Porfirian influence on Mexican journalism: An enduring legacy of economic control

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THE PORFIRIAN INFLUENCE ON MEXICAN JOURNALISM:
AN ENDURING LEGACY OF ECONOMIC CONTROL

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June 2, 1987
The methods used by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional to control the press are an extension of the methods created by Porfirio Díaz in the late nineteenth century. Porfirio Díaz (1830-1916) ruled Mexico from 1876 to 1880 and from 1884 to 1911. That period coincides with the development of the modern press in Mexico, both in terms of technological advancement and government-press relations. Díaz is the only man in Mexican history to have an era named after him (The porfiriato, 1876-1911). This thesis examines his turbulent relations with the press and explains how his policies continue to influence Mexican journalism.

The financial, literary and economic elite controlled pre-porfiriato journalism and was the only segment of the public to use the press as a means of communication. The advent of technological improvements in the newspaper industry and a substantial increase in the national literacy rate resulted in increased influence of the press. Concurrently, Díaz was forced to respond to a generation of liberal journalists, using tactics that he developed to control Mexico, a country that comprised contentious regional, religious and political factions. Díaz used those divisions in the nation to his own ends.

Díaz began the policies of government monopoly of newsprint, newspaper subsidies, government censorship and manipulation of the law to control the press. At times he condoned, if he did not instigate, the murder and imprisonment of journalists who opposed his continuation as dictator of Mexico.

The checkered relationship between the government and the press during the porfiriato helps explain government-press relations in Mexico under the PRI. Díaz developed the methods that the PRI has used and improved upon to control the press in Mexico from its inception in 1929 until the final decades of the 20th century.

Sources for this study included the most influential newspapers of the porfiriato and ten of the largest daily newspapers published in Mexico in 1986 and 1987 as well as interviews with Mexican journalists and archival materials in Mexico City.
The history of Mexican journalists is the history of the struggle between liberty and power; between the anxiety of being and the necessity of survival within the reality of things as they are; in short, of the system; the fight between the inner self and the force of outside reality. The same thing occurs in those who govern.

Nevertheless, we know that to write we have to take sides: the freedom or the power. When we choose freedom, in these times of unjustified, undignified repression, we proclaim our own sentence.

From our hearts we cry: Forward. But our flesh detains us. Reason tells us that, in the face of such, we need to fence with our own inner strength. It doesn't matter that at any moment, the death sentence may be carried out.

I hope that times change and that this automatic sentence, little by little, will be modified. Then we can await the future without condemnation or mystery. Clean. Then, finally, we will be able to exclaim:

Our mission has been accomplished.¹

Rafael Loret de Mola

Denuncia

I went to Mexico in the summer of 1986 looking for the heroes of Mexican journalism, and found them in abundance, both past and present. Most of them, like Carlos Loret de Mola, are dead. Loret, a publisher of several Mexican newspapers, offended several politically influential people in Mexico, including Mario Vazquez Raña, the owner of the United Press International. In February, 1986, Loret died

mysteriously in a single car accident. The crash was attributed to Loret's drunken driving. His son, Rafael, also a journalist, maintains that his father never drank to excess and that the "accident" was never thoroughly investigated -- by the press or by law enforcement officials.

I was concerned mostly with the journalists of pre-revolutionary Mexico. I spent hours reading old newspapers in the Hemeroteca Nacional, the newspaper archives in the Biblioteca Nacional at UNAM, and in the Mexican National Archives housed in the renovated Lecumberri Prison. I also had the good fortune to be able to investigate in the archives of Porfirio Díaz at Universidad Iberoamericana the propagation of press repression. I read the work of Filomeno Mata, Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magón, and perused publication endeavors of Rafael Spíndola Reyes, called "the father of Mexican journalism" because he founded El Imparcial, the pro-government daily of the porfiriato which introduced the Linotype and rotary press to Mexico.

The Mexican revolution was a long time in the making, and the contributions Mexican journalists made to its beginnings have never been, nor may ever be, properly assessed. That was not the focal point of this work. The longer I remained in Mexico the more aware I became that the controls exercised on the Mexican press in modern times are similar to those of the porfiriato. My attempt has been to give
historical perspective to the unwritten constraints under which the Mexican press operates.

As I did much of the primary research in Mexico City, this work reflects the problem of centralism in Mexico, yet Mexico City is and always has been the communications center of the nation, and its newspapers are the most influential in the country. Centralism in the press was probably more of a reality in 1987 than in the days of Don Porfirio, simply because the increase in newspaper chains and modern technology allows publishers who own several papers to relay information from Mexico City to their publications in other parts of the country.

Most of my sources were in Spanish and therein lay great risks for inaccuracy, as a U.S. citizen stands a strong chance of misinterpreting not only language but culture in Latin America. To the end of keeping my research in a manageable framework, I am indebted to Dr. Manuel Machado, although I must take responsibility for any errors in translation.

The Mexican press is, and was, controlled. For U.S. journalist, it is well to remember that the system of controls, which can be attributed to Porfirio Díaz, lay not in law, but in economics and is just as possible in a different form of government. In the course of my investigation, I came to believe that a general
understanding of Mexico can be heightened by a study of the Mexican press.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis resulted from the combined efforts of many individuals who gave selflessly of their time, knowledge and talents. I cannot begin to thank or even mention them all.

Dr. Manuel Machado, Jr., of the History Department of the University of Montana led me not only through the labyrinths of Mexican history and culture, but also corrected my translation and was the first reader of the work while it was in progress. Dr. Warren Brier of the School of Journalism edited each chapter as it was written, as did Dr. Charles Hood, dean of the School of Journalism. Both of these men provided direction and support throughout the process. Much of my research was in Spanish, and Dr. Stan Rose and Dr. Anthony Beltramo of the UM Foreign Language Department remained available for questions throughout my research.

Fellow students also spent time considering my material, allowing me a forum in which to discuss my ideas concerning the Mexican press. Among the most helpful were Lance Grider, Dan Black and Gary Gilbert.

In Mexico, my research was not only aided but made possible by Ignacio Molina, then an instructor at Universidad Iberoamericana, who arranged for me to use the Diaz Archives at UIA and Jane Dale-Lloyd, also an instructor
at UIA, who introduced me to the Ethel Duffy Turner Archives at Museo de Antropologia. Margarita Terrazas of Chihuahua helped me understand her father's journalistic endeavors in porfirian Mexico, and her distant cousin, Carlos Terrazas of Mexico City, helped me understand the atmosphere in which Mexican journalists operate today.

I owe special gratitude to the entire staff of the Departamento de Comunicacion at UIA, but especially to Jaimie Septien, an instructor there and a columnist for Uno Mas Uno. Both he and Mario Beauregard, a freelance commentator in Mexico City, talked to me openly and honestly about the Mexican press and gave me insights that I might have missed.

Finally, this work would never have been completed without the assistance of my wife, Juliet, who served me as editor, helped with translation and served as the first sounding board for most of the ideas presented here. I am also indebted to my daughter, Rima Schneider, for helping with the clerical work that accompanied this task.
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Chapter 1
PORFIRIO DÍAZ AND THE PRESS: 1876-1890

We needed a man, a conscience, a will to unify our moral forces and transmute them into normal progress: this man was President Díaz.1
- Justo Sierra

There are no monuments to Porfirio Díaz in Mexico City, no streets or institutions named after him. However, near El Paseo de la Reforma the monolithic structures that house El Universal and Excélsior, the largest newspapers in Mexico, can be said to be part of his legacy.

Porfirio Díaz, one of the first victims of the Mexican Revolution, became the focal point of a public relations program ahead of its time. The foreign press, especially in the United States, found that the old man made good copy. Grey-haired and dignified, he posed in his uniform and was more often referred to as "general" than "president." Díaz displayed military prowess against the French during the War of Intervention, but his real genius lay in astute political and organizational abilities. During his dictatorship, he was called both the maker of modern Mexico and the greatest statesman of his time. For 20 years after his fall from power in 1911, he was vilified by the controlled press he helped create.

Porfirio Díaz rose out of the chaos created by the political instability of nineteenth century Mexico. Born in 1830 to parents who were neither wealthy nor, as a feature writer for the New York Times would insist in 1901, completely creole (Mexican-born Spaniards), Díaz was mestizo (Indian-Spanish). While he did not emphasize that part of his heritage, it gave him an advantage when dealing with other mestizos.

Like many leaders of Mexico, Díaz received his primary education from the Catholic church. The priests who taught him hoped he would join the clergy, but Díaz opted for a more lucrative career in law. He became embroiled in the Plan de Ayutla revolt in 1854 and from then on was a soldier, rising swiftly through the ranks.

Díaz was not a brilliant tactician, but from the beginning showed keen organizational abilities. In his first post under Benito Juárez, who was intermittently president of Mexico from 1858 until his death in 1872, Díaz organized a national guard of 400 Indians in his native state of Oaxaca, a force sufficient to ensure that the state would not stray too far from the Juárez government. In 1861, Díaz left the army to serve in the Mexican congress, but returned to the military to quell a revolt of conservatives. For this, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general, but on returning to Congress he heard his victory dismissed as a
matter of small importance. Some historians date his contempt for parliamentarians from this experience.

During the war of the French Intervention, Díaz returned to arms, distinguishing himself at the battle of Puebla in 1866 and as the first Mexican military commander to re-establish Mexican control of the capital. Although Juárez, Díaz' mentor, had regained control of the government, small revolutions were rife in Mexico and much of the country was controlled by wealthy individuals. In 1868, Díaz again left the military and was proposed as a candidate for president in the 1870 elections against Juárez.

During this period, the press, lacking both modern technology and a literate audience, communicated only with the elite. While political broadsides were common, they were never intended for the masses. The industry began to grow in the 1860s and much of this fledgling press supported the Díaz nomination, operating under the freedom of the press guaranteed by the 1857 constitution. When Juárez won elections, the press questioned both the integrity of the ballot count and the idea of self-perpetuation in office and helped spread porfirista propaganda throughout the country. Many of Díaz's amiable relationships with members of the
press, including those with key figures in the opposition press, date from this period.²

On November 8, 1871, Díaz led a revolt against Juárez. In the Plan de la Noria he charged, "The indefinite, forced and violent re-election of the Federal Executive has placed the national institutions in danger." The revolution failed, and Díaz became a fugitive in his own country for several months. After the unexpected death of Juárez, Díaz was granted amnesty and remained a political force. His second revolution, the Plan de Tuxtepec in 1876, succeeded when he drove Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada, successor to Juárez, into exile and assumed the presidency still using what would prove to be the ironic battle cry of "No re-election."³

Díaz achieved power on a yet-to-crest wave of popularity at the same time the newspaper industry began its period of growth in Mexico. Like the wealthy and educated liberals who flocked to serve in the porfirian administration, the newspapers coalesced, by and large, around Díaz in 1876. Díaz's popularity was reinforced when he voluntarily stepped down at the end of his first term in 1880.

²James A. Magner, Men of Mexico, (Freeport, N.Y., Books for Libraries Press, 1942), p. 450; Diario del Hogar, April 28, 1893.
Mexican law concerning the press changed considerably during the interim regime of Manuel Gonzales, (1881-1884) in part because Díaz, after giving up his post as governor of Oaxaca, served as the chief justice of the Mexican Supreme Court at that time. The Mexican government tried to ensure the docility of the press through subsidies and a government monopoly on newsprint. But the New York Times recognized that opposition journalism and entire newspapers suffered from government persecution in Mexico as early as 1883. Díaz, as chief justice (and before he reached an exalted position in the U.S. press), ruled that judges could hear appeals concerning bail they themselves had set for defamation offenses, which were criminal, not civil, matters according to the 1857 constitution. Díaz also ruled that it was legally proper for a judge to consider an amparo concerning a defamation case over which the same judge had ruled. Amparos, injunctions against the government over the loss of constitutional rights, are an important part of Mexican law. The loftiest ideals of Mexican journalism are found in these briefs, but little of its history.4

The last days of the Gonzales administration further strengthened judicial power when the constitution was amended to eliminate the two-jury system used in defamation cases. According to the constitution, one jury determined guilt, another punishment. Under the amendment, no juries were involved -- government-appointed judges were given both responsibilities. Mexican journalists responded by calling for lifetime judiciary appointments to break the tie between the government and judges, but to no avail.5

Defamation laws were not the only legalities in need of restructuring to accommodate the Diaz regime. The constitution of 1857 was changed to allow for the reelection of Diaz in 1888, and then amended before each national election until 1910. Most Mexicans were probably relieved: since 1848 no president had completed a term of office until Diaz was elected in 1876.

In the beginning, Diaz, by his own admission, used brutality to gain social order. If a jefe (political boss) of a district was dispatched to capture a criminal and failed, the jefe suffered the punishment for the crime. Simple highway robbery brought the death penalty. "We endured," Diaz later said, "even through cruelty. But it was

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all necessary for the life and progress of the nation. If we have been cruel, the ends justified the means."\(^6\)

With time, Díaz developed the subtlety necessary for any long-term government that rules an ethnically diverse country largely supported by foreign interests. The economic interests of foreign powers in porfírian Mexico have been well documented. Díaz, or more accurately the Díaz administration, became adept at dividing or buying any possible opposition. A working slogan of the administration was \textit{pan o palo} (bread or stick). It rewarded those who adhered to and forwarded its policies and punished those who did not.

Further, Díaz knew his countrymen responded to personalities and recognized the necessity for an \textit{amigo}, or more accurately \textit{amigo de caudillo} (friend of the boss), system of government. In porfírian Mexico, the governors owed their power to the president, the \textit{jefe políticos} to the governors and so on down through village governments. For all its structure, the system was chaotic. Díaz encouraged bickering so that he might stand above it, granting favors and gaining loyalty. He fulfilled a need on the part of the mestizos who craved power by appointing members of that

segment of society to positions that would provide not only salaries and power but opportunities for graft, illegal seizures of property from campesinos (peasants) and other forms of self-enrichment. At the same time, Díaz placated the creoles and foreigners by ensuring their economic interests. The large haciendas were left intact, and concessions were extended to industrial activities.7

Life improved for much of the Mexican population during the porfiriato and those advances were attributed to Díaz, who had opened the country to foreign investment by imposing a system that ensured stability. Ironically, the three advances in which Díaz himself took the most pride -- the development of the railway system, the growth of an urban middle class and the advance of education -- played significant roles in the demise of the porfirian ruling class. When Díaz became president, there were only 578 kilometers of rail lines in Mexico. By 1909, there were 24,160. The Díaz administration believed, as journalist Manuel de Zamacona had written in the early days of the porfiriato, that, "Railroads will resolve all the political,  

social and economic problems which patriotism, sacrifice and the blood of two generations has failed to settle."  

Ultimately, foreigners completed and operated the railroads, which they needed to ship minerals to smelters in the United States. This involvement was resented by many Mexicans, including journalists. In this conflict, Díaz was caught in the middle. While it would be political suicide not to pay homage to the Mexican paranoia concerning foreign powers, the economic well-being of the regime depended on them. These investors were willing to pay the construction costs, which reached 20,000 pesos per kilometer in the mountainous areas. Costs were less on the desert, but rarely within the 6000-pesos-per-kilometer subsidy provided by the Mexican government.  

Not only foreigners benefited from the railroads. By 1910, Mexican merchants were paying about one-twentieth of what they had paid in transportation costs in 1876. By 1905 when Díaz had the government purchase a controlling interest in the Mexican Central, American imperialism was a fairly safe target for Mexican editorialists. Díaz himself was quoted as saying, "Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United States." Ironically, the Mexican Central was the most

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8 José Francisco Godoy, Porfirio Díaz, Presidente de México, El Fundador de Una Gran República, (México, D.F., Muller, 1910), p. 42.
9 Hanson, p. 19.
important line in Mexico and was the first link in an exclusively U.S. dream of connecting all of South America with the United States by rail. The purchase of the railroad probably alienated some important U.S.-based support, but the real problems of the railroads for the porfirian power structure had already been created: mobility of the Mexican population and the emergence of the first large unions in Mexico.*

The railroads provided both advertising revenue and a means of delivery for Mexican newspapers, but it was the porfiriistas' commitment to education that provided publishers with a growing market. The number of school teachers increased during the porfiriato. Equality of educational opportunity was a long-standing goal of the Díaz regime. Minister of Finance José Limantour said, "Education is the national service of the most importance: it is supreme." To the supporters of continuismo, a stable government depended on a homogeneous people, and that homogeneity could be created through education. In 1877, there were 4,715 teachers in Mexico. By 1909, that number had tripled.**

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**José Mancisidor, Historia de la Revolución Mexicana, (México, D.F., Costa-Amic Editores, 1980), p. 36; Milada
The University of Mexico in the capital became the leading educational institution. Funded to produce educators, its philosophy was molded by Justo Sierra, a Díaz supporter who held fast to his own ideals during the ethical decline of the porfiriat. In 1902, Sierra wrote: "Mexican social evolution will have been wholly abortive and futile unless it attains the final goal: liberty."\(^{12}\)

Sierra's students were imbued with the great ideals of democracy and then went out to encounter and become part of the poverty of porfirian Mexico. Francisco Bulnes described the frustration of these educated men: "This poor man had to be excessively stupid to study for years and earn a salary roughly equivalent to that of a train conductor." But the increase in literacy in Mexico created problems beyond the school-house. Recognizing the dangers of an educated but unemployed sector of a growing population, the Díaz regime created a make-work bureaucracy.\(^{13}\)

Díaz himself recognized the problem of the growing bureaucracy but was resigned to it. He once responded to a


\(^{12}\)Alfonso Reyes, prologue to 1940 edition Political Evolution of the Mexican People by Justo Sierra, pp. 5-15; Sierra, p. 368.

\(^{13}\)James Cockcroft, "El Maestro de Primaria en la Revolución Mexicana," Historia Moderna de Mexico, Volume VII. April-June, 1967. p. 567.
question concerning bureaucratic costs, "Feed the beast." And Mexico did. By the first decade of the twentieth century, 10 to 15 percent of Mexico's literate population, which made up about 18 percent of the 15 million total population, worked for the government. For the most part, however, government employees were no better off than the school teachers. If they lacked connections in the power structure, all they could anticipate was meaningless work at low salaries and the criticism of the Mexican populace. Sierra described the Mexican bureaucracy as "that great normal school for idleness which has educated our country's middle class."¹⁴

The middle class formed an audience for a growing number of publications in Mexico and the porfiriato roughly coincides with what historians of Mexican journalism have labeled "the great period of development." Sporadic and influenced by government, this development had more to do with the economics of the newspaper industry than growth of freedom of the press in Mexico. The increase in journalistic endeavors reflected socio-economic changes in Mexico under Díaz, but the mechanics of that industry were largely defined by statutory law that negated Article 7 of the

¹⁴ Hansen, p. 150; Sierra, p. 215
Constitution of 1857, which guaranteed freedom of the press.15

Article 7 was a reaction to the repressive Lares Laws of 1853. During Santa Anna's last attempt at ruling Mexico, his advisers determined that an independent press represented too great a threat to the stability of the Mexican government and devised a subsidy system whereby a newspaper had to be linked with the government in order to exist. Article 7 guaranteed freedom of the press (even with the amendments) unless a publication infringed on private life or threatened public safety, but the porfirian regime manipulated the press, especially in Mexico City.16

The porfirian concern with the press was twofold and sometimes contradictory. First, Díaz and his administration recognized the growing political influence of the popular press on the national politics of Mexico. Díaz had seen freedom of the press grow under Juárez, and he had seen that freedom used to the detriment of that reformist leader and even more so to Sebastian Lerdo. Lerdo truly believed in the freedom of the press and in 1872 issued the following manifesto:

... The freedom of the press, which protects and defends the others, will be inviolable for me,

15José Bravo Ugarte, Periodistas y periódicos Mexicanos, (México, D.F., México Heroico Editorial JUS., 1966), pp. 77-81; Correo de Chihuahua. Jan 1, 1899;
16Sierra, p. 229.
as it was, without exception, in the protracted period during which I functioned as a minister for the illustrious President [Juárez] whose loss we lament. . . Of the excesses which the press may commit, the best corrective is the press itself, enlightened, free, the echo of all opinions and all parties.¹⁷

The industry grew from a few publications read by an elite minority to 84 publications in Mexico City alone in 1881, many of which were aimed at the growing ranks of middle-class Mexico, and Díaz wanted that developing power to continue operating on his behalf as it had against Lerdo. Lerdo had remained true to his word until the last month of his regime when, in desperation, he suspended the freedom of the press. His action was explained in an official circular:

The opposition press overflowed in a scandalous manner, abusing the liberty which Article 7 of the Constitution concedes and the unlimited tolerance of the Executive of the Union.

Said press was serving as an organ of the revolution, publishing the plans of pronouncement of the enemies and their illegal decrees. . . This press disseminated the real or feigned information of the military operations of the enemy, it revealed to the enemy the movement of our troops, their numbers, and their equipment, and daily it was publishing false triumphs of the revolutionists and false defeats of the loyal troops; it was exaggerating the numbers of the enemy and diminishing those of the government.

Said press, attributing to the President, the minister, and other public functionaries, ineptitude, vices, and depraved passions, attempted to quit them of all respectability. Alleging that the government did not recognize the

English debt, affirming that it wasted the public funds, that it made ruinous contracts, and that it had compromised the major part of the products of the maritime custom houses, [said press] spread a lack of confidence among merchants and capitalists, preventing the government from practicing financial operations which would produce what was necessary to cover its pressing needs. Finally, this press, declaring itself openly revolutionary and subversive, has preached that the present government will be legitimate only until November 30 next, and that if the chamber of deputies should declare that there has been an election, it is lawful for the public to revolt.  

Undoubtedly, the Mexican press under Lerdo helped bring Díaz to power. Some of the important newspapers in this struggle, such as El Monitor and El Ahuizote, would be repressed by Díaz. For the most part, Díaz would use existing laws to suppress the press. Under Mexican law, journalists were liable if they published articles that produced criminal consequences. Because of one basic porfirian alteration of the law, they also became liable for articles that might produce criminal consequences. In 1885, the courts devised the psicología, a test in which a journalist's attitude toward the regime was judged. If he had an attitude considered dangerous to society, he could be jailed.  

Díaz also recognized the importance of the press in terms of public relations, which could influence foreign
relations. When he assumed the presidency, Mexico's image was of a country that could not guarantee the safety of foreign investments because of political instability.

Porfirian interests were served not only by creating a positive image of Díaz himself but also by portraying Mexico as a sister republic to the United States. The administration tried to portray the Mexican press as similar to that in the United States. Sometimes this was difficult, as illustrated by the A.K. Cutting case of 1886. Cutting was an American journalist who published _El Centinela_ in El Paso del Norte, the town that would eventually be renamed Ciudad Juárez. When a Mexican, Emiglio Medina, decided to begin a rival newspaper, Cutting placed an ad in the _El Paso Herald_ saying that Medina's purpose was merely to "swindle advertisers." Then Cutting had cards reiterating the charge printed, both in English and Spanish, and distributed them on both sides of the border. Cutting, accustomed to the accepted practice of lambasting one's editorial opponents so common on the American frontier, included on the card the statement that Medina was a "fraud and deadbeat."^{20}

Cutting was arrested in Mexico and jailed in the city of Chihuahua. Refusing to recognize the validity of Mexican law, Cutting appealed to the American consulate in El Paso del Norte. Upon hearing this, Medina assaulted a consulate

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officer and was arrested on a weapons charge. Cutting tried un成功fully to bribe the guards to place Medina in his cell. The incident, which Díaz would later call "something of no importance in itself," created unforeseen tensions along the border. The Mexican government increased the troops stationed in El Paso del Norte from 200 to 2,000 men. At one point, the Mexican judiciary offered Cutting his freedom on bail, but he refused, saying, "I'm under the protection of my government."

The U.S. government, though, did not want to get involved, much to the ire of the New York Times, which editorialized: "The best proof of the worthlessness of Mexico is the fact that we have not annexed any part of that country since the treaty that closed the Mexican war." Several days after that editorial appeared, Mexicans killed a Mexican-American accused of being a horse thief. The Times ran the story under the headline: "Texans will Protect American Citizens even if Uncle Sam Won't."

A week later, the judges in Chihuahua, who had made it known they would "brook no interference from the U.S. government or, for that matter, Díaz himself," found Cutting guilty and sentenced him to a year in jail and fined him

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22 New York Times, July 28, and August 1, 1886.
$600. After the public lost interest, Cutting was freed and quietly slipped across the border.23

The New York Times reported that "Medina, who had caused all the trouble, has leave to sue Cutting." The Times turned around, though, and editorialized that perhaps the case had two sides. It would be a long time before Mexican press law would again be questioned in the U.S. press.24

Antagonism between the government and the small press in Mexico bloomed with the 1888 reelection of Díaz and the constitutional amendment allowing that reelection. By then, the power structure of the porfiriato was in place and the style entrenched. In early June, Díaz began receiving from his state governors letters advising him that an uncontrolled press would do damage to Mexico. One unfavorable article had been reprinted in a Havana, Cuba, newspaper, and the porfiristas feared that some of the bad publicity would creep into the U.S. and European press.25

The governor of Jalisco recommended jailing three of the worst offenders in that state, and in Chihuahua, the governor jailed the author of a letter to the editor. The


24Ibid., August 15, 1886.

Chihuahua governor explained in a letter to Díaz that one writer could result in "grave" danger to society (Díaz made a note to commend the governor on his positive action). 26

From all sides, Díaz was being told that the persecution of journalists was justified to ensure the order and tranquility of the country. By the end of the summer, Díaz had received from state governors several more letters saying they had jailed journalists and publishers. Many of the letters contained pleas for harsher laws to deal with the opposition press. 27

Those laws were not forthcoming. Díaz and his administrators recognized that the mechanisms for controlling the press were already in place. There were also extra-legal procedures for dealing with troublesome journalists, such as assassination, but the outright killing of newspapermen was not common. Francisco Bulnes wrote that only five journalists were killed during the porfiriato and those murders were ordered by state governors rather than federal administrators. While that number has been disputed by modern historians, the porfiristas preferred

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26Ibid., 006519 (Governor of Chihuahua to Díaz, July 26, 1888), 006523 (Lauro Carrillo to Díaz, marginal note from Díaz, July 26, 1888), 006726 through 00672 (unsigned, undated report to Díaz from Coahuila), 006814 (Governor of Monterey to Díaz, July 9, 1888).

27Ibid., 007531 and 07537 (Secretary Particular del Gobernador de Jalisco to Díaz, August 5 and 15, 1888), 007586 (Rafael Gravioto to Díaz, August 27, 1888).
incarceration to elimination. Díaz himself recognized that a repentant journalist was more valuable to continuismo than a martyr, and he would sometimes intervene on behalf of journalists if he believed they had "learned their lesson."\(^{28}\)

During the last ten years of the nineteenth century, the porfirian system was perfected, and Díaz became an unquestioned darling of the press, both domestic and foreign. At age 60, Díaz had mastered the delicate act of balancing the power structure. Unfortunately, his administration gladly sacrificed the viability of the Mexican press for stability and growth.

\(^{28}\)Sandels, pp. 59-60; personal interview with Jane Dale Lloyd, UIA.
Chapter 2
"EL DESAROLLO GRANDE DE LA PRENSA"
THE GREAT DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESS: 1890-1899

We always have to tell the truth, or, better said, what appears to us that which is true. And we must say it with strong words that can be heard like the blast of a cannon. But if we find we are mistaken, we must shout the new truth more strongly yet, like the roar of a hundred cannons.¹

Filomeno Mata

Thirty or forty thousand pesos, in my opinion, would be enough to change the face of the country.²

Porfirio Díaz

By 1890, the credibility of the Mexican press as a vehicle for political thought and information was questionable, as illustrated by the Reyes-Díaz rift of 1891. Díaz had decided to create a party system to imitate the convention system of nominations in the United States. The task of nominating Díaz fell to the newly established Liberal Union. General Bernardo Reyes, not understanding that the organization of political parties was a public-relations sham, organized his own party and fell, temporarily, out of favor with Díaz. He rectified his fall from grace by advising his adherents to


vote for Díaz. In all probability, Reyes failed to learn the truth of the situation by reading newspapers.\(^3\)

Politicians and financially successful newspaper publishers existed symbiotically. Porfirian administrators were more concerned with bribing individual publishers and reporters for editorial support of the power structure than encouraging social responsibility on the part of the press. Government-approved newspapers published pro-Díaz propaganda and empty sensationalism comparable to that of the Hearst organization in the United States.\(^4\)

In 1885, Rafael Reyes Spíndola founded El Universal, demonstrating keen administrative abilities and unquestionable loyalty to the porfirian administration. The paper proved successful and was sold to Ramon Prida in early 1892. Prida, though nominally pro-government, remained suspect since he refused the government subsidy. He explained that he was not anti-government, but wanted to support the government independently. Prida was advised by Romero Rubio, a member of the administration and father-in-law of the president, "Don't be a Don Quixote. Díaz doesn't like bad steers." The next year, Prida was among the


journalists who made frequent trips to jail. To be an independent journalist was tantamount to being a criminal.5

The 1890s marked the emergence of the científicos as the most powerful group in Mexico. The científicos organized formally in 1891 as the Liberal Union to nominate Díaz in 1892. Some of them, including Justo Sierra, were active sponsors of an unsuccessful attempt to make judicial appointments permanent. The group adopted as its name an originally derisive term that singled them out as men who would apply science to government. The científicos were highly educated and believed that they had reached their position through the forces of social Darwinism. Their power was exemplified by the social and political influence they wielded, even over other porfiristas. They would play a major role in the development of the modern Mexican press.6

Although the number of Mexican newspapers decreased because of government persecution between 1900 and 1900, the industry experienced its greatest expansion in terms of technology and circulation numbers. The success of la prensa de a centavo ("penny press") of Mexico City demonstrated the economic feasibility of small publications,

5Ugarte, p. 73; Carleton Beals, Pofirio Díaz, Dictator of Mexico, (Philadelphia, J.B. Lipponcott Company, 1932), p. 271.

bolstered by the subsidy system and a seemingly stable economy. Angel Pola began the first successful "penny" newspaper, El Noticioso, in April, 1984. Not all of the inexpensive newspapers were successful. Reyes Spíndola, before becoming publisher of the government giant, El Imparcial, produced El Siglo XX, a penny newspaper. He abandoned the project and wrote that it was impossible to produce a paper at that price and compete with the established press that sold its product for three or four cents. Spíndola, one of the most active Mexican publishers, also published the magazine El Mundo Semanario Ilustrado, the first modern weekly magazine in Mexico.  

Spíndola, sometimes revered as the father of modern Mexican journalism, relied on personal relationships with the powerful elite of the porfirian administration rather than his publishing skills for career advancement. His most famous contact was José Limantour, the youngest member of the Díaz cabinet who became minister of finance in 1892. He had been a key member in the 1880s of the regime's brain trust that spawned the científicos. Limantour was credited with bringing Mexico's economy from a state of virtual collapse to at least a surface prosperity. He was also

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responsible for the government's sponsorship of *El Imparcial*, which was to change forever the relationship between Mexican journalism and the government.\(^8\)

Reyes Spíndola benefited from the científico-porfirista in-fighting. In 1896, Joaquín Barranda, a porfirista who was at the time out of favor with the científicos, started a newspaper and asked Díaz for a subsidy. Díaz referred the matter to Limantour who suggested the government instead put a major subsidy in the hands of Reyes Spíndola. In a rather drastic change of tactics, the Mexican government cut back its subsidies to other newspapers to provide *El Imparcial* with the funding necessary to make it the most financially sound newspaper in Mexico.\(^9\)

Given $100,000 (Mex.), Spíndola began *El Imparcial*, the first newspaper in Mexico to use a Linotype and be published on a state-of-the-art rotary press. The paper's initial circulation was between 8,000 and 10,000 daily, about three times that of the next largest paper in Mexico City. The government provided a yearly subsidy of $70,000 (Mex.) and reduced subsidies to other newspapers. Mexican historians date the beginning of modern journalism in Mexico with the founding of *El Imparcial*. All major Mexican newspapers were


\(^9\)Sandels, pp. 56-57.
to be affected by the innovations implemented at that paper, including modern printing and typesetting methods, improved design and increased use of wire services.  

Científico Francisco Bulnes later wrote that 1896 was the year the porfirian regime changed from being a military to a civil dictatorship. The administration's ambition concerning the press centered on control rather than suppression. To this end, the government raised the price of newsprint to three times what it was in the United States. Subsidies had reached a point that the press was viewed as part of the bureaucracy and it was the duty of this bureaucracy, knowingly or unknowingly, to create the illusion of democracy. A Mexican writer and contemporary of Reyes Spíndola summed up this duty in his description of El Imparcial: "It was for Díaz and the científicos, because it was supposed to paint them and all their actions in a good light, and it was, in part, for the public peace because it constituted a part of the porfirian forces to continue the peaceful dominion of the president."  

Journalists who failed in their duties often encountered what Bulnes called "maximum terror." The Díaz administration made liberal use of the defamation laws. The most common

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11 López-Portillo y Rojas, p. 343.
method of administrative coercion was incarcerating wayward journalists in the Mexico City jails, of which Belen was the most famous.\(^\text{12}\)

Belen Prison was about half the size of a city block and held from 5,000 to 6,000 men, 300 boys and 600 women. Sanitation was almost completely lacking; 176 prisoners were stricken with typhus in a single day. The first days of a person's incarceration were the worst -- prisoners were placed in dank, dirt-floored, subterranean cells without light and only a hole in a corner for a toilet.\(^\text{13}\)

Ricardo Flores Magón, twenty years after serving his first sentence in Belen in 1893, described the prison:

The dungeon was unpaved, and a layer of mud from three to four inches thick composed the floor, while the walls oozed a turbid fluid which prevented from drying up the expectorations, countless, careless, former occupants had negligently flung upon them. From the ceiling enormous cobwebs overhung, in which huge, black, horrid spiders lurked. In one corner, opening from the sewer there was a hole . . . my lungs then youthful and healthy could resist the poison of that grave, my nerves, though sensitive, could be trained by my will to respond with nothing more than a slight tremor to the assaults and bites of the rats in the dark. . . .\(^\text{14}\)


\(^{13}\)de Fornaro, pp. 80-81.

\(^{14}\)Flores Magón as quoted by Henry Weinberger in a letter to the editor, *The New Republic*, July 5, 1922.
After the first eight days, those prisoners were allowed to mingle with the general population in the main part of the prison. Belen also had the distinction of having an area known as "the editor's room," a special area for journalists who dared criticize important officials in the Mexican government. It was said that Filomeno Mata kept a bed there after 1893.15

In the spring of that year, Mata, founder, publisher and editor of *Diario del Hogar*, found himself at odds with the Díaz administration over the persecution of some young journalists. The conflict between Mata and the administration represented fundamental differences regarding the interpretation of the 1857 constitution and was long standing, as feuds between old acquaintances tend to be. A long-time Mexico City publisher, Mata reflected both the growth in the newspaper industry and the economic problems facing the small publisher lacking strong connections within the porfirian administration. Throughout its existence, *Diario del Hogar* was four pages, sometimes without the advertising to justify even that. In the beginning, its size was probably limited more by technological than political constraints (type was handset and the newspaper was printed on a hand operated press). Having had an amiable relationship with Díaz that dated from the president's days

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15Beals, p. 272.
as a revolutionary, Mata left the favored camp in 1888 over
the issue of reelection and from then on saw the growth of
advertising in newspapers more popular with the
government.16

Mata began his career in 1869 at age 24, working under the
tutelage of two established editors, Vicente García Torres
of El Monitor Republicano (founded in 1844) and Ireno Paz of
La Patria (founded in 1877). These two papers represented
the dichotomy of the Mexican press. La Patria became part of
the claque Díaz established in 1888. El Monitor Republicano,
conversely, was noted for its tenacity in reporting
government misdeeds (including the various incarcerations of
Mata) and was closed down in 1896 by the government and
replaced with a pro-government paper, El Monitor. In the
beginning, both publishers had reflected the optimistic
liberalism of the age of reform, as did Mata, the former
college professor from San Luis Potosí whom they introduced
to journalism.17

Mata displayed not only optimism but ambition in his
youth, founding four separate newspapers in the 1870s: El
Sufragio Libre, El Cascabel, La Hoja Eléctrica, and El
Monitor Tuxtepecano. In 1881, Mata established Diario del
Hogar, originally intended to be a newspaper for families.

16 Ibid; Ugarte, pp. 52 and 66; personal interview with Jane
Dale Lloyd.
17 Beals, p. 267; Diario del Hogar, December 30, 1896.
Mata identified his market for the publication, which sold for five centavos or 75 centavos for a month's subscription, as the literate, middle-class Mexican family.  

In his first issue, he began the serialization of two novels, one translated for the paper from French. Mata was more interested in making a living than in espousing political causes. The country seemed politically stable and Mexico City provided not only an audience for Mata's mild publication but also work for his job presses. Mata also accepted a government subsidy.

Mata's plans for his newspaper were soon changed. Criticism of his publication by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church in Mexico damaged sales and he had to look beyond the family market. Later, during the Gonzales interim, Mata criticized government actions interfering with journalistic activity, ending his political non-involvement. He did not, however, editorially oppose the reentry of Díaz to presidential office in 1884 although he did refuse a government subsidy that year. Throughout most of his career, Mata refrained from editorially attacking Díaz personally. Instead, he blamed real and imagined wrongs on those who surrounded the president.

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19 Ibid, pp. 19-23; personal interview with Jane Dale Lloyd.
20 Ugarte, p. 68.
The first overt break between the two men came on June 22, 1885, when Díaz ordered publication of a sedition law prohibiting articles damaging to the president or his ministers. The issue was the debt owed Britain. Mata wrote that he would be the first to censor a press that did not do its job, but that he wanted more respect for the basic institutions of society. He prudently drew the line at disrespect of government but was critical of those governmental activities that "strike at the fundamental law of the republic."

When Díaz presented himself as a presidential candidate again in 1888, Mata editorially opposed the nomination but was careful to level his criticism against the idea of re-election and not against Díaz himself. While Mata's editorial attitude toward Díaz as an individual was always tempered, he irrevocably split with the administration because of two incidents. In 1890, Luis Gonzales, the editor of El Explorador in Morelia, was murdered. The assassination was ordered by the governor of Michoacan, who, under the caudillo system as perfected in porfirian Mexico, was untouchable. The state governors held as much power, if not more, in their states, as Diaz did over the country. News of the crime was published in Diario and Mata began devoting

more and more editorial space to the plight of the press in Mexico.22

That same year the secret police sacked Mata's home on the pretense of searching for fugitives, terrifying his wife, children and aged father. Miguel Cabrera, head of the growing policía secreta (also known as the bravi), led the raid. He entered the home, pistol in hand, and threatened Mata, accusing him of hiding criminals. The secret police were part of what Mata came to call "a government that has little love of its people."23

Mata was not the first journalist to find fault with the government, and there were other editors more outspoken. Many publications criticized government actions after the 1892 reelection of Díaz. In early spring of 1893, the government responded by arresting hundreds of journalists. The news of those arrests appeared on the front page of Diario del Hogar, and on March 7 the government charged Mata and his staff with 37 counts of defamation. A short jail term did not stop Mata, and on March 18 he again criticized the government in an article headlined: "What is the Difference between 1877 and 1893?" The difference, he wrote,

22Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 19.

23Mata, pp. 39-49; Diario del Hogar, October 28, 1892.
was that now Mexico had railroads, and while foreigners built the railroads, Mexico had the debt. 24

On April 1, 1893, the government arrested the editorial staffs of two publications, Noventa y Tres and El Democrata. Both had been founded the year before, staffed mostly by college students who were impatient for change in Mexico. In an editorial, Mata protested the jailing of the young journalists. The next day, Diario was not published, and for the next two weeks the content of the paper was noticeably unpolitical. This became a telling trend in the paper: when Mata was incarcerated at Belen, which happened more than 30 times in 1893, the paper was bereft of any news of radical or press activity, concentrating on innocuous news or poetry. 25

When Mata was free and working, notices of government malfeasance or press persecution filled the Boletín section of Diario del Hogar. Mata was free on April 28 when Diario reported the final government closure of El Democrata. The paper had been closed for a particularly critical piece and Mata responded by quoting, almost in its entirety, the article, which began, "Not since the tyranny of Santa Anna.


25 Interview with Jane Dale Lloyd.; Diario del Hogar, April 2, 1893.
..." Still, Mata soft-pedaled Diaz's responsibility: "We don't believe that the president of the republic, a man who has shown in other times a passion for liberal ideals, gave the order for this persecution." He did not excuse Díaz, either: "But at the same time, he has not intervened."26

The next day, Mata continued his verbal barrage, predicting accurately the government closure of El 93 and La Oposición. Mata, who rarely referred to himself in print, noted that the directors of El Monitor, El Tiempo, and Diario del Hogar were only at liberty because they had paid a bond to a Mexico City court as insurance against defamation and added that he, alone, was responsible for the publication of this particular article in Diario. Another prophetic article on the front page was headlined: "Opinion of the Press: Near the End." Publication of Diario was not resumed until May 2, 1893.27

On May 12, Mata urged the government to pass a law that would protect the press from the judicial system. The coverage of the journalists incarcerated in Belen continued, and at the end of May, Mata wrote, "The society of Mexico hungers and thirsts for justice." Mata spent most of June in prison, and the contents of Diario reflected his absence. Mata referred to his own incarcerations only once, noting

26 Interview with Jane Dale Lloyd.; Diario del Hogar, April 28, 1893.

27 Diario del Hogar, April 29, 1893.
dryly, "Yes, we have seen the insides of Belen." But his adventures with the bravi were covered by other publications, especially El Monitor Republicano, until the government forced that publication into permanent suspension in 1896. Undoubtedly because of his relationship with Díaz, Mata received preferential treatment, at times even being allowed to write articles inside the prison.  

In early July authorities brought defamation charges against Diario del Hogar for the 39th time that year. Mata reported the event on July 11 in an article that shared the front page with one about Belen. Predictably, after those articles, Diario concentrated on other news: European news was given a fair amount of play, as were problems in Nicaragua, speeches by U.S. President Grover Cleveland and matter-of-fact reporting of elections in the Mexican provinces. The lack of coverage of persecution of the press indicates that in all probability Mata was in Belen, but he was out by August 22 and brought his readers good news: an amnesty had been suggested for journalists in Belen. Enthusiastically, Mata called the idea of an amnesty "the conquest of right" and actually praised the government for the move, which he may well have begun in personal correspondence with Díaz. When the amnesty failed to materialize, Mata took a different tack: he ran the names of

28 Diario del Hogar, May 2 and 30, 1893; personal interview with Jane Dale Lloyd.
journalists incarcerated in Belen. For three consecutive days the lists appeared: set in 8-point type with a 14-pica column width, the lists ran 20 inches — totaling 60 inches of names. Then, again, the paper became silent on the issue. 29

In late October, Daniel Cabrera, founder and editor of El Hijo del Ahuizote and one of the few men who could claim as much time in Belen as Mata, was arrested. Mata complained in print, "We have had the opportunity to read the article [which Cabrera was arrested for] and, frankly, we were surprised at the proceedings because it dealt with a country far away from Mexico." Again, the tone of Diario changed for a time. 30

Both Cabrera and Mata corresponded with Díaz during their stays in prison. The dictator replied that while he would like to help them their fate was out of his hands. He blamed their situation on the attitudes of others in his administration. Throughout his regime, Díaz managed to maintain friendly relations with the great majority of members of the press, even those who were editorially opposed his reelection. The real enemy for most of them was not the man but the system, and by 1893 the system had almost succeeded in eliminating the opposition press in

29 Diario del Hogar, August 1 through 22, August 31 through September 5, 1893; personal interview with Jane Dale Lloyd.
30 Diario del Hogar, October 27-30, 1893.
Mexico. Many of the journalists incarcerated in 1893 did not raise their editorial voices again for seven years. Although 1896 is the year Mexican historians identify as the beginning of the great development of Mexican journalism, marked by the founding of the científico-funded El Imparcial and the use of Linotype machines in Mexico, the government had come close to effectively stamping out opinion in the press three years earlier.  

By 1896, three independent papers were left in Mexico City: Diario del Hogar, El Hijo del Ahuizote (Cabrera's caricaturist weekly), and El Monitor Republicano. Perhaps Diario and El Hijo de Ahuizote were allowed to continue, albeit with frequent jail sentences for their administrators and staffs, because of the publishers' old ties to Díaz. El Monitor Republicano was not so fortunate and the government permanently suspended its operations in late 1896. The paper was replaced by the científico-oriented Monitor, and the change was chronicled in Diario by Fabian Conde, a Diario staff member responsible for much of the government criticism that appeared in its pages during the late '90s. An article headlined "Are there party politics in Mexico?" praised the old Monitor as "The defender of honorable politics, true liberties and the right of the people to know 

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31 Diario del Hogar, October 24, 1893; Ochoa Campos, p. 125.
their institutions." The new Monitor, Conde predicted, would be nothing more than a vehicle for científico propaganda.\textsuperscript{32}

In early 1897, Conde began a series of articles on the periodistas del gobierno (government journalists), referring mainly to the staff of the new Monitor, also published by Reyes Spíndola. In the articles, Conde passionately accused the Monitor staff of betraying everything from the constitution of 1857 to the Catholic Church, labeling it as a counter-revolutionary against the constitution of 1857. "What kind of government would you have us have?" he asked. Mata published an article disclosing the amount of government money Reyes Spíndola received for the Monitor alone: a start-up subsidy of $100,000 (Mex.), an annual subsidy of $52,000, and advertising revenues and job-printing contracts that amounted to more than $12,000 a month. The publishing business in porfirian Mexico reflected the status quo: those with connections flourished and those without struggled.\textsuperscript{33}

The porfirian administrators had the press in Mexico City under control, but the same economic conditions that created the market for growth of journalism in the capital were also at play in the provinces where the federal powers were

\textsuperscript{32}Sandels, pp. 53, 54 and 59; personal interview with Jane Dale Lloyd; Diario del Hogar, December 30, 1896 and January 9, 1897.

\textsuperscript{33}Diario del Hogar, January 26 and February 20, 1897; Ugarte, p. 84; Mata, p. 55.
filtered through state governors. In those areas, where subsidies did not exist and the federal government could not enforce the monopoly on newsprint, the conflict was between the state governments and the publishers.
Northern Mexico is a harsh land. The few officers of the Mexican Army who served in Chihuahua in the 1800s called it "the hot country." Cattle ranching and mining began there in the eighteenth century, and the Spaniards and mestizos who settled that desert area had to be as hard as the Apaches from whom they took the land. Slightly less forbidding was the high plateau where la Ciudad de Chihuahua was built, but even there cattle ranches had to be mammoth to be profitable.¹

Far from Mexico City and economically tied to the United States, the chihuahuenses, recognizing their unique problems, advocated states' rights early in Mexican independence. When asked what kind of government should rule Mexico, a Chihuahua delegate told the national congress in 1824, "We are not interested in the problem. We want you to help us fight the Apache."²

That same year, the governor of Chihuahua brought the first printing press in from Durango, and two years later the first newspaper or, more properly, the first journalistic publication, appeared in the city of Chihuahua.

²Sandels, p. 19.
Titled "verdaderos y falsos independientes," it was a document published by a state legislator to inform the public of the dangers of Spanish domination in Spanish America. In 1827, the weekly El Centinela was founded but failed after seven issues. The small population of Chihuahua simply could not support an ongoing newspaper at that time. Publications in Chihuahua were short lived or one-time-only papers with specific political purposes, such as explaining a political belief or making a political nomination. During the final years of the nineteenth century, the economic high point of the porfiriato, the population in Chihuahua grew to about 400,000 and the improved technology in the printing trade made commercial journalism feasible in the border state. Then, in 1890, several prominent chihuahuense businessmen, including Enrique Creel, established a weekly, El Imparcial.³

Porfirian Chihuahua was ruled by Luis Terrazas, who owned more cattle than any individual in the world. A popular Chihuahuense story about Don Luis is that when a U.S. agent asked him if he could supply 70,000 head of cattle to feed the U.S. troops during the Spanish-American war, Don Luis replied, "What color?" The son of a butcher, Don Luis became rich as a result of the wars of the 1850s and 1860s. As a

³This overview of nineteenth century journalism of Chihuahua was drawn from Francisco R. Alameda, La Imprenta y el Periodismo en Chihuahua, (México, D.F., Gobierno del Estado de Chihuahua, 1943).
jefe político, he was able to expropriate for the government land owned by the church or landowners who supported the losing side. He then purchased the property himself or sold it cheaply to relatives.  

Díaz and Don Luis knew and distrusted each other for good reason. Don Luis became governor of Chihuahua in 1860 and in 1871 led chihuahuense forces against porfirian troops during Diaz's revolt against Juárez. Díaz claimed victory in Chihuahua briefly, placing one of his men in the governor's chair. When Don Luis reclaimed the office after Díaz's defeat in 1872, the peace accord between the two men supposedly included a verbal promise from Díaz that he would never again set foot in Chihuahua. After Díaz became president in 1876, he replaced Don Luis with his own appointee, but that man was rejected by the state legislature in 1879 and Don Luis resumed the position. Expediently, he declared himself a porfirista in 1880. Thus began the uneasy truce between the president of Mexico and the man in Chihuahua who not only controlled the cattle industry but had or would have monopolies in the banking, beer and iron works industries and who would eventually own the telephone and urban transit companies of Chihuahua.

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5 Sandels, p. 22-32.
The split between Don Luis and Díaz never completely healed and the two men avoided direct confrontation. In 1892, supporters of Díaz in Chihuahua informed him that Don Luis was probably a secret supporter of Catarino Garza, an expatriot Mexican journalist who tried, unsuccessfully, to launch a revolt against Díaz from Texas. Díaz did not take action on the information, correctly surmising that Garza did not represent a viable threat to his administration. Ultimately, a young journalist who disapproved of Don Luis's administration weakened public acceptance of the porfirian regime in Chihuahua.6

In 1894, 21-year-old Silvestre Terrazas, a distant relative of Don Luis, returned to his native Chihuahua from Mexico City where he had studied business administration and accounting and found work as the personal secretary to Bishop Jesus Ortiz of Chihuahua. From these unlikely beginnings, Terrazas emerged as one of the most unlikely heroes of the revolution -- the man Francisco Bulnes would someday call "the intellectual author of the revolution in Chihuahua."7


Don Silvestre's social background made possible his employment with the church, which allied itself with the landed gentry. An ancestor had come to Chihuahua in the early part of the eighteenth century, and while Don Silvestre was not as rich as his grandparents' first cousin, Don Luis, he inherited a considerable amount of property from his parents as well as two estates from aunts. In Chihuahua he enjoyed a reputation as a liberal thinker, but his home life reflected the chauvinism of his time. He did not allow his children to play with the poor children of Chihuahua and he was adamantly opposed to any member of his family marrying anyone who had even a trace of Indian ancestry. His first public office was president of the Bicycle Club of Chihuahua.

In 1897, Bishop Ortiz, always politically active, conceived the idea of a weekly publication, Revista Católica, to expound the views of the church. He named Don Silvestre and Ortega Gonzales as co-editors, but the responsibilities soon fell to Don Silvestre alone. That same year, the enterprising young man also began his own publication, La Lira Chihuahuense, a monthly literary magazine. While poetry was the mainstay of Don Silvestre's own publication, the Catholic weekly followed the church line: that liberalism foolishly freed men from restraints on

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8 Personal interview with Margarita Terrazas Perches.
their behavior, thereby creating secular evil that tore at the fabric of society.9

As a Catholic and especially as a journalist who identified himself with the "Catholic press" of Mexico, Terrazas probably shared the same misgivings concerning positivism, the nominal guiding philosophy of the científicos. Church and state had been not only separate but almost at war with each other since Mexico achieved independence from Spain. Díaz had initiated a moderately successful reconciliation policy. Positivism was not a sacred cow in the Catholic press, which included El País, a Mexico City daily with the second-largest circulation in the country. But as a practicality, this conflict was probably little more than an intellectual abstraction to the young journalist. Don Sylvestre later was influential in the founding of both the Catholic Press Association and the Associated Press of the Mexican States, but in 1897 he dealt with the realities of being an employee of the Bishop and a vassal of Don Luis.10

Chihuahua enjoyed a flurry of journalistic activity during the last decade of the nineteenth century, spurred by the economic stability of the porfirian regime and the influx of

9Sandels, p. 67.
U.S. dollars. In fact, several of the 40-odd publications that began during that period were published in English, aimed at the growing American population that was encouraged to come to Mexico by both the porfirian regime and that of Don Luis. Mexican publications were beginning to rely more on advertising revenues than income from subscriptions, and Don Silvestre, who had successfully managed two other publications for two years, had the necessary contacts to build an adequate advertising base. In the fall of 1898, he decided to begin his own daily newspaper, to be named after an earlier, unsuccessful, daily.\textsuperscript{11}

In a prospectus written in December 1898, Don Silvestre promised to circulate daily 2,000 copies of \textit{El Correo de Chihuahua} beginning January 1, 1899. The paper, he wrote, would include news of mining, agriculture and industry in Chihuahua, as well as important national and international news. The monthly subscription rate would be 50 centavos in the city of Chihuahua and 60 centavos throughout the rest of the state. Don Silvestre was confident of success but continued as editor of \textit{La Revista Católica} and the \textit{Lira Chihuahuense}.\textsuperscript{12}

Three names adorned the masthead of \textit{El Correo}, but the work fell again to Don Silvestre. He did most of the writing

\textsuperscript{11}Almada, pp. 25-28.

\textsuperscript{12}Silvestre Terrazas, "Prospectus", December 1, 1898. M-B Part 1, Box 110, Terrazas collection.
and probably some of the printing on the small press set up in the lobby of a Chihuahua hotel to print the two other publications for which Don Silvestre was responsible. *El Correo* was four small pages and the "news" was tame: articles on the Spanish-American War, local population growth and the importance of the novel in nineteenth century literature. The paper editorially aligned itself with the Catholic church and offered its readers few surprises. Don Silvestre did, however, publish an editorial that bemoaned the state of Mexican journalism. Most papers, he wrote, existed only so their publishers could collect the subsidy and this was particularly true in the capital.\(^{13}\)

Then, on March 1, 1899, an unknown assailant attempted to gun down Severo I. Aguirre, editor of the Chihuahua daily, *El Norte*, the president of the fledgling Chihuahua Press Association and a friend of Don Silvestre. Aguirre survived, and the Press Association published a complaint concerning the lack of police efforts to apprehend the would-be assassin. The criminal, according to the journalists, had been hired by a local politico who had been verbally attacked in *El Norte*. Don Silvestre and five other journalists signed the protest, printed in *El Correo*.\(^{14}\)

\(^{13}\) *Correo de Chihuahua*, January 1 through 16, 1899.
\(^{14}\) Ibid. March 2, 1899.
The public protest was only the second time Don Silvestre had criticized local government; the first was on January 16, 1899, when he wrote an editorial criticizing the lack of efficiency in the Chihuahua post office (something that would become a life-long complaint of the publisher). The protest would also be the last for at least three years: at the end of March, the paper ceased publication and Don Silvestre devoted his energies exclusively to the two other publications.15

In 1902 Don Silvestre re-established El Correo de Chihuahua and created his circulation by combining the subscription lists of La Revista Católica and La Lira Chihuahuense. Work on these publications provided necessary experience for Don Silvestre to launch a successful publication. The new paper used a full broadsheet format and from the beginning had an established wire service.

While the 1902 Correo de Chihuahua was still basically a propaganda organization for the Catholic Church, changes were in the wind -- changes that perhaps Don Silvestre was unaware of. His early experience had taught him the importance of the press organizations and his involvement with the church gave him a sense of social responsibility. Don Silvestre was painfully aware of certain problems in Chihuahua, such as the abundance of American workers, which

15Ibid. January 16, 1898; Sandels, p. 76.
kept local residents unemployed; an incredibly high alcoholism rate among the campesinos; and the lack of educational opportunities for them.

Despite regional differences, the situation in Chihuahua reflected national problems and the inability of the government to address them at any level. Further, interesting parallels existed between the power structure in Chihuahua and the capital. Díaz ruled the capital, and Don Luis, Chihuahua. The two men had each chosen proteges. Díaz toyed with the idea of nominating Limantour as his successor, but abandoned the scheme when politicians and the press complained that Limantour, although born in Mexico City, was the son of French parents. Enrique Creel, a U.S. citizen's son who was born while his father was serving in Chihuahua as U.S. Consul, faced similar objections when Don Luis hand-picked him as governor of Chihuahua. But while Díaz picked Limantour because of his keen financial abilities, Creel's association with Don Luis was a bit closer: Don Luis was his father-in-law.16

For reasons lost to history, a great animosity grew between Don Silvestre and Enrique Creel. Ironically, it may have been this animosity that hastened the downfall of the porfirián regime. Don Silvestre would have never endorsed

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violent revolt, but the Madero revolution began in and was won in Chihuahua, largely because Don Silvestre had spent years unwittingly preparing his readers for a moderate revolutionary movement.

But those were things to come. When Don Silvestre returned to the mundane business of publishing the church's weekly and a monthly literature magazine, the history of Mexico was being determined by a small group of men, mostly journalists, who had decided that something had to be done about the administration of Porfirio Díaz.
Chapter 4
THE POLITICS OF SILENCE: 1906-1908

The first five years of the 20th century cast Mexico's future. Due to self-interest, the porfirian administration had left the country socially stunted, economically constricted and politically intolerant. Both the Mexican and international press kept the realities of Mexico from their readers, either through ignorance or design.

Historians now acknowledge that Mexico reached its economic breaking point in 1900, but this was not recognized at the time. According to many U.S. papers, Porfirio Díaz was the statesmen of his time. Seemingly single-handedly, he had transformed Mexico from a revolution-prone, economically backward country to a nation known to provide both preference and generous guarantees to foreign investors. The economic stability of Mexico was an illusion that made a media event of the Pan-American Conference of 1901, attended by diplomats from every sovereign nation in the western hemisphere except Chile. The financial powers of the world believed that the porfirian magic could be worked in other parts of Latin America.

The conference in Mexico City began in the spring and dragged on through November. The delegates failed to accomplish their goal of establishing a system of arbitration for international disputes in the Western
Hemisphere. Still, reporters from all over the world, and especially the United States, flocked to Mexico and coverage of Mexican affairs was more common than at any time since the short reign of Maximilian. The number of articles appearing in U.S. papers increased dramatically from 1900 to 1901 — the New York Times ran only 10 news stories about Mexico in 1900 but 42 the following year. The articles typically featured one of two Mexican attractions: business or the colorful president.¹

The international press painted a glowing picture of the profits to be made from investments in Mexico and of the president who made those profits possible. "President Díaz," according to the New York Times, "has succeeded in making himself not only loved by the common people but by the so-called aristocracy of the republic." The moneyed classes may or may not have loved Don Porfirio but they at least needed him. Those not of the moneyed classes, particularly the 35 percent of the Mexican population that was indigenous, were lucky to be ignored by the Mexican hierarchy. When attention was paid to the Mexican Indian and campesino, it usually meant war, deprivation of land or involuntary servitude on the henequen plantations of the Valle Nacional in southern Mexico.²

Those social conditions simply were not reported. The foreign press reflected the imperialistic, exploitative mentality of the times. In a professional mining journal, an American mining engineer marveled at the capabilities of the Mexican miners who were paid about 25 cents (U.S.) a day. He described them as looking like "undersized boys" who existed on a diet of corn and beans. "To see a group of four load a motor weighing 470 pounds on the back of a fifth," he wrote, "gives one a curious sensation." Anglo prejudice relegated most Mexicans to sub-human status and their plight was therefore ignored in the U.S. press. But for a Mexican publisher, especially a Mexico City publisher, to report the atrocities committed by the Díaz Regime was, at the very least, economic suicide. Even the most radical of the anti-administration press presented abstract arguments concerning law rather than objective reporting about the real problems of Mexico. Publishers avoided criticizing Díaz only partially because of fear of Belen. Many if not most of the Mexican intelligenzia believed the country would flounder without Díaz.³

In reality, the Mexican economy was already floundering. The porfirian-induced economic health was a house of cards, supporting the rich at the expense of the poor. While foreign investments came into Mexico by the millions of

dollars, pounds and francs, the real income of the Mexican population declined by 57 percent during the porfiriato. Hardest hit were the campesinos who paid a 108-percent increase for maize and a 163-percent increase for beans, while receiving an average 60-percent increase in wages during the same period. The middle class benefited economically from the porfiriato, but it could not afford the all-important symbolic trappings of affluence such as imported clothing and furniture.\footnote{Cockcroft, p. 46.}

The grievances of Mexico's poor, and even her middle class, went almost unnoticed in the Mexican press, or what was left of it after the porfirian repression of the 1890s. In 1893, in headline-sized type, Filomeno Mata had printed "The opposition press is inevitable under an unjust government," but by 1900 there were only six important newspapers left in Mexico City. On January 1, 1901, \textit{Diario del Hogar} listed them: \textit{El País}, the pro-Catholic daily that boasted the largest circulation; the heavily subsidized, government-controlled \textit{El Imparcial}; the equally well-subsidized English-language daily, the \textit{Mexico City Herald}; \textit{Diario del Hogar} which by then was printed only three days a week; the often-cited weekly \textit{El Hijo de Ahuizote}; and the erratic \textit{Regeneración}, which appeared only when Jesus,
Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magón were out of Belén, which was not often.⁵

All but Regeneración and possibly El País relied on government subsidies. The slogan of the Díaz administration, pan o palo (bread or stick), applied stringently to the press. Papers that favored the Díaz administration found the association profitable. El Imparcial and the Mexico City Herald received government subsidies of about 50,000 pesos a year. In turn, they printed articles favorable to the administration. The Herald was particularly important as it was the source of most Associated Press copy from Mexico published in newspapers in the United States. The Herald was the favored newspaper of the regime and could boast of having the most (and most prestigious) advertising and the most pages per issue. From 1900 on, it ran between 12 and 24 pages — twice the size of El Imparcial, which was openly controlled by the government. Unlike the Spanish-language newspapers that relied heavily on subscriptions for circulation, the Herald was distributed through street sales, selling for 5 centavos in the city and 10 centavos on the trains. While there is no record of its circulation, it claimed to be "Mexico's largest" — larger than El Imparcial, which had reached a circulation of 40,000 by

⁵Diario del Hogar, January 1, 1901.
1900, and El País, which published more than 100,000 copies a day in 1908.6

Publishers ignored the most important ongoing news story of Mexico. Whether they were for or against Díaz, most informed Mexicans recognized Díaz's age as the most pressing problem of the 1900-1910 decade. While this subject was the theme of several articles in the New York Times, only one Mexican publication dealt with it.

El Hijo de Ahuizote, a weekly newspaper that featured political cartoons, was easily the most radical of the ongoing publications in Mexico. Like Mata, Daniel Cabrera, who founded El Hijo in 1885, had ties with Díaz that dated from the days of the Juárez presidency. As publisher, Cabrera gave the nod to caricatures that would be dangerous even in modern times, while still relying on government subsidies to upgrade his printing equipment.7

Díaz was almost always portrayed as an aging, foolish man in El Hijo de Ahuizote, and Cabrera paid a heavy price for his sense of humor: he was probably one of the few long-term Mexican publishers who spent as much time in Belen as did Mata. In a particularly scathing portrait in 1900, a crippled Díaz, supported by crutches labeled militarismo and

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7Personal interview with Jane Dale Lloyd.
clericalismo, limped down the stairs of unpopularity while the people looked on and laughed. Díaz also appeared as a disinterested observer of a hanging skeleton bearing the words "The Constitution" and of rigged elections. When the radicals of Mexico City sought to take over a publication it is no wonder they turned in 1903 to El Hijo, the publication that ran the words "Mexico for Mexicans" on its masthead. Cabrera leased his publication while still in Belen and was reincarcerated upon his release for being a party to the "new" El Hijo.  

Two years earlier Mata's son, Luis, had gone to jail for admitting to printing El Hijo de Ahuizote in his father's print shop after authorities closed down Cabrera's presses. Luis later praised his father for handling the situation with journalistic restraint. Mata reacted to his son's imprisonment by writing: "The violent repression of totally hostile actions toward a system of government established on a solid base of justice and morality . . . to avoid 'unsettling germs'. . . [is] abuse that would completely impede aspirations of progress." 

The caricatures for which Cabrerra was persecuted were not without a solid foundation in reality. In November 1900, the 71-year-old Díaz traveled to Oaxaca to hunt, but upon

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9 Mata, p. 59.
becoming too ill to go out he returned to the capital. When he remained bed-ridden and in semi-seclusion until spring, concerns about the succession developed among the politicians of Mexico. Already, the real power was slipping from him and the administration reflected the ambitions of the científicos. Administration officials engaged in political in-fighting -- largely between científico and non-científico porfirianos -- while the marginally independent press called for a return to adherence to the system of law created by the 1857 constitution.10

When Díaz regained his health, he proved he was still the grand master of Mexican politics. Always adept at using the press for his own ends, he planted in El Imparcial an article accusing the científicos of thievery and malfeasance, and the story was circulated in many pro-government publications. In 1904 Díaz saw to it that the constitution was again amended to provide him yet another six-year term and the post of Vice President was created. Díaz chose Ramon Corral for this position, a man so unpopular with all factions that he afforded no real political threat to the old man.11

Meanwhile, Filomeno Mata was reporting what he considered one of the most important news stories of the decade: the formation and growth of the **Club Liberal Ponciano Arriaga**. He wrote several stories about the organization in January, and he attended the club's first meeting in San Luis Potosí on February 5, 1901. The meeting had been called by Camilo Arriaga, an engineer by profession, who was upset about the resurgence in power of the Catholic church in Mexico. Arriaga organized the meeting in response to a Mexican bishop's statements at a general assembly of the International Congress of Catholic agencies in Paris the summer before. The priest had boasted that under Díaz, clerical economic and political elites had been re-established in Mexico. Of the 50 official delegates to the original meeting of the Club Liberal, nine were journalists. One of their first mandates was to establish more liberal clubs at local levels with the proviso that many of these clubs would produce their own newspapers, a common occurrence for political clubs in Mexico at that time.\(^\text{12}\)

From its anti-clerical beginnings, the Club Liberal Ponciano Arriaga developed into the **Partido Liberal Mexicano** and became, with small clubs spread throughout Mexico, the first real revolutionary threat to the Porfirian regime. In a public speech in July 1901, Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama, one of

\(^{12}\) Mata, p. 62; Cockcroft, pp. 92-93; Taracena, p. 61.
the organizers of the Club Liberal, described Díaz as a "caudillo who betrayed democracy, who holds the horseman's spur which today lacerates the horse and tomorrow disembowels the people." The speech was not covered in the Mexican press.  

Mata, one of the nine journalists at the original meeting of the Club Liberal, took a different tack in addressing the problem of Díaz. In June 1901 he urged Díaz, in print, to give "a demonstration of affection to the people from whom he took the power in 1876." The "demonstration of affection" Mata sought was relief from the defamation laws and the judges who administered the cases against journalists.  

Both Soto y Gama and Mata suffered judicial repercussions for their statements, and before the government temporarily closed Diario del Hogar in the summer of 1902, Mata wrote that the independent press of Mexico should have the same rights of every Mexican citizen. He advised fellow journalists not to rest on their laurels and to set the ideals of truth, good faith and honesty as a standard of publication. While the administration's case against Mata was in progress, he wrote: "We have received a lot of attention these last few days because of the legal proceedings of which we have been the subject. Our newspaper

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13 Cockcroft, p. 98.
14 Mata, pp. 63,64.
has always distinguished itself because of the frankness of the political opinions expressed in this section [el Boletín] without ambiguity, reticence, rancor or vacillation, and without subversive tendencies."\(^{15}\)

When the government shut down the offices of Diario del Hogar in Mexico City, the core group from San Luis Potosí assisted Mata in publishing the newspaper in that city. During this period Mata used his editorial space to plead for the freedom of Ricardo Flores Magón, the 28-year-old editor of La Regeneración.\(^{16}\)

La Regeneración, the most remembered pre-revolutionary newspaper, was begun in 1900 by Ricardo's older brother, Jesús. The paper began as a legal review, intended for scholarly publication covering judicial proceedings. Ricardo Flores Magón, who had been jailed during the 1893 repression of newspapers, had studied law and joined the staff as an editor. In fewer than three months the paper displayed the words "an organ of combat" on its masthead. Within six months, all three Flores Magón brothers were serving time in Belen because of a defamation suit brought against the paper by a provincial governor. Released in the spring of 1902, Jesús retired from anything that could be construed as "revolutionary activity" and quit journalism. Ricardo and

\(^{15}\)Ibid

\(^{16}\)Diario del Hogar, May 30, 1893.
Enrique leased *El Hijo de Ahuizote* from aging publisher Daniel Cabrera who was serving time in Belen. The two brothers were back in Belen before Cabrera was released, and the old man's term was extended for leasing his publication to them. Undaunted, Ricardo and Enrique published no fewer than eight versions of *El Hijo* during the next two years and were involved in the formation of the Mexico City chapter of the Club Liberal.\(^1\)

In 1903 Ricardo Flores Magon's excited statement that "The Díaz administration is a den of thieves" drew hisses and boos from the moderate conservatives to the second national congress of the Ponciano Arriaga convention in San Luis Potosí. The gap between the radicalism of Ricardo Flores Magón and the San Luis Potosí group narrowed as conservative members withdrew support.

As "liberals in this age of immense corruption," members of the national organization of the Club urged the "resurrection of the institution established by our fathers" to place limits on the power of both church and state. "We do not call you to revolution, but to save our country and to begin the measures necessary for our salvation. To this

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\(^1\) *Regeneracion*, various editions -- 1901, 1902, (While the Flores Magón brothers were imprisoned in 1901, the paper continued to be published by the staff. Throughout the fall of 1901 and winter of 1902, Jesús ran a small advertisement asking for employment as a lawyer); Cockcroft p. 98.
end, we are asking for the formation of many clubs, and, with a sharp pen, to give a brief history of our country."

That sharp pen, which called for a return to "order, the sanctity of law and guarantees of liberty," may well have been that of Ricardo Flores Magón. His style of writing was notable in that he addressed his audience directly, as did the Manifesto: "Is there equality in our country? . . . No. . . . Does business prosper in our country? . . . Only for a few millionaires, mostly foreigners. . . ." and so on, through a list of grievances that included the plight of agriculture, the lack of educational opportunities, the lack of intellectual freedom and the lack of respect for human life.19

In the summer of 1903, after publication of its Manifesto, the Club Liberal convened in San Luis Potosí for a second time. The Díaz regime outlawed the liberal clubs and arrested the most visible perpetrators. Diario del Hogar again carried the slogan "No Reelección" on its masthead and the paper covered the convention in San Luis Potosí and the arrests that followed. In its coverage of persecution of the activists, and especially the journalists imprisoned again in Belen, Mata's publication clashed editorially with the


19 Ibid, pp. 306-308.
journalistic giants of Mexico City. When Mata reported that Flores Magón and Juan Sarabia, both incarcerated in Belen, had called for an investigation of the treatment of prisoners in the prison, El País editorialized: "It is not the Bastille!" Mata replied that the prison should indeed be investigated, but that if Article 7 of the 1857 constitution were to be invoked there would be no need of the investigation because there would be no need of the prison.\textsuperscript{20}

Earlier, Mata had complained of El Imparcial that while some journalists languished in prison, "friends of the government" were allowed to publish not only slander, but falsehoods. Beyond that, Mata wrote, the Mexican press had adopted the "politics of silence."\textsuperscript{21}

But the worst, in Mata's eyes, was the Mexico City Herald, which he claimed provided the world with completely false information disguised as inept translating. In 1903, according to Diario, El Imparcial quoted Limantour as saying, "The plan does not contemplate placing Mexico on a gold standard immediately." The Herald's translation, "Mexico will abandon the silver standard and adopt the gold," had potentially serious effects since it was also the copy used by the Associated Press. Although there was

\textsuperscript{20}Diario del Hogar, June 17, 1903, and July 1, 1903.
\textsuperscript{21}Ibid, January 9 and May 19, 1903.
intense international pressure for Mexico to adopt the gold standard, the measure would further separate the rich from the poor in the country that was the largest silver producer in the world.²²

The Mexican press was permitted to report business news and, within reason, to lambaste the United States. Díaz himself was credited with saying, "Poor Mexico, so far from God, so close to the United States." Economics and foreign relations made safe topics for news articles and drew public interest. The revolution to come would be generated more by bad fiscal decisions than desire for social change. The social inequities existing in Mexico at the time stemmed from the control of Mexican resources by foreign powers and the extremely unbalanced distribution of real wealth in Mexico. At the turn of the century, almost all major industries, including the railroads, were owned by foreigners, and, in a country with a population of more than 15 million, there were fewer than 150,000 land owners.²³

From 1900 to 1905, journalists wrote about economic policy and the questions of re-election and foreign influence, often skirting dangerously close to the real concern of the new liberals of Mexico: corruption in the Díaz regime. Mata pushed the complaint with the following editorial:

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²²Ibid, May 19.

²³Roger D. Hansen, p. 27.
The continuing administration is the antithesis of democracy. The people raised this administration to power during the revolution of La Noria and of Tuxtepec, and when the revolution was triumphant, the fighters saw the end of their work, and opened their hearts to hope.

When General Diaz ended his first term of office and left the presidency, the hearts of his constituency, his friends, his companions of the struggle, [were] filled with glory, satisfied that their country had attained the ambitions which they had fought for. . . . Honor and Law give life, and the law can only be sustained with honor. . . . These principles, founded in the constitution and the reform [La Reforma] are the unmovable basis for progress and peace for Mexico.24

During 1903, 1904, and 1905, Diario del Hogar continued as one of the few Mexican newspapers editorially denouncing el continuismo, careful, as always, to phrase criticism against the administration in terms of the bureaucracy and not Díaz. When Mata, for instance, wrote about the problems of Yucatan, where slavery and massive poverty were common, his complaint centered not on social but on political conditions.25

During this period, another decisive split occurred in the Mexican press. Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magón had left Mexico in 1904 to publish Regeneración from the United States. The brothers had faced continual persecution since 1900 and on June 9, 1903, a Mexican court ordered that any

25Mata, p. 69.
publication that printed articles by Ricardo Flores Magón would be prosecuted under the defamation laws, including the psicologia test. The Flores Magón brothers, like many Mexican journalists before them, had no choice but to leave the country if they were to continue publishing.26

Unlike their predecessors, the brothers had no intention of publishing a paper aimed at Mexican immigrants to the United States. Because of their contacts through the Club Liberal, they planned to use their American sanctuary to attack directly what they perceived as the real problem of Mexico. In one of the first issues, Enrique wrote what could never have been published in Mexico:

Forever -- for as long as Mexico can remember -- today's slavery will be identified with the name of the devil that made it all possible. His name is Porfirio Díaz, and his bestiality is being carried out in Mexico. . . the jefes politicos do not send thieves and other criminals to jail -- rather they sell them as slaves. . . you may say that Díaz does not benefit directly from this human commerce. . . . But what about the governors of Veracruz, Oaxaca, Hidalgo, and other states, and their cronies who do benefit? Who appointed these governors? Porfirio Díaz. . . . But the day of liberation is coming. Prepare yourselves my fellow citizens.”

For the independent publishers in Mexico to provide editorial support for the Flores Magón brothers and what was becoming the Partido Liberal Mexicano would have been

26Ethel Duffy Turner, Revolution in Baja, p. viii..

tantamount to calling for armed revolution, so three
distinct elements came to exist in the Mexican press. These
consisted of the official, heavily subsidized press, which
preached continuismo; the moderately subsidized "independent
press," which called for adherence to the constitution of
1857; and the Flores Magón brothers, who smuggled their
paper into Mexico 30,000 copies at a time. The papers that
had supported Ricardo Flores Magón in his struggles against
the government before his expatriation began to look askance
at the U.S.-based group that called for violent revolution
in Mexico, while the PLM regarded all newspapers in Mexico
as controlled organs of the corrupt regime.
Ricardo Flores Magón, his brother Enrique and fellow journalist Santiago de la Hoz arrived in San Antonio, Texas, on January 3, 1904. They represented the editorial force of three important but defunct Mexico City publications — Regeneración, El Nieto del Ahuizote (an offshoot of El Hijo del Ahuizote) and Excélsior, begun in 1902. The government considered these the most radical independent newspapers in Mexico and closed all three.

The three men had just been released from Belen, and prison officials informed Ricardo that the Díaz administration intended to kill him if he continued publishing in Mexico. From the perceived safety of the United States, the Flores Magón brothers were to launch a protest that would be a forerunner to the revolution of 1910 and, during the next four years, they were to become a major ideological force against the Díaz regime.¹

Born in 1874, Ricardo was the son of a soldier who had fought for Díaz during the revolt of 1876. Of all the independent journalists in Mexico, Ricardo probably had the closest ties to the indigenous population. Although the Flores Magóns sent all three sons to Mexico City to be educated, they maintained tribal customs in their home. The

¹Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 60.
family was not wealthy, though, and Jesús, the oldest, was the only one to complete his schooling and obtain his law degree. All three brothers, however, developed an interest in journalism and politics.  

Ricardo began opposing the Díaz regime in 1892 when, at 19, he joined the staff of the paper El Democrata. He and other staff members of the newspaper were jailed in the spring of 1893. After his release from Belen in the fall, he stayed out of print for seven years. During this period, Ricardo studied the political thinkers of his time and was influenced by Marx and Engels, among others. From his moderate beginnings, he began a life-long journey always moving to the political left.

As editor of Regeneración, Ricardo was jailed in 1900. As editor of El Hijo del Ahuizote, he was jailed again in 1902. As editor of El Nieto del Ahuizote, Ricardo was sentenced to a Mexican prison for the last time in June 1903. By this time, his name was synonymous with protest and the administration would tolerate no more, officially decreeing on June 9, 1903, that any publication printing his writings was guilty of sedition and privately warning him to cease his activity under penalty of death. But Ricardo was not to be so easily intimidated. A heavy-set chain-smoker and hard worker, always active and well organized, Ricardo was "a

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fanatic for his cause." While serving his final sentence in Belen, Ricardo, with Enrique and several others, made plans to move the publishing operation to the United States where they could continue to print anti-Díaz information without their lives being endangered.3

Texas provided only false security, however. The drowning of their friend, de la Hoz, further provoked the Flores Magón brothers. De la Hoz, a widely known poet and journalist, had been an avid opponent of the Díaz regime and the brothers believed, with good reason, that porfírian agents were responsible for his death. The incident made one aspect of their situation clear to them: no matter where they went they would not be safe from porfírian henchmen.4

Their older brother, Jesús, remained in Mexico and mildly opposed his brothers' fight against the regime. Jesús, who founded Regeneración, retired from journalism after he had been imprisoned in 1900 for his involvement with that publication. While in Belen he placed a standing ad in his newspaper stating his intention to return to the legal profession and after being released he became a full-time attorney in Mexico City. While morally and financially supportive of his brothers, Jesús did not believe that the


people of Mexico would support a violent revolution. He also feared for his brothers' safety. As a lawyer, he witnessed the corruption of the porfirian courts and knew that in Mexico protection under law was a facade.\footnote{Jesus Flores Magón to Ricardo Flores Magón, June 7, 1904. M-B 18 part I, Folder 2 of 14, Terrazas Collection; Regeneración, 1901.}

Jesús assessed the situation correctly. While still in Mexico, Ricardo found it necessary to surround himself with supporters to protect himself from porfirian thugs. He believed that he and his companions would find a haven in the United States. He was wrong. His friend de la Hoz died, probably at the hands of agents of the Mexican government and, soon after the first issue of Regeneración to be published in the United States was printed in November 1905, Ricardo was attacked by a man with a knife. When Enrique intervened, police arrived and arrested him. The brothers decided to move their operation to St. Louis, thinking it would be safe to publish a paper in what Ethel Duffy Turner described as "the heart of a nation that guaranteed freedom of the press." Jesús agreed that the move to St. Louis was prudent: "I'm glad to hear you're leaving San Antonio. I'm sure that Saint Louis will be better and that you'll be able to work with more freedom." He also advised Ricardo to
consult with government authorities in Missouri and study
U.S. laws concerning extradition.6

Jesús also believed that Ricardo could present before a
U.S. court a case that would force Mexico to allow
Regeneración to circulate through the Mexican mails.
Distribution of the newspaper was one of two major problems
Ricardo faced as publisher. Because the Mexican government
banned the publication from the mail system, Ricardo
established along the Texas border a network of shopkeepers
who smuggled the papers into the Mexico. Private detectives
obtained actual subscription lists when they raided the St.
Louis office. One such list, most likely a bookkeeping
record from one of the border distributors, contained 693
names and addresses of subscribers. About one-third of them
were in the United States, mostly in Texas, while the
remainder were scattered throughout Mexico, but especially
in the northern states of Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango and
Sonora. These newspapers were often hand-delivered at
considerable personal risk -- rurales were known to shoot
people for possessing a copy of Regeneración.7

6Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 69; Jesús to Ricardo, March 15,
1905. M-B 18 part I, Folder 2 of 14, Terrazas Collection.

7Jesús to Ricardo, September 6, 1905. M-B 18 part I, Folder
2 of 14; 15-page subscription list dated 1906, M-B 18, part
I, Folder 11A of 14, Terrazas Collection; Cockcroft, pp.
123-124.
The second problem — raising enough money to continue publishing — proved harder to solve. Camilio Arriaga paid for the brothers' flight from Mexico. Arriaga, too, was a fugitive and had been an early influence on the political thinking of Ricardo. Arriaga, a member of a well-to-do mining family, had one of the best private libraries in Mexico. From this collection Ricardo borrowed books by famous leftists of the day. Arriaga, an acquaintance of some of the most powerful men in Mexico (Frances Bulnes had sat on Arriaga's thesis committee when he received his master's degree in mining), had gone into exile to the United States at the same time as the Flores Magóns. He continued to fund Regeneración when it was published in San Antonio and arranged a $2,000 (U.S.) loan from Francisco Madero to pay for printing the paper. When the brothers and their companions, now calling themselves the Junta del Partido Liberal Mexicano or PLM, moved their operation to St. Louis, Arriaga began to have misgivings. He recognized that Ricardo was assuming leadership of the movement and worried that the ties the Flores Magón brothers had with the radical left in the United States, including anarchist Emma Goldman, would discredit the movement. In early 1906, he separated himself from the group and withdrew all of his financial aid. 8

8Cockcroft, pp. 123-124.
Eventually, *Regeneración* came to rely heavily on the U.S. left for financial support, but while the paper was published in St. Louis it was funded by small contributions and money from subscriptions. During this period the subscription list grew to more than 20,000, with subscribers in Mexico and the Mexican-American communities in the United States. The *junta*, as the St. Louis group identified itself, sold subscriptions for $3.50 (Mexican) and often received additional donations, but much of this money, along with accompanying requests for subscriptions, was confiscated by both the Mexican and United States governments. In September, 1906, a Mexican subscriber wrote, "It bothers me greatly that you have not answered my previous two letters," and warned Ricardo to be extremely careful with his correspondence.  

How much money was received at the paper's office is unknown, although the Flores Magón brothers could pay themselves a salary of only $10 or less a week during their time in St. Louis. Jesús had been sending his brothers what money he could, but by September he was becoming even more disenchanted with the idea of revolution, writing to them:

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9Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 75; 15-page subscription list dated 1906, M-B 18, part I, Folder 11A of 14, Terrazas Collection; Ancelmo Verlarde to Ricardo Flores Magón, September 15, 1906, M-B 18 part I, Folder 2 of 14, Terrazas Collection. U.S. government involvement in the persecution of the PLM was a reflection of its policy toward American leftists, including the Industrial Workers of the World, which became closely aligned with the PLM.
"Although you call me an alarmist, and many other things that you may think but do not tell me . . . I will repeat a thousand times that the road of revolution is that which the least will follow." Later in the month he reiterated his concerns: "I don't believe that the people are ready for a revolution, and I also don't believe that you have enough prestige to provoke a fight." 10

Whether or not Ricardo Flores Magón had the influence to generate an armed revolution is still debatable, but both the Mexican and U.S. governments considered him dangerous. Governor of Chihuahua Enrique Creel, acting on behalf of Díaz, hired a private detective agency to spy on the PLM. The Díaz regime also sent gifts to officials in the United States for their cooperation in the ongoing surveillance operation. The U.S. Secret Service, operating under the project code name, "Joe Priest," kept PLM members under surveillance and helped Arizona lawmen to arrest several PLM members in Arizona during the fall of 1906. Despite differences between U.S. and Mexican defamation law, U.S. officials arrested Ricardo and Enrique Flores Magón and Juan Sarabia on Mexican defamation charges in October, 1905. Twelve private detectives, undeputized and without a warrant, raided the St. Louis office and confiscated the

10 Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 79; Jesús Flores Magón to R. Flores Magón, September 19 and September 27, 1905, M-B 18 part I, Folder 2 of 14, Terrazas Collection.
press and files. The journalists raised the $10,000 bond and were released after spending two months in jail, but they received from Mexico information that they would be re-arrested and extradited to Mexico.  

Isolating Ricardo's journalistic achievements from his political endeavors is impossible, but it should be noted that the U.S.-based Regeneración provided not only anti-Díaz propaganda but information that was not readily available in the press, Mexican or international. Topics such as the treatment of Indians in Mexico and the influence of the American corporations on the Mexican government received coverage, sometimes for the first time. These articles eventually drew the attention of the American left wing, whose ideals were close to those of Ricardo. Throughout 1906, Ricardo was convinced that the revolution was imminent and that its success was assured. By this time, he had taken the title of president of the PLM and his main concern was that there were more PLM supporters in Mexico than arms. "The triumph will be quick," he wrote a friend. PLM support was particularly strong in northern Mexico where Regeneración was more accessible because of border traffic. Governor of Chihuahua Enrique Creel, with the aid of the U.S. government, intercepted more than 3,000 letters sent to the junta, many containing subscription requests, word of

11Cockcroft, pp. 125, 126 and 128.
support and money. Creel kept lists of individuals and groups supporting the PLM.\textsuperscript{12}

On March 16, 1906, Ricardo and Enrique and Juan Sarabia left St. Louis for Canada, leaving the publication of \textit{Regeneración} to Antonio I. Villarreal, Librado Rivera and Manuel Sarabia. Surveillance by the Pinkertons had become so intense that Ricardo felt that work on the current PLM project, the manifesto that would call for revolution in Mexico, could not be continued. The group hoped that civil liberties would be stronger in the United Kingdom and that the Canadian government might afford them some protection from the Pinkertons. They were wrong. They went first to Toronto and then to Montreal, but the private detectives stayed with them. The group was in Montreal when the strike at Cananea occurred, but not for long. Ricardo interpreted the strike as the first move in the coming revolution and immediately made plans to leave for Mexico.\textsuperscript{13}

On June 1, 1906, Mexican miners struck against the Cananea Copper Company in Cananea, Sonora. The strikers demanded that Mexican miners receive wages equal to those of U.S. citizens who worked at the mine. Mexican miners were paid less than half what workers from the United States received.

\textsuperscript{12}Flores Magón to Antonio Balboa, September 3, 1906, various letters, M-B 18 part I, Folder 2 of 14, Terrazas collection; Cockcroft, p. 128.

\textsuperscript{13}Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 83.
The strike lasted fewer than 36 hours and was crushed with the aid of 200 American "volunteers" from Arizona, but it drew U.S. press attention to the growing problem of anti-Americanism in Mexico. And, for the first time, the U.S. public became aware of the possibility of revolution in that country and the abundance of anti-U.S. sentiment in Mexico.

The strike was fostered by cooperation between PLM supporters and the Western Federation of Miners, the U.S. union that later spawned the Industrial Workers of the World. To what extent the PLM was involved is uncertain (although William Greene, the owner of the company, later placed full responsibility on the St. Louis Junta), but the connection between the PLM and the American left wing was solidified, at least in the minds of U.S. and Mexican officials.\(^\text{14}\)

While the U.S. government was aware of Ricardo Flores Magón, neither the press nor the general public knew anything about him. When the PLM junta was accused of culpability for the strike, both the New York Times and the Associated Press, in the articles they released reporting Greene's allegations, displayed their ignorance of the situation in Mexico and the personalities involved. The

Times referred to Flores Magon as "a man named Magoon" while the Associated Press called him "R. Flores Maghood."

Two weeks after the strike, the PLM issued its proclamation calling for radical change in the Mexican government. The program contained 52 separate points, all in basic disagreement with the current regime, including clauses that would prohibit the reelection of the president, curtail the powers of military and political bosses, and guarantee freedom of the press. The program was a double-edged sword because not only did it criticize the Diaz regime but it called for strict limits on foreign involvement in the political and economic life of Mexico. It urged Mexicans to choose between liberty and "humiliation before the foreigners." Many PLM supporters worked on the program. Although the Programa del Partido Liberal was not as radical as Flores Magon would have liked, it was the most radical document produced by Mexican politics, surpassing the Constitution of 1917 that would draw heavily from the ideas it contained, especially in labor and land reform.

While the PLM program is revered in Mexican history, its publication in 1906 was actually detrimental to the PLM cause. Many well-to-do Mexican PLM supporters, beginning to


16 Programa del Partido Liberal July 1, 1906, as reprinted in La Revolucion Mexicana, Tomo I; Cockcroft, p. 30.
feel the crunch of Mexico's fading economy and the world-wide economic depression of 1907-1911, withdrew their support. The Mexican press, official and independent alike, unanimously opposed the radicalism, and both Filomeno Mata in Mexico City and Sylvestre Terrazas in Chihuahua broke their ties with Flores Magón. He represented the threat of violent revolution, something unacceptable to all publishers in Mexico. These men continued to believe Mexico's future would be best served by the simple enforcement of the constitution of 1857.  

Ricardo Flores Magón traveled from Canada to El Paso in August to organize an armed revolution against Díaz. The fortunes of the PLM were quickly waning. The junta could only afford transportation to Texas for two men. Enrique had to stay in Canada where he was employed as a day laborer for $9 a week, and Librado Rivera struggled to continue publication of Regeneración in St. Louis. The publication had been hurt in February by a U.S. postal decision that dictated that all copies of the paper had to be sent by first-class mail. PLM efforts were further damaged when Francisco Madero publicly rebutted the PLM in September over the program. "Díaz is not a tyrant," he told a reporter. "He may be somewhat rigid, but he is not a tyrant."  

17 Personal interview with Jane Dale Lloyd.  
18 Cockcroft, p. 129; Turner pp. 94 and 103.
PLM supporters, operating from Texas and Arizona, claimed credit for several small revolutionary skirmishes in northern Mexico between 1906 and 1908, but the revolutionaries were easily defeated. In El Paso, Antonio Villareal was arrested and jailed for several months. Ricardo Flores Magón kept moving. He later described that period: "The secret services of two countries chased me from one place to the other, from city to city. It was a question of life or death for me, because my arrest would mean my immediate passage to Mexico and murder without any appearance of justice." In February 1907, Ricardo Flores Magón was in San Francisco and Librado Rivera had moved the operations of Regeneración to Los Angeles, where the name of the publication was temporarily changed to Revolución.¹⁹

Flores Magón's fears were not unfounded. In October 1906, Juan Sarabia and nine other PLM supporters were arrested in Mexico. Some of the men were fined and sentenced to prison terms from one month to two years. Those who were closely linked with Flores Magón were given long prison sentences and shipped to Mexico City where they remained in prison until Díaz fell from power in 1911. The government continued its search for dissidents.²⁰

¹⁹Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 114.
²⁰Alameda, Tomo I. p. 114.
Throughout 1906 and 1907, Mexican intelligence reported names of PLM supporters to political officials. Vice President Ramón Corral and Chihuahua Governor Enrique Creel traded information, making support of the PLM a dangerous activity. *Regeneración* had promised secrecy to PLM supporters in 1906, but the raids on the newspaper offices and confiscation of letters, both in the United States and in Mexico, had made these people known and legal action was taken against many of them. Even Mexicans living in the United States were not safe. In March 1907, a politician in Juárez wrote Díaz, telling him that there were 100 to 150 men meeting in El Paso, planning an armed revolt. He implied the action would not come to pass, because the police chief of El Paso was cooperative with the motives of the Mexican government.21

On August 25, 1907, Ricardo Flores Magón, Librado Rivera and Antonio Villareal were arrested in Los Angeles by the private detective Thomas Furlong, an operative working for Enrique Creel. The three were charged by the Los Angeles Police Department with resisting arrest, murder and robbery, criminal defamation, murder of a "Juan Perez" in Mexico and conspiracy to violate the neutrality laws. Furlong acted without a legal warrant, and the charges spurred a three-

21 Various letters from jefes políticos, etc. and, specifically, Ricardo R. Rangel to Porfirio Díaz, March 18, 1907. M-B, Part I, Folder 14, Terrazas collection.
year-long legal battle. The men remained in jail until 1910, but what they had begun continued.  

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Northern Mexico provided a natural setting for revolution. In a sense, the area was to Mexico what the West was to the United States, a distant land populated by independent pioneers who resented the intrusion of foreign interests or the federal government. Mining and railroads brought fledgling unions to the "hot country." In Douglas, Arizona, a newly-formed Western Federation of Miners chapter played a part in the Cananea strike. Although the Mexican miners in northern Mexico were among the highest-paid laborers in Mexico, they became aware of how poorly their wages compared to those of their counterparts in the United States and those U.S. citizens employed at the mines.

Enrique Creel, governor of Chihuahua and son-in-law of Luis Terrazas, spent considerable time and money keeping track of the St. Louis junta and potential revolutionaries. Thomas Furlong, a private detective tracking the Flores Magón brothers, reported directly to Creel, who also received information from politicians in Chihuahua. When several junta members were arrested in the United States during the fall of 1906, the Chihuahua politicians rejoiced and predicted a quick end to the bothersome junta. They gathered lists of junta supporters and suggested legal
action against the disloyal. Creel sent a "black list" to Vice President Ramón Corral in Mexico City.¹

Silvestre Terrazas's name did not appear on any of those lists. Don Sylvestre knew of the Flores Magons, and, at one time, supported their cause. The publisher disagreed with the PLM on the issue of armed revolt. _El Grito del Puebla_, not _El Correo de Chihuahua_, was the "radical" newspaper of Chihuahua. Don Silvestre, like many newspaper editors and publishers in Mexico, believed that the answers to Mexico's problems lay in adherence to existing law. In 1905, he reprinted from the Veracruz newspaper, _La Opinión_, an editorial that criticized the Díaz regime and opposed the president's reelection. When other northern Mexico newspapers criticized _El Correo de Chihuahua_ for publishing the editorial, Don Sylvestre replied in print that _El Correo_ had merely reprinted the opinion and not generated it. Reprinting controversial articles from other publications was a common ploy of publishers who tried, as did Don Silvestre, to retain a level of political objectivity.²

Until 1907, Don Silvestre prospered in the publishing business and success made him an unlikely revolutionary. By mid-decade, _El Correo_ boasted adequate circulation and

¹S. Montemayor to Enrique Creel, October 21, 1906. M-B 18, part 1, Folder 12A of 14, Terrazas Collection; Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 107.

²Jane Dale Lloyd interview; Sandels, p. 118.
advertising to expand and improve its facilities. In 1904, Don Silvestre imported the first Linotype to northern Mexico and celebrated its installation by inviting local dignitaries, including Governor Creel, to a ceremony at the newspaper's office. Don Silvestre constantly improved both the design and content of his paper and was actively involved in advertising sales. The newspaper he had published in 1899 lacked advertising and legitimate news—mistakes Don Silvestre would not make again. In 1906, El Correo reduced its column size (which usually means an increase in advertising revenues, even in four-page papers) and increased its use of wire-service articles. Don Silvestre hired his brother-in-law, Ignacio Perches Enrique, as administrator. Clearly, Don Silvestre viewed journalism as a business as well as a profession.3

As a businessman, Don Silvestre had two on-going complaints against the government. First, he had become an ardent critic of the Mexican postal system, which he viewed as overly expensive and inefficient. Secondly, he was concerned with the price of newsprint. In his position as head of the Catholic Press Association, Don Silvestre sent queries to other Mexican newspapers, asking if they purchased newsprint from foreign sources and how the prices compared. These activities put him in constant touch with

3Ibid, p. 80, El Correo de Chihuahua, June, 1906; personal interview with Margarita Terrazas.
fellow publishers and may have been the impetus for the formation in 1908 of the Mexican Press Association of the States, which Don Silvestre would serve as president. 4

Don Silvestre devoted considerable space in El Correo to the strike at Cananea. In fact, one of the first, if not the first, photographs published in Correo was of the U.S. "volunteers" in Cananea. The coverage began four days after the strike, a typical delay in coverage of Mexican news. El Correo ran an accurate front-page news story, but ended it by questioning government attitudes toward American and Mexican interests. On June 8, the paper reprinted a critical article from El Tiempo of Mexico City that said, "It has been shown that the Americans were responsible, and that the [Mexican] multitude were disarmed and peaceful. . . . This castigation [of the Americans] is necessary because it shows foreigners that when they are in a different land, they should respect the law." 5

Newspapers in both the United States and Mexico played the strike as an important story, but with different emphasis. The U.S. press, spurred by both imagination and a near-hysterical telegram from a U.S. consular official in Cananea ("all of our lives are in danger"), treated the story as an indication of the rising tide of anti-Americanism in Mexico

5El Correo De Chihuahua, June 4, 6 and 8, 1906.
and unwittingly displayed U.S. prejudices against Mexicans. For the inaccurate Associated Press story, the Great Falls (Montana) Tribune created this headline:

MURDERED IN MEXICO
Enraged Greasers Slaughter
Forty-five Americans below Arizona Line
GREEN'S CAMP DOOMED
Drunken Mexicans using Dynamite to
Blow Up Great Mills and Smelters in Prosperous Copper Camp
-- Troops Sent to Capture and Punish Ringleaders

Actually, only four Americans had been killed while 18 Mexicans died in the violence. Subsequent Associated Press reports, as well as other sources, reported that there were no dynamiters and little, if any, drinking among the Mexican strikers. El Correo de Chihuahua published this information, as well as the major demand of the strikers: an end to the bilateral wage system for Mexicans and U.S. citizens. Don Silvestre had his own editorial bias. While aware of the necessity of U.S. investment in Mexico, Correo de Chihuahua indulged in the accepted practice of criticizing U.S. activities and those of U.S. citizens in Mexico.7

Enrique Creel and Don Silvestre differed in their views of U.S. interests in Mexico. The governor, soon to be named ambassador to the United States, controlled the power

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7 El Correo de Chihuahua, June 4, 6 and 8.
structure in Chihuahua, which benefited directly from doing business with the United States. Since 1898, Creel had served on the board of El Banco Central Mexicano, used heavily by the Mexican government. In Chihuahua, the Terrazas-Creel clan owned 80 percent of the Banco Minero and held monopolies in many businesses, including the Chihuahua phone company and trolley system. By the end of the Porfiriato, the family owned 7 million acres of land and more than 1.5 million cattle. The total (U.S.) value of the clan was estimated at more than $25 million.8

Don Silvestre wrote to a populace he perceived as being exploited by the United States. He believed U.S. investment was good for Mexico but resented the attitudes of some U.S. businessmen in Mexico. In August 1906, he criticized William Greene, the man against whom the Mexican miners had struck:

He is permitted the luxury of cruising the continent in sumptuous special cars; playing the stock market which allows him to stand with impunity, rifle in hand, pistol at his belt, before a mass of workers, who answer rifle shots with stones; for this [reason] he can employ 12,000 workers to whom he only pays a salary imposed by a well known principle of political economy, that teaches us that prices of property, like salaries, are subject to supply and demand. . . . It is false, foolish and stupid to assert that he pays double what other companies pay. . . . In Cananea he pays mine laborers 3.50 pesos . . . in Santa Eulalia . . . where the cost of living is 30

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to 40 percent less than in Cananea, they are paid 2.50 and 3.00 pesos.

Neither Don Silvestre nor Enrique Creel realized that their perceived enemies were only that. The real conflict in Chihuahua was between these two men and the groups they represented--the privileged elite and the stymied middle class. The Cananea strike exacerbated the conflict but was basically unrelated, a skirmish from the lowest of Mexican society against the highest.

The Mexican press, including the Mexico City Herald, reported the strike as a Mexican-American conflict and editors gave free flight to their nationalistic tendencies. Don Silvestre did not support unions as there were no unions in Chihuahua to support in 1906. However, he did support the fraternal guilds of craftsmen formed in Chihuahua, predecessors to unions. Further, Don Silvestre linked the strike to problems in government and reprinted an article from El Tercer Imparo that stated boldly: "The continuation of power of General Díaz is a threat to both our democratic form of government and to our national prestige."  

Chihuahua, however, was a relatively safe place from which to criticize Díaz. Don Porfirio did not rule Chihuahua: Don Luis did. But Don Silvestre began attacking the Chihuahua

9El Correo de Chihuahua, September 24, 1906, as translated in Sandels, p. 108.
10Mexican Herald, June 6, 1906; El Correo de Chihuahua, June 12, 1906.
government in print. A staff-written article described the state government as static because of its domination by the Terrazas-Creel clan. The editorial reflected Don Silvestre's belief that "A truly independent press . . . is capable of moving the world."11

Don Silvestre gave editorial space to social issues, such as education and alcoholism in Chihuahua, and acted on those concerns by participating in local government. He served a term as a Chihuahua city councilman from 1902 to 1904 and introduced local ordinances to lower the consumption of alcohol. His interest in alcohol, partially generated by employees who occasionally came to work drunk, led to his belief that poverty and lack of education were the primary causes of alcoholism. Terrazas blamed the Terrazas-Creel clan for the social conditions in Chihuahua but not, at least at first, in print. From 1906, though, the feud between the Terrazas-Creel clan, specifically Enrique Creel and El Correo de Chihuahua, was discernible to the casual reader.12

Enrique Creel was not the elected governor of Chihuahua, but served as an interim governor acting on behalf of Luis Terrazas, elected to replace a governor who resigned to

11*El Correo de Chihuahua*, June 11 and 12, July 6 and 7, 1906.

12Sandels, pp. 78-79; personal interview with Margarita Terrazas.
accept the governorship in another state. In June 1906, Terrazas began publishing a "Talks on Law" column and one of his main topics was the possible re-election of Don Luis. Don Silvestre had always politically supported his "uncle," as he referred to the old man, but questioned the technicality of his reelection and, through his contacts in the publishing business, asked other newspapers in northern Mexico to do the same.13

In late 1906, Díaz named Creel ambassador to the United States and it seemed that he would be out of the running for the gubernatorial elections of 1907. When Don Silvestre learned that Creel intended to run for governor anyway, he used his "Talks on Law" column to quote a Mexican law that stated that a governor of Chihuahua must be Mexican by birth. Don Silvestre was adamant about this and was prejudiced against non-Mexicans. "If we elect somebody named 'Green' now," he would tell his family, "pretty soon we will elect somebody named 'Wong.'"14

On April 3, 1907, Don Silvestre was arrested on the power of the psicologia on defamation charges brought by a Chihuahua policeman. In an editorial headlined "We Want Guarantees," Don Silvestre accused the police of illegal

13 Sandels, pp. 126-127; personal interview with Margarita Terrazas.
14 Sandels, p. 30; personal interview with Margarita Terrazas.
arrests and searches. The publisher spent 13 days in jail and, on his release, discovered that advertisers with close ties to the Terrazas-Creel clan had canceled their advertising. Don Silvestre quoted other journalists who asserted that the imprisonment illustrated the emergence of political harassment in Chihuahua. Don Silvestre, however, continued his editorials against the Creel nomination. 15

The conflict between Don Silvestre and Governor Creel reached its zenith in 1908 over a bizarre incident that may never be completely understood: the robbery of the Banco Minero of 300,000 pesos on March 1, the largest bank robbery in Chihuahua. The building that housed the bank still stands in downtown Chihuahua. The walls, which the robbers penetrated on a Sunday afternoon, were between two- and three-feet thick. At the time of the robbery, Enrique Creel lived on the top floor of the building. His brother Juan was president of the bank.

After the robbery, the police arrested and/or detained many people, often holding them incommunicado for several days. Those arrested and released claimed to have been tortured. Don Silvestre took special interest in the robbery and later told his family that he knew that Juan Creel was ultimately responsible.

15Sandels, p. 131; El Correo de Chihuahua, March 16, 1907.
Whether or not that was true has never been resolved, but the remnants of the case, the suits against the Creel family resulting from the various arrests made, lasted well into the 1940s. The first people formally charged in the case were released after Correo de Chihuahua published articles placing the suspects far from the bank during the robbery.

Eight months after the crime, police arrested three Chihuahua youths who confessed to the crime, but after they were convicted, letters from them to President Diaz became public. The youths charged that Juan Creel not only had masterminded the robbery, but had come to the bank, supervised the tunneling through the wall and collected the loot himself.

When the boys were arrested, Juan Creel had advised them, through a messenger, that if they confessed to being the "sole authors of the crime" they would receive light sentences, special treatment in prison and 20,000 to 25,000 pesos when they were released. In November, Don Silvestre received those letters and published them in El Correo, as he published all the legal documents generated by the case.

Don Silvestre was imprisoned briefly in 1909 because of his outspoken criticism of the Creel family during the investigation. The specific charges against him, though, were tied to the "We Want Guarantees" editorial. Creel was obviously upset by Don Silvestre's growing journalistic
conscience. The feud between the two men would extend through the revolution.\textsuperscript{16}

Some strange alliances were formed during the conflict. On several occasions, Porfirio Díaz interceded, twice in support of Don Silvestre. In 1911, when Abraham Gonzales represented the revolutionary government as governor, Francisco I. Madero intervened on behalf of Enrique Creel. Madero wrote Gonzales: "It is impossible to attribute the blame [for the robbery] to Señor Creel or any of them, since four-fifths of the capital of the bank is precisely theirs." Madero urged that trifles, such as Creel's personal interrogation of suspects in the robbery, not be held against him. Gonzales let the substance of the letter be known, further discrediting Creel.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16}This account of the Banco Minero robbery is drawn largely from Sandels, pages 144-147, but is also taken from the ongoing coverage of the robbery in El Correo de Chihuahua, information from "Biografía" by Margarita Terrazas and my inspection in Chihuahua of the bank building on July 3, 1986, and an extended conversation with Margarita Terrazas on this particular subject. According to Señorita Terrazas, her "Biografía" was censored and the parts that implicated the Creel family were removed. She republished her "Biografía" in the Boletín de la Sociedad de Estudios Historicos, October-December, 1984, Number 11, pp. 9-14, for the specific purpose of publishing information about the robbery. Unfortunately, the dates she used in this article were incorrect. However, Señorita Terrazas was convinced, as her father had been before her, that Juan Creel was the mastermind behind the bank robbery for one simple reason: only the president of the bank would have the audacity to supervise a party of three men cutting a hole in the stone wall of a bank in a business district on a Sunday afternoon.

\textsuperscript{17}Personal interview with Jane Dale-Lloyd; Sandels, p. 149; Alameda, La Revolución en el Estado de Chihuahua, p. 92.
While the bank robbery was being investigated and debated in *El Correo*, Don Silvestre was also involved in establishing the Mexican Press Association of the States. Provincial editors held preliminary meetings in Aguacalientes in January 1908, inviting newspaper publishers from every part of Mexico except Mexico City to join. Don Silvestre recognized that the publishers in the provinces and those in the capital faced different problems. From his earliest days as a journalist, he also distrusted the newspapers of the capital because they were so heavily involved with the subsidy system. That distrust did not extend to Filomeno Mata, who wrote to encourage the idea of a press association and to praise Don Silvestre for his newspaper.\(^{18}\)

The formation of the Press Association was an act of faith on the part of the independent journalists of the Mexican states. Don Silvestre published a lengthy poem by Guillermo Aguirre y Fierro honoring the new organization: "In other ages/ the press lost their rights because of immoral tyrants/ but in the evolution of the world/ they [the rights] will be guaranteed." The poet concludes, supposedly

\(^{18}\)Mata to Terrazas, July 28, 1910, M-B 18 part II, folder 4, Terrazas collection; *El Correo de Chihuahua*, January 25, 1908; *El Correo de Chihuahua*, prospectus, December 1, 1898, M-B 18, part II, Terrazas collection.
speaking for all the independent journalists of Mexico: "We are brothers."\textsuperscript{19}

Don Silvestre placed significance on the term "independent journalist." Political clubs offered him positions before and after the revolution, but he declined, fearing it would threaten his position as an independent journalist. After the death of his friend Abraham Gonzales, he served Pancho Villa as civilian governor of Chihuahua.\textsuperscript{20}

The press association met for the first time in Puebla in May, 1908. Many Mexican publishers had learned to avoid becoming involved in politics, but many who attended did so to protest persecution of the press. Many of those same publishers would also become involved in the anti-reelection movement that would begin the next year. In many cases, their reasons would be financial as well as political. Many of the publishers of independent newspapers were losing business to newspapers controlled and supported by local governments, such as \textit{El Norte} in Chihuahua. By 1908, in the face of this competition, \textit{El Correo} was published only three times a week.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{19}El Correo de Chihuahua, May 25, 1908. This is a simple translation of the poem. No attempt has been made to recreate poetic rhythm or rhyme.


\textsuperscript{21}Ochoa Campos, p. 127.
The emergence of the Press Association of the States facilitated two specific kinds of information. First, the Press Association became a clearing house for information concerning persecution of newspapers, always a popular topic among independent Mexican journalists. Secondly, the Association facilitated the flow of copy from one paper to the next. In 1908, Luis Cabrera, a radical Mexico City journalist, began circulating an anti-porfirian column under the pen name Blas Urrea. Newspapers throughout Mexico, including El Correo de Chihuahua, ran the articles, which originated from El Partido Democratico. The publishers defended publication of the anti-científico articles on the grounds that they were merely reprinting information already published. It did not work. Eventually, some 39 Mexican newspapers faced legal charges for carrying the articles, many of them Press Association members.22

Another result of Don Silvestre's involvement with the Press Association was his acquaintance with many of the people who would play prominent roles in the 1910 revolution, including José María Pino Suárez, a Press Association member from Yucatan who would become Madero's vice president. The Press Association, in effect, became a means by which various publishers -- most of whom belonged

to the economic class that would philosophically control the revolution -- could transmit their complaints against the porfirian regime. Many of those complaints were regional in nature, such as illegal imprisonment in the Yucatan or high taxes in Chihuahua. Many, if not most, of the publishers were concerned with U.S. economic involvement in Mexico.

In 1908, two U.S. journalists came to Mexico. James Creelman and John Kenneth Turner were political opposites. Creelman, writing for the establishment press, is often credited with starting the Mexican Revolution. Turner, influenced by Ricardo Flores Magón, was responsible for giving the U.S. public the first realistic view of social conditions in Mexico under Porfirio Díaz.
Chapter 7
THE AMERICANS AND MEXICAN POLITICS: 1908-1909

In 1908 and 1909, Mexican politicians and newspapermen formed alliances that would last through the Madero revolt of 1910-1911. The moderates claimed the first victory in the series of revolts between 1910 and 1920, collectively known as the Mexican Revolution. This faction opposed not only the government but also the conservative out-of-power porfiristas and the exiled PLM.

The moderates of 1908, not yet the revolutionaries of 1910, held a world view more similar to that of the porfiristas than that of the PLM. Yet the PLM, not the moderates, first addressed the problems of mass Mexican poverty and, in so doing, gathered the kindling that fueled the entire Revolution. The Revolution was fought by the poor, illiterate masses, and the PLM alone believed it should be fought for them.

Early in 1908, John Kenneth Turner, a reporter for the Los Angeles Examiner, interviewed Ricardo Flores Magón in a Los Angeles jail where the Mexican journalist-turned-revolutionary awaited trial for violation of neutrality laws. The PLM leader described social conditions in Mexico and at first the 29-year-old Turner expressed skepticism, especially about the exile's account of slavery in the
Yucatán. In Barbarous Mexico he described his first response to the charges:

"Slavery? Do you mean to tell me there is any real slavery left in the Western Hemisphere?" I scoffed. "Bah! You are talking like an American socialist."¹

Turner probably wrote that to separate himself in his readers' minds from the American socialists. When he interviewed Flores Magón and the three other PLM junta members in Los Angeles, he was a member of the Los Angeles Socialist Party. Fellow member Job Harriman, attorney for the junta members, had arranged the interview. The socialists of Los Angeles adopted the PLM cause and when one of the richest members, Elizabeth Trowbridge, offered to post bond for the junta members, Los Angeles officials refused the money.²

Turner decided to expose the Díaz regime to the American public and to that end he made plans to mount an expedition to Mexico. Before his departure, fellow socialist John Murray, funded by Trowbridge, traveled to Oaxaca to investigate conditions there. After hearing Murray's report substantiating the PLM description, Turner left for Mexico, accompanied by PLM member Lazaro Gutiérrez de Lara, who acted as an interpreter. When Turner crossed the Mexican


²Sinclair Snow, introduction to Barbarous Mexico, pp. xii-xiii; Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 171.
border in August 1907, he had worked as a journalist for 14 years and the trip, also funded by Trowbridge, proved to be the high point of his career. Posing as a potential investor, Turner witnessed firsthand the slavery rampant in southern Mexico and learned of press persecution throughout the country. Turner easily found proof that Flores Magón's charges were not exaggerated: at that time, more than half of the Mexican population lived under some form of inheritable debt peonage. 3

While Turner traveled through Mexico, his wife, Ethel Duffy Turner, Murray and Trowbridge went to Tucson, Arizona, where Trowbridge purchased a print shop. There they published The Border, a magazine dedicated to exposing Díaz, and a Spanish-language publication, El Defensor de Pueblo, edited by Manuel Sarabia. Sarabia, the only PLM defendant allowed his freedom on bond, later married Elizabeth Trowbridge. Díaz's agents immediately placed the publications' office under surveillance and eventually ransacked the place, causing the end of the endeavor. 4

Although Turner's ties to the PLM definitely affected his work, he brought his own perspective to Mexico and viewed the events and situations there much differently than did


the independent press. For instance, he referred to *Diario del Hogar* as "an old and conservative daily paper." Most of the journalists who attracted Turner's attention were dead or dying:

In 1907 the writer Augustin y Tovao died of poison administered in Belem. Jesus Martínez Carrion, a noted newspaper artist, and Alberto Arans, a writer, left Belem to die in a hospital. Dr. Juan de la Pena, editor of a Liberal newspaper, died in the military prison of San Juan de Ulua. Juan Sarabia, another well-known editor, was also imprisoned there and for a long time was supposed to be dead, until recently, when his friends got word of him. Daniel Cabrera, one of the oldest Liberal editors, was a cripple, and many times was carried to jail on a stretcher.

Professor Luis Toto, an editor of San Luis Potosí, was imprisoned and beaten in prison so severely that he died. . . .

Turner held views similar to those of the unsubsidized Mexican press on the subject of the persecution of journalists, but his coverage of the treatment of the Indians differed greatly. While Turner was investigating the use and mistreatment of Yanqui Indians as slaves in southern Mexico, Silvestre Terrazas was covering the latest flare-up in the ongoing conflict between the Yanquis and the Federales. Clearly unsympathetic to the Indians, Don Silvestre reported that 3,000 to 4,000 armed men were in Torreón ready to take the field against the tribe and noted

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5 John Kenneth Turner, p. 143.
that even U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., were concerned with the "problem."\textsuperscript{6}

The New York Times frequently published articles about the Yaqui wars based on reports from the Mexican press, but Turner's sympathetic reporting of the plight of the Indians would not be available to the U.S. public for another year. On his return from Mexico Turner worked briefly for the doomed Border in the fall of 1908, then traveled to New York City to find a publisher for his reports of conditions in Mexico. American Magazine agreed to publish the articles, scheduling the first for October, 1909. Perhaps sensing that great changes were in the wind, Turner planned to return to Mexico as soon as possible.

But the single most important contribution of U.S. journalism to Mexican history was, by then, long past. Many books about the Mexican Revolution, both in English and Spanish, begin with the James Creelman interview with Porfirio Díaz, which appeared in the March, 1908, Pearson's Magazine. Unwittingly, the two men, reporter and interviewee, had opened the floodgates.

The 45-page article was extremely laudatory, beginning:

\begin{quote}
From the heights of Chapultepec Castle President Díaz looked down upon the venerable capital of his country, spread out on a vast plain, with a ring of mountains flung up grandly about it, and I, who had come nearly four thousand miles from New York
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{6}John Kenneth Turner, p. 159; El Correo de Chihuahua, May 26, June 26 and July 7, 1908.
to see the master and hero of modern Mexico -- the inscrutable leader in whose veins is blended the blood of the primitive Mixtecs with that of the invading Spaniards -- watched the slender, erect form, the strong, soldierly head and commanding, but sensitive, countenance with an interest beyond words to express.

The article continued in the same vein and on the second page, Creelman demonstrated the classic case of the "buried lead:"

Yet today, in the supremacy of his career, this astonishing man -- foremost figure of the American hemisphere and unreadable mystery to students of human government -- announces that he will insist on retiring at the end of his present term, so that he may see his successor peacefully established and that, with his assistance, the people of the Mexican Republic may show the world that they have entered serenely and preparedly upon the last complete phase of their liberties.

The U.S. press largely ignored the revelation, the item not even appearing in the New York Times. The Creelman interview, however, created a stir in Mexico. Then, as now, many magazines were on the stands long before their official publication date, and the interview was reprinted first in Mexico by the Mexican Herald on February 28. El Tiempo, a pro-Catholic newspaper, published a translation March 1, and El Imparcial published yet another translation March 4.9

8Ibid.
The pro-Díaz press in Mexico used the occasion of the president's announced retirement for a series of laudatory articles. The independent press, however, greeted the announcement with much skepticism, partly because the interview had been conducted by a U.S. reporter. Diario del Hogar complained:

In the few lines we have copied, there are omissions that demonstrate that the reporter forgot or never knew Mexican history ... [he] wanted to pay elegant tribute to our president, but forgot to record the politicians who formed the base and actually won these rights for Mexico. It doesn't surprise us that the Yankee made these omissions, but it does surprise us that those newspapers who claim to be friends of the government didn't report them.10

Many of the publishers of Mexican newspapers did not believe that Díaz would retire, among them Mata and Silvestre Terrazas. The article, they pointed out, was meant for American readership. Don Silvestre gave little credence to the report, and, on March 18, El Correo de Chihuahua published an article discrediting the Creelman interview, quoting an unnamed friend of Díaz: "The president will respond to the mandate of the Mexican people." In Chihuahua, the Creelman interview was completely overshadowed by coverage of the Banco Minero Robbery. The interview made the front page only once, while information about the robbery was published almost daily. Chihuahua was far removed from Mexico City and Don Silvestre considered wishing Luis

10Diario del Hogar, April 15, 1908.
Terrazas a happy birthday a more important use of El Correo space than debating election results that would be determined elsewhere and would have little or no effect on Chihuahua. Six months after the Creelman interview was published in Mexico City, El Correo reported, matter-of-factly, that Díaz had decided to accept another term because of the ongoing trouble with the Yaquis.11

Immediately after the interview appeared in the Mexican newspapers, though, Díaz refused to comment further on his political plans, even to the pro-Díaz press. To this day, his intentions are a matter of speculation, but the interview indicates that Díaz may have had an overblown estimation of his own popularity. The fact that a U.S. journalist conducted the interview reflected Díaz's attitude toward the Mexican press. By the time of the Creelman interview, he routinely refused requests for interviews by Mexican newspapermen.

Not all Mexican journalists wanted to interview him. A growing contingent of labor-oriented publications found a ready market among Mexicans working in mining, railroading and industry. As long as they were not openly affiliated with the PLM, Díaz ignored the inexpensive pro-labor papers that began appearing throughout the country. Some of these were radical in tone, such as El Diablo Bromista, a "Weekly

11 El Correo de Chihuahua, March 3, 16 and 18, 1908, June 22, 1908, July 7, 1908.
for the working class, the whip for evil bourgeoisie." The Díaz regime grew somewhat complacent toward unionism after 1907, when the administration ended union strikes in Mexico by shooting down several hundred striking textile workers in Río Blanco, Veracruz. In that same year, the Díaz administration succeeded in having the St. Louis junta incarcerated in a Los Angeles jail.  

Support for unions continued to grow in Mexico, however, reflecting a growing discontent among the populace. Those Mexicans who found employment in the mines, on the railroads and in the textile mills earned a better income than did their fellow countrymen who worked in agriculture but received much less than U. S. citizens working in the same industries in Mexico. This discrepancy became a favorite topic for some Mexican journalists, including Silvestre Terrazas. "The American Problem," as Don Silvestre called it, was another argument for political change in Mexico.

Political change depended on Díaz's retirement. In October 1908, Filomeno Mata published an open letter to Díaz, demanding that he confirm or deny the contents of the Creelman interview. Díaz replied that his statements to Creelman were only expressions of "personal desire." The revelation, at least for Francisco I. Madero, came too late.

After the Creelman interview, several writers published books calling for the formation of political parties and urging political responsibility on the part of the masses. Madero, a wealthy landowner, had written the most important of these, The Presidential Succession of 1910, and arranged for its printing. He was waiting only for final permission from his family to continue.\textsuperscript{13}

Madero was part of the landed gentry of Mexico, coming from a family that had massive estates in Coahuila and Nuevo Leon. Educated in France, the 35-year-old hacendado had been exposed to eastern mysticism while reading the Bhagavad Gita, or "Song of Heaven," of the Hindu faith. According to post-Revolution mythology, Madero began his involvement in Mexican politics because of a "supernatural" experience he had concerning "spirit writing" after returning to the family hacienda in Coahuila.\textsuperscript{14}

At any rate, Madero adopted the Hindu belief that "there is nothing better than a righteous battle," and in 1904 Madero became active in the Coahuila gubernatorial election. He helped fund and wrote for the political weekly El Democrata of San Pedro. His family did not look upon his political ambitions kindly and his grandfather, the family

\textsuperscript{13}Diario del Hogar, October 27, 1908, as quoted in Ross, p. 36.

patriarch, wrote to Madero, warning him about fruitless opposition and comparing his endeavors against the regime to "the rivalry of a microbe with an elephant." Madero reassured his family that he intended only to pursue political ends within the law, and, as noted earlier, withdrew his support of the PLM at the first hint of armed revolt.\textsuperscript{15}

Madero represented those Mexicans who wanted political opportunity and who could appreciate, because of their status and education, exactly what political opportunity could mean for them. Conversely, Madero did not represent the majority of Mexican people, who were chiefly concerned with getting enough food to stay alive. Commonly, historians cite the need for land reform as the major cause of the Revolution and the majority of Mexicans did not own land. Madero had no intention of advancing the cause of the landless masses. As a member of the financial elite of Mexico, Madero hoped only to break the political stranglehold the cientifico's had on the country, not to redistribute the land or wealth. He earnestly believed that an open democracy would bring prosperity to the Mexican people, but because of his comfortable background he lacked the ability to appreciate the country's real problems.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid, p. 36.
Madero's greatest and first hope, he wrote in *La Sucesión Presidencial en 1910*, was that the office of vice president would be filled in a democratic manner rather than by presidential appointment. He also expounded on the well-used praises of the constitution of 1857. Mild enough to meet with his family's approval, the book did not create an immediate stir in Mexico after its publication in January, 1909. Madero sagely used much of the first few pages to deliver a tribute to Díaz's virtues. In subsequent chapters, Madero pointed out that under Díaz, the states had lost the right to elect their own governors, jefes políticos were appointed and so on. Madero reiterated an old theme: the continuismo generated by Díaz was a direct contradiction to Díaz the statesman.\(^{16}\)

As Madero's book was being printed, John Kenneth Turner returned to Mexico City to continue his research for magazine articles and what would become, in 1910, *Barbarous Mexico*. In neither the articles nor the book did he devote much space to Madero. By this time, Turner was deeply entrenched with the magonistas and his position in Mexico City, as sports writer for the *Mexican Herald*, did not lend itself to close association with would-be políticos. Turner's lack of concern with Madero was a foreshadowing of

\(^{16}\) Francisco Madero, *La Sucesión Presidencial en 1910*, as reprinted in *La Revolución Mexicana*, Tomo II. pp. 60, 73-76 and 83-84.
a coming conflict between the maderistas and the magonistas. Turner's first opinion of Madero's book was that it was not suppressed because it did not represent a threat. He credited the book with launching El Partido Democratico, which nominated Reyes.17

The formation of the party and the nomination brought suspicion from the independent press, which viewed the party as simply another government front. On December 25, 1908, weeks before Madero received his family's permission to publish La Sucesion Presidencial, Diario editorialized: "The ruling party has prepared to organize El Partido Democratico and has the idea that they alone have command of the republic without bothering the rest of us with truth or even disinterest, that they alone have the right to worry about politics."18

In February, El Círculo Nacional Porfista held a national convention in Mexico City to nominate Diaz and Corral for reelection. That same month, the first Club Anti-reeleccionista of Mexico met in Mexico City. Madero joined as a charter member, along with radical columnist Luis Cabrera and independent newspaperman Teodore Hernández. Filomeno Mata, who had run the slogan "No Reelection" as part of his masthead since 1888, was also a member of the

17John Kenneth Turner, p. 163.
18Diario del Hogar, December 25, 1908.
group. Goals of the Club included restoration of the powers of the 1857 constitution and an amendment that again would prohibit reelection of the president.\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{Diario del Hogar} published a front page-article on Madero in May, headlined: "The latest book about the Díaz administration." \textit{Diario} also included a photograph of Madero, a rare bit of graphics that illustrated the importance Mata gave to the forthcoming elections. The lengthy article dealt not only with Madero's book but also with Carlos de Farnaro's \textit{Díaz, Czar of Mexico}, published by de Farnaro in New York. In fact, mention of Madero's book did not occur until well into the article's continuation on page two. The article then quoted Madero concerning "the willingness of the Mexican people to fight" though Madero had disavowed the PLM in the opening chapter of his book.\textsuperscript{20}

Mata probably ran a larger risk than did Madero by publishing information about de Fornaro, for de Fornaro openly opposed Díaz. De Fornaro, an Italian journalist, worked as an editor on \textit{Diario} in 1908. The publication of his book in the United States resulted in a criminal libel

\textsuperscript{19}Mancisidor, pp. 89-90.

suit brought by the Mexican government and the journalist spent a year in jail in New York.21

Fortunately for Madero, the administration focused on the movement to nominate General Bernardo Reyes, first as vice president and then as an opponent to Diaz. The movement flared up among the conservative but non-científico contingent in the spring of 1909 but was quickly squelched. Reyes bowed out of the "race" and elected to accept a diplomatic post in Europe rather than risk enraging Díaz.

In June, 1909, Madero began touring Mexico, taking advantage of the vacuum left by Reyes' sudden departure. He succeeded in converting many Revista clubs to Clubes de Antireeleccionistas. He promulgated the idea of "no reelection" and while both his book and his speeches showed his complete lack of knowledge concerning the underlying social and economic problems of Mexico, Madero's acceptance as a political leader grew throughout the summer, much to his family's dismay. His grandfather wrote to him, "If . . . you should support a riotous crowd . . . I, with my 78 years, will be the first in the defense of the government."22

Madero continually reassured his family that his mission was not revolutionary, while he continued his tour. In

21 Sinclair Snow, introduction to Barbarous Mexico, p. xviii.
22 John Kenneth Turner, p. 163; Ross, pp. 81-83.
Yucatan, he met José María Pino Suárez, publisher of El Peninsular, a member of the Associated Press of the States and a frequent writer of letters-to-the-editor in Diario del Hogar. Pino Suárez became a strong supporter of Madero and perhaps impressed upon him the importance of newspapers. About one-third of the 25 communities Madero visited during his summer and winter tours had some vestige of the independent press. In others, Madero helped establish political antireelecionista clubs, and the first order of any political club was to establish a newspaper. By mid-summer, Madero was so convinced that a daily newspaper was necessary to further the cause that he went to his relatives for funds. They refused him.23

The growth of Madero's popularity and name recognition during the summer and fall of 1909 can be attributed largely to newspapers, either the small independent press of the provinces or of the papers the anti-reelection clubs published. Madero received little coverage by newspapers in Mexico City, and he was not an eloquent spokesman. In fact, while giving the first public speech of his tour, in a theater in Veracruz, some of the audience doubted that the speaker was the author of La Sucesión Presidencial en 1910.

Madero, a small, balding man, spoke in a high-pitched voice. But his audiences were receptive to his message, which had been foreshadowed by newspapers throughout Mexico for several years.\(^\text{24}\)

Madero did not call for a radical change in Mexican government, merely a reinstatement of the powers of the 1857 constitution. In this, he echoed the long-standing sentiments of the independent press of Mexico. Furthermore, Madero, unlike the Flores Magón brothers, belonged to that economic class that traditionally involved itself in Mexican politics. In light of the Creelman interview, though Díaz had completely refuted his stated intention to retire by the end of Madero's tour, Madero seemed to the independent press a safe subject for articles.

The subsidized press ignored Madero and his movement, but the small press, both the established independents and the papers created to promulgate anti-reelectionism, took the cause to the literate people of Mexico. By mid-summer 1909 Madero's desire for a daily newspaper was a reality. The paper, El Antireeleccionista, had begun as a weekly staffed by volunteers. Madero's brother, Gustavo, managed to raise the money to staff and print a daily by selling shares in the business. Although the money came mainly from relatives, Madero's ability to raise the funds demonstrated a growing

\(^{24}\)Ross, p. 80.
popularity. Undoubtedly, the young Coahuilan became worrisome to more than just his family, but other events diverted the attention of the Díaz administration.\textsuperscript{25}

In September, \textit{American Magazine} previewed Turner's series, promising its readers an expose of Mexico. In October the series began with a piece entitled "The Slaves of Yucatan." The magazine's editors added an editorial set in 14-point type that concluded:

\begin{quote}
A great Díaz-myth has been built up through skillfully applied influence upon journalism. It is the most astounding case of suppression of truth and the dissemination of untruth and half-truth that recent history affords. . . . Díaz is an able autocrat who has policed the country well, used his power for the benefit of the few and neglected the welfare of the great body of people. In Mexico they say "after him the deluge, if indeed he is not swept away by it."\textsuperscript{26}
\end{quote}

The articles were the first anti-Díaz material widely distributed in the U.S. press (at the time that Turner's articles were published, \textit{American Magazine} claimed a circulation of 300,000) and the regime responded immediately by having favorable writings concerning Porfirio Díaz appear. Its method was standard: bribery. Porfirio Díaz made substantial gifts to several American reporters and hired James Creelman outright. Gratuities went to Harrison Gray Otis, publisher of the \textit{Los Angeles Times}, who owned land on

\textsuperscript{25}Cumberland, p. 81.

\textsuperscript{26}Sinclair Snow, introduction to \textit{Barbarous Mexico}, p. xvii.
the Baja peninsula, and to William Randolph Hearst, who owned a huge ranch in Chihuahua. 27

The series of articles that ran in Sunset magazine, a publication that Turner claimed was owned by the Southern Pacific Railroad, typified the pro-Díaz propaganda. Sunset editors justified the series, "Mexico As It Is," because of the forthcoming elections but never mentioned any candidate except Díaz. An anonymous socialite of Mexico City supposedly wrote the articles, which began in February 1910, and spared no accolade to Díaz:

In spite of the fact that President Díaz has expressed his desire to withdraw from power and to rest—the people have acclaimed him a candidate for the coming presidential term, and with him also Senor Corral, to continue as vice-president of the republic. With this popular informal nomination, Mexico has demonstrated that she is resolved not to abandon for a moment, the program of peace and progress which General Díaz has carried out with such remarkable results. 28

Sunset ran the series for three months. In May the magazine published an article explaining that the Yaquis, blood-thirsty killers that they were, had to be deported to Yucatan for the safety of the Mexican populace. The author praised the tactic and claimed it had been successful. The Yaquis, he wrote, had been pacified because of fear of deportation and were no longer being shipped to the Yucatan

27 Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 13; personal interview with Jane Dale Lloyd.

where they "stand in the same relationship to their employers as the rest of the field laborers in that state."^{29}

Díaz diffused the effect of Turner's articles. For unclear reasons, *American Magazine* discontinued the series after December 1909. Turner charged that the Díaz administration had bribed the publishers. Indeed, the magazine was susceptible. The publication owed $400,000 and scheduled the series in hopes of increasing its circulation. Muckraker Upton Sinclair later corroborated Turner's theory. After *American Magazine* canceled the series, Turner published several more articles in limited-circulation, left-wing publications. In the summer of 1910, Turner decided to publish his articles in a book. Although *Barbarous Mexico* did not appear until December of that year, Turner created a sensation by charging that the U.S. government had persecuted anti-Díaz Mexican refugees.^{30}

After the initial publication of the articles, the Turner affair preoccupied the porfiristas and during this period, from the fall of 1909 to the spring of 1910, the anti-reelection movement and Madero gained support. Local authorities, however, continued their persecution of


^{30}Sinclair Snow, introduction to *Barbarous Mexico*, p. xxix-xxii.
newspapers in their jurisdictions. Enrique Creel, still enmeshed in his animosity with Silvestre Terrazas, wrote Vice President Ramón Corral and urged the government to take severe action against the opposition press. Creel, part of the established power structure in Chihuahua, had strong ties with the Díaz regime and undoubtedly distrusted the anti-reelection movement. He knew Don Silvestre had joined the anti-reelection club of Chihuahua. It mattered little to Creel that the journalist had declined to serve as an officer, saying the position would compromise his position as a journalist.\footnote{Harold D. Sims, "Espejo de Caciques: Los Terrazas de Chihuahua," Historia Mexicana, Volume XVIII, January-March 1969, p. 397; Sandels, p. 200.}

Creel jailed Don Silvestre briefly in the fall of 1909, ostensibly on old charges from the "We want guarantees" article, but he confided in Corral that he had made the move to damage the anti-reelectionist movement in Chihuahua. The arrest probably inspired Don Silvestre to Madero's cause. The publisher, judging from his selection of editorial material, had a better grasp than did Madero of the reality facing most Mexicans. Like Madero, Don Silvestre was part of the landed gentry, but as years went by he was forced to sell much of the land he inherited to continue publishing El Correo. This was especially true after Creel began using his
influence to convince the Chihuahua business community to stop advertising in the paper.\(^{32}\)

In April the anti-reelection party of Mexico formally nominated Madero for president. On May 29, 1910, representatives of the independent newspapers of Mexico City met to endorse Madero. Mata was absent, serving yet another jail sentence, but a son and daughter attended the meeting, carrying a placard with Diario del Hogar scrawled in large black letters denoting mourning. Later, newspapermen and members of the Mata family carried the placard to the National Palace as a sign of protest, but to no avail.\(^{33}\)

As the election drew near, the regime increased its persecution of anti-reelectionists. In an open letter to Díaz, Madero complained:

> At Coahuila the public officials have arbitrarily forbidden demonstrations in our honor, preventing also the spread of our principles. The same has happened in the states of Nuevo Leon, Aguascalientes and San Luis Potosí. . . . In the states of Sonora and Puebla the conditions are serious. In the former state an independent journalist, Mr. Caeser del Vando, was thrown into jail. . . . At Cananea the prosecutions are extreme against the members of my party, and according to late news received from there more than thirty individuals have been imprisoned, among them the full board of directors of the Club Anti-Reeleccionista de Obreros [workers], three of whom were forcibly enlisted in the army.

> At Puebla, Atlixco and Tlaxcala, where untold outrages have been committed against my followers,

\(^{32}\)Sims, p. 397; personal interview with Margarita Terrazas.

\(^{33}\)Mata, p. 85.
raises intense excitement. The last news received shows the condition of the working classes to be desperate; they may at any moment resort to violent means to have their rights respected.\footnote{John Kenneth Turner, p. 165.}

The Díaz regime, working through state governors, persecuted journalists who openly supported Madero simply because they made the easiest targets. As early as October 1909, José María Pino Suárez complained in a letter in Diario del Hogar that more than 100 newspapermen nationwide had been imprisoned under false pretenses and that at least 50 others had been conscripted into the Mexican army.\footnote{Diario del Hogar, October 19, 1909.}

Madero's candidacy proved too much for Díaz. On June 6, more than a month before the scheduled election, Madero was arrested in Monterey. The original charge was, according to Luis Mata, stealing the cuttings from a bush. By this one act, the government turned Madero into a revolutionary. Oddly, Díaz probably would have won the election. The force that rose against him in future months would not use the ballot.
Chapter 8
THE REVOLUTION OF 1910: THE END AND THE BEGINNING

On September 16, 1910, Mexico celebrated its centennial of independence from Spain. Festivities in Mexico City lasted the entire month, and President Díaz, reelected "unanimously," was busy unveiling monuments and entertaining the diplomatic corps that came to pay tribute to the "maker of modern Mexico."

The electoral "triumph" of Díaz in Chihuahua was typical: a few people, nine in Juárez and 16 in Batopilas, actually voted for Madero. In Juárez, election officials had told voters that Madero was not an eligible candidate. In Batopilas, the police jailed the leader of the club anti-reeleccionista. Nationwide the government jailed more than 5,000 Madero supporters on election day.¹

The fraudulent elections did not diminish the ardor with which the celebrators in Mexico City honored Díaz. To the foreign visitors, the capital displayed, at least on the surface, the modernity and affluence that had become the trademark of the Díaz regime. Many new electric street lights had been installed for the occasion: the national palace, the cathedral and the Plaza de Constitución had been

illuminated. The President and Señora Díaz sponsored a "garden party" at Chapultepec Castle, and banners proclaiming "Peace, Liberty and Progress" hung over the well-lit streets.²

The U.S. press covered the celebrations with a pro-Díaz bias. The New York Times published an article from an unnamed special correspondent typical of the articles generated by the U.S. press:

Mexico's celebration of the 100th anniversary of martyred Father Hidalgo's proclamation of independence has been coupled with an equally impressive celebration of the eightieth anniversary of the birth of that wonderful old man, Porfirio Díaz. Who can doubt that the supposedly lesser includes the seemingly greater? Mexico's centennial of independence is unquestionably another manifestation of the power of its president. . . . One's first impression of President Díaz justifies the idea formed of him in reading. He is surely a man of great personal power. Short of stature physically, his personality is large. He stands erect, he walks briskly. His face in repose is grave and stern, but it lights up wonderfully when he is greeting a visitor he is glad to see, or discussing a subject that interests him. . . . He goes about daily in his limousine unguarded. At the National Palace soldiers surround him, but he fearlessly exposes himself. Probably he has no cause for fear. . . .³

To the U.S. press, Madero's attempt to become president was the "ravings of a mad man" and had become an historical anachronism. The Times special correspondent wrote:

²Genaro García, "Las Fiestas del Centenario," from Crónica oficial de las fiestas del primer centenario de la Independencia de México, reprinted in La Revolución Mexicana, pp. 205-207.
Poor Madero, under surveillance somewhere far from the capital, has his admirers. There were cries for him in the densely crowded streets last night. The rurales soon silenced the cries and placed the patriots who uttered them where they could sleep off the effects of too much tequila or mescal. . . . But as a matter of fact there is no real opposition to Díaz, organized or unorganized. While he retains power, the prosperity of the country will remain uncheckèd by any outbreak of the revolutionary spirit so strong in the Latin blood, and foreign enterprise, so needful in the development of the country, will be protected. 

Mexican prosperity, like the Pax Porfiriano, was an illusion. The decline of silver prices, the world depression of 1907 and subsequent drop in demands for Mexican exports all affected Mexico's ailing economy. Díaz's international popularity had resulted largely from the fact that he paid the Mexican debt of the 19th century. In 1910, José Yves Limantour, his minister of finance, traveled to Europe to renegotiate Mexico's foreign debt. During the last few years of the Díaz regime, rampant inflation seriously affected the price of staples. The government found itself threatened on two fronts: Mexico's international financial credibility was in danger, and the poor and middle classes were becoming, understandably, discontent.

The Mexican government had formally charged Madero with fomenting a revolution and insulting authorities in Mexico.

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5 Cumberland, pp. 13-14.
City. U.S. Consular officials, however, informed the State Department that Madero's only crime was "being a candidate for office." After meeting with Limantour, who stopped in San Luis Potosí on his way to Europe, Madero was allowed to post bond. He was permitted restricted freedom and was ordered to remain in San Luis Potosí. On October 6, Madero disguised himself as a railroad mechanic and fled to the United States. Both the Mexican government and newspapers in the United States and Mexico presumed correctly that Madero would launch a revolution, but neither predicted success. After all, the PLM had called for revolution since 1906, to no avail.6

From San Antonio, Madero issued El Plan de San Luis Potosí. The plan was dated October 5, the last day he was in Mexico, to avoid open violation of the neutrality laws. Madero sent the manifesto to many newspaper publishers in Mexico in early November, but none dared print it. Madero's supporters also received copies of the plan. In the manifesto, he set the date of revolution for November 20, 1910. Aquiles Serdan, a shoe salesmen in Puebla, is often credited with firing the first shot of the Mexican Revolution. When Puebla police went to arrest Serdan, a member of the Club Antireeleccionista, at his home on November 18, Serdan and his family opened fire on the

police. Police and Federales finally killed the family and discovered a cache of arms and ammunition in the home. El Imparcial reported these events the next day, under the banner headline "Viva Gen. Díaz!" ("Hurray for General Diaz!").

Madero did reenter Mexico on November 20, but the revolutionary army that he planned to lead did not materialize, so he again left the country. Enrique Creel, with permission from Díaz, sent to the New York Times a letter, assuring U.S. citizens that the political situation in Mexico "does not present any danger and the lives and interests of all strangers are absolutely secure. . . . At this moment order is complete in the whole republic."  

Earlier in the month, on November 4, a lynch mob in Rock Springs, Texas, burned a Mexican national to death, setting off a wave of anti-American riots that swept through Mexico and generated support for the revolutionary cause. In Mexico City, a mob, comprising both magonistas and maderistas, threw a bomb into the U.S. embassy, then attacked the offices of El Imparcial and the Mexican Herald. One U.S. citizen was lynched, and police killed two demonstrators.  

7 Silvestre Terrazas, El Verdadero Pancho Villá, pp. 30-35; El Imparcial, November 20, 1910.  
8 Enrique Creel to the editor of the New York Times, November 24, 1910.  
9 Regeneración, November 12, 1910.
The riots in Mexico City, which preceded the outbreak of maderista hostilities, illustrated that those who would actually fight the revolution drew little distinction between Madero and Flores Magón, who had been released from prison in the United States on August 3. Their focus was anti-Díaz and their first targets, after the American embassy, were the two newspapers most closely associated with the Díaz regime. The government, in turn, was quick to deal with the threat of the independent press.

In November, Mexican authorities arrested Mata, his son, Filomeno Jr., who was editing the paper, and several other staff members of Diario del Hogar on charges of defamation against a minor official. From his prison cell, Mata wrote one last editorial about the anti-reelection movement and titled it, "No Reelection Was a Debt." He traced the history of the Díaz regime, pointing out that Díaz was opposing the very cause that he had trumpeted in his early years. He concluded: "It is time. The people want the freedom to name his [Díaz's] successor."\(^{10}\)

The revolution sputtered in northern Mexico. Maderistas threatened Torreón briefly and gathered on the outskirts of Chihuahua. Revolutionary forces cut telegraph wires and briefly controlled some spur rail lines in northern Mexico,

\(^{10}\) Mata, pp. 88-89.
but by November 23, Creel prematurely declared the revolution had been "crushed."\(^1\)

In Chihuahua, Silvestre Terrazas published an article about the Madero revolt as his lead story November 20. On November 13, there had been an anti-American riot in the city and Don Silvestre had concentrated his coverage on "the American problem," treating Madero's threat of revolt as secondary. On the 20th, however, El Correo de Chihuahua published the banner headline "Madero in Laredo, Texas." The following day, the lead story concerned the efforts of the Mexican government to have Madero extradited. On November 22, El Correo published another update on the Madero revolt under the headline "The Delicate Situation" and two days later it announced with the largest banner headline yet, "Madero in Coahuila."\(^2\)

On November 26, agents of the Chihuahua state government arrested Don Silvestre at his office. He was taken first to the state prison where he was held incommunicado for several days, then transferred without a judicial order to Lecumberri prison, known as the "Black Palace," in Mexico City. The exact charges against Don Silvestre are unknown. His daughter claims he was arrested because he published the complete Plan de San Luis Potosí, which he did not. In fact,

\(^1\) New York Times, November 23, 1910.
\(^2\) El Correo de Chihuahua, November 20, 21, 22 and 24, 1910.
his objective coverage of the Madero revolt demonstrated that Don Silvestre was not yet a Maderista. His ongoing editorial bias had not been against Díaz, but against the Terrazas-Creel power structure in Chihuahua, and the logical assumption is that Don Luis preferred to have Don Silvestre out of the way during the coming tumult.\footnote{Margarita Terrazas, p. 331-332; personal interview with Margarita Terrazas.}

The initial phase of the Madero revolt had been suppressed by the government as easily as it had quelled the magonista attempts between 1906 and 1910. Both the U.S. press and the subsidized press in Mexico declared the emergency over by December. Even Madero, now in New Orleans, was disheartened. But in Mexico, a ground-swell movement was occurring. Maderistas and magonistas were banding together, much to the chagrin of Flores Magón who considered himself the indisputable head of the revolutionary movement. At this point, the Mexican revolutionaries coalesced because of their common opposition to Díaz.

E.D. Trowbridge (no relation to Elizabeth Trowbridge), a writer in Mexico during the revolution, described the events that resulted as the rumors of the maderista revolution swept the country. Díaz began concentrating his troops, leaving many garrisons deserted or understaffed. This act lent credence to the idea of the revolution, and in many areas the people rose against those whom they considered
their immediate oppressors, either the local rich or the remaining soldiers. Trowbridge wrote about the adventures of one such band, formed by Gabriel Hernández:

Hernández, an Indian lad 24 years of age, started with three men at the village of Chignahuapan, in the state of Puebla, to raise a Maderista band. Within a few days he had picked up fifteen or twenty men from neighboring villages and had obtained horses and arms from sympathizers. It was an easy matter to take possession of several small towns and villages, and in each more recruits were obtained, and farmers were induced to contribute horses "for the cause." The band, all mounted and now numbering a hundred men or more, took the town of Sacatlan, a place of considerable importance, then occupied Xico, and then Hanchinanago, the county seat.14

As 1910 ended, the press reported that the uprising was basically over, although accounts of fighting still appeared. This was not unusual: articles concerning revolutionary activity in Mexico had appeared in the New York Times since June. For those involved in that activity, it did not matter what the newspapers in the United States or Mexico printed, except, perhaps, for one.

Flores Magon had resumed publishing Regeneración on September 3, while Madero was still a prisoner in San Luis Potosi. In the first issue of the Los Angeles-based paper, Flores Magon correctly predicted that the revolution was at hand: "The calmness of today is the revolution of tomorrow." But that revolution, he warned, would be for nothing unless it "carried the convictions of both political and economic

14 Trowbridge, pp. 133-34.
liberties." Simply put, Flores Magón did not take Madero seriously as a revolutionary because Madero, a rich hacendado, belonged to the class against which the revolution had to be fought.  

Flores Magón, heavily influenced by the American left, held close ties to the economic philosophy of the Industrial Workers of the World. His main concern, though, had long since evolved to ideas based on economic reform. He wanted not only to redistribute the wealth but to change the system that created it. The articles he wrote for the new Regeneración designated the capitalist as the enemy.

As the Madero revolt gained momentum, so did the rivalry between Madero and Flores Magón. Madero reportedly offered the provisional vice presidency to Flores Magón, who flatly rejected it. Supposedly, Flores Magón suggested to Madero that if he wanted to become a revolutionary, he should become a magonista.

Flores Magón found himself in the same situation as Camilo Ariaga had in 1905. As Flores Magón had usurped the position of revolutionary leader from Arriaga, now Madero usurped that postion from him. According to Ethel Duffy Turner, the early victories in Chihuahua during December 1910 were

15 Regeneración, September 3, 1910.
16 Personal interview with Jane Dale Lloyd; Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 218.
fought by magonistas, but the spoils were to be enjoyed by the maderistas.17

Meanwhile, from December 1910 to February 1911, Silvestre Terrazas languished in Lecumberri. When he was moved from Chihuahua to Mexico City, one of the guards who accompanied him was ordered to claim ley fuga and kill him but refused. The orders obviously came from Chihuahua, not Mexico City.18

Don Silvestre's wife followed him to Mexico City and once there wrote Señora Díaz, asking her to intervene. The president agreed to interview the prisoner. Díaz asked Terrazas about the situation in Chihuahua, which by February 1911 was the center of revolutionary activities. Don Silvestre responded by making a speech against the Terrazas-Creel clan and its various monopolies in that state. Díaz, perhaps thinking that Don Silvestre represented no threat to his personal image in Chihuahua, had him released. However, one of Don Silvestre's first articles after returning to Chihuahua was an interview with Madero.19

Don Silvestre asked Madero if the rift between the magonistas and maderistas was irreparable. Madero replied that it was not certain, but he had stopped worrying about it. He had not had any contact with Flores Magon since

17Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 217.
18Personal interview with Margarita Terrazas.
19Silvestre Terrazas, p. 60.
coming to the United States in October and claimed he did not know why Flores Magón attacked him in his newspaper. 20

Madero, in all probability, was lying. In January, Antonio Villarreal, who had edited Regeneración in St. Louis after Flores Magón had fled to Canada and who was responsible for moving the newspaper to Los Angeles, had broken with Flores Magón and joined Madero. The maderistas distributed a circular claiming that Flores Magón had accepted the position of provisional vice president, and with Villarreal's help published and circulated a bogus Regeneración in northern Mexico during the critical months of January and February, 1911.

Flores Magón responded in Regeneración with a scathing editorial entitled, "Francisco Madero is a traitor to the cause of liberty." Madero was closer to Díaz than he was to Flores Magón, at least according to Flores Magón:

Mexicans, open your eyes. Why doesn't Madero fight with el Partido Liberal? Because el Partido Liberal fights for the poor, whose interests are opposite those of the rich. . . . The rich need the poor to work and for this Madero will not support el Partido Liberal because he wants the poor to remain, that is, be the slaves of the rich. 21

Flores Magón repeated this theme many times. In April, he wrote:

21 Regeneración, February 25, 1911.
El partido maderista represents the interests of the rich class because they care only about the fall of the tyrant Díaz, to recreate the vigor of the constitution of 1857; in a word, to give the people political liberty. The people would then be free to vote, to have meetings, to show their thoughts [free to publish], but there would still be misery afoot because what law is there to abolish misery?22

Flores Magón continued his campaign against Madero, even after Madero became president of Mexico. In 1911 Flores Magón would launch an abortive revolution in the Baja, but his supposed allegiance with Madero may have helped turn the tide in Chihuahua. On May 10, 1911, maderista forces took the city of Juárez. The end was in sight.

On May 21, representatives of the Díaz regime and the provisional government met in El Paso and signed a peace treaty. The document dictated that an interim government, made up mostly of porfiristas, would rule Mexico until elections could be held in October. Madero left for Mexico City and Porfirio Díaz left for Europe.

Shortly before Díaz's departure, Filomeno Mata was released from prison for the last time. The last seven months in Belen had destroyed his health. Mata made one last decision at Diario del Hogar: he named Juan Sarabia, the PLM member who had been captured in northern Mexico in 1907, as editor. Mata had fewer than three months to live and his

22 Regeneracion, April 15, 1911.
family reflected bitterly that Díaz was sailing to Europe, safe and sound.\(^{23}\)

The duty of escorting the fallen president to the dock at Veracruz fell to General Victriano Huerta, an old professional soldier destined for his own infamy. At the dock, so the story goes, Díaz turned to him and said: "Madero has unleashed a tiger. The question is, can he control it?"

\(^{23}\) Mata, p. 89.
Francisco Madero ruled Mexico for 14 months, but his regime was doomed before it began. According to the Treaty of Ciudad Juárez, which ended the Revolt of 1910, Francisco León de la Barra, who had served Porfirio Díaz as foreign minister and ambassador to the United States, was to serve as interim president from May 26, 1911, through the elections in October and the inauguration in November.

De la Barra's presidency created at least two ongoing problems. First, as de la Barra was a longtime porfriían politician, he did not initiate massive personnel changes. Many government administrators who had served under Díaz now served under de la Barra and continued to hold their positions even after Madero took office December 1. Madero did not seem to recognize that Mexicans hungered for massive changes.

Secondly, many Mexicans believed de la Barra was "president in name only" and that Madero had the power. Had Madero been an astute politician, this might have happened, but he simply did not have the ability to control de la Barra. Maderistas asked their leader for political changes and favors that he could not deliver.¹

¹Calvert, p. 85.
The de la Barra government increased the size of the Mexican army and tried to disband and disarm the remaining revolutionary forces. Some of the revolutionary leaders, like Emiliano Zapata of Morrelos, refused to lay down their arms, sensing correctly that the revolution was not finished.

In June 1911, during the first month of de la Barra's presidency, Madero tried to make his peace with Ricardo Flores Magón who had staged an unsuccessful revolution in Baja, California. By this time, Flores Magón had lost all credibility as the leader of the revolution, but because of his proximity to Baja and his connections with the IWW, which provided many of his soldiers, he still represented a threat to the Mexican government. Madero sent four men to Los Angeles to meet with Flores Magón: Juan Sarabia, who was now publishing Diario del Hogar intermittently; Abraham Gonzales, who would serve as governor of Chihuahua under Madero; Antonio Villareal, who was responsible for editing the bogus Regeneración in early 1911 after supporting Flores Magón for many years; and Ricardo's brother Jesús, by then an ardent maderista.

Sarabia and Jesús met with Flores Magón on June 13. The results of the meeting were inconclusive. On the following day, Los Angeles police arrested Flores Magón, Librado Rivera and another Regeneración staff member. The three were charged with conspiracy to break U.S. neutrality laws. Their
bond was set at $2500 and the PLM could raise only enough money to obtain Flores Magón's release.²

On July 2, Flores Magón published an issue of Regeneración containing an article entitled: "Juan Sarabia, Judas." Sarabia republished the article in Diario del Hogar and wrote in an adjoining article that he was not, and had never been, a maderista. In August, Sarabia and Villareal again published a paper called Regeneracion, this time in Mexico City. Flores Magón referred to the new paper as "degeneración."³

Although Flores Magón's concerns about land reform influenced the Mexican Constitution of 1917, his popularity among liberal Mexicans dwindled after 1911. He died in the U.S. penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1922, almost blind, terribly unhappy and deserted by his own country. After his death, the Mexican government carried his body back to Mexico City in a special train and gave him a hero's funeral, but in 1911 he was important only in so far as he demonstrated Madero's complete lack of ability to unite the various factions that divided Mexico.

Madero's popularity was indisputable, however. On October 1, in what may have been the only honest presidential election held in Mexico, Madero was elected president and

²Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 261.
³Ibid, p. 262.
José María Pino Suárez vice president. Pino Suárez was not well liked, especially among journalists. He had been accused of persecuting journalists in his native Yucatán where he had served as interim governor; still, Madero chose him as a running mate because of a political debt: Pino Suárez had spent 80,000 pesos in 1909 on a daily newspaper espousing the antireeleccionista cause. But repayment of that debt carried a high price for Madero: Pino Suárez became highly unpopular when he used existing laws against two newspapers in January 1912 and jailed a reporter after an unfavorable interview. These were the only transgressions against the press by the Madero government, but they were enough.

In January 1912, Madero supporters complained bitterly to the president concerning the independent press. In turn, journalists countered with articles defending the freedom of the press. Articles on the persecution of the press again became popular in Mexico City newspapers.

Madero obviously recognized the importance of the press early in his political career and used it to his advantage. But the impressive array of pro-Madero newspapers created during the 1909 campaign was gone. Mata was dead, replaced by Sarabia, and Madero's only support in the press came from

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4Bravo Ugarte, p. 82; Guzmán, José María Pino Suárez, p. 57; El Correo de Chihuahua, January 4, 1912.

5Bravo Ugarte, p. 82.
Nueva Era, a daily founded by his brother Gustavo, and Diario Official. During the revolution Madero had proclaimed that freedom of the press was "one of the most sacred principles of the revolution." When he actually came to power, he was beset by a series of minor revolutions and newspapers frequently published grievances against him. Madero responded by ignoring the press. In December 1912, he said, "I don't read the press, and if I would, I would not believe the articles." He did, however, try to end the subsidy system, but beyond ending blatant abuses such as imprisonment of newspapermen, Madero did little to change the laws concerning the press. Perhaps because of this journalists charged that Madero's promises of a free press were empty.6

Gustavo Madero, over his brother's objections, tried economically to control several of the larger dailies in Mexico City, but to no avail. Though Ernesto Madero, Francisco's uncle and minister of finance, was nominal publisher of El Imparcial, the paper remained anit-Madero. The Mexican Herald, another paper highly critical of Madero (and which sent its critiques over the wires of the Associated Press) received subsidies through Gustavo. Members of Madero's cabinet, in an attempt to diffuse what they perceived as a dangerous situation, drew up plans to

6Ibid, pp. 82, 85; Taracena, p. 256.
revise Chapter Seven of the constitution, and when this news was made public the press accused Madero of tyranny and suppression of free speech.\textsuperscript{7}

\textit{El Imparical}, \textit{El País} and the \textit{Mexican Herald} remained critical of the new government and Madero could not be convinced to use coercion to bring them into line. His actions and attitudes rested entirely on theoretical ideals rather than reality. On several occasions he interceded on behalf of journalists charged with defamation and when his supporters urged him to control the press he refused, saying, "I prefer to sink with the law than to sustain myself without it." The lengths to which Madero actually carried freedom of the press now seem incredible. While Zapata was in open revolt against him in 1912, Madero personally approved the publication of Zapata's call for revolution in \textit{Diario del Hogar}.\textsuperscript{8}

The press had good reasons, real and imagined, to criticize Madero. From the left, he was charged with nepotism, being a \textit{limantourista} and failing to keep the promises he made during the revolution. From the right, he was criticized as being incompetent and, when he appointed Jesús Flores Magón to his cabinet, too radical. \textit{El Mañana}, a Mexico City newspaper, published an article that asked,

\begin{flushright}
\texttt{\textsuperscript{7}Ross, pp. 233-235; Calvert, p. 114.
\textsuperscript{8}Ross, p. 234; Calvert, p. 96.}
\end{flushright}
"What remains for us of the order, peace and prosperity internally and the credit, respect and prestige abroad which Mexico enjoyed under the government of General Díaz?" El País also criticized Madero: "Legality is not enough, the country needs to be governed."

Madero had to contend with a multitude of counter-revolutions. In addition to Zapata in the south and Orozco in the north, minor revolutionary outbreaks led by conservatives General Bernardo Reyes and Felix Díaz flared up in 1912. Government forces easily put down the latter two, and Reyes and Díaz were both imprisoned. Not only did Madero not have them shot, he had them moved to the penitentiary in Mexico City.

In covering the revolutions against Madero, Mexican newspapermen gave full vent to their animosity toward the idealistic president. When Porfirio Díaz had faced dissension in the nation, the press most often ignored the violent outbreaks. If they did report revolutionary activity, the articles always negated the possibility of victories against the government. Porfirian journalists dismissed revolts as the rumblings of malcontents who did not have the intelligence to appreciate the benefits of the Pax Porfiriano.

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9 El Manana, as quoted in Ross, p. 233; Taraceña, p. 256; El País, January 29, 1913.
Under Madero, however, the press reported most revolutionary outbreaks as threats to the republic and blamed Madero for not being able to control the country. Anyone who read El Imparcial in January 1913 would have concluded that Mexico was being ripped apart. Daily reports, usually on the front page, of Zapata's revolt in Morelos as well as several articles about revolutionary activities in Juárez and strikes by railroad mechanics, factory workers and printers appeared in El Imparcial that month.

The Mexican Herald published similar reports during January, making them available to U.S. papers through the Associated Press. Madero appeared to the U.S. public as a weak, ineffectual leader. Madero's image in the U.S. press was further damaged by his ambassador to the United States, Manuel Calero, who admitted to a Chicago reporter in 1912 that the fighting continued in Morelos and elsewhere. "The only way the government will be able to deal with these people," he said, "is to exterminate them."

Flores Magón published that statement in Regeneración and continued his anti-Madero campaign, printing articles in both English and Spanish. According to Flores Magón, many of the men fighting with Zapata were members of the PLM. He also claimed to have a growing number of supporters, both

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10 El Imparcial January 1 through 30, 1913.
11 Mexican Herald, January 1-30, 1913; Ethel Duffy Turner, p. 288.
hispanic and anglo, in the United States. His most famous anglo supporter had decided to confront Madero personally.12

John Kenneth Turner returned to Mexico in January 1913 to discuss land reform with Madero. To help finance the trip, Turner planned to sell a series of articles to El Pais on U.S. influence in Mexico. Turner met with the president, who greeted him warmly. Turner wrote to his wife:

Big News! Last night El Senor Presidente received me, sending various personages away to talk with me. He greeted me with "You are a very famous man." We talked for 45 minutes, walking up and down the same balcony where Creelman had his highfalutin interview with Diaz. . . . he said that "Barbarous Mexico" had helped him very much in the revolution of 1910, as it gave the American people the knowledge he was fighting for liberty. . . .[Madero] gave me the thing I wanted -- a sweeping letter ordering all the authorities, military and civil, in the republic, to give me all the data I asked for . . .13

At the end of January, Silvestre Terrazas was also in Mexico City and met with Madero on February 1. Terrazas, as did many journalists, had misgivings about the president. Terrazas thought that Madero had not been strong enough in his support of those who had waged the revolution. When Madero offered Terrazas the ambassadorship to Brazil, he

13 John Kenneth Turner to Ethel Duffy Turner, January 28, 1913, quoted in the introduction to Barbarous Mexico.
took umbrage. "What would I do down there?" he asked his family.  

Madero simply did not inspire confidence -- neither in the domestic and international press nor in his own governors. In December 1912, Governor Vestuniano Carranza of Coahuila arranged an informal meeting of the governors of Chihuahua, Sonora, San Luis Potosí and Aguascalientes. At the meeting, Carranza criticized the Madero government for its weakness and urged the governors who had come to power as a result of the revolution to band together to face the coming difficulties.

On February 8, the introduction to Turner's series appeared in El País. In the lengthy front-page article, Turner presented his Mexican readers with a number of questions, including, "Is American intervention a fact or fantasy?" Promising to write the truth because he was "an American against intervention," Turner wrote that he would answer the questions he raised in subsequent articles. But these articles were not forthcoming. The next day El País became one of the many casualties of the first day of what

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14Madero to Silvestre Terrazas, January 31, 1913, Box 110, Terrazas Collection; personal interview with Margarita Terrazas.

15Ross, p. 278.
Mexicans now call *La Decena Trágica* -- the Tragic Ten Days.\(^{16}\)

During the pre-dawn hours of Sunday, February 9, a conspiratory force, comprising Mexican Army troops and military school cadets, broke General Reyes and Félix Díaz out of prison and marched toward the National Palace in the center of the city. They planned to capture the National Palace and Madero. In front of the National Palace is a large square, called the Zocalo, used primarily for military parades during official functions of state. The revolutionaries charged across the plaza, into the waiting machine guns of loyal government troops.

General Reyes and 400 others were killed in the first skirmish, but the insurgents captured Gustavo Madero, who was later released. Díaz and his men retreated southeast through the city streets to the Ciudadela, a large stone armory built in the 1700s as a tobacco warehouse. Its granite walls were 10 feet thick in some places, and it contained enough ammunition and small artillery to maintain the small army.

Oddly enough, had Díaz moved straight east to the Alameda, he would have captured Madero. When word of the revolt came, Madero was not at the National Palace, but at the castle at Chupúlotepec and Díaz had reached the National Palace before

\(^{16}\) *El País*, February 8, 1913.
Madero. Madero waited in a shop across the street from the Alameda, about five blocks from the Zocalo, until the battle was over.  

More than 1,000 people had been wounded at the fighting at the Zocalo, including the commander of the loyal troops. Madero replaced him with General Victriano Huerta, Porfirio Díaz's escort to Veracruz. Huerta, who had commanded several military excursions against rebels, notably Orozco in Chihuahua, was to command the troops defending the National Palace and retake the Ciudadela. Huerta had the advantage of numbers and the fact that in a recent remodeling windows had been placed in the previously impenetrable walls of the Ciudadela. It was vulnerable, but Huerta's efforts to take it were greatly restrained. What began on February 10 would be called a sham artillery duel in which badly placed guns hammered at the civilian population while Huerta, Felix Díaz and Henry Lane Wilson, the U.S. ambassador to Mexico, decided the fate of the country.

Henry Lane Wilson had little faith in Madero and had few qualms about expressing his sentiments in the reports he sent to Washington. His indulgence in repeating rumors in the reports finally drew comments from State Department officials. Wilson's bluster made him unpopular with U.S. citizens living in Mexico, 40,000 of whom filed complaints

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17 This account of the fighting at the Zocalo is drawn from Ross, Madero, Apostle of Mexican Democracy, p. 282-285.
against him. Many Mexicans disliked him because of his inability to speak Spanish well. Both Mexicans and Americans knew Wilson as "a man who liked to drink and not only got pleasure in the taste of alcohol but delighted in drinking himself into the semi-conscious state of the habitual drunk." Wilson served in Chile before coming to Mexico during the last days of the porfiriato and owed his appointment to his brother, John Wilson, Republican senator from the state of Washington and publisher of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer.¹⁸

Still, his position as U.S. ambassador made Wilson one of the most important members of the international diplomatic corps in Mexico City and most reports appearing in the U.S. press agreed with his perspective on Madero and Mexico. On February 16, the New York Times published an editorial praising Henry Lane Wilson for his efforts to safeguard the lives and property of the 25,000 foreigners in the Mexican capital. John Kenneth Turner provided a different view of the ambassador. On the same day the New York Times editorial appeared, Diaz forces detained Turner and took him to the Ciudadela. Later he wrote:

I was taken to the Ciudadela. After General Mondragon had seen me, I was thrown into a hole, with drunken soldiers for fellow prisoners, and kept there for seven hours.

I sent for Ambassador Wilson, who came and promised to get me out that night. Then he said he had lost a great deal of time and would let me stay there over night, but I would be perfectly safe, he said.

Up to that time I had given a false name, but when Ambassador Wilson said he would have to look up some of my friends, I told him my right name. He took umbrage at this and brusquely asked me why I had given a false name. I told him I had done so because my life would not be worth the purchase price if the Díaz people knew I was the man who wrote Barbarous Mexico, describing the atrocities of Porfirio Díaz.

Ambassador Wilson practically compelled me to give my right name to the lieutenants of Felix Díaz.

In so many words, Mr. Wilson told me that the only thing that in any way made me deserving of the punishment they intended for me was the fact that I had criticized the policy of the American administration.

Felix Díaz afterwards accused me of plotting to assassinate him. Fortunately, after my arrest and before reaching the arsenal, I had destroyed a letter from President Madero which I had been carrying. It commended me to all his officers, assuring them that they could give me with safety any information at their disposal, and informing them that I was criticizing the administration of President Taft. If this letter had been found upon me, I should have been summarily put to death.

Three times I was sentenced to be shot, but each time something happened to prevent the execution. Notwithstanding the Ambassador's promise, I was three days in the arsenal.¹⁹

On February 10, the New York Times published news of the revolution on the front page, saying "indications are that

the disorder will spread across the country." The *Times* predicted the downfall of Madero "and his weak and vain policies" and called him "above all an idealist."\(^{20}\)

The fighting continued, for the most part in the vicinity of the Ciudadela only a few blocks from the American Embassy and the Zona Rosa, the European neighborhood of Mexico City. Both sides claimed to be in control of the city. Madero told the Spanish ambassador, "I will die before I resign," while Díaz felt confident enough of the outcome of the battle that he refused to bring in from army posts in the provinces replacement troops who vowed allegiance to him.\(^{21}\)

By February 16, Huerta had decided to break with Madero and that decision was known to Díaz. The two men did not, however, agree on the succession until the evening of February 18 when they met at the American Embassy. In what came to be known as the Pact of the Ciudadela, arbitrated by Wilson, Huerta would become interim president and felicistas would control the cabinet. The hostilities did not end immediately: Huerta told his generals to fire shells containing shrapnel, which would explode ineffectively against the stone walls of the Ciudadela, and ordered row after row of troops loyal to Madero against the fixed machine gun positions there. Meanwhile, forces under Díaz


\(^{21}\) *New York Times*, February 16, 1913.
fired their cannons randomly into the residential areas of Mexico City. 22

On February 17, Gustavo Madero ordered Huerta arrested. Francisco Madero had the general brought to him in the middle of the night and reinstated him after Huerta professed fidelity. In fewer than 12 hours, Huerta would betray him. On the afternoon of February 18, Huerta ordered the arrest of Madero and Pino Suárez at the National Palace. That same afternoon Gustavo came to a particularly gruesome end. Huerta supporters shot him to death, but not before blinding him and beating him insensible.

Madero and Pino Suárez were held at the National Palace for four days while their families tried to obtain their release. On February 19 both resigned, after being guaranteed their own safety and that of their families. Ambassador Wilson suggested that Madero be placed in an institution for the insane. "Madero is crazy, a fool, a lunatic and ought to be declared legally unfit as far as his capacity to exercise his office," he said. The crux of the statement was reported by the New York Times, which predicted a sanity hearing would be held. Wilson reported to the U.S. Department of State that during the last days of

the shelling Madero's mental capacities, "always abnormal and fragile," had deteriorated.23

During the bombardment, El Imparcial was the only major daily to continue publishing. The paper, usually 12 pages, ran only four during the fighting and those pages contained only advertisements and information concerning the revolt. Mobs had looted El País and had burned the building, which housed the pro-Madero Nuevo Era. Telegraph services to the provinces had been stopped and details of the fighting in Mexico City -- sent regularly to the New York Times and other U.S. papers -- were not published in Mexico's provincial newspapers for weeks.24

When the fighting ended, the Mexico City newspapers were unified in their support of the Mexican government, although it was unclear who the government was. El Imparcial ran a photo of Huerta embracing Díaz, the man Ambassador Wilson had heralded as the "Savior of Mexico." El País, again able to publish, proclaimed "Maderism has been tumbled noisily and tragically, never to be born again."25


24 El Imparcial, February 10 through 23, 1913; El Correo de Chihuahua, March 6, 1913; New York Times, February 10 through 23, 1913; Ross, pp. 310.

25 El Imparcial, February 20, 1913; El País February 20, 1913.
Wilson reported to the State Department that one of the unwritten agreements of the Pact of the Ciudadela was that freedom of the press would be observed. Perhaps this was formality on the part of Wilson, but it was definitely not to be. In the justifiable criticism the Mexican press unleashed on Madero, it had unwittingly destroyed its greatest ally.\textsuperscript{26}

On the evening of February 22, Madero and Pino Suárez were murdered by the escort who was to take them from the National Palace to the Penitentiary. After the two men were killed, the escort riddled the automobiles with bullets to lend credence to the pre-concocted story that Madero's supporters tried to free him and he was killed in the fighting. The \textit{London Times} commented: "It is curious that no one else was wounded in the battle." The reaction in the U.S. press was stronger. On February 24, the \textit{New York Times} reported reactions from 20 U.S. newspapers, all of which condemned the Huerta government. \textit{El Imparcial} reported the events exactly as the government dictated them.\textsuperscript{27}

More than a month later Governor Carranza would take the formal action that would plunge Mexico into civil war. In the fighting that followed, each faction would publish newspapers and when the revolutionaries emerged successful

\textsuperscript{26} Ross p. 311.

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{London Times}, February 24, 1913; \textit{New York Times}, February 24, 1913; \textit{El Imparcial}, February 23 and 24, 1913.
at the end of the decade, the Mexican press would resume its porfirian-style relationship with the government. The dream of an independent press for Mexico died on the street with Madero.
Chapter 10
CONCLUSIONS: THE PORFIRIAN STYLE OF GOVERNMENT RELATIONS
WITH THE MODERN PRESS IN MEXICO

Porfirio Díaz consolidated his power between 1876 and 1888 when he was able to effect his own reelection. According to Enrique Krauze, author of a recent biography of Díaz, Don Porfirio developed twelve distinct elements to control the government. One of those elements was control of the press, but the manner in which he achieved this was found in the other elements. Taken as a whole, Krauze's list could be considered the porfirian style and it was the porfirian style that was and is used to control the press in Mexico.¹

Don Porfirio took control of the Mexican government by force, but he held it with a system of unwritten policies, many of which had an impact on the press and are still used to control the press. Don Porfirio, for instance, adeptly "divided and conquered" his opponents. To this end, his government occasionally subsidized "opposition papers" that

Krauze's complete list is:
1. Repression or pacification
2. Divide and conquer
3. Control and flexibility in government
4. Ineffective suffrage -- re-election
5. Control of legislative power
6. Control of judicial power
7. Pan o Palo (bread or stick)
8. Political reconciliation with the church
9. Creating the image of "statesmanship" outside Mexico
10. Control of the press
11. Control of the intellectuals
portrayed the Mexican government so maliciously that readers discounted the information and began to look askance at serious opposition journalists, such as Filomeno Mata or Luis Cabrera. In 1976, Uno Más Uno, a liberal tabloid daily began in Mexico City with a government apoyo (grant). The newspaper became quite popular. In 1980, the government partially funded the beginnings of another liberal tabloid daily, La Jornada.

Of all the elements of porfirian style, the best known is pan o palo (bread or stick). The publishers who adhered to porfirian precepts, such as Spíndola Reyes of El Imparcial, became wealthy while publishers who questioned porfirian policies, such as Filomeno Mata, faced ongoing financial difficulties. Today in Mexico, it is possible to ascertain any daily newspaper's political leanings by the amount of advertising it contains.

Don Porfirio correctly surmised that holding power in Mexico meant keeping power from other people, which included the press. He did not rule the country by force. In fact, as today, the majority of Mexicans supported the government. While the abuses of the Mexican system seem readily apparent, perhaps more so to outsiders, there is a necessary reciprocity between the people and the government, a
reciprocity in which the media plays a crucial part and without which the government cannot continue.²

With the exception of Victoriano Huerta, all the men who ruled Mexico in the decade following the resignation of Díaz died of gunshot wounds. Although the Mexican Constitution of 1917 set the governmental form of Mexico, Mexican politicians learned much from Porfirio Díaz. For Mexican journalists, that constitution is as much a "dead letter" as the constitution of 1857 was for Ricardo Flores Magón in 1902.

The constitution of 1917 does not guarantee freedom of the press, but establishes limits. A Mexican journalist cannot legally publish articles containing material which attacks private life or interferes with the public peace. Even though the laws are regulatory in nature, they play no effective part in newspaper operation.³

For the most part, the availability of information in Mexico today is governed by the principle of autocensura, which can be defined as an editor's ability to understand what he can and cannot publish. Autocensura exists in all Mexican media and is most severe in popular entertainment


³"Ley de Imprenta, Reglamentaria de Los Artículos 6 and 7." As reprinted in Oswaldo Baqueiro López. La Prensa y el Estado, (México, D.F., Editorial Nuestra America, no publication date), passim.
such as movies and television, is present to a great extent in newspapers, to a lesser degree in magazines and almost non-existent in book publishing because many books are self-published. In short, intellectual freedom in any given medium is dependent on financial accessibility. One can read about the indiscretions of Mexican politicians in books which are too expensive for many Mexicans to buy, but rarely in newspapers.4

Carlos Jiménez edits the arts and leisure section of the Mexico City News and has worked as a journalist in Mexico for 30 years. Jiménez has never been personally involved in a law suit and could not remember being on the staff of a paper that was. "The laws are there," he said, "but to get involved in a libel suit would be impossible because they [the libel suits] just go into the bureaucratic judicial system and disappear."5

When asked about Mexican press law, Glenn White, managing editor of the Mexico City News, the largest English-language daily newspaper in Mexico (35,000 press run, founded in 1951), replied: "We don't get involved with press law. I

4 Margarita Terrazas claimed that the first edition of her biographical essay of her father included in El Verdadero Pancho Villa was censored. Like many books in Mexico, El Verdadero Pancho Villa was self-published.

5 Personal telephone interview with Carlos Jiminez. March 6, 1986.
simply follow the dictates of the publisher and that's that."  

Romulo O'Farrill, Jr., owns and publishes the Mexico City News as well as Novedades, a Mexico City daily founded in 1936 which claims a 200,000 press run. O'Farrill, Jr., also owns a television station in the capital and he and members of his family own several newspapers in the states. Some of these operations are managed by members of the O'Farrill family, others by recognized political associates. O'Farrill's multi-media ownership reflects a basic trend in Mexico. Mario Vazquez Raña, who now owns the controlling interest in United Press International, owns 42 dailies and is said to be funded by Luis Echeverría, former president of Mexico.

Mexican newspaper publishers receive financial support from the Mexican government, both in the form of paid advertising (see Appendix A) and unreported subsidies. Few, if any, Mexican newspapers could survive without government subsidies and few Mexican newsmen could survive without the common types of remuneration available for favorable coverage of government institutions and politicians. Agencies regularly issue monthly stipends to beat reporters (chacotes), politicians pay reporters to feature their name prominently in news articles (embutes), and Mexican

6 Personal telephone interview with Glenn White. March 5, Mexico City.
advertising salesmen are adept at sobornes, a form of political blackmail. Journalists also receive gratuities in the form of gifts, entertainment and free rent for apartments.  

In turn, the Mexican government has, until recently, overtly controlled the press through its monopoly of newsprint. In recent foreign trade agreements, the Mexican government has allowed importation, thereby formally relinquishing complete control of newsprint. This does not represent a liberalization on the part of the government but a response to modern technology. The Mexican government enacted a statute by which it owns all hardware used by newspapers to receive satellite transmissions.

Government monopoly of newsprint is not the only means of controlling the press but it remains an important one, as shown both by the Echeverria-backed take-over of the El Sol chain by Mario Vazquez Raña (paper was denied to the previous owner) and the fact that no newspaper in Mexico is able to publish more than 250,000 copies. However, putting its power to withhold newsprint into effect usually constitutes a last-ditch attempt by the government to control a publication. More often, the "revolutionary family," that group of individuals who comprise the "power

7Personal interview with Dr. Gabriel Molina, Jefe del Departamento de Ciencias de la Comunicación, Universidad de las Americas. March 9, 1987.
elite" of Mexico, concern themselves with influence rather than control. To exert that influence, they must ensure that Mexican publishers remain dependent on the financial elite.

This dependency is imposed not only on publishers, but on the entire system. Traditionally, journalism in Mexico has been a low-paying profession but one in which the possibility of accepting bribes was rife. Columnists, important in Mexico since the days of Luis Cabrera, are notably underpaid, a situation which creates financial benefits for the newspaper and opportunities for the ruling elite to influence what appears in print. 8

In the case of some papers, the government maintains financial control in the form of subsidies. Both Uno Mas Uno and La Jornada, supposedly left-wing newspapers, were established with apoyos (grants) from the government and continue to receive financial support. But even those newspapers that do not get direct subsidies receive ample amounts of government money in the form of advertising revenue (see Appendix A). 9

Government-press relations have been further strengthened by the development of the position of jefe de publicidad


9 Ibid.
(news director) in many government agencies since the mid-1960s. A jefe de publicidad acts as a public relations man for the government agency and insures that the coverage of the political agency is favorable, using whatever means, including money, that the agency places at his disposal. This position has become the professional goal of many Mexican journalists because the pay is greater, the hours more reasonable and the chances of political and economic advancement greater. Beat reporters are less eager to provide unfavorable coverage of prospective employers.\textsuperscript{10}

The labyrinth of economic and political power in modern Mexican journalism represents a problem to U.S. reporters covering the ongoing rash of murders of journalists in Mexico. It is difficult to determine to what extent these killing have been related to the murdered journalists' involvement with bribery and information control. While Manuel Buendía, a columnist for \textit{Excélsior,} has come close to public deification since his murder in a Mexico City parking lot in 1984, both working journalists and others maintain that Buendía probably died because he became too involved in accepting embutes from conflicting sources within the PRI structure.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10}Personal interview with Dr. Gabriel Molina, March 9, 1987.
\textsuperscript{11}Ibid.
There have been notable attempts by editors to upgrade the ethical standards of Mexican journalism, the most important being Julio Scherer García's editorship (1968-1976) of the employee-owned Excélsior. How the Mexican power elite dealt with that particular situations is more telling than why.

The workers, both editorial and production, who owned Excélsior elected Scherer editor in 1968 and during his eight year tenure, Scherer accomplished an almost unthinkable task. He developed Excélsior into a publication that was respected for its integrity, objectivity and commitment to the ethical practices espoused by U.S. journalists. Scherer was extremely aware of the problems of corruption in the Mexican press and surrounded himself with an editorial staff that shared his views.

The conflict between Scherer and other members of the cooperative dated from the mid-1960s when conservative elements within the co-operative lost political control of the co-operative and were replaced by a liberal element called "the group" which included Scherer, Manuel Becerra Acosta and Manuel Granados Chapa. Under the leadership of Scherer, the editorial department of Excélsior rid itself of many corrupt practices such as selling front page news stories for $8,000 (U.S.). The editorial staff's position was further bolstered when Luis Echeverría became president
of Mexico in 1970, as he espoused dedication to a free press.\textsuperscript{12}

A rift between the editorial policy of \textit{Excélsior} and Echeverría, or more accurately, the PRI party, was inevitable. It began in the early 1970s with the newspaper's criticism of the government-controlled Mexican television network, Telesistema Mexicano (today Televisa), when the network began gathering its own news rather than relying on Mexican newspapers as news sources. The immediate result of this conflict was that government agencies and conservative businessmen stopped advertising in \textit{Excélsior}, placing the newspaper in an extremely precarious financial position which was exacerbated by a boycott of U.S. firms who pulled their advertising from the paper in 1972 because of Scherer's critical stance toward U.S. president Richard Nixon.\textsuperscript{13}

President Echeverría came to the aid of \textit{Excélsior}, arranging for direct financial aid to the paper, and for an extension of the paper's credit with Productora e Importadora de Papel, S.A. (PIPSA), the government-owned company which had a monopoly on all newsprint sold in


\textsuperscript{13}Raul Trejo Delarbre, coordinator, \textit{Televisa, el Quinto Poder}, (México, D.F., Claves Latinoamericanas, 1985), p. 33; Baqueiro López, page 176; Vargas.
Mexico. This concession of credit would return to haunt Scherer.  

In 1976, Echeverría, prohibited by the constitution from seeking re-election, was preparing to turn the government over to the PRI presidential candidate, José López Portillo. Traditionally, presidents of Mexico begin to lose their almost godlike powers during the last two years of their term and become vulnerable to press criticism. Through the outgoing president, the press has some opportunity to criticize the PRI party for its monopoly of power. Excélsior did that in November of 1976, but the hierarchy of the newspaper was not prepared for the backlash that would emanate from the PRI party or the conservative elements in its own cooperative in the spring of 1976.  

In November of 1975, Excélsior criticized Echeverría for directing the Mexican ambassador to the United Nations to vote for an Arab-sponsored resolution which condemned Zionism as racism. The editorial, along with another that called for the resignation of the Mexican foreign minister, was "an unprecedented use of its Excélsior's critical

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15 Vargas; personal interview with Dr. Gabriel Molina, March 9, 1987.
powers." The foreign minister did resign, but Excélsior would pay a heavy price.16

Excélsior came under attack from all sides: advertising decreased; government agencies spent hundreds of thousands of dollars placing ads in other Mexican publications questioning the paper's patriotism; Televisa newscasters criticized the paper at every opportunity and government officials disputed anything about their various agencies that was published in Excélsior. The "group" at Excélsior had no doubt that Echeverría was behind the anti-Excélsior campaign. Not only did the outgoing president hold a grudge, he was also trying to consolidate a power base for his future political aspirations which included becoming a substantial share holder in El Sol newspaper chain, the largest in Mexico.17

During the first week of June, PIPSA began a series of meetings with the upper-echelon management of Excélsior. The paper owed the agency money and this time credit would not be extended. To add insult to injury, the management of PIPSA called high-level Excélsior editorial staff members, including Scherer, to meetings that amounted to bureaucratic harassment. PIPSA officials accused Excélsior management of incompetence, even though Excélsior business manager Hero

16Vargas.
17Ibid; Leñero, passim.
Rodríquez Toro showed them that the newspaper's gross profits had increased by fifteen percent from 1970 to 1976.18

On June 10, 1986, the government launched a new attack on Excélsior, this time on the economics of the cooperative. A well-organized group of slum-dwellers, led by a PRI politician, took over a 218-acre tract of land owned by the Excélsior cooperative. The property, purchased in 1959 as an investment to generate money for the cooperative, was to be the site of a housing development with a projected value of $40 million. Land invasions were not uncommon in Mexico during the 1970s but were usually dealt with quickly and severely by federal police. In this instance, however, the squatters were bussed to the site, fed hot meals brought in on government trucks and made celebrities by the Mexican media. Their leader, a PRI congressmen-elect, told reporters the squatters would not leave "until Scherer is expelled from Excélsior."19

Excélsior's lawyers immediately obtained a statement from the secretariat of agrarian reform which recognized the cooperative's title to the land, but were told by Mexico City officials, "We have been instructed not to receive any complaints in this case." Scherer and the group began

19Vargas.
arranging meetings with Mexican politicians, looking for some compromise that would allow them respite from both PIPSA and the PRI-sponsored land-grabbers. They even spoke with president-elect José López Portillo who said he could not help them. Finally, a cabinet member told them that he might be able to help them after July 8, but not before.  

The "group" decided to take their case to the people, and published an editorial on July 7 which read:

The passivity of the police and the authorities is alarming. Nearly a month has passed since the crime was committed and nobody has lifted a finger against it. We have to ask ourselves if this governmental passivity is caused by its lack of will to act or in its lack of power to enforce the law.

That evening, the government-controlled television news aired a special feature on the situation, which amounted to a 40-minute attack on the newspaper. But the "group" had already decided on a stronger editorial statement, a full page gacetilla (announcement) warning the Mexican people that the freedom of the press in Mexico was under attack. The statement was signed by 50 editors, reporters and intellectuals of Mexico, many of whom wanted to see the announcement on the front page of Excélsior, an idea vetoed

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20 Ibid.; Leñero, p. 159.
21 Vargas.
by Scherer. Finally, it was decided to run the announcement on an inside page in the July 8 edition.  

The announcement was never published. Between 2 and 3 a.m., 60 supporters of the conservative element of the cooperative took over the presses of Excésior and removed the offending page. As the mutilated edition was being distributed to the street vendors of Mexico City, the editorial staff was gathering at the Excésior office. By 5 a.m., 200 editorial workers were present to support Scherer. At noon, the conservatives of the cooperative called for an assembly and, their numbers swelled by several hundred people who had never before seen the inside of the Excésior offices, they expelled Scherer, the Excésior business manager and five of the paper's editors. More than 200 reporters resigned their positions in support of the ousted editor-in-chief.

Scherer and the other members of the "group" never returned to Excésior. Later that year, Scherer founded the weekly news magazine Proceso. Although the impact of his work is lessened, he remains one of the most respected journalists in Mexico. Also in 1976, Manuel Becerra Acosta founded the leftist daily tabloid Uno Más Uno, a publication that was, ironically, founded with a grant from the

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22 Ibid; Leñero, 'pp. 191-192.
23 Vargas.
government and depends on government subsidies to survive. In 1980, Miguel Ángel Granados Chapa, one of Scherer's closest associates at Excélsior, was part of the editorial group that began, also with government help and ongoing subsidy, La Jornada.  

Excélsior, under Scherer's leadership, represented the first vestige of a free popular press since Madero. Since his expulsion from Excélsior there have been altercations between individual journalists and the Mexican power structure, but these conflicts have been settled, usually by removing the offending journalists, before any of the material gets into print. Most recently, a U.S. editor, Peter Hamill, was removed from an editorial post at the Mexico City News simply because he wanted to cover both sides of a strike. Last year, the editorial staff of the weekly magazine Impacto was rearranged because the magazine began to criticize the government.  

As a nation, Mexico has made great progress since the days of Porfirio Díaz. Educational opportunities, federal expenditures for social services and the average real income of most Mexicans have increased. Yet Mexicans, as a people,
seem to be as much of an enigma to themselves as to the rest of the world. When Ignacio Rodriguez Zarate, a communications instructor at Universidad Iberoamericana, analyzed the impact of a political columnist on the presidential selection of 1982, he found it necessary to begin his thesis by explaining three theories of the Mexican presidential succession. Mexico remains a mystery to most Mexicans, and the press, controlled by the same mechanics that Don Porfirio perfected in the last century, remains the servant to that small group of men who rule Mexico.26

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APPENDIX
From Monday, February 23, 1987, to Sunday, March 1, 1987, I took an informal survey of 10 of Mexico City's 31 daily newspapers to determine what percentage of their advertising was paid for directly or indirectly by the Mexican government. As I was looking at the purchase of advertising as a means of control and influence, I divided advertising into two categories: government and commercial. Neither area is beyond question, but my conclusion that the Mexican government is the major source of advertising revenue in Mexico is not new: Robert N. Pierce studied the Mexican press during the 1970s and discovered not only an abundance of government-based advertising but also that the government was paying an average of three times the commercial rate.¹

The advertising I selected as government based was that advertising which could be controlled by the government. I included in that selection all advertising of television programing because of the severe censorship that the media are subject to in Mexico, the visible connections between television and the Mexican power structure and the fact that television stations, while they purchase an inordinate

amount of advertising space in the daily newspapers, actually pay a higher rate than do commercial advertisers.\(^2\)

In the charts I have included a commercial and non-commercial rate to give the reader an idea of the discrepancy between rates charged to private firms and what advertisers linked to the government pay. My source, the rate and data book published by Medios Publicitarios Mexicanos, S.A. of Mexico City, included a much more extensive breakdown, listing rates for various sectors and, in some cases, discounts for long-term advertisers. However, the one consistent element was the fact that commercial advertisers paid less for their advertising than did those that fell into the category of government-controlled advertisers.

I have also included the number of copies printed, as listed in the rate and data book. Since there is no recognized entity for the auditing of newspaper circulation in Mexico, these numbers are supplied by the publishers and are not considered reliable, even by the staff of Medios Publicitarios. José Alberto Villamil Duerte, the general manager of that firm, emphasized that these figures represented supposed numbers of papers printed and not

\(^2\)José A. Villamil Duerte, Tarifas y Datos Medios Impresos, (México, D.F., Medios Publicitarios Mexicanos, February, 1987), passim..
circulation, adding, "It's simply too dangerous to run
circulation numbers."\textsuperscript{3}

The tables indicate weekly averages and I have given
some background information concerning the specific papers,
including format, history and known political connections.
The information in the profiles of the newspapers has been
confirmed by at least three of five sources: Señor Villamil;
Gabriel G. Molina, Jefe del Departamento de Ciencias de la
Comunicación (chairman of the communications department) at
the University of the Americas at Puebla); Dr. Francisco
Prieto, Jefe del Departamento de Comunicacion at Universidad
Iberoamericana; Jaimie Septien, an instructor at UIA and a
columnist for Uno Más Uno; Mario Beauregard, a freelance
television commentator who has worked on the staff of both
Ovaciones and Novedades.

\textsuperscript{3}Interview with José Alberto Villamil Duerte, March 19,
1987.
EXCELSIOR

press run..............................................200,000
single issue cost.................................200 pesos
commercial rate.........................6,924 pesos per column inch
non-commercial rate.............17,568 pesos per column inch

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Excélsior (founded in 1917), despite controversies in its recent past (see Chapter 10), is the most respected newspaper in Mexico and claims to be the oldest general-interest newspaper in Mexico City. Like several other Mexico City newspapers, it claims to be a national newspaper. In reality its importance probably lies in the influence it has as a media leader both in the capital and in the states. **Excelsior** is staff-owned.

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4At the time of this survey (February 23, 1987, to March 1, 1987) the exchange rate was approximately 1050 pesos to the dollar.
EL UNIVERSAL

press run ............................................85,000
(includes 8,800 papers sent outside Mexico City)
single issue cost ..................................200 pesos
commercial rate ............................10,728 pesos per column inch
non-commercial rate ..................15,804 pesos per column inch

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<td>14</td>
<td>13,608</td>
<td>4,468</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>non-commercial advertising</th>
<th>no. of inches</th>
<th>% of total space</th>
<th>% of advertising</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,958</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>commercial advertising</th>
<th>no. of inches</th>
<th>% of total space</th>
<th>% of advertising</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,510</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

El Universal (founded in 1916) is reputed to be the daily newspaper most closely linked with U.S. interests in Mexico.
EL HERALDO

press run........................................209,600
single issue cost...............................200 pesos
commercial rate.................................8,460 pesos per column inch
non-commercial rate............................unlisted
gacetillas.................................25,020 pesos per column inch

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>no. of classified</th>
<th>inches</th>
<th>advertising</th>
<th>total space in ads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pages</td>
<td>ad pages</td>
<td>available</td>
<td>inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>8,172</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>non-commercial advertising</th>
<th>no. of inches</th>
<th>% of total space</th>
<th>% of advertising</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>commercial advertising</th>
<th>no. of inches</th>
<th>% of total space</th>
<th>% of advertising</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,966</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

El Heraldo (founded 1965) is considered the newspaper that reflects the interests of the Mexican business community.
Novedades (founded in 1936) is published by Romulo O'Farrill, Jr. O'Farrill is a major figure in the Mexican media, owning the English-language Mexico City News and a television station in Mexico City and is second only to Mario Vazquez Raña of the El Sol chain in ownership of newspapers in the states.
El Día is a small daily, unlisted in the rate and data book, said to be closely aligned with the Catholic church in Mexico.
EL NACIONAL

press run...........................................181,375
single issue cost.................................250 pesos
commercial rate.........................10,728 pesos per column inch
non-commercial rate..........15,804 pesos per column inch

| no. of classified pages | ad pages available | inches in ads | total space
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>5,760</td>
<td>1,042</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>non-commercial advertising</th>
<th>% of total space</th>
<th>% of advertising</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>835</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>commercial advertising</th>
<th>% of total space</th>
<th>% of advertising</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>207</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

El Nacional is the only Mexico City daily owned by the government.
Uno Más Uno was established in 1977 after Julio Scherer García was removed from the editorship of Excélsior. Scherer began a magazine, El Proceso, but staff members who left Excélsior at the same time began this tabloid with a government grant and it continues to receive financial aid from the Mexican government.
press run............................................35,000
single issue cost........................................200 pesos
commercial rate...............................8,040 pesos per column inch
non-commercial rate..................14,592 pesos per column inch

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>no. of classified inches</th>
<th>advertising total space</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pages ad pages available inches in ads</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 3 1,632 442 27%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>non-commercial advertising</th>
<th>no. of inches</th>
<th>% of total space</th>
<th>% of advertising</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>242</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>commercial advertising</th>
<th>no. of inches</th>
<th>% of total space</th>
<th>% of advertising</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Mexico City News (founded in 1950) is one of the most appealing newspapers for those interested in Mexican history, as it so closely follows the editorial bent of the Mexican Herald during the porfiriato. The most recent example of press control in Mexico occurred at this paper. (See Chapter 10)
LA JORNADA

press run............................................50,000
single issue cost..300 pesos (reflects recent price change)
commercial rate..................3,011 pesos per column inch
non-commercial rate....................unlisted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>no. of</th>
<th>classified</th>
<th>inches</th>
<th>advertising</th>
<th>total space</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pages</td>
<td>ad pages</td>
<td>available</td>
<td>inches</td>
<td>in ads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>2,835</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| non-commercial | advertising | % of  | % of  |
| inches         | total space  |      |      |
| 372            | 13%          | 65%  |      |
| commercial     | advertising  | % of  |      |
| 198            | 7%           | 35%  |      |

La Jornada (founded 1980) is another tabloid that was begun as a result of Scherer's departure from Excelsior. Like Uno Más Uno, La Jornada is left-wing and established with government support. It continues to accept financial aid from the Mexican government.
El Sol de México (founded 1965) is the capital city daily of the El Sol newspaper chain, which, with 42 papers, is the largest in Mexico. Its publisher, Mario Vazquez Raña, also owns United Press International and is said to be financed by Luis Escheviera, former president of Mexico. In Denuncia, a book by Rafael Loret de Mola concerning the murder of journalist Carlos Loret de Mola in 1985, Raña was severely criticized for political and financial malfeasance.
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Archival Material


Turner, Ethel Duffy. Assorted correspondence and published documents at Museo de Antropología, Mexico D.F.

U.S. Department of State, Consular Despatches from Mexico City. Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

Interviews


Villamil, José A., Manager of Medios Publicitarios Mexicanos and editor of the quarterly Tarifas y Datos Medios Impresos. Interviewed in Mexico City, March 11 and 13, 1987.
Published

Magazines:

*The Border* (various editions, 1909)
*Collier's* (various edition, 1900-1910)
*Engineering and Mining Journal* (1908)
*Nation* (various editions, 1900-1914)
*New Republic* (July 5, 1922)
*Pearson's* (March, 1908)

Newspapers (during the Porfiriato)

*Correo de Chihuahua* (various editions, 1899-1913)
*Diario del Hogar* (various editions, 1881-1911)
*Great Falls Tribune* (June, 1906; various editions, 1910-1913)
*El Paso Herald* (1910)
*El Paso Times* (various editions, 1910-14)
*El Hijo de Ahuizote* (various editions, 1892-1900—Daniel Cabrera, editor; various editions, 1892—Ricardo Flores Magón, editor)
*El Imparcial* (editions published in January, 1900, 1905, 1906, 1908; various editions, 1900 to 1910)
*Mexican Herald* (editions published in January of 1900, 1905, 1906, 1908; various editions, 1900 to 1910)
*New York Times* (1900 to 1904; various editions, 1886, 1904-1914)
*El País* (editions published in January of 1900, 1905, 1906, 1908; various editions, 1900 to 1910)
*El Universal* (1901)
*La Regeneración* (various editions, 1900 to 1917)

Contemporary Magazines

*Editor and Publisher* (various editions, 1983 to 1986)
*Proceso* (various editions, February, March, 1987)
Contemporary Newspapers

El Día (various editions, July-August, 1986; February-March, 1987, specifically February 23 to March 1, 1987)

Excélsior (various editions, July-August, 1986; February-March, 1987, specifically February 23 to March 1, 1987)

El Heraldo (various editions, July-August, 1986; February-March, 1987, specifically February 23 to March 1, 1987)

Mexico City Bulletin (various editions, July, August, 1986; February, March, 1987)

Mexico City News (various editions, July-August, 1986; February-March, 1987, specifically February 23 to March 1, 1987)


Novedades (various editions, July-August, 1986; February-March, 1987, specifically February 23 to March 1, 1987)

Ovaciones (various editions, July-August, 1986; February-March, 1987)

Punto, published weekly, (July-August, 1986; February-March, 1987)

El Sol de Mexico (various editions, July-August, 1986; February-March, 1987, specifically February 23 to March 1, 1987)

El Universal (various editions, July-August, 1986; February-March, 1987, specifically February 23 to March 1, 1987)

Uno Más Uno (various editions, July-August, 1986; February-March, 1987, specifically February 23 to March 1, 1987)
Books


Sierra, Carlos (editor). La Prensa Volara la Figuera de Juárez. (Newspaper articles concerning Benito Juarez published between 1872-1910.) México, D.F.: Secretaría de Hacienda y Credito Publico, no publication date.


Other Publications

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Unpublished


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Beauregard, Mario. Freelance writer and broadcast commentator, former staff member of Ovaciones, El Día, and others. Interviewed in Mexico City, July 24, 1986 and March 11 and 16, 1987.


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Vanderwood, Paul J. Disorder and Progress: Bandits, Police and Mexican Development. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska, 1981.


Articles


