

University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana

Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, &
Professional Papers

Graduate School

1988

War of words and music| Veterans remember "Tokyo Rose"

Clover Koopman

The University of Montana

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd>

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.

Recommended Citation


Koopman, Clover, "War of words and music| Veterans remember "Tokyo Rose"" (1988). *Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers*. 4046.
<https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/4046>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPT IN WHICH COPYRIGHT
SUBSISTS. ANY FURTHER REPRINTING OF ITS CONTENTS MUST BE
APPROVED BY THE AUTHOR.

MANSFIELD LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA
DATE: 1988



WAR OF WORDS AND MUSIC;
VETERANS REMEMBER "TOKYO ROSE"

by

Clover Koopman

B.A., University of Montana, 1982

Presented in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

University of Montana

1988

Approved by

CE Hood
Chairman, Board of Examiners

D. C. Murray
Dean, Graduate School

June 6, 1988
Date

UMI Number: EP34259

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent on the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI EP34259

Copyright 2012 by ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.



ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346

War of Words and Music:
Veterans Remember "Tokyo Rose" (208 pp.)

Director, Charles E. Hood *CEH-a*

The purpose of this study is to examine the reactions of veterans from the Pacific theater during World War II to the Japanese radio propaganda broadcasts of "Tokyo Rose," by collecting verbatim statements. Veterans were sought through the Western Montana Military Officers Association and through a letter to the editor of The Missoulian. Their statements were recorded on audiotape in personal interviews. The veterans chosen for the study came from around the U.S., served in different branches of the Armed Forces, and held varying ranks and occupations.

For perspective, two intelligence specialists were also consulted. One had broadcast propaganda for the U.S. during the liberation of occupied France, and one had worked for the Voice of America in Vietnam. Two media historians contributed statements, one about the origins of the Armed Forces Radio Network and one about the role of U.S. propaganda agencies during World War II. These respondents were interviewed by telephone and the conversations recorded with their permission.

From 1942-1945 the nature of Japanese propaganda underwent a significant change. Early in the war, when the Japanese were winning, their broadcasts contained accurate news and intelligence. After their losses in the Battle of Midway (June 1942), falsified battle results became the norm. Many women were used as announcers, and all were called "Tokyo Rose" by the servicemen. But from 1943 through 1945, the "Zero Hour" program, on the air from 6:00 - 7:15 p.m., used the American Iva Toguri as a disc jockey. These programs contained the least propaganda and were the most popular, but resulted in her conviction for treason.

The half-hour documentary created from the collected statements is an attempt to tell the story of Iva Toguri, the most famous of roughly 20 "Tokyo Rose" broadcasters, who is still oddly misunderstood by the American public. Transcripts of her broadcasts under the name of "Orphan Ann" were recorded from the National Archives in Washington, and telephone interviews were obtained with two people who played a part in her situation: Dr. Clifford Uyeda, who headed the committee to obtain her pardon by President Gerald Ford, and Mariano Villarín, who was subpoenaed by the FBI from the Philippines in 1949 to testify against her.

The collected statements reveal that propaganda's success depends upon three things: the circumstances surrounding it, the truthfulness of its content, and the appeal of the music and entertainment used to attract listeners.

PREFACE

"War of Words and Music" is designed to be heard. The use of radio entertainment to reach across enemy lines and demoralize fighting men had its origin during World War II. As developments in radio transmission pushed the frontiers of technology, broadcasters thrust their polyglot frenzy of messages into the air.

By the end of the war, Japanese propaganda in the Pacific had clearly backfired. When the U. S. entered Japan, Admiral O'Brien issued a mock citation to "Tokyo Rose" for raising the morale of U.S. soldiers.

The first object of the documentary is to tell the story of Iva Toguri, the most famous of roughly twenty "Tokyo Rose" broadcasters. It is an attempt to examine a wrong, to restore to one brave American who was a prisoner of her situation a respected place in American radio history.

But there were more announcers than Iva Toguri, even though hers was probably the best-liked voice from Radio Tokyo. This story also tries to examine the soldiers' responses to enemy propaganda and disinformation. Veiled in American music, it came on board ship as they lined up for dinner, or into their tents, or into the lonely cockpits of the planes while they kept watch at night. While they served in relative isolation, far from home, the music managed to remind them of what they were fighting for.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface.....	iii
Introduction.....	1
Documentary: <u>War of Words and Music</u>	41

APPENDICES

Iva Toguri's Witnesses.....	52
Dr. Clifford Uyeda.....	53
Mariano Villarin.....	65
Media Historians.....	84
Dr. Kenneth Short.....	85
Lawrence E. Suid.....	102
Intelligence Specialists.....	114
Barry Zorthian.....	115
Max Kraus.....	119
Veterans.....	125
Robert Anderson.....	126
Will Clover.....	131
Georgana Egeland.....	142
Dick Grant.....	146
Ken McConnell.....	153
Gareth Moon.....	164
Bill Ohrmann.....	171
Paul Snyder.....	177
Lester B. Tucker.....	188
Letters.....	197
Bibliography.....	204

INTRODUCTION

In war more than any other time, the role of the media is crucial to linking isolated people with events in the rest of the world. This study examines the use of radio for propaganda by Japan to American servicemen during World War II, and looks at the response by Americans both during and after the war.

The Japanese programs employed both men and women as announcers, and played American popular music to attract listeners. American soldiers called the women, collectively, "Tokyo Rose." This format for propaganda has been used in wars since then with embellishments, but its effectiveness can only be determined by hearing the soldiers' recollections in their own words.

Though "Tokyo Rose" propaganda attracted listeners, it failed to demoralize the American soldiers at whom it was aimed. Japan's use of U.S. popular music and other cultural images sometimes evoked nostalgia, but the false news and propaganda sounded more like political wishful thinking than truth.

Even today in the U.S. the myth persists that "Tokyo Rose" was a traitor or even a double agent. The Biographical Dictionary of World War II describes "her" as one person, a propaganda broadcaster who was indicted for treason by a grand jury in San Francisco.¹ This view is not

held by the servicemen, although many talk about the broadcasters as if they were one person. The image of betrayal came after the war, when one announcer was found to have been an American citizen, a nisei born in California, and was brought to trial in San Francisco.

The strange story of Iva Toguri, whose role as a prisoner of the situation in wartime Tokyo has been documented in both popular and scholarly studies, became a cause celebre in the 1970s when the Japanese American Citizens' League petitioned President Ford for her pardon. On January 29, 1976, President Gerald Ford pardoned Iva Toguri, and on June 20 of the same year CBS broadcast an interview of her with Morley Safer on "60 Minutes." But even at the time of the trial, from July through September, 1949, the press seemed to be increasingly convinced of her innocence. This was reflected in a poll reported by Stanton Delaplane of the San Francisco Chronicle: "It is an interesting point that most of the regular spectators who sat through 13 long weeks had concluded the 33-year-old Los Angeles girl was not guilty. The press table on a trial's end ballot voted 9-1 for acquittal on all eight counts (of treason)."2

Iva Toguri's treatment at the hands of the U.S. Government reveals more about post-war U.S. sentiments than it does about her effectiveness as a propagandist. However, it is not possible in these discussions to establish which announcer each serviceman heard; to try to separate the

influence of one disc jockey in the recollection of events of over 40 years ago is more than this study can undertake. Iva Toguri's role can be ascertained from some excellent material documented by her biographer, Masayo Duus, who had access to what remained of personnel files at Radio Tokyo after their destruction in 1945; from listening to the few remaining broadcasts made under her radio name, "Orphan Ann"; and from interviews with two participants in her story, Dr. Clifford Uyeda and Mariano Villarin.

PROPAGANDA

Propaganda can only work when people believe it. Two approaches to gaining belief are openness and deceit. The "black" propaganda mentioned by Max Kraus in his interview conceals its origin, pretending to be information from an impartial or friendly source; "white" propaganda openly exhorts the enemy to join its side. The French scholar Jacques Ellul differentiates methods of persuasion still further. He says "vertical" propaganda originates from a position of authority and uses all the techniques of centralized mass communication to control or influence the crowd, who remain passive and separate recipients.

"Horizontal" or "sociological" propaganda is made inside a group, promotes group discussion and adherence, and addresses the intellect to argue its points; but the information may be falsified in order to bring the participants into adherence to the group's goals.³

According to these descriptions, the "Tokyo Rose" broadcasts would be called "white" and "vertical," that is, open about their source, and coming from a central authority through the mass media. But they were not didactic, as were the messages of Goebbels or Mildred Gillars, known as "Axis Sally" in Europe. "Tokyo Rose" and "Axis Sally" are often thought to differ only in geography, so a look at their content can be instructive.

A recording of a speech that "Axis Sally" directed toward American women shows her direct and inflammatory approach.

...I'm not on the side of President Roosevelt and his Jewish friends and his British friends. Because I've been brought up to be a one hundred percent American girl Believe me, as one American to another, do you love the British? Well, of course the answer is no. Do the British love us? Well, I should say not. But we're fighting for them, we're shedding our good young blood for this kike war, for this British war.⁴

"Orphan Ann," as Iva Toguri called herself on the air, never addressed political issues. She introduced records, for example as follows:

"This is Monday, washday for some, rifle-cleaning for some, and for the others, just another day to play. So let's all get together and forget those washday blues. Here's Kay Kaiser, Sully Mason and all the playmates. So come join the parade, you boneheads."⁵

The attempt to inspire war-weariness in the listeners had little or no effect on the men, who welcomed the music wholeheartedly.

Evidence shows that early in the war, in 1942, Japanese propaganda was different from the sort of banter Iva used to introduce records. Rex Gunn, a veteran and journalist, and colleague of Stanton Delaplane, who covered Iva Toguri's trial for the San Francisco Chronicle, published a book about Iva Toguri in 1977. He found the first use of the name "Tokyo Rose" to have been recorded in a ship's log by a U.S. submariner, and credits the voice to Fumi (or Foumy)

Saisho, a former University of Michigan student who became Radio Tokyo's principal female announcer and an interpreter for Shigetsugu Tsuneishi, the chief of propaganda. She went to work at Radio Tokyo in 1938 and broadcast as "Madame Tojo" throughout the war.⁶

That was the original, authentic GI Tokyo Rose - a newscaster, not a disc jockey or a torch singer, not a nostalgia peddler as she was later pictured to be. Prior to the Battle of Midway (June 4-6, 1942) there was nothing playful about her. We credited hers as the voice of our daily fears. Her roll call of our outfits on the move sounded like the crack of doom....She was the victorious enemy.⁷

Veteran Dick Grant, who served in New Guinea, said: "We listened to her news, yeah. It was very interesting. Oh, they know we're coming tomorrow - that's very interesting. But we were just as alert then. This didn't scare us at all." Veteran Will Clover, who fought at Midway, said: "We used to turn on the radio - we knew her schedules - and we'd turn on the radio just to hear what she had to say that we knew wasn't true."

Radio Tokyo had 13 affiliated stations in Japanese outposts, and structured the propaganda programs in a similar format.⁸ However, the personalities of the women seem to have been as varied as their accents. One, the elderly Mrs. Henry Topping, was a retired missionary who visited the American POWs and then reported that they were "as comfortable and happy as they could be away from home," and thought the Japanese soldier in general was "not a bad fellow at all."⁹ Cut from a different cloth, Myrtle Lipton

was an Asian-American who broadcast from Manila with a low-pitched husky voice, according to an article in Yank Magazine, who enjoyed nights spent "seeing the town," and had "starlet's legs" as well as other physical charms.¹⁰ Her broadcasts were more in keeping with the "Tokyo Rose" stereotype described in rumor. Her script-writer, Ken Murayama, testified in in 1949 at Iva Toguri's trial, "We had stories of girls having dates with men at home, while possibly their husbands and sweethearts might be fighting in the Southwest Pacific area...."¹¹ These women were never charged with war crimes; only Iva Toguri was brought to trial.

The Japanese propaganda was more effective at home than it was abroad. Shortwave radio use was strictly forbidden to the Japanese public under the military government; even the employees at Radio Tokyo were not allowed to listen unless there was good reason.¹² Foreign news did not reach the general population, and Iva Toguri, brought up with American standards of freedom of speech, had conflicts with others when she worked at the Domei News Agency, which monitored foreign news, because she heard how reports from London and San Francisco differed from the local fare.¹³

Reviewing the state of world propaganda, the New York Times printed an article on June 27, 1943 entitled "The Short Waves at the Half-Year." The author compared Allied and Axis propaganda, and talked about the increase in

shortwave transmissions from Africa and South America as European countries under Nazi domination shifted their centers of resistance from their fallen capitals. Shortwaves, the article said, are "delicate barometers of coming events." It contrasted the "theatrical fanfares" from Berlin to "the known day-to-day effectiveness, in terms of civilian resistance to the Nazis, of the European broadcasts emanating from London."¹⁴ Japanese propaganda was not mentioned.

People's reaction to propaganda depends on variable factors: the impact the war has on them, the strength of popular support at home, the credibility of the speaker, and the strength of the cultural symbols. If there are several sources of information available from which to triangulate a perspective on events, propaganda may have no effect at all.

When "Axis Sally" played the song "Lili Marlene" after her address to the women of America, she introduced it as a piece their "husbands and sons in North Africa have learned to love so much."¹⁵ This song could be relied upon to stir the emotions, but emotions can be ambivalent: it was a German song, popularized by Marlene Dietrich, who left Nazi Germany and entertained the Allied troops. In the "Zero Hour," the early-evening program in which Iva Toguri participated, she played "My Resistance Is Low," by Bonnie Baker, making a tongue-in-cheek joke about the title: "My, what taste you have sir, she said."¹⁶ Her use of humor must

have contributed to her popularity.

Veteran Paul Snyder, in his interview, pointed out that "Tokyo Rose" had "played a lot of Harbor Lights," a song that he associated with his girl back home. He did not feel demoralized by this, he said; the submariners were avid listeners, because they heard American music. It is interesting to see how far the Japanese were at the beginning of the war from understanding the importance of using American popular music as a way of evoking emotions. Masayo Duus, Iva Toguri's biographer, tells this account:

The Japanese radio propaganda efforts were plagued with problems. The more fanatic patriots insisted that the broadcasts include the mystical nationalism characteristic of domestic propaganda. This was not likely to have much effect on overseas audiences....At one point Tsuneishi and his staff even came up with the idea of getting together a group of actors to recite Shinto prayers over the radio.¹⁷

As a means of attracting American servicemen, it is hard to conceive of a less effective type of program.

Marie-Louise von Franz, a student of psychologist Carl Jung, raises the important question of whether the unconscious part of the human psyche can be influenced by propaganda at all. She investigates the symbols present in films made as propaganda to deliberately try to influence the public, and concludes: "If a man who wants to influence public opinion misuses symbols for this purpose, they will naturally impress the masses in so far as they are true symbols, but whether or not the mass unconscious will be emotionally gripped by them is something that cannot be

calculated in advance, something that remains completely irrational."18 If the servicemen had emotional associations with particular songs, this was a private experience. The advantage to the Japanese when they decided to use prisoners of war to broadcast was not just cheap labor; they needed the Allied prisoners to show them what to play.

No amount of intensive interviewing in peacetime can truly be used to predict how people will react during wartime. The surprising feature of "Tokyo Rose" was the popularity of the broadcasts. They still evoke a strange affection from veterans who remember.

JAPAN'S CONTROL OF INFORMATION

To see where the Allied prisoners fit in to Japan's plans, it is helpful to trace the stream of the programs' history. Early in the development of radio technology in Japan, the Ministry of Communications instituted a basic legal framework for the new medium stating that all program content required government approval.¹⁹ As government leaders saw the potential of the medium for political, social and educational uses, they abandoned plans for privately owned stations and established the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nippon Hoso Kyokai - NHK). This was a government-sponsored monopoly in which private citizens or enterprises could own shares.²⁰

Early programming had a high proportion of serious educational content, and less than one-fifth of radio time was devoted to entertainment, such as traditional music and plays.²¹

In 1934 officials from the army became members of NHK, and during the years of military expansion, they tightened official control of radio. In 1935, NHK helped to found the Domei News Agency, where Iva Toguri first found work as a typist in 1942. This agency supplied NHK with most of its news and information. The government established an Information Committee to co-ordinate propaganda, and censored all programs to prevent transmission of any element

that could cause public disturbance or "impair the honor of government and public offices or of the Army or Navy..."²² During hostilities with China in 1937 the NHK broadcast casualty lists, but military intervention later prohibited them from airing these figures.²³

Two events in 1940 foreshadowed the type of propaganda used at the time of "Tokyo Rose." On July 29 Japan's foreign minister, Arito Hachiro, began to broadcast on major themes of policy, and advocated "co-existence, co-prosperity and stabilization with other East Asian nations."²⁴ This instituted the first public mention of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, a theme of economic alliance with racial overtones which later formed the background of the propaganda war on Australia.²⁵ Also, in December 1940 the Cabinet Information Bureau replaced the Communications Ministry in the power structure of NHK. The new bureau declared its aim to be "the establishment of a military state through the unity and solidarity of the public...."²⁶

The new centralized authority was ready for Japan's entry into war with the U.S. on December 7, 1941. It had worked out a system of civil defense in which all broadcasts could be suspended during air raids, and all frequencies unified. At night NHK used five frequencies, each corresponding to an area held by their armed forces; later the number increased to eight.²⁷

The Radio Section of the Bureau consisted of three

officials: one chief, one official for domestic programs, and one official for international programs. When war broke out, NHK had a staff of 6,000, with more than 100 men and women in the Overseas Section. These included producers, writers, typists, announcers, directors and their assistants. Among them were about ten nisei, or American-born Japanese.²⁸

Early in the war the tone of domestic broadcasts had been designed to inspire group effort, and featured such series as "The People's Resolve" and "Our Determination."²⁹ But by 1943, war news became increasingly serious for Japan. American air and sea maneuvers created shortages of food and raw materials, and as austerity increased, it erased material incentives for people to continue working. By May 1944, the government responded to the situation with a change of radio strategy, abandoning slogans of optimism in favor of pure entertainment programs that emphasized Japanese culture and were more popular than propaganda.³⁰

Overseas entertainment seems to have reflected the same transitory rise in quality. In an article in Collier's Magazine, January 8, 1944, Henry Strauss wrote: "...on the whole, the 'Zero Hour' is a very pleasant program to listen to. A session with it is enough to give a man new inspiration for memories of home that will keep him company for quite a while. If this were Tokyo's intention, we would gladly send our thanks, but, knowing it isn't, as a bit of

neighborly advice, we suggest they get a new Goebbels."31

Japan's news broadcasts, both domestic and overseas, continued to state that Japan was winning the war. But in spite of the reports of false victories, frustrations affecting the Japanese morale increased throughout 1944. One response was the creation of the "Divine Wind," the suicide missions against U.S. warships. Commander Nakajima, who headed the 201st Air Group in the Philippines, the first group selected by Admiral Ohnishi for suicide missions, wrote: "Thus the Japanese morale, this kamikaze spirit, or whatever one wishes to call it, was widely evident in the autumn of 1944. It found its culmination in kamikaze attacks - a climax as violent as the circumstances which engendered it."32 This spirit of sacrifice raised morale in Japan, and many of the young flyers were interviewed for radio at their bases with the sound of their planes in the background.33 But the news beamed to both domestic and overseas audiences continued to demonstrate the psychology of denial. Japanese defeats became victories when they reached the news.

The New York Times kept the American public abreast of false news with reports from the Office of War Information (OWI):

Sept. 1, 1942 - The OWI said that Japanese propaganda had frequently 'annihilated' the Pacific fleet. After the battle of the Coral Sea, it said, Japan reported the fleet 'reduced to a fourth-rate naval power,' and after the first Solomon Islands battle Tokyo had it 'reduced to a third-rate power'.34

When MacArthur returned to the Philippines and the U.S. invasion of Leyte Gulf liberated the islands, the Times carried days of front-page headlines and stories about every aspect of the battle, comparing it to Normandy. An inside article on October 29, 1944 appeared under the title, "Tokyo Rose Stirs Philippine Mirth":

As the Japanese defeat mounts Japanese official propaganda becomes increasingly tenacious. American and Philippine listeners here in Leyte laughed tonight when Tokyo Rose, broadcasting in English, said:

"The Americans' great naval defeat caused great gloom in New York when news was flashed around The Times building in Times Square."

It is to be wondered how long Japanese-conquered territories will believe this increasingly mendacious tale when our forces continue to make leaps of hundreds of miles forward and our Navy always reappears as strong as ever and closer and closer to Japan after each 'defeat' by the Tokyo radio.

Namikawa Ryo, selected by NHK as the cabinet official of the international programs division, wrote in 1983: "We at NHK knew of the gap between the achievements of Japan and the USA but we could not give any hint of defeat on the air. The truth about all these matters was hidden from the nation by the Daihonei (Japanese Imperial Headquarters) and the mass media....If the mass media had carried news closer to the facts, a large part of the nation would have been able to assess the situation and such alarm and indescribable anxiety would not have been caused by the Emperor's ordering, in so many words, unconditional surrender."35

IVA TOGURI'S ROLE

Iva Toguri was a bit player who became a star. But stardom, in her case, made her a casualty of all the prejudices and stereotypes, both racist and sexist, that came through the distorting ether of glamor.

Iva Ikuko Toguri was born on July 4, 1916, in Los Angeles, California, one of four children of Japanese parents who were permanent residents of the United States. During her childhood and student years she had very little contact with Japanese culture; her family spoke English at home, belonged to the Methodist Church, and her friends were mostly Caucasian. She attended public schools, studied music and became an accomplished pianist, as well as a skilled typist. In 1941 she received her bachelor's degree in zoology from UCLA.³⁶

After she graduated, her family learned that her maternal aunt in Japan was ill, possibly close to death. They sent Iva to Japan to be with her, but because of the urgency of the situation, did not want to wait the several months necessary to obtain a passport. Iva left the country with only her birth certificate and a State Department Certificate of Identification. She arrived in Japan on July 24, 1941, with barely enough money to buy a ticket back, bringing quantities of food, but almost no knowledge of Japanese language or customs.

In August Iva Toguri applied for an American passport at the United States Consulate in Tokyo. But this was during a period of total prohibition of Asian immigration, under the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1924. Her application apparently was ignored; her passport never came. She tried to board a ship leaving December 2, 1941, but without a passport was refused port clearance.³⁷

The day after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Army Kempeitai (called "Thought Control Police" by the Japanese American Citizens League) interrogated Iva Toguri and demanded that she renounce her American citizenship, or else life in Japan would be "very, very inconvenient."³⁸ She refused, saying she had been raised as an American and would never consider changing her citizenship. The Kempeitai classified her as an enemy alien, restricted her movements, denied her a food rationing card, and constantly harassed her with visits. Because of her outspoken support for the United States, coupled with her inability to speak Japanese and the frequent visits from the Kempeitai, neighbors made life intolerable for Iva's relatives, and in 1942 they asked her to find another place to live.

On her own without a food ration card, Iva faced slow starvation. After several weeks she found a part-time job typing and monitoring English language broadcasts at the Domei News Agency. There she met Felipe d'Aquino, a Portuguese citizen of Japanese ancestry. They became good

friends; later they married.

Her low wages barely kept her alive, and by June, 1943, Iva was hospitalized for beri-beri.³⁹ Now burdened with debts, she found a second part-time job in August as a typist in the business office of Radio Tokyo. There she met several Allied prisoners of war who were brought in from Bunka camp daily to broadcast propaganda. Three of these men broadcast on the "Zero Hour" program: Major Charles Cousens, an Australian captured at Singapore; Captain Wallace Ince, an American captured at Corregidor; and Lieutenant Norman Reyes, a Filipino captured at Bataan. These three had had broadcasting experience before the war, and were ordered to work by Colonel Tsuneishi, who directed the radio propaganda. ⁴⁰

Iva became friendly with the POW broadcasters, and when in November 1943 the Japanese authorities decided to add a female voice to the program, Cousens chose her because of her pro-American sympathies. When informed by the authorities of her new duties, Iva tried to refuse, saying she had no experience. She was ordered to broadcast and reminded that she had "no choice" in the matter; as an enemy alien she had no rights.⁴¹ Although she was not directly threatened with bodily harm, she was aware that refusal could result in severe punishment.

Her appointment surprised other women employees. Some had several years of experience and resented not being

chosen. A handful of women worked as announcers, some nisei, born in America, and some educated abroad. When the bureau was shorthanded women were pulled from the typing pool, and several got started as announcers this way.⁴²

Under the pretext of correcting scripts, the three POWs were secretly burlesquing the Japanese propaganda. The Japanese censored everything before it aired, but Cousens, Ince and Reyes were able to use strange expressions with double meanings, or to slip news items out of the file of items to be broadcast. Probably none of these carried through to the listeners, but each secret change must have given the prisoners a sense of victory over the oppressors. According to Cousens' testimony, their intent was to play down the propaganda and provide good music that would bring up the morale of the troops.

The Japanese soon saw that Cousens was a professional and let him write the scripts himself. Masayo Duus offers a possible explanation for this latitude: "Whereas the United States drew on its ablest announcers and journalists for its radio propaganda efforts, the Japanese had difficulty finding anyone either to announce or to write scripts. There were few professionally trained English-speaking announcers in Japan." ⁴³

Cousens picked Iva in part for her "rough, almost masculine" voice, which he thought would suit the kind of comedy routine he had planned.⁴⁴ He promised her that she

would not harm and would possibly help the war effort. He coached her in her delivery, and she went on the air on November 11 or 12, 1943, calling herself "Ann," the abbreviation for announcer. Later she changed this to "Orphan Ann."

Since the music was good listening, "Zero Hour" became popular with the GIs. On June 29, 1943, before Iva went on the air, the New York Times printed an article from Guadalcanal:

Between the Tokyo radio and Japanese bombers, the nights are not always dull here.

Tokyo has been beaming a program called "the zero hour" direct to the Russell Islands and Guadalcanal. The fellows like it very much because it cries over them and feels so sorry for them. It talks about the food that they miss by not being at home and tells how the war workers are stealing their jobs and their girls.⁴⁵

After Iva Toguri joined the program the expanded "Zero Hour" ran from 6:00 -7:15 p.m. Tokyo time. To pacify the censors, Cousens' scripts had her call the GIs "boneheads" or "honorable boneheads." Following the scripts, she sometimes introduced herself as "your favorite enemy, Ann."

At Cousens' request, Iva began bringing food, medicine and other supplies for the prisoners almost daily. In February or March, 1944 one of the POWs at Bunka came down with a high fever and chills. The POWs were issued only one thin futon, or cotton quilt, and the authorities refused to give the prisoner another one. When Cousens informed Iva of this situation, she brought in a blanket she had been using

to cover a trunk. Ince wrapped it around his body and brought it into camp under his coat. Iva's friend Felipe d'Aquino was shocked that she would give away a good wool blanket, a valuable item in wartime Tokyo. 46

In December Iva quit her job at the Domei monitoring service because of a falling-out with other employees over her pro-American sentiments. She questioned the truthfulness of Japanese news from the Imperial Headquarters because she had access to other information from San Francisco and London broadcasts, and the domestic fare was becoming more and more detached from reality. Her friend d'Aquino got into a fistfight defending her position. 47 Fortunately for Iva the Danish legation needed a secretary, and this time she found work quickly. Lars Pederson Tillitse, the Danish minister, was interested in the United States and enjoyed talking with her. She became friends with his family, and often told them that she thought America was going to win the war. She did not tell the Tillitises about moonlighting at Radio Tokyo, and did not tell the authorities there at her job at the Danish legation.

In the spring of 1944 the staff of "Zero Hour" began to change. The American, Captain Ince, was beaten at Bunka camp and disappeared for a while; a few months later he reappeared on another program. Major Cousens was hospitalized in June with a heart attack and never came back

to the "Zero Hour." His departure was a blow to Iva, since her role as Orphan Ann had been his creation. Without him the program lost its meaning for her. She wanted to quit, and began to take frequent leaves of absence. Mitsushio, her superior at the station who later testified against her, said she had better reconsider whether she could quit a program directly under control of the army for her own personal reasons.⁴⁸

In autumn of 1944 Mitsushio was promoted to chief of the news analysis section, and Kenkichi Oki took over the "Zero Hour." Oki later became the second U.S. Government witness to testify against Iva Toguri. He said he had ordered Iva to broadcast the words, "Orphans of the Pacific, you really are orphans now. How will you get home now that all your ships are sunk?"⁴⁹

These words were never recorded, although many claimed they heard them after the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Iva Toguri flatly denied ever saying them, but did remember hearing Oki tell Norman Reyes to use the phrase after a battle off Formosa. The phrase "orphans of the Pacific" was often used to refer to the Australian army, cut off from the Allies, and "your ships are gone" was another phrase frequently used in Japanese propaganda.⁵⁰

Words like "your ships are sunk" were not likely to devastate the GIs after they had landed with MacArthur and liberated the Philippines in what the press called a "second

Normandy." On Monday, October 29, 1944, the New York Times printed the story previously mentioned called "Tokyo Rose stirs Philippine Mirth." This quoted an entire dispatch from the Domei News Agency, not the sort of announcing that Iva did with her disc jockey routine, and showed that to the Americans, at least, Radio Tokyo was whistling in the dark.

MILITARY ENTERTAINMENT

Long before the United States entered World War II, studies of the troops' morale had convinced the Army that it should provide its own entertainment internally and not continue to rely on outside agencies such as the Red Cross, the Knights of Columbus and the Salvation Army.⁵¹ Armed Forces Radio began in 1941 with small radio stations started by the troops themselves. The Government also formed three separate agencies -- the Education and Information Office (I&E), the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Signal Corps. All of these dealt with defining war aims and persuading members of the armed forces that these aims were legitimate.⁵²

Beginning in 1942, under Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, Frank Capra produced the "Why We Fight" series of seven documentary films intended for military indoctrination. These were required viewing for all soldiers going overseas, and it was marked on each person's record once he had seen the films.⁵³ These were propaganda films, in the sense that they simplified the truth in order to appeal to the emotions and inspire patriotism. However, they were technically brilliant, and three found commercial distribution within the U.S. The first in the series, Prelude to War, defined the events leading up to the war, and won an Academy Award for the best documentary of 1942.

Another Capra film, The Negro Soldier, was produced to demonstrate to black troops their particular stake in fighting the Axis powers. The Army Pictorial Service of the Signal Corps, formed after an administrative shakeup in 1943, sponsored a trilogy directed by John Huston. The most famous of these, the recently discovered "Let There Be Light," explored the nature of psychosomatic illness as a response of normal men to the unendurable.

In his study of these documentaries, Professor David Culbert points out that film was the chosen tool of social engineering, which he calls "an outgrowth of behavioral psychology arguing that human behavior can be manipulated towards socially desirable goals."⁵⁴ Each nation needed to give its citizens a feeling of patriotic community in total war, and these films provided "the most comprehensive statement of war aims produced in America between 1941 and 1945."⁵⁵

In addition to films made for the military, radio entertainment provided by the Armed Forces Network essentially played network programming with the advertising removed and army spots inserted.⁵⁶ An article by George Horne in the New York Times, March 27, 1943, criticized their programming. Writing from the New Hebrides about U.S. radio and film entertainment, he said:

The programs that reach the boys down here...could be a lot better....They do not want to hear a single program about how evil and dumb the enemy is, or a single "back the attack" program. They are backing it already.

They would like to hear more dance bands, light love stories, light musical comedies....They will probably continue to listen to Tokyo Rose, but no one at home need worry about that."

As "Tokyo Rose" began to make ripples in the press, the Armed Forces Network did take notice, although how seriously they took it remains in doubt. The San Francisco Chronicle report of Iva Toguri's trial indicates that one witness, Lt. Ted E. Sherdeman, arrived in Australia in 1943 and, as an officer and former Hollywood writer in charge of Armed Forces Radio, "his morale was assaulted daily by the competitive Radio Tokyo." Delaplane reported:

It was Sherdeman's job to wean American troops from the jive and propaganda fare of Tokyo to the safer but duller programs of the "Jungle Network."...

At Milne Bay in New Guinea, far from Schwab's Drug Store on Sunset Boulevard, the expatriate Hollywood writer heard: "Wouldn't this be a nice night to go to a cool corner drugstore and have an ice cream soda?"

Said Sherdeman: "I felt that this was very damaging to my morale."

This remark was deleted by Federal Judge Michael J. Roche.⁵⁷

In spite of Armed Forces Radio, many of the veterans interviewed here say there was little or no other entertainment available to them. The "Zero Hour" was a hit before Iva Toguri joined them. Ira Wolfert's previously cited article in the New York Times, June 23, 1943, makes no mention of a female announcer, and the article by Lt.

I. Henry Strauss in Collier's Magazine January 8, 1944, talked about the program and called the announcer "Tokyo Tony." It is worth quoting a full paragraph from this to show the details attributed to someone other than Iva Toguri. The article may have been written before Iva went on the air, as two months' lead time to print was not unusual then; or Strauss and his company may simply not have thought she was important.

It is difficult to realize that the program is not coming from a studio back home, so American is the voice and language of the announcer. Its friendliness holds you as he continues: "There is a place many thousands of miles away, a place dear to all your hearts, where you used to sip sodas with the girl next door; where, as a little boy, you swiped your mother's cookies; where your car sits on the blocks awaiting your return, and your dog goes to the gate every evening to see if you are coming down the street. We know how you feel, so we are going to give you music that will warm your hearts - music that will turn back all those weary miles. Our first selection for tonight will be that old favorite, Tommy Dorsey's arrangement of Star Dust."

After a long description of the men's reaction to the music, Strauss continues:

The recording ends, and the announcer asks, "Reminds you of the little girl you left behind, doesn't it? Well, don't waste your thoughts, brother, she's not waiting for you. She's probably out with some lad right now who was smart enough to keep himself out of these malaria-infested islands."

Strauss goes on to say that although homesickness is a dangerous disease for fighting men, Tokyo's efforts, subtle or not, failed to instill it.

THE SHIFT IN PUBLIC OPINION

By the end of the war, the legend of "Tokyo Rose" had gone beyond publicity into myth. "Tokyo Rose" may have been the third most well-known Japanese name to Americans after Emperor Hirohito and Prime Minister Tojo.⁵⁸ As victorious American allies pushed into Tokyo two reporters, Clark Lee from International News Service and Harry Brundidge from Cosmopolitan, both owned by Hearst, raced into Tokyo trying to scoop the story of Tokyo Rose.

They contacted a writer, Leslie Nakashima, whom Lee had known from the Domei News Agency before the war, but found no-one knew who "Tokyo Rose" was. Still they persisted until Nakashima introduced them to Iva Toguri, now Mrs. d'Aquino. They brought her and her husband Felipe to the Imperial Hotel and offered her \$2,000 on publication of her exclusive story in Cosmopolitan if she would sign a contract saying she was "the one and only Tokyo Rose." Iva was elated, in part because she thought she was at last going to be recognized by her own country, and in part because the money was a fortune for war-torn Tokyo. She signed the agreement, and Clark Lee came out with a news story in the Los Angeles Examiner September 3, 1945 under the heading "Traitor's Pay - Tokyo Rose Got 100 Yen a Mo. - \$6.60." ⁵⁹

Brundidge then wrote a first-person story to sound like a confession of treason, and sent the story to Frances

Whiting, editor of Cosmopolitan Magazine in New York. She informed him the next morning by cable that she would not run a story about a traitor. Brundidge, needing to absolve himself from the terms of the contract, arranged a mass news conference for "Tokyo Rose," and then handed the 17 pages of notes typed by Clark Lee over to the Eighth Army CIC offices of General Willard Thorpe, saying it was her confession as a traitor.⁶⁰

Iva Toguri was arrested in September 1945 and held in Sugamo prison along with many other Japanese of all levels of official status. A year later, on October 25, 1946, she was released. The Justice Department had decided not to prosecute for lack of evidence.

* * * * *

In 1945, Americans who had been united by the war effort came home to find society fragmented into diverse elements once again facing separate problems. A new form of social engineering took place: an attempt to rid society of its disaffected fringe elements by addressing the issues of loyalty and treason. The Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials were two main arenas where the world tried to come to grips with principles of morality; acts of sadism and brutality became targets of investigation. In the U.S., treason trials overhauled the recent past and loyalty oaths attempted to protect the country's future, as the press peddled the fear of a domestic "red menace."⁶¹

On November 25, 1946, President Truman created the President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty.⁶² Its recommendations became the basis for Executive Order 9835, requiring the loyalty investigation of all employees and applicants for employment with the executive branch. Those charged with disloyalty went before their own agency's loyalty board; appeals came before the Civil Service Commission's Loyalty Review Board. The order also directed the Attorney General to furnish the board with a list of subversive organizations. The FBI, the chief investigative agency, was permitted to conceal the identity of its confidential informants.⁶³

At this time Tom Clark was Attorney General under Truman, and like many other public figures he took a public beating from the vitriolic Walter Winchell. At this time many members of Congress, especially in the House Un-American Activities Committee, thought the administration was "soft on traitors."⁶⁴ Winchell, formerly pro-Roosevelt and anti-fascist, had swung sharply to the right, and in 1948 was at the peak of his influence. In addition to his New York Mirror column syndicated in 800 daily newspapers, his Sunday night broadcasts commanded the biggest audience in radio - perhaps 20 million. Critic John Crosby wrote: "The Walter Winchell rating is a gauge on how nervous the nation is. When the United States is worried, his rating is high. When the United States is serene, his rating is low."⁶⁵

When Iva Toguri tried to return to the United States in 1947, the Chief of the Passport Division at the State Department wrote to the Justice Department asking for an opinion on her attempt to re-establish citizenship. The Assistant Attorney General under Clark wrote that after analyzing the available evidence a prosecution for treason was not warranted, and there was no objection to granting her a passport. A few days later the Commander of the American Legion publicly asked the Justice Department to expedite the prosecution of "Tokyo Rose" to forestall her attempt to re-establish residence in the U.S. Concurrently, Brundidge had managed to get a series of articles published in the Nashville Tennessean in May 1948 in which he stated that Clark had in his possession "a signed confession by Tokyo Rose."⁶⁶ Letters and resolutions of protest from local Legion branches flowed steadily into the Justice Department through early 1948. Publicity from an anti-Japanese organization in California called the "Native Sons of the Golden West" joined the protest as this group sent letters to numerous top officials.⁶⁷

Walter Winchell took up the "Tokyo Rose" issue after receiving a letter from a Gold Star mother whose son had been killed in the war. Winchell apparently had a grudge against the Attorney General for not letting him know in advance of the official announcement of his appointment to office.⁶⁸ 1948 was an election year and the democratic

administration's popularity was at a low ebb. It had become politically expedient to take a strong stand against treason.

The Constitution defines treason against the United States (in Article III, Section 3) as "adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort." To establish this requires "the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act." The need to establish overt acts is designed to protect citizens from false accusations by the government, since treason is a crime not necessarily accompanied by objective results.

Three years after the war ended the Justice Department began to move on a number of World War II cases. From January 25 through March 11, 1949, "Axis Sally" was tried in Washington, D.C. The trials, although seemingly similar, differed substantially in content.

Mildred Gillars was in fact the only "Axis Sally," and she called herself "Sally" on the air. At first she also claimed duress as a motive, but on the second day in court changed her story, saying that love for her former teacher, Max Otto Koischewitz, formerly of Hunter College, had motivated her allegiance to the Nazi cause.⁶⁹ The jury found her guilty on one count of treason involving a Nazi broadcast called "Vision of Invasion." Broadcast in May, 1944, the play was beamed overseas to American homes and to U.S. troops waiting to invade Normandy. Miss Gillars

participated in the role of an American mother who dreamed that her son in the invasion forces had died in a burning ship attempting to cross the English Channel. The broadcast was accompanied by many screams, groans and outcries as a background for the account of what would happen if the Allies dared to invade Europe. The prosecution charged that she got a "sadistic joy" out of the broadcasts.⁷⁰ Miss Gillars asserted that she had tried to help the U.S. by broadcasting news of American POWs. The POWs testified at the trial that she had approached them as a Red Cross nurse and had promised to deliver their messages without propaganda; but evidence showed they were laced with propaganda from beginning to end.⁷¹ It is also worth noting that Mildred Gillars had dramatic training, chose to live in Nazi Germany before the war, and sought the radio as a means of making a living; she was paid three times as much as other employees at Radio Berlin, second only to Koischewitz himself.⁷² She had signed an oath of allegiance to Germany, and when the Allies invaded Berlin, she fled with Koischewitz, rather than trying to return to the United States.

On December 3, 1947, the New York Times carried an article headed "Seek Treason Witnesses," which began: "Anyone who ever saw Iva Ikuko d'Aquino broadcasting as 'Tokyo Rose' or recognized her voice coming over the air waves, should communicate with the FBI, that agency stated

today." A year and a half later, on July 5, 1949, Iva Toguri's trial opened in San Francisco. She was charged with eight overt acts of treason. Defense Counsel Wayne Collins tried to defend her on three grounds: That there were 15 or more English-speaking women broadcasting from Japan over shortwave to the enemy; that broadcasts were made from nine occupied radio stations besides Radio Tokyo; and that "Zero Hour" on which Iva Toguri was accused of treasonable broadcasts never got beyond the point of playing entertainment to build up listener interest among American troops.⁷³ But the prosecution had two witnesses, Mitsushio and Oki, who said they definitely had seen her write and broadcast propaganda. Both men were her supervisors at NHK and both were nisei who had joined the Japanese cause. They were not prosecuted because they had not kept their citizenship.

Iva Toguri was found guilty on September 30, 1949, of one count of treason: "That on a day during October 1944, the exact date being to the Grand Jurors unknown, the defendant in the offices of the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan did speak into a microphone concerning the loss of ships."⁷⁴ She was sentenced to ten years in prison and a fine of \$10,000. Counting her time in Sugamo, she served eight years.

In 1976, the Chicago Tribune ran a story by Ronald Yates under the heading, "Tokyo Rose's accusers claim U.S. forced

them to lie." According to the story, which named Mitsushio and Oki, one of them, who asked not to be identified, said, "U.S. Occupation Army police came and told me I had no choice but to testify against Iva, or else. Then, after I was flown to San Francisco for the trial along with other government witnesses, we were told what to say and what not to say two hours every morning for a month before the trial started." 75

Concurrent with the "Tokyo Rose" trial and overshadowing it in the press, several other stories grabbed the headlines and showed the temper of the times. Alger Hiss and Judith Coplon went on trial for spying for Russia. The San Francisco War Memorial trustees banned Wagnerian soprano Kirsten Flagstad from the Opera House on the grounds that her deceased husband had been suspected of collaborating with the Nazis in occupied Norway; this threatened the cancellation of the entire following opera season. Baritone Paul Robeson, a self-declared radical, spoke out against the House Un-American Activities Committee, calling them a "definite menace"; two veterans' organizations, the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the Disabled American Veterans picketed his concert in Newark, New Jersey chanting "Go Back to Russia."76 In Peekskill, New York, anti-communist demonstrators attacked buses leaving a Paul Robeson concert and injured 83 people.77 Seen in perspective of the times, "Tokyo Rose" had a brief flicker as headline news.

But 40 years later, the impact of that trial is still hard to dismiss. The "witch hunt" years of American history are a reminder that the price tag of repression and intolerance, paid in the coin of personal suffering, has yet to be written off the ledger. These interviews show that the effect of the "Zero Hour" propaganda during the war is difficult to assess: those who remember "Tokyo Rose" have no way of sorting out which woman said what from which station. Part of the enjoyment of enemy programs may have come from the group participation which inspired feelings of patriotic community; or from memories evoked by the music; or from having a chance to relax after a day fraught with extraordinary tensions. It can be seen that GIs, concerned at first by the accuracy of the information, later enjoyed the chance to laugh at the obvious lies. But they always enjoyed the music, and Iva Toguri, the "orphan of the Pacific," helped them along.

NOTES

1. Christopher Tunney, A Biographical Dictionary of World War II, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972), p. 193-4.
2. Stanton Delaplane, The San Francisco Chronicle, September 30, 1949, p.1.
3. Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes. (New York: 1969), p. 80-81.
4. Broadcast of Mildred E. Gillars, 18 May 1943, Voices of World War II, audiotape 12, "The Media in Wartime," (National Archives 262-00650).
5. National Archives audiotape 262-107, August 14, 1944.
6. Rex Gunn, They Called Her Tokyo Rose (Port Angeles, WA, 1973), Appendix p.3.
7. Ibid.
8. Masayo Duus, Tokyo Rose: Orphan of the Pacific, (Kodansha International, Ltd., 1979), p.198.
9. "Captive Messages Amuse Chunking," The New York Times, February 2, 1944.
10. Yank Magazine, cited in Duus, op. cit., p.199
11. Duus, op. cit., p.199.
12. Ibid., p.70
13. Ibid.
14. W.T. Arms, "The Short Waves at the Half Year," The New York Times, June 27, 1943, p. 7.
15. Gillars, "The Media in Wartime," Voices of World War II.
16. National Archives, 262-107.
17. Duus, op. cit., p. 66.
18. M.-L. von Franz, "The Process of Individuation," in Carl G. Jung, Man and His Symbols (London: Aldus Books, 1964), p.221.

19. Gordon Daniels, "Japanese Domestic Radio and Cinema Propaganda," in Film and Radio Propaganda in World War II, K.R.M. Short, ed. (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee press, 1983), p.294.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid, p.296.
24. Ibid.
25. Lucy Meo, Japan's Radio War on Australia, 1941-1945 (Melbourne University Press, 1968), p.206.
26. Daniels, op.cit., p.297.
27. Ibid., p.298.
28. Namikawa Ryo, "Japanese Overseas Broadcasting: A Personal View," in K.R.M. Short, op. cit., p.321.
29. Daniels, op. cit., p.298.
30. Ibid, p. 301.
31. Lt. I. Henry Strauss, "The Zero Hour," Collier's Magazine, January 8, 1944.
32. Captain Rikihei Inoguchi and Commander Tadashi Nakajima, The Divine Wind (New York: Bantam Books, 1958), p. 34.
33. Daniels, op.cit., p. 303.
34. "Tokyo Radio News Slights Milne Bay," The New York Times, September 1, 1942.
35. Namikawa Ryo, op. cit., p. 323.
36. National Committee for Iva Toguri, Iva Toguri d'Aquino: Victim of a Legend (San Francisco: Japanese American Citizens League, 1975), p. 2.
37. Ibid., p.3.
38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., p. 5.

40. Stanton Delaplane, The San Francisco Chronicle, July 13, 1949, p. 4; see also August 16, 1949, "Defense Witness Tells of Duress, Sadism, Murder," p. 1.

41. Ibid.

42. Duus, op. cit., p.67. June Suyama, "the Nightingale of Nanking," was born in Japan but reared in Canada, and worked at NHK before the war. Ruth Hayakawa was brought up in California; Margaret Kato was brought up in London and had a marked English accent. Typists chosen were Katherine Fujiwara, Katherine Morooka and Mieko Furuya, all nisei, and Mary Ishii, half-Japanese, half English.

43. Duus, op. cit., p.67.

44. Ibid., p.81.

45. Ira Wolfert, "Japanese Radio Attacks the Morale of Men On Guadalcanal With Tales of Home Folk," New York Times, June 29, 1943.

46. Duus, op. cit., p.87.

47. JACL, Victim of a Legend, p. 6.

48. Duus, op.cit., p.95.

49. "Tokyo Rose Guilty," The San Francisco Chronicle, September 30, 1949, p. 1.

50. Duus, op. cit., p.173-4.

51. Interview with Lawrence E. Suid, February 10, 1988.

52. David Culbert, "Social Engineering for a Democratic Society at War," in Film and Radio Propaganda in World War II, K.R.M. Short, Ed. (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1983), p. 178 passim.

53. William J. Blakefield, Documentary Film Classics, (Washington, DC: The National AudioVisual Center, National Archives and Records Service, second edition), p. 19.

54. David Culbert, op.cit., p. 173.

55. Ibid.

56. Suid, Interview, p.3.

57. Delaplane, the Chronicle, August 2, 1949, p.1.
58. JACL, Victim of a Legend, p. 11.
59. Rex Gunn, They Called Her Tokyo Rose, p. 30.
60. Rex Gunn, op. cit., p.30.
61. Stanley Kutler, The American Inquisition: Justice and Injustice in the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), p.28
62. John H. Schaar, Loyalty in America (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1957), p. 138.
63. Ibid, p.139.
64. Ibid.
65. Bob Thomas, Winchell (New York: Doubleday, 1971), p. 28.
66. Nashville Tennessean, May 2, 1948.
67. Duus, op. cit., p.110.
68. Ibid., p. 112. See also Stanley Kutler, The American Inquisition: Justice and Injustice in the Cold War, New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), p.14.
69. New York Times, February 25, 1949.
70. Ibid., March 11, 1949.
71. Duus, op.cit., p.137.
72. Ibid.
73. Delaplane, the Chronicle, July 14, 1949, p.1.
74. JACL, Victim of a Legend, Appendix B.
75. Ronald Yates, "Tokyo Rose's accusers claim U.S. forced them to lie," The Chicago Tribune, March 22, 1976, p.15.
76. San Francisco Chronicle, July 22, 1949, p.1.
77. Ibid., September 5, 1949, p. 1.

WAR OF WORDS AND MUSIC

Transcript of the Documentary

March, 1988

WAR OF WORDS AND MUSIC

Maybe they were lonely, or maybe they just liked her music. Perhaps by 1944 they knew they were winning. But the GIs in the South Pacific made her one of the most popular disc jockeys ever.

IVA TOGURI: Hello, you fighting orphans of the Pacific. Hows tricks? This is after her weekend Ann, back on the air strictly under union hours. Reception OK? Well it better be, because this is all-request night, and I've got a pretty nice program for my favorite little family, the wandering boneheads of the Pacific Islands. The first request is made by none other than the boss. And guess what. He wants Bonnie Baker and "My Resistance Is Low." Low, what taste you have, sir, she said.

Yet Iva Toguri is an obscure name, ignored by history that once burned her with its spotlight. The U.S. Government tried her for treason, saying she had attempted to demoralize American troops as the legendary propagandist the GIs called "Tokyo Rose."

IVA TOGURI (introduced as "Ann"): This is Monday, washday for some, rifle cleaning for some, and for the others, just another day to play. Let's all get together and forget those washday blues. Here's Kay Kaiser, Sully Mason, and the Playmates, so come join the parade, you boneheads. (music)

The legend was far from the truth, but it had strong roots in the power of her radio popularity. Iva spent eight years in jail for treason. Yet there was no such person as Tokyo Rose. The name she used was Orphan Ann, but as many as twenty women went on the air for Radio Tokyo to play records and try to demoralize the American GIs. The GIs called all of them by the generic name "Tokyo Rose."

IVA TOGURI ("Ann"): I see Betty's getting impatient for her request of the evening. Oh, come on, don't hold back, Betty. What is it you want to hear? Don't be bashful.

BETTY: Can you oblige with "My Heart Belongs to Daddy?" Bea Wayne doing the vocal of course.

IVA TOGURI ("Ann"): Well, no sooner said than done. (music)

Robert Anderson served on the USS Half Moon in the South Pacific.

ROBERT ANDERSON: Tokyo Rose had a beautiful voice. She was easy to listen to. And that was kind of appreciated, and besides, it was a sexy voice as far as the troops were concerned. And they liked that. She could lead into the music portion of it beautifully.

Paul Snyder says she was well-known in the submarine force.

PAUL SNYDER: She was female and there were a lot of lonely guys out there in the Pacific and that was about the only feminine voice they could hear, so they used to tune her in a lot.

Dick Grant, a former Intelligence Officer, was with the Army Air Corps in New Guinea.

DICK GRANT: She had a real sweet voice. It was a sexy voice, whether she was trying to make it sexy or not, we were pretty lonesome down there in New Guinea and any woman's voice was kind of sexy at the time. But she had good delivery, and she evidently had good intelligence, or the Japanese Imperial Staff had good intelligence. They just fed the propaganda to her.

The legend grew as Japan beamed broadcasts over short and medium-wave transmissions. From Tokyo to Manila, Saigon, south to New Guinea, north to the Aleutian Islands, they broadcast in English, and used for bait the latest American music.

(Fade up Teddy Wilson's orchestra, "Mean to Me.")

Iva Toguri was a California girl. She paid her first visit to relatives in Japan in the summer of 1941. When war broke out she was caught in the alien country of her ancestors, unwilling to renounce her U.S. citizenship, but unable to return home.

She got a job as an English-speaking typist at the Japanese Domei News Service. The military government needed broadcasters who spoke English. Iva refused. She said she had no experience. But the army gave orders at Radio Tokyo. Iva went on the air.

(This is Radio Tokyo calling in the Pacific - voice under next segment) (male voices)

Iva worked with a team of three men, all of them Allied prisoners. Major Charles Cousens, called "the Walter Cronkite of Australia," wrote her lines. Both he and Iva

tried to diminish the effectiveness of the propaganda. They exaggerated the facts to make them preposterous.

But by then, the Japanese broadcasts had become the only game in town. The many voices called "Tokyo Rose" told the GIs their own troop movements. Dick Grant:

DICK GRANT: The Tokyo High Command had some kind of intelligence net that really produced, because Tokyo Rose would get on the air and, for instance, "The 5th Fighter Squadron - when you come over Rabaul tomorrow we're going to be waiting for you." Specifics like that - she would name the targets that had been planned to be hit the very next day.

Leo Rhein was with the Forty-first Quartermaster Company in Australia and New Guinea.

LEO RHEIN: She would address units. She would address companies, or regiments, or battalions. And they knew exactly what regiments or battalions were there. And it even got to the point where she could pinpoint individuals; and she'd, say, give somebody's name and a certain unit, and say that he was at a certain place, and so you knew pretty well that some information was getting through, that they knew where people and where units were.

Les Tucker, on the USS North Carolina, said Tokyo Rose had the news first.

LES TUCKER: I remember when the Chicago was sunk, and we took on the survivors, oh, approximately 36 to 48 hours off the Chicago. And I can remember that broadcast, what date I can't tell you, one or two or three days after, but the Chicago had been sunk. They knew it - they had sunk it. And the only way we knew about it at the time was from the survivors.

Paul Snyder:

PAUL SNYDER: I remember in 1944 that the rumor was that Tokyo Rose was really an American spy who was providing Naval information to Navy submarines particularly, because it was uncanny when we would get a message that the Seattle-Marine was at such-and-such a longitude and latitude and we would hit that longitude and latitude and there would be the Seattle-Marine.

Gareth Moon, with the Marines, watched an air fight from Guadalcanal.

GARETH MOON: That evening when we listened to Tokyo Rose she told how the Imperial Japanese Forces had made an air strike at Guadalcanal, and then she proceeded to tell the exact truth. She told how many planes they lost, six or seven of their planes were lost and two of ours were lost, and she told how the battle hadn't turned out as well as they wanted, that the Americans had actually chased off the Japanese planes - partly because they had run out of gas and had to go back to Munda, I suppose - but she told the truth. And we were amazed about that.

The news was not always reliable.

GARETH MOON: What we found out afterwards was what she told about the other place was absolutely false, there was no truth to it at all. But we, having heard about what had happened at Guadalcanal in which she told the truth, were almost inclined to believe that there had been a terrible massacre up on the other island, and that we'd had some bad luck back there.

Les Tucker found some disinformation as well.

LES TUCKER: The ship I was on, which was the USS North Carolina, was consigned to the depths twice. I don't remember the exact dates, but there we are just floating around, you know, as well as ever, doing our job.

The men knew the broadcasts exaggerated, but they stayed tuned. And sometimes, they worried. Navy men in the New Hebrides had to take atabrine tablets to prevent malaria, and it turned their skin yellow. Robert Anderson remembers Tokyo Rose told them they would become sterile.

ROBERT ANDERSON: Propaganda goes so far, but that kind of worried the young fellows out there and some of them planning on getting married...I know an MD on board ship had to come on and say, "Don't worry, fellows, that is strictly propaganda - there's no research saying that atabrine tablets are going to cause sterility."

They weren't sterile, but they were far from women. And the voice on the airwaves tried to play on their fears. Paul Snyder:

PAUL SNYDER: This particular thing about telling us that some 4-F was back wining and dining our sweetheart was really almost an every night thing with her. And it was very smart, because she did figure out that there were only probably four or five really important songs that everybody would have some feeling for or relate to some girl. The girl that I was going with at the time, I particularly

remember "Harbor Lights" was our song. She played a lot of "Harbor Lights" - I don't know how effective that was.

Barry Zorthian, a communications specialist, worked with the Voice of America and for Information Vietnam.

BARRY ZORTHIAN: The basic technique of appealing to the desire for home, the desire to be with family, the desire to be in familiar surroundings and therefore to be less than committed to fighting, is standard operating procedure if you will.

Though they laughed, everyone who heard Tokyo Rose remembers that part of her message. It's the same technique advertisers use for hard sell - to repeat until the listener remembers a brand name. Broadcast historian Dr. Kenneth Short says you have to be cautious before you dismiss the effects of a repeated message.

DR. SHORT: If you're worrying about what your girlfriend's doing back in L.A., and if Tokyo Rose is reminding you about that question, you may on the outside be laughing and on the inside you may be crying.

But the United States never tried to block Japanese radio. Instead, they provided their own training films, the now classic "Why We Fight" series by Frank Capra. Armed Forces Radio slowly got into gear. Author Larry Suid says it was started by the servicemen.

(Glenn Miller softly in background "In the Mood")

LARRY SUID: And by that I mean military radio stations which were created purely to relieve the boredom of the troops in the field. And they were spontaneously created by the men themselves. General Marshall brought in Capra and Tom Lewis, not in response to Tokyo Rose, because when this was started the troops with a few exceptions were not fighting. I mean, there were troops on Guadalcanal, they were fighting on Wake Island, but the idea was domestic. Domestic in the sense of whatever they throw at us, this is what we're going to do. It wasn't in reaction to Tokyo Rose that Armed Forces Radio was created.

(Bring up Glenn Miller)

But by 1944, when Iva was on the air, the enemy broadcasts still filled a vacuum with entertainment for war-weary listeners. Ken McConnell was with the Signal Corps in the South Pacific.

KEN McCONNELL: The program was very entertaining. We used to be able to - when I'd pick it up on the radio - lots of times the crew would request that we plug it in through the PA system. She played real good records. They had all the American records. I recall that when "White Christmas" first became available, they had it available within a week or so of the time when it came out in the United States. And it was a wire recorded version, it was excellent.

Gareth Moon:

GARETH MOON: Just like anything else - when we were out on the islands anything we had to do was diversion. We did things that would be boring as all get-out back home but out on the islands it was just something to do.

Listening to the radio became a daily ritual. Les Tucker:

LES TUCKER: It was a pleasure because we didn't have Armed Forces Radio set up at that time and it was entertaining.

Dick Grant:

DICK GRANT: Every evening around chow time between 6:00 and 7:00 when everyone had finished the chores was back home and everything, the most modern and up-to-date music emanated from Tokyo Rose and her evening broadcasts. And everyone tuned in to listen to the latest music from home. We didn't have Armed Forces Radio like we do now or like we did during the Korean War or the Southeast Asian War.

In April, 1944, the New York Times's George Horne wrote from the New Hebrides, saying Armed Forces Radio should try a different format to please the GIs. He said they would like to hear more dance bands. And he added, "They will probably continue to listen to Tokyo Rose, but no-one at home need worry about that." Bill Ohrmann:

BILL OHRMANN: She'd come on and say, Well, you boys fighting down there in the jungle, some 4-F back home is taking your girl out, and stuff like that. And we'd just laugh about it the next morning, and say, "Did you hear Tokyo Rose last night?" And the guys that were lucky enough to hear her would tell about it, you know. It was just an entertaining program for us. Nothing sinister at all.

Dr. Clifford Uyeda spearheaded the attempt to have Iva Toguri pardoned by President Gerald Ford. He says Major Cousens, who worked with Iva Toguri, recruited her for her obvious American sympathies.

DR: UYEDA: As far as he was concerned, Iva would be the most unlikely Tokyo Rose. Because of her voice. She does not have a soft voice at all. She has a rather sharp voice, which is still evident today. So knowing this, he said that he was going to have a program in which there'd be nothing that would be anti-American.

Iva did not hide her pro-American sympathies. Sometimes that worried the other Americans who were also stranded there.

DR. UYEDA: They didn't like her because they said she was just too outspoken. And after all, they said, the war was going on, you're in an enemy country, and you don't start saying things against the country where you're living. Because Iva would say, "America's going to win the war," and you don't say that in Japan during the wartime, that's not a very popular thing to do.

IVA TOGURI ("Ann"): According to union hours we are through today. We close up another chapter of sweet propaganda in the form of music for you, for my dear little orphans wandering in the Pacific.

The exaggerated announcements from Radio Tokyo became a source of entertainment in themselves. Will Clover, in the Navy, worked with radio communications and coded signals.

WILL CLOVER: She had a program there and told us that the Japanese forces had invaded the West Coast of the United States and had progressed to Oklahoma.

Leo Rhein:

LEO RHEIN: The claims that were made over the radio were so outrageous that they were unbelievable. The claim that they made in the Philippines was that there was so many American ships sunk in the Philippines that the water... the water rose a foot around the islands. You know, just unbelievable.

It was easy to laugh when the truth was clear. But truth is sometimes hard to come by. Americans in the South Pacific listened for news of their prisoners of war, who went on the air, but said what they were told. Ken McConnell monitored the speeches.

KEN McCONNELL: She didn't interview them - they would just perfunctorily read and you assumed or you felt certain that that's all they were doing. They were talking in a

very monotonous voice and "I'm so-and-so and I belong to such-and-such outfit and I come from so-and-so. I've been taken prisoner on so-and-so, and I'm receiving the Red Cross packages and they're treating me well and everything is fine." It was just a canned speech.

Mariano Villarin was captured in the Philippines and brought to visit Radio Tokyo as part of an indoctrination plan. Drawn to the sound of American music, he watched Iva Toguri speak into the microphone, and talked to the Allied prisoners who wrote her scripts.

MARIANO VILLARIN: They were on a starvation diet. But they were better treated than regular American POWs in prison camps, because they were there to broadcast, they were employed by Radio Tokyo so they got better treatment. But they were undernourished, of course, because there was a rationing system in Tokyo at that time. We were hungry too, though, we were hostages, but we were given better treatment than the American POWs.

Iva smuggled oranges from the countryside, and blankets for the men who shivered with malaria. Dr. Uyeda:

DR. UYEDA: So what Iva did was, she said she used to buy the things, and then would hand it over to Captain Ince or Major Cousens. Or Norman Reyes. And what they would do then is that they would put it under their coats, and when they visited, then they would go ahead and give it to the prisoners at the POW camp.

Many of the prisoners were from Bataan and Corregidor in the Philippines. They waited for liberation under appalling conditions of starvation and maltreatment. They waited until the battle of Leyte, in October 1944.

(Actuality: Gen. MacArthur) This is the Voice of Freedom, General MacArthur speaking. People of the Philippines, I have returned. By the grace of the Almighty God our forces stand again on Philippine soil, soil consecrated in the blood of our two people. (fade out) (NA 200-174)

Dick Grant:

DICK GRANT: How can you beat success? MacArthur was one of the most brilliant men in military history, in my estimation. He could have gone against every island on the way up, but he didn't - he left entire Japanese armies, like the 18th Japanese Army in Wewak, on the north coast of New Guinea - he left it there, bypassed it, went on up to the Philippines. You can't beat success.

Max Kraus, who fought with the 84th Infantry Division in Europe, used propaganda from a mobile loudspeaker across the front lines from the Rhine to the Elbe to urge the Germans to surrender. 2500 Axis troops turned themselves in.

MAX KRAUS: The effect of any propaganda depends on whether you are winning or losing. If you are losing there is no way in which you can ...talk the enemy into surrendering. And if you are winning it's relatively easy because there is already the tactical and strategic pressure.

Oxford University's Dr. Kenneth Short has published a book about radio and film propaganda.

KEN SHORT: Propaganda neither wins nor loses wars. It's simply a contributory factor towards the winning or losing. You could argue that a country that had the most effective propaganda could still lose the war because it had the smaller army.

They could create a mood with music and nostalgia, but the Tokyo Rose broadcasts will be remembered for not succeeding. Dick Grant:

DICK GRANT: I don't think they had any clear understanding of the Americans' psyche. This would make us want to hurry up and get the job over with and get home...Maybe the Japanese thought we were not a warlike race, or warlike people, I should say, and something like this would intimidate us. But I think it just got our dander up.

WILL CLOVER: I know we all got a big laugh out of it. In fact, it kept our morale kind of high.

BILL OHRMANN: When you feel like you're winning, your morale is pretty good and that's the way we felt. Because we could see our troops and ourselves moving up the coast by jumps and we felt confident the war would end some day.

At the end of the war, a mood of retribution pervaded society. In 1945 the U.S. Government jailed Iva Toguri in Japan on suspicion of treason. They released her a year later for lack of evidence. But when she tried to return home, the legend of a provocative spy created by the media met the young woman who smuggled medicine to prisoners. War crime trials filled the news. The FBI subpoenaed witnesses to try to put Iva Toguri, the typist and part-time announcer, behind bars. Mariano Villarin:

MARIANO VILLARIN: Question by the prosecutor: "Will you tell His Honor and the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what the defendant said on that occasion over the microphone, in substance, according to the best of your recollection?" So I said, she said, according to the best of my recollection, "Hello, honorable enemy, what do you have to say in the foxholes in New Guinea? Your girlfriends are back home running around with other men. It's about time you fellows went back home."

Dr. Uyeda:

DR. UYEDA: The interesting thing at the trial was that many of the persons, the American soldiers who testified saying that they pinpointed certain Sundays that they heard her, she was not, it would have had to be somebody else because she was not even broadcasting.

The trial took three months and cost half a million dollars. Out of eight counts of treason, the jury could only find grounds for one, Overt Act Six, that some time in October, 1944, she did speak into a microphone concerning the loss of ships. Mariano Villarin:

MARIANO VILLARIN: She said, "Orphans of the Pacific, you really are orphans now. How will you get home, now that all your ships are sunk?" But they were not, on the contrary, it was the Japanese ships that were sunk.

Iva Toguri received her pardon from President Ford on his last day in office, January 20, 1977. But the vets who remember her thought her trial was a mistake to begin with. Georgana Egeland's husband, Roy, fought in the Philippines on the USS Santee.

GEORGANA EGELAND: When Tokyo Roses's trial hit the front pages of all the newspapers, they were going to put her in prison for hurting the military and the naval boys morale so much, Roy says, "What a shame. What a shame." He said, "They should give her a medal." He said, "She was the only connection we had with what was happening at home." And he said, "She had all the latest records, all the best music, and all the latest news." And he said that he couldn't wait for her to come on so they could go and listen.

Leo Rhein:

LEO RHEIN: As the songs were played, and as they came out, we got them, or she got them, and she played them for us. And it was terrific. This was the bright spot of each day, was to gather round the radio and listen to her.

Gareth Moon:

GARETH MOON: We would listen to the music and instead of it making us homesick it made us feel better, because we were comfortable with it. That was the stuff we knew in high school and at home, and we enjoyed it. I don't think that Tokyo Rose as such ever made us homesick or upset. It was just kind of fun to listen to her. As I say, she was kind of an idol for a lot of the fellows.

Paul Snyder:

PAUL SNYDER: My organization, the Submarine Veterans of the United States of America, would like to have her back at a reunion some time. She's almost an affectionate friend in a way.

(bring up Billie Holiday: "Mean to Me")

"War of Words and Music" was produced by Clover Koopman and recorded at the Recording Center at Missoula, Montana. Engineered by Richard H. Kuschel. Executive Producer, Jane B. Koopman.

Special thanks to all the veterans and their wives who gave their time and help. Thanks also to the following organizations: The National Archives. The Japanese American Citizens League. The Missoulian. The Mansfield Library. And the Western Montana Military Officers Association.

March, 1988.

IVA TOGURI'S WITNESSES

Dr. Clifford Uyeda spearheaded the movement by the Japanese American Citizen's League to have Iva Toguri pardoned by President Gerald Ford. He published a summary of the process, A Final Report and Review.

Mariano Villarin fought with the Philippine Army and was in the Bataan death march. Because he spoke both English and Japanese, he was brought to Japan for an indoctrination program by the military government. As part of this program he was brought to Radio Tokyo and saw Iva Toguri as she broadcast. He kept a diary, and for this reason was subpoenaed as a witness by the U.S. Government for Iva Toguri's trial. His book, We Remember Bataan and Corregidor, is due for publication.

Interview with Dr. Clifford Uyeda
February 19, 1988

Dr. Uyeda spearheaded the movement with the Japanese American Citizen's League to have Iva Toguri pardoned by President Gerald Ford. He lives in San Francisco. I interviewed him by telephone from Missoula, MT.

(I start by asking him if I can interview Iva Toguri. He explains that she has many requests for interviews, but doesn't give them, as she is working under contract with one person to record her story. So she turned down my request because she thought it would be unfair to the person to whom she is already committed.)

CK: I see. Well, thank you for asking her anyway. And I wondered if I could ask you a couple of questions yourself, about how you got started on the drive to restore her citizenship.

CU: That was - although I was born on the West Coast, I was born in the state of Washington, but I left the West Coast way back in 1936. And so I was in Boston during her trial. (apologizes for his voice, as he has the flu now.) So I was in Boston, and I really knew very little about Tokyo Rose. But once I came to the West Coast in the 1950s, I heard about it and I was still in practice then, so I decide that, gee, this is something that I should look into. So what I did was after work, I used to go to the library, the public library here, and go through the entire trial in the three San Francisco newspapers. The trial was in 1949 from July through September.

So when I went through all that, then I start to ask around to see if anything was being done for her, and when I

heard that nothing was being done I decided that I'll get two people that are interested and see what I can do. At the very beginning, I still remember the first meeting we had, we didn't know what to do. We just - it was an exploratory meeting. And we asked some attorneys, and their advice was that because Wayne Collins and Ted Tamba, who were her attorneys, had also tried to get a pardon for her, a presidential pardon, maybe this would be the most simple thing to do, because that would restore her American citizenship. However, to try to bring the thing back and redo the trial would be impossible, they said, unless you have new evidence, which we didn't have at that time, nothing new, so because of that statement we decided that OK, we would go for the Presidential pardon, just the way Wayne Collins had tried to get and failed earlier. So therefore we went that route.

CK: Was she still in jail when you tried?

CU: Oh no. She was - she went to jail in 1949, and then she came out in 50 - gosh, I've forgotten - she was let out for good behavior without serving ten years. I think she was - she served -however, all told, she served more than eight years of her life. Because she was kept in jail here in San Francisco for almost a year, she was kept in jail in Japan for almost two years before she - so if you put all that together, she served almost ten years of jail.

CK: That's amazing. That's so cruel. I'm wondering, did

she talk to you about doing the broadcasts under duress?

CU: Actually, what she said was that - the way it was told to her, she really trusted Major Cousens, you know, the Australian. Major Cousens was a well-known Australian broadcaster. They even - I don't know how true this is, but they used to call him "the Walter Cronkite of Australia." It was he that recruited Iva. And also, that was frequently justified at the trial, saying that as far as he was concerned, Iva would be the most unlikely Tokyo Rose. Because ..because of her voice. She does not have a soft voice at all. She has a rather sharp voice, which is still evident today. So knowing this, he said that he was going to have a program in which there'd be nothing that would be in the program that would be anti-American. He felt that it would be safe, and because he was the one that was given the authority to put up the programs, and he said "I would do all the writing," and the script was written by him and also there was an American chap by the name of Ted Ince who also did script-writing.

CK: Did she ever ad lib, or did she just read?

CU: No, she went strictly by the script, because it was written for her. Actually when you listen to her speech, almost all of it is really like a disc jockey. All she does is introduce the musical numbers, the recording that she is going to play. And -

CK: Were there many other women -

CU: Oh, there were many others, yes. In fact I've met some of the women, who have said "If anyone should be tried for being Tokyo Rose it would be me." I've talked to a woman - this particular person, she could not be tried, because although she was born in Japan, therefore she was not an American citizen, she had come to Los Angeles when she was a little girl, very young, I think a baby. She grew up and went to school in the United States so for all practical - the way she talked, she was like an American. Her English was very good. She had gone back to Japan, and was in Japan when the war started, so therefore they recruited her as one of the broadcasters. And she said she - her script was quite different. She was much more of the type that people had...accused Tokyo Rose of saying.

But of course the problem, the real problem was that nobody knew who Tokyo Rose was. People in Tokyo never knew that the Americans had named anybody Tokyo Rose. Because that name was used for almost any female broadcaster. There is a statement broadcast as early as December, 1941, in which a Navy submarine log states that they were listening to Tokyo Rose. Now that was about three years before Iva even went on the radio.

CK: I wonder if the other women were also more or less under duress.

CU: Well - except that there was one who was very much - her statements were much more anti-American, (she) was a

woman broadcasting from Manila. She was...apparently she was a nightclub singer. Very - a beautiful woman, from what I heard. And her statement was much more anti-American in tone, and she was saying a lot of the things from () and she also had a very seductive voice, a very good voice, and so many people would say that, hearing her would give all the impression of what the press calls Tokyo Rose. But...she was also up for trial, but what happened right after the war was that she married an American colonel, after the Americans took over in the Philippines. She married an American colonel and immediately all the investigations stopped right there.

CK: For heavens sake. What was her name?

CU: I think her name was - gosh, I have it in that green book, it's Lipton, or something like that. You have that green book (refers to a booklet he sent me.) Myrtle Lipton. Something like that.

CK: OK.

CU: She was, from what we hear, her statement was much more like what people have accused Tokyo Rose of saying. Also there were other - the person who was on what they called the German Hour was also more anti-America. But there were many, many women broadcasting.

CK: I heard stories that Iva smuggled supplies and provisions.

CU: Well the way she did it was, because - she could not

go into the American POW camps at all. Because they wouldn't allow her to go there, obviously. There were American military personnel, like Captain Ince was one, and also the Australian Major Cousens, they, being former military people, they were POWs. And they could go and see the prisoners of war. So what Iva did was, she said she used to buy the things, and then would hand it over to Captain Ince or Major Cousens. Or Norman Reyes. And what they would do then is that they would put it under their coats, and when they visited, then they would go ahead and give it to the prisoners at the POW camp. Because she herself, they would not let her go ahead. She was the only person that could go out. She said that at one time she became pretty good at - in black market, because she would go out into the country to buy things which ordinary people could not get because of...she was able to get around. And she was able to buy a lot of the things that the ordinary ...you could not get. She could smuggle the things in to her work and then have her co-workers there smuggle it into the POW camp. And they said they were able to do that. She was ...the amazing thing to me is that, of all the people that were broadcasting in Radio Tokyo, she had been the most unlikely Tokyo Rose. Yet she was the only one ever arrested or charged or tried. No one else was ever even touched.

CK: Do you think they wanted her because she was

popular?

CU: No,...

CK: Or do you think...

CU: I think it was just the circumstance of the time. When she was first chosen as Tokyo Rose there was sort of a scramble for recognition. Because after the war, when the country was defeated, it was in shambles, everybody was starving, and to be suddenly, to become a celebrity in this mess, and to be offered money, you know that was a fortune really in those days, \$2,000 in American money. You couldn't get that much money in several years of work. So some of the people at the radio station had hoped that ...I know one person that was also working there, he wanted his wife to be recognized as Tokyo Rose. And he was very miffed when Iva was chosen. And Iva was chosen only because there was - also this is in the green book - the person that was a close friend of the American journalist said "I do know somebody who works in Radio Tokyo," and he introduced her to them as someone from Radio Tokyo. Of course as soon as he introduced her he immediately named her as Tokyo Rose. But I don't think she ever at that time realized what that name really meant.

CK: But she did call herself Orphan Ann and she was popular.

CU: Yes, Orphan Ann. She called herself Orphan Ann, right.

CK: But did she have any idea how popular she had become?

CU: No, I don't think she had any idea. Because she was on, I think, gosh, I've forgotten how often she was on. I know that she never worked on weekends. So that the interesting thing at the trial was that many of the persons, the American soldiers who testified saying that they pinpointed certain Sundays that they heard her, she was not, it would have to be somebody else because she wasn't even broadcasting.

CK: Did she care that - did she want the Americans to win?

CU: Oh yes, she had always said - in fact, she got into a lot of trouble in Japan. One of the reasons why she couldn't live with her aunt and uncle was that she was too pro-American, and the aunt and uncle felt very uneasy about that, and also the neighbors didn't like the idea because they said there was an American spy living among them. And so finally she had to leave the place. Then she was alone, she had to go out and find work, and she had a difficult time trying to find work, at that time. And then she obtained work at the Danish legation - the consul - and that's where she was working until she found a typist job at Radio Tokyo.

CK: Did she ever tell you how much she was paid?

CU: At where?

CK: As an announcer.

CU: I think it was something like - oh, I think it was around 80 or 100 something in that area. (Does not specify whether this means dollars - other sources have said as little as \$18.00 a month.)

CK: Was she afraid to - how did she feel? Did she ever tell you at all? How she felt about being chosen?

CU: Well she first refused to, she said that she didn't want to do it because she felt that first of all, she was not a radio personality, she doesn't ...she just went there as a typist. But Major Cousens said that he wanted somebody to work. Since the Japanese workers instructed Cousens to find an English-speaking woman to also be on the program, he said he had to find someone, and he said that there was only one person he could trust at Radio Tokyo at that time, and that was Iva. Because the rest of them, he said he wasn't quite sure. Because Iva had always been anti-Japan and pro-America, this is why, outspoken to all other people who were in Radio Tokyo, also broadcasting. You know Iva was not very popular among those people. Especially Americans who were also stranded there and were working for the Radio Tokyo broadcasting. They didn't like her because they said she was just too outspoken. And after all, they said, the war was going on, you're in an enemy country, and you don't start saying things against the country where you're living. Because Iva would say, "America's going to win the war," and

you don't say that in Japan during the wartime, that's not a very popular thing to do. Even if she thought so, they said they thought she should keep quiet because they would be treated better. But she was very outspoken, even then.

CK: When did she make the remark about the loss of ships?

CU: Well that was in October, 1944.

CK: Was that during the campaign in the Philippines?

CU: 1944 was the battle of Leyte Gulf. In October '44.

CK: Yes. Her remark - was it during that battle, or before it?

CU: It must have been afterward.

CK: It just seems such an odd thing to -

CU: The thing is there's no tape - the funny thing is that the American government had all the tapes of all her broadcasts. And this is what was gone over in detail, in Japan, and they let her go, saying that there's absolutely no evidence at all. And then when they tried to get the same tape back at the time of the trial, the government said the tapes were no longer available. So...they said that either it was destroyed, or it was lost, but they never got hold of the tape. Because the tape they sought, Wayne Collins (Iva's attorney) had said that you could listen to all the tapes and you could tell what the tapes were about, there's nothing treasonous in the tape. And what they said that she said...she states that she never said such a thing

that was stated in the charges. But there's no evidence to ever show that she said anything of that sort. Because the tape is not available. It still is not available today.

CK: That's amazing. One more question. What was the hardest part about getting her free? Was it speaking to President Ford? I mean getting her pardoned, excuse me.

CU: No, I think the most important thing was to get the American public to realize the story. And once they realized it, then I think the pressure was already on the President. Because the San Francisco Chronicle was the first paper to - not the first, because the New York Times in February, ... a person by the name of McDowell, who was ... who knew about the Tokyo Rose trial even in those days, he came out with an article in the New York Times, I think it was in February 1975, '76. Followed by the Denver Post and all the others. All the editorials that I've seen, I do not recall a single editorial, much as I've collected editorials, almost 100 per cent supported pardon for Iva. I think that was the big thing. And also a lot of statements by many people all say that Iva should be pardoned. So I think the President already had a lot of messages, that came to him before he made his decision. I think the one thing with President Ford was that it was difficult for him to make any decision. He had the Nixon pardon still in his mind, apparently. So for him to go ahead and give another pardon, I suppose he had to be careful, I suppose this is why he waited until the

last day to announce the pardon. Because it was announced on the 19th of January, the 19th was the last day that he was in office officially.

#

Interview With Mariano Villarin

February 18, 1988

I have exchanged several letters and phone calls with Mariano Villarin. He met Iva Toguri when he was a Japanese prisoner of war, a hostage, and was summoned to testify - as it turned out, against her - at her trial. His diary was subpoenaed by the U.S. Government, and he has never seen it since. I traced the possible whereabouts of the diary, and called to discuss it. He sent me some information from his book, which is due to be published in a few weeks.

CK: (I talk about the possible location of the diary.)

MV: There are 4 or 5 entries stating that I was present and that I talked to Iva Toguri d'Aquino. That was enough information, that's why I didn't bother to go to the archives to dig out all the other information that I was looking for. So I thought that the information that I have on hand served the purpose.

CK: I guess it's more personal interest, I think its interesting, diaries are always interesting. And especially in an unusual situation.

(I talk about the thesis I am writing.) I think she should get some credit for having been a good entertainer.

MV: Yes, right. There was a 50-50 deal there. The GI's that listened to her broadcasts, some of them were in favor of her broadcasts. And the other half claimed that she was a traitor. So it's a half and half deal. I put that in my book and I justify that, I put everything, the pros and cons, to show that she had been a victim of racial hysteria,

war hysteria, after the war. So that's why President Ford pardoned her. And that is explained, and also the propaganda broadcasts that she made, and the GI's that listened to her broadcasts thought she was being cheerful and she seemed to be all right, they thought. There was no propaganda there, they were merely interested in the entertaining feature of that...broadcast.

CK: But when I read books, people say that she said they'd be boiled in oil and that - (I'm referring to an anecdote in Admiral Halsey's Story.)_

MV: Yeah, that's malarkey.

CK: Do you think she said that?

MV: To be boiled in oil? The people that were against her? I don't know, the people that were against her - it was the fact that she was Japanese. And that more or less - there was a racial tone there.

CK: When you were at Radio Tokyo, did you have the impression that she was friendly?

MV: Yes.

CK: Actually I would like to ask your permission if I could just use a home tape recorder and ask you to just talk about her a little bit?

MV: Well...

CK: Is that not OK?

MV: Well, what can I say...

CK: Well, just tell me about meeting her?

MV: Yeah, I can write it down, or I can...mail you the ...whatever...

CK: When you were there at Radio Tokyo, you said that you met her in the hallway...

MV: Yes, yes. A POW introduced me to her. And then... I didn't realize that she was going to be tried years later. She seemed to be friendly and American-born and of course she spoke good English. No accent.

CK: And you were all against the Japanese?

MV: Well...we were against the Japanese because we were taken prisoner, we were captured by the Japanese during the atrocities in the Philippines.

CK: And was she - did you get the impression that she was acting - you know, being made to act the way she was, being made to broadcast -

MV: That part I am not sure right now, because all I could tell was that I enjoyed listening to her American music, she was playing American music.

CK: Uh huh.

MV: And I wrote it down in my diary. That was the most important thing that impressed me was the music that I had been missing because of the war, and about her being tried later, years later, I never foresaw that, that she would be tried, I never could tell. So it's neither here nor there but we - I thought she was being neutral.

CK: Didn't some - did she smuggle - what was it that she

smuggled -

MV: Oh yeah. Citrus fruit for the POWs. And then of course she had access to the - she could leave as she pleased while working at Radio Tokyo, she was living in an apartment. So she took advantage of that free time by getting some citrus fruit - fruit which she gave to the POWs in Radio Tokyo, there was just a handful of them. And that was shown in the book too.

CK: So she was sympathetic. I guess it was like everybody was pretty much - well, under the wartime situation, you weren't really free to come and go -

MV: Yeah, being a Japanese, being that she looked Japanese, they never really bothered her, she went to the countryside to get some citrus fruit which she smuggled, secretly gave to the POW's in Radio Tokyo -

CK: How about news? Because one thing I read was during the battle of Leyte, the Japanese announced a victory, they had a public holiday -

MV: The Japanese had a public holiday?

CK: And, I actually can't remember which source, but they said it was a public holiday and in fact it was a loss for the Japanese, and it was really a victory for the -

MV: Well it wasn't a victory for Japan, because the victory at Leyte Gulf, that I don't know, I haven't read anything about a celebration in Tokyo over the victory that they had in Leyte gulf. On the contrary. The Americans

scored a decisive victory in Leyte Gulf. That was the grounds for holding her, that they were charging her - let me see, there were eight counts, she was convicted only for one count. Broadcasting count number six, there were eight counts of treason against her, only one held. The others were eliminated. That was the charge that found her guilty, that count number six, when she broadcast that, let me see, what did she say, oh, to the American soldiers, now that your navy was defeated in Leyte Gulf how will you ever return home - how will you - something like that, which the jury considered treason.

CK: I see. I guess I understood that the Japanese didn't dare to announce their losses so they pretended it was a victory.

MV: Yeah.

CK: But she herself knew because she could listen to the real news -

MV: That's right, she knew. But I don't know what - in spite of that she made that broadcast saying that, Listen, you American soldiers, how will you return home, now that your - that your navy was defeated, you have no transportation, to get home, something like that.

CK: Something like that. Now that your ships are sunk -

MV: Yeah, it's in my book but I don't remember now.

CK: I've seen the remark, but I wish I had the recording

of her. I don't know - that must be in San Francisco also.

MV: Yeah.

CK: Because none of those recordings - the ones in Washington were just funny, you know, they were light, pleasant, cheerful, she sounded like a nice person -

MV: Yes, yes.

CK: And that's why I want to say I think she was a really good entertainer -

MV:: Yes, the GIs enjoyed that. The broadcasts of American music. She was playing American music. The GIs loved that. In between she would have some - she would make some remarks. Sometimes they were reprehensible, some of them were in a joking manner, I don't know, but other people found it - like treason. It's handy here, my chapter of Tokyo Rose is handy here. Can I read that to you -

CK: Sure.

MV: OK, I'll get them, just a moment, a few minutes.

(Reads aloud.) We missed the big band boys like Glenn Miller and the rest. It was also good to meet some of the allied POWs working at Radio Tokyo and to chat with them. (etc., see document.) The prisoners had been carefully screened for those who had radio broadcast experience.

CK: (I interrupt) Had you had radio broadcast experience?

MV: Yeah, the prisoners were screened for radio broadcasting experience and were taken to Radio Tokyo.

CK: Were you one of them?

MV: No, no, I was not one of them. Those were the Allied prisoners of war. I was considered a Filipino, they were trying to win us over so they made hostages of us. Here's the continuation. (Reads.) Under penalty of death the POWs were now working on Japanese propaganda projects. They were being held at the Bunka prison camp. During next half dozen or so times that I visited Radio Tokyo in 1944 I always heard a female American voice over the loudspeaker. Hearing such a voice for the first time since I left Manila for Bataan in 1941 naturally aroused my curiosity. I thought it was an American woman formerly interned at Santo Dommagio University in Manila or an American woman stranded in Japan when war broke out who was now forced to work at Radio Tokyo with the other POWs there. (etc.)

CK: Just a second. How did you get to Radio Tokyo? Did they - did the Japanese want you to work there?

MV: Yes. Our Japanese honcho thought that it was part of our indoctrination so they took us to Radio Tokyo, to see how things were, and probably to show us how the ...how, well, I don't know, just to see how the operations were going on. They had no idea that we went there to enjoy talking with the POWs. It was just one of those propaganda ...reasons for showing us around.

CK: So you were free to come and go?

MV: Yeah. Later. Well, our supervisor, our Japanese

supervisor took a group of Filipinos through Radio Tokyo just to show us around, including war plans and aircraft factories. To show us how strong Japan was. Back to the propaganda.

CK: I see.

MV: But they didn't realize that we were keeping our eyes wide open for intelligence reasons. Which we later transmitted to the Allied Forces when they arrived.

CK: So did you - did - you got to see the inside of Radio Tokyo -

MV: Yeah. Yeah.

CK: And did you see the other guys who were on the set?

MV: Yeah. There were three or four of them that we met.

CK: Uh huh.

MV: One American, one Australian, there were Allied POWs working there who had radio experience.

CK: Were they Charles Cousens -

MV: What?

CK: Do you remember their names?

MV: Uh - one Australian, Major Cousens -

CK: Yes!

MV: C,O,U,S,E,N,S.

CK: You met Charles Cousens.

MV: Charles Cousens -

CK: Uh huh.

MV: I forgot the first name.

CK: Maybe he was called Bill. They wrote Charles and then "Bill" -

MV: In the book I didn't mention the names because I just wanted to avoid further embarrassment, when they read the names, oh, this guy is a traitor, he collaborated, but they didn't know he was under penalty of death. If they refused to - that's why I don't want to mention by name - they were hurt by being assigned there.

CK: Was she under penalty?

MV: Yeah, penalty of death. They were forced to work for Radio Tokyo.

CK: And do you think - Iva Toguri was also forced. I guess.

MV: Yeah. Yeah. But there was no proof of that. In the trial the prosecutor succeeded in convincing the jury that she was not forced, coerced, so she lost that part there. That's why the jury held her accountable for one count out of the eight.

CK: Kind of silly, but -

MV: Yeah.

CK: It's just the temper of the times.

MV: Uh huh. Yeah.

CK: But it's a tragedy, too. I mean, it's too bad for her.

MV: Yeah, that's right.

CK: Because I think she was a nice - from what I hear - she sounds like a decent person.

MV: Yeah. Right. She was pro-American. Even when she was there she hated the way of - the lifestyle in Japan. Because she couldn't speak the language. That particular count out of the eight, it's not in this chapter, but it's in another chapter. Would you like me to ..

CK: No, you told me about that. It's very interesting, because -

MV: It's in another chapter, it's very handy, it takes only about a minute.

CK: OK.

MV: I'll pull that out. OK. I'll read these paragraphs to you. (Reads.) My one way trip to the United States (tells how he was subpoenaed in 1949 to come to the U.S.) They were looking for the hostage who kept a diary. I never thought that the diary, which was used as an exhibit in court, would make me a witness for the prosecution five years later in the trial of Iva Toguri d'Aquino, a Los Angeles-born Nisei better known as Tokyo Rose. The charges were that she had betrayed the land of her birth to the land of her ancestors by her radio broadcasts beamed to the American forces in the South Pacific to undermine their morale (etc.)

CK: Now - tell me about the diary. How did they find out that you had a diary?

MV: (faint, almost inaudible) Oh, the other fellows with me. There were about 30 or 40 hostages from the Philippines and we would get together at the International School for the Japanese Language. They knew that I was keeping a diary. So when the FBI went around asking them, "Do you have any particular information about Tokyo Rose? Do you know anything about Radio Tokyo during the war?" and they said, no, they didn't, "Oh, wait a minute! That fellow Mariano used to go to Radio Tokyo. I think he maintained a diary." That's how they got ahold of me and they subpoenaed me. Say, where's that particular quote I want to read to you, about you lost your ships, you have no more transportation - let me find that. Oh yes, here. Guilty on only one of the eight charges, Overt Act Six, which was that Iva did speak into a microphone concerning the loss of ships. She said, "Orphans of the Pacific, you are really orphans now. How will you get home, now that your ships are sunk?" To the government this was treason, since the American forces had scored a decisive victory at Leyte gulf. So that's how they found her guilty.

CK: I see. But I'd love to - But when she said that MacArthur was winning.

MV: Yes. Right. Right.

CK: So I guess maybe it was - before, but it was sometime in October.

MV: Yes, October. When the Americans landed in the

Philippines, landed on Leyte Island.

CK: Uh huh.

MV: And they defeated the Japanese Navy there. That's when they had a decisive victory.

CK: Well when -

MV: When she said, "Orphans of the Pacific, you really are orphans now. How will you get home, now that all your ships are sunk?" But they were not, on the contrary, it was the Japanese ships that were sunk.

(break in tape) for the U. S. Government..That's why she was charged with Overt Act Six.

CK: When they subpoenaed your diary, you said they had no idea that -

MV: That's right, I had no idea that would be used in court.

CK: Did you feel badly about that? That must have been kind of -

MV: No, I don't think I did. I had my diary with me, and I

CK: So it was just facts that they asked you, you were there on this date -

MV: Yes, it was just an incidental event, a deal there, so I never had any idea that...so I volunteered -

CK: Did you hear her make the remarks about the -

MV: Did I hear what?

CK: The remarks, the quote that you just read. Did you

hear her say that?

MV: Yes. I precisely mentioned here in court when they were asking me, let's see, oh yeah. The prosecutor asked me ...he asked me, let me see, I'm reading that question by the prosecutor, "Will you tell His Honor and the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what the defendant said on that occasion over the microphone, in substance, according to the best of your recollection?" So I said, she said, to the best of my recollection, "Hello, honorable enemy, what do you have to say in the foxholes in New Guinea? Your girlfriends are back home running around with other men. It's about time you fellows went back home." That's what I heard. During the testimony, then the second question..."What other occasion was that you heard similar...and I wrote it down ...yeah, Mr. De Wolfe. And my answer was, "Yes, I remember the second instance, she said in substance, "You are wasting your time in the South Pacific when you could have fun back home." That was all the direct examination. So that was my statement.

CK: Oh, so that's not really going to -

MV: Yeah, that did not hold any weight. The whole thing was her broadcast about the loss of the ships. That's what really got her. Overt Act Six. The rest of the testimony by the prosecutor, prosecution witnesses, I think there were about 40 or something, did not hold weight except that one. Orphans of the Pacific, that's what really -

CK: Did you hear her say that?

MV: No, no. Yes, that's too bad. It was monitored and it was shown on the record, that's what she broadcast. But I didn't hear her say that.

CK: I see. That seems so trivial - you know. But it's very hard to look at history from - it's like being a Monday morning ball player. It's very hard. It's hard to know, was anybody really concerned about these remarks, because -

MV: Yeah, that's right, at that time nobody paid any attention to them. She said, "How will you get home, now that your ships are sunk?" So apparently she didn't mean it, or maybe she was directed by the military in Radio Tokyo to make that broadcast. Without realizing that she was incriminating herself. So the trial, the jury, convicted her on that charge, Overt Act Six. So that's the only one that counted.

CK: I see. Well, that's really interesting, because that was - what I'm hearing - all the veterans are saying that she was fun, you know, they enjoyed it. Nobody was scared.

MV: That's right, yes. Especially when she was playing American music, it made the guys nostalgic.

CK: Do you remember the songs you heard?

MV: Oh, all kinds of American songs, played by Glenn Miller and Tommy Dorsey. I was sitting there in the hall and I heard those songs. Now on the other hand, the

prosecution witnesses - OK, I'll read this part to you.

(Reads.) Similar chatter by the Zero Hour personnel were told in court (etc.) "Wouldn't this be a nice night to go to the corner drug store and have an ice cream soda?"

Another one, "Wouldn't you California boys like to be at Coconut Grove tonight with your best girl? You have plenty of coconut groves, but no girl." "The island of Saipan is mined with high explosives. You're given 48 hours to clear the island or you will be blown sky high." Another one:

"Why don't you stop fighting and listen to good music?"

Another one: "Greetings, everyone. How are my victims this evening? All ready for a vicious assault on your morale?"

"Radio Tokyo calling you in the person of your sworn enemy and playmate. What's come over you, Aussies? Have you lost your robe playing poker with those bad, wicked Americans?"

"Joe Brown, a rejectee, is out with Sally Smith. He's getting the cream of the crop while you're out there knocking yourselves out." Those are the kinds of broadcasts that the prosecution witnesses among the GIs mentioned in court that they had heard her broadcasting.

CK: Where would she get information about Joe Brown and Sally Smith?

MV: Yeah, and also Saipan, you'll be blown sky-high. From the intelligence, I guess, they furnished that information to Radio Tokyo. And then a military man apparently gave her this information. Here, you can

broadcast this. That's why people were wondering how come that she knew about the movements of certain troops and American ships in and out of certain locations. Well the intelligence furnished all that information to her, through the military at Radio Tokyo.

CK: Tell me about the three guys that you met, the ones who were under pain of death.

MV: Oh yeah. There was Cousens, of course, one American, and one from the Philippines, who spoke good English, his mother was an American so he was used to it. He was broadcasting on Corregidor Island, he was speaking into a microphone, they call it the Voice of Freedom. He was one of those. Norman Reyes.

CK: Did he do the skits?

MV: One American who used to be a radio announcer in Manila before the war, he was commissioned in the army, he was a captain, and he was with the Voice of Freedom too. So they were screened and they were found to have broadcasting experience and they were sent to Radio Tokyo.

CK: That must have been Wallace Ince.

MV: Yeah. Yeah, right. Wallace Ince.

CK: It's amazing, it makes them come to life. You know, these are just people that I've read about in books, and it's amazing to meet somebody who's actually met them.

MV: Yeah, right. He was called Ted Wallace as a radio announcer before the war. In peacetime. Then his real name

is Wallace Ince. And he was a Captain in the U.S. Army.

CK: Did you hear the skits that they did? Did you hear any of those -

MV: No. No.

CK: Did they look healthy?

MV: No, no, they were undernourished, that's why. They were on a starvation diet. But they were treated better than regular American POWs in prison camps, because they were there to broadcast, they were employed by Radio Tokyo, so they got better treatment. But they were undernourished, of course, because there was a rationing system in Tokyo at that time. We were hungry too, though, we were hostages, but we were given better treatment than the American POWs. Because they claimed we were from the Orient, so they were trying to be nice to us.

CK: So they were racist too.

MV: Yeah.

CK: Was she undernourished?

MV: Yeah, yeah. She was very thin. Practically everybody there in Tokyo, even the civilians were undernourished, because there was a strict rationing system. Everything went to the army. To the military. So with the rationing system there in Tokyo everything was limited. Not enough food. So that was the story.

CK: That's interesting. That's really something. I - you know - it's so interesting to hear it from somebody who

was there.

MV: Yeah. I couldn't believe it myself. (laughs)
(Talks about his book. The final page proofs will be done in a few days and will be forwarded from New York for corrections, and will be out in about a month. It will be called We Remember Bataan and Corregidor, the story of the American and Filipino defenders of Bataan and Corregidor in their captivity. It has a sketch of the starving American POWs on the cover, drawn by one of the POWs.)

CK: (I thank him for his help, tell him I will use a couple of lines from his taped conversation along with many others in a script.)

MEDIA HISTORIANS

MEDIA HISTORIANS

Dr. K.R.M. Short is Senior Lecturer in History at Westminster College, Oxford, and Secretary General of the International Association for Audio-Visual Media in Historical Research and Education. He is the Editor of the Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television. At the time of this interview he was teaching at the University of Houston School of Communication.

Lawrence H. Suid has written a history of the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service for the Armed Forces Information. He has published a history of the image of the Armed Forces in Hollywood movies, Guts and Glory, and at the time of this interview is writing a book on the image of manned space flight in literature and film.

Interview with Dr. K.R.M.Short
December 3, 1987

Dr. Short is Senior Lecturer in History at Westminster College, Oxford, and Secretary General of the International Association for Audio-Visual Media in Historical Research and Education. He is the Editor of the Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television. At the time of this interview he was teaching at University of Houston School of Communication.

(I introduce myself, tell him I've read his book, ask how to get in touch with Namikawa Ryo, who wrote the chapter about NHK. He talks about the Bellagio conference that led to the book, says Namikawa Ryo was 85 at the time and may not still be living; says his son is the best cameraman in Japan. Recommends I talk to Gordon Daniels at Leeds. Says NHK is publishing material with information about the war but it's in Japanese.)

CK: About your book, in the preface you talked about latent propaganda in films, in other words escapist fantasy that helped a repressed people to forget their repressions. Do you think radio can serve that purpose?

KS: Well I think it depends. Radio is a rather more diffuse medium. First of all it's something that happened in the marketplace, as readily as it could, within the confines of one's home. The difficulty is that whereas the movies provide you with a document which is almost timeless, there are very very few radio broadcast recordings left, particularly in things such as news. One does have the old

recordings of things like the Jack Benny Show, but radio is - my own feeling is that radio had...a potentially greater impact on morale than the movies.

For example if you look at the Time magazine in 1940... George Schaeffer of RKO had, through George Gallup, a series of polls done by a new Gallup organization called the Audience Research Institute. And Schaeffer at RKO wanted to know what Hollywood audiences actually were, so obviously he could tailor his product to tap the market more effectively, which was very avant garde considering the fact that most Hollywood moguls guessed by the seats of their pants or whatever.

CK: This is audience research? That's the first time -

KS: Yes, that's right. It was actually run by a young Scot by the name of Ogilvie. And Ogilvie, as soon as the war begins, goes to work for the British Ministry of Information, so he goes from one form of propaganda to another. But what the Audience Research Institute did was to do a very very thorough (survey)... It was never published since it was a job being done for RKO, and it wasn't something for public consumption. But you do get the sort of general, overall import, statistics being published in Time Magazine, as to what American audiences were really doing.

But I think the point that I'm slowly getting around to making is that what is so startling is that first of all

(they found) the American cinema audience was probably closer to 50 million attendances a week, as opposed to much higher figures that had formerly been quoted. On a given Sunday evening their estimate was that you would probably have 10 million people at the movies, but there were probably 16 million people sitting home listening to Jack Benny. So that the radio audiences, from the standpoint of entertainment, were probably anywhere from 30-40 percent higher than the movie audiences at the same period. When you're talking about the heyday of movies, you're talking about an even greater heyday from the standpoint of radio entertainment.

Now I don't know of anyone who has done a serious study of the way in which wartime radio entertainment reflected the needs of national defense. The Office of War Information certainly had a division which was concerned with the planting of what one would call positive images into the radio scripts. In other words if you look at soap opera scripts I think you'd probably find - I know that I've seen evidence of key wartime issues being planted in soap operas to create positive views on a wide range of subjects, everything from recycling tin cans to thinking better of the Chinese people.

CK: Right. They still do. There's still plenty of that on television.

KS: Well sure there is. But during the war it becomes a

matter of policy. And it happened only within a very limited period of time, that's one thing you have to keep in mind, which makes it more accessible in the sense that the Office of War Information's Domestic Division really was only in gear for the period of summer of '42 to summer of '43. Because by then Congress has cut their appropriations to the bone, because they don't want a domestic propaganda branch keeping the New Deal in office for another four years. But during that period of '42 to '43, I think there's an excellent field for research looking at the way in which the Office of War Information used radio to promote the general and specific goals which were being devised within the OWI for the purposes of raising American morale as well as improving American perceptions of its allies.

CK: What do you think that it takes to be successful at doing this? I mean some propaganda is successful and some isn't.

KS: (Laughs.) What it takes to be successful I think basically is to first of all, one has to know the - one must have a very clear idea of the target audience. I mean first of all you have to know what the problems are. And one of the things that people from Harold Lasswell onwards did was to create the concept that there was such a thing as public opinion, that public opinion was measurable, quantifiable. And once it was quantifiable then you were in a position to modify it by what people in the Office of War Information

called programs. So during this period there was a very heavy poll taken by a variety of means in the Bureau of Intelligence in the Office of War Information. They had three levels of information gathering, running from traditional Gallup poll sweeps down to individual in-depth interviews, in which they determined what - they decided what the questions were that they wanted answers on. Those seemed to be the crucial questions. They sent the questions out, they determined what the American people felt about these questions, and then they determined whether or not they had a problem. If people were positive, they didn't have a problem, they could maintain what they called a low supportive propaganda profile. If the people were thinking the wrong thing, let's say they were anti-Russian or anti-British, or anti-Chinese or anti-rationing, or anti-paying your income tax, then they realized they had to go about changing those attitudes. And they would change those attitudes by...a fairly intelligently conceived grasp of the fact that you've got to attack on a broad front. So they would create programs that would go into the press, into the weekly press, that would then be supplemented in the weekly magazines, as opposed to the daily press. Issues - things that would appear in the news reels, that would appear in the Office of War Information short subjects which were showing in the cinema, things that would then appear in radio programs.

In other words the secret of propaganda is that you are telling people something that they are prepared to accept, which is to say you are looking for gradual modification of attitudes rather than a volte-face. And you are telling it to them again and again from a variety of means, of media. So that it's very much a question of coming at them with the same thing from every conceivable angle, but in such a way that they are - they do not feel threatened or propagandized. And one really does have to examine the Office of War Information intelligence reports and see the programs that they then create, because it's by looking at the programs that you see the sort of breadth of the attack that they then mount to correct these opinions that they see as being detrimental to the war effort. And...I can document it through the cinema, I can document it in the press, I've seen enough to believe that if you look in the right places you'll be able to document it in the use of radio, particularly through network programming. You did not have direct censorship, but ...you didn't have censors in the studios, but I mean it's quite clear that network executives took (it) almost as seriously as they took the sponsor's pressure.

For a period of time they also took pressure from being patriotic Americans, from the Office of War Information, to help them pursue certain of these programs. If one got into...the production records and scripts for a series of

programs like the Kate Smith show, I imagine since that was always more of a variety show...you'd find a very clear input going into every week's or every day's shows. I forget how Kate Smith actually ran, I think she ran it daily, five days a week, for 15 minutes, of patriotic stuff designed to support the home front as well as improving views of one's allies that you were actually out there fighting for.

CK: You see that stuff in old Bing Crosby films, too.

KS: You see it in the movies.

CK: It's everywhere.

KS: Sure, but the very important point that you're raising is that it's also in radio, and the only reason that not enough has been made out of radio is because radio has not left very obvious documentation. I mean if it weren't for the insatiable appetite of American television, which demands the rerunning of old movies, one would not even have that as a source. The fact is that old radio programs don't have a market...unless you're just an old radio program nut. Old movies fill air time. Radio can fill air time by playing records, it doesn't have to play old radio programs. So that what happens is that whereas we can quite readily see the extent to which the movies were used for wartime propaganda purpose, we are only impressionably aware of what the radio was doing. And my own view was that radio made a greater impact, greater impression, than the movies did. And I would love to see somebody prepared to get in there

and prove it. CK: Why do you think radio - well, you've given me the answer pretty well -

KS: Look at the statistics, that radio entertainment, as entertainment, was more important to Americans in the '40s than the movies were. The movies of the people had the press agents; radio did not. If you look at the reality, people listened to the radio. They sat home, they didn't go out to the movies, particularly if they had small children. If one actually had access to the Audience Research Institute findings, you'd learn a great deal more about America's habits. See, you didn't go to the movies to get your news. You got your news from 1937 on by listening to any one of a dozen top-flight news broadcasters who in their 15-minute programs gave their very very strong opinions, some so strong like Beau(?) Carter that he got yanked off the air. But they provided the opinion-making for Americans, and the fact that you were hearing on the night's news what you were going to read in the morning's newspaper put radio in the forefront of opinion-making in the United States. So that from that standpoint the straight news, news commentators, the commentary programs made the sort of political side of opinion-making very much the province of radio. Movies could not touch it, not even "The March of Time." "March of Time" is extremely important in opinion-making in this period. But I see it as something that's complementary to radio, because newsreels were not doing it,

newsreels couldn't do it, they were basically an 8-minute entertainment filler. However if you then look at current event programs, the sort of town meeting of the air -

CK: Now this is on radio -

KS: On radio. You have radio programs which were facing major critical issues. You have all sorts of cultural programming that the FCC demanded and that certainly makes an important contribution, and I think you would find through the entertainment side of radio programming, a very clear effort to influence American public opinion. And you have to realize that in a period when you didn't have television, people were turning their radios on when they got up for breakfast, they were hearing the news, the kids were coming home at lunchtime, and their mother is going to have been doing the wash with the radio on virtually all day long, they are going to suffer through Kate Smith and Our Gal Sunday, and whatever during their lunch hour, and Ma Perkins, and what have you, and I think you would find that the basic pattern of American home life, particularly from a woman's point of view, was non-stop radio listening throughout the day. There's 50% of your population. Except of course during war time you get large numbers of American women going out to work in industry, but even there you had radio, you didn't have piped music, you didn't have musak, you had the real thing in the work place.

CK: Now, was this the same - What was the audience of

Mildred Gillars? She was called Axis Sally...She was an American, are you familiar with her?

KS: (Laughs) Yeah, I know about - You see you've got four fascinating characters. You've got Axis Sally. You've got Tokyo Rose. You've got Lord Haw Haw, William Joyce. And of course you've got Ezra Pound, who was the American poet who broadcast for the Fascist Italians. So you've got these people. I don't know - William Joyce, Lord Haw Haw, has been fairly well written up, largely because they hung the poor bloke, though he was actually an Irish citizen. Axis Sally I've not actually seen much on.

CK: Well, I've heard - I went to the National Archives in the summer, and listened to some of her (broadcasts), and it's quite different from Tokyo Rose, because as you were describing, some of it was aimed at the housewife who was home washing the dishes, and had very active talk about the situation. But with Tokyo Rose, I don't know if you've heard her -

KS: I have heard her -

CK: - And I'd like to talk about her for a minute. I'm wondering, what was the Japanese government trying to accomplish?

KS: Well they were trying to in fact undermine the morale of the GI in the mud-filled foxholes. I mean this sort of typical one about Hello, GI's, what are your girlfriends doing tonight on the heights overlooking the

Pacific in the convertibles with those 4Fs...The scripts that I've seen of Tokyo Rose suggest that it was basically, " We will provide you with music and a bit of fairly predictable undermining morale" sort of stuff. One of the things that you have to always keep in mind is that it's very easy to do propaganda when you're winning, it's more difficult to do it when you're losing. Because what really makes an impact is being able to announce your victories and the other guys' defeats. So long as Haw Haw was doing that he had an easy time; he had a very difficult time actually making his points after the war began to swing in the other direction. But it would be very interesting to look at the Axis Sally programming, keeping in mind that one of the problems always is where you're dealing with radio, is that I would say for the most part you could pretty well write off the impact of short wave broadcasting.

CK: And most of Tokyo Rose was on short wave?

KS: No, most of Tokyo Rose, if I remember, was actually on medium wave. That was because they were broadcasting to the front lines. And of course Haw Haw was broadcasting medium and long wave programs primarily out of Hamburg, which made his target area of Great Britain a very easy one to zero in on. But somebody like Dorothy Thompson, for example, who was doing short wave CBS propaganda for the United States, back in '39, 40, '41, of course was having to use short wave because that was the only way they could

actually get a signal into Germany. There's a fascinating book that Dorothy Thompson published I think in about 1941, which contains the text of her short wave broadcasts, which if I remember correctly, was entitled, Listen, Hans.

CK: Now I'm not sure who she was.

KS: Dorothy Thompson was one of those absolutely marvelous '30s women who was a political columnist, and

CK: -An American?

KS: A very tough American lady. I think by '40 she had - I don't actually know enough of the story of Dorothy Thompson except to recognize that she's a fascinating person, a person who was an influential opinion-maker and unique in being a woman at that time.

CK: Why do you think the Japanese used prisoners of war for their propaganda? I mean it seems to me as though that would be the worst population to pick from.

KS: I don't know. It may simply have been a matter of availability.

CK: And they're English-speaking.

KS: That's right. If you were able to use a nisei, obviously you've got somebody who could actually speak English. They were second generation.

CK: I've interviewed a number of veterans who can remember being in the foxholes and being in their ships listening to Tokyo Rose. And it's totally clear that the propaganda didn't work in lowering their morale. They loved

it, they looked forward to it.

KS: But the interesting question there, however, is whether or not it was in fact in some way succeeding. I mean the - you see, you may in fact turn it on, and you may laugh, and you may say isn't that funny. But I think that what you have to ask is whether or not Tokyo Rose and her compatriots were not actually raising questions that in a sense lay in the back of people's minds anyway. And if you're worrying about what your girlfriend's doing back in L.A., and if Tokyo Rose is reminding you about that question, you may on the outside be laughing, and on the inside you may be crying. So the one thing that I would suggest is that you have to be very cautious. I mean if you lose the war clearly your propaganda didn't win it for you. But then again, I don't - it's one of the things that you always have to be very clear on, is what you actually expect that propaganda to have done. Propaganda neither wins nor loses wars. It's simply a contributory factor towards the winning or the losing. You could argue that a country that had the most effective propaganda could still lose the war because it had a smaller army. What you'd have to be is fairly well-versed in both the theory and the practice of propaganda to be able to judge whether your expectations are in line with the sort of realities of it all. I know the British Government did a study of the potential impact of Lord Haw Haw's broadcasting. Just because you turn the guy

on and laugh at him doesn't mean that you're not taking him seriously. He may still have some sort of influence, some sort of negative influence on you. I can't prove a thing, but I'm saying you have to be cautious.

CK: I'm wondering about that myself. Because I'm hearing from vets who said, "Did you hear her last night? She was in great form." And everyone kind of looked forward to it. And it became this social hour and this coin that they talked - I mean that was the entertainment for a lot of them. For a lot of them it wasn't -

KS: Which is interesting in that in a sense you see - Somebody who you ought to talk to if you possibly can at some point is Eric Barnouw.

CK: I did, he was the one who told me about you.

KS: I see. But my guess is that the United States did not effectively produce a radio personality that could effectively, say, provide a substitute for Tokyo Rose. Now you'd actually have to do a very careful look at Armed Forces broadcasting. And Eric, of course, having had experience in that area, would be able to tell you if there's somebody who's actually written extensively on Armed Forces broadcasting in the Pacific theatre, to see exactly what they were doing, and the sort of programming that they were running. Because they were clearly going to be running primarily rebroadcasts of things like Bob Hope, and what have you, Lux Radio Theatre and -

CK: Did he study - did Eric Barnouw study the -

KS: Eric worked for them. I don't know, you see somebody like Mike Kitross...Michael Kitross at Emerson College in Boston (I ask him to spell it) He's professor of broadcasting at Emerson College in Boston, and co-author of the basic text for the history of broadcasting. Mike, who also was the editor of the Journal of Broadcasting would probably be the person who would be able to tell you if there are any competent studies of Armed Forces broadcasting in either or both theatres of war, because it would be important to look at what AFN's broadcasting policy was in trying to deal with Tokyo Rose. Because the one thing you have to remember was that it was easily within the capability of the American Armed Forces to jam Tokyo Rose. I mean there would have been no problem at all, if they felt...There was a policy decision that clearly had to have been made not to jam her, on the grounds that she clearly was doing no harm.

CK: I wonder how we'd find out, if there -

KS: Ah well, how do we find out! I'll tell you somebody else to talk to...(mentions David Culbert of Louisiana State University as a broadcast historian.) And David may be able to help you particularly because David is perhaps the most knowledgeable person in terms of U.S. Government documentation. David would probably be the person who would point you more directly to where the sources would be for

within - you see, in the Pacific theatre you've got two commands, you've got a Naval and an Army Command.

CK: Now I've spoken to both...not commands but to historians in the Naval Archives of Washington, and to historians at the Army Archives at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The army has absolutely nothing about Tokyo Rose. Now I don't know what they have about their own policy -

KS: What they would have at Carlisle at the Army War College would be not a great deal anyway. I mean where you are going to find it will be in the War Department Archives at Suitland.

CK: Where is that?

KS: Suitland, Maryland. It's the Washington National Records Center. In other words it's the National Archives Outstation. And there is a shuttle bus that runs between the two...What you need to do is to find out where the Armed Forces Radio policy making was going on, and what documents, what files, they are going to be in. Because I think it's there you'll probably find discussions about Tokyo Rose, for example, and other broadcasting of that sort, and questions as to what sort of programming they'd have to put on in order to draw listeners away from her, and whether or not she ought to be jammed or what.

CK: Another thing, just to finish with, I'm curious from your point of view, you wrote the article about film-making

in Hollywood and the attitudes toward Jews. I'm wondering if anyone has done a study about the effects of the blacklist in the 1950s and '40s, the communist blacklist, on film-making in Hollywood, and on the content.

KS: Well, I think there's probably been a lot ...the Cetlair Englund book on Inquisition in Hollywood is the basic book on that issue, on the impact of HUAC on the American film industry. How the film industry basically pulls back on all fronts. But in terms of films, you have to recognize that as soon as you get the Divorce Act, the divorce proceeding which breaks distribution from production in Hollywood through anti-trust legislation, Hollywood as a viable restrictor of content begins to collapse, and the influence of the Motion Picture Production Association and its production code begins to collapse with it. So that by 1954 Otto Preminger's quite prepared to not have a production code certificate with "The Moon Is Blue." And from that point on basically distributors were prepared to put anything on the screen they could get past local censors. So that in one sense the anti-communist thing comes almost at the end of Hollywood's being able to influence movie product as severely as it had done previously.

Interview with Larry Suid

Feb. 10, 1988

Lawrence H. Suid is the author of a history of the Armed Forces Radio and Television Network. He also wrote Guts and Glory, a book about the image of the Armed Forces in Hollywood movies. He lives in Washington, D.C.

(I introduce myself before recording, and tell him about my project; tell him he was referred to me by someone at the Library of Congress when I asked for information about the Armed Forces Radio, and government policy about dealing with the Tokyo Rose broadcasts.)

LS: To be honest the book was written, the manuscript was completed two years ago, and that part was written almost three years ago. So I'm just, as you're asking, I'm trying to think back. Because they had the same issue in Germany, in the European war, a little bit more because Germany would sometimes imitate Armed Forces Network, and give false information, etc. etc. And if there was jamming it would not have been done through Armed Forces Radio, it would have been done through the Signal Corps, through the Office of War Information, or the OSS. My inclination is to say, and I'd have to go back and look a little bit, that the Armed Forces Radio in its mission was simply concerned to provide information for the troops, and entertainment, and it was not their role whatsoever to get involved with the propaganda part.

CK: Who was involved with the propaganda part?

LS: That would be the OSS and Donovan's group, plus I would think Army Intelligence, or of course Navy

Intelligence, and in the Pacific the Marines. I am almost certain that Armed Forces radio itself had no involvement in those kinds of decisions, they did not have jamming equipment whatsoever. They were limited to very small portable transmitters in most places except in Europe where Armed Forces Network and the BBC had rather large generators coming out of England right after the invasion. And so ...Armed Forces radio itself would not have gotten involved with that and Tom Lewis, who ran Armed Forces Radio operations out of Los Angeles, had as his mandate simply to provide the material. He was not a military person and in fact was not listened to in any sense, he had wanted to set up American Forces Network to go onto the Continent, right after the invasion, and Eisenhower overruled him and made it a joint operation with the BBC. So he had no military standing and was not consulted in any way.

CK: What kinds of programming did he have?

LS: Well, OK, I'm sorry, I keep assuming people know. (Laughs.) I don't know if you heard (discusses NPR show on Armed Forces propaganda in Vietnam. We talk about that for a while.)

In all honesty I have grave reservations about what they said vis a vis Armed Forces radio and television and censorship. They claim that Armed Forces radio and television in Vietnam was heavily censored. To the extent that...the military command and even the embassy did try to

do this I'm not going to question it. Armed Forces radio and television itself did not censor its programs. It was from the outside. To the layman that may be a very insignificant distinction. But if I'm writing a history of Armed Forces radio and television and I say they never have censored their own programs except for military needs, that's not the same thing as to say the U.S. Government may not have insisted. The U.S. Government owns it. You go back - Edward R. Murrow, who everyone thinks is a good liberal, when he ran the USIA, got President Kennedy and MacNamara to approve five-minute propaganda broadcasts every day on Armed Forces radio and television. Propaganda is certainly against the 40-year-old mission of Armed Forces radio and television, but if the President of the United States says you do it, you do it.

Back to your question however. From the very beginning, this is in June, July, August of '42, Armed Forces Radio broadcast without advertisements, they put in their own, ultimately, their own spot announcements. Broadcast all the leading American radio shows from the networks, they had arrangements with each of the networks. Took the top shows off, took the ads out, put in spot announcements, for help, whatever, information, and then these were put on discs and sent overseas to wherever there was a station. There were ultimately two to three hundred, something like that. They also, and this is I suppose an anomaly, produced five or six

or seven or eight of their own programs out of their own headquarters using the top Hollywood and New York radio entertainers. They had writers who would write the scripts and then they would call up and get entertainers, Bob Hope, Bing Crosby, whatever, they'd come in and do the shows, and these would be sent out also.

I say it's an anomaly because the mission was to provide troops overseas with, and it still is, the same information, entertainment, as they get back home. And since these programs that they produced were not available at all to the domestic audience, they - it goes against their prime mission, but since they could get 'em at all they decided to produce these shows. But these were standard entertainment shows, they were not ...I would say they were not propaganda.

Some of the shows they did put together were education, information, you know, "know your enemy" sort of thing. Which I suppose you could argue border on propaganda. But it was General George Marshall who set up Armed Forces Radio, same thing that set up the Frank Capra film unit, to provide education and information. Capra's films are clearly propaganda. There were undoubtedly shows saying the enemy is bad, you gotta fight, etc. etc. But whatever jamming is done, and I really have no information about that, the point of Marshall is to provide your own version of events, and your own things, and that will take care of

itself. And to the extent that it was, I always say a necessary war rather than a good war, there wasn't much need to present out and out propaganda. There were very few people that were going to be at all susceptible to Tokyo Rose and Axis Sally. We think that's a primary thing. By first showing them the "Why We Fight" series in basic training, and then giving them the programming over Armed Forces radio, I don't think there was ever much need to jam.

CK: A lot of jamming would be - well, not jamming, but there would be a lot of contradictory news, because the Japanese would be telling them about military losses at sea, and...in fact there was one ship...I interviewed a veteran who said his ship was sunk three times by the Japanese according to the radio.

LS: Well, on this Vietnam program, for what it's worth, they... even the soldiers who knew that the war was wrong, said that Hanoi Hannah had very little impact on them despite her very extensive propaganda.

CK: (I ask for a lead for a historian or a source for Signal Corps.) (He tells me the Signal Corps has probably been defunct since the 1960s.)

LS: During the war the Signal Corps did on occasion provide equipment and set up generators for Armed Forces Radio, they did that particularly in England in '43. They set up the original transmitters because initially Armed Forces Radio did not have that expertise. By '43, early '44

they started to train their own people to take little stations out in the Pacific.

I think, my empirical conclusion, is that they never really worried about Axis Sally or Tokyo Rose, particularly Tokyo Rose, that... it wasn't like in Europe or even in Vietnam where there was an opportunity for the soldiers to desert, you know, you landed on an island and you took the island and the Japanese were gone. And so there was really no concern about that. And if they - to the extent that they listened to her, it was one, to laugh, and two, simply for the music. The more Armed Forces radio went on, with all the stars that they had, and the baseball games and whatever else they could do with short wave broadcast, that Axis Sally and Tokyo Rose had rather a small audience. My guess is they didn't even think it was worth the effort.

CK: (I ask him how he came to write the book)

LS: I had a contract with the Armed Forces Radio and Television to write their history. Armed Forces Radio and Television Service is one of the components of American Forces Information Service, which also does "Yank" and "Stars and Stripes." There is an overall head for each of these organizations and I was essentially contracted to the deputy director of Armed Forces Information.

CK: Is that part of USIA?

LS: Armed Forces Information has never been involved with Voice of America or USIA, except in Europe they use

some of the same transmitter towers. Conversely VOA and USIA were very anxious to get on Armed Forces Radio and Television because of what they call their shadow audience, eastern Europe, and they had a very large audience. The USIA and Edward R. Murrow had this idea that since no one was listening to the Voice of America, because it was propaganda, they could put in their two five-minute programs a day which they did for three or four or five years.

CK: Is it still propaganda?

LS: No, when Nixon came in one of the first things he did was eliminate these two programs. What was happening was USIA was writing the...writing...I don't remember, it's not a secret, I just don't remember how the material was delivered, I believe it was delivered in script to the short wave people who had to then put it on the air. And the gentleman who ran the Armed Forces Information Service at the time said it was sometimes so badly written they had to rewrite it to make it even understandable, and they were adamantly opposed to these programs. But as I said, if the President and the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the USIA mandate it, you do it. But it was taken off the air I think in '69, something like that, not any sooner, I think it was under Nixon. The Armed Forces Radio and Television Service as far as possible sees itself as a broadcast network, world-wide, totally free of propaganda, and there were always controversies in Vietnam about the

news. If you see "Good Morning Vietnam" there was an indication of censorship -

CK: There certainly was. It was stated.

LS: They were wrong. That movie bears no resemblance to Armed Forces Radio and Television in Vietnam.

CK: I'm glad to hear it.

LS: I've written a book on the image of the military in Hollywood war movies. From that point of view, it is a bad movie, it is inaccurate, etc. etc. But there were contentions by young troops - the current director of Armed Forces Information on one of these tapes said he never heard of one of the major incidents where a broadcaster got on and said he was censored.

(Talks about today's Armed Forces R-TV programming - that it's exactly what you get here and that it's pre-recorded with their own spot announcements.)

(Talks about Tom Lewis's group of writers not being connected with Armed Forces policy, but writing because they were drafted to do so. Said Tom Lewis was made the Commander of Armed Forces Radio and reported to General Osborne, same as Frank Capra.)

The military believe they win the war with bullets, I will always argue that it's the support agencies that win or lose a war. Now Tom Lewis himself and his boys often implied they won the war because they boosted morale. Well, we would have won the war without them, to be sure,

and probably won it at exactly the same time, however it made the conditions of the men more enjoyable to the extent that they heard music and entertainment from home. Their biggest job was right after the war, the transition from war to peace, where they had special programming that they'd already put together, one to help prepare the troops for occupation and two, to explain to them how they would be rotated back home and what their benefits would be and all that. That was the information side of it. And I've always indicated that if Edward R. Murrow, for example, had been given control of the Armed Forces Radio at the beginning of the war, it would have been purely education, information and news. It happened that they brought in Tom Lewis who was an advertising man, who decided that the way to create an audience was to bribe them with entertainment and then you will slip in the message. So that was a basic policy and philosophic decision.

(Talks about before the war, when all the radio programs were put together by ad agencies and then sold to the networks.) Armed Forces Radio had its beginnings in Kodiak, Alaska at the end of 1941. In fact it was unofficial but it became part of Armed Forces Radio in the middle of 1942. In fact the first station was in Panama in 1940. And by that I mean military radio stations which were created purely to relieve the boredom of troops in the field. And they were spontaneously created by the men

themselves. General Marshall brought in Capra and Tom Lewis, not in response to Tokyo Rose, because when this was started the troops with a few exceptions were not fighting. There were troops in Guadalcanal, and they were fighting in Wake Island. But the idea was domestic. Domestic in the sense of "whatever they throw at us this is what were going to do." It wasn't a reaction to Tokyo Rose that Armed Forces Radio was created. If you - see you go back, and ... there had been studies during and after World War I, about the morale of the troops. And the bottom line conclusion was that in the next war the United States Army should provide its own entertainment-recreation internally, not rely on the Red Cross, the neighboring Knights of Columbus, Salvation Army, whatever. So that this idea of providing your own entertainment...was not in reaction to the efforts of Tokyo Rose. That's another reason why I say that Lewis would have nothing to do with jamming. Besides they were probably arrogant enough to believe that their programs were so much better no one would listen to anyone else.

CK: Right.

LS: And they were. Command Performance, which was their weekly program, which started before Armed Forces Radio and Television, in March of '42 before it was taken over in August, was probably the greatest radio program ever put together.

CK: Command Performance?

LS: Command Performance. Because they had access to every entertainer, no advertiser could afford all the stars that they brought in, and besides, the individual advertisers tied up - one would have Bob Hope and one would have Bing Crosby, so you couldn't put them on the air at the same time.

CK: Who produced it?

LS: It was Armed Forces Radio.

#

PROPAGANDA EXPERTS

THE EXPERTS

Barry Zorthian is a communications specialist who worked as a program manager with the Voice of America from 1948-61, and a public affairs officer from 1961-64. He served as a counselor for Information Vietnam from 1964-68. He became a vice president for Time, Inc., from 1969 - 1979, and now works as an executive with a communications firm in Washington, D.C.

Max Kraus is a retired Foreign Intelligence Officer with the USIA. During World War II he was with the U.S. Army 84th Infantry Division and used a mobile loudspeaker to speak across enemy lines in German to urge the soldiers to surrender. His broadcasts are credited with the surrender of 2500 enemy troops.

Interview with Barry Zorthian, November 25, 1987

CK: (I introduce myself and tell him I'm looking for an expert in propaganda during World War II.) I noticed in reading about your background that you were in the Marines during World War II.

BZ: Yeah, World War II I am hardly the expert. I was in the Marines, a young second lieutenant in field artilleries. We had nothing to do with any of the propaganda aspects of World War II.

CK: Did you hear Tokyo Rose?

BZ: Oh, yeah, but so did a million other people.

CK: Can you tell me, as propaganda, is that type of transmission with music and patter, or chatter, is that an effective method of propaganda?

BZ: Well, it certainly got an audience to a certain extent, simply because of the content. But I don't know that it had any great effect. People listened to it for the music and not much more.

CK: That's what I found when I interviewed - I've interviewed a couple of dozen veterans who did hear it, and all of them said they laughed at it, they didn't take it--

BZ: The substance, sure. You know it may have hit one or two individuals here or there, but as a general thing--I don't think it had any effect.

CK: Did they use the same kind of propaganda in Vietnam?

BZ: We used very often, there were all forms of it in Vietnam, but we used very often the Vietnamese equivalent of it, in other words messages from Vietnam to the other side emphasizing home and family and the harm in fighting, etc. etc. So in a different sense we used the same technique...the basic technique of appealing to the desire for home, the desire to be with family, the desire to be in familiar surroundings and therefore to be less than committed to fighting, is standard operating procedure if you will.

CK: Do you think it has an effect to make soldiers less committed?

BZ: To some extent less committed, less aggressive if you will. In Vietnam we put a great deal of emphasis and with some success on getting people to surrender, our so-called Chu Lai program. And a lot of that was based on the appeal of wanting to leave the harsh conditions of combat or front line duty and return to your home. By raising questions as to the validity of the effort, the futility of fighting etc. etc.

CK: Do you think--isn't that the same as what the Japanese were trying to do?

BZ: Oh sure. Sure, in a very real sense.

CK: Why do you think the Japanese (propaganda) didn't work, then?

BZ: Well I think for one thing the impact, the reason

for the Americans fighting was much more clear. And that the countereffect on American promotion, if you will, of the war, is a very profound one. There'd been an awful lot of material put out in the U.S. to these troops up to, leading to the war, and beyond it, after the war started. So that there was a very ingrained resistance to anything from the Japanese. Furthermore the Japanese communicating with the Americans, the whole culture, the means of communications, the methods of communication, were very alien. Whereas in a place like Vietnam we tried to use Vietnamese to talk to the Vietnamese.

CK: I see. Did any of the North Vietnamese do the same to our men?

BZ: They certainly tried to do it to the South Vietnamese. They had very little or no effect on the Americans I think. Hold on please a minute.

CK: Certainly.

BZ: I have a call on the other line. As I say, the man who knows most about World War II that I'm aware of, who served in the European side is a fellow named Max Kraus, (spells it) and he should be in the Washington phone book.

CK: Do you know what office he works--

BZ: Well, no, he's retired now, he's writing a book about that APSE, that Unity Europe that undertook propaganda.

CK: OK. Well, thanks for the reference. And thanks for your time.

BZ: You're very welcome.

MAX KRAUS

I served during World War II with a psychological warfare unit which did combat propaganda...so I can present some expertise on the subject.

(I explain what I'm doing, ask permission to record)
First of all, with radio, Dr. Short from England talks about latent propaganda - (What kind?) Latent, meaning subtle, it's the kind of propaganda that doesn't have a direct message, but it has more of a subtle psychological effect, to lay down your arms and go home, and what are you fighting for, this kind of thing. Escapist fantasy. Is that a technique that was used a lot in World War II?

MK: Well, um, in part yes, in part, also, in Europe, and I'm not acquainted with Tokyo Rose's broadcasts since my service was in Europe, I think our messages were somewhat less subtle and latent,...I mean they were definitely aimed at inducing surrender in enemy troops and undermining civilian morale by pointing out that the war was really lost and people shouldn't be foolish and lose their lives at the last moment when they could surrender to the Allied armies and survive the war and be reunited with their families.

CK: Do you think it had any effect?

MK: Yes, very definitely.

CK: How could you tell?

MK: Well in addition to using the radio broadcasts, we also, and I did a good deal of it myself during the war,

used mobile loudspeaker systems to talk directly across the front lines to the enemy troops when they were nearly cut off, and ...so...and.. for instance during the final drive from the Rhine to the Elbe I worked mainly with a mobile loudspeaker system with the 84th Infantry Division and they credited my surrender appeals with the surrender of about 2500 German troops. And there was a very well documented radio operation targeted at the city of Lorient during the war in Brittany ...where we...some... due to I think Austrian or German-born psychological warriors, broadcast into the fortress which was pretty much cut off, at regular intervals, and they talked enough of the German troops into coming out of Lorient and surrendering to us so that we never had to actually take Lorient by assault. It held out until the end of the war but had become militarily insignificant.

CK: I see. (ask for spelling of Lorient)

MK: It's one of the towns on the coast of Brittany, just south of the English Channel.

CK: I see.

MK: It was one of the main German U-boat bases together with St. Lazare, and Brest.

CK: Do you think that the messages from the radio were effective because they were true?

MK: Yes. I mean this was our cardinal rule. Don't ...always ... always tell the truth, don't lie. At least in

our ...in what we called white propaganda. Because for instance we had also a black propaganda station in Europe during World War II that operated out of Luxembourg, the British had several which pretended to be underground stations inside of Germany which were operated by anti-Nazi...mainly officers. And as long as you ...these black propaganda stations could take liberties with the truth, because they did not avow their true origin. In all white propaganda, where it obviously came from Allied sources, we had a very firm rule of always speaking the truth because ... if the enemy could check up on what we were telling them and found out that it wasn't so, we would have been discredited.

CK: I see. Can you...OK, you would define white propaganda as being...

MK: White propaganda is propaganda which does not hide its origin. Black propaganda pretends to originate from a different source, there's sort of an area in between which is called grey propaganda which leaves it's origin kind of in doubt. But black propaganda and white propaganda are the principle categories which we differentiate it.

CK: I see. I've read the definitions but somehow I understood that one was more obvious in its message and the other was -

MK: No. No.

CK: I see.

MK: The...Tokyo Rose obviously came from Japan and therefore was white propaganda.

CK: Yes, she did, the broadcasts were obvious, in their message as well.

MK: Yes.

CK: Is this a standard kind of format, to play music or something that is part of the culture of the enemy? In other words she played American music and gave them the message, what's the use in fighting, your ships are being sunk, and so on. Is this an effective kind of broadcast, or does the effectiveness depend on -

MK: The effect of any propaganda depends on whether you ... during the war, whether you are winning or losing. If you are losing there is no way in which you can talk the enemy into surrendering. And if you are winning it's relatively easy because there is already the tactical and strategic pressure. This is why the propaganda... our propaganda broadcasts, leaflets, loudspeaker operations in Germany during the final phase of the war were very effective. Because the German troops really knew that there was no way that they could win, and therefore it was frequently enough, especially during loudspeaker broadcasts, to talk to them in their own language, to tell them that if they surrendered they would be treated well, in conformance with the Geneva convention, and give them instructions in how to surrender. Because there is always a risk involved

in surrendering during a battle, because the enemy may not know - may not be sure whether you are trying to surrender or trying to charge their positions.

CK: Uh huh.

MK: By having somebody speak to them in their own language and say if you throw away your weapons, walk slowly with your hands up in the air toward our lines, we will take you prisoners and we will treat you in conformance with the Geneva convention and you will survive the war.

CK: Has it ever happened that the message was false, and that they were shot trying to surrender?

MK: Not that I know of. I don't know of any incident when that was deliberately done.

CK: I see. What branch of the government were you working for, when you were doing this kind of dangerous work?

MK: I was with the U. S. Army, with the Psychological Warfare Detachment of the 9th U.S. Army, in Europe.

#

Note: Max Kraus is listed in the 1956 Who's Who in America as a Foreign Intelligence Officer with the U.S. Information Agency.

VETERANS

VETERANS

(in alphabetical order)

Robert Anderson, Storekeeper 2nd Class SK2C USNR. Served on the USS Half Moon, a sea plane tender, in the South Pacific for 15 months.

Will Clover, US Navy. Saw action at Pearl Harbor, Midway. Sunk on a destroyer in the South Pacific, 1942, was hospitalized in Fiji.

Georgana Egeland, widow of Roy Egeland, USN, who served on the USS Santee, the first CVE to be hit by a kamikaze pilot.

Dick Grant, 5th Fighter Squadron, Army Air Corps, served in New Guinea and Port Moresby, Australia.

Ken McConnell, Signal Corps, South Pacific, 1942-45. Worked with radar and radio repair.

Gareth Moon, 2nd Battalion, Ninth Marines, 3rd Division. Served in Guadalcanal, Guam, Iwo Jima.

Bill Ohrmann, Army Air Corps, Crew Chief of C-47 plane, New Guinea, 1943-44.

Paul Snyder, Navy Submarines, served in Manila and Australia.

Lester B. Tucker, U.S. Navy, Chief Warrant Officer. Served aboard USS North Carolina, Guadalcanal and Solomon Islands, 1942-43.

INTERVIEW WITH ROBERT ANDERSON

October 26, 1987

R: As a Navy veteran in the Asiatic-Pacific area during WWII we had occasion to listen to broadcasts by Tokyo Rose. It was announced and we looked forward to listening, usually in the evening wherever we might have been, usually down in the New Hebrides, New Guinea, as I recall down in there. Knowing very well that it was a propaganda broadcast on short-wave, we would stop everything actually and listen to it on the small ship I was on because it was interspersed with the music of the big time bands of the 1930s and '40s and we liked to listen to Harry James and some of those boys, but then she always had a message, a propaganda message. And I can recall one in particular--she hit upon attabrine tablets, which was a drug tablet that we all had to take and at that time was the only known--it wasn't a "cure", it was a deterrent of getting malaria. And the tablet was real yellow in color and it affected your body so your complexion was almost yellow. And after a month or so of taking these, one tablet a day and it was kind of mandatory and we didn't want malaria so we took this tablet, and she came on and the solo broadcast was that we that had taken attabrine tablets to the point of discoloring our skin was causing us to become sterile. And propaganda goes so far, but that

kind of worried some of the young married fellas out there and some of them planning on getting married. It didn't bother me because, heck, that was the furthest from my mind at that time. I know an M.D. aboard ship had to come on and say, "Don't worry, fellas, that is strictly propaganda--there's no research that attabrine tablets were going to cause sterility."

But another thing, as I recall, is--she came on trying to, I guess as I understood, get everybody homesick. And she came on several times with all the "Dear John" letters we were getting, it was an effort in our futility, and our government, and our knowing that we would never get back to the States because of the Imperialists' superiority over the area, the folks back home (especially the women) were not going to wait. So we'd get "Dear John" letters and rightfully so.

C: Did she read any of them over the air?

R: No. Naturally it was a devastating moment for some of these people that were getting "Dear John" letters, and I hope you understand what I mean by a "Dear John" letter--the relationship is through in a letter. And friends, sweethearts, young wives--and that was a devastating effect in itself. And she promoted, increased the anxiety of these "Dear John" letters.

This was the two main things that I remember about

Tokyo Rose.

C: Did you have any friends or buddies who did receive "Dear John" letters who were depressed by this?

R: Well, we by and large were very amused by it. It got to a point where we were wondering what was going to come out next. I was on a back echelon--the ship was on a back echelon--most of the islands had been secured, so then to hear her say how we were outmanned, outgunned, and the superiority of the Imperial Forces was like a comedy to us at that time. This was 1944 and the spring of 1945. And fleet commanders let us listen to it. They would record the short-wave and play it to us at a certain time on the ship because it was amusement and you didn't have movies or anything like that, except old movies, so it was just a lighter section of our day after chow in the evening.

C: Did you say they were recorded?

R: Evidently, because as we went from time zone to time zone on the ship on movement we got it a certain time each day, so I knew it wasn't coming direct. Now maybe the fleet censored some of it out, I don't know. I'm not aware of it. It was after evening chow, as I recall, which was around 6:00 - 1800 as Navy time. So that was an ongoing thing. But it could have been censored, I don't know. But the thing about the attabrine tablets and the "Dear John" letters--if it

had been censored before we heard it, they let that go, for whatever reason.

C: What kind of voice did she have?

R: Tokyo Rose had a beautiful voice. She was easy to listen to. And that was kind of appreciated, and besides, it was a sexy voice as far as the troops were concerned. And they liked that. She could lead in to the music portion of it beautifully, you know, about Glenn Miller, which was very popular at that time. And I think it was about the time when he had disappeared or was killed in the Service, so his music was more than relevant to us at that time. And, Harry James . . . but most of the big name bands, she had a piece of music--not complete recording and I don't remember how long Tokyo Rose . . . You see we weren't allowed radios, it had to come over the ship's intercom system to us, so I'm sure it was censored, a lot of it, but they didn't censor out the "Dear John" and the attabrine tablets.

C: How did the music make you feel?

R: Great! Great! She had us there, because then we were attentive. Then we would laugh and "ha, ha" at her when she would come out with some of the propaganda statements and so forth because we knew they were wild and out of context, especially when our fleet was chasing the Japanese fleet all over the Pacific and she

was telling us how superior the Imperial Navy was and all that, and that we would all be in Davy Jones' locker and all of this business. I think our service personnel and commanders looked at it as kind of an ego-boosting thing. You know, "Hey, see what she's saying? and where we are? It's all false anyway." So that's probably why they let it go.

C: Did you have an idea what she looked like?

R: No. In fact, with her soft voice I guess most of us, and I for one, had envisioned her as not a Nisei but she could be in Hollywood in the movies--you know, beautiful gal, that's the way we envisioned her. And she was saying how well she was treated in Japan and was so glad that she wasn't in America anymore, and all of that. So we knew that her background was from the States.

C: Did she refer to the States? To California?

R: Not specifically that I recall. Like I said before, I don't know how long her broadcasts were--10 minutes, 15, half hour or whatever.

INTERVIEW WITH WILL CLOVER

October 25, 1987

W: (Talked about spending 3 days on a raft and their rescue.)

We listened to Tokyo Rose for amusement when we were at sea. She would say things to encourage the American forces to give up because the Japanese forces had invaded the United States. And there was one time something to the effect that the Japanese had invaded the West Coast and had progressed as far as Kansas or Oklahoma or something in their progress of going across the United States.

C: Did you believe it?

W: Oh, no. We had reports and everything--we had other reports of our own and I was in Communications so I was in direct contact with the latest news items and stuff.

C: So you knew it wasn't true?

W: Yeah.

C: Was this news announcements in a male voice or was it Tokyo Rose?

W: She would announce it. She started and concluded her programs--they would play American music that they knew the Americans liked, like Glenn Miller and different big-name bands at that time.

C: Do you remember which ones she would end with or start with? Did she have any special theme song?

W: I don't remember quite that well--it's been some time. I do remember at times I might lend an ear to the radio when she was on, just long enough to get a chuckle or two and then go on about my business.

C: Can you tell me what division or what branch of the service you were in?

W: I was in the Navy and was in radio communications. I had a security clearance that was top secret and used to be involved with coded messages and that, and when coded messages came in I would have to take them down and set up the code machines and decode messages or encode messages for transmittal.

C: Where were you stationed when you were doing this work?

W: I was at sea. Most of my service was at sea. I was at Pearl Harbor when Pearl Harbor was attacked and I was on a light cruiser named the USS Detroit, later transferred to a destroyer, the USS Meredith. It was on the USS Meredith that I went down into the New Hebrides area on a mission that we were assigned from there. We were escorting--two destroyers were escorting a sea-going tug that was towing a great big tank raft--they called them lighters--that was towing gasoline for the planes on Guadalcanal and when we were about 90 miles from our destination some Japanese air-carrier based planes attacked us and sunk us.

C: How long--was that when you were in the water for 72 hours?

W: About 2 to 4 hours longer than 3 days--76 hours.

C: What did you hang on to?

W: I got to a raft. The first raft I started to go to I changed my mind because the Japanese planes stayed around the vicinity and as the sunken sailors of the U.S. destroyer were gathering around the raft the Japs would peel off and come down and strafe them. So I made my way on the waves to one off to itself and that's the one I went to. When I got to it there was an estimated 25 or so on it. When we were rescued 3 days later there was only 9 of us left.

C: What did you do with the ones who died? Did they stay on the raft with you?

W: Well, you know, during the war we wore dog tags or identification tags around their neck. As they would either die or--some of them we didn't get their dog tags because some of them had illusions and would see islands and ships that weren't there and they'd start swimming for them and of course get away from the raft. We had no control over them. On the raft the first night or first afternoon of the first day we had the executive officer of the ship that was with us but being in Communications and everything and as quickly as we were attacked and sunk--we were sunk in probably

about 7 minutes--when I got to this raft the executive officer asked me if I was ever able to get a contact with a shore station about our contact with the enemy and of course it was negative because the Japanese knew our frequencies and they used to block them. If we tried to send a message out they had transmitters on the same frequencies and send a bunch of gibberish to block them. So we had no way of knowing whether our contact message--I sent it out 2 or 3 times in what we called "sending it in the blind"--but we didn't know for sure whether there was any contact. So anyways this executive officer explained that we were, by the currents of the waters as he knew them and by our last known location and so forth, if anyone of us felt strong enough or wanted to just wait for the currents to carry us we would eventually end up next to a certain island--I can't remember. But by morning he was gone, so we don't know whether he tried to take off or not. But as different ones passed away or died we just had about a 15-man raft and there were 25 of us on it to begin with, approximately, there was fellows that couldn't hack it or they'd lose their minds or have hallucinations--and we had no food or water because this raft had been blown from the ship during the bombing when we were sunk--we were hit with several torpedoes and bombs and strafing, so as near as we

could recall we were sunk within . . . there was probably about 30 aircraft and our one ship because the skipper of our ship had been placed in command of our task force of 3 ships. He had ordered the sea-going tug to abandon ship and be prepared and we went alongside and we took the personnel off. Then we swung away--the other destroyer that was with us--our commanding officer ordered the other destroyer to high-speed run on into Guadalcanal, a distance estimated around 90 miles, so we were all alone when the planes showed up. We had radar that picked them up. But as we swung away from the sea-going tug our skipper slowed our ship down and ordered a torpedo fired into the sea-going tug and light our gasoline so the Japs wouldn't be able to salvage it. But as we slowed down, the Japs made their first appearances and came straight down at us and dive-bombed us and we never did get to fire a torpedo into the sea-going tug. It was later thought when we were on the raft that--'cause we could see the tug and the lider quite a distance away from us when we raised up on the waves. At that time the executive officer was with us and he warned us against trying to make for it because he said the Japs probably had submarines alerted and they were probably watching it and if we got on it they would probably sink us again. So we left it alone and stayed away from it. We lost

sight of it overnight the first night. We finally ended up--well, overnight and after what the executive officer said about our contact with the enemy he decided to, apparently, try it on his own to get to this island and we never did hear from him. It was later learned after we were rescued--those of us that did survive used to make contact with the Commander of the Southwest Pacific Forces whose headquarters were in Australia--and we learned of the survivors' names but his never showed up, so he apparently didn't make it.

The lighter of gasoline and the sea-going tug later they were . . . When I was rescued, a Navy PBY spotted us and he flew over us a few times--we'd seen him several times making passes but he never did spot us--it was quite some time later of the day that they did find us--and when they did find us they dropped us what they call a smoke bomb and then he flew up the horizon and he'd come back and eventually there was two or three masts showed and they were sea-going tugs and destroyers and they came over and the sea-going tug came alongside and there was only 9 of us left. They came alongside of us and they tried to get us to come aboard and we didn't have the strength to climb the sea ladder to board even a small tug, so they had to use a boatswain's chair to lower over the side and bring us aboard one at a time that way.

I recall as I got on board the sea-going tug a couple of guys helping me to sick bay--I heard a lot of machine gun fire and I asked these guys, in my rather adverse condition, if we were under attack. They said no, those guys were having machine gun practice on all the sharks that were in the vicinity of our raft--he said there must have been 50 to 100 out there. Then I was taken to sick bay. (Told about all the rations normally tied to the raft having been blown from the raft so they had no food or water.)

(Talked about tying himself onto the raft so that if he fell asleep his head wouldn't go into the water. Saw an article in the water and swam for it--it was a big piece of bark. Chewed pieces of bark and spit it out after it was pulp. Several did it--those who did survived.)

C: Was it exposure or thirst or hunger that . . . ?

W: (Talked about being rescued and taken into Guadalcanal and a destroyer going to make a high-speed run to the hospital ship USS Solace to transfer these men to it. Submerged in salt water from neck on down for the entire time on the raft. The destroyer found the sea-going tug. Put a skeleton crew on the tug and finally got it on into Guadal- canal, so the Japanese never did anything with it.) (Talked about seeing a submarine about 400 - 500 yards away on the morning of the second

day, and the fact that subs had to surface to recharge batteries then. Turned and moved toward them. Talked about swimming away, and sub then submerged before it got to the raft. Saw shark fins in the water.)

(Talked about bodies being taken by sharks. Also talked about some of the men being attacked by sharks.)

C: That must have been the hardest part--not knowing whether you were going to be there forever.

W: (Talked about fate--not being a Christian, etc. Remembered the saying "Through the power of a living God I will live through this." Thinks that saw him through it.)

Re Tokyo Rose--they listened to her quite frequently. Turned the programs on for amusement and entertainment but they never believed anything because they had access to all the information themselves. Received it with a big laugh as they knew it was propaganda.

C: Did you ever compare the intelligence you received with what you heard on the broadcasts?

W: Not really. (Talked about his security clearance--was the only one on board ship including officers who had the rating.) Knew that Tokyo Rose was just propaganda and was a way for the Japanese to get the Americans to give up.

C: How about music?

W: Well, she used to, in between her announcements and her little statements about trying to encourage us to forget about fighting for the United States and to turn ourselves in to the Japanese forces, she would play popular music at that time like Glenn Miller, Tommy Dorsey and all those big bands that played jitterbug music. She had some records from the Andrews Sisters-- but her program consisted of playing popular music that the American forces enjoyed along with her little comments.

C: Did the music make you homesick?

W: Any time away from home--especially like myself I had been at Pearl Harbor and when I was finally rescued I ended up on the USS Solace at New Hebrides, then they took me and others to Suva Fiji and there they had an Army base hospital there (Johns Hopkins) with very reliable and highly-trained doctors and nurses there and they took real good care of us.

(Told the story about a nurse waking him up every night and taking him into the office for hot chocolate. He thought she had a thing for him but when he asked her she said he had such bad nightmares she had to wake him up so he wouldn't wake up all the rest of her patients.)

(Talked about not selling his story because he felt he would be selling his buddies' lives for the story and the money.)

C: (Said you would be putting together a story about Tokyo Rose.)

W: Well, I think that's about all I can tell you about her. We used to turn on the radio--we knew her schedules--and we'd turn on the radio just to hear what she had to say that we knew wasn't true. She did try to impress in her programs that the American forces should just give up because the Japanese--like I say, she had one time she had a program that the Japanese forces had invaded the West Coast of the United States and had progressed to Oklahoma.

C: Did anyone around you appear to be affected by hearing this?

W: I don't believe so. I know we all got a big laugh out of it. In fact, it kept our morale kind of high because we knew she was making statements to the effect that the Japanese forces were doing this and that and the other and were winning the war, so the speak, and we . . . I remember when the Midway battle was on she had a program about that and she told how badly we had been beaten in that battle. Well, that was actually the turning point of the war because that was when the Japanese didn't know exactly how many carriers we had left to operate and they were making preparations to attack and destroy Midway and they had a diversion action up there in the Aleutians where they attacked

them and bombed Dutch Harbor, hoping to divert any American forces away from Midway. But the American forces had decoded some of the Japanese messages and they were aware of what their plans were, so in trying to outwit the Japanese they put the three remaining carriers that we had at the time in a position where they could either help Midway or, if they did make an attack on the West Coast, they would be able to get there in short order. They were in a position where they could get there in short order and yet they were in a position where they could help at Midway. It's all military strategy.

(Talked about the movie "The Battle of Midway"-- said it was fairly accurate.)

INTERVIEW WITH GEORGANA EGELAND

October 27, 1987

C: (Discussing the history of the ship that her husband was on.)

G: He was a Seaman 2nd Class on the USS Santee. Enlisted when he was 17.

He didn't talk about the things, the actual happenings during the war because it hurt him. The things that he did talk about were the good things that he remembered. When Tokyo Rose's trial hit the front pages of all the newspapers, they were going to put her in prison for hurting the military and the Naval boys' morale and everything so much, Roy says, "What a shame. What a shame. They should give her a medal." He said, "She was the only connection we had with what was happening at home." And he said, "She had all the latest records, all the best music, and all the latest news." And he said that he couldn't wait for her to come on so they could go and listen. Sometimes she'd say, "Well, I know where you boys are." And she'd name a position, a navigational position. And he said, "Sometimes she'd be right and sometimes she'd be wrong." Or she'd tell them, "I know what's going to happen on such-and-such a day." And sometimes she'd be right and sometimes she'd be wrong. She did do propaganda and I suppose it was demoralizing for a

certain percentage of the men, but Roy said the greater percentage of them just enjoyed the music because it was something from home and they couldn't get it anywhere else.

C: Who were the ones who were demoralized?

G: Well, if they were demoralized it was because they listened to the propaganda part about "Do you know what your wives are doing? Do you know what your girlfriends are doing?" and some of them were very young and very attached and were torn away from their families, so to speak, and it bothered them a great deal. But by and large he said it was a bigger morale builder than anything else, at least as far as he was concerned.

C: Did she ever play on family . . . were there men who had children, to be missing their children--did she ever play on that?

G: He never said much about that. The only thing he ever said was the good things about her, and as I said--he said "She should have had a medal" for bringing the boys the things that they couldn't get out there in the middle of the ocean. The Navy didn't supply them with the latest music or the best records, but she did.

C: He must have been out there for long stretches.

G: He was out there for 3 years. They were at shore sometimes but he was in 3 years.

C: And she knew what they liked?

G: Oh, yes! You know, the 40s' music was marvelous. I should have made a list. I have all the records in there. The Big Band era--Glenn Miller--all the songs. And she played them all. She had them all. And she knew some of the names. She'd dedicate a song to a certain person. I suppose in her thinking this was supposed to make him feel bad, because here's this beautiful lonesome song, you're gone to the war, you know, and it's dedicated to so-and-so. But Roy said they just loved the music because it was something from home and she actually did them a service.

C: So they looked forward to . . .

G: They looked forward to her broadcasts. And he said if it got too sticky with propaganda and such, they just shut it off. He said you didn't have to listen to it.

C: How about the news value? Was the news correct, or didn't they care?

G: He said a great deal of the time she was very, very right about what ship was where. Some of the times she was wrong, but he said a lot of the time her information was very, very good. And correct.

C: Did he remember any particular song that he was fond of?

G: Oh, yes. He said she used to play Margaret Whiting's "Old Cape Cod." He loved that. There was another one too--I can't think of the name of it. I'd have to look

it up.

C: (Unintell.--something about a lot of them not getting letters.)

G: A lot of them didn't get letters, or get letters regularly from home. Some didn't get letters at all. And this was a tie with home. The music, the latest records, and a lot of times the news.

C: Would she have personal news about individuals?

G: As I remember, Roy said yes, sometimes she would actually mention someone's name and this--I almost forgot this, I don't know how I could forget this--Judy Garland was from our home town, Grand Rapids, Minnesota. And she played it, a song of Judy's, one night for the boys from Grand Rapids, Minnesota. Nobody on the ship believed that Roy actually came from Judy's home town or was part of that, and she actually played it. And it came over the radio that way. He said he was big-time on the ship after that. Yeah, she did. She'd say, "This is for the boys on the USS Santee," or whatever. She knew most of the time where they were, or that they were within distance of her radio. And where she was ever located I don't know. He never said, and I don't think he knew. I don't know if she had pre-recorded broadcasts or if she was a live entity on the radio waves. I think he said she came on live. I'm almost sure of that.

INTERVIEW WITH DICK GRANT

October 28, 1987

- C: Dick, could you tell me your rank and what branch of the service you were in.
- D: I was in the old Army Air Corps, WWII, '47--of course, it became the Air Force. In my 20 1/2 years I served 3 years with the Navy, 15 years with the Army Special Forces I was in unconventional warfare, which now seems to be the common thing--Green Berets and everything. During the period we're talking about here, I used to listen to Tokyo Rose down in New Guinea at Port Moresby--Spring '43 until I came home after two years. I remember specifically every evening around chow time between 6:00 and 7:00 when everybody had finished the chores and back home and everything, the most up-to-date and most modern music emanated from Tokyo Rose and her evening broadcasts. And everyone tuned in to listen to the latest music from home. We didn't have Armed Forces Radio like we do now or like we did during the Korean War or the Southeast Asian War. And not only the music but what we all marveled at--the Tokyo High Command had some kind of an intelligence net that really produced, because Tokyo Rose would get on the air and, for instance, "The 5th Fighter Squadron--when you come over Rabaul tomorrow we're going to be waiting for you." Specifics like that--she would name the

targets that had been planned to be hit the very next day. And of course the guys laughed it off but they still wondered how in the devil she could get this information, because as you know, New Guinea was just above caveman status. They were aboriginals and there was no chance of any of them even, any native peoples, working in any of the offices or working around in the camps. But I still marvel at how they used to get that information.

Of the two years I was over there, 18 months, my squadron was assigned to the Australian 7th and 9th Infantry Divisions to re-supply them by parachuting in the jungles and isolated patrols and everything, and just before I came home in early Spring of 1945 I was in the Dutch East Indies and I went to pay my respects to the senior Australian general who was on the same island in the Dutch East Indies on which I was stationed and I wanted to tell him good-bye because I had worked with him 18 months out of the previous 2 years--his name was Sir Leslie Moreshead. When I went to say good-bye to him, he said, "Come on up, Grantie." I said, "Sir, I just wanted to say good-bye before I go back to the States. And, sir, there's a question I want to ask you--Is it true that Goebbels, Hitler's propaganda minister, called you Ali Baba Moreshead and Your Twenty Thousand Thieves?" The general roared [he

was a 3-star general], short, chubby, but a real man.
(Story about Rommel and North Africa--going through a
mine field. Turning point for Rommel.)

I was born and raised in Washington, D.C. and was
in government 5 1/2 years before the war started.
(Talked about his going into the service.) (Talked
about the unit being sent to Port Moresby and getting
in on the last Japanese bombings of Port Moresby.
History shows that the Japanese got within 5-7 miles of
Port Moresby and if it had been taken, Australia was
wide open.)

It was at Moresby that I first heard the
propaganda of Tokyo Rose because it was the only radio
station we could get over there. New Guinea itself is
a very mountainous area, like Montana is, and the music
was up-to-date, modern, it seemed like it was piped
right from the United States via Tokyo into our tents
over there. That, and the fact that she interspersed
her music with taunts, threats, call it what you want--
for instance, she would say, "You fellows in the 5th
Fighter Squadron, we'll be waiting for you over Rabaul
tomorrow." Rabaul, of course, was the main Japanese
base in the South Pacific. And, sure enough, they'd be
waiting for the guys. She'd do this with the units
every night--fighter squadrons, bomber squadrons. We
made the first parachute drop into New Guinea a couple

of months after I got there and this caught her by surprise, and that night she was very vindictive towards us because of what had happened. But it was a good program--we enjoyed it. Everybody listened to it. I shouldn't say "everybody" because I know Glen Parmeter said he didn't.

C: What was the quality of her voice like?

D: She had a real sweet voice. It was a sexy voice, whether she was trying to make it sexy or not, we were pretty lonesome down there in New Guinea and any woman's voice was kind of sexy at the time. But she had good delivery and she evidently had good intelligence, or the Japanese Imperial Staff had good intelligence--they just fed the propaganda to her. But I never forgot Tokyo Rose.

C: How did the music make you feel?

D: Well, the old-timers will remember the Mills Brothers singing "Paper Doll" and some of the old quartets they had and some of the singers, very melancholy, would make you think of home. And that's what she wanted you to do and probably tear down your resistance, but the Japanese I don't think really had any clear understanding of the Americans' psyche. This would make us want to hurry up and get the job over with and get home. That's the way all of us took it, I thought.

C: Did you listen to the news when you were there?

- D: We listened to her news, yeah. It was very interesting. Oh, they know we're coming tomorrow-- that's interesting. But we were just as alert then. This didn't scare us at all. I imagine it was meant to make you apprehensive because maybe the Japanese thought we were not a war-like race, or war-like people, I should say. And something like this would intimidate us. But I think it just got our dander up. We took it, not as a joke but . . .
- C: Do you think these programs were the product of a thought-out plan, or do you think it was a group of people ad-libbing?
- D: I'm convinced in my own mind because they did seem to know the places we were going to hit--maybe just by deduction that they knew that, Rabaul for instance was the thing she used over and over, but that was the main shipping center, both surface shipping and aerial shipping--it supplied the Solomons, Dutch East Indies, all over the South Pacific. I'm convinced it had to be a planned operation.
- C: Did her broadcasts have an emotional effect on the guys you were with where you were stationed? Did she depress you or anger you or . . .?
- D: I don't know anybody that she angered or depressed. I know a lot of fellows that wouldn't miss her for the world because she was entertaining. And even though

she had these innuendoes and threats and kind of cast aspersions on your family life back home, they took it with a grain of salt.

C: Do you think she liked you?

D: After reading about Tokyo Rose and the fact that she had been an American citizen, supposedly went home and got caught there by the war, I think she was just a young girl who got caught up in the spirit of things and the Japanese used her.

C: At the time when you were listening did you have any idea what her psyche was like?

D: No. It was a Japanese mentality. I think they bit off more than they could chew and they realized it after Pearl Harbor when we struck back. It was those few seconds those B-25 bombers spent over Tokyo--that really must have surprised them. And from then on--and even with your best propaganda how can you beat success? MacArthur was one of the most brilliant men in military history, in my estimation. He could have gone against every island on the way up, but he didn't--he left entire Japanese armies, like the 18th Japanese Army in New Guinea--he left it there, bypassed it, went on up to the Philippines. You can't beat success regardless of how much propaganda. Of course, we knew we were having the success. We had our own bulletin boards and everything, telling what happened. (Talked

about the newspaper "Guinea Gold.")

C: Was there anything that she said in these broadcasts or that the news announcer said that you could identify clearly as being lies?

D: No. We took most of it with a grain of salt, about our sweethearts back home off with somebody else. That happens during wartime--wartime separation makes the heart beat greater for somebody else. It was just one of the facts of life. I don't know of anybody that was really affected by that.

C: So, in general you're saying that everyone looked forward to hearing her and . . .?

D: Yes. I'll make a flat statement that everybody looked forward to hearing the good music and listening to her forecast what was going to come up the next day, whether she was right or not. She had a pretty voice.

INTERVIEW WITH KEN McCONNELL

October 26, 1987

- C: When did you join the service and what branch of the service were you in?
- K: I joined the service in August of 1942. I joined the Signal Corps and subsequently took training at the University of North Dakota in radar and radio repair. After that I went into active service. We trained at Camp Kohler, California, Western Signal Corps Replacement Training Center, and was assigned in November of 1943 to the Los Angeles Port of Embarkation in the transportation full ships complement ship radio operator. From there I made a number of trips from the fall of 1943 through November 1945--all of my trips were in the South Pacific. Especially in 1944, we used to constantly listen to Tokyo Rose. We were able to get Japanese Domei news and she had regular broadcasts. I don't recall the days, but it was a regular, consistent broadcast. During that time she would reference to particular soldiers, had them by names and by units, and the islands that they were serving on. Another thing, she used to have prisoners of war--that they had already captured. Most of them came from the Philippines and they would be . . . she would have three or four of them every few nights and they would give just a radio report stating the same things in a

very perfunctory, uninformative and unenlightened tone, about they were receiving the Red Cross packages and all was well and that everything was going fine. From listening to them it was quite obvious that it was reading nothing more than what was written for them to say. The program was very entertaining--we used to be able to, when I'd pick it up on the radio--lots of time the crew would request that we plug it in through the PA system. She played real, real good records. They had all of the American records. I recall that when "White Christmas" first became available, they had it available within a week or so of the time when it came out in the United States. And it was a wire-recorded version, it was excellent. So, instead of being kind of a depressing thing, it didn't seem to depress anybody--everybody was kind of amused by it. They looked forward to listening to it, and the only thing that seemed odd was how she was able to actually get people's names and the units they belonged to and the fact that they were on Kwajalein, maybe they were on Guam, might have been in New Guinea, Bougainville--some of those places. But she knew units, and she knew their names. And of course she would tell them about the fact that they should quit and that their girlfriends or their wives back home were running around with somebody else, and in that means she was

trying to depress the morale. But it really . . . I don't think it actually ever served that kind of purpose. So from the time that . . . I used to listen to it with the intent of writing letters to the parents of the servicemen that were prisoners. But after listening to about three or four it became quite obvious that there wasn't anything that the parents would be interested in because, outside of the fact that the person was still living and you weren't even sure of that, there just wasn't anything worth mentioning or worth doing anything about.

C: Did you listen when you heard the names of the prisoners of war?

K: Oh, yeah. You bet. When I first started doing that, I thought it might be interesting to take the information down because they would tell their home address, who their parents were, and I thought, well, I'll take this information and drop them a letter and tell them I heard from their son or their husband or whatever, and that everything was fine and everything was . . . But after listening to about, oh, two or three months of that, every single particular one was exactly the same and then you became totally uncertain whether they were just having somebody do this or whether they actually had anybody, because they were not receiving the Red Cross packages as they maintained they were. Everybody

knew that. They were not being distributed by the Japanese. Prisoners that were re-captured, I mean prisoners that were taken back again after the United States forces consolidated position, told them that there was never any distribution of Red Cross packages. Whether they even received them or not, I mean whether the Japanese received them or whether they went to the Japanese mainland, they just stayed wherever they were--they never got anyplace.

C: Were you monitoring the radio? Did you say (unintell.)

K: Oh, yeah. That was my job on board ship. I was the ship's radio operator. And we had regular schedules and I would listen to what is called BAMS--it's Broadcast Allied Merchant Shipping. So four times during the day I'd have to turn the radio on and go into that schedule and during the off-times we could just tune in on Radio Tokyo. We could pick up her broadcast, just a regular . . . the same as it would be in the United States--it was a regular set scheduled broadcast.

C: Did you like it?

K: It was interesting. They had good music on. She went on and on about things we knew were not true, but it was information fed to her by the Japanese propaganda department, telling about how badly beaten the Americans were in such-and-such a place and what a

beating they were taking and all the things that were happening, which similar to, whose was it, Lord Haw Haw did the same thing and unfortunately, neither of them seemed to have the proper and correct information. But it worked very good as far as propaganda was concerned.

C: Did you look forward to hearing the music?

K: Sure. Sure. It was interesting, and they played all the big time bands. They had records of Jimmy Dorsey and Tommy Dorsey, Glenn Miller, Benny Goodman-- everything. Everything they did was tape-recorded off American stations.

C: Did it make you homesick?

K: No. Not that. I don't think that had any effect. It was just something different that you could kind of look forward to. I suppose it was one of those sessions where you could vent your frustrations listening to it, knowing that it was a bunch of just junk, it really was. But nevertheless nobody took any terrible offense to it or nobody put any big personal feelings towards it that this is gospel or anything like that, because about the time--the early part there in '43 and '44 and '45--American forces were moving so fast through the Pacific that actually most of the troops in the Pacific had a fairly good knowledge really about what things were, and so when they would relate to the fact that she was saying "the terrific

beating they took on Guadalcanal" or something like that, they already knew it was not true. So it was just something different, something interesting to listen to.

C: So you had access to news, and you knew by the . . .

K: Yes, that it was not true, right.

C: Do you think if you didn't have access to news it might have been different?

K: Yeah, I would imagine that if you were on an island someplace . . . Of course, we didn't make the habits that the Japanese did. I mean, we created situations there by island-hopping and leaving various islands totally--just by-passing them, left them there. So I would imagine that they still had radio equipment there and those Japanese that were still there listening to that, they must have felt terribly elated about it. It must have given them a big charge, to think that everything was going great. But the United States didn't do that. We didn't leave anybody alone anyplace; we took a place, we consolidated it, left what was there that was necessary to manage it, and moved on, so that the Americans for their part were pretty well up to date with what was happening.

C: Did she seem attractive to the men?

K: Oh, I don't think so. You know, you couldn't tell anything--I don't recall any pictures of her until

after the war. Then it seems like Life Magazine, after she was charged with prisoner-of-war and she had a trial--she was trained in the United States, lived in the United States for a long, long time and then went back to Japan shortly before the start of the war. She had just a normal voice. I mean, nothing . . .

anything about it. She had a good radio voice. But I can't say anything else about it. She was just like on radio--it's different with television--but with radio you can't really tell anything from the voice anyhow.

C: Did people feel that she was pleasant or on their side or anything?

K: She was definitely against the United States. There was no question what her broadcasts were beamed for. Her broadcasts were essentially--that was the whole idea of it--was to lower morale. Because she would spread all this about all the things that were happening back home and "Think about your girlfriend or your wife," or somebody back there is running around with the fellows that are back home on furlough, and "Don't you think you should get out of the service and go back home." Her motive was definitely to decrease morale. But at the same time, the fellows were receiving letters from their family and their friends and their girlfriends, so it kind of knocked that position out of the way a little bit. I think by and

large there may have been a few that felt something to it, but, especially the guys on the islands--lots of them looked forward to it. They used to get a big kick about it, listening to where they were supposed to be and where they were going to be, and how badly they were being beaten--when they weren't. So they got a kick out of it.

I know on board ship every time we'd get it in we always plugged it in to the PA system so everybody could listen to it and hear what she had to say.

C: So you felt safe, you didn't feel like . . .

K: Right. Everybody looked forward to it. Every time we'd get the broadcasts we'd just plug it through the PA system and . . . her broadcasts used to last somewhere from around one-half hour to 40 minutes, depending on how many prisoners of war that she had. And usually she didn't have more than five of those. I don't know what the . . . I guess that was basically time, but she would interview each one of them. She didn't interview them--they would just perfunctorily read and you assumed or you felt certain that that's all they were doing. They were talking in a very monotonous voice and "I'm so-and-so and I belong to such-and-such outfit and I come from so-and-so. I've been taken prisoner on so-and-so, and receiving the Red Cross packages and they're treating me well and

everything is fine." It was just a canned speech.

C: Did you know they were being treated . . . Could you tell . . . ?

K: No, you couldn't tell from that, but from seeing places that were re-taken that the Japanese had prisoners you knew darn well how they were being treated, and it wasn't like they were talking about. Especially when they recovered the prisoners that had been taken on the Philippines, and Corregidor and Bataan, when they took those guys back again--you knew darn well the kind of treatment . . . If they had the available food and medicines, they never made it available to the American prisoners. Medicines, medical treatment, anything like that--they just didn't make it available, if they had it--I don't know if they had it or not. But nevertheless it was not a thing that was made readily available.

C: But you didn't regard this announcer with hostility?

K: No, never did. I always thought it was kind of interesting.

C: And you knew it was being done for your benefit.

K: Oh, yes, you bet.

C: So, when she named the different ships in different ports . . .

K: Well, she didn't name ships but she knew islands. For instance, some of the--I'm trying to think in

particular--she knew that--I came in to Kwajalein not for the invasion but after Kwajalein was taken--but several months before I came in there when the engagement was still on we heard her broadcast where she was addressing something to a particular sergeant who was stationed or who was involved in the invasion of Kwajalein. And she would really use that because the invasion of Kwajalein was mainly 100% naval and air engagement, but she used it for people in Guadalcanal and she used it again in Guam and Saipan, where she actually had the names of particular servicemen and units that they belonged to. That was always wonder-- somehow she got it, I don't know, but she did have it.

C: Or spooky.

K: I imagine they wondered how she got it, and we spent some time trying to figure out how they could have done it and I'm sure that the government knew how they were doing it. I'm sure that our military intelligence knew what was being done and how it was being gotten. But she didn't have a massive amount of that, but she would pick every once in a while when she would address something to somebody, in such-and-such a unit on . . . that he was in, and then she would mention to him about didn't he worry about what was happening back home in the United States with his wife or his girlfriend or whatever the matter happened to be, and . . .

C: She named . . .

K: She named the person, right.

C: And she knew what unit . . .

K: Yes. She knew units that he belonged to, what unit he belonged to. And knew he was on a particular island. So, that's what I say--it was . . . I would imagine that somebody in the intelligence in the United States so it was done. I never really bothered far enough to try and check that but that's what I mean, it was interesting listening.

INTERVIEW WITH GARETH MOON

October 25, 1987

G: We left San Diego and went to Auckland, New Zealand. From Auckland we went up through Caledonia to Guadalcanal. From Guadalcanal we went up and made the invasion of Bougainville but before that we went to New Hebrides. After the attack at Bougainville, back to Guadalcanal, then after a while we went up to Kwajalein, went over--while they made the invasion of Saipan we were a floating reserve--then we went to Eniwetok. When we landed there we had been aboard ship for weeks so they took us ashore to get our sea legs back. There was a big rotary snowplow on the end of the runway at Eniwetok. How a snowplow ever came to be in the South Pacific I'll never know. From Eniwetok we went to Guam and from Guam to Iwo Jima, back to Guam, then home. That was about 28 - 29 months. I was in the 2nd Battalion, Ninth Marines, which is in the Third Marine Division.

To talk specifically about Tokyo Rose, I got out another map. When we listened to what the fellows called "Tokyo Rose"--it was a lady talking--and they kept saying, "That's Tokyo Rose." I had no way of knowing whether it was Tokyo Rose or not. And later I read where there were several Tokyo Roses. This was at night and I suppose in the early 1940s that was the

best radio reception. I don't remember it in the daytime at all, but we were busy in the daytime too. I can remember sitting around the radio in Guadalcanal, particularly, and listening to this woman talking and I can remember the music they played. That was what we liked, the music. The music she played was all the music that we heard in high school in the early '40s and it was what we liked and remembered. It was good music. I can remember the fellows talking about her and talking about the radio; for example, they would say, "Today, she said something about our particular unit." She was supposed to say, "I see where the 2nd Battal. 9th Marines has left New Zealand and they're now in Guadalcanal." These were the kind of things that I suppose made her good at her business because she--they knew where we were at just as well as we knew where they were at. I think that was the kind of thing that got through to the fellows, although I think sometimes it was just the fellows talking because rumors started easy. I know just for the fun other fellows and I would start rumors to see how far they would go, and it was real interesting to start one and see how it would end up 3 months later. Some of those fellows, I'm sure, gave Tokyo Rose credit for saying things. On the other hand, I know from my own personal experience on one occasion. We arrived in Guadalcanal

in July of 1943, then we left there in October and went to the Hebrides. Then we went directly to the island of Bougainville and made a landing there. After the campaign was over with--they lasted about 3 months--we came back down to Guadalcanal right after Christmas in 1943. We stayed at Guadalcanal until June and left and went up to Guam. So I don't really know whether we were listening to the radio in that period from July 6, 1943 until October 1943, or whether it was after we returned about the 1st of January in 1944 until we left in June of 1944. So it's either one of those two periods and I don't know which, but the thing that was interesting was that I remember one night we had a real heavy air raid and about two days later we had a heavy daytime air raid. The sky was full of airplanes. I remember there was a bunch, Joe Foss and that bunch, was just about 12 miles from where we were at Henderson Field. And I was originally from Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and that was where Joe Foss and several of them in that squadron were from and we got to see each other and visit at that time. They took off from Henderson Field and met these Japs--I think they were coming down from Munda--in the sky and we just watched the fight. We didn't know if it was ours or theirs that were shot down, but the only thing we did know was that it went on for a while. But after it

happened the planes came down and came back in formation to land at Henderson Field and as I remember now there was only 1 or 2 missing. The rest of the planes we saw shot down were Japanese. That evening as we listened to Tokyo Rose she told how the Imperial Japanese forces had made an airstrike at Guadalcanal, and then she proceeded to tell the exact truth. She told how many planes they lost, 6 or 7 of their planes were lost and 2 of ours were lost, and she told how the battle hadn't turned out as well as they wanted, that the Americans had actually chased off the Japanese planes--partly because they had run out of gas and had to go back to Munda, I suppose--but she told the truth. And we were amazed about that. And we talked about that. But at the same time she was talking about another battle they had made somewhere up the line (and up the line was somewhere near New Georgia or Vella Vella, on up toward New Britain) but somewhere in there she talked about another battle they'd made the same day and wiped out a whole bunch of Americans and they'd sunk a bunch of ships and dropped a bunch of American planes. Well, afterwards, when we were able to put the thing together and talk about it--several weeks afterwards--we found it real interesting in this respect. On Guadalcanal there were thousands of men. Literally thousands of men. The place she talked about

there were maybe a couple hundred. What we found out afterwards was that what she told about the other place was absolutely false, there was no truth to it at all. But we, having heard her talk about what happened at Guadalcanal in which she told the truth, were almost inclined to believe that there had been a terrible massacre up on the other island and that we'd had some bad luck up there. This was my first real experience in what I'd call the use of public relations or whatever to fool people--what did they call it? They had a term for it--but throughout the war the Americans and the Japanese and others would use stunts of this nature to confuse the troops that were fighting and get them upset and worried and so forth, but it always interested me how she would tell the truth where there were thousands of people listening and then when it was a little island somewhere with only a couple hundred she would make up a whole bunch of stuff. But it confused the fellas and the fellas really thought that it happened for that reason.

C: How did it make you feel to hear the music when you were so far from home?

G: Just like anything else--when we were out on the islands anything we had to do was diversion. We did things that would be boring as hell back home but out on the islands it was just something to do. (Talked

about hearing music on records as there were no tape recorders or whatever. And reading magazines that were quite up-to-date, only about 2 months old.) (Talked about every battalion having men whose job it was to improve morale.)

C: Did it scare you to hear her predict where your troops were, where the Americans (unintell.)

G: Not particularly. When we were out there--of course, the unknown always scared anybody, but that type of thing didn't bother us. As far as her being effectual in getting the troops unnerved, I don't think she was. I think they had fun, listening to the music, and I think they enjoyed it. I think she was well-liked from the standpoint that she brought a lot of good music to us. The other part, you know "What are your wives and girlfriends doing back there?" nobody paid an awful lot of attention to that. They just kind of laughed about it and joked about it. And those of us who were single out there had a lot of fun teasing those who were married out there and we would give them a bad time about the same things she would. So it wasn't anything new, just the same old stuff between a bunch of fellas particularly in the typical Marine corps.

(Discussion about battles and the fact that it was 45 years ago. Said it was the first battle against the enemy. Didn't remember if Coral Sea was before

Guadalcanal or not.) Said he wasn't homesick for the entire time of 4 years until the last 2 hours coming home on the train.

With Tokyo Rose, we were listening to the music and instead of making us homesick it was real comfortable. That was the stuff in high school and we enjoyed it. I don't think that Tokyo Rose as such every made us--certainly never made me feel homesick or upset. As I say, she was kind of an idol of a lot of the fellas.

INTERVIEW WITH BILL OHRMANN

October 28, 1987

B: Well, it was in New Guinea, and northern Australia part of the time. Like I told you, that's been a long time ago, you know.

(Discussion about being in the plane and guarding them.)

Well, we'd just spend our time there writing letters and listening to Tokyo Rose.

C: You said the planes were very far apart.

B: Yes. They were in little clearings in the jungle that they dozed out and made revetments, if you know what that is--they're horseshoe-shaped banks of earth that the planes were in so that a bomb would have to hit them direct to hurt them because if it hit outside that revetment it would just go against that dirt. And they were scattered half a mile to a mile apart in the jungle. Just on account of air raids.

C: This was in New Guinea?

B: Yes.

C: What year was that?

B: 1943 and 1944.

C: Did you talk about her amongst yourselves?

B: Well, just the joking. We didn't take her serious. She might have thought she influenced us. They'd play that American music and she'd come on and say, "Well,

to you boys fighting there in the jungles, some 4-F back home is taking your girl out," and stuff like that. And we'd just laugh about it the next morning, and say, "Did you hear Tokyo Rose last night?" And the guys that were lucky enough to hear her they would tell about it, you know. It was just an entertaining program for us. Nothing sinister at all.

C: So, when you said "lucky enough" . . .

B: Well, we were on guard duty those nights. The ones that weren't on guard duty. There was no radios that could pick up short-wave. I don't know of anybody that had any radios. There was no rule against it that I know of, but we just didn't have them--we had to travel light.

C: Did you look forward to doing guard duty?

B: Kind of for that one reason, yes, that we could listen to mainly Tokyo Rose because I can't think of any other stations that anybody listened to. They were hard to pick up anyway, the short-wave radio.

C: Did you hear that she was called "Tokyo Rose" or did she call herself something else?

B: No, she'd say, "This is Tokyo Rose." And she talked real nice, you know. She was far-removed from the war, you know, and I suppose her propaganda was written by other people, but she could put it over pretty good. But nobody took her serious.

C: Did you like her music, was that what it was?

B: The music, yes. It was American music. They had all the modern American songs, and singers and bands.

C: What about the news, did she give news on her program?

B: Yes, I think she did. Yes, I think she did give news, if there was any good news from her side. About that time, though, we were creeping up the coast, taking one place after another, and the news wasn't too good for them. Of course we knew that.

C: Do you think she slanted it?

B: Oh, yes, sure. Sure, she'd slant the news. And she'd tell us things--probably news from their side that we'd never hear about either.

(Talked about "Guinea Gold" newspaper.)

That was really the only news we got, from her and that little "Guinea Gold" paper. Lots of rumors, you know, but . . .

C: Did you have any idea what she looked like?

B: No idea whatsoever. No.

C: How did it make you feel to listen to her?

B: Oh, about like I feel now, listening to you. Just interested. It was no . . . there was nothing sinister about it, it was just a radio program. Of course we knew she was on the other side, but . . .

C: So she did not succeed in demoralizing you.

B: Oh, no. Heavens no. Not in the least. If anything, she was kind of a bright spot.

C: You looked forward to hearing her?

B: Yes, sure!

C: (Question re his describing verbally for the radio program the image of his sitting in the cockpit of the plane on guard duty and writing and listening to Tokyo Rose.)

B: (Talked about listening through earphones to Tokyo Rose as much as they could.)

C: Were you engaged to be married at the time?

B: No, uh, uh.

C: I think what she did was she tried to work on people who left their wives at home.

B: Definitely she did that, yes. Yes, she tried to make the boys feel sorry for themselves, but I don't think anybody did.

C: Did you know anybody else who was depressed by her?

B: Can't think of a single person who ever was depressed by it at all, because, like I say, in the mornings we'd compare notes as to what we'd heard and just laugh about it and say, "Well, she was in good form last night," and things like that. Those kind of programs really didn't bother us at all.

C: Did you have any idea why she was doing it?

B: Oh, yes. Propaganda. We figured she was trying to

make us dissatisfied, break down morale. But you know, when you feel like you're winning, your morale is pretty good and that's the way we felt. Because we could see our troops and ourselves moving up the coast by jumps and we felt confident the war would end some day.

C: So really, your morale had nothing to do with homesickness.

B: No, not really, except it seemed like a long time, that's the only thing that I think--to soldiers, that's always the thing. Because there's nothing sure about when it's going to end.

(Discussion about his duties--troop carrier--dropped supplies to the forces.)

C: Did you hear any other propaganda aside from her?

B: I can't think of any, no.

C: I guess you've pretty well answered what I'm curious about, but I just wondered--were you aware of the treason trial--what happened afterwards?

B: In Chicago?

C: I'm not sure where it was--I think it was San Francisco.

B: Oh yes. I followed that closely. I couldn't figure why she came back to the United States. Maybe she was forced to. She lives in Chicago now, as far as I know. Yes, I'm sure she does.

C: I've heard that she does. I don't know if it's true . . .

B: After the trial I read that; that's going to be her home.

C: Did you feel that she should have been treated that way?

B: No, not at all. Not a bit. I would have thought they would have just written that off, because she never hurt anybody's morale. Not a bit. She might have if we were really losing the war and having lots of setbacks, but we didn't feel like we were.

C: Well, that's interesting, because I'm hearing a lot of people saying the same thing--that they looked forward to listening to her, or that they enjoyed the music and they just threw away the news part.

B: Yes, uh huh.

C: Some people have said that she was very accurate, that her newscasts were incredibly accurate.

B: Yes, they might have been. I can't really remember. Our side didn't slant the news too bad. You know, when we had setbacks we heard about them. So I can't say that hers were slanted too much one way or the other, nor ours either.

C: That's interesting. So she didn't hurt your morale at all.

B: No.

INTERVIEW WITH PAUL SNYDER

October 26, 1987

C: I'd like you to tell me about when you joined the service--how old you were and what you were doing.

P: I joined the Navy in 1940, a year before the war started, and went out to the Asiatic Fleet. I was in Manila when the war started on the morning of December 7 and from that point on 5 months or 6 months later I ended up in Australia. It was not until 1943 that I went aboard submarines.

I had never heard of Tokyo Rose in the first two or three years of the war, but as I went aboard submarines it was really the first time I had heard of her. She was well-known in the submarine force in the United States for a couple of reasons, the most important of which was that she played the best music that you could pick up anywhere, and the second reason was that submarines generally were only on the surface at night and the only thing we could get was Tokyo Rose and we could pick her up at night. She would play the best music that you could imagine and her whole idea in playing it was that she assumed that all of us were in love with somebody back in the United States and that all of us must have a favorite song, like "Stardust" or "Harbor Lights", "Don't Get Around Much Anymore," "Missed the Saturday Dance," and so Tokyo Rose would

start out by telling us that we were fighting a dumb war against a brave enemy and that we were the victims of a system and that she really wasn't mad at us but that she felt we ought to know that back in the United States our sweetheart was now being wined and dined by some 4-F. And I can remember her saying a thing about, "Your girlfriend tonight is sitting on the sofa and he's got his arms around her and now we're going to play your song while you think of her in the arms of someone else." And then she would play probably one of those four songs. Usually she stayed with "Stardust" a lot; she really liked that. She had a really beautiful voice. In later years I talked to a lot of submariners about how they felt about Tokyo Rose. I think all of us have a lot of affection for her, strangely enough. We never really looked on her as a traitor. Some of the reasons, I think, for that was the fact that she was so outrageous in what she said and so outlandish and most of us were closer to the truth about what was going on in the war than she was, so we never really took some of the things that she said seriously. I think the thing about propaganda, you have to be reasonably close to the truth to be effective. Tokyo Rose was never close to the truth. One effect--I can remember a program that came on ahead of Tokyo Rose in which there were two men, one I remember had a

distinctly English accent and they talked more about the East Asian Co-prosperity Alliance and why the Chinese and the Japanese and the middle Indonesian people should support Japan more, and they put out some news but they were never really outrageous--they were more political. I never remember that Tokyo Rose was political. She only was on, as I can remember, about 2 hours a night. I would talk to other people that would tell me that she was on in the daytime, but I never heard her any other time than at night. I think another reason why we were never really upset with Tokyo Rose was, when one thinks about Lord Haw Haw they realize that he was a British citizen, he was despised by the British people. Tokyo Rose, while she was an American and she graduated from UCLA--people in those days had a deep dislike for the Japanese, even the American Japanese we never really accepted because we always felt that they were very loyal to the Emperor, so even though Tokyo Rose may have been an American I don't think the American servicemen ever looked on her as anything but a Japanese who was trying to do something to win the war for Japan. Besides, the really other real reason was that she was female, and there were a lot of lonely guys out in the Pacific and that was about the only feminine voice they could hear there, so they used to tune in to her a lot.

C: Did you have any idea what she looked like?

P: No. I saw a picture of her after the war was over.

C: (Unintell.--something about the voice and the picture)

P: She was very articulate but you could recognize the Oriental expressions in her voice. But I never really had a picture of her, never had the fantasy of her. Like I said a little earlier, she was . . . really, her propaganda was outrageous. However, we did get scared a lot on submarines because every once in a while she would mention the name of your submarine and I remember when we left Brisbane, Australia, and we got out on our way to . . . up in the northern coast of Australia when we first picked her up--and she mentioned in this broadcast that the USS Guardfish had just left Brisbane and that our patrol area was going to be around Truk Island and that the brave and honorable Japanese were waiting for us in Truk. I have a friend of mine who was a fella by the name of Ed Hall who was on the Sunfish. The Sunfish fought a heavy battle with four ships and sank all 4 ships, but they were heavily depth-charged and got away, and later on surfaced and heard Tokyo Rose tell everyone that the USS Sunfish had been sunk by Japanese destroyers. There was a favorite submarine, the USS Wahoo, which had a lot of fame during the war and the first instance that anyone ever knew that the Wahoo was sunk was when Tokyo Rose made

the announcement that the Japanese had just sunk the USS Wahoo. I can remember the mention of an aircraft carrier--she liked to use the names of ships that she knew were in a particular area. I heard her in about 1944--I've been trying to get somebody else who remembers but I can't. But I remember in 1944 that the rumor was that Tokyo Rose was really an American spy who was providing Naval information to Naval submarines particularly, because it was uncanny when we would get a message that the Seattle-Maru was at a such-and-such longitude and latitude and we would hit that longitude and latitude and there would be the Seattle-Maru. I do believe, though, after the war was over we discovered, or I discovered, that they had broken the code--the United States had broken Japanese code. Nothing was ever mentioned in her trial about this, but there was quite a prominent rumor about her then.

C: You said she was a smart person for making you feel homesick.

P: Oh, yes, she'd just . . . she had a sexy voice and, after all, we were guys in the Pacific. Many of us were months and months without seeing women. Her voice--and she played on that a lot. This particular thing about telling us that some 4-F was back wining and dining our sweetheart was really almost an every night thing with her. And it was very smart, because

she did figure out that there were only probably 4 or 5 really important songs that everybody would have some feeling for, or relate to some girl. The girl that I was going with at the time, I particularly remember "Harbor Lights" was our song. She played a lot of "Harbor Lights" and--I don't know how effective that was. It didn't seem to bother us. As I say, Tokyo Rose was never really very close to the truth. She exaggerated a lot and, other than the naming of names of ships that were sunk, she never really had much chilling effect on anyone. We really sort of felt more affectionate toward her.

C: Did that have a chilling effect?

P: Yeah, that did. Particularly the Wahoo. And being on the Guardfish when she told us that we had just left Brisbane and that--no one knew that our patrol area was around Truk Island--I don't know how she knew that. I'm sure I know how she knew that some submarines were in the area. We used to dump garbage at night and we tried to weigh it so that it would sink. But I'm certain that some of that information would float to the surface and eventually get back to her, because she would very often tell you what ships were in what area and they were always waiting for us with a whole bunch of ships to sink us. She also at one time offered a reward for the capture of any American submariner. I

remember those things that she said.

C: There's something I've forgotten.

P: There were other propaganda shows around. But I don't think--Lord Haw Haw betrayed his country, Axis Sally to a certain extent betrayed hers--I don't think Tokyo Rose ever betrayed the United States because we never really accepted her as a United States citizen and we looked at her as a Japanese. And even after the fact that she was a citizen or at least a graduate from UCLA, we never considered her a traitor. I can remember when she was first tried, we really didn't care--I didn't--I didn't care if she was tried or not. I never felt any anger about it. I don't think any of the fellas that I've ever talked to felt anger about her.

This past week-end we had a submarine reunion in Great Falls and I asked all the guys there how they felt about Tokyo Rose and they had a lot of good stories about her and how they really thought she was neat and kept them from being too lonely, and all mentioned her great choice of music. It was the only music that we could get in the Pacific. I think if she would have been more subtle with the propaganda she would have been more effective, but she . . . the brave Japanese forces were always winning great battles and we knew they weren't. We just never were really angry.

My organization--Submarine Veterans of the United States--America would like to have her back at a reunion some time. She's almost an affectionate friend in a way.

C: Do you remember when she was tried?

P: If I remember correctly, wasn't there some discussion about whether they were going to try her at all or not? I think in the beginning they were not going to. I can't remember exactly, but it seems to me it was quite a while after the war before they really did try her. And I don't think she got very long. I'm kind of vague about that, but it seems to me that she was not sentenced--was it 25 years and 10 years? But I think she was let out earlier than that. There never seemed to be any harshness about her trial. I can remember reading about . . . at least that I read . . . in the paper, and I really didn't care whether she got tried or not. There was nothing . . . I mean, I didn't like Lord Haw Haw, I can tell you that, and I was glad that anything bad would happen to them, but I never felt the same about Tokyo Rose. She was kind of a friend on a lonely night in the Pacific.

(Discussion about Lord Haw Haw and Jane Fonda being true traitors in his mind. Discussion about Jeanette Rankin voting against WWII and the fact that she was a woman, not a man. Talked about Jane Fonda

being a woman and if a man had gone over it would have been different -- macho society.)

It was the same with Tokyo Rose. She was a female in a macho society, and I think that we had sort of an ambivalent cross-over feeling because she was female, where I doubt that they had that same feeling with Lord Haw Haw. They probably did with Axis Sally more. This is only my own idea, but it just seems to me that the female would get away with it easier in a male world like a war than another male would. I think that may have had some bearing. Certainly, if this would have been Tokyo Joe broadcasting propaganda, the American sailor wouldn't have had the same feeling for him. Not in any way would we have had the same feeling. The fact that she was female and with the ambivalence of a male-female sort of emotional relationship anyway, I think there was a better feeling about Tokyo Rose. I've wondered what we would have done if it had been Tokyo Joe.

C: But there were male commentators.

P: Yes. And I listened to some of them. But I can't name any. These two English guys that came on ahead of Tokyo Rose, at least at night, I couldn't tell you their names. I used to think of them as sort of . . . well I couldn't have because there was no Jerry Lewis-Dean Martin sort of thing . . . but Abbott-Costello,

yeah, I used to think of them in that way. And they were more political. I don't remember that Tokyo Rose was ever political. She was political in the sense that she was trying to get you to love Japan more, or understand Japan more, or . . . Tokyo Rose was more sexy, her propaganda, at least her approach, was more sexual as far as getting to the American serviceman. She gave a lot of historical document about what was, like the Battle of Midway and the various battles, particularly around Guadalcanal. I can remember those. And her claims were outrageous. We were just losing more ships than anyone can imagine. Well, the truth of the matter was that we weren't. But her music was super.

C: You said you didn't think of her as an American.

P: No, we never did. Well, at that time we didn't know she was an American. I didn't really know until after the war that she was a graduate of UCLA. We didn't know that then.

C: Didn't she refer to night spots, nightclubs?

P: In the States?

C: In California.

P: I can't remember that. She sure might have. The thing that I mainly remember about her was the 4-F that was taking over my nest back home. You're probably right about those nightclubs. I just don't remember them.

C: Did you feel homesick or did you feel . . .?

P: Oh she'd make you feel homesick, boy would she ever. Particularly music. It wasn't so much Tokyo Rose as it was the music she played. We didn't have access to that kind of music. We didn't have VCRs. We had some old record on a machine and that was about it.

I think, though, if we did know that she had come from the United States, yeah, I know we did know that, but I didn't look on her as a traitor.

(Remarks about fear--living with fear makes you lose sexual feelings.)

INTERVIEW WITH LES TUCKER

October 28, 1987

C: You can give your rank and serial number when you were in the Navy.

L: My name is Lester B. Tucker. I'm a retired Chief Warrant Officer from the U.S. Navy, having retired in 1967, entering the service in 1939. I served aboard the USS North Carolina during WWII in the Guadalcanal area, Solomons, from August 7, 1942 until September 1, 1943.

C: Tell me about what you did in the Navy. Tell me how old you were when you first enlisted.

L: I was 19 years old. I enlisted November 9, 1939, having completed high school and was serving in the CCC in California.

(Discussion of what made him enlist. Discussion also about his employment situation at the time, since it was Depression time.)

(Discussion about his duties and responsibilities while in the service--about his ranks and interests, etc. Talked about when the war started and where he was when Pearl Harbor was attacked--in New York City.)

C: Do you remember while you were out on ship ever hearing broadcasts from the enemy?

L: I know that you are referring to Tokyo Rose, having been in quite a bit of action in the South Pacific. I

cannot remember specific broadcasts but I do remember very well generally several broadcasts. I should say that we thoroughly enjoyed most of her broadcasts from the viewpoint of the entertainment. She always had the best records--Glenn Miller, Benny Goodman, Artie Shaw and many others--and it was a break for us to listen to the music.

C: Did you look forward to hearing it?

L: Yes, it seemed to me that the broadcasts we would receive would be in the early evening, around 1800-1900 hours (that would be 6:00 - 7:00 PM). It was a pleasure because we didn't have Armed Forces Radio set up at that time and it was entertaining.

C: Did the men talk about it?

L: All of the men, or the majority of them, enjoyed. Of course, we soon realized that she was a propagandist. But that didn't seem to deter us from listening to her.

C: What kinds of things did she say?

L: It would seem like she would go ahead and hit on homesickness. "And what are you American troops doing out here?" The only demoralizing effect that she seemed to have on us at the time was when she had rapid information, and we knew that we had lost a ship or a certain battle had raged in the area and it seemed like her intelligence was exceptionally rapid and good. And we would often wonder how come she got the word so

fast. So we would listen to that and, if we knew the ship had not been sunk or so forth and maybe just hit by one or two bombs or a projectile, we knew right then and there that she would elaborate that the ship had been sunk, or that so many people had been killed, like the Marines at Guadalcanal or Talage. And we were nip-and-tuck during the whole Solomons campaign. We were almost defeated and it was depressing when she would immediately, within 48 hours, say, "You Americans lost such-and-such ships and so forth. What are you doing here? Why don't you go back?" This was a little disheartening. But we teased and braved it and enjoyed the music. And we let that bypass our thoughts.

C: Was there anything you could identify as lies that you heard?

L: Oh, absolutely. The ship I was on, which was the USS North Carolina, was consigned to the depths twice. I don't remember the exact dates, but there we are just floating around, you know, as well as ever, doing our job, and so we knew that this must apply also to other ships, that she was absolutely exaggerating which, of course, later proved to be the truth. She was exaggerating.

C: So you heard her say that you'd been sunk?

L: Yes. I couldn't give you a specific date but there was one time when she said that a battleship [we were the

only battleship out there at the time] had been sunk. Seemingly the Japanese had very good intelligence. It was the rapidity with which she reported the actions--we wondered how could she get this information so fast? Often we weren't told of what ships might have been sunk or damaged in another task force or group. We hadn't been told a thing--we learned these things from Tokyo Rose.

C: Did you believe them?

L: Not all of them.

C: Any of them?

L: We might have . . . For instance, I remember when the Chicago was sunk and we took on the survivors, approximately 36 to 48 hours off the Chicago, and I can remember that broadcast--what date I can't remember, whether it was one or two days after we took the survivors aboard. But the Chicago had been sunk; they knew--they had sunk it. And the only way we knew about it at the time was from the survivors.

C: Did it ever make you think that there might be spies on your own ship or in your own forces?

L: Not at all, and the reason would be that radio communications was a controlled area, and it would have been very difficult for anyone to have a radio 200 or 300 miles from nearest land and to be relaying information from the ship, such as a crew member. No,

it never dawned on us that this would occur.

C: Did you know anybody who was depressed by any of her broadcasts?

L: I cannot recall anyone's name, but various personalities who were homesick or who had received a "Dear John" letter--yes, they would get slightly depressed but it usually passed very soon.

C: How about the . . . did you have a girlfriend at the time?

L: I was engaged at the time.

C: How about all those remarks about the 4-F people going out with your girlfriend?

L: Certainly that occurred, and there were men that were transferred from the ship that had listened to Tokyo Rose that had written back to their shipmates and said, "When I got home my girlfriend was going out with someone and I guess Tokyo Rose might have known what she was talking about." But this was rare, this was an exception when this would occur. Anything in communications--letters primarily, at that time--we very seldom got a Red Cross telegram that far at sea--but anything that would abrase you, play upon the personality of unknowing reality, Tokyo Rose seemed to be pretty good in applying these suggestive statements. That, "Yes, your girlfriend is back there. You've been gone so many months she's probably dating so-and-so.

Not a specific person, but a fella she works with, maybe. Don't keep your hopes up that she's going to be waiting for you." Such information as that.

C: What about requests? Did she play requests for music?

L: I certainly can't remember her playing any specific requests from--there was no way we could get in touch with her for a request.

C: How about prisoners-of-war?

L: Well, of course at that time the major prisoners of war, the Americans, were those that had been captured in the Philippines, although a few in Hong Kong. And we had absolutely no information about those prisoners-of-war.

C: What year was that?

L: Of course I was only in the South Pacific from, as I said before, the initial attacks on Guadalcanal up through the New Britain campaigns in the eastern Solomons, up to about September 1, 1943.

C: Then were you sent home?

L: Yes. You rotate your men after two years in the Navy. Assignment for schooling, new construction, or, like myself, back to flight training, shore duty for a while. Remember the whole period I am talking about we have not enlarged our forces, naval forces; we're almost at a very boresome state, long days at sea, boring routine, and under those circumstances, hanging

on waiting for the Navy to increase, send ships--it was many times just . . . it got on your nerves because it was so boring. All you could do was study for advancement, stand your watches, and of course we would get up at anywhere from 4:00 to 4:30 in the morning to be at our battle stations against the submarines primarily, until about 30 minutes after dawn, then it was breakfast, then training, gun practice or specific technical training in your field, on watch. (Talks about watch schedules--day after day, week after week, etc.)

(Talked about staying at the Royal Hawaiian for 25¢ per day.)

- C: Tokyo Rose had a reputation for referring to specific bars and hang-outs that people liked and she'd talk about the Coconut Grove or about the team she'd rooted for, or something like that, and it was those little pieces of playing on homesickness--did you ever hear any of that, being a Californian?
- L: Well, of course Tokyo Rose was a southern California gal just like I was a southern California boy, raised in Long Beach area. I think she must have been 3-5 years older than myself, having graduated from the University of Southern California or California about 1940-41, because she was in Japan when war broke out on December 7 and I didn't graduate until very early '39

from high school. Yes, I was acquainted with some of the places, but in the Depression those people that didn't have the money did not go to the Coconut Grove but, of course, the Coconut Grove was used from time to time for a U.S.O. show or for dances put on by the Hollywood Theater Guild, just on occasion, and a lot of servicemen would go up there. But there were other places--and of course not being 21 I didn't go to bars in '39, '38.

C: Did you have any idea of what she looked like?

L: I think we all tried to match her very sweet voice with her face. Having gone to school with about 90-100 Nisei there were some very cute Japanese girls, including some in my class, and of course having never served in Japan at that time you would put together . . . well, such a voice like that she must be a very nice-looking, by American standards, woman. And then years later when I served in Japan in 1946 and again from 1950-1953 in Sugei, Japan, it's just like in the United States--the variations in females' looks cover a broad spectrum.

C: Was she a fantasy for the various servicemen who were out there for months at a time, or do you think that it worked that way?

L: I don't think so. I believe that we were pretty steadfast in our thinking about, "Hey, this is a

propagandist." We all would conceive in our minds what she might look like but, no, I could see no concept applied by individuals.

C: Were you wounded in the course of the war?

L: I can just say "nearly." (Discussed being coverage for the "Enterprise" and the near-hit for him during an attack.)

C: Just to finish up with Tokyo Rose, did you have any anger or hostility for her or for what she was doing? How did you feel about that?

L: I really think I was unconcerned about her personally. I did not know that she was a citizen of the United States at the time. I cannot remember that being revealed to us. It may have been and I could have forgotten. But as far as any feelings at all pro or con, I can't recollect. All I can say is that I certainly appreciated the music she played.

N A V Y D E P A R T M E N T

HOLD FOR RELEASE
PRESS AND RADIO
UNTIL 1:15 P. M. (E.W.T.)
AUGUST 7, 1945

NAVY "CITATION" FOR TOKYO ROSE OF RADIO TOKYO

The Navy Department, through Captain T. J. O'Brien, U.S.N., Director of Welfare, today cited Tokyo Rose of Radio Tokyo for "meritorious service contributing greatly to the morale of United States armed services in the Pacific," and gave her permission to "broadcast soon to the United States Army of Occupation in Japan and to the ships of the United States Fleet at anchor in Yokohama Bay, the history-making scene of Admiral Halsey riding the Japanese Emperor's white horse through the streets of Tokyo."

The "citation" was recorded by Captain O'Brien for broadcast over "The Navy Reporter," radio program which is short-waved to all personnel beyond the continental limits.

The text of Captain O'Brien's statement follows:

"The men and women of the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard take pleasure in presenting this citation to Tokyo Rose of Radio Tokyo, for service as set forth in the following:

"For meritorious achievement while serving as a radio propaganda broadcaster for the Japanese. While the United States armed forces in the Pacific have been extremely busy capturing enemy-held islands, sinking Jap ships, and killing Japs and more Japs, Tokyo Rose, ever solicitous of their morale, has persistently entertained them during those long nights in fox-holes and on board ship, by bringing them excellent state-side music, laughter and news about home. These broadcasts have reminded all our men of the things they are fighting for, which are the things America has given them. And they have inspired them to a greater determination than ever to get the war over quickly, which explains why they are now driving onward to Tokyo itself, so that soon they will be able to thank Tokyo Rose in person.

"As the Japanese Empire crumbles about her, Tokyo Rose zealously continues to bring laughter and entertainment to our men and women.

"In recognition of this meritorious service, this citation is presented and with it goes permission to broadcast soon to the United States Army of Occupation in Japan and to the ships of the United States Fleet at anchor in Yokohama Bay, the history-making scene of Admiral Halsey riding the Japanese Emperor's white horse through the streets of Tokyo."

(Photographs available in Pictorial Section, Office of Public Information.)

2 DEC 87

CLOVER KOOPMAN,

WHILE STATIONED ON PALAWAN ISLAND IN THE PHILIPPINES DURING THE SUMMER OF 1945 WE WERE EXPOSED TO BROADCASTS OF TOKYO ROSE.

IN GENERAL, I DIDN'T PAY MUCH ATTENTION BECAUSE THEY WERE PRETTY MUCH THE SAME STUFF OVER & OVER.

ONE SPECIAL BROADCAST GOT OUR ATTENTION. OUR U.S. NAVY PRIVATEER SQUADRON, VPB 106, HAD AN AIRPLANE WITH A SHARK'S SNOUT PAINTED ON THE FRONT OF THE FUSELAGE. TOKYO ROSE EXPLAINED THAT A SIMILAR AIRPLANE HAD DONE DAMAGE TO JAPANESE PROPERTY. SHE INDICATED THAT THE JAPANESE AIRCRAFT AND SURFACE FORCES WOULD HUNT DOWN AND DESTROY ALL U.S. AIRCRAFT WITH SIMILAR PAINTINGS. THAT THOSE AIRCRAFT WOULD RECEIVE TOP PRIORITY! WE WERE FLYING OVER SINGAPORE AT THE TIME TO HARASS JAPANESE FORCES AND BATTLESHIPS. SO THERE WAS A GOOD CHANCE OF OUR SQUADRON'S "SHARK" AIRCRAFT BEING SPOTTED.

HER PSYCHOLOGY MADE US A BIT MORE NERVOUS, BUT DID NOT DAMPEN OUR SPIRITS.

Bob Munner

1085 KM Road
Whitefish MT 59937

Oct 22

Dear Mr. Kaapman,

I am responding to your request for information concerning enemy propaganda broadcasts during WWII.

During the years of 43 & 44 I was shore based in Naval Aviation units in the northern Solomons i.e. Bougainville, Milne Bay & Open Island.

Often for kicks our radio man would flip dials until he found a particular sweet female voice telling us how we were losing the war. Especially after a major battle shed tell us how much of a drubbing the allied forces were taking.

She'd enjoy telling us how our wives and sweethearts were having difficulty remaining faithful to us while we were away from home so long. Between these themes of hers shed play Bing

Cracky and Glen Miller records which I ~~suppose~~ suppose was to make us homesick which didn't work. We already had our own records and transcriptions.

I don't know how the name "Tokyo Rose" came about. Maybe, there was someone by that name broadcasting.

We never heard of that name then. Was it a name given to her by the Americans? The one we heard called herself "Little Orphan Ann". I'm not sure if the broadcasts came from the Japanese home islands or from some Japanese held islands.

We were quite close to Rabaul, a major Naval base, that had not been secured at that time nor do I believe it was, till the end of the war. It's possible the broadcasts were transmitted from such a base.

I hope the foregoing will help and I certainly would like to see the finished ones Eugene E. Graf

I saw your letter in the Wisconsinian about "Tokyo Rose."

I was in Alaska (at Fort Greely, and then on Adognak Island) from September 1942 until December 1944, and while I wasn't near a radio very often I did hear quite a few of her broadcasts.

She would usually start off by saying something like this: "While you American soldiers are crouched in fox holes eating moldy 'K' rations, the people in the States are living off the fat of the land - but don't worry about your wives or sweethearts: the 4-F's are taking good care of them! you are fighting a war with Japan that you can't win. Why don't you all quit and go home?"

And then she would sing us songs to make us homesick: songs like "Deep in the Heart of Texas"; "Don't Sit Under the Apple Tree"; "One Dozen Roses" and others that were popular then. She had a fine voice, and all

in all but on quite a show. Toward the end of 1944 she switched somewhat and harped mostly on the atrocities Americans were committing on the islands in the Pacific.

You can no doubt guess what some G.I.'s said they would do to her if they had the opportunity. But perhaps you'd better leave that out of your thesis.

Hugh W. Hagon
583 Diamond Road
Superior, Mont.
59872

I went to Europe in Dec. of 1944, and so heard a few of "Iris Valley's" broadcasts. She wasn't as entertaining as Tokyo Rose.

Oct 28, 87

Dear Ms Koopman,


Yes, of course I can talk over the phone with if it'll help you with your project.

My phone number is
and I'm usually in evenings, so most any day would be alright.

Altho Tokyo Rose no doubt thought she was influencing the US boys and making them feel bad, I can tell you we enjoyed the American music she played and only laughed at the rest. Incidentally, in our outfit, only the soldiers on guard ever got to hear her as we didn't have any other radios

Very truly yours

Bill Ohmann



Wm. R. Ohmann
6155 Hwy 10-A
Drummond, MI 59832

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Blakefield, William J. Documentary Film Classics. Washington, D.C.: National AudioVisual Center, National Archives and Records Center.

Choukas, Michael. Propaganda Comes of Age. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965.

Doob, Leonard W., ed. "Ezra Pound Speaking": Radio Speeches of World War II. Westport, Connecticut: Greenward Press, 1978.

Doob, Leonard. Public Opinion and Propaganda. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1948.

Dower, John W. War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War. New York: Pantheon Books, 1986.

Duus, Masayo. Tokyo Rose: Orphan of the Pacific. New York: Harper and Row, 1979.

Edwards, Violet. Group Leader's Guide to Propaganda Analysis. New York: Institute for Propaganda Analysis, Inc., 1938.

Ellul, Jacques. Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969.

Gunn, Rex B. They Called Her Tokyo Rose. North Olympic Library System, Port Angeles, WA, 1976.

Hada, John Juji. The Indictment and Trial of Iva Ikuko Toguri d'Aquino - "Tokyo Rose". University of San Francisco, M.A. Thesis, History Department, 1973.

Hagoromo Society of Kamikaze Divine Thunderbolt Corps. Survivors. Born to Die: The Cherry Blossom Squadrons. Los Angeles, 1973.

Hankey, Lord Maurice. Politics, Trials and Errors. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1950.

Harter, D. Lincoln, and John Sullivan. Propaganda Handbook. Philadelphia: Twentieth Century Publishing Company, 1953.

Hosoya, C., et al. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial. New York: Harper and Row (Kodansha International Ltd.), 1986.

Hurst, James Willard. The Law of Treason in the United States: Collected Essays. Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Corp., 1971.

Inoguchi, Captain Rikihei, and Commander Tadashi Nakajima. The Divine Wind. New York: Bantam Books, 1958.

Irwin, Will. Propaganda and the News. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1936.

Japanese American Citizens League. Iva Toguri (d'Aquino): Victim of a Legend. San Francisco: National Committee for Iva Toguri, 1976.

Kodama, Yoshio. Sugamo Diary. Japan: Radiopress, 1960.

Kutler, Stanley. The American Inquisition: Justice and Injustice in the Cold War. New York: Hill and Wang, 1982.

Lowenthal, Leo, and Norbert Guterman. Prophets of Deceit: A Study of the Techniques of the American Agitator. Palo Alto, California: Pacific Books, 1970.

Meo, L. D. Japan's Radio War on Australia, 1941-1945. Melbourne University Press, 1968.

Minear, Richard H. Victor's Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971.

Piccigallo, Philip R. The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1954 - 1951. University of Texas Press, 1979.

Rolo, Charles J. Radio Goes to War. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942.

Roosevelt, Kermit, ed. War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services). New York: Walker and Co., 1976.

Schaar, John H. Loyalty in America. Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1957.

Seth, Ronald. The Truth Benders. London: Leslie Frewen, 1969.

Short, K.R.M., ed. Film and Radio Propaganda in World War II. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983.

Stewart, Kenneth, and John Tebbel. Makers of Modern Journalism. New York: Prentiss-Hall, Inc., 1952.

Thomas, Bob.- Winchell. New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1971.

Toland, John. The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945. New York: Random House, 1970.

Uyeda, Clifford I. Final Report and Review. San Francisco: The National Committee for Iva Toguri, 1976.

Weiner, Ed. Let's Go to Press: A Biography of Walter Winchell. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1955.

Whitton, John B. and Arthur Larson. Propaganda: Towards Disarmament in the War of Words. New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1964.

Willoughby, Major General Charles A., U.S.A. (Ret.) The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines: 1941-1945. New York: Vantage Press, 1972.

Winkler, Allan M. The Politics of Propaganda: the Office of War Information. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978.

Winslow, Capt. W. G. The Fleet the Gods Forgot. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1982

RECORDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

262-107 Radio Tokyo, Zero Hour, Japan. Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service. Music, War News, commentary; voice of "Orphan Ann," August 14, 1944

262-108 Radio Tokyo, Zero Hour, from Pobru. August 14, 1944.

262-197, -197A Radio Tokyo, Zero Hour, August 12, 1945.

262-21439 "Berlin to North America" German Radio Broadcast in English; "Lord Haw Haw" (William Joyce) broadcast to England.

262-09315 Berlin broadcast to Allied forces; war news; Goebbels propaganda; "Home Sweet Home," American music and comments by Mildred Elizabeth Gillars ("Axis Sally").

Voices of World War II, audiotape 12, "The Media in World War II." Mildred E. Gillars, 18 May, 1943, National Archives 262-00650. General MacArthur, 22 October, 1944, National Archives 200-174.

PROPAGANDA COVERAGE IN THE NEW YORK TIMES
(Chronological Order)

"Tokyo Radio Slights Milne Bay," New York Times, September 1, 1942, p.3.

"Japanese Camps Stir Investigation," New York Times, January 16, 1943, p.5.

"Japanese Decide to Make Their Propaganda 'Brisk'," New York Times, January 26, 1943, p.4.

Arms, W.T. "The Short Waves at the Half Year," New York Times, June 27, 1943, Sec. 2, p. 7.

"Japanese Radio Attacks Morale of Fighting Men On Guadalcanal With Tales of Home Folk," New York Times, June 29, 1943, p.8.

"Captive 'Messages' Amuse Chunking," New York Times, February 2, 1944, p.5.

Horne, George. " 'Tokyo Rose' a Hit With U.S. Soldiers," New York Times, March 27, 1944, p.4.

"Tokyo Rose Stirs Philippine Mirth," New York Times, October 29, 1944.

Davies, Lawrence E. "Directed to Tokyo," New York Times, April 1, 1945, Sec. 2, p. 7.

OTHER ARTICLES
(Chronological Order)

Strauss, Lt. (JG) I. Henry, U.S.N.R. "The Zero Hour," Collier's Magazine, January 8, 1944.

"By Any Other Name," Time Magazine, April 10, 1944, Radio Section, p. 58-60.

"So Smelly the Rose," Time Magazine, August 21, 1944, Radio Section, p. 75.

"Tokyo Rose," Time Magazine, December 18, 1944, People Section, p.24.

"Your Old Friend," Time Magazine, July 11, 1949, National Affairs Section, p. 18.

"Axis Sally" Treason Trial, New York Times, January 25 - March 12, 1949.

Delaplane, Stanton. "Tokyo Rose On Trial," San Francisco Chronicle, July 1 - October 7, 1949.

"Tokyo Rose" Treason Trial, New York Times, July 5 - October 11, 1949.

Yates, Ronald. "Tokyo Rose's Accusers Claim U.S. Forced Them to Lie," Chicago Tribune, March 22-23, 1976.

CBS Television Network, "Sixty Minutes," vol. VIII, no. 26, "Tokyo Rose," Sunday, June 20, 1976.