Soviet-American rivalry in Korea 1945-1950

Donald Edward Bartell

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Chairman of the Board of Examiners

Date Aug 18 1937
Preface

The strategic geographical position of the Korean peninsula has whetted the interest and avarice of various and sundry world powers for the past half century. It has been aptly termed "the crossroads of the Orient." As a means of introduction to the primary problem, the writer felt it necessary to acquaint the reader with the series of events during the last decade of the past century and the first decade of the present century which made the Korean peninsula an arena of rivalries and contributed in a large degree to the situation existing, 1945-1950.

For obvious reasons, the writer did not attempt to refer in any manner to the present conflict in Korea. Someday when all documents and facts are available, then an attempt can be made to chronicle the ramifications of the United Nations war in Korea.

Korea's ills still remain a fascinating subject to the author. It might interest the reader that the author served in the 1st Marine Division, December 1, 1950-November 1, 1951, which served to a considerable degree in interesting the author with the subject of Korea.
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D.E.B.
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For a thousand years Korea depended upon its relationship to China as a member of a family of nations. Both were united by Confucian principles of society and government, according to which society was based on a series of inequalities between male and female, father and son, elder brother and younger brother, friend and friend, and finally, sovereign and minister (or subject). These relationships were held to be as permanent and enduring as the universe. The hierarchical scale of inferiors and superiors ascended to the emperor, with each inferior controlled by a superior, and with proper rules of conduct for each class. The emperor, at the head of Confucian society, was responsible

1M. Fredrick Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia, (Baton Rouge, 1945), 5.
2Ibid., 6.
to no one except a vaguely defined Heaven. "All men were
his children, and to protect them and prevent them from
straying from the natural way is the purpose of his
existence." 3

Thus, government was not an artificial thing based on
law alone. Their authority derived from society, the emper-
or and his officials retained their positions only as long
as they were virtuous and adhered to the rules of society.
The official example of virtue was so overwhelming that it
compelled acquiescence:

The doctrine of control through example, of
conquering through virtue, throws the problem
of the control of society back on the individ-
ual. War is therefore incompatible with the
Confucian theory, which requires that sub-
missive people should be conquered by a display
of civil virtue and culture.

When the peoples on the fringes of the Chinese Empire
accepted the Confucian theory, they were initiated into the
great "family of nations," now the modern states of China,
Burm, Siam, Indochina, and Korea. Although autonomy was
given to the local rulers, they were responsible to the
Chinese emperor for the conduct of their subjects. Once a
year, envoys arrived from the "middle kingdom" to accept and
renew the oaths of fealty to the emperor. 4 Relationship to
the "middle kingdom" did impose some obligations, i.e., if
the emperor needed a military force in order to teach a

3Ibid., 8.
4Ibid., 10.
5Ibid., 16.
barbaric sovereign a lesson in Confucian ethics, the nearest subject nations were expected to furnish the necessary armies.

Such was the philosophy of government which bound Korea to China and isolated the Japanese from harmonious political and commercial intercourse with the Korean peninsula. All Japanese recognized the need of destroying this unique relationship if Japan were to expand to the Asia mainland with a minimum of effort.

II

Early Japanese efforts to break the "family of nations" were expressed by the brilliant Japanese leader, Hideyoshi, in 1592. He invaded the peninsula and for six years ravaged the country almost unchecked. He was finally defeated by the continual Korean resistance, and devastation of Japanese shipping by an extraordinary "turtle ship," the forerunner of modern armor plated naval vessels. The Japanese armies eventually withdrew and did not threaten again for another three centuries.

For three hundred years, Korean frontiers were closed to all nations except China, whose suzerainty was recognized. Relations with Japan were restricted to the dispatch of a congratulatory mission each time a new Japanese shogun was appointed, and only forty Japanese junks a year were permitted to trade.

7 Ibid., 24-26.
permitted to enter the important Korean port of Pusan. By 1811, the congratulatory missions to Japan ceased, and in 1869 and 1871 when the Japanese wanted to have them resumed, the Korean king not only refused, but denounced the Japanese for having become renegades of the Orient.

The Korean rebuff incensed the militantly powerful Japanese war clique who clamoured to the government for war. But the conservative government, formed with the peace party, was convinced that Japan should husband its resources to promulgate domestic reforms in order to make Japan a world power. A war would only dissipate strength for the doubtful gain of inflicting defeat on the Koreans. Therefore, the government resisted the war clique and followed a program of correspondence with the Chinese government regarding the status of Korea. In 1873, the Japanese broached the question of China's responsibility for Korea's actions, but China waived any responsibility by maintaining that, though Korea was a vassal state, it still possessed the right to make war or peace.

Two years later, a Japanese gunboat off the mouth of the Han River in Korean territory was fired on by Korean batteries. The Japanese government, advising the Chinese of


9Treaty, 193.
10Treaty, 245.
11Ibid., 287.
their intentions, dispatched two warships and an expeditionary force to Korea. The result was the Korean-Japanese treaty of commerce of February 26, 1875. Ostensibly a commercial treaty, the first clause was prophetic of Korea's political future, for it recognized Korea as "an independent state enjoying the same sovereign rights as does Japan." Other clauses abolished trade restrictions at Pusan, opened two additional ports to trade, and gave the Japanese extraterritorial rights in Korea.

Curiously enough, the United States was the first western nation to conclude a treaty with Korea. The treaty was negotiated by Commodore Shufeldt of the United States Navy and was signed by the Korean king in 1882. The treaty provided for "perpetual peace and friendship" and stated:

> If other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings.

It also provided for the exchange of diplomatic representatives and guaranteed certain trade privileges. Similar treaties were signed by Korea with the following European nations:

14 Nelson, 140-145.
15 Ibid., 140-145.
powers; Great Britain in 1882, Italy in 1884, and France in 1886.\(^{16}\)

The first decade after the opening of Korea disclosed the ugly nature of European political intrigue in the Far East. Russia, a European power, was working quietly to establish herself in the Far East. In 1860, Russia had acquired from China the Maritime Province,\(^{17}\) that extended from the mouth of the Amur River in the north to the northeastern border of Korea. It was inconceivable that the Russians would permit their Japanese rivals to occupy a position so menacing to Vladivostok. The Trans-Siberian Railway, which would link European Russia to a warm-water outlet, had been planned as early as 1862, although actual construction did not begin until 1891.\(^{18}\) Korea in possession of a hostile power would bar Russia, not only from warm water, but also from the markets of southeastern Asia. Without Korea, Russia had not the assurance that it could even hold the Maritime Province, much less penetrate farther into Manchuria.

\(^{16}\)Treat, 289.

\(^{17}\)Steiger, 620.

\(^{18}\)Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia*, (New York, 1922), 472.
At the end of the century, France was rapidly becoming the creditor of Russia and at the same time seeking the good will of Japan. French interests in southern China and in Russia brought it into an alignment against the Chinese. 19

The opening of Korea alarmed Great Britain. For years, the latter had been concerning itself with placing obstacles in the path of Russia's southward advance. In April 1885, fearing that the Russians contemplated the seizure of a harbor on the Korean coast, Great Britain suddenly occupied Port Hamilton, on the peninsula's southern tip. Although, China did not protest Britain's action, Russia sent a formal warning to the Chinese Resident in Korea, stating if the British consolidated their position, Russia would seize a foothold in Korea. Bowing to the Russian threat, and wary lest Japan be inclined to imitate the Russians, the Chinese pressed the British for withdrawal. Negotiations continued for some months until the British finally evacuated Port Hamilton early in 1887, 20 apparently because of British feeling that as long as Korea remained under the shadow of the Chinese, British interests in the peninsula were secure.

In the bewildering maze of European diplomacy, transplanted to the Orient, the United States maintained a fairly

19 Ibid., 472-473.
neutral policy toward both Japan and China, because American commercial interests were dependent upon the maintenance of peace between the two countries. Thus, the United States government instructed its representatives in Peking and Tokyo to do everything possible to arrest the growing irritation between Japan and China, while at the same time treating Korea as an independent and sovereign nation.

Sino-Japanese relations in Korea became decidedly strained during the last months of 1884, when the Chinese abruptly decided to take a more active role in Korea. In the trade regulations which China published in September, 1884, Korea was relegated to the inferior status of tributary state. In December, 1884, while the Chinese were at war with the French, Japan attempted a coup d'etat in Korea. A Japanese representative visited the Korean king and hinted darkly at the result to Korea were Japan and China to fight on Korean soil. In response to the Japanese threats, the king issued a series of reform decrees, which remained in effect for one day. The following day, the Chinese Resident

21 Dennett, 474.
22 Ibid., 475.
23 Morse and MacNair, 392.
24 Dennett, 479.
appeared with several thousand Chinese troops, and forced
the Japanese to retreat to their ships at Chemulpo.\textsuperscript{25} The
old form of government was re-established, and the Japanese
and pro-Japanese Koreans who had not escaped were sought
cut and executed.

The Japanese government dispatched Count Ito to Tienstin
to negotiate a settlement to clarify Korea's relation to China.
Two days after his arrival, the Chinese-French war came to an
abrupt end, and Japan could not afford to be un-cooperative.
Count Ito had to content himself with a treaty which still
fell short of recognition of Korean independence, yet made
substantial advances in that direction. On April 13, 1885,
Japan and China agreed to a convention which stipulated:

that the forces under the Chinese Resident as
well as the Japanese Legation guards were to be
completely withdrawn from the kingdom. The Korean
king was to be invited to organize a Korean army
in the formation of which neither the Chinese or
Japanese were not to be employed. In case any
serious disturbance in Korea made it necessary
for either China or Japan to send troops into the
peninsula, the country sending the troops must
notify the other, previously and in writing of
the intention to do so, and the troops should be
withdrawn when the matter had been settled.\textsuperscript{26}

The Chinese-Japanese rivalry diminished in the next
years. Japan, occupied with domestic reforms, was passive;

\textsuperscript{25}Gradjanzew, 26.

\textsuperscript{26}Dennett, 472.
while the Chinese, encouraged by the British, became aggressive.\textsuperscript{27} The Chinese government appointed a Resident too Korea, well known for his anti-Japanese sentiments,\textsuperscript{28} and Korea soon returned to Chinese control. The canny Chinese, now politically secure in Korea, began to strengthen their position by commercial means. A Chinese-built telegraph line was completed between Seoul and Peking, while at the same time the Japanese were refused permission to build a telegraph line between Seoul and Pusan. This line was built later under Chinese supervision, which gave China a virtual telegraph monopoly in Korea.\textsuperscript{29} Also apprehensive lest Korea's need for capital should turn it toward the West, the Chinese took over the financial affairs of the Korean government, insisting that all Korean loans would have to be approved by the Chinese government.\textsuperscript{30}

The strong Chinese policy toward Korea divided the Japanese government into two camps. The military clique, alarmed at the growth of the Chinese navy, wanted to strike before it was large enough to threaten the Japanese homeland. The conservative peace party, however, recalled that China had consistently leveled off after such active periods and

\textsuperscript{27} Nelson, 174.
\textsuperscript{28} Bennet, 484.
\textsuperscript{29} Nelson, 199.
\textsuperscript{30} Treaty, 295.
permitted its national defenses to weaken. When this occurred, the conservatives asserted, would be the moment to strike. They also stressed that a premature war in Korea would only incite the Russians to aid the Chinese. For the time being, the Japanese government viewed the Korean situation with apparent indifference, marshalling its forces for the appropriate moment.

The rebellion in Korea of a religious society known as the Tong-haks provided the impetus for the Japanese invasion. The Tong-haks were a revolutionary group of cultists, opposed to foreign interference, whether Asiatic or Western. The initial outbreak began in the southern provinces, and reports of the rebellion were magnified considerably by the time they reached Seoul. On June 2, 1894, the Korean court telegraphed the Chinese government requesting assistance. Peking notified Tokyo, in accordance with the Tientsin Convention of 1885, and dispatched approximately 2000 troops. However, the Japanese troops were more mobile, and when the Chinese arrived in Seoul, they were startled to discover the Japanese there. Although Japan had not been requested to furnish assistance, it had sent nearly 15,000 troops. Ironically,

\[31Ibid., 295.\]
\[32Horse and MacNeil, 397.\]
\[33Ibid., 398.\]
\[34Treat, 298.\]
enough, the Korean army was able to put down the rebellion long before the Japanese and Chinese troops disembarked from their transports.

China suggested that all troops evacuate the country, but the Japanese refused to leave, and proposed to cooperate with the Chinese in the introduction of reforms into the Korean administration. The Chinese refused and on July 23, the Japanese seized the Korean king and his name formed a government which denounced all Chinese treaties and asked Japanese aid in driving the Chinese from Korea.35

When the United States government received the news that troops of China and Japan were in Korea and in a position to fight, it instructed the United States minister in Seoul that:

in view of the friendly interest of the United States in the welfare of Korea and its people, you are instructed to use every possible effort for the preservation of peaceful conditions.36

The United States was bound by treaties to extend good offices at the request of both China and Korea, and to act as a friendly mediator at Japanese request. The Secretary of State in 1871, however, had interpreted such a request as meaning that the United States could not mediate in a dispute unless both parties to the controversy accepted the President as the mediator.37

35Dennett, 495.
36Ibid., 439.
37Ibid., 496.
The Koreans appealed to Russia, France, Great Britain, and the United States for aid, and all great powers responded with a note asking China and Japan to agree to a simultaneous withdrawal of their troops. Both refused.38

Negotiations were kept up between China and Japan by the American ministers until late in January, 1895. The two powers distrusted each other, and China was always trying to ascertain in advance what the demands of Japan would be in order that she might procure the intervention of Great Britain or Russia.39

The Japanese naval and land forces overwhelmed the Chinese at almost every engagement. Japanese ships bombarded Port Arthur at will, and its troops fanned out over the Korean peninsula. In April, 1895, China and Japan signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which compelled China to acknowledge the full independence of Korea.40 In addition, China ceded Formosa and the Pescadores Islands, thus giving Japan strategic control of the southern approach to China and northern Asia. Japan appeared to be firmly entrenched on the Asian continent.

III

Within a year after the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Japanese position in Korea underwent a sudden reversal. In March, 1896, the Korean king, a pitiful and ineffectual monarch, escaped from his Japanese jailers and sought refuge at the Russian embassy. The presence of armed Russian sailors and marines from their ships in the harbor at Chemulpo prevented a Japanese attempt to reclaim the king.

38Ibid., 501.
39Morse and Mackeir, 407.
40Nelson, 233.
Once again in control of his royal office, the king issued a series of proclamations, annulling the detested Japanese reforms. Anti-Japanese sentiment reached a climax, and several pro-Japanese cabinet members were killed by mobs while attempting to escape from the country. To all appearances, the Russians did not restrict the liberty of the king, but there was little doubt that the Russians assumed the same advisory capacity which the Chinese and Japanese had once occupied. The centuries of being an inferior nation in the family of nations seemed to persist in the minds of the Koreans.\(^1\) The American minister cabled his Secretary of State that:

I only know that the King and the Cabinet defer to Russian opinion in matters of consequence, the King appears to govern with Russia behind the throne.\(^2\)

In March, 1896, Russia negotiated an agreement which gave it control of Korean finances, the right to furnish military advisors to train the Korean army, and indirectly advise the Korean government.\(^3\) The following month, a mining concession along the Tumen River was granted to the Russians, and in August, the Russians were given an enormous timber grant along the Yalu River.\(^4\) By September, 1897, Russian prestige was so tremendous that the aggressive

\(^1\)Ibid., 232.
\(^2\)Ibid., 233.
\(^3\)Morse and MacNair, 508.
ambassador, de Speyer, informed the Korean king that henceforth, he must take Russian advice on all matters. De Speyer also lashed out at the growing importance of American missionaries, when he informed the Korean officials that any who showed friendship to the Americans would be dismissed from the government.

The Japanese government did not forsake an active role in Korean affairs, in spite of the fact that Russian influence was at its peak. By clever diplomacy and threats, the Japanese minister, Baron Komura, concluded a Memorandum with the Russian representative, M. Waeberer, on May 14, 1896. It provided that both countries would leave the matter of the king's stay at the Russian embassy to royal discretion, although Waeberer agreed to advise the king to return to his palace as soon as possible.

It was declared that the present cabinet members in Korea were noted for generous and mild principles, and had been appointed to their post by the king of his own accord. The Japanese and Russian representatives should always make it their aim to advise the king to govern the people in a generous spirit.45

Less than a month later, Japanese and Russian representatives met in St. Petersburg to negotiate regarding the relative position of the two powers in Korea. By the Yamagata-Lobanoff Protocol, signed in June, 1896, the Japanese attempted to limit Russian influence in Korean financial

\(^{45}\)ibid., 264.
matters by agreeing to lend money to Korea by mutual accord, and to leave the creation and maintenance of the police and army to the Koreans. The final clause permitted the Japanese to continue the administration of the country’s telegraph lines.46

It was unfortunate for Russia that the mild Waember was transferred to Mexico, and replaced by the haughty and arrogant de Speyer. Shortly after his arrival, de Speyer, irritated because of continued anti-Russian sentiment in the country demanded in a test of strength that the Koreans give a small island in the Pusan harbor to Russia for a coaling station. Some time prior to the Russian demand, an American representative had marked off the island as the site for a foreign settlement for Pusan. In a peremptory note, which in tone and content amounted to an ultimatum, de Speyer suggested that if the Koreans did not acquiesce to the Russian demands, the latter would vacate the peninsula, leaving the Koreans to their fate. The astounded Koreans replied firmly and politely that perhaps it would be more convenient if the Russians would depart. To the chagrin of the Russians and the glee of the Japanese, de Speyer was left to no alternative but to make preparations for his departure. He was summarily relieved of his post by his government, and the

146 Nelson, 237-239.
Russian military advisors were transferred to Port Arthur, while the financial experts were sent to Tokyo.\(^7\)

The Japanese government profited from the Russian loss in Korea with the Nishi-Rosen Protocol, signed within a few weeks after de Speyer's departure. The protocol bound both Japan and Russia:

\[\ldots\text{to take no measures in respect to the appointment of military instructors or financial advisors without having arrived before hand at a mutual agreement on the subject.}\]^{48}

Japan also secured a pledge from Russia recognizing, "the wide development of commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea." Both parties also recognized the "sovereignty and entire independence of Korea" and pledged themselves "mutually to abstain from all direct interference in the internal affairs of the country."^{49}

Interpreting the Nishi-Rosen Protocol to mean that Russia was willing to abandon its Korean aspirations for claims in Manchuria, the Japanese immediately began the task of securing paramount commercial interests in Korea. Concessions for the construction of railways and public utilities were secured for Japanese businessmen.\(^50\) Japanese diplomats successfully blocked a Russian attempt to convert Masanpo, the finest port on the peninsula and only 110 miles from

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\(^{47}\)Chung, 95.

\(^{48}\)Ibid., 106.

\(^{49}\)Steiger, 719.

\(^{50}\)Nelson, 245.
Japan, into a naval base which would threaten the entire Far East. A member of the Japanese embassy at Seoul described the position of his government as follows:

Our policy in Korea is very simple; it consists of our abstinence from innovation in the internal affairs of this country and to make possible the development of our economic interests. This policy has received the approval of the great majority of our countrymen and we do not have any reason to change it. 51

In the years immediately after the Sino-Japanese War, Japan and Great Britain began to effect a diplomatic rapprochement while encouraging China to resist Russian pressure in Manchuria; herein, they had the general support of the United States. 52 China's growing weakness was apparent, and Great Britain considered that its immense interests in China would best be protected and maintained by the integrity of the Chinese government and an open door in its markets. Japan had progressed considerably in less than fifty years, and Britain noted the rising prestige of the Japanese in the Orient. For Japan in particular, there was more than Manchuria at stake. Japanese statesmen perceived that Manchuria could only be a starting point for Russian penetration of Korea, whose independence was of vital necessity for Japan. British statesmen were convinced that as long as Russia was

51 Ward and Gooch, 290.
52 Ibid., 290.
in possession of Manchuria, it would completely dominate the Chinese court at Peking, to the detriment of British interests and prestige. 53

As a solution, the German minister in London suggested to the Japanese minister, Count Hayashi, the possibility of an Anglo-Japanese understanding in the Far East. Upon receiving the authority from Tokyo to sound out the British, Hayashi began communications with Lord Lansdowne on April 17, 1901. 54 The negotiations continued until October, when the Germans became apprehensive lest an Anglo-Japanese alliance be signed before the projected Anglo-German treaty would be consumated. The Germans protested to the British, who replied that Germany could demonstrate its good faith by protesting to St. Petersburg in regard to Russian action in Manchuria. Germany betrayed its center-of-the-road policy by demurring, consequently, when Hayashi bluntly asked Lansdowne if the Germans should be invited to join the alliance, the British refused. 55

At that stage in the negotiations, the conference learned somewhat to their alarm, that Prince Ito, former Japanese premier was enroute to St. Petersburg. A powerful group in the Japanese government felt that a Russian alliance would be

53 Ibid., 291.
54 Ibid., 291.
55 Asakawa, 200.
   Ward and Gooch, 291.
more preferable to one with Britain, since the Russian understanding would avert a war, while a British alliance would simply strengthen the Japanese position.\(^56\) Much to British relief, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was signed before Ito could begin negotiations in Russia. The treaty's first clause recognized that:

\[\ldots\text{while Japan in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea.}\]\(^77\)

In view of this attitude, the two powers were aware that it would be:

\[\ldots\text{admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard these interests, if threatened either by aggressive action of any other power or by disturbances arising in either China or Korea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects.}\]\(^58\)

In the event that either Great Britain or Japan in defense of these interests should become involved in a third nation, the other party to the alliance was to maintain strict neutrality and to use its efforts to prevent other powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.

When the provisions of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were published, though the Russians outwardly maintained a calm

\(^56\) Ward and Gooch, 291-293.
\(^57\) Ibid., 292-293.
\(^58\) Nelson, 247.
attitude, they nevertheless regarded it as a diplomatic check, and were quick to declare that their dual alliance with France, in existence since 1885, was now considered as extending to the Far East as well as to the areas formerly designated. 59

In Korea, the Russian minister extracted a promise from the king to grant no further mining concessions except to Russia, and at the same time agreed to furnish the necessary capital to build a railway from Seoul to Wi-ji. Russians also began to appear on their timber concessions in northern Korea. Since the concession agreement stipulated that should a disagreement occur, the Russian views would prevail, the Japanese and Korean protests were ignored when the Russians interpreted the concession to include all the streams flowing into the Yalu River, thus giving Russia control over a vast area in northern Korea. Relations became so strained by October, 1903, that Japanese merchants and bankers in Seoul began calling in their loans and refusing to make further commitments. 60

To relieve the tension in Korea and Manchuria, the Japanese government suggested to its minister in St. Petersburg on July 28, 1903, that the Imperial government:

59 Nelson, 249.
60 Asakawa, 298.
...after the most serious consideration, have resolved to consult the Russian government in a spirit of conciliation and frankness, with the view toward concluding an understanding designed to compose questions which are at this time the cause of their anxiety.61

Japanese anxiety was expressed by a communication from the Japanese foreign office to its minister in St. Petersburg, in which was demonstrated a concern more serious over Russia's advance into Manchuria.

Russia stationed on the flank of Corea would be a constant menace to the separate existence of that empire, and in any event it would serve to make Russia the dominant power in Corea. Corea is an important outpost in Japan's line of defense, and Japan consequently considers the independence of Corea absolutely essential to her own repose and safety. Japan possesses paramount political as well as commercial interests and influence in Corea, which having regard to her own security, she cannot consent to surrender to, or share with, any other power.62

The Russian-Japanese negotiations continued in St. Petersburg for six months and were unsuccessful.

Russia was willing to acknowledge Japanese predominance in Corea, provided Japan would guarantee Corea's independence, and Japan was prepared to make a similar conditional acknowledgment in regard to Russia's position in Manchuria.63

As a result, the Japanese severed all diplomatic relations with Russia on February 6, 1904, and Japanese warships attacked Port Arthur two days later, demonstrating Japanese.

61 Nelson, 249-250.
62 Ibid., 250.
63 Chung, 197.
desire and willingness to carry the fight to the Russians.

The Korean government was not unduly concerned about its relation to the Russo-Japanese War. It looked to the treaty of 1882 with the United States which guaranteed that:

...if other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly relations.\(^64\)

To the Koreans, the U. S. had become a "big brother" by its assurance of good offices in the event of a war. Korea therefore, issued a proclamation of neutrality.

Concerning the American attitude, the president of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt is purported to have said:

As soon as war broke out, I notified Germany and France in the most polite and discreet fashion that in the event of a combination against Japan... I should promptly side with Japan and proceed to whatever length necessary.\(^65\)

Thus, it was apparent that the President would ignore the American-Korean treaty of friendship, signed in 1882, the Department of State dispatched a circular to both belligerents, admonishing them to respect the neutrality of China. Both Great Britain and Germany favored the war; the British because it would drive Russia from Korea and Manchuria where it threatened China and British interests there, and, Germany because it wanted Russia bogged down in the East where it


\(^{65}\) Nelson, 254.
could no longer threaten Germany's eastern border. France was Russia's ally and obligated to the financial support of the tsar.

Two days before the declaration of war, the Japanese took possession of the Korean capital. The Korean king was forced to sign a protocol on February 23, guaranteeing the independence and territorial integrity of Korea in return for Japanese advice on administrative reforms. The American minister at Tokyo stated that all his information led him to believe that Japan had "every intention of respecting the integrity of the Korean Empire." 66

From November, 1904, to the end of his second term, Roosevelt was to all intent and purpose, his own Secretary of State. Sometime during 1904, the president began to profess fears concerning the rise of Japan in the Far East. With the thought of a Japanese invasion of the Philippines in mind, the President became vitally interested in a policy which would harmonize with Japanese intentions toward Korea. 67 In January, 1905, he wrote in a confidential letter that:

"We cannot possibly interfere for the Koreans against the Japanese. They couldn't strike one blow in their own defense." 68

Two weeks later on February 6, he wrote to a confident that:

66 Griswold, 124-125.


68 Ibid., 1116; Roosevelt to Von Longerke Meyer.
...if peace should come now, Japan ought to have a protectorate over Korea, which has shown its utter inability to stand by itself and ought to succeed to Russia's rights in and around Port Arthur.69

During July, 1904, Secretary of War Taft, and the Japanese prime minister, Count Katsura, reached a definite understanding in regard to American policy toward Korea and the Japanese attitude toward the Philippines.70 In their Tokyo conversations, Count Katsura emphasized that Japan's interest in the Philippines was limited to a desire to see a strong and friendly nation such as the United States governing the islands, rather than an unfriendly European power. He confirmed in the strongest terms that Japan did not harbor any aggressive designs against the Philippine Islands. In return for such frankness, Taft remarked that in his opinion:

...the establishment by Japanese troops of a suzerainty over Korea to the extent of requiring that Korea enter into no foreign treaties without the consent of Japan was the logical result of the present war and would directly contribute to permanent peace in the East.71

President Roosevelt confirmed Taft's opinions in a cablegram several days later:

Your conversation with Count Katsura absolutely correct in every respect. Wish you would state to Katsura that I confirm every word you have said.72

69 Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, (New York, 1925), 112-113.

70 Ibid., 114.

71 Morrison, IV, 1293; Roosevelt to Taft.

72 Nelson, 253.
With the American policy stated in such disarming candor, the Japanese turned to the other Western power in the Far East, Great Britain.

In August, 1905, Great Britain and Japan renewed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and in a letter of explanation which accompanied the announcement, Lord Lansdowne wrote that:

The new treaty no doubt differs at this point conspicuously from that of 1902. It has, however, become evident that Corea, owing to its close proximity to the Japanese Empire and its inability to stand alone must fall under the control and tutelage of Japan. . . . England has every reason to believe that similar views are held by other Powers with regard to the relations which should subsist between Japan and Corea. 73

The delegates to the peace conference convened at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, August 10, 1905, and during the following days, most of the Japanese demands were accepted. Russia acquiesced to Japanese demands for Port Arthur and certain territory and railway concessions in Manchuria. However, the great powers, Great Britain and the United States protested a Japanese foothold in Manchuria, and restricted Japanese gains to Sakalin Island, Korea, and a war indemnity. 74

73 Morse and MacNair, 153-154.
74 Griswold, 121.
The Japanese had obliterated Russian sea power, driven Russia from Korea, humbled her in Manchuria, undermined the Tsar's throne, and reduced her in the Far East to a minor power. 75

IV

The two wars within a decade left the Japanese in complete control of Korea's destiny. Japanese businessmen, diplomats, and immigrants packed their belongings and departed for the Korean peninsula.

Marquis Ito, veteran diplomat and four times a prime minister, was ordered to Korea with the rank of resident-general to administer Japanese political and economic interests. Ito and his staff were impeded from the beginning in their reform program because the Korean king still ruled the country through his advisors, ministers, and provincial governors. Japanese advisors could only make suggestions and could not compel the execution of reform measures. Quite naturally, the Koreans resented the Japanese and did everything to block the Japanese efforts.

The Korean-Japanese arrangement continued until 1907, at that time, the Korean king secretly dispatched three Koreans, accompanied by an American missionary, to the Hague Peace Conference. The Japanese delegates attending this conference had little difficulty in preventing the recognition of the Koreans, and as a result of this ill-

75Steiger, 731.
advised act, Ito presented the Korean cabinet with the ultimatum that only the king’s abdication could save the country from a worse punishment.76 Five days after the abdication, the Japanese “negotiated” a new convention with the crown prince who succeeded his father. All internal government was taken from the Koreans.77

For two years, Ito attempted to promulgate reform legislation in the face of sullen opposition, while plans were being laid in Tokyo to annex Korea.78 Ito resigned from the residency-general in August, 1909, and three months later was assassinated by a Korean terrorist in Harbin.79 The formal annexation was delayed until August, 1910, because the Japanese sought to avoid the impression that the annexation was a result of the assassination. The government established by the annexation treaty was relatively simple. At the top was the governor-general, appointed by the Japanese emperor and in theory responsible to no one but him. The governor-general issued decrees and appointed all judges, minor officials, and provincial governors. The new governor-general appointed after the annexation was a harsh leader in the Japanese military clique.80 By this final act of annexation, the Japanese initiated an un-

76Treat, 390.
77Ibid., 390.
78Grajdanzev, 42.
79F. A. McKenzie, Korea’s Fight for Freedom, (New York, 1920), 105
paralleled program of commercial and political aggrandize-
ment in the Far East.

During the first decade after the annexation, the Japanese did little to court the Koreans. They were con-
cerned with creating a strong administrative machine, while at the same time integrating the country's economy with the Japanese industry. Land and natural resources were expro-
priated by devious means, while Japanese corporations formed huge holding companies which took over large segments of the Korean economy, managing it to the satisfaction and profit of the Japanese. 81

The Koreans did not submit without protest. During the years following the annexation, they agitated constantly for participation in their government and finally for independence. A climax was achieved at a huge "independence" rally on the day of the old king's funeral, March 1, 1919. The Japanese retaliated with a wave of arrests and executions. Many prominent Korean leaders fled to Shanghai where they organized a Korean Provisional-Government-in-exile, led by Syngman Rhee, former classmate of Woodrow Wilson at Princeton.

Some reforms in Japanese administration followed the independence demonstration; a Japanese admiral replaced the

81 Steiger, 783.
harsh army general, penal laws were reformed somewhat by the abolition of flogging, and police affairs were taken from the army and placed in a separate department. A system of elective and semi-elective councils was established, which were partially elected by the local communities. The council elections were virtually ignored by the people because of the puppet nature of the councils and the voting restrictions. The Japanese, by urging the minor aristocracy and conservatives to start small factories and stores, attempted to build a middle class as a buffer between them and the Koreans.

During the twenties, thousands of Koreans migrated across the White Mountains and Yalu River to settle in Manchuria and Siberia, from where they constantly harassed the Japanese with strong guerrilla raiding parties. Soviet political commissars conducted schools among these "Siberian" Koreans, and they made useful additions to the Soviet army in 1945. The Siberian-Manchurian Koreans believed in open warfare against the Japanese and aid from the Soviet Union, while the Korean Provisional Government-in-exile, called the "American" group, believed they could persuade the United States to intervene on behalf of Korean independence.

82 MacCune, 23-25.
84 David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East, (New York, 1948) 52.
Communism made little impression on Korean minds and attracted only a few to party membership. In 1925, a Communist Party was organized within the country, composed almost entirely of intellectuals who naively made themselves conspicuous by wearing their hair long, sporting red ties, and keeping their shoes studiously unpolished in order to appear proletarian. The Japanese crippled the party in 1926 by arresting a thousand of its members and sympathizers. By the end of the year, the Comintern disbanded the party, and it did not flourish again until 1945.85

The establishment of the puppet state of Manchuko emphasized Korea’s role as a link between the Japanese islands and the exploitation of China, both commercial and political, which was progressing under the guise of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." There was an acceleration of Korean industry, and an estimated forty percent of the rice crop was exported to Japan. Coal, aluminum, and chemicals were shipped across the Sea of Japan to the industrial plants in Osaka and Kobe.86 Japanese troops and supplies for Manchuko embarked aboard ships at Kobe for the 110 mile trip to Pusan, and thence travelled on excellent railroads from southern Korea to the Manchurian border.87

85Foreign Policy Report, June 1, 1944, 67-68.
86Foreign Affairs, April 1944, 479-483.
87Ho Yong Pak, "Cross Currents in Asia," Current History, November, 1946, 390.
Eighty percent of the land was owned by the Japanese, and in 1941 the average Korean income was 150 W ($50.00) of which a half was taken for taxes. Sixty-three percent of the students at Seoul National University were Japanese, while only 2.7 percent of Korea's population were Japanese. Eighty-five percent of the industrial capital was owned by Japanese. Little wonder that Korea constituted such an important part of Japan's wartime economy.

Early in 1945, the Japanese government conscripted 500,000 Korean youths to serve in military labor battalions. Although the peninsula was spared the devastating bombing inflicted on the Japanese islands, the people were well aware of the war's progress and sabotaged Japanese war effort at every opportunity. It has been estimated that approximately 60,000 Koreans fought with the Chinese against the Japanese, while another 30,000 partisans occupied themselves with tearing up railroads and engaging Japanese troops in skirmishes. By such tactics, Japan was forced to maintain a huge occupation army which undoubtedly was needed in the South Pacific as the war progressed.

In August, 1945, the Japanese government sued for peace, and within a few days, the governor-general gave the Koreans permission to organize a government. The Koreans were

88 Ibid., 391.
89 McCune, 16.
delirious with happiness, for it meant that after a half century of domination, they were permitted to organize a self-government.

The Koreans interpreted the Cairo Declaration to mean that they would be recognized as a liberated nation, and independence would come in a "few days." The translation error embarrassed occupation authorities many times during the following two years. George M. MacCune, noted authority on Korea, and head of the Korean Desk in the State Department's Far Eastern Affairs Division noted that:

"...the three forces, nationalism, conservatism, reliance upon an ally—emerged as dominating characteristics of Korean policy before the annexation, and they persisted throughout the Japanese era to re-emerge with the removal of Japanese power."

90 MacCune, 16.
CHAPTER II
INITIAL POLICIES FOR KOREA

Immediately after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, exiled Korean leaders hopefully applied to the United States for world recognition of the Korean Provisional Government. Many of the Korean leaders wanted an official declaration by the large powers concerning the future independence of Korea. In Chungking and Washington, Korean groups were particularly vigorous in publicizing the Korean cause. The question of making a statement relative to future independence and of granting some kind of recognition to the Korean Provisional Government was informally discussed in Washington, as early as 1942. At the conclusion of these discussions, it was resolved by the government leaders to postpone any such action until it might be more useful in arousing Korean opposition to the Japanese, or until a declaration might be included in the context of a statement of general war aims for the Pacific area.¹

Official recognition of the problems of Korean independence came in December, 1943, at the Cairo Conference of

¹McCune, 41.
President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. In the momentous Cairo Declaration, released December 1, 1943, the allies in the Pacific acknowledged:

The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course, Korea shall become free and independent.  

In response to that paragraph of the Cairo Declaration, former Secretary of State Cordell Hull, wrote in his memoirs five years later that President Roosevelt did not consult with him previous to:

...agreeing with Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill on a statement that independence would be returned to Korea "in due course." I considered this statement unwise for several reasons. One was that the Koreans wanted their independence immediately Korea was liberated, and not in due course. They did not welcome the Cairo Declaration, and they feared that their country would be placed under the control of China. Another reason was that the Soviet Union should have been consulted first. Although Russia was not at war with Japan, she was our ally in Europe and she had an interest in Korea.  

Further reference to Korean independence was also made in 1943 at a Washington conference attended by the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and President Roosevelt. In the discussion of post-war

\[^{2}\text{Department of State, Korea's Independence, Far Eastern Series 18, 16.}\]
\[^{3}\text{Cordell Hull, Memoirs, II (New York, 1947), 153+}.\]
policies for the Far East, President Roosevelt suggested that

...a trusteeship be set up for Indo-China, that Manchuria and Formosa be returned to China, and that Korea might be placed under international trusteeship with China, the United States, and one or two other countries participating.

At the war-time conference of Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill, held at Yalta in the Crimean peninsula during February 1945, the future status of Korea was vitally affected by Roosevelt's efforts to extract a promise from Stalin concerning the Soviet entry into the war against Japan. Prior to leaving for the conference, the President had been advised by his military leaders that Japan could endure another eighteen months of war, possibly until the latter part of 1946. Under these circumstances, it was imperative that the Soviet Union be induced to enter the Pacific war as rapidly as possible and with all the force it could muster.

However, Stalin made it clear that he wanted to discuss the terms of the German surrender, the future form of the German state or states, reparations, and the allocation of a German zone of occupation to France. In response to Roosevelt’s repeated queries, Stalin laid down his price for entering the war in the Far East. It meant that everything

4Ibid., 1594.

5Hanson Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War (New York, 1950), 63.
the tsar had long ago taken from China and everything that Japan had subsequently taken from the tsar would be returned to the Soviet Union. "The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be returned to the Soviet Union." This included the recovery of southern Sakhalin, recognition of Russia's preeminent interest in the port of Darien, restoration of Port Arthur as a Russian naval base, and an arrangement for joint Sino-Russian operation of the Manchurian railroads formerly controlled by Japan. In return, Stalin promised that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan three months after the cessation of hostilities in Europe. Although Chiang Kai-shek did not attend the conference, Stalin insisted that China sign a pact with the Soviet Union to confirm the decisions reached at Yalta. The Sino-Soviet Pact was signed on August 14, 1945, the day Japan sued for peace.

Three months after the Yalta Conference, and following President Roosevelt's death, Stalin, Churchill, and Truman met at Potsdam, Germany, by this time, July, 1945, it was apparent that Japan's defeat was imminent. Although the military leaders of the United States believed that the entry of the Soviet Union into the war would shorten it, even

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8Dallin, 198.
this belief was rapidly becoming debatable. Certainly Soviet
participation was no longer an essential ingredient of
victory.9 Collaboration between the military delegates to
the conference reached a new high in cordiality. Talks were
held concerning the disposition of forces and liaison be-
tween commanding officers, and agreements were quickly
concluded.10

On the political side, the Soviet Union informed the
Western Allies of an approach made by the Japanese to the
Soviet Union asking it to act as an intermediary in ar-
ranging for the cessation of hostilities. The Japanese
offer failed to go into the conditions under which the war
should be concluded, but it stressed the futility of con-
tinuing the struggle and suggested that it be terminated
for humanitarian reasons. The response to this approach
was the Potsdam Declaration, which called for unconditional
surrender, but did offer Japan the prospect of retaining
sovereignty as a nation. The Soviet Union was not consulted
on the declaration, for it was still a neutral in the war
against Japan, but it was promulgated with Stalin's con-
currence. Affirmation of the Cairo Declaration by the
Pacific Allies was also included in the Potsdam Declaration.

9Deane, 267.
10Ibid., 270-275.
and received Stalin's tacit assent. It was fortunate for the Soviet Union that Japan rejected the offer in the Potsdam Declaration, for it presented the Soviet Union with the opportunity to enter the war.

Following the Potsdam Conference, certain military and political events moved with amazing swiftness to end the war. At Potsdam, Stalin had promised Truman that the Soviet Union would enter the war during the latter half of August. When the atomic bomb landed on Hiroshima, August 6, the historic event received scant notice in the Soviet press, although it must have produced considerable consternation among the leaders, for:

Russia had to buy her ticket to the Pacific peace conference, but she would have to hurry or the show would have started and the seats would all be taken.

Thirty-six hours after the dropping of the A-bomb, Foreign Minister Molotov handed a note to the Japanese ambassador in Moscow. The brief note stated that Japan was the only great power still holding out for the continuance of the war, and further rebuked Japan for failure to observe the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. The declaration of war went on to the concluding paragraph which stated that:

The Allies have addressed to the Government of

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11 Ibid., 273.
12 Dallin, 210.
13 Ibid., 275.
the Soviet Union asking it to join in the war against the Japanese aggressors and in this way shorten the duration... True to its duty toward the Allies, the Soviet Government has accepted the proposal of the Allies.14

The note was handed to the Japanese ambassador on the evening of August 8, and was considered to be in effect on the ninth. Molotov in informing the United States ambassador placed particular stress on the fact that the Soviet Union was entering the war almost three months to the minute after the German surrender in Berlin. "This was a further demonstration of the sanctity which Stalin held for his promises."15

Japan's surrender came six days after the Soviet declaration of war. Only during the first three days of the war were there any decisive battles. The Japanese air force in Manchuria had been reduced from nearly 2000 planes in 1942 to less than 400 in 1945, and offered only weak and token resistance. During the remaining days of August, 1945, and after hostilities had ceased, the Soviet press and radio continued to impress the Russian people with the importance of the Soviet entry in the war against Japan. Newspapers lauded the brave Soviet armies and compared the Soviet entry into the war as being more important than the atomic bomb. This propaganda line, Russia's decisive contribution

14Ibid., 210.
15Deane, 276.
to victory in the Far East and the negligible role of the United States, was to be the tenor of Soviet press releases to Asian people during the following years.

A Soviet army of approximately a quarter million men marched into Korea on August 10, 1945, almost a month before American troops landed in southern Korea. The Soviet forces over-ran much of northern Korea by force of arms, while the Japanese fled to the south, preferring to wait the arrival of a military foe of four years rather than surrender to a traditional enemy of a half century.

The atmosphere between the surrendered Japanese and the Soviet Command was one of enmity, while in the southern zone the Japanese assumed an attitude of guileless cooperation toward the occupying authorities. The Soviet troops who swept over northern Korea were not the Red Army's finest nor the best disciplined, for many of them were ex-prisoners recruited from Siberian prison camps. They carried with them only a limited amount of supplies, and when those supplies were exhausted, they began to live off the land. Such a policy did not endear them to Koreans, regardless of political affiliations. Murder, rape, and theft continued unchecked by the Soviet officers until the arrival of special military police troops from Manchuria brought some order to the country.


The end of the war found the Soviets totally unprepared for the task of occupying northern Korea. They quickly imported an estimated 35,000 of the 800,000 Korean emigres who had fled to Siberia following the abortive attempt at independence in 1919, and who had become Soviet citizens. Not only were they loyal citizens, but they were also thoroughly familiar with Soviet ideology and methodology. Along with these "Siberian Koreans" came a group of Koreans from China who were just as loyal to the Soviet interests as their Siberian counterparts. Although there had been a Korean Provisional Government-in-exile established in Chungking, which had received the lukewarm approval of the Nationalist Government, many leftist Korean leaders in exile had allied themselves with the Chinese Communists and directed their efforts from Yenan, in northwestern China. These Koreans had entitled themselves as the "Emancipation League" and for years had vied with the Chingking group for leadership in the struggle to gain world recognition.18 Certainly the Koreans in the "Emancipation League" had been more active in organizing armed resistance to the Japanese than had the group at Chungking, who were derisively called "American Koreans" by the leftist group. The Chinese and Siberian Koreans afforded the Soviet Command in Korea with an excellent and well trained cadre of leaders for the infant North

18 Dallin, 257.
Korean government, and could be depended upon to establish a Korean-speaking bureaucracy to serve as a buffer between the Soviet occupation army and the local population.

Shortly after the Japanese surrender, the Soviet Commanding General, Colonel-General Terentyi Shikov, ordered what he called "The Executive Committee of the Korean People" to assume administration of the country. Although the Executive Committee had several prominent Korean liberals as members, the majority of the members were political emigres who had only recently returned to Korea. Henceforth, to all appearances, the Koreans were governing themselves and the Soviet forces were present merely to maintain order and offer advice to the Korean "democracy." The Executive Committee quickly became popular with the north Koreans for its immediate retaliation against the Japanese and the pro-Japanese Koreans. All Koreans were delighted to see the detested Japanese overlords and their Korean lackeys receive just retribution. Former Japanese-owned land and industrial holdings were expropriated; the land being allocated to the landless peasants, and the industry nationalized. Many of the landowners fled to the southern zone with the appearance of the Soviet armies while the minority who did not escape were accused of collaboration with the Japanese and summarily executed.

19MacCune, 51.
20Ibid., 51-53.
As applied to northern Korea, the principles of Soviet policy embodied a ruthless extermination of all former Japanese and Korean capitalism, along with the middle class which accompanied such an economy. Any remnants of capitalism linked with the average Korean's inherent feeling of nationalism, which incidentally had survived forty years of Japanese effort to erase, would prove fatal to Soviet aspirations in the Korean peninsula.

Certainly another basic tenet of Soviet policy was the recognition of Korean nationalism and desire for self-government. The difficulties which the Japanese had encountered in their attempts to thwart Korean political expressions remained an object lesson for the Soviet Union. By the creation of a puppet government and a coalition with all liberal parties until Soviet sympathizers were firmly entrenched, the Soviet applied a policy which it was successfully using in Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. Soviet efforts were aided somewhat by the fact that most Koreans by heritage and culture are socialistic. After centuries of tightly interwoven village life and cooperative farming in the rice paddies surrounding the village, an average Korean could understand and sympathize with a political belief which held that society was based upon the proletarian. The result of such a policy: extermination of Japanese capitalism, suppre-

21Dallin, 239.
ssion of the middle class, puppet government, and Korean socialistic tendencies would be anti-climactic, a government favorable to Soviet interests.

Geographically, the Korean peninsula was of immense importance to the Soviet Union. Not only did Korea constitute a land bridge linking the Japanese islands and a population of 81,000,000 to the land mass of the continent, but it also controlled the military and commercial gateway (and outlet) for northern Asia. At the turn of the century, Korea had posed a threat to Russian aspirations for a warm-water port on the Pacific, and the continual threat had by no means diminished during the passage of a half century.

A fumbling and ineffectual Soviet Far Eastern policy during the thirties was suddenly given new life at the Yalta Conference, when the western leaders, Churchill and Roosevelt, bribed Stalin to enter the war in the Pacific with: (1) the southern part of Sakalin Island and the islands surrounding it, (2) the internationalization of Darion along with the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union safeguarded, (3) the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base for the USSR, (4) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provide an outlet to Darion, operated by a joint Sino-Soviet company, and (5) the Kurile Islands. Such generosity on the part of Prime Minister

\[\text{Dallin, I.94.}\]
Churchill and President Roosevelt simply whetted Soviet post-war Far Eastern ambitions and, moreover, dictated that those interests be safeguarded and guaranteed by the acquisition of the entire Korean peninsula.

Unfortunately, the United States, by virtue of its overwhelming contributions to the Japanese defeat, commanded the occupying forces in the Japanese islands. A Soviet attempt to aid the United States in occupying the Japanese islands and administering post-war policies was soundly rejected by the United States ambassador in Moscow during the three days following the Japanese surrender. By reason of its preponderance of power in the Japanese islands and in the southern half of the Korean peninsula, the United States occupied a position analogous to that of Japan a half century previous, when Russian prestige in the Far East was thoroughly destroyed, and culminated in abject Soviet concessions to the Japanese during the thirties. The revival of another "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," which had furthered Japanese commercial and political interests throughout Asia for two decades, under the guise of United States policy would be fatal to the Soviet Union. Also the United States occupation of Japan and Korea was a decisive factor in the struggle which was progressing in China between the Nationalists and the Chinese "agrarians."
China was in a flux with resurgent communist and nationalist armies, militantly powerful owing to lend-lease and captured Japanese war equipment, in a struggle which by the nature of the participants could end only in complete defeat for one faction. Both parties previously had demonstrated their utter inability to co-existence and cooperation in the Chinese government. Both were racing across northern China to accept the Japanese surrender of industrially rich Manchuria, for possession of the "Ruhr of the Orient" would be a powerful and determining factor in the forthcoming struggle.

Not only were the Manchurian factories valuable to the Chinese "agrarians", but the occupation of that region would also permit a harmonious and profitable conjunction with the Soviet Union, while if the Nationalist troops were to occupy Manchuria, they would pose a constant threat to Soviet Far Eastern ambitions. Although the Chinese communists were aided by the Soviet Union in the race for North China, the United States by reason of war time associations, was sympathetic to the Kuomintang. Within a month after the Japanese surrender, the United States occupied two strategic North China cities, Tsingtao and Tientsin, with 50,000 Marines. The presence of these American troops represented a constant threat to the Chinese Communists.23

23 In October, 1945, the Nationalist Eighth Route Army landed in Tsingtao, after arriving from Burma in United States Navy ships, and proceeded north from the city to fight the Chinese Communists. At that time, the Communists completely surrounded Tsingtao, and the only entrance was by the ocean.
Not only were the Chinese Communists threatened by the United States troops in North China, but strategic Soviet ports in the Far East were rendered virtually useless by the combinations of United States forces in Japan, Korea, and China. Vladivostok, the most important Soviet port in the East is just across the Sea of Japan from Honshu and only seventy miles from the northern border of Korea.\(^2\) Port Arthur, the newly acquired naval base, and Darien, both lying on the northern coast of the Yellow Sea were effectively neutralized by American forces in China and Korea. The factories of Manchuria are within easy fighter-bomber range of Japan. Such a forbidding situation would be reversed if the Soviet Union were capable of exercising hegemony in Korea, thus driving a wedge between American installations in China and Japan, and restricting the United States to the confines of the Japanese islands.

The primary and immediate consequences of Soviet success in Korea and in the withdrawal of American military forces would be strategic, for it would strengthen the Chinese Communists immeasurably. The Chinese Communists would be able to achieve a comfortable and leisurely alliance with the "colussus of the north." Relative to the strengthening of the Chinese Communists, the position of the United States Marines in North China would be untenable and vulnerable to harassment by Communist troops, in addition to being targets of accusations and charges in the Soviet propaganda network.

\(^2\text{Harlind, 258.}\)
The secondary and far-reaching effect of Soviet ascendancy in the Korean peninsula would be the neutralization of Japan as an industrial giant in the Orient. For years political economists had been interested in the correlation between the growth of the Japanese industrial machine and the dynamic expansion of their political influence, which began in the Korean peninsula and in a few years mushroomed through Manchuria, re-named Manchukuo, and on into northern China. Japanese economic prosperity and strong government were constantly in direct ratio to the markets which the Japanese developed on the land mass of the continent. Elimination of those markets and sources of raw material would inevitably contribute to industrial and political chaos.

If the Soviet Union could divorce the Japanese economy from the continent, the resulting consequences would undoubtedly weaken and embarrass the United States occupation, paving the way for a communist infiltration of the islands. Strategically, the Japanese well remember that Korea is a land bridge from the continent to the Japanese islands, and the armies of Asia could easily walk that bridge into Tokyo. The post-war struggle for power in the Far East was conceived at Yalta, born on the morning of August 9, 1945, when the Soviet forces marched against the Japanese, and baptized September 10, 1945, when American troops landed in southern Korea. Soviet preliminary success would be achieved when a.
Soviet hegemony was established over the entire Korean peninsula. Soviet Far Eastern policy would be complete when the United States evacuated the Japanese islands.

III

In the three weeks which elapsed between the announcement of the Japanese surrender and the landing of the XIV Corps from Okinawa under the command of Lt. General John Reed Hodge, the Korean people reacted violently and characteristically to their long-delayed freedom. They quit their jobs, and with a huge bonus paid by Japanese fearing reprisals the Koreans went on a long-delayed, unrestrained celebration. Political parties were formed every time two Koreans sat down to tea. They organized law and order patrols and self-government councils under the supervision of resistance leaders, many of whom were communists, while at the same time some of these committees had been created by the Japanese Governor Abe during the last month of the war it became apparent that Japan was about to sue for peace.

Many of the men elected to these committees were without political affiliation, but were animated by the prospect of national liberation. A few of the Korean liberals also joined, the most prominent of whom was Lyuh Woon Heung, a well known resistance leader. Two days before the arrival of the American occupation forces, a congress of "People's...

Republic." This "duly elected" government claimed to represent the bulk of the Korean people, trade unions, and the small Communist Party. The abrupt Japanese surrender found the United States Army and State Department without personnel trained for occupation functions in Korea. To complicate the situation, a sharp rift developed between the United States government and Chiang Kai-shek concerning the selection of a commanding officer for American military forces in Korea. "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell, who knew more about the Far East than any other American commander, with the possible exception of General Douglas MacArthur, had originally been scheduled for the command in Korea. At the last moment, someone high in the State Department decided that Stilwell's appointment would have to be cleared through Chiang Kai-shek. Although there never was an official statement made on Chiang's reply, it was no secret that a mutual animosity existed between the two, and Stilwell was not sent to Korea. In his place, the Department of the Army decided to send Lt. General John Reed Hodge, veteran of campaigns on Guadalcanal, Bougainville, Leyte, and Okinawa, a pugnacious professional soldier, who was a competent battle leader, but hardly qualified for occupation duties in Korea.

26 Lauterbach, 197.

27 Edgar Snow, "We Meet the Russians in Korea," Saturday Evening Post, March 30, 1946.
A delegation of the newly formed People's Republic met General Hodge aboard the ship which had brought him from Okinawa, and courteously stated that they were the recognized leaders of a government which had just been elected by the Korean people. They offered him their help and cooperation in every possible manner. Hodge, erroneously lumping the Koreans together with the Japanese, retorted that, "Koreans are the same breed of cats as the Japanese." It was an unforgivable insult to a people who had been fighting the Japanese for a half century, and who greeted the Americans with shouts of "Mansei, Mansei, (Long Live One Thousand Years)" and who were acclaiming the occupying troops as liberators and not as conquerors.

Hodge landed in Korea with a draft directive which failed to include concrete proposals concerning economic and political matters. The one thing that he had definite orders on was the formal surrender and disarming of the Japanese troops. The day after his arrival, when he accepted the surrender of approximately 180,000 military and 650,000 civilian Japanese in southern Korea, he began stepping on Korean sensibilities. Announcing that Korea's desire for immediate independence would not be granted, Hodge

28 Sugg., 39.
29 Tauterbach, 184.
30 Summation of USMCOK, 7 September 1945-August 30, 1946, Department of Army, 95-96.
stated that "to prevent chaos" he would temporarily retain the Japanese in office. A wave of protests broke out in the American zone following Hodge's statement, and prominent Koreans in Washington appealed to the State Department. According to George M. MacCune, at that time in charge of the Korean Desk in the State Department's Far Eastern Affairs Division, Hodge had implicit orders to:

...remove the Japanese administration, though retaining a general structure of the government. An elementary political sense should have dictated the immediate removal of at least a token number of the top ranking Japanese officials, but apparently Hodge's political advisors were too shortsighted to realize this.\(^{31}\)

In a statement congratulating the Korean people on attaining "freedom," President Truman attempted to reassure the Koreans from the highest level that the Japanese would soon be eliminated. The statement released on September 18, ten days after Hodge's arrival, soothingly noted that:

Such Japanese as may be temporarily retained are being utilized as servants of the Korean people and of our occupying forces only because they are deemed essential by reasons of their technical qualifications.\(^{32}\)

Nevertheless, it took direct communication with General MacArthur in Tokyo and the State Department in Washington before Hodge felt secure enough to remove the top Japanese administrators from their positions and the Japanese police

\(^{31}\) Lauterbach, 199.

\(^{32}\) MacCune, 48.
from their police stations throughout the country. By this initial U. S. attitude toward the Japanese, the Koreans formed an opinion of the American occupation authorities which was to embarrass the latter constantly for several years.

In addition to providing for the administration of the country, Hodge had to consolidate his position in regard to the 38th parallel, and the occupation forces of the Soviet Union. Hodge was well aware of the nearness of the Soviet Union and the frailty of the imaginary line bisecting the Korean peninsula. Hodge did not land in Korea with a pre-conceived notion that relations with the Soviet Command would be cooperative and harmonious. 33

IV

The responsibility for the establishment of the 38th parallel as the boundary between the Soviet Union and the United States has been variously attributed to the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, and to various departments within the United States government. The State Department has at times accused the Department of Army of the heinous crime of allowing the Soviet Union to occupy northern Korea. On June 8, 1949, Undersecretary of State James C. Webb stated

33In June 1949, the former Deputy Governor for Korea from 1945-1948 stated that: "Congressman Richards, "If there had been a question of who got there 'fustest' with the 'mostest' Russia could have taken over the whole country, could she not?" General Helmick, "Yes, and I think one of General Hodge's main concerns was to get up to the line as soon as possible before the Russians got over it." This testimony is taken from the Hearings before the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives, 81st Congress, 1st Session, on H.R. 5330, 42.
in testimony before a committee of the House of Representatives that:

...as a result of a purely ad hoc military decision, the line was drawn at the 38th parallel, and it was agreed that the United States would accept the Japanese surrender below that line and the forces of the USSR would accept the surrender above the line.34

In rebuttal to the Under Secretary's testimony, Major General T. S. Timberman, personal representative to General Omar Bradley, the Chief of Staff, United States Army, stated before the Foreign Affairs Committee for the House of Representatives that:

...the decision was taken in the State-War-Navy Committee here in Washington and it was approved by the President. So the State Department did have a voice in this drawing of the 38th parallel.35

From all present available sources, the reader can assume that the spokesman for the Army was correct when he said that the decision was taken in the State-War-Navy Committee.

Disclaiming the responsibilities for the selection of the 38th parallel as a demarcation line between the occupying forces of the Soviet Union and the United States, and approaching the policy of the Soviet Union in regard to the Korean peninsula and joint occupation, General Timberman stated further that:

34Ibid., 46.

35Background Information on Korea, Memo on S 3809, July 7, 1950, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, 3.
his research indicated that the Russians planned all along on coming into Korea, because they asked at the conference in July, 1945, (Potsdam), that the Americans cooperate with them in the reduction of the forces of the Japanese in Korea. At that time, General Marshall explained to them that this was impossible as we were then trying to build up to the capture of the Japanese homeland, which would be the then total American military effort. 36

There is also some thought that the division of Korea came at the Yalta Conference in February as a result of urgent Russian demands:

At that time no one appears to have been conscious that the 38th parallel possessed any ominous significance and that its historical origins went back to the era of Russia's defeat, yet it is clear that Stalin's speeches indicate that it was precisely in order to avenge the defeat incurred during the Russo-Japanese War that he wanted his troops to march to the parallel. 37

Shannon MacCune, an authority on Korean history and boundary questions, states that the division of the country had a historical precedent at the end of the last century, 1896, when Russian-Japanese relationships were strained in Korea and the Japanese representative in Moscow carried on a series of discussions with the Russians toward effecting a compromise of their interests in Korea.

...as a first step, (Yamagata) proposed a division of the peninsula along the 38th

parallel. The Russians were to have the sphere of influence in the north and the Japanese in the south. The proposal was rejected by the Russians on the ground that it would contradict their recognition of the independence of Korea.38

Understandably, such a division would not have allowed the Russians the bases which they coveted in southern Korea. Again in 1903, only a few months previous to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, a similar division line, the 39th parallel, was proposed, this time by the Russians as the southern boundary of a neutral zone.39 It seems quite apparent in view of this evidence that the 1945 division along the 38th parallel was by no means original.

In General Order No. 1, broadcasted to the Japanese nation on September 7, 1945, General Douglas MacArthur stated that:

...having in mind the long enslavement of the people of Korea and the determination that in due course Korea shall become free and independent, the Korean people are assured that the purpose of the occupation is to enforce the instrument of surrender and to protect them in their personal and religious rights. In giving effect to these purposes, your active aid and compliance is required.

By authority vested in me as Commander-in-chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, I hereby establish military control over Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude and the inhabitants thereof, and announce the following conditions for the occupation...40

38 Shinnan MacCune, "The 38th Parallel," World Politics, 1, 1945, 225.


40 Background Information on Korea, Memo on S 3809, July 7, 1950, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, 3.
The policy planners in the State-War-Navy Joint Committee innocently pre-supposed that the 38th parallel would simply be a military line of demarcation to effect the surrender of the Japanese forces, and the "independence of Korea would come in due course."

However, virtually from the beginning of the occupation, this demarcation line was a far more effective dividing boundary than most national frontiers. As the Korean problem of independence and unity became linked more and more to the dismal course of Soviet-American relations, Korea was divided against itself in spite of the fundamental homogeneity of the Korean people. The 2000 years of recorded Korean history had knit the people of the peninsula together strongly with one language, one culture, and one social pattern. The spirit of nationalism which the Korean people possessed long before the Japanese annexation and which was given a new importance during the Japanese occupation, could not be divided as easily and simply as the country. The creation of a purely arbitrary divisional line such as the 38th parallel could only inevitably contribute to economic and political ramifications, which would constantly serve to embarrass the occupying powers.141

The basic economy of the country demands that the pre-dominately industrial north, and the home industries and

141MacCune, Modern Korea, 52.
agriculture of the south, be in close conjunction. For years the rice from the southern provinces had been traded for the industrial products and raw materials of the north. All the highway and rail traffic moves north and south, built by the Japanese to link the Japanese home islands to Manchuria, consequently, there is little traffic traversing the peninsula from east to west. The line crosses 75 streams and 12 rivers, and in the northwestern corner of the southern zone, isolates the Onjin peninsula except for weekly convoys through the Soviet zone. 42 Two-thirds of the agricultural resources, over two-thirds of the population, ninety percent of the textile plants, sixty-five percent of the machine industry was located south of the parallel, while north of the parallel, ninety percent of the iron and steel industry, eighty-five percent of the chemical plants, and ninety percent of the electric generating plants were isolated. 43 Seven of the country's eight cement plants are located north of the parallel, while the manufacturing center at Hungnam has the largest nitrogenous fertilizer plant in the Far East, and the only petroleum processing plant in the peninsula is located at Hamhung. 44 One dramatic example of the economic division of the country was the

42 Shannon MacCune, "Physical Basis for Korean Boundaries" 286.
43 Senate Report, III, 540-849, 81st Congress, 1st Session, No. 748.
44 Hearings Before the Foreign Affairs Committee, H.R. 5330, 39.
bisection of the Haeju industrial area on the Ongjin peninsula. The utility of this extensive Japanese development was destroyed for either zone when it was discovered by survey that the port facilities were located in one zone and the factories in the other. Neither occupation command was inclined to cooperation, consequently, the region was abandoned for manufacturing purposes.

The diversity of economic development made the uniting of the country of utmost importance to the rational recovery of Korean agriculture and industry, and the ultimate attainment of a decent standard of living for the people of both zones. By May of 1946, the occupation policies and rivalries of the Soviet Union and the United States were apparent to even the most optimistic observers, and Shannon MacCune wrote that:

If it is the intention to make the boundary a rigid barrier, such a geometric boundary will require much more administrative supervision than a physical boundary. On the other hand, if it is the desire to make the boundary only a loose administrative device for the separation, then a geometric boundary is, in some cases, much more desirable than a topographic boundary. Thus the functioning of the 38 degrees parallel as a boundary line depends on the decision of the administrators on each side of the line.

45 MacCune, 54.

CHAPTER III

MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND THE BEGINNING OF THE POWER STRUGGLE

The contrast in the occupation policies of the United States and the Soviet Union was apparent from the beginning. As applied to its zone in Korea, the policy of the Soviet Union was expressed by Colonel-General Terentiyi Shtikov, the senior Russian delegate to the Soviet-American Commission, held in Seoul early in 1946, when he said that the Soviet Union was interested in seeing:

A true democratic, independent country, friendly to the Soviet Union so that in the future it will not become a base for an attack on the Soviet Union. ¹

Meanwhile the United States attitude toward its zone in Korea was stated by Secretary of State George C. Marshall when he said that the United States was interested in forming a "self-governing sovereign Korea, independent of foreign control."² The significant phrases, "sovereign country" and "country friendly to the Soviet Union" were indicative of Soviet-American regard for the Korean peninsula and were to

¹Lauterbach, 211.
²George H. McCune, Korea Today, 281.
crop up again and again in Soviet-American conferences regarding Korean affairs. The clash of interests began when the Soviet Union and the United States attempted to apply their respective policies to their zones.

When the Soviet army of 250,000 men marched into Korea early in August, 1945, they were confronted with the task of erasing all traces of Japanese capitalism and creating a government sympathetic and friendly to the Soviet Union.3 The Soviet Command did not establish a formal "military government" comparable to the American effort in southern Korea. To all appearances, the Soviet authorities remained discreetly in the background and permitted the Koreans to form their own government.

Several days after the Japanese surrender, unobtrusive political commissars attached to the Red Army cooperated with left wing elements in electing units of local government, attractively called "People's Committees." Political exiles returning from years of exile in Siberia were instrumental in directing the voting efforts of the people. Needless to say, the Koreans elected to the "People's Committees" were either Communists or avowed sympathizers. By August 25, more than two weeks before the Americans landed in their zone, these committees of workers and peasants were united by an "Executive Committee of Korean People."4

3 Dallin, 239.
4 George M. McCune, Korea Today, 21.
The new government gave the impression, whether erroneous or not, that Koreans possessed more than nominal authority in the government. Trustworthy Korean protégés were placed in responsible positions and allowed to exercise control, while a Soviet "advisor" was retained in such a manner that "direction and leadership" might be achieved. A strong appeal was made to all Koreans, regardless of political beliefs, by the appointment of Cho Man Sik as chairman of the Executive Committee of the Korean People. Immensely popular, he had been known for years as "Korea's Gandhi" because of his repeated sponsorship of passive resistance to the Japanese and his campaign for home industry and handicrafts. 5 As a moderate liberal and chairman of the Chosen Democratic Party, his participation in the government exerted a political magnetism on indecisive Koreans. Many small political parties were drawn into support of the government during the initial months because of the presence of Cho Man Sik.

Little opposition to Soviet political meddling was recorded in the months immediately after the war, because to the Koreans, rid of Japanese oppression, an atmosphere of political freedom existed. An estimated 35,000 political emigres returned from Yanan and Siberia and were welcomed by both Soviet and Korean authorities. 6 The presence of these Korean Communists enabled the Soviet Command to set up a

5Henry Chung, The Russians Came to Korea, (Washington, 1947), 71.
6Lauterbach, 212.
Korean-speaking bureaucracy between themselves and the populace, in addition to having numerous translators who possessed a thorough knowledge of Korean customs.

During the first month after the cessation of hostilities, the Soviet Command, working through the "Executive Committee," effected a sweeping and violent overthrow of everything, political and economic, that was tainted with Japan. Japanese administrators and those Koreans in responsible political positions who were allegedly pro-Japanese were relieved without delay and either imprisoned or executed. Such action was in direct contrast to the southern zone where the Americans permitted the Japanese to remain at their posts for nearly two months. Many Japanese fled to the southern zone as the Soviet forces appeared, while others gave their Korean employees a huge bonus and resigned themselves to the inevitable logic of Korean retribution. Most landowners were Japanese, a landowner in those hectic days being defined as anyone who possessed land enough to support more than two families. Old scores between landowner and tenant were settled by the epithet of "pro-Japanese" hurled at the unsuspecting landlord. A prison term or an execution was the customary sentence of the People's Committee, following such an accusation.

The purge of pro-Japanese and anti-Russian Koreans continued during the last months of 1945. Repeated object-

Ibid., 213.
ions by Cho Man Sik and several other liberal members in the Committee of Korean People did little to halt the wave of executions. By the middle of January, the Soviet Command attempted further to strengthen its grip on the North Korean government by unceremoniously replacing the venerated liberal Cho Man Sik with a revolutionary Korean Communist.

Both Cho Man Sik and Kim Il Sung were famed resistance leaders, although the passive resistance advocated by the former was somewhat overshadowed by the latter's daring guerrilla raids against the Japanese garrisons during the thirties. From Manchurian bases, he had posed such a threat to the Japanese that they were forced to maintain a large occupation army. During the thirties, Kim Il Sung visited Moscow where he became an apt pupil of Marxist-Leninism, and from the beginning seems to have occupied a preferred position in Stalin's affections. Many prominent South Koreans insist that Kim Il Sung was killed during World War II by the Japanese, and the present Kim Il Sung is an imposter.

The Soviet pattern of control gradually emerged during the following months of occupation by the establishment of a strong all-Korean Communist regime which would work closely with the Soviets. Extreme care was taken by the Russians to

8Ibid., 212-213.
10Henry Chung, The Russians Came to Korea, 86.
to remain in the background as far as the government was concerned, although there was no hesitation in loudly proclaiming Russian bravery and endeavors. Pictures of Stalin accompanied the often heard claim that the Soviet Union had won the war against Japan. The Soviet Command avoided a great deal of criticism by hiding behind the North Korean "People's Government," even though the Russian control of that government was only thinly veiled.11

With Cho Man Sik under house arrest in Pyongyang and Kim Il Sung as nominal head of the government, the Soviet Union now advertised a departure from its initial policy. On February 8, 1946, a Conference of People's Committees was convened at Pyongyang, where a government of twenty-five men, headed by Kim Il Sung, was appointed.12 All the members of this all-Korean cabinet were not Communist. Two non-Communist parties were assigned to represent groups other than the Communists. Their membership was restricted enough that they were unable to exert any political influence. The three parties making up the government were the Communists, the Democrats, and the "Chen To Gyo" (the Heavenly Way).13

Three weeks after the conference in Pyongyang, Kim Il Sung announced a program of land reform for North Korea.

11 George M. McCune, Korea Today, 52.
13 Dallin, 288.
Some importance was attached to improvements in agricultural production, but primary emphasis was attached unquestionably to its political importance. Although tenancy was not so widespread as in South Korea, nevertheless, 53% of the land was owned by landlords who comprised but three percent of the population. Until now, the Korean farmer, ignored by the generations of landlords, had been unaware of such an incredible possibility as land ownership. For centuries Korean agricultural economy had been personified by the feudal lord who lived in the capital and relied on an agent to arrange his rental fees with the tenants.

Four decades before the arrival of the Soviet forces, the feudal lord had been exchanged for the Japanese businessman, who quickly demonstrated that he was far more avaricious than the noble. With such a history of rapacious landlords behind him, the farmer looked forward with anticipation to the proposed land reform. The land reform was announced in a decree on March 5, 1946, approximately seven months after the arrival of the Soviets. The purpose and scope of the program was clarified in Article I.

...The mission of land reform lies in the abolition of Japanese land ownership, land ownership by Korean landlords, and of land tenancy, and bestowing the right to exploit the land on those who cultivate. The agricultural system in North Korea shall be founded on individual ownership by farmers who are not shackled to landlords...  

14 George M. McCune, Korea Today, 201.  
15 Ibid., 202.
All confiscated land was entrusted to the North Korean People's Committees, and actual distribution was to be achieved through village committees acting under the supervision of the district, county, and provincial committees. In accordance with Article III of the decree, all land owned by landlords in excess of twelve and one fourth acres was to be confiscated. Land belonging to churches was to be confiscated when cultivated by hired or tenant labor. The following article, IV, exempted certain persons and their estates from confiscation. It ignored the land of those who had been outstandingly active in the independence struggle and persons occupying positions of importance in the building of the "new democratic Korea." By these provisions, the new government rewarded its leaders. The last article of the decree stated that "all lands distributed to farmers under this decree shall not be bought, sold, or rented for tenancy, or mortgaged." Later criticism of the land reform revolved around this article; that the new owners did not have actual ownership of the land.

By the end of 1946, the distribution of land had been completed with over 725,000 peasants receiving approximately fifty percent of the farmland in North Korea. The land reform was widely publicized by the Soviet Union in an attempt to court the South Koreans into abandoning the American

policy, where a formal military government stifled land reform.

Concurrent with the popular land reform, the Soviet Union effected a sweeping nationalization of all industry in North Korea. The banks, industry, transport, and means of communication "belonging to the Japanese aggressors and to traitors of the Korean people" were confiscated and placed at the disposition of the Korean People's Committees. Although technically at the disposal of the Korean people, the industry was in many instances managed and in some cases, operated by Soviet technicians. Many of the Japanese technicians had fled southward in spite of Soviet attempts to detain them, leaving valuable factories sabotaged and without skilled operators. Those Japanese technicians who did remain in North Korea were not executed or banished to a prison camp, but rather were retained in their former positions until Koreans could be trained to replace them. Korean workers committees were formed to assist in putting the plants and factories back into operation. By the end of 1946, Kim Il Sung professed that a good start had been made toward the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the country's industry.19

During the summer of 1946, in preparation for the

19 George M. McCune, Korea Today, 213.
elections planned in November, the groundwork was laid for
the establishment of a completely "democratic" government.
This called for a complete re-organization of the country's
political parties. The first step was to disguise the Com-
munist Party, and in succeeding days there was organized, or
re-organized, a series of parties which were Communist-front
or wholly Communist under disguised titles. For example,
the equivalent of the Soviet Komsomol, or Young Communist
League, became the "Democratic Youth Alliance." The formerly
nationalistic democratic party, the Chosun Democratic Party,
was seized bodily, its officers thrown out, and the offices
taken over by the Communists. Among other Communist-front
parties was the "People Youth League," "The North Korean
Provisional Peoples Committee," the "North Korean Trade
Union," and the "Korean-Soviet Culture Association." Through
the initiative of Kim Il Sung, all these parties were merged
into the "Korean National Democratic Front."20

On November 3, 1946, in every city and town and village
throughout northern Korea, the adult population turned out in
an impressive display of balloting to select deputies to com-
pose the Provincial, Municipal, and County Committee. Pro-
vincial Committees were selected on the basis of one member
for each 30,000 population, while the Municipal and County
Committees represented 30,000 persons per member.21

20 Noble 9.
provincial and 90 county committees were selected. The election brought out 99.7% of the registered voters, and the Korean National Democratic Front gained a sweeping endorsement, receiving 97% of all the ballots cast.\textsuperscript{22}

A constituent assembly, representing the People's Committees elected in November convened in February, 1947, at Pyongyang and assumed the title of "Convention of the People's Committees.\textsuperscript{8}" Its membership was chosen by the Provincial, Municipal, and County Committees, which elected one-fifth of their number to represent them. In the three day meeting, the delegates approved all the legislation enacted by Kim Il Sung during the previous year, adopted a national economic plan proposed by Kim Il Sung, decided to establish a "People's Assembly of North Korea," and as a concluding act, the convention:

\...adopted a petition to the governments of the USSR and the United States requesting the speedy resumption of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission with regard to the formation of the United Interim Democratic Korean Government in accordance with the decisions of the Three Power Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{23}\n
The People's Assembly of North Korea was created by the convention as a permanent body, a national legislature to meet every two years unless called in special sessions. It was one-third the size of the convention, but represented the Provincial, Municipal, and County Committees. The 237 members of the People's Assembly met briefly on February 21

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., 178.

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., 175-176.
and 22, and elected a Presidium of eleven persons and a Supreme Court. A new People's Committee for North Korea was confirmed after the previous committee's action had been approved. The new committee was in effect an executive cabinet composed of 22 men and headed by Kim Il Sung.

The pattern of political control organized by the Soviet Union in North Korea has sometimes been termed a three-cornered system: (1) the People's Committees, (2) the political parties and, (3) the People's militia. The People's Committees were the actual means of administration at all levels, local, provincial, and national, and through administrative tactics, furthered a regime sympathetic to Soviet interests. Political parties had been tailored to this particular situation in that all the parties belonged to the Korean National Democratic Front. Rumblings of discontent among the minority parties were either diverted or made the occasion for a purge while the dominant Labor Party, guided by Russian advisors, exercised complete control of the political scene. The third element in the structure of control was the People's Militia, variously estimated between 150,000 and 500,000 well trained and fanatically loyal young Koreans, to provide the force necessary for sustaining the People's Committee should the Soviet forces withdraw from the country.

During the first two years of the Soviet occupation, the occupying forces sponsored in North Korea a cultural

\(^{24}\) Ibid., 177.
The cultural renaissance was affected to some degree by the close intellectual ties developed between the two countries. Their cultural intercourse was highlighted by a tour of the Soviet Union by a delegation of North Korea's intelligensia, whose visit began in August, 1946, and continued for approximately two months. They visited Soviet intellectuals and industrial centers, and when interviewed by the Soviet press, the Koreans spoke in glowing terms of the Soviet way of life and the achievements of the Soviet regime.

The apparent ease with which the Soviet Command seemed to be governing North Korea was misleading to the American occupation authorities in the southern zone. Censorship of news created an effective blockage on public information from the north, but from carefully sifted reports by refugees, it

\[25^2\text{Washburn, 158.}\]
was obvious that freedom of expression and political activity was denied to the North Koreans. Most of the reports reaching the American zone characterized the Soviet zone as a police state where the National Democratic Front eliminated anyone not subscribing to the party line. Rations and passports were confiscated from recalcitrant individuals as a means of ensuring political cooperation. Another device used for political control was the threat of revoking the deeds to land distributed under the March 1946 land reform if the new owner did not support the party or do his part toward supplying the government with produce.

There appears to be little doubt that the Soviets exercised a strong control of the country's administration. Although the Soviet civil administration kept well in the background and gave the Koreans maximum experience in self-government, nevertheless, Soviet control was secured by political officers in the capital and in each province. These rarely appeared before the People's Committees but rather exerted control through the ranking members of the Labor Party. Thus, while important policy decisions were Soviet inspired, the Korean party members appeared to initiate and support such decisions. The impression created for the population was that the government's action was Korean in origin and implementation.

The mass of the Korean people reacted favorably to Soviet policy, especially when it was accompanied by land

26George H. McCune, Korea Today, 180.
and the correction of labor abuses. Disillusionment did not come for several years, and by then the Soviet pattern of political control was firmly established. Meanwhile, in South Korea the so-called fundamental freedoms of democratic society were not appreciated by the south Koreans in view of the absence of social reforms and because of the irregularity with which democracy was applied.

II

The occupation of Korea south of the 38th parallel by units of the United States Army began on September 8, 1945. Although Korea had suffered no perceptible war damage, there were many critical situations calling for prompt and wise decisions. Tense and uncertain conditions were complicated by the presence of thousands of Japanese soldiers and Korean collaborators, both intensely hated by all the Koreans; by Korean expectations that they would be given independence immediately and that all Japanese-held property would be liquidated; by the confused political situation involving dozens of parties with widely conflicting views and a broad split between the radical and conservative elements; and by the artificial division of Korea along the 38th parallel. Armed road blocks on the Soviet side of the parallel prevented communication, and effectively stopped the free passage of people, goods, and information.27

The scarcity of qualified Korean officials or administrators, untainted with Japanese collaboration, and the absence of a political party or coalition truly representative of the Korean people, made it necessary for the United States to decide between continuation of the present Japanese administration or the establishment of an American Military Government by using the limited numbers of trained personnel Hodge had brought from Okinawa. On September 10, 1945, Lt. General John Reed Hodge unwisely announced to the Korean people that a military government would be formed and the framework filled in with the present Japanese administrators. 28 A roar of protest and indignation arose from the Korean people which reached to Washington, D. C., and upon presidential orders, Hodge removed the detested Japanese from their positions. A change-over to Korean personnel began, and by the end of January, 1946, only sixty Japanese remained of the 70,000 who had held government positions at the beginning of the occupation. 29

Late in September, 1945, Hodge received a State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee directive outlining "United States Policy for the Administration of Civil Affairs in Korea," and approved by President Truman. 30 With this statement to guide them, the American forces began to work toward

30 Friedricks, 360.
their objectives; the separation of Korea from Japan and the early establishment of independent Korean governmental, social, and economic institutions.

During the latter part of September, a new military governor was appointed. Infantryman Major General Archibald Arnold took over with 109 military government officers, not one of whom had been trained for service in Korea. They had all been trained for military government duties in Japan. Military government, with its offices in Seoul, was organized to correspond to the existing central government organization in Korea, called the Government General. Departmental and bureau activities were closely interwoven. To assist the military governor, a civil administrator coordinated the activities of the secretariat and of the nine distinct bureaus. The secretariat assumed the functions of the civil service, general service, foreign affairs, intelligence, army information, property custody, and planning and accounts. The bureaus administered finance, mining and industry, agriculture and commerce, public safety, public health, education, justice, communications, and transportation.

Although the bureaus were headed by military government officers, attempts were made to staff them almost completely with Koreans. Gradually more and more authority was given to the military governor so that in civil affairs, he was required to clear fewer and fewer policy decisions with the

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31 Lauterbach, 199.

32 Friedericks, 419.
general staff officers of XXIV Corps. American military government operated fairly satisfactorily on the national level and in and around the major cities, but its great weakness lay in the ineffective direction of civil affairs on provincial and local levels because of the continuance of the tactical unit type of control.

On January 1, 1946, the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was established by General Order No. 1, United States Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK). The control over all military government units passed from the tactical commanders to USAMGIK. This immediately increased the authority and enlarged the position of military government in Korea and at the same time provided for much closer cooperation. It established military government on a territorial basis consonant with the political and administrative subdivisions of the occupied area. Tactical unit commanders were relieved of their previous responsibilities over non-military activities, and the administration of civil affairs was placed in the hands of trained military government officers. Instead of being held accountable for non-military activities, the tactical commanders were charged with assisting the military government officers in accomplishing their tasks. 34

Relations between the American command and the Korean

33 Ibid., 362.

34 Ibid., 362-363.
political organizations during the early period of the occupation were not maintained with ease or mutual satisfaction. An American directive on the subject stated that no group would be recognized as having governmental authority and that all political parties would be treated impartially. In the first months of American occupation, there were literally dozens of new parties which sprang up overnight. It soon became apparent, however, that two groups would dominate the political scene. The liberal and left-wing People's Republic enjoyed a considerable organized following among the Korean people, while the right-wing Provisional government, which had only recently returned from Chungking, had little organized strength. In October, 1945, Dr. Syngman Rhee, a well known conservative, returned from the United States and rallied the wavering rightist parties in support of the Provisional government. Although the American Command nominally kept its neutral position, it was no secret that it favored the conservatives.

Throughout the fall of 1945, scattered elements of the People's Republic continued to govern in outlying districts while resisting the Provisional government's challenge to political leadership in the larger cities and towns. In the violent agitation against the Americans which followed the announcement of the Foreign Ministers' decisions at the

35 George M. McCune, Korea Today, 48.
36 Ibid., 48.
Moscow Conference, Syngman Rhee seized the initiative and thereafter never relinquished the country's political leadership.

The political situation continued chaotic and by March 1946, 134 parties had registered with the military government. Various attempts to reconcile the left and right proved futile and gradually the larger parties absorbed many of the smaller groups. The general tenor of the political discussions were far from conciliatory toward the military government. All parties wanted a Korean government, the abolition of the 38th parallel, the elimination of trusteeship, and the control of Korean economy.

In a move calculated to appeal to the Koreans and obtain their support for the military government, the military governor formed the "Representative Korean Democratic Council" on February 14, 1946. Syngman Rhee was appointed chairman of this all-Korean body which was to act in an advisory capacity to the commanding general. Since the appointees were almost all right-wing conservatives, the leading liberals refused to participate, with the result that the Council was of little value. The following month, Syngman Rhee attempted to resign, but was persuaded to accept a six months leave of absence. A month later he was back and tendered his resignation, declaring that he wanted to be free from all political

37 *Summary of USAMGIK, No. 6, March, 1946, 9.*
38 *George M. McCune, Korea Today, 50.*
ties, so that he could render unbiased aid in the formation of a new government. 39 By the first of April, military government analysts reported that an all-time low had been reached in American popularity.

Far reaching reforms were initiated by the military government beginning in December, 1945, when an ordinance was published vesting title to all former Japanese property in the military government. 40 To facilitate the sale and redistribution of Japanese property to the Koreans, the military government established the "New Korea Company" to assume the assets of the "Oriental Development Company," a huge holding combine which had exploited Korean resources during the Japanese occupation. Nearly 600,000 farms or two-thirds of the South Korean farmland was owned by this Japanese colossus, in addition to 52,000 cattle through the "Chosen Livestock Company." Other subsidiaries were the "Graphite Mining Company," the "Korean Woolen Company," and the "Greenhill Construction Company."

In the hectic days following the Japanese surrender, records were burned, and in some instances, Korean land grabbers appropriated Japanese land. The most difficult task from the American administrative viewpoint was locating the property, reducing it to actual possession, and devising records comprehensive enough to maintain control both over

39 Summation of USAMCIAK, No. 6, March 1946, 9.
Ibid., No. 7, April 1946, 14.

40 Ibid., 7 September 1945-31 August 1946, 96.
the economic activities of the property and its value. In the next two years, the new Korea Company recovered former Japanese property, sold farms to Korean farmers to be paid for in produce over a twenty year period, and finally was absorbed into the "National Land Administration" on March 22, 1948.\footnote{Final Report and History of the New Korea Company, HQs., USMCGAIK, 30 April 1948.}

Another notable reform was the de-Japanization of the Korean legal system. Many branches of the profession, particularly the Korean Bar were reorganized; the procurator system was modernized to center on prosecution rather than investigation; and all the court decisions and opinions were made public.\footnote{Summation of USMCGAIK, 7 September 1945-31 August 1946, 95-96.} The Korean Civil Service was reorganized to include a Civil Service Training Academy, along with an extensive in-service training program in all branches of the government.\footnote{Ibid., 100.} The basic police system, designed and manned by the Japanese prior to the occupation, was reorganized. A total of 14,000 Japanese were removed and 15,000 Koreans recruited and trained into an efficient, loyal, and dependable force.\footnote{Ibid., 100.} Further internal security was made possible with the...
organization of a constabulary force of 5,000, which ultimately would have a strength of 25,000.\textsuperscript{45}

Under the Japanese, supervision of public health and welfare had been a hit-and-miss affair, with the police in charge of health and welfare policies. Shortly after the arrival of the Americans, the Department of Public Health and Welfare was organized into an effective and separate agency. Programs of DDT spraying of buildings, people, and transportation systems were undertaken, and smallpox incidence was reduced substantially by city-wide vaccinations. Health education was popularized and resulted in a declining rate of sickness and disease. Education personnel in South Korea faced the problem of an estimated 2,000,000 students, with few teachers and no textbooks. To cope with this situation, the military government allocated a large percentage of the national budget toward education, resulting in teacher training programs, the purchase of nearly 3,000,000 textbooks, while two shifts of students attended schools in makeshift classrooms.\textsuperscript{46}

Korean political parties continued to be the focal point of trouble for the military government. A rice famine during the spring of 1946 occupied the people's minds with problems other than political; also the political parties were on their best behavior awaiting the outcome of the Soviet-American Commission meetings.\textsuperscript{47} Attempts were made by

\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Ibid.}, 101.

\textsuperscript{46}\textit{Ibid.}, 104.

\textsuperscript{47}\textit{Summation of USMGIK}, No. 7, April, 1946, 2.
prominent political leaders to work out a compromise between the more moderate left and right wing groups. Unity among moderate political factions was expected to decrease the influence of the highly vocal extremists and to provide the basis for increased Korean participation in the government.\textsuperscript{48} On June 29, 1946, the military governor proposed that a legislative body be established to help him determine the wishes of the Korean people in legislative matters.\textsuperscript{49}

The proposed legislative body would consist of members representing the major political parties and members elected to represent the various provinces. It would have the power to enact ordinances which, when approved, would have the force and effect of law. It would have the power to screen past appointments of Koreans to important jobs in the military government and to confirm future appointments.\textsuperscript{50} The military governor felt that such a body would provide an opportunity for the Korean leaders to obtain practical experience in handling the kind of problems which would confront them when the Provisional government was formed through the efforts of the Soviet-American Joint Commission.

Koreans were given further responsibilities on September 13, 1946, when the military governor gave the Korean directors full charge of their respective departments and placed

\textsuperscript{48}Ibid., No. 9, June 9, 1946, 16.
\textsuperscript{49}Ibid., No. 10, July, 1946, 12.
\textsuperscript{50}Ibid., 12.
Americans in advisory capacities. During October the first elections in South Korea since the Japanese annexation were held. Forty-five members for the new Korean Interim Legislative Assembly were chosen. Representation was divided among 31 rightist conservatives, 2 from the extreme left-wing People's Committee, and 12 independents. Many of the liberal leaders protested that the elections had been unfair, and demanded that new ones be held. Even the extreme conservative, Syngman Rhee, was not satisfied with the election results and the progress of his party, and on December 2, 1946, departed for the United States to plead his cause before the United Nations and the American people.

Eight days after his departure, the commanding general published a list of 45 additional Korean men and women who would join the elected 45 representatives in the formation of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly. According to the commanding general, the selections were made from nominations by the Coalition Committee and from consultations with many other leaders of political parties. Fifteen members of the Hankook Democratic Party boycotted the legislature for the first ten days in order to show their dissatisfaction with the commanding general's appointments and the decisions to hold new elections in several provinces.

Although Snygman Rhee, the titular head of the rightist coalition was in the United States, his party continued to block all attempts at constructive legislation. In January, 1947, General Hodge issued a lengthy statement in which he called upon the Koreans for unified action in the Interim Legislature. 56 The next month, the military governor wrote in a letter to the chairman of the Interim Legislature that, "I regard as both wasteful and useless the discussion of problems whose solution is beyond the power of the Legislature." 57 The first legislative act of the Assembly was passed on March 8, and provided that no member of the Assembly could hold any other public office. 58 Not until August 12, 1947, did the Assembly enact a franchise law acceptable to the military governor. Throughout the debates, it was evident that the conservative majority in the Assembly would not submit to the passage of any liberal legislation. Much of the needed reform, therefore, was blocked by the land-holding class.

The Interim Legislature could hardly be classified as a success, though it did give the Koreans a voice in their government and was of value in helping them to take the next step in self-government. Many honest and sincere efforts in the Assembly were often overshadowed by the extreme propaganda and criticisms of the far right and the far left, and

56 George M. McGun, Korea Today, 31.
57 Ibid., 33.
58 Summation of USAMCAIK, No. 18, March, 1947, 12.
it was quite evident that the Koreans would have to learn a
great deal before the May, 1948, elections for the Korean
National Assembly and the establishment of the Republic of
Korea. The embryo government was embarrassed, not only by the
lack of skilled legislators, but also by the constant harass-
ment of the Soviet Union and the North Korean People's
government, which contributed a great deal of indecision and
confusion to the post-war political conflict in the two zones.

III

Overtures were made by the People's government to lead-
ing South Korean liberals as early as December, 1947, to
seriously discuss the re-unification of the country. This
was by far the most astute move by the Soviet and North Kor-
ean Communists and perhaps the most deadly to the weary and
disillusioned South Korean liberals. Nothing had been ac-
complished in the Joint Soviet-American Commission meetings
towards the country's unification. Many of the prominent
South Korean liberals felt that:

...at least such a move may lead to the estab-
lishment of some form of government for all
Korea. Then at a later date we will purge the
Communists. 59

Since a "temporary alliance" with the Communists had
proved fatal for European statesmen in Czechoslovakia and
Rumania, the following conditions were laid down by the South
Koreans before they would consent to a conference held in
North Korea by North Koreans: that the conference: (1) would

59Chung, III.
oppose monopolistic capitalism but recognize the right of private enterprise; (2) would oppose the establishment of a dictatorship, including a dictatorship of the proletariat; (3) would support the formation of a United Korea government through elections in all of Korea; (4) would oppose the maintenance of military bases in Korea by any foreign power; and (5) would advocate the withdrawal of Soviet and American armed forces through a two-year agreement.60 The American Command replied immediately with a denunciation of the North Korean invitation, and General Hodge issued a lengthy statement in which he warned the South Koreans of the dangers of such an invitation.

Despite such opposition, more than fifty political leaders in South Korea decided to attend the conference. The Coalition Conference met on April 22, and 23, 1947, at Pyongyang, and was attended by 240 South Koreans and 205 North Korean delegates. Significantly, the North Korean People's government did not attempt to outnumber the South Korean representatives, and the conference quickly passed a resolution agreeing to the five conditions previously agreed upon by the South Koreans and presented to the North Koreans before the conference opening.61

Late in April, the South Koreans returned to the American zone and were outspoken in their approval of the North


61George W. McCune, Korea Today, 263.
Korean's moderate views. However, General Hodge did not concur and issued a stinging rebuke, warning the South Korean people against heeding the counsel of these men, and suggesting that they were "blind men" who had been "baited by the Communists." Under such circumstances, the unity meetings held by the South Korean liberals proved abortive and after the May 10 elections, they decided to postpone any action because the American Command and the United Nations Temporary Commission vigorously disapproved. A further invitation by the North Korean People's government to attend another conference in Pyongyang was rejected by the South Koreans.62

IV

The entire situation in South Korea was more than a simple solution of right versus left controversy. Conflict between the right and the left would have arisen if Korea had not been divided in two by the 38th parallel, and occupied by the foremost exponents of contrasting political ideologies. The divided occupation made a test of power inevitable, and the Soviet Union took up the challenge early in the occupation. It is difficult to assess the extent of infiltration and direct assistance from the north to the south; but it is no secret that the American Command believed that the Soviets had trained and sent to South Korea a strong underground group to control and direct all Communist activity in the American zone.

62Ibid., 264.

63 Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 81st Congress, 1st Session, on H.R. 5330, 50.
The primary objective of South Korean Communists was to discredit the military government and to arouse opposition to the Americans. In order to counteract Communist influence, the American Command strengthened the rightist elements, which in many instances resulted in the support of conservatives who had been associated with the Japanese. The second method used by the Americans was the outright suppression of Communist activity whenever it reached proportions threatening the maintenance of peace and order. In September, 1946, the military governor ordered the arrest of the three ranking Communist leaders in South Korea, while at the same time three newspapers in Seoul were suspended and their editors jailed for printing inflammatory articles against the military government. 64

The Soviets devised several ingenious methods for financing their activities in the American zone. Early in their occupation, they called in all Korean money and issued worthless "occupation rubles" in return. 65 Since the confiscated Bank of Chosen notes were still considered legal tender in the southern zone, it was an easy matter for the Soviet consulate in Seoul to distribute the funds taken in the North to Communist agents in the south. Further Communist financial chicanery was unearthed in May, 1946, with the arrest of 19 persons who were members of an organ-

64 Summation of USANGAIK, No. 12, September, 1945, 1-7.
65 Chung, 67.
ization which flooded South Korea with 9,000,000 Y in bogus currency. The military government succinctly announced that "all the counterfeiting equipment had been found in a building which housed the headquarters of the Korean Communist Party." 66

Much of the Communist activity in South Korea was directed from the Soviet consulate which continued to function in Seoul until June, 1946. The consul general, Andrei Polyansky, had served in the same capacity under the Japanese and had even continued his work during the six-day Soviet-Japanese war. He maintained contact with the South Korean Communist leaders and served as an intermediary between Pyongyang and the southern Communists. In April, 1946, an American ultimatum requesting an answer within one month was delivered to the Soviet authorities, demanding that they either permit the opening of an American consulate in the northern zone or close the Soviet office in Seoul. The Soviet government did not reply, and the following month Polyansky and his staff were brusquely ordered to leave. 67

Probably the most effective means used by the Communists to discredit the American military government was through labor union agitation. The suppression of trade unionism was one of the many ways by which the Japanese succeeded in

67Dallin, 295-296.
retarding Korean social and political development. Early in
the occupation, the military government endeavored to in-
stitute some reform in working conditions by encouraging the
labor movement to develop along lines of the American pattern.

Labor-management relations became strained, however, as
prices continued to rise and the unions assumed a more def-
ine form. Tension increased when the unions became instru-
ments for political action. In 1947, the military govern-
ment termed the Korean Federation of Labor as an "extreme
rightist" organization, while the All-Korea Labor Council
was an "extreme leftist." The tendency for labor to strike
without presentation of preliminary demands or any attempt at
mediation spread through many industries and occupations and
culminated in a mammoth railway strike on September 22, 1946,
which halted rail transportation in South Korea. Five
days later, General Hodge, in a radio address to the Korean
people, frankly admitted that the strike had "been fomented
by radical agitators to discomode and discredit the Amer-
ican forces in Korea." The General urged that the striking
railway workers return to work and allow the military govern-
ment to solve the problem in a "truly democratic" manner.
The railway strike continued until October 26, 1946, seri-
ously threatening the waver South Korean economy.

68 George H. McCune, Korea Today, 162.
69 Summation of USAHCAIK, No. 12, September, 1946, 5.
70 Ibid., 4.
71 Ibid., No. 13, October, 1946, 5.
Labor riots against the South Korean police plagued the occupation authorities during October and November. While the riots were creating havoc, the Communists cemented their grasp on the country's liberals by an alliance with the People's Party and the New Democratic Party under the misnomer, "Socialist Labor Party." Communist infiltration was not confined solely to labor activities, but also penetrated into the country's army.

The nucleus of an army was formed by the American Command in what was called the Korean constabulary, and by May 1, 1948, it numbered approximately 26,000 troops. Shortly after the Republic of Korea assumed the country's administration in June, an acceleration of enlistments began which continued until an un-announced "quota" had been attained. By using the "democratic" method advocated by the American advisors, there was little attempt to "screen" the new recruits in regard to political beliefs, and therefore a considerable number of Communist youths infiltrated the Korean army. Once in the army, they began to organize and initiate members. Late in the year they organized a coup d'etat in which they took almost complete control of the large Korean island of Cheju. Loyal army regiments were called from Seoul, and serious fighting occurred before the ringleaders were captured and summarily executed. As a

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72 Ibid., 4.
73 Ibid., 4.
result, the Korean army was thoroughly "screened" for Communists and their sympathizers, and many units were completely reorganized until the discordant elements were weeded out.

Perhaps the ever-present and never-ending threats emanating from North Korea had a more disquieting effect on Soviet-American and South Korean-American relations than was actually realized at the time. The continual stream of threats, invectives, and overtures which flowed from North Korean radio transmitters and newspapers, in addition to the sobering tales related by North Korean refugees, certainly were potent factors in Soviet-American rivalry.

Northern propaganda derided and ridiculed the southern government as being the "reactionary puppet" of American capitalists who sought to make Korea the "springboard of American imperialism." There was a persistent and widespread feeling among the Americans that the open allusions to impending conflict broadcast by the Pyongyang radio station were not idle threats and that invasion was imminent. Many North Koreans listened to station JODK, the military government's powerful station in Seoul. Early in 1949, the State Department's assistant chief of Northeast Asian Affairs hesitantly admitted that programs in the Korean

74 George H. McCuno, Korea Today, 265.
75 Ibid., 265.
76 Lauterbach, 217.
language were beamed to "North Korea as well as to South Korea, both from New York over the Voice of America and from local radio transmitters." In the south, the leaders of the northern regime were labeled as traitors who had sold out their country to the Soviet Union.

Soviet intentions toward the military government in peninsular economy never varied: pursuing a constant policy of non-cooperation and disruptive tactics. Shortly after General Hodge's arrival in Korea, he attempted to initiate conferences with the Russians concerning the removal of the parallel as an inter-peninsular trade barrier. He encountered almost unsurmountable opposition in obtaining anything from the Soviets, and following the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, his efforts were completely ineffective.

Liaison was sustained between the two commands only by the presence of a small Soviet delegation in Seoul and a corresponding American group stationed in Pyongyang. About the only "working contact" which the American command had with the Soviets concerned an interchange of mail trains once every two weeks. By April 12, 1946, only three mail exchanges had been completed between the two zones, and from then until November, the Soviets refused to participate in further mail exchanges. Chemical shortages in South

77 Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 81st Congress, 1st Session, on H.R. 5330, 24.
78 Ibid., 39.
79 Ibid., 39.
80 Summation of USAGAIX, No. 7, April, 1946, 2.
Korea, particularly chlorine for water purification, became aggravated until finally Hodge was able to work out an agreement whereby South Korean cotton yarn was traded for three railroad cars of North Korean chlorine. Such economic strangulation continued to exert a paralyzing effect on both zones. Mines in the northern zone remained idle because smelters were south of the parallel; the large reservoirs which customarily flooded southern rice paddies remained closed; and the light customer industry in the southern zone did not function until the military government began to import the needed chemicals from Japan and the United States. Not all the hardships caused by the 38th parallel were confined to the American zone, for during 1947 and 1948, it was necessary for the Soviet command to institute a severe rationing system in their zone in order to avoid a famine, even though one-fifth of the population had fled to the southern zone.

The constant stream of North Korean refugees was a major problem to the American military government. They required medical attention, food, and temporary shelters until they could be interrogated and re-located in the southern provinces. Approximately 2,000,000 people fled from the

81Ibid., 2.
82Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, on H.R. 7378 and H.R. 7797, 375-450.
83Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 81st Congress, 1st Session, on H.R. 5330, 44.
84Ibid., 84.
Soviet into the American zone. They were driven out by economic conditions and by the systematic action of the Russians to eliminate the small landowner, the small shopkeeper, and the more conservative elements of the population, in other words, the middle class. Among the unwanted Korean middle class driven into the American zone were Japanese who had no special talents justifying their retention by the Soviets in North Korea. Once in the American zone, these Japanese had to be repatriated to Japan, thus constituting additional labors for the already overworked American repatriation teams busily evacuating nearly 650,000 Japanese from South Korea.

Throughout this difficult period, and reflecting the country's political and economic strangulation by the 38th parallel, loomed the omnipresent problem of North Korean electricity. Before World War II, the Japanese had developed an adequate power system in the peninsula, but the preponderant share of this electricity was generated north of the parallel. The lack of electricity became significant to the American command because the coal burning thermal plants in South Korea could not begin to cope with the need. Satisfactory arrangements were concluded between the two commands whereby payments were made to the Russians in money and...
electrical equipment, both of which had to be imported from Japan and the United States. 36

In 1946, there was little electricity produced in the southern zone, and two-thirds of the country's power came from North Korea. 37 By 1947, the purchases from North Korea were larger, despite a definite increase in the amount of thermal electricity generated in the south. 38 Threats to cut off the flow of electricity came from the North Korean government after the United Nations Temporary Commission arrived in Korea to supervise elections preparatory to the establishment of a formal government, but those were discounted by the military government, as the usual propaganda blasts. Broadcasts from Pyongyang intimated that unless representatives were sent from South Korea to discuss power payments, the power would be cut off, but the American command believed that the principal purpose of the ultimatum was to secure de facto recognition for the North Korean government. 39

On May 14, 1948, just four days after the general elections in South Korea and fourteen days after the adoption of a "national" constitution in North Korea, this last vestige

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37 Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 81st Congress, 1st Session, H.R. 5330, 83.
38 Ibid., 84.
39 George H. McCune, Korea Today, 147.
of economic relations between the two zones terminated. The United States formally protested the high-handed action to the Soviet Union, and a series of discussions followed in which the Russians adamantly insisted that the United States had not carried out the contract.90 The Russians insisted that the power shut-off was the doing of the "free, independent and democratic" North Korean government; the Soviet Union had absolutely nothing to do with the action. Further attempts to solve the situation through conferences proved fruitless, and the discussions were terminated.91 Needless to say, the power shut-off was catastrophic to the struggling South Korean industry, and the military government made hurried attempts to restore some semblance of electricity to the stricken country. Power barges were moved in from Japan, while coal mining was accelerated in order that the production of thermal electricity might be increased. Still the power shut-off was devastating to South Korean industry and American prestige.

Considerable controversy between the United States and the Soviet Union over the Russian "evacuation" of North Korean factories resulted in the visit of Edwin W. Pauley and a United States Reparations Commission to North Korea at President Truman's behest. Through May and June, 1946,

90Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 81st Congress, 1st Session, H. Rept. 5330, 81.
91Ibid., 81.
the Commission toured North Korea, and upon completion of the inspection, Pauley stated that he had found little evidence that the Russians had removed enough Korean industrial equipment to damage the country’s economy. The validity of Pauley’s statements were seriously questioned by the American military government on the basis of refugee reports. In rebuttal to the military doubts, Pauley stated that he had been denied access to the industrial areas of Hambung, Hungnam and Chongjin in northeast Korea on the grounds that Russian soldiers were undergoing demobilization at these points. He also was refused entrance to Wonson on the eastern coast, where North Korea’s only oil refinery was located, because the Russian army general escorting Pauley’s group declared that the area was controlled by the Soviet navy and therefore beyond his jurisdiction. Pauley reiterated his original contention that he had seen nothing to indicate a large scale removal of capital goods, and that “on the whole, the Soviets in their zone were trying to revive the industry.”

During the two post-war years, the Soviet Union and the United States had imposed two widely divergent policies on the Korean peninsula, and each of them with varying degrees of success. Neither policy had the approval of the majority of Koreans in the zone concerned; the north catered to the

92 *Summation of USAGAIL*, No. 9, June, 1946, 17.
94 *Summation of USAGAIL*, No. 9, June, 1946, 18.
Communist minority, while the south was built upon conservative elements. Though a great deal of Soviet-American rivalry and conflicting aims were confined to the Korean peninsula, where military government and economic difficulties did not escape to the average world citizens, the entire world received an intimation of Korean ills during December, 1945, at Moscow. During succeeding years, the high-level differences between the Soviet Union and the United States were traced through the Moscow Conference and the Soviet-American Commission, until finally the problem was placed before the United Nations General Assembly.
CHAPTER IV
THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS

I
Throughout the autumn of 1945, General Hodge made continual efforts to achieve an understanding with the Soviet command regarding concrete proposals which would lead to the unified and independent Korea envisaged by the Cairo Declaration. His efforts were to no avail; the Soviet command consistently refused to discuss Korean unity and independence.¹ By the latter part of November, Hodge, in desperation and realizing the hopelessness of his position, appealed to his superiors for action on a higher level. As a result, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes reviewed the situation and made plans to present the subject at the impending Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, where representatives of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States might review the impasse.²

II
The Moscow Conference had been proposed by the United States after the London Conference of Foreign Ministers had

²James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, (New York, 1947, 222.)
adjourned, unable to solve the problems of post-war Europe.\(^3\) Always weighing politics on the scale of power relations, Soviet leaders considered the American move an acknowledgment of United States failure to achieve aims independently.

Shortly after the talks began, the United States delegation submitted a paper proposing the establishment of a joint Soviet-American Commission to unify the administration of currency, trade and transportation, telecommunications, electric power distribution, and coastal shipping. It also proposed that a four-power trusteeship be established which would "endure for no longer period than necessary to allow the Koreans to form an independent, representative, and effective" government.\(^4\)

A few days later, Molotov countered with a Soviet proposal for a Joint Commission on urgent problems of economic unification, the establishment of a provisional government, and a four-power trusteeship to last for five years. Byrnes stated that "in the interest of promoting agreement, we accepted the Soviet draft with a few amendments and it was included in the Moscow protocol."\(^5\) John Carter Vincent, another high official in the State Department who attended the Conference, declared that, "we are pleased to find that

\(^3\) Dallin, 263.

\(^4\) Byrnes, 222.

\(^5\) Ibid., 222. See appendix A.
the Russian viewpoint and ours were easily reconciled because there was a common objective.\(^6\)

Although the State Department felt that the "Russian viewpoint and ours were easily reconciled because there was a common objective," certain other reputable sources were less optimistic. The *New York Times* soberly reflected that:

\[\text{A note of cautious optimism about the results persist. There are going to be many important results of the main difficulties that have interrupted collaboration between the big three since early October. Optimism is being tinged with caution because implementation of agreements after conferences always creates difficulties that eventually require further conferences.}\]

Future events prove this paragraph to be most prophetic, for during the ensuing months Soviet-American relations hit new lows and the Korean problem necessitated further conferences.

Upon the announcement of the Moscow Decision, the nationalist aspirations of the Koreans were sharply manifested. All political parties united for violent action against the military government.\(^8\) In contrast to the Soviet zone, where the term "trusteeship" had been interpreted to mean "guardianship" and was therefore more acceptable to the North Koreans, the military government south of the parallel was confronted with explosive actions by irate Koreans.\(^9\)

\(^6\)Dellin, 267.

\(^7\)The *New York Times*, December 27, 1945, 1.

\(^8\)House Miscellaneous Reports, IV, 700-969, 81st Congress 1st Session, Report No. 962.

\(^9\)Lauterbach, 227.
Until January 3, Korean Communists joined with their less "liberal" brethren in denouncing the Moscow Decision. On January 3, the South Korean Communist Party organized a monster parade in protest against the proposed five year trusteeship of Korea. The parade had already started and the Communists at the head were proudly carrying banners inscribed with "down with trusteeship," when a breathless courier from Pyongyang arrived at party headquarters in Seoul. A horrible mistake had been made; trusteeship was a good thing; the Soviet Union was committed to it. Hastily, the remaining banners were revised. Now the last half of the parade contradicted the first, for their banners read "up with trusteeship." 13

Communist propaganda throughout the world followed the line that the United States had proposed the ten year trusteeship plan for Korea, but the ever-watchful Soviet ministers had managed to compromise the American suggestion at five years. 14 These propaganda charges reached such alarming proportions that acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson was moved to take up the challenge at a State Department press conference on January 25, 1946.

Asked whether the original American plan for Korea presented by Secretary of State Byrnes to the Moscow Conference

13 Chung, 107.

had projected a ten year instead of a five year trusteeship, and whether it omitted provision for the interim establishment of a provisional Korean government, Acheson declared that the "original American plan" was not a plan in the sense that it proposed a specific series of proposals. It was, he said, a paper which stated the general problem and directed attention to possible avenues of solution. What had been stressed was the necessity for a unified Korean administration to be brought about by the two commands in Korea. It was not discussed in the paper whether it should be a government or whether it should be something else, but the important thing brought forward for discussion was that it should be an administration operated by Koreans and created by the two commands.

Another correspondent questioned whether it was correct that the United States had first brought up the Korean subject at the conference. Acheson replied that that was correct, and added that in the paper there was also discussion of the necessity or desirability or "utility" of a trusteeship. It had been suggested that one might not be necessary; but if one were necessary, a plan should be made for five years. With the American position expressed by none other than the acting Secretary of State, Communist propaganda ebbed somewhat and ceased to be an annoying embarrassment to the American military representative attending the Joint Soviet-American Conference in Seoul.

16 Summation of non-military activities in Japan and Korea, SCAP, No. 4, January, 1946, p. 4.
Arrangements for the conference were recognized and concluded by an exchange of notes between General Hodge and Colonel General Chistiakov. On January 4, Hodge received a brusque note from Chistiakov in which the Soviet commander named Colonel General Shtikov as the chief Russian delegate and who would be "ready to meet with your proper representatives between the 15th and 20th of January in Seoul or any other place convenient to you." In reply, Hodge bluntly stated that "...I suggest that the place of meeting be at Seoul and that the date be not later than 15 January." 17

The conference convened on January 16 in Seoul's pretentious Duk Soo palace, home of Korean kings for centuries. After an exchange of pleasantries between Major General Arnold, representing the American command, and Colonel General Shtikov, the conference formally opened. Misunderstandings arose the first day between the conferences and the American and Korean press, when the Soviet delegation insisted that the press be barred from all meetings and from interviewing any of the participants. In the absence of any real news, the newspapermen indulged in speculative stories based on rumors. 18

17 Summation of non-military activities in Japan and Korea, SCAP, No. 4, January, 1946, 4.
18 Lauterbach, 228.
The conference continued until February 5, and in a communiqué the delegates announced the various agreements which had been reached. "A joint agenda was agreed upon and sub-committees were appointed, the principal ones being economic, administrative, and transportation." During the following days, the Soviet and United States delegations presented their views and proposals on the items of the agenda and agreements were reached on the following items:

(1) railroad, motor, and coastwise waterborne transportation,
(2) movement of Korean citizens between the two zones,
(3) exchange of mail between the two zones,
(4) radio broadcasting frequencies within Korea, and
(5) the future coordination between the two commands in regard to economic and administrative matters.

In addition to the above agreements, the two delegations exchanged views regarding the exchange of goods, settlement of mutual accounts, and release of electric power. Arrangements for the establishment of a joint commission were announced. The text of the agreements follows:

The conference of representatives of the Soviet and American commands in Korea called by Paragraph III, Korea, of the Communique of the Moscow Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, studied the question of establishing the Joint Commission under paragraph II of the Moscow Communique.

19Summation of non-military activities in Japan and Korea, SCAP, No. 4, February, 1946, 5.
This commission is to help in the establishment of a provisional Korean Government. It was decided that the Joint Commission will start its work not later than one month after the end of the present conference.

The Commission will consist of 10 men; five from the Soviet command and five from the United States command with the necessary advisors and assistants.

The permanent seat for the work of the Commission will be Seoul. The Commission will visit Pyongyang and will travel to other points in Korea.

The Commission will consult with democratic, political and social organizations of both northern and southern Korea.

The Russian delegation returned to Pyongyang where Colonel General Terentiy Shtikov denounced the United States policy for Korean unification before a press conference of North Korean newspapermen. He told the North Koreans that the Soviet plan was much more "salutary" for the country.

The Soviet delegation was expected back in Seoul early in March to initiate the Soviet-American Commission, but the Russians did not appear until March 20, 1946. Shtikov's delay in returning may be attributed to the low tide of Soviet-American relations elsewhere in the world. The Iranian issue was before the United Nations and insistent American demands were causing embarrassing notoriety for the Soviet Union.

IV

Formal ceremonies at Duk Soo palace marked the Soviet return on March 20, and his speech Shtikov denounced the American plan. The thunderstruck Americans recoiled even

20 Ibid., 6.
further when Shtikov declared that "we do not intend to deal with any Korean parties or individuals who have opposed the decisions of the three foreign ministers in Moscow." 22 Implications of Shtikov's address are apparent when the reader recalls that nearly all Korean political and social organizations with the exception of the Communists, had violently opposed the Moscow Decision. On such a tenuous technicality, the Soviet delegation intended either to force the American delegation to consider only the South Korean Communists, or break off the commission and destroy what little American prestige remained in South Korea. It was manifest to the American delegation listening to Shtikov's speech that the following weeks promised to be stormy and uncompromising.

The American military government attempted to take a conciliatory attitude toward the Soviet delegation. The day following Shtikov's startling announcement, the military governor threatened arrest and jail terms for all speakers, writers, publishers, editors, and pamphlet distributors responsible for statements "calculated to disturb peace and order." Moreover, he stated, "that freedom of speech and press did not mean unrestricted license." 23

Throughout March, the commission continued to meet in secrecy, issuing only guarded communiques which were described as being evasive and unsatisfactory. 24 However, it

22 Lauterbach, 231. George M. McCune, Korea Today, 280.
24 Ibid., March 31, 1946, 14.
was no secret to even casual observers that stormy sessions arose over interpretation of the preceding Joint Soviet-American Conference concerning "consultation with democratic political and social organizations." The clash was personified by disagreement over the eligibility for discussion of such noted conservative anti-Soviet Koreans as Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo, both former leaders of the defunct Provisional Government at Chungking. The American delegation refused to have them barred; the Russians refused to consult them on any terms.

The commission's dramatic fifth communiqué was issued on April 17 (nearly a month after the opening date) and reported that a decision had been reached to consult with "democratic" parties and social organizations in the formation of a future Provisional Korean Democratic Government. The commission decided to invite the assistance of truly "democratic" groups by requiring that, before such groups would be accepted for consultation, a statement had to be signed to the effect that they upheld the aims of the Moscow Conference on Korea to re-establish the country as an independent state. They also had to abide by the decisions of the Joint Commission in working out the basis for the future government. According to the communiqué, the actual mechanics governing the consultations were being worked out.

25Summation of USAMGAK, No. 7, April, 1946, 15.
26See appendix B.
by a Joint sub-commission No. 1. A second joint sub-commission would prepare the charter in which would be incorporated the structure and operation of the Provisional Government at all levels, while a joint sub-commission No. 3 would work out the political platforms for the future government, embracing all political, economic and cultural fields.  

A week later on April 24, the commission stated in its sixth communiqué that the chiefs of the delegations, Generals Arnold and Shtilkov, were still discussing the problem of consultation with Korean democratic parties. The first sub-commission was making progress in working out the procedure for consulting Korean political and social parties, while the sub-commission 2 and the sub-commission 3 were working on questionnaires ultimately to be submitted to representatives of the political and social parties. The purpose of these questionnaires was to obtain for the commission:

...a broad and clear understanding of the opinions of the Korean people and to give consideration to their advices and proposals on the structure and principles of organization of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government.

Further clarification of communiqué No. 5 was released to the South Koreans by the commanding general on April 27. Many South Korean political parties were in a quandary, wondering what their position would be if they signed the document

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27Summation of USAMCAIR, No. 7, April, 1946, 15.
28Ibid., 15-16.
outlined in communique No. 5. Their inquiries were well answered by General Hodge’s statement:

General Arnold, my chief representative on the Joint Commission, confirms to me the understanding that by signing the declaration outlined in Communique No. 5 of the Joint Commission, political parties and social organizations thereby assure themselves of the privilege of expressing their views to the Commission, either for or against trusteeship. Signing the declaration for consultation with the Joint Commission does not indicate that the political party or social organization favors trusteeship, or that the organization commits itself to support of trusteeship. Those who will not sign the declaration, however, will not be consulted by the Joint Commission.29

Three days later, the Soviet delegation assumed the position of excluding those representatives of social and political organizations, who "actively oppose the Moscow Decision." As this was contrary to the conditions of the previous agreement (communique No. 5) and was clearly contrary to the principle of freedom of expression, the American delegation refused to assent to the Soviet proposal. However, in order to facilitate progress, it offered to discuss in the commission the eligibility of a representative if the issue were raised in individual cases. The Soviet delegation refused to agree and insisted that a statement be published warning the organizations not to select representatives who were opposed to the Moscow Decision.

Discussions were at this point when the Soviet delegation informed the commission that all parties and organizations

29Ibid., No. 6, May, 1946, 17.
affiliated with the Representative Democratic Council of
Southern Korea, an advisory body to the American commander,
were considered by the Soviets ineligible for consultation
because of a statement by the Council's acting chairman which
the Soviet spokesman quoted as follows:

After detailed discussion of communiqué No. 5,
we have decided that signing the declaration
means cooperation with the American-Soviet
Joint Commission in the matter of forming a
Provisional Government and that after the govern-
ment is formed, we may express our opposition
to trusteeship.30

Following the reading, the Soviet spokesman made it clear
that he was not prepared to consult with those parties,
unless and until they renounced such views, despite the fact
that they signed the declaration in communiqué No. 5.

Inasmuch as the new situation thus created by the Soviet
demands would inevitably cause a great delay in the forma-
tion of the Provisional Government, the American delegation
suggested that pending clarification of that point, the com-
mission undertake to remove the 38th parallel as an obstacle
to the re-unification of Korea. The Soviet delegation re-
fused to consider this subject. Since there was no other
task that the commission could undertake at this stage, the
American delegation was left with no alternative but to ask
for an adjournment of the commission. At 10:00 A.M. on
May 3, 1946, Shtikov was received by General Hodge and the
situation reviewed in a three hour conference. Ten hours

30 Ibid., 19.
later, Shtikov again called on Hodge and informed him that after having communicated with higher authorities, he had received orders to cease work and return to North Korea with his delegation.31

After the Joint Commission's adjournment, Colonel General Shtikov was informed by Major General Arnold that it would be possible to resume work immediately if the Joint Commission agreed to recognize the right of all democratic groups and individuals in Korea to freedom of speech. This would mean that they would not be excluded from consultation with the Joint Commission, or from participation in the Provisional Korean Government because of their statement on trusteeship, the Moscow Decision, or any other political issue.

V

The abrupt termination of Soviet-American negotiations, was an outstanding development in Korean politics. For the Koreans, this event postponed the possibility of an early abolition of trusteeship and the 38th parallel as a boundary dividing the country. Following the breakdown of negotiations, the possibility of a separate provisional government in South Korea was openly discussed by the general public.32 However, as time progressed discussion of this prospect diminished and was offset by a growing desire for the continuance of American military government.33 With the prospect

31Ibid., 19.
32Ibid., 21.
33Ibid., 21-23.
of independence apparently more remote than ever, there was
a prevailing mood of disappointment bordering on despondency
throughout the country.

Meanwhile, anti-American propaganda furthered by the
Communist front organizations mounted in both north and south
Korea, the tenor of the propaganda being that it was America's
fault that Korea could not be united. On June 3, 1946, Pravda
devoted three columns to "The Question of Establishing a
Provisional Government in Korea." It excoriated Hodge and
the Americans for the Commission's failure, charging that
the Americans were attempting to introduce "reactionary
leaders" who spoke openly against the Soviet Union and stood
in the way of the democratic development of Korea. The sub-
ordination of Korea to U.S. influence, charged the Pravda
article, was the real purpose of the American representatives
in Korea, masquerading under talk of "defense of democracy."34
Additional anti-American rumors denounced American business
companies which would arrive in Korea within thirty to
sixty days to establish "trade relations" between the two
countries.35 The State Department countered with a long
policy statement of American aims in Korea, stating that the
"United States gains no economic advantages in Korea from our
occupation."36

34Lauterbach, 233.
36Deilling, 303.
American military government was annoyed by a campaign instituted by the Communist controlled "Democratic People's Front," a political party which urged the re-opening of the Joint Commission. A general policy announcement in the leftist Central Times of Korea on June 2 demanded "strict adherence to the decisions of the Three Foreign Ministers Conference as the only means to achieving Korean independence." Military government analysts reported that the propaganda had little effect upon the bulk of the South Koreans.

While Communist anti-American propaganda continued, Hodge attempted to correspond with Chistiakov, expressing his willingness to resume the talks.

VI

In two letters, dated May 9th and June 15th, 1946, Hodge repeatedly stressed to the Soviet commander that the "Americans stand ready and willing to continue the work of the Commission in carrying out fully the Moscow Decision upon one day notice." Moreover, Hodge suggested that "if there remains any other issues to be cleared up before the Commission reconvenes... we will meet for a personal conference at such place and time as you request." Hodge declared that he would gladly "come to Pyongyang for such a meeting." Hodge's first letter remained unanswered and not until August 6 did Chistiakov reply to the American commander's letter of June 15th.

37 Summation of USAMCAIK, No. 9, June, 1946, 17.
38 Korea's Independence, Department of State, Far Eastern Series II, Released October, 1947, 20.
Colonel General Chistiakov arrogantly stated that, "having studied the material of the work of the Soviet-American Commission, I have come to the conclusion that the stand taken by the Soviet Delegation... was correct."\textsuperscript{39} The Soviet commander regretfully noted that "the break in the work of the Joint Commission... came about on the initiative and suggestion of the American delegation." He suggested that:

...your letter did not state whether the American Delegation in the Joint Commission will uphold the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision and consult only with those parties and organizations and their representatives which fully, and without any reservations, support this Decision and did not compromise themselves by active opposition to this Decision.\textsuperscript{40}

In the concluding paragraph, he added that "upon receiving your consent to resume negotiations on the basis of the above mentioned," the Soviet delegation would travel to Seoul for further meetings in order to fulfill the Moscow Decision on Korea.

Hodge was prompt in replying to the Soviet commander's note. In a letter to Chistiakov on August 12, 1946, Hodge sarcastically noted "with interest your statement that the Soviet Delegation is motivated by the necessity for the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision."\textsuperscript{41} Moreover, Hodge stated that there were certain "factors in this

\textsuperscript{39}Ibid., 21.  
\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., 22.  
\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., 22.
connection that I am impelled to point out." He called attention to the fact that there had been nothing that the Americans could read into the Moscow Decision which would require or imply that only those parties and organizations are to be consulted by the Joint Commission, "which fully with reservations, support this decision and did not compromise themselves by active opposition to this decision." Hodge lashed out at the Soviets frequent use of "democratic" in describing the Koreans who would be permitted to participate in the formation of the government. He stated that there was nothing that defined the word "democratic" throughout the world, which restricted its "application only to organizations and parties belonging to schools of thought favoring certain classes in the community over others." Furthermore, he wrote that there was nothing in the Moscow Decision "that prohibits Koreans in conferences with the Commission, or elsewhere, from freely expressing their wishes and desires," in the formation of their government. In conclusion, Hodge was certain that the Soviet delegation might wish to "restudy the Decision in the light of the views expressed above," and that on this basis he invited the Soviet delegation to return to Joint Commission negotiations in Seoul.\(^3\)

Chistiakov ignored Hodge's suggestions and invitations until October 26, and then in a carefully worded and

\(^2\)Ibid., 22.

\(^3\)Ibid., 22.
somewhat tart note, the Soviet commander wrote that the
"Soviet delegation is guided in its work by the terms of the
Moscow Decision of the Three Foreign Ministers ... and in-
tends to steadfastly adhere to this decision." Chistiakov
took a sly thrust at Hodge's remarks concerning democracy,
by noting:

...that at the same time it is impossible not to
note that there is an obvious contradiction be-
tween the interpretation in your letter of the
word "democracy" and the actual position which
the American delegation assumed during the period
of the work of the Joint Commission.\textsuperscript{44}
the American delegation assumed during the period
In both the work of the Joint Commission.\textsuperscript{44} repeated
the Soviet assertion that the Soviet delegation as
always ready to assume negotiating as soon as possible "on
the basis of the exact fulfillment of the Moscow Decision."

Hodge waited only four days before replying to the
Soviet note. Evidently after seven months of correspondence,
in which Chistiakov had demonstrated only desultory interest;
it had become increasingly apparent to Hodge that he would
have to yield somewhat in order to get future Soviet parti-
cipation in the Joint Commission. Accordingly, Hodge offered
the following concessions. He agreed to interpret the dec-
laration in communiqué No. 5 to mean that:

...such individuals, parties and social organi-
zations shall not foment or instigate mass op-
position to the work of the Joint Commission or
the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. These
individuals, parties and social organizations

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Ibid.}, 24.
which do foment or instigate such opposition shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission.\textsuperscript{45}

In consideration of this interpretation, Hodge felt that both delegations should agree that they will not oppose "consultation with ... which subscribes to and abides by the declaration published in Joint Communiqué Five."\textsuperscript{45}

Thus Hodge was assured that if the Soviets did accept his points, the South Korean political parties who had violently opposed the Moscow Decision of the previous December, would not be barred from the commission meetings and the formation of the Provisional Korean government. In conclusion, General Hodge foresaw a great difference between "(1) the instigation of mass opposition to the work of the Joint Commission and the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision" and (2) "the proper exercise of freedom of expression by Korean individuals ... concerning their wishes and desires in the formation of their own government." Hodge closed his letter with a cordial invitation to meet just as quickly as possible in Seoul.\textsuperscript{46}

Chistjakov answered brusquely but rather promptly, for only three weeks elapsed between the dispatch of Hodge's letter and the receipt of the Soviet reply. In his opening

\textsuperscript{45}Ibid., 27.
\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., 28.
paragraph, the wily Soviet commander regretfully concluded that the new conditions laid down by Hodge in substance did not differ "from the position laid down in your previous letter, which, in the opinion of the Soviets ..., is in contradiction to the Moscow Decision." Furthermore, according to Hodge's "formulas" the Joint Commission would consult not only the democratic parties and social organizations which uphold the Moscow Decision, but also the parties and organizations which are hostile to it.

Chistiakov felt that the acceptance of such a proposal would appear "as a call to reactionary parties and groups not to retreat from their hostile position..., but merely to curtail such activities... so that they may have an opportunity to take part in the Commission meetings." The Soviet commander suggested the following proposals be used as a basis for the resumption of the commission: (1) the commission must consult only democratic parties and organizations which uphold the Moscow Decision, (2) parties and organizations invited for consultation must not nominate those representatives who voiced opposition to the Moscow Decision, and (3) parties and organizations invited for consultation must not and will not voice opposition to the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. Colonel General Chistiakov concluded his missive with the proper felicitations and the promise.

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48 Ibid., 169.
that the Soviet delegation was ready to proceed to Seoul should the Americans accept the above proposals. 49

General Hodge did not answer the Soviet commander until December 24, 1946. In the month between the letters, Hodge made a careful comparison between his suggestions for ending the impasse and the Soviet counter proposals. As a result, he felt that "in view of the closeness of our position... suggest that your proposals and the following modifications be made the basis for reconvening the Joint Commission." 50

First on Hodge's list of modifications was the thought that signing the declaration in communiqué No. 5 would be accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to upholding the Moscow Decision, and would make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultations. Second, any party or organization could appoint the representative it believed would be best, however, should such a representative prove antagonistic to either of the Allied Powers, the Joint Commission could after mutual agreement, require the declarant party to name a substitute spokesman.

Individuals, parties, and organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission shall not after signing the declaration contained in communiqué No. 5 foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied Powers or the fulfillment of the Moscow Decision. 51

In essence, Hodge's new proposals differed very little

from his previous attempts to get Soviet participation in
the abandoned Joint Commission. The Soviet command was in-
terested only in banning all the South Korean center and right
wing political organizations from consultation with the Joint
Commission. Active participation by all South Korean polit-
ical parties would be fatal for Soviet aspirations in re-
uniting the severed peninsula into a puppet state sympathetic
to the Soviet Union. Therefore, any proposal made by Hodge,
short of actually banning the non-Communist parties from the
consultations, would be rejected by the Soviets.

Hodge's proposals went ignored by the Soviets for over
two months, and it was the last day of February, 1947, before
the Americans heard from the Soviets. Chistjakov opened his
letter with the debatable statement that the American command
was ready to accept as a basis for the resumption of the
Joint Commission, "the proposals set forth in my letter of
November 26, 1946." Furthermore, the Soviet commander
declared that he was in complete accord with Hodge's pro-
posals, advocated in the American's letter of December 24,
1946. Again, he emphasized that the organizations taking
part in the consultations with the Joint Commission be informed
that they must not designate such representatives who have
compromised themselves by voicing opposition to the Moscow
Decision. In conclusion, the Russian expressed the hope
that there would be a speedy resumption of the Joint Com-
mision.

Such optimism was not shared in quarters other than the Soviet commander's. During the previous October, Major General A. V. Arnold, former military governor and chief American delegate to the Joint Commission, stated in Washington that there was no hope of accomplishing a reconciliation on the occupation level in Korea... if anything is done, it must be done on a higher level." His predictions crystallized in the months following the seemingly successful conclusion of Hodge's efforts, for the Americans waited in vain for the Soviets appearance in Seoul.

While the American delegates waited for the Russians, Major General Brown, new military governor and chief American delegate to the Joint Commission, published a series of four reports in an attempt to reassure the South Koreans of the procedure under the Moscow Agreement by which Korea would become independent. He rebuked them for their initial outbursts against "trusteeship" and attempted to clarify the meaning of the word.

According to Brown's interpretation, the Allied leaders who signed the Moscow Agreement had envisaged a troubled post-war world, where the smaller nations would not be protected by a strong international organization. In order to protect these smaller nations, who had no armies and navies, the United Nations was proposed, but until that organization

53 George M. McCune, Korea Today, 63.
54 Summation of USAHGAIK, No. 17, February, 1947, 15-16.
could be a powerful operating agency, it was necessary for
Great Britain, the United States, China, and Russia to
guarantee security to these smaller nations. This was the
first meaning of the word "trusteeship."

Brown continued that in order that the world might live
in peace, it was essential that all nations remain stable,
and if a small nation should become shaken with internal
disention and disorder, it becomes a threat to the peace of
the world. Moreover:

We are all aware that the technical knowledge
and management experience required to guide
such a development is in some degrees lacking
to Korea because of long domination and oppres-
sion. In order to insure a healthy and normal
development of Korea which would enable it to
participate on an equal basis of competition
with other nations of the world and to assure
internal peace and tranquility during this
period of growth and progress, the Four Powers,
in guaranteeing independence under the Moscow
Agreement, undertook to aid and assist Korea
for a period not to exceed five years during
this development.55

This was the second meaning of the word "trusteeship."

Brown emphasized that Korean translations of "trusteeship"
were both inadequate and inaccurate; that it did not mean
that it would become a mandate under the protection of any
foreign power. South Korean newspapers carried Brown's
articles, and military government analysts reported that the
Korean public had intelligently received the new interpre-
tations.

55Ibid., 20.
Ultimately the subject of Korean independence and unification was taken up in an exchange of notes between Secretary of State George C. Marshall and Foreign Minister Molotov during the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference of April, 1947.

VII

Secretary of State Marshall wrote to Molotov on April 8, 1947, reviewing the Korean situation since the Cairo Declaration, and stressing that it had been sixteen months since the Moscow Agreement, with no progress toward implementation of that agreement. Marshall suggested that both governments agree to instruct their respective commanders in Korea to reconvene the Joint Commission as soon as possible and "charge it with expediting its work under the terms of the Moscow Agreement on a basis of respect for the democratic right of freedom of opinion." The secretary of State hinted that a mutually acceptable date during the summer of 1947 "be fixed for a review by the two governments of the progress made to that date by the Joint Commission." By his attitude, Marshall intimated that the ineffectual negotiations conducted on the "occupation level" would not be permitted, but rather would be constantly reviewed by the respective governments in order to hasten the day of Korean independence.

Ten days later, Foreign Minister Molotov replied with a long and faintly provocative missive in which he briefly

56 Department of State Bulletin, April 20, 1947, 717.
57 Ibid., 717.
reviewed Soviet participation in the quest for Korean independence. He accused the American delegation of suspending the work of the Joint Commission because of their stand contrary to the Moscow Agreement, and furthermore, insisted that the American command in South Korea did not agree to "a serious consideration of the proposals by the Soviet command in North Korea on the question of an economic exchange between the two zones."58

Molotov repeated Chistiakov's ancient assertion that it was the American Delegation which had barred "whole series of large democratic organizations in South Korea and insisted on consultation with groups which had taken a stand in opposition to the Moscow Agreement."59 The Soviet minister noted that the "Soviet Commander in his relations with the American Commander endeavored to find a basis for the renewal of the work of the Commission," and as a result of an exchange of letters, there had been a "considerable rapprochement of the points of view of both sides."60

Mr. Molotov sincerely believed that an agreement would be reached shortly and that Joint Commission would begin its work in the near future. Shifting his attack somewhat, he outlined the "wide democratic reforms ... which guarantee political freedom and raise the standard of living of the population" and ended on the note that "such wide reforms

58 Ibid., May 4, 1947, 812.
59 Ibid., 812-813.
have been carried out only in Northern Korea, where there is only two-fifths of the population of Korea." In conclusion, the Foreign Minister proposed that:

"... the Joint Commission resume its work on May 20 of the current year in the city of Seoul, on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, and that the Commission present the result of its work on the elaboration of recommendations with respect to the establishment of a provisional democratic Korean government for consideration by the two governments in July and August, 1947."

The Soviet Foreign Minister did not advocate anything that had not previously been dealt with by Chistiakov.

Marshall's reply on May 2 was brief and to the point. He carefully stated the U.S. position in regard to "expediting the work of the Commission on the basis of respect for the democratic right of freedom of opinion." In reply to the Soviet assurance for the restoration of Korea as an independent democratic state and in the development of its national economy, Marshall cast a thinly veiled hint that:

The United States Government has under consideration a constructive program for the rehabilitation of the economy of Korea and for its educational and political development.

This plan for Korean rehabilitation with American aid, a forerunner of the greater Marshall Plan for European rehabilitation, did not fail to make an impression in Moscow.

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60 Ibid., 813.
61 Ibid., 813.
63 Ibid., 947.
Molotov displayed more urgency in his reply dated May 7, 1947, for he accepted without hesitation the proposals advocated by Hodge on December 24, 1946. Soviet awareness of what Korean rehabilitation would mean was manifested in Molotov's sly presumption that after the Joint Commission had concluded their initial task of the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government, it "should consider with the participation ... from the American and Soviet sides concerning measures of aid and assistance for the political and economic progress ..." of the Korean people.64

Secretary of State Marshall's reply to "My Dear Mr. Molotov" briefly accepted the Soviet views and concluded with the reminder that the United States was instructing its Korean commander to "make immediate preparation for reconvening the Commission in Seoul.65 All correspondence between Marshall and Molotov was closely followed by China and Great Britain, the other participants in the Moscow Decision.

Three days after Marshall's acceptance, General Hodge issued a personal statement to the Korean people. He called upon the Koreans to abandon their petty issues and personal quarrels and urged them to work "wholeheartedly" to create "a united, prosperous Korean nation which can stand as a

64Ibid., May 18, 1947, 996.
beacon of steadfastness in an Asia too long torn with strife and poverty. The Koreans responded with a barrage of congratulatory letters and cordial greetings from social organizations and private citizens addressed to both delegations sitting in Duk Soo palace.

VIII

On May 20, 1947, after a year's absence, Colonel General Terentyi Shtikov, accompanied by a staff of 65 persons, arrived in Seoul to begin the second session of the Joint Soviet-American Commission.

The first meeting of the Commission convened the following day at Duk Soo palace, and was devoted to the Commission's formal re-opening.

In the discussions which followed during the remainder of the month, it was agreed upon by the delegations that the Commission should limit itself to preparation of plans directed toward the formation of the Provisional Korean Government. Sub-commissions were named to study and recommend the type, structure, and composition of the Provisional Government, design a Provisional charter for the government, and an elaboration of the political platform for the Provisional Government. The Commission's main body continued to discuss the method of consulting with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations, and directed a sub-commission to

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67 Ibid., 19.
68 Ibid., 21.
draft coordinated proposals to be submitted to the Joint Commission for consideration. 69

During the first week in June, the Joint Commission devoted its attention to the question of consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations in North and South Korea; the thorny subject which contributed to the previous Commission's breakdown, and necessitated the intervention of the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister for the Soviet Union.

The decision reached by the Commission regarding the method of consultation and those with whom consultation would be held was contained in a document entitled "the Method of Consultation with Korean Democratic Parties and Social Organizations in North and South Korea." 70 There was also an agreed questionnaire on the "Structure and Principles of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government" and a second questionnaire on the "Political Platforms of the Future Provisional Korean Democratic Government." The questionnaires were for the purpose of determining the views of the Korean people on the proposed Charter and political platform for the Provisional Government. Each party and organization would submit their views through their central party organs so that only one set of answers was filed for each party or organization. 71

Consultations with Korean parties and organizations would be guided by the conditions stated in Molotov's letter of

69 Ibid., 22.
70 Ibid., No. 21, June, 1947, 16.
71 Ibid., 16.
May 7, and Marshall's letter of May 13. The Joint Commission would hold oral consultations in both Seoul and Pyongyang for the benefit of those parties which demand special scrutiny.

In the first ten days following the release of the questionnaires, 344 political parties and social organizations in South Korea obtained copies for submission to the Commission.

On June 25, Major General Brown, the chief American delegate, addressed the Joint Commission in an optimistic tone, remarking that the Commission had taken remarkable steps towards the "erection of a democratic state of power and dignity which will be a worthy political edifice for the people of this ancient and cultured race." In his enthusiasm, the general seemed to have forgotten that the purposes of each delegation had not changed, and that the proposed questionnaires did not solve the question which had contributed to the breakdown of the previous Commission. Method of consultation was altered somewhat, but still it did not satisfactorily solve the original problems of which Korean political and social organizations would be permitted to participate actively in the formation of the Provisional Government.

It was inevitable that future difficulties would arise concerning this interpretation. Brown paid slight heed to

72 Ibid., 17.
73 Ibid., 19-20.
74 Ibid., 26.
this discrepancy in his address, merely remarking that, "differences of opinion (Korean) must not, however, lead to lack of harmony or to non-cooperation with the work of the Joint Commission." 75

The following day, 41 Russians accompanied by American liaison officers, departed for Pyongyang to make arrangements for oral consultations with the North Korean leaders. Commanding General Chistiakov welcomed the American delegation at the Joint Commission's 36th meeting, held in Pyongyang on June 30, 1947. 76

Five meetings were held in Pyongyang and Soviet-American differences continued unsolved through July 24. 77 The Soviet delegation were adamant in their demands that the following types of political parties and social organizations should be excluded from the list for initial consultations: (1) those not classified by them (Soviet Union) as social organizations, (2) district and other purely local organizations, and (3) those which it (Soviet Union) contends do not intend to support fully the Moscow Decision, particularly members of Anti-trusteeship Committee and similar organizations. 78

Essentially this had been the Soviet position since the inception of the first Commission, and had consistently

75 Ibid., 26.
76 Ibid., 29.
77 Ibid., No. 27, July, 1947, 19.
78 Ibid., 20.
plagued amicable proceedings for the past 18 months. Should the American delegation acquiesce in the Soviet demands, it would permanently bar all South Koreans with the exception of those favoring the Soviet Union, from consulations with the Joint Commission. By such an abandonment, American prestige would be irrevocably lost in the Korean peninsula.

Specific Soviet intentions were that industrial, mercantile and producer's organizations, along with the societies formed for the study of politics and economics were not "in fact social organizations as the word 'social' is used in the Moscow Decision."79

Another interesting conclusion drawn by the Soviets stated that just because a party is eligible for consultation under the agreement of the Foreign Ministers, and repeated in the Joint Commission Decision, "does not mean that it must be admitted for consultation by the Joint Commission."80 In other words, the Soviet delegation could for the sake of compromise concede that a certain American-sponsored party was eligible for consultation, but by the same token deny that party admittance to the Joint Commission. Such a pitfall was evaded by the American delegation in stating that their position and understanding of Korean recognition.

The American delegation stressed again that signing the declaration in communique No. 5 was agreed upon by Marshall and Molotov as a declaration of good faith in

79Ibid., 20.  
80Ibid., 20.
respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision, and "would make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation." Irritated by the Soviets liberal interpretation of "social" as used in the Moscow Agreement, the American delegation primly stated that the Moscow Agreement "does not define the term 'social organization' and the Soviet delegation refuses requests of the American delegation to define the term in Joint Commission decisions." Therefore, the American delegation felt the term "social organization" must be interpreted as defined in the dictionaries of the world." Progressing through the remaining Soviet views, the American statement summarily rejected them one by one as being impracticable and not in conformity with the Marshall-Molotov agreement.

In rebuttal to Brown's accusative statement, Colonel General Shtikov held a large press conference on July 21, 1947, where he presented additional and seemingly conclusive Soviet views. The Soviet spokesman derisively dismissed the American claims which attached importance to the strength of local organizations. Mockingly, he expressed doubt concerning "the so-called Korean Civil Engineers and Architects League, which had indicated a total membership of 1,200,000 members." Apologetically, Shtikov pointed out that the League "could not have that many members because all Korea

81 Ibid., 21.
82 Ibid., 21.
has less than 1,000,000 workers." He added significantly, "that the American representative on sub-commission had declared after investigation that such an organization does not exist." Shtikov coldly drew the Soviet conclusions; the membership rolls of many South Korean political parties were fraudulently presented; many of the local organizations were too small to be consulted by the Joint Commission, even though the American delegation insisted that all should be consulted; and that the political parties in the "American inspired" Anti-trusteeship League be excluded from Commission consultations, even though they signed the declaration in communiqué No. 5. It was apparent that, although the issues were slightly disguised, the Joint Soviet-American Commission was in the same straits which broke up the first Commission.

In Seoul, Korea, Brown, the chief American delegate to the Joint Commission, represented General Hodge before a mass meeting of the Democratic People's Front, comprised of outstanding leftist organizations. Brown paid homage to the "burning desire of all Koreans for independence" and repeated the well-used Soviet-American chiche, "...will work earnestly toward the immediate objective of the Joint Commission... the establishment of a Provisional Government over united Korea." He charged that the American delegation could not agree to eliminate the Korean parties which were members of the Anti-trusteeship League because:

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\[83\] Ibid., 25-27.

\[84\] Ibid., 25-27.
(1) these parties having signed the declaration indicating their intention to cooperate with the Joint Commission are clearly eligible for initial consultations; (2) they have not been proven guilty of inciting or fomenting active opposition within the meaning of the Marshall-Molotov correspondence; and (3) the result would be to deny representation to an important segment of Korean opinion.

As a final thrust, Brown expressed the hope that the divergence in viewpoint with the Soviet delegation could be overcome, and the Joint Commission could proceed to successfully accomplish the establishment of a united Korea.

Soviet-American discussions continued throughout July, 1947, and on July 25, the American delegation proposed that sub-commission one be reconvened and directed to consider the application of all parties and social organizations which have applied for consultation with the Joint Commission. From these applications, the sub-commission was to prepare a list of all parties and organizations which have applied for consultation. In addition, the sub-commission was to prepare a list of those parties with which either delegation does not wish to consult, together with a statement of specific objections in each case. The American delegation felt that such action would not compromise the Soviets from their position, nor would it aid the Americans, but it would give a clear factual picture of both positions. At the July 29 meeting, the Soviet delegation without discussion and without stating proper cause, summarily rejected the proposal of the American delegation.

85 Ibid., 28.
86 Ibid., 29.
87 Ibid., 29.
Shtikov re-introduced a proposal which had been previously rejected by the American delegation. The Soviet proposal contained a list of parties and organizations, each with a claimed membership over 10,000 for consideration by sub-commission one. Seventy-one moderate parties with a membership of 19.3 million, along with seventy-five leftist parties representing 32.3 millions, and no representation from the right-wing comprised the Soviet proposal. The proposal was rejected because it did not include certain important parties and organizations which the Soviets contended belonged to the Anti-trusteeship League.

As there were no counter-proposals or other suggestions from the Soviet delegation for solving the issue, the American delegation submitted another proposal on August 12, 1947. It recommended that oral consultations be dispensed with and the written questionnaires completed by the applicant parties be accepted as consultation under the Moscow Agreement. Furthermore, it proposed that the Commission set up the framework of a Provisional Government for all Korea, specifying the elective and appointive offices be filled and providing proper procedure for appointments and for holding an immediate general election to select a national legislation and other elected personnel. Moreover, the election would permit unrestrained electioneering and secret

88 Ibid., 30.
89 Korea's Independence, Far Eastern Series, 18, 3.
and multi-party balloting and would be under international supervision.

The Soviet delegation replied to the American proposal with a counter-proposal that agreed to dispense with oral consultations of parties, but advocated the creation of a provisional assembly, on a basis of equal representation from North and South of those parties that "fully support the Moscow Agreement." Equal representation from North and South Korea in such an assembly could not in the opinion of the American delegation be reconciled with the disparity in numbers between the populations of the two zones. South Korea contained approximately two-thirds of the peninsula's total population of some 30 million. The other provisions in the Soviet proposal did not appear to constitute any substantial change from previous Soviet proposals, which had not been found acceptable by the American delegation.

IX

Despite the many and varied approaches which had been attempted by the American delegation in Korea and Marshall to achieve the aims of the Moscow Agreement, the position of the Soviet Union remained unchanged. American concern of the continuance of this condition prompted Marshall to communicate again with Molotov on August 11, 1947. Referring to Molotov's suggestion in his letter dated April 19, 1947, that the Joint Commission report its progress in July or

90 Ibid., 9.
91 Ibid., 51.
August, Marshall requested that the Joint Commission report by August 21 the status of its deliberations so that:

... each government may immediately consider what further steps may usefully be taken to achieve the aims of the Moscow Agreement, namely, the establishment of an independent, united Korea which can take its proper place among the United Nations.91

In his reply dated August 23, Molotov again restated the Soviet position, made an accusation that the arrest of certain persons for subversive activity in South Korea was damaging the work of the Joint Commission, and suggested that the two delegations continue their deliberation. He continued in a vague accusative way, stating that:

The Soviet Government considers it necessary that the American Delegation in the Joint Commission receive appropriate instructions for the fulfillment of the agreement reached between the Governments of U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in April of this year. (Molotov's letter to Marshall, April 19, 1947.)92

In conclusion and almost anti-climactic, the Soviet Foreign Minister noted no objection to Marshall's proposal for a Joint Commission report on the status of its deliberations.

The Joint Commission was unable to agree on this report covering the status of its negotiations. All efforts to reconcile the drafts prepared by the two delegations proved unsuccessful. Although the American delegation did approve the prepared Soviet draft, nevertheless, they offered to

92 Ibid., 53.
accept the Soviet views as a statement of position, providing
the Soviet delegation would accept the American draft and
permit the two to be forwarded under an explanatory letter. The Soviets refused this proposal or to discuss other American
suggestions. Upon an acknowledgement from the Soviets that
they had no proposals to make, the American delegation pro-
posed that the two delegations agree that their divergence
of views precluded agreement on a joint report. To this
proposal, the Soviet delegation agreed.

The obvious stalemate in the Joint Commission and its
failure to accomplish even the first step of its important
task indicated to the United States government that the aims
of the Moscow Agreement were being defeated through bilateral
negotiations. Accordingly, acting Secretary of State Robert
A. Lovett dispatched a letter to Molotov and the governments
of China and the United Kingdom on August 26, 1947.

He denied categorically that there had been oppression
or persecution of Korean parties and individuals in the
American zone as charged by Molotov in his previous letter,
and stated that the Soviet position is not only "contrary to
the specific terms of the agreement you and Secretary Marshall,
it is also contrary to the democratic principle of freedom
of opinion." Lovett briefly outlined the sorry state of
Soviet-American negotiations, and then exploded a bombshell:

93Ibid., 10.

94Department of State Bulletin, September 7, 1947, 473.
The United States Government therefore submits for the consideration of your government the following enclosed outline of proposals designed to achieve the aims of the Moscow Agreement on Korea ... (and) proposes that these suggestions be considered at an early date by the powers adhering to the Agreement.95

Lovett closed with the anticipation that the Soviet charge d'affaires at Washington, "or an authorized deputy may be designated to participate in four-power conversations on this problem at Washington beginning on September 3, 1947."

The Soviet minister did not acknowledge the American note until September 4, short days before the projected four-power conference. In the manner of a schoolmaster lecturing a dull student, Molotov pointed out that pursuant to the Moscow Agreement, all preliminary measures necessary toward establishing a Provisional Korean Government were to be carried out by the Joint Commission, consisting of representatives of the Soviet command in North Korea and the United States command in South Korea. And, furthermore, the four governments would act only "in the consideration of the proposals worked out by the Joint Soviet-American Commission."96

Molotov regretfully noted that the Joint Commission had done little in this direction, but that situation was a result of the position adopted by the American delegation. Moreover, the Soviet government "considers inexpedient" the American proposal to submit the question to four-power

95 Ibid., 474. See appendix C.
96 Ibid., September 28, 1947, 623.
discussion, inasmuch as the "Joint Commission was far from exhausting all its possibilities for working out agreed recommendations."97 "The United States proposals concerning Korea" set forth in Lovett's letter were also declared unacceptable.

Hopelessness of bilateral action in Korea was admitted by acting Secretary of State Lovett in his reply to Molotov on September 17, 1947. Lovett sadly dwelt for a moment on the two years which the United States "has faithfully endeavored to reach agreement with the Soviet Union to carry out the terms of the Moscow Agreement but with no appreciable success."98 In a cold, formal tone, he wrote, "that it is the intention of my government to refer the Problem of Korean Independence to the forthcoming session of the General Assembly of the United Nations."99

In the two years since the end of World War II, Soviet-American rivalry in Korea had run the gauntlet from Hodge's feeble efforts to the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers. The Joint Soviet-American Conference in Seoul had initiated the inception of the Joint Commission's first session, which weathered Soviet-American differences until May 8, 1946. Correspondence was necessary between Marshall and Molotov before the Joint Commission's second session convened on

97 Ibid., 624.
98 Ibid., 624.
99 Ibid., 624.
May 21, 1947; which accomplished nothing and created a situation where the Secretary of State regretfully concluded that the matter should be placed before the United Nations. The United States hopefully looked to the United Nations to solve the impasse.
The situation confronting the United States as a result of Soviet refusals to cooperate in formulating a just and mutually acceptable solution in Korea presented three logically possible peaceful courses. One thought would be to abandon all Korea to the Soviets, while a second course would go to the opposite extreme and establish what would be in effect a virtual United States protectorate over South Korea. A third program would strike somewhere between these two, furnishing the South Korean people with sufficient assistance and support to enable them to progress through their own efforts "toward a goal of freedom and independence," while at the same time allowing the United States to reduce progressively, its commitment of men and money in Korea.

This course involved laying the issue squarely before the United Nations as the only appropriate and remaining avenue through which Korean political independence could be established.¹

¹Background Information on Korea, Memorandum on S 3809,9.
By letter of September 17, 1947, the delegation of the United States requested that the following item, "The Problem of the Independence of Korea," be included in the agenda of the second session of the General Assembly, which was meeting at Lake Success, New York. Written by the Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, and delivered before the General Assembly by the United States delegate, Warren Austin, the letter briefly and factually reviewed the unsuccessful attempts by the Soviet Union and the United States to solve the Korean problem.

Referred by the Assembly to the General Committee for consideration, the United States proposal was unmercifully attacked by Mr. Vyshinsky in general debate. The Soviet delegate hotly accused Marshall of describing the Korean situation arbitrarily and incorrectly, "as though the ineffectiveness of the work of the USSR-USA Commission on Korea should be attributed to the USSR element." He felt that Marshall's proposal was a direct violation of the obligations undertaken by the United States at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December, 1947, and, therefore, was unjustified and unacceptable. With the Soviet position unequivocally stated by its chief delegate, other delegations began to present their views.


Vyshinsky’s arguments were buttressed by another Soviet delegate, Andrei Gromyko, whose interpretation was that if the United States was dissatisfied with the results of the negotiations, and he added, “the Soviet Union was also dissatisfied,” the proper procedure would have been to place the question before the other three powers concerned, but "to switch the question to the General Assembly was illegal."\(^4\)

In rebuttal to the Soviet Union’s two chief spokesmen, Austin arose and mildly noted that the United States had requested the other powers concerned to join in discussing those proposals. China and the United Kingdom had agreed, but the Soviet Union had refused, leaving no alternative but to bring the problem before the United Nations.\(^5\)

China’s representative, Wellington Koo, stated that his government favored the inclusion of the item in the agenda. As long as there was no agreement among the four powers modifying the Cairo and Moscow Agreements, the obligations arising from those agreements remained binding, and the inclusion of the Korean question in the agenda could not effect the positions of the four governments concerned.\(^6\)

From within the Soviet orbit, Poland’s Lange said that, “it was a question of the delineation of the competence of the United Nations.” His government held the opinion that, “two groups of issues existed at the moment, the winding up

\(^4\)Ibid., 19-20.
\(^5\)Ibid., 19-20.
\(^6\)Ibid., 19-20.
of the heritage of the war, and the building of the new peace.

Both issues had been allocated to different bodies. The United Nations dealt exclusively with the problems of peace, therefore, as the Korean problem arose from the war, it was within the competence of some body other than the United Nations.\(^7\)

The Middle East, represented by Syria's El-Khouri, and Sir Fazi Ali of India, contended that the General Assembly was empowered to take up any question under Article 14 of the Charter, and to make recommendations for the peaceful adjustment of any situation.\(^8\)

Final conclusive arguments for the inclusion of the Korean problem in the agenda were proposed by Sir Hartley Shawcross, representative of the United Kingdom, who stated that, although the provisions of the Moscow Agreement were binding upon the signatories, it did not mean that the United Nations should close its eyes to the fact that the pledged intention to ensure Korean independence had not been carried out. The British delegate felt that the General Assembly should ascertain whether or not any recommendation should be made.\(^9\)

Late in the afternoon on September 21, 1947, the General Committee overwhelmingly voted, 12-2, to recommend to the

\(^7\)Ibid., 20.
\(^8\)Ibid., 20.
\(^9\)Ibid., 21.
General Assembly that the problem of Korean independence be included in its agenda.\(^{10}\)

Further discussion of Korean independence continued at the Assembly's nineteenth plenary session on the following Tuesday. Vyshinsky dwelt at some length on the correspondence between Marshall and Molotov regarding Korea, and conceded that, although they were close to an understanding, the American delegation in the Joint Commission refused to accept an understanding. Therefore, the United States must "bear the responsibility for the situation which has arisen on the Soviet-United States Commission." The Soviet delegate disputed the allegation that the United Nations could take up the question of Korean independence under Article 14 of its Charter. He contended that under Articles 10, 11, and 14, the General Assembly could discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with paragraph 2, Article 35. However, according to Vyshinsky there was no doubt that questions raised by the United States delegation on Korea, "particularly when there is an international agreement such as exists at the present time, cannot be made a matter of review by the General Assembly."\(^{11}\)

Following an address by dour Evatt of Australia, in which the delegate from "down under" thoroughly disproved the Russian delegate's interpretations of the United Nations

\(^{10}\text{Ibid. p. 22.}\)

\(^{11}\text{United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Plenary Meetings, Second Session, I, p. 276.}\)
Charter, Austin addressed the General Assembly in a warning tone. Taking a firm stand, he declared that:

You do not have to decide between the United States and the Soviet Union in doing this. We think that it is highly important, in the interests of the Charter as well as in the interests of that small country, that the General Assembly should show its capacity to act and not show itself to the world as a perfectly futile organization.  

Late that afternoon, following addresses by the Chinese and British delegates, who spoke in favor of placing the Korean topic in the agenda, the vote was taken in the General Assembly. Forty-one nations voted for inclusion, six against and seven abstained from voting. Those nations voting against the topic's inclusion were Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, and Yugoslavia. Abstentions were from the "Middle East," Afghanistan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.  

Future voting "blocs" in regard to the Korean problem were similar to this initial record. By this vote, "The Problem of the Independence of Korea" was referred to the First Committee for discussion and report.

Korean independence was postponed in the First Committee until October 28, 1947, when Dulles began the discussion of Korea. Slowly and clearly, he reviewed the series of discussions and correspondence relative to Korean independence,

12 Ibid., 237.
13 Ibid., 294-295.
beginning with Hodge's attempts and continued to the Joint Commission, which theoretically was still in session. He concluded with the startling information that on September 26, 1947, nine days after the United States representative had announced his intentions of requesting that the Korean question be placed in the General Assembly's agenda, the Soviet delegation had proposed in the Joint Commission that Soviet and American troops should be withdrawn simultaneously and the trusteeship system abandoned. The United States delegation had replied that "the withdrawal of troops had to be considered as a part of the general problem of the establishment of an independent government for the whole of Korea."

Mr. Dulles elaborated that any troop withdrawals must be subsequent to the "establishment of machinery for effecting the transition from the present state of affairs to the formation of a single government representing the Korean people." Such machinery would include supervision by a "United Nations Temporary Commission," instructed to report to the General Assembly. Elections should be held very soon, if possible, before March 31, 1948, and that the number of persons elected should be in direct proportion to the population. A Korean National Assembly, elected by the people, should form the national government for both zones, and would assume all functions now taken by the Soviet and American military
military commanders. All these steps would be taken under United Nations observation.\(^1\)

All eyes were on the Soviet delegate, Andrei Gromyko, as he arose to answer Dulles. Patiently, the dark haired Gromyko repeated the worn Soviet accusation, "the Commission had failed because the United States did not intend to abide to the Moscow Agreement." His observations were that Korea could not establish its independence freely until the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops, therefore, his delegation was submitting to the Committee, a proposal providing for the withdrawal of all foreign troops early in 1948. Gromyko's second proposal was that elected representative of Korea, "excluding persons nominated by the foreign military authorities," should be heard by the Committee and the General Assembly. Thus, "the Korean question would be examined in an objective manner."\(^2\)

The latter proposal varied little from the Soviet position which had plagued the American delegation in the Joint Commission during the past 20 months. By delaying and questioning the "democratic" representatives, the Soviet Union could achieve its ultimate policy of seeing a divided Korea until a proper and opportune moment to withdraw. Eyebrows were raised as the full implications struck the assembled delegates for it was glaringly apparent that the

\(^1\)United Nations, General Assembly, First Committee, Summary Record of Meetings, Second Session, 249-250.

\(^2\)Ibid., 251.
Soviet Union intended to use the same tactics in the United Nations which had confounded the Soviet-American Commission for 20 months. Although the new Soviet position regarding troop withdrawals promised to be annoying, it would not deter Korean unity and independence as effectively as the latter proposal.

Viewpoints expressed by other delegates did not add anything constructive. Australia felt that the Korean question concerned all the states that would participate in the peace treaty with Japan, but thought the best way to solve the Korean problem would be by agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and, if these conferences failed, Australia would support the United States proposal. 16

Poland's Lange added nothing new when he expressed the belief that the Korean question could be settled by direct conversations between the United States and the Soviet Union, "with freely elected representatives of the Korean people given an opportunity to state their views." It was essential that the Korean representatives be freely elected. 17 Lange had evidently and conveniently forgotten that such conversations had proved a fiasco during the previous 20 months.

Wellington Koo noted that Korea had been since the end of the nineteenth century, "a pawn in a game of power politics carried on by Japan and Russia, to the detriment of northern China." He supported the Polish and USSR sug-

16 Ibid., 252.
17 Ibid., 253.
18 Ibid., 254.
gestions that Korean representatives should be invited to take part in the present debate. Understandably, he did not offer to suggest a method to select these representatives.

The Ukrainian delegate recalled the inadvisability of conducting elections while foreign troops remained in a country. He cited that in 1884, Great Britain had agreed to maintain troops for a short time in Egypt, and that they were still there, with the Security Council confronted with the question of their withdrawal.19

The United Kingdom generally supported the United States proposal, and felt that if the occupying troops were withdrawn from Korea, chaos would result.

In closing the 88th session, the chairman requested that all delegates submit their proposals in writing, in order that they might be circulated before the next meeting.

The following day, October 29, the chairman opened the Committee's discussion by inviting remarks on the USSR document, "concerning an invitation to elected representatives of the Korean people from northern and southern Korea to take part in the discussion of this question." Remarks which followed were distinctly divided between the Soviet Union and the United States viewpoints, depending upon the speaker's affiliation with either.

19Ibid., 254-255.
Dulles gravely conceded that the problem needed the consultation with Korean representatives, but "just who were the true representatives of the Korean people." Therefore, while accepting the principle of the USSR proposal, he was submitting an amendment establishing a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea "to observe and consult throughout Korea in order to ensure that the representatives were duly elected and not mere political appointees of military authorities."  

The Soviet "group" recoiled quickly and disparagingly noted that the United States amendment would lead to postponement of Korean independence, while at the same time, there were democratic organizations in both North and South Korea which could elect representatives. Gromyko charged that the United States "was afraid to have Korean representation in the United Nations discussing the Korean problem." He suggested that Dulles withdraw the United States amendment.

Additional Soviet controlled delegations derisively belittled the American amendment to establish a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. The delegates from Poland, Yugoslavia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic united in attempts to talk down the American amendment. In direct opposition, the delegation from New Zealand and India supported the United States amendment as the sole, just solution.

\[20\text{Ibid.}^261.\]

\[21\text{Ibid.}^267.\]
A host of new amendments and proposals greeted the First Committee on the following day, October 30, 1947. At Dulles insistence, a vote was taken on the United States amendment to the USSR draft resolution. The Committee decided by 43 to 6, with 4 abstentions, that the United States text was an amendment. Further attempts by the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics to emasculate the United States amendment were rejected by Committee votes of 40 to 6, and 36 to 6, respectively.

The United States amendment was then voted on, paragraph by paragraph, and adopted, but in every instance the Soviet "bloc" abstained from voting. The chairman then put the USSR draft resolution to the vote and it was rejected 35 to 6 with 10 abstentions. As a concluding note, Gromyko added warningly that should a Temporary Commission on Korea be established after the General Assembly had considered the question "without the participation of Korean representatives in that body's discussion, the USSR would not be able to take part in the work of the Commission."

With the sulky Soviet delegation quiet, the remainder of the day was spent in consideration of the USSR draft resolution concerning the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea. The Philippine delegate soberly felt that the Committee's decision would have far reaching effect and would

\[22\text{Ibid., 278.}\]
\[23\text{Ibid., 279.}\]
\[24\text{Ibid., 281.}\]
provide the basis for reconciliation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Far East, and pave the way for economic and political reconstruction of Korea, or else widen the breach between the two great powers; "condemn the Korean people to political and economic chaos and pave the way for war." 25

The French delegate took a sly thrust at the Soviet Union when he asked, regarding the USSR demand that free elections could not be conducted in the presence of foreign troops, if the elections which had been held in the Eastern European countries had been free. The Canadian delegate expressed surprise that "supposedly free elections, held in Northern Korea, should have resulted in almost unanimous support for a particular party." 26

Heated discussions in the Committee's 92nd and 93rd meetings between Gromyko and Dulles preceded the Committee's vote on the Soviet draft resolution to withdraw all foreign troops from Korea. After the Soviet resolution had been rejected by a vote of 20 to 6, with 7 abstentions, Dulles suggested that the Temporary Commission be composed of delegates from Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines, Syria, and the Ukrainian SSR. However, the Ukrainian delegate refused Dulles invitation, stating that "he must decline the work in the Temporary Commission because

25 Ibid., 282.
26 Ibid., 294.
the representatives of Korea had not been invited to attend the present debate." With no more consideration by the Committee, the entire United States draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 46 to 0, with 4 abstentions.27

Referred to the Assembly's Fifth Committee, Budgetary and Administrative, the Soviet delegate opened fire on the draft resolution. He stressed that his delegation could not vote for any expenditure for the commission on Korea, "nor could it participate in any detailed analysis of the project."28 The chairman coldly stated that all comments should be limited strictly to budgetary implications. Four other delegations from within the Soviet orbit arose, and one by one endorsed the remarks made by the Soviet delegate.

Action was initiated by the United Kingdom delegate on November 10, 1947. He formally proposed that a report should be made to the General Assembly indicating that the total expenditure involved would be 100 thousands in 1947, 550 thousands in 1948.29 This was based on the assumption that the Commission would operate from December 1, 1947, to December 1, 1948. The Committee adopted the United Kingdom proposal 27 to 6 votes, with 5 abstentions, and the referred draft resolution back to the General Assembly.30

27Ibid., 307.


29Ibid., 410.

30Ibid., 410.
Gromyko was the center of attraction at the Assembly's 11th plenary meeting held at Flushing Meadows on November 13. Speaking coldly and resolutely, the impassive Soviet delegate accused the United States regulation of complicating the entire situation, because "it was not based on the interests of the Korean people but on the designs of the United States, which has undermined and continues to undermine and appropriate solutions."31 Again he reviewed the Soviet-American activities since the Moscow Conference, 1945, and launched into a long vilification against the United States.

Dulles ignored the Soviet taunts and stated that his interpretation of the First Committee's work had been different from Mr. Gromyko's. The American felt that there had been three basic issues confronting the First Committee: (1) should the General Assembly do anything, (2) should the Committee act or wait until it could get representation from Korea to New York, and (3) "if we acted now, should we act on the basis of trying to get the troops out first and create a government afterwards, or try to create a government first."32 According to Dulles, the Committee had taken the only logical course in view of past events.

Consideration by other delegations the following day were either pro-American or pro-Soviet. No other suggestions

32Ibid., 833.
were made; it was as if the sheep were following their leader. At the final vote the United States draft resolutions, estab-
lishing a Temporary Commission on Korea, were adopted by 43-0 with 6 conspicuous abstentions. 33

Throughout the General Assembly's consideration of Korean independence, the Soviet Union attempted by devious parliamen-
tary means to postpone the problem of Korean independence and unity. Comparisons can be drawn between the Moscow Conference
when it was necessary that high level action by Byrnes and
Molotov initiate the Soviet-American Conference and the Joint
Commission, and the General Assembly where it was necessary,
by a vote of 41-6, to convince the Soviet Union that the
United Nations intended to discuss the problem.

Once adopted by the General Assembly, the Soviet policy
resembled their delaying tactics which had disrupted the
Joint Commission for 20 months. Soviet speeches were hours
of contradictory insinuations and counter-charges, in which
the United States was blamed for everything imaginable. The
basis for the Soviet accusations rested on their charge that
the United States by its action was breaking the Moscow Agree-
ment.

Soviet solutions for the Korean problem were master-
pieces by which they hoped to further delay and embroil the
Korean problem into a snarled web of technicalities, while
the Soviet agents leisurely created a state in northern Korea

33 Ibid., 853.
which would be sympathetic to the Soviet Union. The question of Korean representatives threatened to assume the same importance in the General Assembly that the Soviet Union laid to it in the Joint Commission meetings. The impractical Soviet suggestion concerning simultaneous troop withdrawals was rejected by the United States. Competent American observers correctly forecast the development of increasing propaganda concerning troop withdrawals which would serve to further embarrass American efforts to achieve a just solution to the Korean problem.

III

The refusal of the Ukrainian delegate to participate in the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, (UNTCOK), left the remaining eight members with no alternative but to establish their headquarters in Seoul. A series of public meetings were commenced on January 12, 1948, and continued until June 1.\(^3\) Letters were addressed to the military commanders of both zones requesting permission to pay courtesy calls. The commanding general in South Korea replied on January 19, and a courtesy call was made the following day, while no reply was received from the commanding general in northern Korea.\(^3\)\(^5\)

Consequently, the United Nations Secretary-General was asked by cable to request the permanent representative of


\(^3\)\(^5\) Ibid., 24.
the USSR to transmit to Moscow the Commission's communication regarding the exchange of courtesies with the general officers commanding the forces in North and South Korea. In reply to the Secretary-General's request, Gromyko retorted that he found it necessary to refer to the negative attitude taken by the Soviet government during the General Assembly's second session toward the establishment of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. 36

Upon receipt of Gromyko's reply the Commission dispatched another cable to the Secretary-General asking him to remind the Soviet government of paragraph six of resolution II, which established the Commission, calling all Member States concerned to afford every assistance and facility to the Commission in the fulfillment of its duties. No answer was received by the Commission.

At the Commission's seventh meeting, the secretariat reported that the letter addressed to the commanding general in North Korea had not been accepted by the Soviet authorities. It was apparent that the Soviet refusal in the General Assembly to recognize the Temporary Commission extended to the Korean peninsula as well, leaving the Commission undecided as to whether to abandon their assigned task and return home, or to carry out their functions in the American zone.

During the Commission's next three meetings, the members thoroughly discussed their inability to communicate with

36 Ibid., 24.
North Korea, and finally decided to refer the matter to the General Assembly's Interim Committee for instructions.\textsuperscript{37}

Difficulties were encountered in the Interim Committee for the Soviet Union had consistently refused to acknowledge the Interim Committee as a representative body of the Assembly, charged with carrying on the Assembly's functions while that group was not in session. It was March 1, 1948, before the Interim Committee informed the Temporary Commission that it should "go ahead and discharge its duties in Korea wherever and to the extent that circumstances permitted."\textsuperscript{38}

Meanwhile, the commanding general in South Korea had gone ahead and announced that USAMGIK would sponsor elections on May 10, 1948. Following a series of recommendations by the Commission to the commanding general, a Korean "Bill of Rights" enumerating the "inherent rights and liberties of the Korean people" was issued over the general's signature, and approximately 3000 political prisoners were freed in order to ensure a "freedom of atmosphere" in the elections.\textsuperscript{39}

An ordinance was promulgated by the military governor on criminal procedure which extended such guarantees as requiring warrants for the making of arrests. Also, the Commission had received a number of complaints concerning the conduct of the national police and the so-called "youth organizations" and for this reason, decided to closely observe the attitude.

\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., 25.
\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., 27.
\textsuperscript{39}George M. McCune, Korea Today, 225-226.
\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., 226.
of the police during the pre-election and election periods.\textsuperscript{140} The Commission appointed member teams to supervise the elections in the larger cities and to travel through the southern provinces.

The political situation in South Korea in the weeks preceding the elections was far from satisfactory. Moderate liberals and left-wing organizations opposed the separate elections on the grounds that adequate efforts had not been made to achieve an agreement with the North Korean regime, and also because they believed a separate election would permanently divide the country. Active support for separate elections came only from the right-wing party of Syngman Rhee and the Hankook Democratic Party. Rhee had been agitating for months the necessity for separate elections, and maintained that a sufficiently free atmosphere prevailed to conduct elections.

The expected violence did not occur on election day and approximately 95\% of the registrants, or 75\% of all eligible voters cast their ballots.\textsuperscript{141} The American command and the South Korean Interim Government described the elections as a great victory for democracy over communism, but many unofficial reports maintained that the elections had been conducted in an atmosphere of terrorism. They pointed out that the Commissions actual staff numbered about 30 persons, and it was upon this limited number of observers that the Commission would rely to make its report to the General Assembly.

\textsuperscript{141}Ibid., 229.
Following the elections, the Temporary Commission departed for Shanghai to prepare its report for submission to the General Assembly. Early in June, the Commission returned to Seoul to confer with the elected assembly concerning measures for the establishment of a Korean government. On June 30, 1948, the Commission's chairman announced to the Korean National Assembly that the election results were "a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the Commission." Although the Commission did not elaborate on its attitude toward the formation of a government, the National Assembly acted under Rhee's leadership together with military government cooperation, to gradually assume full responsibility for the organization of a South Korea government.

By August 12, 1948, Chiang Kai-shek extended formal diplomatic recognition to the Republic of Korea, while the State Department released a statement on the same day which amounted to giving de facto recognition to the new government. A week later, the President of the Philippines extended to the Republic, "sincerest wishes ... for the success of the new state of Korea." Thus, the Republic of Korea was well established long before the General Assembly's scheduled third session in Paris.

IV

Propaganda from the northern zone assumed threatening

Ibid., 230.


Ibid., 102.

Ibid., 102.
proportions during the spring and summer of 1948, while the Temporary Commission was active in South Korea. According to the Pyongyang radio, the Korean people were being betrayed by the Americans and a small group of pro-American reactionary Koreans. Furthermore, retribution for these Korean traitors would be swift and dire. Soviet action against South Korea approached an entirely new thesis in June, 1948, when the cornerstone for a new North Korean governmental structure was laid.

According to the pro-Soviet North Korean press, a conference was held in Pyongyang sometime between June 29, and July 5, and was attended by leaders of many political and social organizations in both northern and southern Korea. Members of this conference asserted that the May elections held under U.N. supervision in South Korea had been intended "to dismember Korea and to transform the country into an American colony." Conference members stated further that the popular will had been illegally circumvented and resolved not to recognize the South Korean National Assembly on the grounds that it had been established by "rigged" elections and thus did not represent the people.

The conference outlined a program for the creation of a "genuinely" democratic Korean legislature, whose members should be elected by the free expression of the "will of the Korean

Elections were to be held for a new Supreme National Assembly of Korea, and a single unified Korean government, which would include representation from Northern and Southern Korea. It was also announced that the Supreme National Assembly and the new government would seek the earliest possible implementation of the Soviet government's troops. In planning the elections, the conference leaders realized that "persecution of certain South Korean political and social organizations by American occupation authorities" made direct elections impossible. Therefore, it was decided to carry out an indirect two-stage election: (1) the South Korean population would elect delegates to a Congress of People's Representatives of South Korea, and (2) this congress would elect deputies to represent the South Koreans in the Supreme National Assembly.

On August 21, 1948, such a congress did convene in Haeju just across the parallel in the Soviet zone. A "special committee" which had "directed" the elections in Southern Korea reported that 77.1% of the South Korean electorate had voted despite American opposition. The 1102 to the congress elected 360 delegates to the Supreme National Assembly. The direct elections in Northern Korea on August 25, resulted in the election of 212 northern delegates. In

47 Ibid., 54.
48 Ibid., 55.
49 It must be remembered that the Temporary Commission had reported that 75% of the electorate had voted on May 20.
concluding its report, the Election Committee declared that "all people of North and South Korea except for a few reactionaries and pro-Japanese elements, traitors to the motherland, participated in the elections. 50

There is little doubt that the Soviet attempt to court the South Koreans into abandoning the American efforts caused some amount of embarrassment to the Temporary Commission and the American occupation authorities. Even the moderate liberals continued to hope for one more attempt at reconciliation with the North Korean regime. Campaign promises of a unified Korea, staffed by Koreans, along with the promised evacuation of all foreign troops, exerted a magnetic appeal on indecisive Koreans. Clearer heads recalled that it was such Soviet tactics in Eastern Europe which had converted that vast region into a Soviet sphere. It was this North Korean government which the Soviet Union constantly referred to in their discussions at the Assembly's third session as "representative Koreans."

V

At the 142nd meeting of the General Assembly in Paris on Friday, September 21, 1948, the Soviet delegate, Jacob Malik, scornfully took up the issue of Korean independence. Referring to the reports from the Temporary Commission on Korea and the Interim Committee, Malik expressed the belief that

50 Ibid., 55.
neither report should be examined, as both organizations were "illegal bodies which had been set up in violation of the principles of the Charter." 51

He further accused the Temporary Commission of carrying on its work under conditions of terror. Malik pointed out that the Soviet Union had recently decided to evacuate all its troops from Korea by January 1, 1949. In conclusion, he stated that there was no need to link the problem of Korea with peace and security, as propaganda "alleging the contrary was only aimed at concealing the true designs of some States in Korea." A USSR proposal to delete the problem of Korean independence from the agenda was rejected 47-6, and the problem was referred to the Assembly's First Committee. 52

Not until the First Committee's 200th meeting on November 15, 1948, was the Korean question broached. At that meeting, the Czech delegate warily raised the question concerning the participation "of the representatives of the People's Republic of Korea" in the debate on the problem of Korean independence. Proceeding cautiously, he explained that the distance from Korea to Paris was more than 15,000 kilometers, and the Korean delegation would require at least a "fortnight's journey if it were to be present when the Korean question came up for discussion." 53 He thought that an agreement could be

52Ibid., 105.
reached on his proposal without delay since all members agreed on the necessity of having as complete a discussion on the Korean problem "as possible."

Malik quickly seconded the Czech request, noting that it would be difficult for the General Assembly to fully examine the Korean question without the presence of the Korean representatives. Continuing, he outlined the government which had been elected by the people in North and South Korea, and since it had been decided in earlier debate that only elected representatives could be invited to take part in debate, it was "clear that the only persons who could be invited were the representatives of the Korean Democratic People's Republic."54

Dulles returned the Committee's discussion to the Temporary Commission when he stated that the Commission was a "sort of a credentials commission" with the task of assuring that the representatives who were invited to participate were truly representative of the Korean people.55 He thought that it would be "disrespectful" to the Commission to issue an invitation to one of the governments before going over the Commission's report.

Malik replied that the point of view expressed by the United States was illogical. "How could the First Committee discuss the report of the Temporary Commission on Korea before inviting the representatives of the Korean people to take part?"56 The Czech proposal to invite Korean representatives

54 Ibid., 632.
55 Ibid., 633.
56 Ibid., 934.
of the Democratic People's Republic was put to a vote and rejected 38 - 6.

Again at the Committee's 229th session, while discussing the Temporary Commission's report, the Czech delegate submitted for consideration a draft resolution which invited the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic to participate in the debate on the Korean problem.

Dulles arose and carefully read from the verbatim record of the 200th meeting, and stated that he had thought the Committee had voted down the Czech proposal, therefore, it could not be brought up for consideration until after a two-thirds vote of approval from the Committee. The Committee's chairman, the Belgium delegate, hastily interposed with the statement that the Committee had voted not to consider the Czech proposal at that time, leaving the way open for future discussion and vote.57

The Polish delegate passionately stated that if the Committee really wanted to aid Korean independence, then they should show it by voting on the Czech proposal, then they would know. Dulles rejoined that those nations which were largely responsible for having refused the Commission access were saying the Committee should hear representatives from North Korea without knowing if they were legally elected. He strongly felt that it would "be beneath the Committee's dignity to give such a privilege to those who have defied the Assembly's Commission in this matter."58

57 Ibid., 936-937.
58 Ibid., 939.
Malik replied with the accusation that there were ample eyewitnesses with evidence that the South Korean government had not been freely elected by the inhabitants of the southern zone, where "people were thrown into prison for long periods merely on the order of the military governor." On the other hand, there could be no doubt that the Democratic People's government represented the Korean people. This was demonstrated by the fact that nearly 99% of the North Korean population had participated in its elections, and the USSR was already withdrawing its occupying forces from the northern zone.\textsuperscript{59} He accused the Commission of giving way to United States pressure in the southern zone.

The following day, the Soviet delegate again attached the problem of Korean independence as expressed by the United States. Also included in the Soviet attack was the Chinese proposal which would invite representatives of the South Korean National Assembly to take part in the Committee's deliberations. At the end of the meeting, the Czech draft resolution was put to a vote and rejected 34 - 6, with 3 abstentions, while the Chinese draft proposal was adopted 39 - 6, with 1 abstention.\textsuperscript{60}

The 231st meeting opened with a long speech by the Rapporteur of the Temporary Commission. The Chinese delegate stated that the Temporary Commission had observed the progress of the elections in South Korea, and had reached the conclusion

\textsuperscript{59}ibid., p. 940.

\textsuperscript{60}ibid., p. 955.
"that those elections had represented a valid expression of the free will of the people of South Korea, who formed two-thirds of the population of the whole of Korea." Thus, a representative government had been formed in Korea under the supervision of the United Nations.

Dulles thoughtfully reviewed the promise made by the Great Powers during the past war, when they had promised independence to 30 million Koreans. He charged that North Korea was dominated by a communist regime "which was attempting to govern the whole of Korea and threatened to carry out its efforts by force." He repeated that the occupation troops would be withdrawn as soon as possible, and then added that the "withdrawal would be such that the Korean people would really be masters in their own house and would not be terrorized by groups receiving their orders from a foreign country." In the strongest language, the American delegate charged that as in Greece, the Communists were attempting to impose their will by force and the support of neighboring communist elements.

At the Committee's 232nd meeting, the South Korean representative spoke to the Committee. He traced the development of what he called "a Communist dictatorship under USSR sponsorship" which had its headquarters in Pyongyang, and was supported by Russian-trained military forces. He believed

61 Ibid., 956-957.
62 Ibid., 961.
that the greatest aid to Korean unification would be the Assembly's approval of the government of the Republic of Korea, and its subsequent recognition by all Member States.63

The remaining two meetings were subjected to long and declaratory denunciations by pro-Soviet delegations. The Ukrainian SSR did not want its name to be "used as a cover an camouflage for the United States colonial policy in Korea." Poland felt that in Korea, as in Greece, "American imperialism was on the lookout for new bases, preferably near the territories of the USSR." Malik accused the American military government in Korea as being "police machinery which was an enlargement of the old Japanese Security system."64

At the Committee's 238th meeting, Dulles wearily reviewed the past events in Korea, and added the belief that if the USSR would cooperate in carrying out those provisions for an observed withdrawal of occupying forces, as he was prepared to pledge that the United States would cooperate, one of the remaining problems would be solved. It would then be practical to leave the Republic of Korea in charge of the situation.65

In conclusion, the Committee prepared to vote upon the USSR and the USA draft resolutions. Briefly, the USSR resolution called upon the Assembly to: (1) recommend termination of the Temporary Commission on the grounds that the Commission had not helped to liquidate the baneful effects of the Japanese

63Ibid., 967.
64Ibid., 983-993.
65Ibid., 1023.
rule in Korea, (2) achieve the aims of re-establishing Korea as an independent democratic state and create conditions for the development of the country along democratic principles, and (3) state that the activity of the Commission not only did not contribute to the holding of free elections, but on the contrary resulted in the elections in South Korea taking place in conditions of police restraint and suppression. The Soviet draft resolution was rejected 42 - 6 with 3 abstentions.

The joint resolution submitted by China, Australia and the United States recommended that the Assembly should be guided by three considerations: (1) the independence of the whole of Korea must achieved with the least possible delay, (2) independence must be granted to Korea as an integral unit, and the Assembly would not approve any plan which might weaken the prospects of achieving the aims, and (3) the Assembly would lend the fullest support to ensure that every effort was made for conciliation between the two zones. The joint draft resolution was adopted by 41 - 6 with 2 abstentions.66

The First Committee's report with a text of the adopted resolution was considered at the General Assembly's 186th plenary meeting on December 11, 1948. The Ukrainian delegate immediately drew comparisons between the southern zone, where the American army existed by "discrediting" the Korean people, and the northern zone, where the people enjoyed a real freedom, achieving many successes in the field of "democratization."67


In a terse speech, the Chinese delegate dryly observed that the facts had been gathered impartially, and no speech "however eloquent" could alter them.\textsuperscript{68} Two policies exist in Korea, stated the Byelorussian delegate, that of the USSR which aimed at liquidation of the old reactionary elements, and that of the United States which aimed at crushing democracy and turning South Korea into an American colony.\textsuperscript{69} The following day Halik went into another long accusation of the United States policies in South Korea.

After approving a Canadian amendment which had the effect of retaining on the new Commission all members of the Temporary Commission with the exception of Canada and the Ukrainian SSR, the resolution submitted by the First Committee was adopted by a roll-call vote of \textsuperscript{\textit{48 - 6,}} with 1 abstention.\textsuperscript{70} A Soviet draft resolution which provided for the termination of the Commission was voted upon and rejected, \textsuperscript{\textit{46 - 6.}}

Thus, on December 12, 1948, the General Assembly reaffirmed its policy of the previous year regarding the problem of Korean independence, and took a renewed interest in the welfare of the embryo Republic of Korea by establishing a "United Nations Commission on Korea."

VI

The Commission held its first meeting in Seoul in February 2, 1949, and made immediate efforts to contact the Demo-

\textsuperscript{68}Ibid., 1014.
\textsuperscript{69}Ibid., 1018.
\textsuperscript{70}Ibid., 1043.
ocratic People's Republic. The Soviet Union was requested through the Secretary-General to lend its good offices toward establishing contact between the Commission and the North. The Soviet Government did not reply to the request. Transmission of a message directly to Kim Il Sung through shipping channels, via Hongkong, was without result. The Commission's requests were to no avail and they were unable to contact the North Korean government; constant proposals were received from the North concerning means of achieving Korean unity. They were rejected as being inconsistent with the General Assembly's resolutions of November 14, 1947, and December 12, 1948.71

Although the Republic of Korea felt that they were a creation of the United Nations, and therefore looked to that body to solve many of its problems, still it refused to acknowledge the Assembly's recommendations that the Commission be available for observation and consultation in the further development of representative government based on the freely expressed will of the people.72

Therefore, the Republic of Korea did not call upon the Commission for aid in meeting the developing problems of representative government. Syngman Rhee made it crystal clear to the Commission that he viewed any suggestions for North-South discussions, even unofficial, as being disloyal.72

72 Ibid., 290.
In the face of this attitude, the Commission did not suggest any extra-governmental attempt at contact with the North.

The Commission's conclusions were that:

(1) The embittered propaganda and hostile relations which mark the relations between the two parts of Korea render the prospect of unification more and more remote.

(2) As long as the opposition of the USSR to the efforts of the United Nations Commission to achieve the objectives of the General Assembly resolution of 12 December continues, neither a relaxation of hostile propaganda nor any other measure can facilitate to a substantial degree the achievement of unification.73

The Commission acknowledged that the world-wide antagonism between the USSR and the United States continued to be one of the basic factors underlying the present difficulties confronting Korean unification. However, the Commission also felt that the "broadening" of the Republic of Korea's political base would allow it to meet the problems of insurgent uprisings within the country, and would enable it to play a more effective part in realizing unification. "The situation in Korea is now no better than it was in the beginning and the Commission had not been able to facilitate the achievement of the General Assembly's objectives."

Such was the pessimistic attitude presented to the General Assembly at its fourth session opening at Lake Success, New York, during the autumn, 1949.75

73 Ibid., 291.
74 Ibid., 291.
progress in achieving Korean unification and independence had been thoroughly blocked by the Soviet Union for two grim years, just as the Soviet delegation had stymied American efforts on the Soviet-American Joint Commission. The future for Korean independence and unification was still dark.

VII

United Nations consideration of Korea was not restricted to the General Assembly. On January 19, 1949, the Security Council received a communication from the acting Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea making application for membership in the United Nations, and declaring an acceptance of all obligations of the Charter. The application also stressed that the Republic of Korea was the direct result of the mandate of the General Assembly.

The application laid dormant until February 15, when the Soviet representative opposed its inclusion in the agenda. He contended that the so-called Republic of Korea was an illegal government, nothing but a puppet regime which had been established by the occupation forces in South Korea. The Soviet delegate objected to referring the application to the Committee on the Admission of New Members.

He charged that the government had been elected by American military forces to the accompaniment of "harsh police terrorism on the lines of the Nazi plebiscite in the Saar."

In spite of the Soviet delegate's objections, the Security Council's president, proposed to refer the item to the Committee on the Admission of New Members. The proposal was adopted, 9 - 2.

At the Committee's meeting on February 24, 1949, the Soviet representative repeated the same arguments which he had used in the Security Council. In addition, he charged that the Temporary Commission was also "illegal because consideration of the Korean question by the United Nations was illegal." In opposition to the Soviet views, the point was taken by nine members of the Council that the Republic of Korea was fully qualified for membership under Article 4 of the Charter, and stressed that the General Assembly had already expressed its views on the elections and the legality of the government. By a vote of 8 - 2, the Committee approved the application and returned it to the Security Council for further consideration.

Once again before the Security Council, the application was denounced vehemently by the Soviet delegate. The Russian also angrily questioned the American forces remaining in Korea and expressed his doubt and dissatisfaction with the American explanation that the American forces in Korea were there at the request of the Republic of Korea.

The Chinese formal draft resolution which had recommended the admission of the Republic of Korea to membership was voted upon by the Council. The resolution received 9 votes for and
2 against, and since one of the negative votes was that of a permanent member, the resolution was not adopted.\textsuperscript{77}

Concurrent to the Republic of Korea's application for membership, the Security Council also received a request for membership by cable from the minister of foreign affairs for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.\textsuperscript{78} Two days later, February 11, 1949, the Soviet representative requested that the application be placed on the Council's provisional agenda.

The United States delegate attacked the application, stating that the only recognized government in Korea was the Republic of Korea. The Soviet delegate contradicted the American delegate's charge, insisting that the Democratic People's Republic had been established as a result of all-Korean elections.

At the Council's 410th meeting, the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution requesting that the application be referred to the Committee For New Members. The Ukrainian delegate supported the resolution, while the delegates of China, Cuba, Canada, Norway, and Egypt united in opposition. After the Soviet resolution had been rejected, 8 - 2 with 1 abstention, the Soviet delegate stated that the Anglo-American "Bloc" in the Security Council had committed a new act of injustice against one of the oldest peoples in Asia, who had every legitimate right and reason to be accepted into the United Nations.\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{77}Ibid., 382.
\textsuperscript{78}Ibid., 383.
\textsuperscript{79}Ibid., 383.
Further discussion of Korean independence occurred in the General Assembly's fourth session which convened September 20, 1949, at Flushing Meadows, New York. Two days later, the Assembly voted over Soviet protestations to include Korea in the agenda, and referred the subject to the Ad Hoc Political Committee for consideration and report. 80

Further accusations and counter-charges concerning the representative government in Korea continued in the Committee's five meetings between September 28, and October 3, 1949. At its third meeting, the Committee adopted, 42 - 6, a draft resolution submitted by the Philippines representative, inviting the delegation from the Republic of Korea to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. 81 Also, the Committee rejected, 35 - 7, a Soviet draft resolution inviting representatives from the Northern Republic to participate in the Committee's discussions.

The general debate was centered around two draft resolutions. Submitted jointly by the United States, China, and the Philippines, the one took note of the conclusions of the previous Commission's report on Korea, and resolved that the Commission should continue to function. The Soviet resolution was directly opposite, calling upon the Assembly to recognize


81 United Nations, General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Summary Record of Meetings, Fourth Session, 3.
that the solution of Korean unity and independence was the
task of the Korean people, and considering that the Com-
mission’s activities as being an obstacle to Korean unifi-
cation and therefore should be terminated.

In the debate which followed, the South Korean delegate
requested that the United Nations should continue its efforts
toward Korean unification, and in view of increasing guerrilla
attacks from the north, the Commission should be augmented by
military observers. Moreover, he hoped that the United
Nations would formally declare that its Member States were
responsible for his country’s security, and urge the countries
who were friendly to the Republic of Korea to give it the
necessary military assistance to cope with the security
problems confronting it.\(^{82}\)

The delegates supporting the joint draft resolution con-
sidered that the Commission had fulfilled an important task
as a stabilizing factor in those areas of Korea where it had
been permitted to exercise its functions. Other delegations
supported the joint resolution, but there was an organized
movement among the opposing the recognition of the Republic
of Korea as the country’s national government.

The Soviet delegate continued his assertion that the
Commission was illegal, and that the American refusal to
evacuate its troops from its zone was the main deterrent to

\(^{82}\)Ibid., 9-10.
the establishment of a united and democratic Korea. Once again, the Commission was accused of aiding the United States in its colonial practices toward the South Koreans.83

On October 3, the Committee voted 44 - 6 to adopt the joint resolution, while the Soviet resolution was rejected, 44 - 6.84

The Ad Hoc Political Committee's report containing the draft resolution adopted by it was considered at the Assembly's 233rd plenary meeting on October 23, 1949. Along with the Ad Hoc Political Committee's report, the Assembly also had the original Soviet draft resolution, which had been rejected by the Committee, and had been re-submitted for consideration.

The debate in the General Assembly followed the same general lines as the discussions in the Ad Hoc Political Committee, and when the joint draft resolution recommended by the Committee was voted upon, it was adopted 48 - 6.85 Just as quickly and decisively, the General Assembly rejected the revised Soviet draft resolution, 42 - 6, with 5 abstentions.

Thus, the General Assembly culminated its two year policy regarding the fortunes of Korean unity, and avowed a continual interest by the appointment of a Commission to "maintain its seat in Korea." Eight months later, the North Korea invasion of South Korea was a pressing item on the Security Council's agenda. Little was contributed by the General Assembly toward

83Ibid., 20-21.
84Ibid., 25.
the problem of Korean unity, other than perhaps focusing world attention on Soviet-American ills in that peninsula. The basic and intense Soviet-American rivalry continued to impede and finally destroy even the most optimistic hopes for a settlement.

The United Nations Commission in its report for 1949 aptly summed up the situation when it concluded that "without a new effort by those powers to reach agreement on the question of Korea, no substantial progress toward the achievement of unification on the basis of the principles approved by the General Assembly can be made." 36

CHAPTER VI
MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Outside the United Nations, there were particular incidents apparent to interested but helpless observers, which emphasized the progressive continuation of Soviet-American rivalry in Korea. Theoretically, the problem of Korean independence was before the General Assembly, but that world agency was unable to contribute to a lessening of Soviet-American attitudes toward the Korean matter. The Soviet Union simply refused to recognize the General Assembly's participation in Korea, and continued with a solution of its pressing problem of achieving complete American withdrawal from the southern zone.

While the Soviet Union fostered an increasingly militantly and economically strong Democratic People's Republic, the United States, aware now that possible cooperation with the Soviets in uniting Korea was futile, vainly attempted to correct and supplement their errors of the past three years by an ineffectual aid program which was not endorsed by the American congress. While the Soviet Union extended credits and aid, both economic and military, to its northern protege, an American congress fought a losing battle with the country's
administration and consistently slashed economic aid bills destined for the struggling Republic of Korea. While the Soviet Union withdrew its military forces from the Northern zone, secure in the knowledge that the Soviet-trained People's militia could ably cope with any internal dissatisfactions, and at the same time repulse any threats emanating from the southern zone; the United States withdrew from its zone, leaving a token group of American army sergeants and colonels as an advisory group to instruct Korean army personnel in the mechanics of war.

II

Just nine days before the United States introduced the subject of Korean independence into the General Assembly, and after the Soviets had received a warning of American intentions, the Soviet Union made the first of a series of attractive proposals concerning the simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Korean peninsula. It was apparent that the Soviet overture was an attempt to woo the United Nations, in addition to furnishing Soviet and pro-Soviet propaganda mills with excellent material aimed toward creating a rift between the American occupation authorities and the uneasy Koreans. The United States refused to accept this gambit and the subject of Korean independence was introduced into the General Assembly.

During the General Assembly's second session, 1947, the Soviet Union reiterated its previous proposal, this time in the form of a draft resolution suggesting the withdrawal of
all troops by the end of the year. A general assembly resolution rejected the Soviet proposal, and attempted to approach the subject somewhat more circumspectly, proposing that the American troops be withdrawn as soon as practicable.\footnote{United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Plenary Meetings, Second Session.}

Such a policy was not acceptable to the Soviet Union, and during the following year, 1948, an unending stream of invective poured from the pro-Soviet press and radio throughout the world, condemning the United States policy in regard to troop withdrawal. The American military government was accused of building a "puppet regime" in South Korea, from which the United States intended to strike against the Soviet Union.

Accordingly, the Soviet Union addressed a note to the United States government on September 18, 1948, two days before the formal opening of the General Assembly's third session, in which the Soviet foreign minister noted that the Supreme National Assembly of Korea had on September 10, 1948, addressed itself to the USSR and the United States with a request for the simultaneous and immediate withdrawal of Soviet and American troops from the Korean peninsula.\footnote{Korea's Independence, Far Eastern Series, 18, 114.} Moreover, the Presidium of the USSR considered this action possible and had instructed the Soviet Council of Ministers to initiate the movement of troops so that the evacuation would be concluded by the end of 1948. In a formal tone, the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet expressed the hope that the "government of the United States of America would also agree to evacuate American troops from southern Korea within this period." 3

The renewed Soviet proposal was received with some surprise in American quarters, but was interpreted to mean that the Soviets believed that the Democratic People's Republic now had sufficient strength to stand alone. President Rhee declared that he believed the United States could not be "lured into the Soviet game," and would not agree to any Soviet proposal concerning Korea.

On September 20, 1948, the State Department released a formal statement of the United States position on the withdrawal of occupation forces in Korea. 4 The statement coldly and formally announced to the Soviet world that it had been the "consistent" view of the United States government that the best interests of the Korean people would be "served by the withdrawal of all occupying forces from Korea at the earliest practicable date." Furthermore, this view was embodied in the General Assembly's resolution of November 14, 1947, in which provision was made for such withdrawal "as soon as practicable after the establishment of the Korean government, which it was the intention of that resolution to bring into being." The Soviet Union was also lectured for

3 Ibid., 115.
4 Ibid., 116.
had it... cooperated in carrying out the provisions of the
resolution of November 14, 1947, the question of troop with-
drawal would doubtless have been already solved."

Eight days after the statement's release, the State De-
partment formally answered the Soviet note of September 18.\textsuperscript{5}
The State Department note stated that the United States govern-
ment felt that the question of troop withdrawal was a part of
the larger question of "Korean unity and independence" and
added somewhat testily, "that its views will be presented at
the appropriate time by the United States delegate to the
General Assembly."

Soviet tactics during the General Assembly's third
session were directed to repeated debate and proposals con-
cerning simultaneous troop withdrawal from Korea. Such a
policy was dictated for no other purpose than to complicate
existing Korean discussions, and to embarrass American mili-
tary forces which remained in Korea at the insistence of the
Republic's leaders. Pro-Soviet press and radio, together with
"whispering campaigns," derisively charged "American imperial-
ism" while the Soviet forces conspicuously withdrew from the
northern zone. On December 12, 1948, the General Assembly's
resolution which established the United Nations Commission on
Korea, also re-affirmed the United States view that occupa-
tion troops would be withdrawn as soon as practicable.

\textsuperscript{5}Ibid., 115-116.
From the beginning of the occupation, American authorities had regarded the key to South Korea's internal security as being the state of readiness maintained by Korean defense forces, rather than the prospect of the continued presence of American occupation troops. Accordingly, the American occupation officers had directed their efforts toward training and equipping a respectable security force.

Beginning with a well-trained and thoroughly loyal constabulary of 26,000 under American military government, the Korean forces were allowed to gradually expand until they numbered approximately 100,000 men. Full scale expansion was not permitted until after the formation of the Republic of Korea, August 12, 1948. Consequently, the Soviet proposal was timed to catch the young republic hurrriedly enlisting young men in an attempt to build up their forces. The Korean constabulary, which cooperated with the national police force in maintaining law and order, were well-trained and fanatically loyal to the South Korean Republic. Organized under the administration of the South Korean Interim government, all applicants were carefully screened for political beliefs before they were sworn into the country's service.

In contrast, formation of the South Korean army was under the supervision of American army officers who urged that applicants be given a physical examination, and not questioned concerning his political beliefs. By the use of such "Democratic" methods, many communists and their sympathizers infiltrated into the South Korean army, where they contributed
to unrest and ultimately, revolt. Ill timed efforts by these communists to effect a coup d'etat within the army, together with the increasing number of communist guerrilla bands which controlled large sectors in isolated South Korean districts, prompted the National Assembly on November 20, 1948, to pass a resolution urging the continued presence of American troops until the republic's security forces were fully capable of maintaining internal security.

Korean fears were not appreciated by the Department of Army, which announced five weeks afterwards on December 28, its intention for an early and complete withdrawal of American military forces from Korea. The statement pointed out that this was in conformity with the General Assembly's resolutions, and further cited that a revolt of "dissident elements" in the South Korean army had been efficiently and quickly put down by the constabulary, "an indication of the capacity of the native security forces to defend the area alone." 6

The Soviet Union made an appeal to all Korea on December 30, 1948, when it announced that it had completely withdrawn its troops from North Korea. The communist regime in Northern Korea had strengthened strategically by the overwhelming successes of the Chinese Communists. Two weeks after the Soviet withdrawal, the Kuomintang announced the loss of Tienstin, and reported that Chiang Kai-shek was

6George H. McCune, Korea Today, 266.
willing to enter into peace discussions with the Chinese Communists, but on his own terms. The Soviet sponsored regime in Northern Korea was further bound to Moscow by the appointment of Colonel-General Terentyi Shlikov as "ambassador" to the Democratic People's Republic. Having served as the Soviet representative to the Joint Commission for nearly 20 months, the new ambassador was well acquainted with his duties in North Korea, together with his government's policy toward the Republic of Korea. Continual Communist propaganda incited President Syngman Rhee to bitterly attack the North Korean regime and its leaders. He denounced as "lies" the stories published in Moscow that his government had given the United States industrial leaders control of 30% of South Korea's economy. Rhee predicted that the heads of the North Korean government would soon be placed "before the firing squad" for their crimes against the Korean people.

Such was the situation in Korea in June 8, 1949, when a Department of State Bulletin announced that the "United States forces will soon have accomplished their withdrawal from South Korea." Three weeks later, the last 8,000 of an estimated 50,000 American troops which had landed in South Korea on September 10, 1945, quietly withdrew from the peninsula, leaving only a Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), consisting of approximately 500 American army personnel.

8Ibid., 11.
9Ibid., 12.
to act as an advisory-liaison link to the Republic of Korea, and to instruct Koreans in the use of American military equipment which was being transferred to their government. Although the respective occupying armies had withdrawn from their zones, leaving a highly inflammable situation, Soviet-American rivalry continued through economic and military aid to their proteges.

III

Both the Soviet Union and the United States provided aid programs to implement and further their policies in the Korean peninsula. The record of their assistance to the Democratic People's Republic and the Republic of Korea is indeed indicative of the regard which the world leaders held for their creations. Certainly the rivalry grew more indirect and subtle under the guise of aiding the North and South Koreans.

In preparation for close cooperation and understanding between the North Korean government and the Soviet Union, Kim Il Sung petitioned the Soviet Union early in 1949 for an audience with Stalin. Anticipating a Soviet invitation to confer with its leaders, Kim Il Sung presented his cabinet with the three issues which he had decided to discuss with the Soviet Union: (1) the import of machinery and spare parts from the Soviet Union, (2) an agreement for economic, cultural, and technological assistance, and (3) the establishment of

10 Background Information on Korea, Memorandum on S 3809, 15.
credits in order to control the price of imported goods. 11

During the last week in February, 1949, he and six cabinet members flew to Moscow where they were received at the Moscow airport by Foreign Minister Molotov, and treated with considerable respect and honor during their stay in the Soviet capital. The Soviet-Korean agreement, which was signed on March 20, 1949, bound the North Korean economy closely to the Soviet Union. The North Korean government was promised credits amounting to 212 million rubles, to be paid over a period of three years beginning July 1, 1949, and was to be repaid at 2 percent interest during the three years following July 1, 1952. 12 The interest was exactly twice that demanded a year later from the Red China's People's government. Together with the credits, Stalin promised an enormous trade increase between the two countries.

On the day following the signing, a Pravda editorial eulogized the agreement "as well as the other agreements signed during the sojourn of the Korean delegation as corresponding to the vital interests of the peoples of the two countries," and the agreements "opened wide vistas for future economic and cultural cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Korean Democratic People's Republic." 13 Another important feature was that the agreement provided for

11Payne, 78.

12Ibid., 78.

"reciprocal shipments of goods in conformity with requirements
for developing the national economics of both countries." 14

In addition to the Agreement on Economic and Cultural
Cooperation, the following pacts were also signed. An agree-
ment in regard to commodity exchange and payments between the
Soviet Union and the Korean Republic, as well as an agreement
extending technical aid to Korea. Pravda lyrically concluded
that:

In beginning a new page in the history of the
Soviet-Korean relations, the agreements signed
in Moscow express the sincere friendship be-
tween the Soviet and Korean peoples, which
grew and developed day by day following the
liberation of Korea by the glorious warriors
of the Soviet Union. 15

From the unnumerable speeches delivered by the North
Korean premier during the next months, it was apparent that
the northern government was growing more and more dependent
economically upon the Soviet Union. Coupled with this
economic dependence was an increasing veneration of Stalin,
which amounted to unadulterated adoration. One famous letter
written to Stalin described him as "the greatest genius of
mankind and the savior of the Korean people," and was signed
with 16,767,680 Korean signatures. 16 A remarkable letter in
view of an estimated 9,000,000 Koreans who were residing in
North Korea.

As early as 1945, the Soviet-created People's militia
was an important element in the Northern zone's security.

14 Ibid., 266.
15 Ibid., 266.
16 Payne, 80.
Conscription was introduced, military schools established, and the training of Korean cadets and officers assumed considerable proportions. The North Korean army was patterned after the Soviet army, complete to political officers who instructed the officers and enlisted men in Marxian dialectics.

By 1948, the Soviet-trained North Korean army had attained an estimated strength of 200,000 men, and was commanded by an experienced Korean general, who had been a trusted and an experienced and valuable member of the Chinese Communist party.\(^7\) An armoured force was trained and supplied with the latest "Stalin" model tanks, and approximately 200 propeller type Soviet planes were based at military airfields constructed by the Soviet army about Pyongyang.\(^8\)

The exact amount of Soviet aid given to the North Koreans during this period is unknown. Possibly the combat experienced Soviet non-commissioned and commissioned officers who trained and developed the North Korean army donated the most intangible and immeasurable aid to the North Korea Republic. These trusted Red Army officers developed a fanatically loyal North Korean army, well trained and militarily strong, which strengthened Soviet policy in the Far East. The North Korean's military potential far overshadowed the south Korean army which had been ineffectually trained by 500 American army personnel since the American withdrawal in June, 1949.

\(^7\)Ibid., 31.  
\(^8\)Ballin, 293.
The North Korean Democratic People's Republic was further strengthened by cooperation with the Chinese Communists. On May 6, 1949, the Chinese government's official Central News Agency declared that the Chinese Communists had signed a mutual defense pact with the "Russian sponsored North Korean regime," and had further pledged aid to Burmese Communists in the "joint struggle against American and British imperialism."¹⁹

The news report stated that the North Korean pact called for "common defense against aggression of whatever nature, joint action against an attack on either, supply to North Korea of arms, material, and manpower from Manchuria from July 1, 1949, to August 3, 1950."²⁰

If this newspaper report were true, it meant that communist forces were linked in an unbroken arc stretching across Eastern Asia, and confronted only by American occupation troops in Japan, the embryo Republic of Korea, and Chiang Kai-shek's tottering regime. It was apparent that the Soviet-created Democratic People's Republic was an integral part of the Soviet Union's Far Eastern policy, which had steadily and consistently developed during 1945-50.

IV

North Korea was probably somewhat less dependent upon internal economic considerations than was South Korea. By virtue of its greater heavy industrial development and its

²⁰ Ibid., 7.
superior position in regard to natural resources, the northern republic could probably become a substantial exporter of industrial raw materials with less effort than could the southern republic. The South Korean consumer household industry was vitally affected by its relation to northern Korea, and it was apparent early in the occupation that the success of the American-sponsored republic would be determined by American economic aid.

From the beginning of the occupation through July, 1948, the United States spent or obligated over 250 millions for Korean assistance. Most of this sum went for such essential items as food, fertilizer, and agricultural supplies. Until December, 1948, all economic aid was under the administration of the Department of the Army, and was appropriated under "government and relief in Occupied Areas." In addition to this appropriation, the United States negotiated an "Initial Financial and Property Settlement Agreement," under which it agreed to pay for most of the produces ordered from Japan for the Korean people. United States relief also included as a gift to the Republic of Korea various miscellaneous assets, including 101 locomotives valued at 32 millions, and approximately 24 millions were credited to the Korean government in full payment for debts incurred by the American occupation forces during the occupation.

22Ibid., 39.
As early as 1947, administration and congressional leaders were seriously considering an economic rehabilitation plan for South Korea, which would be more comprehensive than the aid given through the American occupation forces. This decision was shelved pending the outcome of the Joint Commission, which convened in Seoul from May until September, 1947, and was postponed still further while the Korean question was being acted upon by the United Nations.

In April, 1947, the necessity for a definite Korean rehabilitation program was recognized in the United States Senate by Senator Arthur Vandenberg, the distinguished Republican from Michigan, when he stated in congressional debate concerning aid to Greece and Turkey:

... that we are constantly hearing the statement made that if "we go into the Greco-Turkey program, the next thing we know we will have to go into Korea." I think that it ought to be made perfectly plain that there is an unescapable obligation in Korea which is totally unrelated to the question we are here discussing, and which we shall confront regardless of what we do in Greece and Turkey, because we are occupying the southern half of Korea and are responsible to the allies, not only for the occupation of Korea, but for the development of an internal situation in Korea which will permit us to retire and get out.24

Vandenberg stressed that the United States had precisely the same responsibility in southern Korea that it had in the

23George M. McCune, Korea Today, 251.
24Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 1st Session, Volume 93, part 3, 3/52.
American zone of occupation in Germany, and "I should like to make it very plain that, yes, there will have to be a Korean program, as there had to be a program in the American zone of Germany." Such awareness was not shared by Vandenberg's colleagues, for the following month, Senator Styles Bridges angrily demanded that, "Congress be told how much is planned for foreign spending instead of being asked for money in dribs and drabs."

Although the South Korean economy was recovering somewhat from the effects of the disastrous division, still the 1948 production was far below the pre-liberation level. Many industries required new equipment, in addition to the country's needs in petroleum, fertilizer, coal, cotton, raw rubber, and certain foodstuffs. Without American aid, there was a serious discrepancy between South Korea's exports and its most fundamental requirements for imports. Not only was the southern zone poorly supplied with natural resources, but the existing resources were not well-developed for exploitation. The South Korean economy was tightly interwoven with the northern zone, and the entire peninsula was bound to the Japanese industrial economy. A lack of basic industry and resources in the southern zone created a disproportionate economy, and the best intentions of the South Koreans could not correct this situation. There was little doubt that if the Republic of

Korea were to survive politically and economically, it would need a strong and comprehensive aid program from the United States.

On December 10, 1948, administration of Korean aid was removed from the Department of Army and transferred to the Economic Cooperation Program. Under this agreement, the United States agreed to assume the responsibilities for assisting the South Korean government in financing a long-range economics rehabilitation program.

The Truman administration repeatedly urged the importance of aid to Korea, and in June, 1949, a 150 million dollar program was taken into consideration before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives. As a part of the testimony accompanying this bill, Secretary of State Dean Acheson warned that the South Korean government would fall "within three months" if economic assistance were not provided. The Undersecretary of State also advised the Committee members that "without a continuation for the present of outside assistance ... the Korean economy would suffer a rapid and inevitable collapse."

In spite of these warnings, the Korean situation received scant attention from the 81st congress during the first session. There was a prevailing "wait and see" attitude in the light of other far eastern developments, notably China. The American

27 Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 81st Congress, 1st Session, on H. R. 5330, 1-200.

28 Ibid., 192.
congress ignored the warning of the administrator of Korean economic aid who declared that "the Republic of Korea could not stand up without aid from the United States. In reply to the question of what the Korean situation would be in a year if the United States did not extend aid, he declared that:

I do not know whether the civil war would be over by that time or not, but there would most certainly be a civil war in Korea. The direction in which victory would go is pretty clear.29

The administrator of Korean aid stated further that the odds definitely favored the Communists taking over the peninsula.

Major General Charles C. Helmick, former Deputy Military Governor concurred with these observations and added that:

If the Russians decided to do so, they could take over South Korea without any great military difficulty. They are right there with large armies. Any troops that we have there would suffer another Betan.30

Additional military impressions were expressed by Generals Hamilton and Timberman and Admiral Woldridge, all personnel representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when they unanimously agreed that it would not be wise to keep troops in Korea, taking into consideration world conditions and potential world enemies of the United States.31

Such qualified expert advice did not sway the 31st congress and efforts to enact legislation providing for Korean aid were rejected. A paltry acknowledgment of Korean ills was

29Ibid., 147.
30Ibid., 43.
31Ibid., 177.
noted by the congress during the fall, 1949. On October 10, 1949, Public Law 343 was enacted which made 30 million dollars available for the period July 1 to October 15, 1949; and on October 28, another 30 million dollars were provided for use during October 15, 1949 to February 15, 1950. Congressional critics of the administration mastered sufficient strength to prevent the passage of a 60 million dollar appropriation for the period after February 15, 1950.32

Outside congress, the House vote was received with dismay, and press criticisms of the bill's defeat were strong. The immediate and widespread reaction to the defeat assured the administration, and its Republican advocates of cooperation with the administration in foreign affairs, that the bill would be re-considered. On February 9, 1950, the House finally approved a 60 million dollar appropriation which extended aid until June 30, 1950. The bill contained the unusual proviso that aid should be terminated "in the event of the formation of a coalition government which includes one or members of the Communist Party or of the party now in control of the government of North Korea.33

Critics of the administration's Korean aid program inferred that the United States was pouring money down a "rat hole" in South Korea, and assumed that the communist regime in the north would take over the southern government before too long. A warning to the Koreans was also expressed

32George H. McCune, Korea Today, 254-256.
33Ibid., 255.
by the American Ambassador-at-large, Philip Jessup, back from a trip through the Far East, when he stated that "the problems of the Far East certainly will not be settled if you (Korea) and the other Far East nations sit back and hope the United States will cope with the situation alone." 34

While the United States fumbled its way through an inadequate economic program, an equally inadequate attempt was made to furnish the Republic of Korea with military assistance. The resulting program accomplished nothing toward building a militarily strong and capable Republic.

Military assistance to the South Korean government was divided into two spheres, (1) that furnished under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, and (2) that furnished during the fiscal year, 1950, by the transfer of equipment upon the withdrawal of American occupation forces. 35 All the assistance was predicted upon definite policies, as the Korean military forces were to be an internal security force. Its equipment was to be such as would permit the development of a well-trained force which would preserve internal security, prevent border raids and incursions north of the 38th parallel, and would deter armed attack or other aggression by the North Koreans.

When the United States occupation forces were withdrawn from the peninsula in June, 1949, they left behind them military and naval equipment which was transferred to the

34 Ibid., 257.
35 Background Information on Korea, Memorandum on S 3809,
South Korean government under the Surplus Property Act through the Office of Foreign Liquidation. This equipment had originally cost the United States Army approximately 56 million dollars and had a 1949 replacement value of about 110 million dollars. The ground force equipment was primarily divisional, and was sufficient for the proper equipment of a security force of 50,000 men, in accordance with the previously stated policies.

The military equipment transferred to the Korean government forces included more than 100,000 small arms, (rifles, pistols, and machine guns) and approximately 50 million rounds of ammunition; more than 2,000 rocket launchers (2,36 bazookas), and over 40,000 rounds of bazooka ammunition; more than 4,900 vehicles of all types; and a large number of 37 and 97 millimeter anti-tank guns, 105 millimeter howitzers, 61 and 11 millimeter mortars, together with over 700,000 rounds of ammunition for these weapons.

In addition to the ground force equipment, 79 naval vessels, along with 150,000 dollars of spare parts were transferred at the same time. After the withdrawal of American forces, additional individual and organization equipment for 15,000 troops was transferred from United States stocks in Japan to the South Koreans during the middle of 1949. The estimated cost of this equipment was approximately 1.5 million dollars. The military aid program did not provide for a South Korean air force nor for an armoured force.

36 Ibid., 33.
The extent of the program was inadequate in relation to the vast amount of aid given to the northern regime by the Soviet Union during the five years, 1945-50; however, certainly the greatest deficiency under the program, and one that was virtually ignored by the United States, was leadership and training for the untrained South Koreans. A token group of 500 Americans was created in order to instruct the South Koreans, but this group proved totally inadequate in terms of the existing situation.

Historically, there had not been a Korean army since 1900, and during the Japanese occupation the Koreans were not permitted to possess firearms, much less be trained in their formal use. Even during World War II, Korean effort and participation in the Japanese war program was limited to Korean labor battalions.

The mock army created in South Korea by issuing equipment to the greenest of recruits could hardly be compared to the Soviet-organized North Korean army, which was reported to be in excellent fighting condition.
CHAPTER VII
A SERIES OF WARNINGS
I

The Soviet-created Northern regime and the American-sponsored Southern Republic, political and economic expressions of their creators, were only a magnification of Soviet-American rivalry throughout all Eastern Asia. This rivalry was initiated by American concessions made to Stalin at Yalta, and its history during the following five years is a disastrous and sorry record of ineffectualities and inconsistencies. There is no comparison between the American policy toward Europe and its counterpart across the world. While former prime minister Churchill ranted down the "iron curtain" at Fulton, Missouri, on April 6, 1946, and a concrete American policy stiffened in Europe, i.e., Greco-Turkish aid and the Berlin airlift; the same United States abandoned China, to the Communists. MacArthur succeeded in building a strong anti-communism redoubt in the Japanese Islands concurrent to the American abandonment in China.

II

As early as 1944, such a Soviet-American rivalry in Asia was accurately predicted to the United States Government by General Douglas MacArthur, who doubtlessly knew
more about the Pacific than any other American. In an angry letter, he wrote that the "lands touching the Pacific with their billions of inhabitants will determine the course of history for the next ten thousand years." Even before the Yalta Conference, he warned that Stalin also knew that Pacific picture and while fighting in Europe, was actually looking over his shoulder toward Asia. The Russians were determined to reverse the Russo-Japanese War and re-acquire Port Arthur as a warm-water outlet on the Pacific. MacArthur's frank and impassionate warning went unheeded by those determining American Far Eastern policy, as did succeeding observations by other reputable observers.

In May, 1945, before President Truman departed for his Potsdam Conference with Stalin, the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union voiced a warning concerning Soviet intentions in the Far East. Harriman stated he "was satisfied the Russians would enter the Pacific war because of their requirements in the Far East [Yalta]" and he also believed the Soviet Union greatly feared the United States would conclude a peace with the Japanese without Soviet participation. Furthermore:

... it was important that we determine our policy as to a strong or weak China, that if China continued weak, Russian influence would move in quickly and toward the ultimate domination ... there could be no illusion about anything such as a "free China" once the Russians got in, that the two or three hundred millions in that country would march when the Kremlin ordered.2

1Walter Mills, The Forrestal Diaries, (New York, 1951.)

2Ibid., 59.
The following day at a State Department meeting, Harriman re-emphasized his contention that the United States should have a clear outline of its Far Eastern policy. He further believed that the Yalta Agreement should be re-examined:

... in light of the fact that Russian had not observed its part of that contract, and also in the light of the cessation of hostilities in Europe, which have changed the matter of fact on which that agreement was drawn.

Harriman concluded with the penetrating question of what the American objectives were concerning the future of Japan, destruction or retention as a power? Needless to say, the ambassador's searching inquiries were not acted upon by the State Department.

Two months after Harriman's warning to the State Department, the administration and the State Department received still further warning by the release of the War Department's Military Intelligence Divisions dramatic and prophetic Peabody Report. The report acknowledged that the fundamental conclusions may be summarized as follows:

... (1) the "democracy" of the Chinese Communists is Soviet democracy, (2) the Chinese Communist movement is part of the international Communist movement, sponsored and guided by Russia, and (3) there is reason to believe that Soviet Russia plans to create Russian-dominated areas in Manchuria, Korea, and probably North China, (4) a strong and stable China cannot exist without the natural resources of Manchuria and North China, (5) In order to prevent the separation of Manchuria and North China from China, it is essential that,
if Soviet Russia participates in the war, China
not be divided (like Europe) into American-
British and Russian zones of military occupation.\(^1\)

Going farther into the report, it was recommended that the
post-war peace in the Far East depends on re-establishment of
Chinese independence and unity. China has always been the
center of the Far East, with political, economical, and
military relationships revolving around its huge mass.
Russia's growth in the Far East depended on its acquisitions
in China, and Japan grew to a world power by reason of its
conquests in Manchuria and Korea. The Peabody Report em-
phasized that "with the defeat of Japan, Soviet Russia will
emerge as the sole military land power in Asia" and that a
"prevention of a repetition of the 'Polish situation' in
Manchuria and Korea is essential to post-war stability in
the Far East."

The problem of post-war peace in the Far East
revolves, insofar as the United States is con-
cerned, around two major questions: (1) How can
the military-political vacuum in the Far East
be filled following the defeat of Japan? (2) How
can the United States promote internal unity in
China?

and:

Many of the fears and speculations current at
that time, (1943-1944), to the effect that the
Soviet Union intended to develop Eastern Europe
as an exclusive Soviet sphere of influence, have proved to be right. There is justification
for similar fears, in regard to Manchuria, North
China, and Korea,\(^2\)

\(^1\) Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the
Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal
Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States

\(^2\) Ibid., 2309-2310.
Fifteen copies of this report were sent to the White House, three copies were dispatched to the State Department, and three months later Lt. General John Reed Hodge landed in South Korea without even a basis of policy directive. It must have been very gratifying to the Kremlin.

Early in 1946, the State Department received a further warning concerning Soviet Far Eastern intentions. In his appeal to Washington, the American commander in Korea, General Hodge stated that the Russians had no thought of unifying Korea while the American forces remained, and that North and South would never be united until the Soviet Union was certain that all Korea would be communist. He seriously questioned the American ability to stem the propaganda and controlled military maneuvering of the Soviets. "We are opposed by a strongly organized, ruthless military machine, designed to appeal to the millions of uneducated Koreans." He warned that the United States must do likewise and not be "satisfied with dealing with the wealthy U.S. educated Koreans." Still the State Department did nothing, wavering indecisively in its policy toward Communist encroachment in China and Korea, while MacArthur continued to build a bulwark against communism in Japan. It was quite apparent that he did so independently of the American State Department.

III

Throughout the five post-war years, American failures are cemented to its withdrawals from China. Although Korea

6Mills, 135.
strategically controls the approaches to Northern China and Manchuria, so does China loom as a colossus to the Koreans. The Japanese effectively controlled the Far East during the twentieth century, however, as a result of the Japanese surrender in 1945, a power vacuum existed in the Far East. The Chinese Communists, aided by the Soviet Union and while the United States stood by apparently uninterested, increased their pressure to fill that void.

While the Communist menace continued to mushroom through China, successive American missions to China resulted in an American denial of aid and comfort to the Kuomintang. Granted that Chiang Kai-shek's regime was not particularly attractive to the governmentally-fastidious United States, nevertheless, under the circumstances it did offer the only available barrier to the Communists. Through inadequacy in the State Department, and a questionably amount of pro-communist sympathies, the United States government abandoned Chiang Kai-shek.

Although the importance of Chinese Communist success was not apparent to the State Department, many South Koreans who, for centuries, lived in the buffer zone of Chinese-Russian-Japanese pressure, the omen was quite distinct. During 1946, an American congressman questioned a group of South Koreans concerning their attitude toward American occupation. Their replies were illuminating for the congressman, and the following is typical of the Korean responses.
I asked various other questions, to all of which he replied in substance, "there is no way you can solve the problem so that we can be independent and secure until you help China remove the communist menace in Manchuria."

Upon his return to Washington, D. C., the congressman's provocative inquiries to the State and the American congress concerning an American policy in China were ignored.

IV

By the summer of 1949, the State Department still had not consolidated its policy toward the Republic of Korea. Secretary of State Acheson appeared before a House committee and made a series of rather nebulous statements concerning American aid and attitude to the Republic of Korea. In the light of previous and subsequent events, the Secretary's statements appear to be somewhat contradictory and ridiculous.

I believe we cannot possibly guarantee the southern Koreans their independence by American military power. However, we can and should give the Koreans this economic aid so that they can support themselves in their country and give them such military assistance as we are now giving and will have completed in the very near future so they can at least hold their own against the northern Koreans. 7

Was this a prediction of a forthcoming Korean civil war? The Secretary admitted that "this Korean business is one of the situations in the whole tangled problem of the Far East

7Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, Volume 94, Part 12, A 4555.

8Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 81st Congress, 1st Session, on H.R. 5330, 192.
where some kind of action is possible" Concluding, he stated that:

We cannot protect them but we can say, "We will give you a good fighting chance, if you are brave men, to survive economically and protect yourselves."

Thus, nearly four years after the Japanese surrender and as a culmination to an ineffectual American Far Eastern policy, the American Secretary of State, in a sporting gesture, promised the infant Republic of Korea, the last Western outpost on the eastern shore of the Asian continent, a "good fighting chance."

9Ibid., 192.
INDEX OF PERSONS
Acheson, Dean Goddarham, (1893- ). Acheson studied and practiced law until appointed secretary of the treasury in 1933. He served in that capacity until being appointed assistant secretary of state in 1941, followed by an appointment to under secretary of state in 1945. He has been secretary of state since 1949.

Arnold, Archibald Vincent, (1889- ). Arnold graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1912. Following World War I, he has had various commands, attended the Army Command College and the Army War College during the twenties. His World War II combat command consisted of commanding General, 7th Infantry Division during the operations on Leyte and Okinawa.

Austin, Warren Robinson, (1877- ). Austin studied law in his native state of Vermont, and was admitted to the bar in that state in 1902. His abilities were recognized early and he served on various commissions concerned with the adjudication of World War I. He is credited with devising the plan which was adopted as the Act of Chapultepec. He became a temporary delegate for the United States to the United Nations in 1946, and the following year became the permanent delegate to the U.N.

Bradley, General of the Army, Omar Nelson, (1893- ). Bradley graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point, and served in a variety of commands during the twenties and thirties. He was recognized as a sound tactician, and when United States forces landed in North Africa, Bradley was commanding officer of the II Corps. He served in North Africa and the campaigns in Sicily, and when the allies landed in France, June. 1944, he had command of another corps. After the war, he served as administrator of veterans affairs 1945-1947, and was then appointed Chief of Staff, United States Army. He was appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1949, and has served in that capacity until the present time.

Brown, Albert E., (1889- ). Brown graduated from the military academy in 1912 and served through the various grades, rising to the rank of major general by 1941. Little is known of his war time accomplishments, and in 1947, he relieved General Arnold as the chief American delegate to the Joint Soviet-American Commission.
Bridges, Styles, (1893- ). Bridges graduated from his native University of Maine, and entered the newspapers of the state. He served as editors of various state fair magazines, state governor, 1935-1936, and as United States senator since 1937. He is a Republican and is noted for foreign policy work.

Byrnes, James Francis, (1879- ). Byrnes graduated from the law school, University of South Carolina, and practices law until 1930. He served as a member of the United States Senate from 1911 and culminated his senate career in 1925. He was re-elected senator in 1930 and served again until 1941. President Roosevelt appointed Byrnes associate justice of the Supreme Court in 1941, and he served as a justice for two years. During the war, he served in various government administrative posts; Director of Economic Stabilization, 1942-1943; Director of War Mobilization, 1943-1945; and finally, secretary of state, 1945-1947. He formulated much of the United States post-war policy in Europe. At the present time, he is governor of South Carolina.

Chiang Kai-shek. Began a revolutionary career quite early as he served in the first and second Chinese revolutions under Sun Yat-sen. He captured Hankow and established the Hankow National Government and began his campaigns against the Chinese Communists. He was president of the Republic and Yuan until 1943, when he resigned premiership, retaining Presidency and full military powers. Following World War II, the struggle with the Communists burst into flames, aid was denied by the United States, and Chiang was forced to retreat to Formosa, where he has established a Provisional Chinese government in exile.

Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston Spencer, (1874- ). the son of noted Lord Randolph, Churchill has a long and distinguished governmental career. He served in the British army and as a war correspondent, 1895-1900. Following his return from the wars, he entered Parliament as a Conservative. He was President of the Board of Trade 1908-1910; Home Secretary, 1910-1911, and First Lord of the Admiralty, 1911-1915. He was active in the government during the twenties and thirties, contingent upon which party was in power. He was prime minister and Minister of Defense 1940-1945, and in Britain's first post-war election, Clement Atlee, Socialist Party, defeated him. Upon his defeat, he assumed his former post as head of the Conservative Party, and last year, 1951, defeated Clement Atlee, and at the present time, he is Prime Minister.
Dulles, John Foster (1888- ) Dulles has a distinguished and profitable law practice in addition to the services which he has rendered to his country's government. Throughout his life he has specialized in foreign affairs, and during the interim period between the two world wars, he served on many commissions and boards. He attended the London and Moscow Conferences of Foreign Ministers as a special aide and advisor to Secretary of State Byrnes. In 1949, he was appointed United States senator from New York state to fill a post created by the death of that state's senator. He has been the State Department's special consultant since 1949. His career in the United Nations has been outstanding, serving as his country's representative at all General Assembly plenary sessions.

Eden, Rt. Hon. (Robert) Anthony, Eden was elected Conservative M.P. from Warwick and Leamington in 1925. During the thirties, he served for a time as under secretary of state for foreign affairs, until his resignation due to disagreement with British foreign policy in the thirties. He associated himself with Winston Churchill, and while the latter was Britain's prime minister, Eden was secretary of state for foreign affairs. In addition to these duties, he was his party's leader in the House of Commons. After the end of World War II, Eden has occupied a post second to that of Churchill, in the party and the government.

El-Khuuri, Fayez Bey, (Syria) Since World War II, he has been alternate representative to the United Nations and the Interim Committee.

Evatt, Herbert Vere (1894- ) A noted lawyer in his native Australia, he has also been a lecturer in philosophy at many distinguished colleges in Australia and England. He was minister for war during World War II, served as a United Nations representative on the Palestine dispute. He was chairman of Australia's U.N. delegation at the 2nd and 3rd sessions of the General Assembly, and was president of the 3rd session, 1948-1949.

Harriman, William Averell, (1891— ), Extremely wealthy, he attended Yale University, and upon graduation, entered a firm of Wall Street investment bankers. His name soon graced the doors as a full partner, Brown Brothers and Harriman Company. By virtue of his number of Union Pacific shares, preferred and common, he also was chairman of the railroad’s board. His liberal ideas and contributions to the treasury of the Democratic Party, attracted him to President Roosevelt, and in 1941, he was appointed United States Ambassador to the Court of St. James. After a two year stint in London, he and his family moved to Moscow as the United States Ambassador to the great and true friend of the United States. The end of the World War II saw him moving back to London where he served another year as ambassador. In 1947, he returned to the United States, and was appointed Secretary of Commerce in the cabinet of another liberal, Harry S. Truman. At the present time, he is democratic aspirant for the presidential nomination.

Hayashi, Tadosu, Count. (Japanese statesman), Educated in England, a writer in the English language, he returned to Japan in 1889 to serve as a governor in Kobe; vice minister to China, 1895-1896; to Russia, 1897-1899; and to England, 1900-1905. In addition to his political service to his country, he translated English books on political science into Japanese for his less fortunate brothers.

Helmick, Charles Gardiner, army officer, (1892— ), An army officer, who graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1913, served for a year as an ensign, and then transferring to the army. He attended the Army War College, and the Command School at Fort Leavenworth. He advanced through the ranks to brigadier general by 1942. Served as deputy military governor for Korea, 1945-1948.

Hideyoshi, Toyotomi, the Taiko, (1536-1596), Possibly the greatest soldier and statesman in Japanese history. Regent of Japan, 1581-1591, and the following year he invaded the Korean peninsula, in a plan to subjugate China. Although he was defeated and died in Korea, he gave the Japanese an international status in the Orient.

Ito, Hirobumi, (1841-1909), During the Japanese reformation period, he contributed to the fall of the shogunate, and became a provincial governor in 1868. He held various ministries from 1878 until 1888. The following year 1889, he promulgated the Japanese constitution, and held office as premier, 1894-1895, 1898, 1900-1901. Appointed Resident-General in Korea 1905, he was
president of the Japanese Privy Council, when he was assassinated by a Korean terrorist in Harbin, 1909, possibly the only Japanese friend which the Korean nation possessed.

Hodge, John Reed, (1893- ). A graduate of a teacher's college before he entered the University of Illinois, Hodge entered the first World War as a second lieutenant. He advanced through the ranks to major general by 1942. He served throughout World War II in the Pacific theatre of operations, and by the war's end, commanded the XXIV Corps on Okinawa. Commanding general of United States occupation forces in Korea 1945-1949.

Hull, Cordell, (1871- ). Born in Tennessee, he entered the bar there in 1891. He served with distinction in Cuba during the Spanish-American War, and returned at the end of the war to practice law. He was elected to the House of Representatives, 1907-1921, and 1923-1931, served as a United States senator. He attracted the eye of President Roosevelt in 1933 and was named as secretary of state until 1944. In 1945, he received the Nobel Peace Prize.

Jessup, Philip C., (1897- ). A scholarly student of law, he lectured in law at Columbia University, 1925-1946, rising to a full professorship. He served on many commissions as legal advisor, and has been active in legal work connected with various United Nations commissions. In 1949, he was appointed ambassador-at-large by President Truman.

Komura, Jutaro, Baron, (1855-1911), a distinguished Japanese statesman and diplomat. Komura served as assistant foreign minister, 1896-1898. He held diplomatic posts at Washington, D. C., St. Petersburg, and Peking. He was senior Japanese representative to the Portsmouth Peace Conference, 1905, ambassador to Great Britain, 1906-1908, and was Minister of Foreign Affairs when he died.

Katsura, Tarō, Prince, (1847-1913), During the Japanese restoration, Katsura fought for the emperor, and served in the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895. He was appointed governor of Formosa, 1896; war minister, 1898; and prime minister, 1900-1906. He was a great leader of conservative thought in his country.

Kim Il Sung, An aura of mystery surrounds the present premier of the Democratic People's Republic. Many noted South Koreans who have known Kim Il Sung during revolutionary days insist that the present Kim Il Sung is an imposter. Be that as it may, Kim Il Sung was born in 1912, the son of a noted anti-Japanese Korean. He fought against
Koo, Wellington, (1888- ). Koo received all his education, including a Ph.D. at Columbia University. He was his country's representative at various peace conferences in the twenties and thirties. He was acting prime minister and minister of foreign affairs in 1926-1927. During World War II, he was China's ambassador to Great Britain, and in 1946, entered the United Nations as China's senior delegate.

Lange, Oscar Richard, (Poland), (1904- ). A noted lawyer, but better known as an economist. He was professor of economics at various American universities, including Minnesota, Michigan, and Chicago. He is the author of many scholarly works on economics. His present address is Warsaw.

Lansdowne, (Henry Charles Keith Fitzmaurice), A graduate of Eton and Oxford, he served in the war and Indian offices under Gladstone. He was foreign secretary during 1900-1905.

Lovett, Robert Abercombie, (1895- ). After graduating from Harvard, Lovett entered the investment banking field, associating himself with Brown Brothers and Harriman Company. During World War II, he was assistant secretary of war for air, and from 1947-1949, was the assistant secretary of state. He has been the Secretary of Defense since 1951.

MacArthur, Douglas, (1880- ). Graduating from the military academy in 1903, MacArthur served in various commands until World War II. In France, he was wounded twice in action. He was chief of staff for the United States army from 1930-1935, and then took charge of Philippine national defense, 1935-1937. He resigned from active duty until July 26, 1941, when he assumed command of United States Forces in the Far East. Following the war, he was chief of American occupation forces in Japan and is credited with an outstanding job in the Japanese Islands. He was relieved by Truman and returned to the United States during 1951.

Malik, Yakov (1906- ). Malik has had extensive training in foreign affairs. He was Soviet ambassador to Japan, 1942-1945. Following his return to the U.S.S.R., he served as deputy minister of foreign affairs for two years, and then was appointed the Soviet delegate to the General Assembly.
Marshall, George Catlett (1880- ), Marshall graduated from the Virginia Military Institute and by 1936 was a brigadier general. He was Chief of Staff for the United States Army, 1939-1945, and was then appointed a special envoy, with the rank of ambassador, to China. Marshall's efforts to achieve a truce between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang were futile, and the United States abandoned Chiang Kai-shek. In 1947, he was appointed secretary of state, and formulated the great Marshall Plan; a plan to rehabilitate the world's economy with United States money and technical assistance. Retired in 1949.

Molotov, Vaycheslav Michailovich (1890- ), Molotov has an outstanding record of revolutionary activities leading up to and culminating with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917-1918. He became a member of the Politburo in 1921, of the Presidium in 1929, and was appointed People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in 1939. He directed this office until the end of World War II, when he was appointed minister of foreign affairs. He attended both the Moscow Conference in 1943 and the Yalta Conference in 1945.

Pauley, Edwin Wendell (oil corporation executive) (1903- ), Pauley has a successful career as an oil corporation executive combined with real-estate speculation. During World War II, President Roosevelt sent him to England to be Petroleum Coordinator for Lend-Lease supplies to Russia and Britain. After the war's end, he was appointed reparations commissioner with the rank of ambassador. He has been special assistant to the secretary of army since 1947.

Roosevelt, Franklin D. (1882-1945), Roosevelt graduated from Harvard, studied law, and entered the New York Senate in 1910 for three years. He was appointed assistant secretary of navy in 1913 and served in that capacity until 1920. He was elected governor of New York state in 1929, and in 1932 he was elected the 32nd President of the United States. He was constantly re-elected, and died in office, April, 1945.

Roosevelt, Theodore, Another Roosevelt who graduated from Harvard and went on to serve as assistant secretary of navy, 1897-1898. After serving in the Spanish-American War as commanding officer of the Rough Riders, he was elected governor of New York in 1899. In 1900, he was elected vice president, and upon McKinley's assassination in September, 1901, assumed the presidency. He was re-elected in 1904. In 1908, he declined to run for office, but in 1912, when he was refused the Republican candidacy, he organized the Progressive Party and stumped the country
in a campaign for president. He was defeated in the ensuing election.

Shufeldt, Robert Wilson, (1850-1923), Shufeldt entered the United States Navy as a young midshipman of 14 years, and served in the navy until an injury forced his retirement in 1891. After his retirement from the navy, his interests turned toward the study of birds, and he contributed to various magazines on that subject.

Stalin, Generalissimo Iosef Vissarionovich, Stalin has a long record of revolutionary activities. From 1897 to 1917, he was in and out of various prisons and was exiled from Russia for some time. He became General Secretary of Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1922, and three years later, became a member of the Presidium, the supreme Soviet governing board. Through a series of purges during the twenties and thirties, he became more and more powerful. He assumed the title of generalissimo in 1945.

Stillwell, Joseph W., (1883- ), Stillwell graduated from the United States military academy in 1904, and in the following years served at various commands, attending the Army War College. He was a Chinese language student at the University of California at the end of World War I, and thereafter was in Peking studying the Chinese further. During the thirties he was military attaché in Peking, and at the U.S. entry into World War II, Stillwell assumed command of Chinese armies in Burma. He vainly attempted to bring order into the Chinese army, and was sacked by Chiang Kai-shek at the end of World War II.

Timberman, Thomas S., (1900- ), Timberman graduated from the United States military academy in 1923, and served in various commands during the twenties. He attended Chinese language schools in Peking, 1931-1935. Until the U.S. entry into World War II, Timberman served as military attaché at various U.S. embassies throughout the world. During World War II, he was in the Operations Division of the War Department.

Truman, Harry S., (1884- ), Truman managed the family farm in Missouri until the outbreak of World War I. He entered the United States army, and was retired to inactive duty with the rank of captain. He studied law, owned an ill-fated haberdashery, and finally was appointed a circuit judge in 1934. He ran for the Senate in that year, was elected, and in 1940, was re-elected. His Congressional career is notable for his stint on a Senate investigating committee. President Roosevelt selected Truman as a vice presidential running mate in
1944, and the following year when Roosevelt died, Truman rose to the presidency of the United States. He was re-elected in 1948.

Vandenbergh, Arthur H., Vandenberg graduated from the University of Michigan, and was editor of the Grand Rapids Herald from 1906-1928. He was elected to the United States Senate in 1928. He served with great distinction in the Senate and is responsible for much of the United States Foreign policy in the post-war period. He was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the post-war period. A staunch Republican throughout his life, he died in 1950.

Vincent, John Carter, (1900- ), Vincent has a long record as a foreign service officer in the State Department. He attended Peking Language School, 1928-1930, and was a consular officer in China during the thirties. He was appointed assistant to the chief for Far Eastern Affairs in 1943, and the following year was appointed chief of the State Department's Far Eastern Affairs. He attended various post-war conferences, and in recent months has been the target of pro-communism charges.

Vyshinsky, Andrei Yanvarovitch, (1883- ), Vyshinsky entered Russian revolutionary work shortly after Stalin. After the Bolshevik Revolution, he practiced law, and was special prosecutor for various "purge trials." He served as deputy minister for foreign affairs during World War II, and was appointed minister for foreign affairs in 1949.

Webb, James Edwin, (1906- ), A successful lawyer, Webb was appointed assistant to the Under Secretary of Treasury in 1946. He was appointed Director of the Bureau of Budget in 1946, and served in that capacity until 1949, when he was appointed under Secretary of State.
APPENDIX
APPENDIX A

Excerpt from the Report of the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, and the United Kingdom, Moscow, December 27, 1945, (The Moscow Agreement)

III

Korea:

1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.

2. In order to assist the formation of a provisional Korean government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures, there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations. The recommendations worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States, prior to final decision by the two Governments represented on the Joint Commission.

3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with the participation of the provisional Korean democratic government and of the Korean democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.

The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultation with the provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and China, for the working out of an agreement concerning a four power trusteeship of Korea for a period up to five years.

4. For consideration of urgent problems affecting both southern and northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea, a conference of the representatives of the United States and Soviet commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks.
APPENDIX B

Excerpt from Communique No. 5 Issued by U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission, April 18, 1946.

The U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission continued discussion on the question of conditions of consultation with democratic parties and social organizations. Col.-Gen. T. F. Shtikov, Chief of the Soviet Delegation was chairman on session held on April 8, 9, 11, and 13, 1946, in the Buk Soo Palace, Seoul Palace, Seoul, Korea, and Maj.-Gen. A. V. Arnold, Chief of the U.S. Delegation was chairman at the session, April 17, 1946.

As a result of a thorough investigation and analysis of the points of view of the Soviet delegation and the delegation of the United States, the Joint Commission reached the following decision on the first point of the joint program of work covering the conditions of the consultation with democratic parties and social organizations.

"DECISION"

"The Joint Commission will consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations which are truly democratic in their aims and methods and which will subscribe to the following declaration:

"We declare that we will uphold the aims of the Moscow Decision on Korea as stated in paragraph I of this decision, namely:

"The reestablishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles, and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea. Further, we will abide by the decisions of the Joint Commission in fulfillment of paragraph 2 of the Moscow Decision in the formation of a Provisional Korean Democratic Government; further, we will cooperate with the Joint Commission in the working out by it with the participation of the Provisional Korean Democratic Government of proposals concerning measures foreseen by paragraph 3 of the Moscow Decision.

"Signed ____________________________
Representing the ____________________________
Party or Organization"

The procedure for inviting representatives of Korean democratic parties and social organizations to consult with the Joint Commission is being worked out by Joint Sub-Commission No. 1. When details of the procedure are completed it will be announced publicly."
APPENDIX G

Excerpt From Letter of the Acting Secretary of State to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 26, 1947.

"United States Proposals Regarding Korea

1. In both the U.S.S.R. and U.S. zones of Korea, there shall be held early elections to choose wholly representative, provisional legislatures for each zone. Voting shall be by secret multi-party ballot on a basis of universal suffrage and elections shall be held in accordance with the laws adopted by the present Korean legislatures in each zone.

2. These provisional zonal legislatures shall choose representatives in numbers which reflect the proportion between the populations of the two zones, these representatives to constitute a national provisional legislature. The legislature shall meet at Seoul to establish a provisional government for a united Korea.

3. The resulting provisional government of a united Korea shall meet in Korea with representatives of the four powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement in Korea to discuss with them what aid and assistance is needed in order to place Korean independence on a firm economic and political foundation and on what terms this aid and assistance is to be given.

4. During all the above stages the United Nations shall be invited to have observers present so that the world and the Korean people may be assured of the wholly representative and completely independent character of the actions taken.

5. The Korean Provisional Government and the Powers concerned shall agree upon a date by which all occupation forces in Korea shall be withdrawn.

6. The provisional legislatures in each zone shall be encouraged to draft provisional constitutions which can later be used as a basis for the adoption of the national provisional legislature of a constitution for all Korea.

7. Until such time as a united, independent Korea is established, public and private Korean agencies in each zone shall be brought into contact with international agencies established by or under the United Nations and the presence of Korean observers at official international conferences shall be encouraged in appropriate cases."
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Korea, 1945-1948, Publication 3307, Far Eastern Series 28, released October 1948, 124 pp

The United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, Publication 3922, Far Eastern Series 34, released July 1950, 68 pp

The United States Policy in the Korean Conflict, Publication 4263, Far Eastern Series 44, released September 1951, 52 pp

The Conflict in Korea, Publication 4266, Far Eastern Series 49, released October 1951, 36 pp

Guide to the U.N. in Korea, Publication 4299, Far Eastern Series 47, released November 1951, 31 pp

All the above publications were complete with maps, graphs and official correspondence concerning the unification of Korea. All were invaluable in the preparation of this thesis.


A weekly publication, which explained official policy.

Department of Army:

Summation of non-military activities in Japan and Korea, numbers 2-5, SCAP Headquarters, Tokyo, Japan, October 1945-February 1946.

Summation of non-military activities in Korea, numbers 6-22, Commanding General Army Forces in Korea, Seoul, Korea, March 1946-July 1947.
The summations by the Commanding General, Army Forces in Korea, are extremely detailed reports to the Department of Army concerning political, social and economical matters relative to the occupation. They are very thorough, completely reliable, and were used extensively in this thesis.


Final Report and History of the New Korea Company, Clyde Mitchell, Director, HDQS, USAMCOK, April 30, 1948.


The U.N. Action Reports and Analysis Division, 1950.

These sundry reports were invaluable in acquainting the student in matters which are not covered as completely in the summations.

Congress:


Congressional Committees:

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Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, on H.R. 7378 and H.R. 7797, Part 2, March 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 1950.

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Senate Reports, Volume III, 81st Congress, 1st Session, No. 748.

United Nations:


First Committee, Summary Record of Meetings, Third Session, First Part, September 21-December 8, 1948, Lake Success, New York.

Ad Hoc Political Committee,

Summary Record of Meetings, Fourth Session, September 27-December 7, 1949, Lake Success, New York.


Memoirs:


The former Secretary of State makes some quite startling statements in his book, regarding his conferences in the search for peace. In some instances, the manner in which he regarded the Russians is almost naive, and at all times, he gives the reader the impression he was overworked and longed to return to his South Carolina plantation. His account of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers is extremely interesting.


The author, a Major General, USA, was head of the United States Military Mission to Moscow during World War II. From his day to day contact with the Russians, including their promises and failures, he condemns them rather severely. He writes in an easy manner, and is not hesitant in condemning his own errors in Soviet-American relations. This book was very helpful for background on the wartime conferences.


There was little concerning Korea in the second volume, however, that there is, throws an interesting light on the feelings of the American wartime Secretary of State and how he regarded the discussions of Korea during World War II.

Just recently published, the late Secretary of Navy in his memoirs writes a fascinating account of errors and stupidity concerning policy making during the war and immediate years. Very detailed, and filled in many of the gaps existing from previous sources.

Harrison, Samuel E. J. *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, 4 Volumes.

The fourth volume was very valuable for Roosevelt's intimate conversations and correspondence regarding the Japanese at the turn of the century.

**SECONDARY SOURCES**


Although the author has written this account very well and has thoroughly documented it, nevertheless, it is violently pro-Japanese. Mr. Asakawa was a well known Japanese scholar, endorsed by many American historians, and evidently sincerely believed what he wrote. His account of the pre-war diplomacy and the Russo-Japanese War was particularly useful in outlining some of the Russo-Japanese rivalries previous to the war.


Mr. Baldwin is very critical of President Roosevelt's actions and settlements with Stalin during the World War II. Though it was of little use in this thesis, it aided in filling in the background to the wartime conferences.


The author is one of many observers to the Japanese annexation of Korea, who honestly believed that the annexation in 1910 was the only action which could aid the "backward Koreans." His type is the direct antithesis of the "missionary type" who vehemently protested the Japanese annexation. Mr. Bland is very lurid in his story telling, and was of no use in this thesis.

Excellent and basic.


Mr. Chung, sometimes known as Henry DeYoung, frankly admits that his book was written with the Robert T. Oliver and the Korean Pacific Press, which acts as the Republic of Korea's propaganda center, and is registered as an agent of a foreign government. Mr. Chung has been very active in the fight for Korean liberation and recognition since 1919, and his book is written from that viewpoint. His lurid account should not be read by any citizen desiring an impartial and thorough picture of the post-1945 situation.

Korean Treaties, New York, 1919.

Standard and excellent for all students of Asian history.

Crow, Carl, Japan's Dream of World Empire, The Tanaka Memorial, New York, 1942.

Mr. Crow's account of the celebrated Japanese plan to effect world conquest was of little aid in this thesis.


The author, a Korean Christian, wrote of the ravishment of Korea in the luridness which Bland affected in his pro-Japanese account. His book is of no value.


Although there was a great deal of lurid criticism of Soviet Far Eastern policy, Mr. Dallin hesitates to investigate the astuteness of American policy. His writing is extremely loose, and found it difficult to document some of his assertions. Therefore, he hesitated to use all his statements at face value, and would not recommend his book for the beginner.

Without a doubt, the best reference in its field. Mr. Dennett is a recognized scholar in his field, and his account should be studied by every student of Far Eastern History. For the years up to 1900, this reference was extremely helpful in the writing of this thesis.

Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, New York, 1925.

Almost a continuation of *Americans in Eastern Asia*.


The "elder statesman" of American foreign policy has written a penetrating analysis of present Soviet-American problems. Although it was extremely interesting, it was of little use to this thesis.


A detailed study of Korean economy under the Japanese administration. The author published his book under the auspices of the Pacific Affairs Institute, which has come under a great deal of fire from the present administration concerning its pro-communist sympathies. His solution for post-war disposal of Japanese property in Korea marks the author as an extreme left-wing liberal, and is not a natural continuation of his careful, thoughtful documentation in the previous chapters. With the exception of the last chapter, this book was very helpful in writing this thesis.


Comparable to Tyler Dennett's two volumes dealing with the Far East. It is a "must" for any reading in Far Eastern history, and would recommend it without reservation.

The author who served as Far Eastern correspondent for Newsweek magazine during World War II, has written an easy to read, running account of conditions as he sees them in the Far East. The account is strongly biased and simply gives opinions; however, if the reader has a foundation in Far Eastern history, he can evaluate some of the discrepancies. Offers as a solution to the constant friction in the Far East, that the Soviet Union and the United States both withdraw from the Orient.


Mr. Lattimore, who presently is being investigated for his pro-communist sympathies, and who is purported to have written the American policy for the post World War II Asia, has in this book made a detailed analysis of Asian foreign policy, country by country. He advocated the creation of "third powers," powers which would stand between the Soviet Union and the United States. Suggests Japan, India, Pakistan, Denmark, Sweden and Yugoslavin as possible "third powers."

*Solution in Asia*, Boston, 1945.

This book was of no value in the preparation of this thesis.


A Life newspaperman on many Oriental assignments, Mr. Lauterbach is guilty of major omissions in his chapters pertaining to post-war Korea. Although it is very readable, it should be treated with care.

*These are the Russians*, New York, 1945.

Written during the hey-day of good war relations between the Soviet-American people. He concerns himself with the Soviet personages, and was of no use in this thesis. Subsequent changes in Soviet policy have rendered this book valueless. Would not recommend it.

Lippman, Walter, U.S. *Foreign Policy, Shield of the Republic*, Boston, 1943.

Reviews American foreign policy since the American Revolution and makes some quite startling predictions. In view of subsequent events, Mr. Lippman has proved to be somewhat a prophet. States that alliances are the basis for peace, and any peace in post-war 1945, will depend upon an alliance between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.

A good authoritative account of post-war Korea. The author was in the State Department's Far Eastern Affairs Division during the war as head of the Korean Desk, and previous to that was Professor of Far Eastern History at the University of California. Although much of the material had been gathered by 1948, McCune died at that point and the book was finished by his wife and a graduate assistant, who was familiar with McCune's style. Would unhesitatingly recommend this work.


For years this has been a standardized account of an American missionary's plea to the world concerning the "Japanese rapists of Korea." In his impassionate plea for Korean recognition, McKenzie castigates the Japanese and lauds the inherent fineness of the Korean people. Was undoubtedly written to stir up some Western thought and resentment against the Japanese. Would not recommend this book.


Little value.


The authors are old "hands" concerning Far Eastern history, and have written an authoritative account. Both gentlemen are history professors and are authors of numerous articles and books about various phases of Oriental history. Would recommend this book.

Nelson, Fredrick W., Korea and the Old Orders in Western Asia, Baton Rouge, 1945.

Absolutely the best account of Korea up until Independence Day, 1919. The author in this doctoral dissertation for Duke University, has done a great deal of original research for his work, and his writing is very scholarly. Used this text extensively for the initial chapter of the thesis. Would unhesitatingly recommend it to anyone.

Former professor in Far Eastern history at Syracuse University, the author is now associated with the Korean Pacific Press in Washington, D. C. Oliver has written extensively, articles, pamphlets, and several books concerning Korea. He makes no excuses for the fact that his sympathies are with the Republic of Korea. Was of little value.


Condems American policy in Korea and yet hesitates to offer a solution. Also guilty of broad assertions and yet fails to document these assertions. Quotes Anna Louise Strong, which in itself is significant.


Published in cooperation with the Institute of Pacific Relations, this book was of value in providing background material. Of little value, otherwise, and would not recommend it.


An American minister in Korea before the turn of the century, Rockhill's is standard for a student of Chinese-Korean history.


One of the first members of the American diplomatic corps to the court of the Korean king, this book is written with the nostalgia of remembering pheasant hunts in Korean hills and the ambassador's parties in Seoul.


Written in the hey-day of Soviet-American friendship, this book is lavish in praise for everything which has Russian written on it. The author was a wartime correspondent for the Saturday Evening Post and traveled quite extensively in the Soviet Union.


Very good reference of general Far Eastern history.
A ringing denunciation of capitalism as practiced by the United States, and a plea for closer understanding with the Soviet Union. Suggests that strategic areas such as Greenland and Korea be internationalized to allay Russian suspicions. No use.

Another authoritative account which documents the rivalry in the Far East during a critical period.

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