possessions almost completely free from Spanish authority and limitation. 25

Shortly after sending to England a copy of his proposed treaty, Fanshawe received orders to return home. The effect was immediate. The Duke of Medina de las Torres, Fanshawe reported, "asked me whether my orders to go home were now positive, or only in the nature of the former to depart if such and such a thing was not done? I answered they were now positive." 24 The Duke expressed the conviction that the draft Sir Richard had submitted could hardly be the basis for a treaty; the terms asked were the same demanded during the time of Cromwell, and Spain could not comply. Fanshawe knew that the newly arrived Dutch ambassador had already offered Spain an alliance in exchange for less than England was demanding. 25 Spain's need for a strong naval power as ally could be met most cheaply by accepting the Dutch offer. Medina de las Torres returned again and again to the point of Fanshawe's orders, saying "it was impossible to be meant in earnest, whereby to give the world occasion to discourse, as if England were breaking with Spain." Sir Richard believed that he had now regained some of the dignity he

23 Fanshawe to Bennet, Nov. 14, 1664, ibid., pp. 322-43.
24 Fanshawe to Bennet, Nov. 16, 1664, ibid., p. 356.
25 Fanshawe to Bennet, Nov. 22, 1664, ibid., p. 356.
felt he had lost during the period of his service thus far in Spain. "I answered, what they did I knew not, but as to myself, his Excellency might perceive by my present orders that the King my master is not minded to let me lie dead any longer, after serving his Majesty many years in the nearest truths about his royal person, as also out of his sight far off, with gracious acceptance, and that conformably when I came, though the title I brought was but of ordinary, the powers and trusts reposed in me were of a magnitude which many extraordinary ambassadors have not been charged with." The Duke then asked Sir Richard if he no longer had the power and trust. Fanshawe answered that though he had the same power, he did not know whether Charles II had in mind different alliances in other countries, and that perhaps the King of England had changed his mind about Spain, since "his Majesty despaired of any thing of moment to be negotiated here by me, after so many months trial in vain, and I as well as others, hearing it rumored here, that somebody else hath, in few days, sped better in another place." The Duke brushed this aside, saying it was of no moment. As long as he remained in Spain, Fanshawe told the Duke, he was resolved to continue his efforts to carry out his instructions. Now he had the satisfaction of hearing that the Conde de Molina was being sent at once to England as ambassador. Fanshawe was asked to prepare for the Conde's reception. Particular attention
was drawn to his presentation to Catherine of Braganza. With relations between Spain and Portugal so strained, Spain wished to be certain that no slight would be shown her envoy by the Queen of England. It was made clear that by court rule the Spanish ambassador could speak in no other language but his native tongue. That being the case, Fanshawe returned, "I must by the rule of contraries unstudy the little Spanish I have, and betake me to my mother-tongue, too."36

One reassurance was given to Fanshawe at this time that must have made him feel that his ministrations at the court of Spain had not been entirely unsuccessful. Medina de las Torres informed him that France had offered an alliance to Spain against England, but the Englishman was assured that Spain had no intention of accepting the offer.37

In February, 1665, Fanshawe addressed to the King of England a detailed report of his year's activity in Madrid. In the covering letter which he wrote to the secretary of state, Morice, Sir Richard confessed frankly to the failure of his mission. "He [the messenger] carries likewise, incidentally, the success of my negotiation in this court, the sum whereof is, I am no forwarder therein to this day than I was when I left London, so that if this shall be

37 Fanshawe to Bennet, Jan. 23, 1665, ibid., p. 428.
thought sufficient ground for my return, your honour may
be attended shortly in person by your humble servant. 38

Fanshawe's report to the King consisted of a dreary
recitation of his failures, so worded as to reveal his
conviction that the failures should be attributed to
Spanish duplicity. The report reads:

TO THE KING

Madrid, Wednesday, the 16th of Febr., 1665.

SUCCESS OF MY NEGOTIATION IN THE COURT OF SPAIN, AFTER
THE UTMOST TRIALS MADE BY ALL PLAUSIBLE ADDRESSES,
SOME MINATORY (BY IMMEDIATE INSTRUCTION FROM YOUR
MAJESTY, BESIDES SUNDRY SIGNIFICATIONS FROM TIME TO
TIME, OF YOUR MAJESTY'S PLEASURE, THAT I MUST RETURN,
UNLESS SPEEDY SATISFACTION WERE HAD); YET NONE RUDY
OR UNMANNERLY, BRIEFLY ABSTRACTED OUT OF MY PAST AND
PRESENT DESPATCHES FOR ENGLAND; WHEREIN THE CLEAR
MATTERS OF FACT ARE LAID DOWN AND DILATED UPON

1. No Accomodation between Spain and Portugal, unless
that King [of Portugal] will surrender to his Catholic
Majesty the Kingdoms of Portugal and Algarve.

2. No Peace from Spain with England, if your Majesty
continue to assist Portugal with Defensive Arms.

3. No Trade for your Majesty's Subjects, to or from
those Kingdoms, during the War; daily Prizes being
made of them upon that Account, by Frigates and Men-
of-War, Navigating under Commissions from his Catholic
Majesty, without any Restitution.

4. No Free Trade in the Spanish Dominions, in the
Indies, or from your Majesty's therein, to Spain.

5. No Peace for your Majesty's Subjects in America,
wheresoever the Spaniard finds himself the stronger,
according to their present Practice, and Interpretation
of the Articles of 1630, which yet they must have
understood to bind our hands as to them.

38 Fanshawe to Morice, Feb. 18, 1665, Heathcote MSS.
6. No new Adjustment with England, otherwise than by way of Confirmation of those old Articles.

7. No Restitution of any Estates of your Majesty's Subjects, seized by Embargo of 1665, tho' point-blank against the said defective Articles there, upon change of times, as several other things are, which are daily acted by the Spaniards.

8. No Nulling the said Embargo to this Day (tho' long since insisted upon by me) in reference to Goods of your Majesty's Subjects, which have lain deposited in secret Trust from that time to this; but a pretence of still seizing them to the use of his Catholic Majesty.

10. No Correspondence to this hour, of Visit or Message to your Majesty's Ambassador, from the Marquess de Caracena or the Conde de Pennaranda; tho' the Dutch Ambassador told me long since, that the Conde had Re-Visisted him, and the French hath told me, he hath been Visited by both, presuming they have done the like towards all Ambassadors in this Court but my self.

11. No Commission to this hour produced unto me, of any one or more nominated to Treat with me; no Project of a Treaty, on the part of Spain, or Answer to That proposed by me; tho' I never read or heard of any Negotiation in Spain, or elsewhere, by the which any real Effect was mutually intended, whereunto such Commissions were not the Common Preface: Moreover, that your Majesty's Fifth Instruction doth point me to expect (as I did) such Commission, and such Project, on the Spanish Part, for some space before I exhibited mine; having, since the exhibition of mine, used something of Invitation, besides the Example, to draw the like from them, but in vain.

12. No Spanish Ambassador yet gone to your Majesty: in more than a twelvemonth that I have already been out of England (whatever the Conde de Molina may yet do) tho' promised there should be one soon after my arrival here, before your Majesty would consent to send me.

Your Majesty having this clear Information upon the whole, tho' this Court had never, in obedience to your Majesty's several Orders, been threatened by me (as they call it) before with my going away, will not,
I presume, think it your Service to continue me any longer here, whatever may be deemed fit as to a Resident (whether in the Person of my Secretary and Kinsman, whom I humbly propounded to your Majesty by Mr. Secretary Bennet; or whomever else your Majesty shall judge meet for the Employment), whereby to keep things fair between the two Crowns, until a better mutual Understanding for perpetuity, may be settled between the same; vouchsafing your Royal Letters of Credence and Revocation respectively, to the same purpose, to be applied in manner as I have formerly humbly proposed, likewise by Mr. Secretary Bennet, to your Sacred Majesty, whom God preserve.39

Fanshawe's accomplishments after a year's work, as his report candidly admitted, were almost nil. Tangier was profiting from more open trade, both Spain and England released prisoners in the Indies, and an ambassador from Spain, the Conde de Molina, was due in London. These points were to the good. On the other hand, Fanshawe had made no progress on the treaty question between Spain and Portugal, and therefore had obtained no commercial concessions. Spain was still helping the Moors at Tangier, and the return of Tangier and Jamaica was still demanded by Spain. With the outbreak of the Anglo-Dutch war another problem had developed when the Dutch sold their prizes at Cadiz and San Sebastian. Fanshawe felt himself "driven to a dead wall,"40 and only express orders stopped him from returning home.

40 Voelling, p. 173.
By April, 1665, Clarendon and Arlington had reversed their opinion that Fanshawe should return home. "We could not either of us concur with the opinion of your returning so speedily, which I ventured to tell you in my last would be the resolution; it will be absolutely necessary that we first see what the Spanish ambassador will say to us, who is this evening arrived, and we are [at?] the French ambassador's, who 'tis likely will go to work with us presently, especially if they mean really to intend the mediation of the peace betwixt us and Holland." The Conde de Molina's arrival in London had caused a change in attitude, and the ministers of the King hoped that now an ambassador was at hand something could be evolved from the apparent shambles of Anglo-Spanish relations. For his part, Fanshawe quickly withdrew his insistence upon leaving Spain:

I asked a power to leave this court; if it should therefore be feared I might do it without such a power, I beg license thus far only to reply that, as on the one side I could never be so disingenuous as to have asked that liberty either then or since under notion of his Majesty's service unless according to the best of my understanding it had tended thereunto (especially when I might have made it my downright suit in reference to my own particular only, as without offence always and often with success, many public ministers to foreign parts have done insall times and places, whereof printed and other letters are full) so, on the other side I could not be so steeped as to ask leave for that,

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41 Arlington to Fanshawe, April 6, 1665, Harleian MSS. 7010 (British Museum), fols. 229b-231.
the which not granted, I would put in execution howsoever, whereby to draw upon myself the guilt of a double presumption.\textsuperscript{42}

In spite of his personal inclination and regardless of his feeling of futility, Fanshawe dropped his pretentions of leaving Spain and settled down to a period of relative inactivity, for the negotiations with the Spanish ambassador in London passed the burden of that task to Arlington and Clarendon.

The King's ministers opened their discussions with the Conde de Molina with as little promise of success as Fanshawe had managed in Madrid. But at least the Conde was warmly received:

The Spanish ambassador here will not yet avow the having any particular instructions for our further satisfaction, but professeth himself ready and willing to hearken to anything we shall propose and assures us with all confidence that we shall receive satisfaction therein. I lost opportunity of telling you with how much kindness the King received the ambassador: but his satisfaction therein was so great that I assured myself he told it sufficiently in letters, together with the extraordinary civility and kindness with which the Queen also received him and hath since admitted him in subsequent conversations, making him play at cards and performing all things and ceremonies towards him as she could not have done more if had been sent from Lisbon, and all this in the eye of the French ambassadors to heighten the obligation.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{42} Fanshawe to Bennet, April 12, 1665, Harleian MSS. 7010, \textit{(British Museum)}, fol. 235.

\textsuperscript{43} Arlington to Fanshawe, April 20, 1665, Harleian MSS. 7010, fols. 242-45.
From Madrid Fanshawe reported the Spanish reaction to the Queen's audience with Molina. "Our Queen's gracious usage of the Conde de Molina particularly in discoursing with him in Spanish, is here far spread, already, and hath much surprised this court and nation, not without something of extraordinary reverence to her royal person and virtues above what they intended to pay, how due soever."44 The honor done to Fanshawe on his arrival in Spain had been returned in full measure to Molina upon his arrival in England. Spanish uneasiness about Molina's reception by Catherine of Braganza had been dispelled. Such beginnings revived hope in England that a treaty with Spain might be concluded.

France had offered to mediate in the undeclared Anglo-Dutch war, and Charles II had accepted the offer "but in the meantime prosecuted the war with some fervour."45 Fanshawe kept Whitehall informed of the activities of the Dutch in the Mediterranean, with particular emphasis upon their interest in Tangier and "how little the Viceroy of Galicia observes the rules your lordship hath formerly required me to insist upon with this court in reference to English prizes brought in by Hollanders, the which also I have done as effectively as I could."46

44 Fanshawe to Arlington, May 10, 1665, Harleian MSS. 7010 (British Museum), fol. 253.
45 Arlington to Fanshawe, April 20, 1665, ibid., fol. 243.
The English garrison at Tangier under Lord Belasyse had secured the fort against the Moorish chief, Gaylan. Fanshawe heard that the Dutch fleet, then hovering in the neighborhood of Tangier, would attack by sea while Gaylan attacked by land; "whether this opinion is groundless or upon more ground than we know, I presume a few days now will discover." From Belasyse, Fanshawe heard that there were provisions to withstand a Dutch attack until relief came from England, and that a truce with Gaylan had been arranged. "Yet cannot I conclude his reality towards us, whilst he sees how the Dutch have domineered in those seas for some time and may be made believe they do so now in our English Channel likewise." Fanshawe was correct in his suspicion of Gaylan. The peace lagged, although there was little activity on the part of the Moors. The French fleet under the Due de Beaufort met with the same treatment which English captains received when they came to Spanish ports to restock and make repairs. The French ambassador in Madrid complained to Philip IV: "His answer was the plague in Seville and other parts of Andalusia was so fresh and dismal a sore that Spain must be pardoned if they fear the shadow of it ever since. How far this answer satisfied I cannot tell, but this passage I set down the

47 Fanshawe to Arlington, June 7, 1665, Harleian MSS. 7010 (British Museum), fol. 281b.
48 Fanshawe to Arlington, June 21, 1665, ibid., fol. 299b.
rather that in this particular, having so good company, we may not be too sensible of what was done to us in the same kind last year and in the same place, as also in some other upon the selfsame account.\textsuperscript{49} Beaufort's expedition ostensibly was directed against the Algerian corsairs, but England kept a wary eye on his movements, suspecting a conjunction with the Dutch and a menace to Tangier.

The Dutch did their best to curry favor with Spanish authorities, but must have been discouraged at the prospect of influencing Spanish policy. Fanshawe reported an exchange of entertainment between the Dutch and the Viceroy of Valencia, at which time the Dutch welcomed the Spaniards with a salute of three hundred guns "with as many protestations of true love and friendship to Spain. You must now have a very great deal of charity for me if you can persuade yourself that I have used those which I ought to this court in behalf of his Majesty's ships, seeing no effect thereof in all this time, and yet much more charitable to the Spanish court and nation if, being of that persuasion, you can induce yourself further to believe that they are not very partial to the Dutch.\textsuperscript{50}

Spain's next move was to imprison the English consul to Cadiz, Westcombe, and shortly thereafter to treat the

\textsuperscript{49} Fanshawe to Arlington, May 10, 1665, Harleian M35. 7010, Fols. 223-253b.

\textsuperscript{50} Fanshawe to Lawson, Aug. 6, 1664, Heathcote M33. (R. H. C.), p. 162.
Dutch consul in the same manner. Spain played no favorites. Ships of England and Holland were charged with having slipped out of port without proper papers to fight. Secretary Belasco de Loyola in the King's name requested Fanshawe "to give notice to the captains of his Britannic Majesty's ships to observe punctually and carefully the conditions of the peace, as regards entrance into, stay in and departure from our ports; that they may not fail in the respect which they owe to those of his Majesty, nor embarrass and obstruct the intercourse and free commerce between friendly nations and this crown."51

It was no wonder that Fanshawe was often bewildered at Spanish attitude. First she would appear to be sympathetic to England, then to the Dutch, and in another move such as imprisoning the consuls of those countries, would destroy what good work had been done previously to strengthen relationships. Arlington wrote to urge Fanshawe to press for satisfaction. "I hope you will not sit down with an ordinary satisfaction for such an exhorbitancy, nor let that court be quiet till they have satisfied you in the other points, whereof your enclosed memorials tell me you have complained." The consul was released, but not until

51 Belasco de Loyola to Fanshawe, May 15, 1665, ibid., p. 193.
52 Arlington to Fanshawe, July 1, 1665, Harleian MSS. 7010 (British Museum), fol. 266b.
the exchange of letters between Arlington and Fanshawe and many protests registered with Spanish authorities.

With an eye to improving Spanish-Dutch relations, the Dutch frequently spread false stories of Dutch victories over the English at sea. The influence on the Spaniard was considerable, 'till the truth began to get out little by little, and turning their joy into mourning; this was short and sweet. A great man at this court asked men why they spread such false news. I answered that whatever moved them to it, it was a content I did not grudge to an enemy, hurting nobody but themselves. 53

Fanshawe himself added to the confused state of affairs when a new Dutch ambassador arrived in Madrid. The usual formal request for attendance was made of him.

'I went to visit him, and after wishing him joy told him that I desired to explain why I could not send my coach and family to accompany him and to stop the mouths of those who might therefore be likely otherwise to say that war is already declared between England and Holland, but that the King my master had forbidden this ceremony, both as to foreign ambassadors in his own court and to his own in foreign courts, desiring us to seek out other ways to express our respects to the ambassadors of his Majesty's allies.' 54

54 Fanshawe to Downing, Nov. 30, 1664, ibid., p. 170.
The Venetian ambassador to Spain, Marin Zorzi, reported to his home government:

The ambassadors of England and Holland, encountering in the King's ante-chamber, greeted each other as allies rather than as enemies. England tells everyone that there has been no declaration of war, and that the dispute is more a private than a public one, his King only asking for compensation. But Holland makes a great fuss, expresses his detestation of ambition and violence and says that the aims of England are not to obtain reparation, but usurpation, and that the object of these aims tends to the occupation of territory and not for the recovery of some trifling capital and possessions.55

Two months later the second Anglo-Dutch war began, and there were no further exchanges of pleasantries between Fanshawe and the Dutch ambassador.

In February, 1665, France made a final attempt to reconcile Holland and England. But her effort met with no success for England refused to accept the Franco-Dutch terms because of the popularity of the Dutch war in England. After England's brilliant victory of Lowestoft, her people were in a mood to demand terms of their own. This attitude was encouraged by the Bishop of Münster's preparation for an attack upon the Dutch. The Bishop was England's only certain ally on the continent. In return for 30,000 soldiers, England was to pay him £500,000 in three installments and further small monthly payments if the Bishop could get the

55 Zorzi to the Doge, Jan. 14, 1665, Calendar of State Papers Venetian, 1664-1666, p. 76.
small German states to join him. England fell behind in the payment, and the French began to mass an army to put down the war the Bishop had started. The help the Bishop could give was actually insignificant, and England only stalled for time to see what France would do. Fanshawe received a report on the situation from Downing, the English ambassador at The Hague:

They have here several days ago had certain notice that the Bishop of Münster is levying four regiments of foot and two of horse, and that he is endeavoring to draw to him several neighboring Princes of Germany for to give this country some trouble; and Monsieur d'Estrade hath now given in a memorial notifying in the name of the French King that the said Bishop hath made a treaty with our Master, and that our Master hath furnished him with money, and that hereupon the French King had sent one to the said Bishop to notify him that he do desist, or otherwise he shall be enforced to oppose him with downright force, so you see you on all sides the French take part with this country /Holland/ against us, but yet this matter is of a very delicate nature for him and which concerns him very near and which may very much embroil his affairs.

But Downing understood, and the Dutch understood, the cost they might pay for French support. "The Bishop of Münster still threatens, and all hope for relief from France, and yet withal I must tell you that they are very jealous of France lest they should let in the Trojan horse among them." The Dutch had always been wary of the growing power of France.

56 Peeling, p. 181.
57 Downing to Fanshawe, July 12, 1665, Harleian MSS. 7010, (British Museum), fol. 319.
58 Downing to Fanshawe, July 20, 1665, ibid., fol. 325b.
Their alliance was a poor marriage of two countries, the one determined to dominate Europe, and the other searching for a kind of vengeance against her commercial rival, England.

Shortly before the death of the King of Spain Fanshawe had another conference with the Duke of Medina de las Torres. Spain demanded Tangier and Jamaica. They could not, the Duke insisted, "be of any considerable use to his British Majesty unless in case of war with Spain; and that for them his Catholic Majesty is ready to give to the King of England what would be really much more considerable for which Spain would never give cause, and for any other purpose England should never want parts in Spain more commodious and no less opportune than Tangier." Fanshawe had been led to believe that some progress had been made, particularly by de Molina in London. He also believed that Spain was ready to offer concessions. Conversations with Medina de las Torres had pointed in that direction. He reasoned that France was at the bottom of this new attitude of Spain. "I should think it to be that, whereas at first they apprehended the French would begin to break with them, and then they must court us to make a counterpoise; now they may behold for a certain that the French will begin to break downright with us, and

consequently that we must woo them at whatsoever rate or stand by outsiders. 60

The instructions issued to Fanshawe at the time of his appointment had read in part: You shall likewise employ your utmost skill and industry in penetrating into and discovering under what model and form his Catholic Majesty designs to leave the government there, when it shall please God that he did. Which, considering his great infirmity and weakness, may be presumed is already projected, with all things else of the most secret nature that may possibly come to your knowledge. 61 Fanshawe never lacked information on the state of health of the Spanish King or of his heir. The peace of Europe hinged upon those two lives. Fanshawe now had news on a recent illness of the Infanta Charles:

And one very active statesman of the second rank, withal a shrewd prior spyng into the first, adventured to tell me that since the Prince was in no wise like to live to man's estate, it would be some ease to the public loss that he died before his father, whereby his Catholic Majesty might see a necessity of settling the succession to the Monarchy without those confusions which might otherwise follow, seeing whatsoever his Majesty would decree therein universally subscribed and submitted to in his lifetime: that of two things, if the Prince now died, he thought one would follow, either clapping up a sudden peace with Portugal, or peaceably declaring the succession for France. This was a person who I conceive wished more the former, but believed the latter more, from whence

60 Fanshawe to Arlington, Aug. 2, 1665, Harleian MSS. 7010 (British Museum), fol. 285b.
I collect that either he finds a patent party of this mend when they shall dare shew it, or judges the whole government so disjointed or so awed by French terms or manners or convinced of French right in default of such issue, notwithstanding the renunciation, that a fair and easy way will lie open to his Most Christian Majesty; this gentleman's own phrase was that the King of France stands in a good window. 62

The Spanish court was divided on this as well as on any other issue. Don Juan of Austria returned to court from the armies at this time, and Arlington acknowledged Fanshawe's notice of his return *which we hope will bring some amendment to their affairs.* 63 But Arlington also recognized the uncertainty of any successful treaty with Spain. "It is certain that they will not be able to make any considerable advances toward us till they have lost their fear of France, whichever disturbs them therein; however, the Ambassador here continues giving us good words and we paying him in like coin." 64

The King of Spain chose this moment to die. His will left his possessions to his heir, Charles II. Because of the precarious state of his health, the will further provided that if Charles died the crown and possessions would pass to the Infanta Margaret, affianced to the Emperor.

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63 Arlington to Fanshawe, Aug. 12, 1665, ibid., fol. 355.

64 Arlington to Fanshawe, Sept. 9, 1665, ibid., fol. 331.
From the successon, since she had renounced her rights to the throne, Marie Thérèse, sister of Louis XIV, was excluded.
intermission" with the Spanish ambassador, and that they should be constantly and speedily advertised of all the progress you make there.⁶⁶ The elation was short-lived. His next audience with Medina de las Torres continued "a long space, after which not knowing whether we are gone forwarder or backwarder than we were, I confess myself to your lordship for the present at as great a gaze as ever, suspending my thoughts of my express I formerly mentioned till I see farther."⁶⁷

While these most vital negotiations were in progress Fanshawe was involved in a quarrel with the Spanish police. Some of his household servants were arrested for "going with the scabbards of their swords open, contrary to the recent edict." The ambassador complained to Medina of the affront, but his men had not been immediately released. An alcalde passing the embassy with a staff in his hand, as a sign of authority, was attacked by the household and the staff taken away. Fanshawe's letters to England were filled with complaint of the affair. The matter of the treaty was temporarily dropped from his correspondence, and he pursued this personal matter to the exclusion of all other business.

I shall endeavor to dig it out as well as I may till his Majesty's pleasure may be known, discovering in the meantime as far as I can, whether my public negotiations will probably end in anything which may

⁶⁶ Arlington to Fanshawe, Sept. 25, 1685, ibid., fol. 401b.
overpoise these private and personal disgusts, if
at least anything can be called private and personal
which so directly strikes at my public capacity;
for this I do assure your lordship never ambassador
in this court shewed more respect to the justice
(preserving whole the prerogative of his master) than
I from time to time have done; never family (servants)
of ambassador more offenceless or more provoked by
the justice. 66

Sir Richard had little success in getting a written
agreement for an Anglo-Spanish treaty. The Duke of Medina
de las Torres gave him promises, but never a written agree-
ment. One of Fanshawe's letters to England would contain
news of hoped-for success. The next would report the
Spanish attitude entirely different, until Fanshawe had
no idea as to what he should write to Clarendon and
Arlington to help with the negotiations on that end. When
France finally broke with Spain to support the Dutch, and
overran the Spanish Netherlands, Spain turned to England.
For the first time in several years negotiations progressed
beyond the conversation stage. One of the reasons for this
renewed activity was a move toward Portugal on the part of
the French. 66The Duke of Medina de las Torres told me at
the same time as in great confidence that they are here
assured the French King is suddenly dispatching a person
to Portugal, there to press their not listening to any
accord whatsoever with this crown before January or
February next, with promise that by that time France will

66 Zorzi to the Doge, Oct. 21, 1585, Calendar of State
Papers Venetian, 1664-1666, p. 214; Fanshawe to Arlington,
Oct. 11, 1665, Harleian MSS. 7010 (British Museum), fol. 412b.
enter into a league with the King of Portugal offensive and defensive against all the world. Fanshawe had the permission of the Queen of Spain to send some one to Portugal, and England sent Sir Robert Southwell to work with Fanshawe to bring about peace between Spain and Portugal.

By special messenger Fanshawe sent to England papers which contained his latest negotiations for a commercial treaty with Spain. When Arlington received them he seemed pleased. "The papers enclosed will be of use to us in this very instant that there is preparing a new body of articles to present the Spanish ambassador, who in all probability will apply himself to the court at Madrid for their judgment and resolution upon them." Clarendon thought that the question of Tangier and Jamaica would not recur, and that the Portuguese question was in the hands of Charles II.

The only difficulty as Clarendon saw it was the French interference in Portugal, "for it is a madness to imagine that they will reject a friend who hath been so useful to them upon what motives soever, of whose assistance they may stand in equal need of a few years hence." Clarendon was sure that the best means for solving the problem in

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89 Fanshawe to Arlington, Nov. 4, 1665, Harleian MSS. 7010, (British Museum), fol. 228b.
70 Arlington to Fanshawe, Nov. 14, 1665, ibid., fol. 482.
71 Clarendon to Fanshawe, Nov. 25, 1665, ibid., fol. 441b.
Portugal was a long truce during the minority of the Spanish King, Charles II. Fanshawe, however, did not find the situation quite as clear-cut as did Clarendon.

Although Fanshawe was well aware that Arlington, Clarendon and Molina were working on a new draft for a treaty in London, he signed the Spanish protocol late in October, 1665. The protocol provided that unless completed by a stipulated date the whole treaty would be void. Pressure from the Spanish council caused Fanshawe to sign the treaty on December 7, 1665. There was great rejoicing in Spain, and the Fanshawes were offered large sums of money from the pleased Spanish government. 72

The first section of the treaty dealt with commercial questions, and simply confirmed the essential conditions of the treaty made in 1620. It made no provision for free trade in the Indies, made no mention of the Navigation Act, provided no exemption from the right of search, and defined contraband in a sense unpopular in Whitehall. Above all, England would enjoy no better trading privileges than did the Dutch. By the second section of the treaty, and this one secret, Fanshawe had tried to settle the Portuguese question. All he had managed was an agreement for a thirty-year truce and not a definitive peace. Alfonso's royal title was not recognized. 73

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72 The money was never paid, since the arrival of Sandwich necessarily cancelled Fanshawe's negotiations.

73 Feiling, pp. 175-76.
The treaty which Fanshawe had worked out was far from what Clarendon had expected. Sir Richard's version of the treaty, however, was somewhat different. "The peace between England and Spain renewed and commerce adjusted upon much better and clearer terms than ever formerly. A long and honourable truce adjusted with Portugal, if the King of Portugal so thinks, and close thereupon in order thereunto it is judged convenient that I pass in person to that kingdom, which God willing I shall do about a fortnight hence in virtue of my instructions from our master, and safe conduct by this crown." 74

The articles which Fanshawe sent to England were accepted there only as material for a treaty, not as a treaty itself. An order was sent from London, which never reached Fanshawe, to await the new articles drawn up in England. At the same time Charles II decided to send the Earl of Sandwich as extraordinary ambassador to Spain. The Earl was temporarily in disgrace, but he was close to Charles II and knew more of the King's wishes regarding Portugal and Spain than did Fanshawe. Sir Richard's recent trouble with the Spanish policy certainly had some influence in his recall, or at least the way in which he had handled the affair. The timing

74 Fanshawe to Arlington, Dec. 7, 1665, Harleian MSS. 7010, (British Museum), fol. 449.
of the treaty-signing and the lack of constant communication between Fanshawe and England were other factors that led to his recall.

Not knowing that he had been superceded, Fanshawe travelled to Portugal to meet Southwell, and together they presented the terms of the Spanish truce. Since Portugal was again being influenced by offers of a French marriage for Alfonso and support if Portugal continued the war with Spain, the Portuguese were not receptive to Fanshawe's proposal for an end to the Spanish war. Their success on the battlefields at this time also moved them to reject any thought of truce. Alfonso wanted his title to be recognized, and he wanted a peace that recognized the independence of Portugal.

Fanshawe took the Portuguese demands back to Madrid, where they were rejected by the Council of State. Now that England and France were approaching war, the Spaniards were less afraid of immediate trouble with France. The Council of State hoped to hold Charles II of England to the treaty Fanshawe had signed, and leave Portugal to her fate, relying on a promise made by England's king that he would drop Portugal if her demands were exhorbitant. The Spaniards insisted that Portugal had invited such action by refusing Fanshawe's offer. How many Spaniards were angry at Fanshawe. He had promised them peace and they
had begun to disarm. Medina de las Torres, with whom Fanshawe had worked closely, was being attacked by the anti-English party in court. Suddenly Spain accepted a French offer to mediate the Spanish-Portuguese war. 75

The letters sent by Arlington in December did not reach Fanshawe until March. In them Arlington reviewed the stand the English Privy Council had taken upon Fanshawe's recommended treaty, and directed Fanshawe simply to stand by until the Earl of Sandwich could arrive to take over.

I perceive that the Duke of Medina de las Torres hath verbally again allowed of two of your three papers, which you must give us leave to say [that] we cannot so much value ourselves because, not finding them so exact in all the points relating to the great trade of that kingdom as were to be wished, his Majesty as I have told you in my former had caused them to be examined and reviewed by some of my lords of the Council; and that their lordships out of them had caused a new prospect of a treaty of commerce to be made which had been delivered before this time into the hands of the Spanish ambassador here, if the resolution of seeing my Lord Sandwich thither as his Majesty's Extraordinary Ambassador had not suspended it, whom we are now despatching with all possible expedition, as I told you in my last. For these reasons his Majesty commands me to signify his pleasure to your Excellency that you hold your hand, declaring the cause of it in these transactions, till the arrival of my Lord Sandwich, employing yourself in the meantime only in cultivating and improving the good correspondence betwixt the two crowns by all the ways and means that shall best occur to you, and assuring them

75 Feiling, p. 178.
that the extraordinary ambassador will carry with him a full and entire satisfaction to all their wishes, which we cannot but think will be very acceptable. 76

The letters from England had finally arrived, and with them Fanshawe’s diplomatic career came to an end. His negotiations had failed. He had arrived in Madrid with precise instructions which clearly assumed England’s dominant position over Spain and her power to demand the terms she desired. Through international circumstances but as much through his own bungling Fanshawe had lost the initiative. The personal and diplomatic rebuffs he received had discouraged him. He often had met defeat by threatening to leave Spain. Once suggested by Arlington, Fanshawe found such threats satisfying and had used them frequently until he was at last definitely instructed to remain in Spain. The treaty he had worked out with Spain had not been advantageous to England. And finally the government had found him tactless and unbusinesslike, particularly in the way he had pushed his quarrel with the Spanish police over his servants. With the French war looming it was necessary that England clear up her relations with Spain as soon as possible. 77

There was nothing for Fanshawe to do but prepare for the arrival of Lord Sandwich. But in asking the Duke of

76 Arlington to Fanshawe, Dec. 17, 1665, Harleian MSS. 7010 (British Museum), fols. 464-65.

77 Feiling, p. 176.
Medina de las Torres to welcome the Earl of Sandwich, Sir Richard took the opportunity to indicate the pique he felt at unfavorable reports of his conduct which had been sent to England by his enemies at the Spanish court.

With regard to the coming of the Earl of Sandwich to this court as Ambassador Extraordinary, I cannot count it bad news, both for the reasons which I have already mentioned—end because he is my very good friend, although this does not prevent my acknowledging my infinite indebtedness to the kindness of the Queen [of Spain] and yourself in vouching for my innocence on being informed that complaints have been made to our English court of my ill-carriage in Spain by a minister [Feneranda, the leader of the anti-English element at the Spanish court] who has neither seen nor treated with me in his life. If this were so, I am very sure that upon the King, my master—by whom I have been proved so many years—no hearsay testimony would make the least impression to my prejudice. I hold it for certain that his Majesty has taken this resolution in order, by the talents and rank of the new ambassador, to bring quickly to an end some fresh negotiations of importance, and also to show how greatly he esteems the persons and desires the friendship of the Catholic Sovereigns. One thing I confess will grieve me, and that is if there is an omission in giving the court [of the new English ambassador] as hearty a reception at Madrid as I had upon coming into Spain—and more, if more is possible—since, on the one hand, I have certain information that it will be noticed in England and, on the other, any failure herein might, by malevolent or mistaken persons, be imputed to me.78

Fanshawe's embassy to Spain was officially at an end. The assignment he had failed to carry out now fell to the Earl of Sandwich.

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78 Fanshawe to Medina de las Torres, Feb. 11, 1666, Heathcote MS. (R. M. C.), p. 236.
Lady Fanshawe always insisted that the Lord Chancellor Clarendon was her husband's enemy. She contended again and again that the Earl was jealous of the favors Fanshawe received from Charles II. The appointment of the Earl of Sandwich as ambassador to Spain was, she felt, just another of Clarendon's doings. She called Sandwich his "cast Conde."

In 1666 Sandwich was in temporary disgrace in England because of a division he had allowed of some captured Dutch merchandise. It was the custom to divide the spoils among the officers and men of the ship or fleet which captured a prize at sea, but only after a Royal Commission for Prizes had set aside the King's allowance. Sandwich knew of the law and of the financial difficulties of the Restoration government, but he also was aware of the good nature of Charles II. He and the other officers divided the spoils of a Dutch prize before the arrival of the authorities. The public indignation that followed was enormous, and Sandwich was the scapegoat. A bill was even proposed in Parliament to make it a felony to break bulk before the arrival of the King's officers. Sandwich was saved by the King's pardon, and was even allowed to retain his share of the spoils.

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cover the shame of his forced resignation from the command of the fleet he was appointed ambassador extraordinary to Spain. It is no wonder that Lady Fanshawe was incensed at the appointment of Sandwich to succeed her husband.

There is some evidence to support Lady Fanshawe's contention that her husband's disgrace was the result of political intrigue in England. The treaty between England and Spain was signed on December 7, 1665. Sandwich was actually assigned to the Spanish embassy after Fanshawe had signed the treaty. Although Clarendon wrote his Life and Continuation without access to his papers, his version of the circumstances agrees with Lady Fanshawe's.

The treaty was no sooner brought to the King by the Spanish ambassador (who had received it by express), and perused at the council-table, but many gross faults were found to be in it. Besides the gentleman's absence, who would with greater abilities have defended himself than any of those who had reproached him, it was no advantage to him that he was known to be much in the (Spanish?) chancellor's confidence; and therefore the more pain was taken to persuade the King that he was a weak man (which the King himself knew him not to be) and they put such a gloss upon many of the articles, and rejected others as unprofitable which were thought to contain matters of great moment, (that) they would not consent that a trade to the West Indies could be any benefit to England and the like. In the end, the King concluded that he would not sign the treaty, for which he had some access of reason within a month after the death of the King of Spain.

2 Arthur Bryant, Samuel Pepys, The Man in the Making (New York, 1924), pp. 264-74. Pepys remarked in his diary on December 7, 1665: "Sir G. Cartaret's letter tells me my Lord Sandwich is, as I was told, declared ambassador extraordinary to Spain, and to go with all speed away, and that his enemies have done him as much good as he could wish." Henry B. Wheatley (ed.), The Diary of Samuel Pepys (London, 1905), V, under date of December 7, 1665.
When all these reproaches were cast upon the ambassador, and notice given that the King did disavow the treaty and refused to sign it, it was reasonably resolved that he ought not to remain there longer as ambassador, but to be recalled. But the plague driving the King from London and dispersing the Council, the pursuing this resolution was no more assumed, till the business of the Earl of Sandwich made it thought on as a good expedient. 3

Clarendon admitted, then, that the foreign office did have Fanshawe's treaty before Sandwich's appointment was considered, but added that the plague caused the government to scatter and postpone consideration of the treaty. Lady Fanshawe noted that the papers had been in the hands of the English ministers for two months. 4 No matter how long the draft treaty had been in England, it was obvious that it was not well received by the Council. Clarendon was certainly fair in his defense of Fanshawe, and Lady Fanshawe's criticism of the Lord Chancellor seems to have been less than fair. Fanshawe's wife found some consolation in the kind words spoken of her husband by Medina de las Torres. "The Duke added that the King his master said to him upon occasions that if this ambassador of England, who is so discreet and careful both to follow his master's instructions and to assist me, should either be called home before he hath finished his business here, or any other...

4 Heathcote MSS. (E. M. C.), p. xvi.
sent to treat over him, I will never give him more than accustomed ceremonies at my court, but to treat; if this fail none will do.*5

Fanshawe's failure as an ambassador produced a physical breakdown. Hardly had he welcomed Sandwich when he fell victim to a fever. Waving aside the priests and relics with which Spanish friends besieged him, he died on June 16, 1666, leaving an adoring family, a chequered diplomatic reputation and a sizeable debt due from the Crown. A week later his body set out on its long journey home to Hertfordshire. 8

Sandwich's mission to Spain was accomplished only after considerable delay. French intrigues in Portugal succeeded in prolonging the Spanish-Portuguese rivalry. Sandwich worked patiently on an Anglo-Spanish treaty, and refused to let the whole question depend upon Portugal. Finally the treaty with England was completed. 7 English merchants were to enjoy the same privileges as did the Dutch in trading in Spanish territories. By avoiding mention of the treaty of 1650, Sandwich steered clear of ambiguities, such as the status of Jamaica, in which Fanshawe had floundered. Secret clauses provided that

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*5 Lady Fanshawe to Fanshawe, Jan. 18, 1666, Heathcote MSS. (K. M. C.), p. 225.

*6 Felling, pp. 178-79.

*7 Ibid., p. 232.
the commercial section of the treaty should stand, regardless
of what happened in Portugal, and that neither England nor
Spain should assist the other's enemies.

Portugal rejected Sandwich's first offers for a peace
with Spain in November, 1666. A French Queen, French money
and the skill of St. Romain, the French ambassador in
Lisbon, had demolished Castelmelhor's Anglophile system.
But an uprising in Portugal led by Don Pedro, the King's
brother, caused the downfall of Alfonso. The murder of
Sandé, the head of the French party, and the desire of the
people for peace, once more brought Sandwich in to
mediate. The Spanish Council pledged themselves to treat
for a perpetual peace as from King to King. Since this
amounted to a recognition of Portuguese independence, the
terms were soon arranged and Sandwich accomplished what
Fanshawe had tried to do two years earlier. 9

Fanshawe's salary was far from paid up at the time of
his death, and Lady Fanshawe set sternly to work to
recover from the Crown. 8 On the 16th my Lord Arlington
visited me, proffering me his friendship to be shown in
procuring of arrears of my husband's pay, which was £2,000,
and to reimburse me £5,815 my husband had laid out in his
Majesty's service. 10 Petitions had already been made in

8 Feiling, p. 238.
9 Ibid., p. 226.
10 Lady Fanshawe, Memoirs, p. 224.
behalf of Lady Fanshawe. There was an "order for a warrant
for £2,000 for Lady Fanshawe, relict of Sir Richard
Fanshawe, late British resident in Spain, £1,000 of which
was due before his death, and £1,000 is granted to her
for the charge of his interment in England, and trans-
portation thither of herself and family." Later a
warrant was drawn on the Exchequer to pay the widow an
additional £5,600, approximately what Sir Richard had
spent of his own money in the King's service. At the
same time she petitioned the King "for a pension for
thirty years from the customs, the unexpected death of
her husband leaving his family unprovided for; her husband
was His Majesty's first servant in business during the
late unnatural wars, and seven years a prisoner after the
battle of Worcester, etc." Lady Fanshawe had lost none
of the art of promoting her own cause. Indeed, her success
in pressing her suit at court was greater than that of her
husband had ever been.

11 Calendar of State Papers Domestic, 1666-1667, October 26, 1666, p. 219.
12 Ibid., p. 517.
13 Ibid., p. 501.
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