Soviet-American military strategy: What price security?

Peter Michael Meloy

The University of Montana

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.

Recommended Citation
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/5178

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.
SOVIET-AMERICAN MILITARY STRATEGY:
WHAT PRICE SECURITY?

By

Peter Michael Meloy

B.A., University of California Riverside, 1966

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA

1969

Approved by:

Chairman, Board of Examiners

Dean, Graduate School

Date
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Span Covered</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods and Sources Employed in the Study</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND ITS OBJECTIVES</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American National Security Objectives</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet National Security Objectives</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. NON-SECURITY POLICY: AN ANALYSIS</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Trade</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Objectives</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Objectives</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Objectives</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Objectives</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in International Organizations</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Objectives</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Objectives</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space Research</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Objectives</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Objectives</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Interchange</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Objectives</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Objectives</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ii
INTRODUCTION

The growth of the academic literature of military strategy has been one of the major intellectual phenomena of the cold war era in the United States. The literature has had a twofold effect on the various social science disciplines. The first effect is quantitative: a great amount of work is being done on problems that were once almost completely outside the ken of social scientists. The change is so striking that the incoming head of the American Political Science Association in 1961 was led to predict that national security analysis would become one of the important "fields" in political science and in the social sciences generally;¹ this prediction has long since come true.

Second, there is a qualitative effect: social science appears to have finally become a key element at the high levels of policy-making, as the following quotations indicate:

Collectively, (Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter, Henry Kissinger and Thomas Schelling) are the vanguard and foremost representatives of a new element in the counsels of American Government: the Academic Strategist.

The two principal sources of this new theory are the simulated situations of the traditional "war games" and the transposition of the mathematical theory of games into military-political matching of wits and threats involved in deterrence theory. 

As a result, the traditional military strategists have been replaced by a new breed of men. Herman Kahn, Thomas B. Schelling, Henry Kissinger, Donald Brennan, Oskar Morgenstern, Albert Wohlstetter, Glenn H. Snyder.

Whatever the explanation, academics have moved into the military policy field, and have brought with them a degree of sophistication and intellectual rigor never before seen.

The inspiration for this inquiry was, initially, a feeling of strangeness induced by a lengthy study of the literature on national security policy. Almost all of the works one encountered in this field seemed vested with a tremendously authoritative air, an air that one normally associated with scholarly work in the most well-established and systematically researched disciplines. Yet, clearly, the study of security policy, particularly nuclear deterrence policy, was not in any meaningful sense a discipline; and somehow, all this authority produced policy proposals

that one felt absolutely no urge to agree with. Some were at best questionable: e.g., the assertion that there was a delicate balance of terror at a time when one could perceive no visible reason to feel delicately balanced. Others seemed absurd: e.g., the casual assumption that the rational response to a nuclear strike on one's cities is a counterstrike on the attacker's cities. Still others seemed absurd given one's own preconceptions: such as the development of complicated contingency plans requiring more and different levels of nuclear and conventional armaments, plans that seemed designed to further accelerate an already dangerous arms race. Finally, one did not know what to make of the assertion that nuclear war could be survived and was therefore "thinkable" when it was so obviously (in Herman Kahn's odd locution) "unthinkable."

The most frightening thing is that these intellectually elaborate theories were not merely proposed as guidelines, but were in fact implemented as security policy. It is amazing to note the cool, detached way in which the most frightening thing is that these intellectually elaborate theories were not merely proposed as guidelines, but were in fact implemented as security policy. It is amazing to note the cool, detached way in which the most frightening thing is that these intellectually elaborate theories were not merely proposed as guidelines, but were in fact implemented as security policy.

3 The "delicate balance" strategy was used to guide the Eisenhower security policy. "Counterforce" was a term used to describe the security policy of the early Kennedy years. "Spectrum deterrence" policy developed from a modified counterforce strategy and was used during the last years of the Kennedy administration. The term also aptly describes the policy in existence today. Spectrum deterrence strategy dictates that a country develop military power at all levels, from guerrilla warfare to general nuclear war, required to deter any aggressive activities by
which Secretary of Defense McNamara explained his policy of pure counterforce—direct retaliation against Russia's arsenal in case of attack—in July of 1962 and then a month later proposed that American policy was a "modified counterforce"—direct retaliation against Russian cities—because the Soviets had "hardened" their missile sites. 4 Defense Secretary McNamara changed his policy as easily and with the same lack of remorse as Thomas Schelling would change his strategy in a "non-zero-sum game." 5


5I am referring here to the mathematical games Schelling plays in his Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965). A further example of this lack of remorse is found in certain statements by Herman Kahn, when he talks about the aftermath of nuclear war: "Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, objective studies indicate that even though the amount of human tragedy would be greatly increased in the postwar world, the increase would not preclude normal and happy lives for the majority of survivors and their descendents."
It occurred to me that this inculcation of academic theory into the real world of national policy-making might have a substantial effect on the whole foreign policy situation. What follows is an attempt to explain this effect; to demonstrate that present national security policy can only have a deleterious effect on the attainment of stated "non-security" policy. Such a study is especially needed because of the peculiar way in which the academic theorist and the foreign policy-making elite have become insensitive to the working realities of their strategy.\(^6\)

\(^6\)"Security" policy is distinguished from "non-security" policy in Chapter I of this study.

\(^7\)It is of significant note that I blame both the intellectual and the policy-maker for this state of affairs. The policy-maker has accepted the theories presented by the scholar without regard to their practical utility. This condition has probably come about due to our society's great respect for the claims of science and expertise. Indeed, it has not been the exception that the academic theorist has been given the authority to make American policy. John Bennett takes an interesting turn on this point. In his article "Moral Urgencies in the Nuclear Context," he submits that the academic community adds to the complex of power which Eisenhower mentioned. He illustrates his position with references to the link between RAND Corporation's think tank and the Air Force on the one hand and with the universities on the other. Bennett warns that there is a danger we shall confront one vast establishment which includes business, the military, the civilian government, the scientific community, foundations and the universities and that those who are most competent to criticize the policies of government concerned with national defense will be inhibited by their responsibilities in relation to these policies. For further reference see John C. Bennett, "Moral Urgencies in the Nuclear Context," in John C. Bennett (ed.), Nuclear Weapons and the Conflict of Conscience (New York: Scribner, 1962), pp. 112ff.
Scope

It is appropriate at this point to state some presumptions which seem most likely to influence my analysis of national security policy. The reader is urged to bear in mind that these are, for the sake of analysis, only asserted presumptions. I shall not attempt to defend them, but only present them so the reader may understand the scope of this paper.

To attempt an analysis of foreign policy requires a framework in which the interplay of different pressures can be observed and recorded. The research design used here is based on a simple proposition: the concept of a system is no less valid in foreign policy analysis than in the study of domestic politics. Like all systems of action, the foreign policy system comprises an environment or setting, a group of actors, and structures through which they initiate decisions. The latter two components of the system are discussed later. The operational environment contemplated in this study is essentially bilateral in

---

It is not particularly relevant to this study to explain the components and workings of a systems design in international relations. It is to be conceded that the theoretical content of studies in foreign policy is wholly inadequate. However, the scope of this paper is so narrow as to preclude the use of an elaborate design as a research aid. The reader is referred to a design presented in M. Brecher, B. Steinberg and J. Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XIII (March 1969), 75-102.
A bilateral system refers to the total pattern of interactions between two superpowers; at present, this refers to relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The pattern creates an image of intensive competition and interaction in the diplomatic, economic and scientific fields, with a different sort of competition in the military field. It will be recalled that the basic motive for this study is to uncover the effects of national security policy on the foreign policy arena itself. Such a study involves a focus upon the policy of both superpowers.  

**Hypothesis**

Chapter I of this study is devoted to a description of United States and Soviet national security policy. The discussion in Chapter II has a twofold purpose. First, since the primary focus of the study is on the Soviet-American confrontation, there are certain related but distinct questions which it does not attempt to deal with at length. Specifically, other advanced countries, particularly those in Europe, have an important role to play in the international system. However, from the point of view of this study, the contribution of Europe to the system is viewed as a distinct problem worthy of being dealt with in its own right. See, for example, Henry Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership*, op. cit.; and Stanley Hoffman, *Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968). Similarly, while the accommodation of Soviet-American competition in the developing areas is discussed, a full-scale treatment of the role of these areas in the evolving world system is not attempted. For a brilliant development of this point, see John G. Stoeessinger, *The Might of Nations* (New York: Random House, 1962), especially chapters 4 and 5.
the "non-security" foreign policy objectives of both countries are presented and compared for divergence and compatibility. Second, these objectives are viewed in the light of national security objectives to demonstrate the following hypothesis:

Implementation of security objectives in the United States and the Soviet Union tends to frustrate the attainment of nonsecurity objectives by both countries.

Time Span Covered

The period chosen for study was January 20, 1961, to January 20, 1969. There was a consistent political philosophy moving American executive policy-making during this period. Moreover, there was little significant turnover in the top echelon of the executive department during the Kennedy-Johnson administrations. There was, of course, a more substantial break in the governing elite of the Soviet Union during the period. However, the ideological motives determinative of Soviet policy remained relatively constant for both the Khrushchev and Breshnev regimes.¹⁰

Methods and Sources Employed in the Study

The problem of establishing, with a high amount of accuracy, foreign policy objectives for the United States and the Soviet Union is basic to this study. The method chosen for this study is one which focuses upon what may be called "elite articulation." There is only one presumption involved in this method: foreign policy objectives are what the foreign policy elite say they are. Such a focus implies certain limitations.\footnote{For a lengthy discussion of these limitations and the use of "elite articulation" in foreign policy analysis, see S. Hoffman, Contemporary Theories in International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1960), especially pp. 171ff.} First it raises the problem of properly identifying the foreign policy-making elite. Stated generally, the decision-making elite consists of those individuals who perform the function of political authorization in the foreign policy arena. Political authorization may be defined as authorization sanctioned by the conventions of the system. This core group usually consists of the head of government, his department and his foreign minister; its size and composition will vary with the issue. The scope, nevertheless, will of necessity be narrow here: many may influence decisions but only those who articulate them will be considered. In the United States, of course, the Chief Executive is charged with the conduct of foreign relations by law. The
President and his Secretaries of State and Defense are the American elites. In the Soviet Union, the top echelon of the Soviet foreign policy-making apparatus is fused in the leaders of the Party Politburo.\textsuperscript{12}

The second limitation arises when one attempts to determine whether the articulations, expressions of opinion and statements of policy are particularly reliable indices of actual goals. One may infer them from actual behavior, or one may infer them from what the actors say about them, but in each case he is compelled to rely upon the intelligent inference.\textsuperscript{13} Furthermore, it is generally true that an individual is never fully aware of the forces that make for his own behavior, even though he may be aware of these forces in the behavior of others. Finally, there is the problem of dissimulation in any of its myriad aspects. An elite may articulate in order to generate an image, persuade an audience, demonstrate solidarity, plead a case or merely blow off steam. Despite these pitfalls, however, freedom of speech is enough of a reality in the United States for one to accept that elite articulations do represent the

\textsuperscript{12}For further discussion of this point and for a listing of the high level members of the Politburo, see J. F. Triska and D. D. Finley, \textit{Soviet Foreign Policy} (New York: MacMillan & Co., 1968), pp. 75ff.

\textsuperscript{13}Perhaps the best discussion of the problem of inference is in A. L. George, \textit{Propaganda Analysis: A Study of Inferences Made from Nazi Propaganda in World War II} (Evanston, Ill.: Peterson, Row, 1959), especially chapter 4.
opinions of those people for whom they purport to speak. There is also justification for conceiving that enough free play has developed in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death for elite differences of value to come to light in Soviet statements.

The third problem is encountered when one attempts to identify those written materials that would most faithfully reflect the assumptions, expectations and policy of the elite. After considerable research, I selected for the United States: Public Papers of the President—Kennedy and Johnson, a governmental publication of the speeches and news conferences of the President; the Department of Defense Bulletin and the Department of State Bulletin, the weekly official organs of the executive agencies most deeply involved in foreign policy; the New York Times, a privately published daily newspaper, most widely confided in and read by the governmental decision-making elite; and Foreign Affairs, a quarterly journal privately published by the Council of Foreign Relations in New York.\footnote{Other American sources of limited value were Congressional Committee Reports and Hearings; The Congressional Record; Documents on American Foreign Relations (annual); and The Congressional Quarterly Almanac.}

And for the USSR, I selected: Pravda, a daily newspaper published in Moscow, organ of the Central Committee.
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Kommunist, a monthly journal published in Moscow, the theoretical spokesman for the Central Committee, both of these papers as translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, published weekly by the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies in New York; and International Affairs, a monthly journal published in Moscow in several languages.\textsuperscript{15}

The most difficult methodological step of all was working out a set of distinctions among the various foreign policy goals. I have attempted to justify my distinctions in the first chapter. In Chapter I, the goals of national security are presented in order that objectives of a decidedly "non-security" nature would come to light. Thus I have formulated two categories of foreign policy objectives. The first category is termed "security" and includes those objectives which are patently concerned with national security. The second category contemplates those objectives which are, when taken at face value, "nonsecurity" oriented. The second category is broken down into five sub-categories: foreign trade; foreign aid, participation in international organizations; space research; and cultural interchange. It is recognized that the second category of foreign policy

\textsuperscript{15}Other Soviet sources of some help were Decisions of the Congress of the CPSU; Military Thought; and various articles from Red Star and Soviet Union as printed in The Current Digest.
objectives may have latent security underpinnings, but for purposes of discussion they can be distinguished from this underlying motive.

A comment about the validity of my research design might be made at this point. It must be admitted that the method of research used in this study was somewhat selective. However, as it turned out, there were few surprises in the comparison of Soviet-American foreign policy objectives. My results show close correspondence with independent, more systematic and quantitative analyses by American scholars. For this reason, it is submitted that one may regard the method as a valid one.
CHAPTER I

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND ITS OBJECTIVES

If self-preservation is the first law of nature, it is also the first law of foreign policy. Safeguarding the security of the nation is the foremost obligation of the statesman according to Nicholas J. Spykman:

Because territory is an inherent part of a state, self-preservation means defending its control over territory; and because independence is of the essence of the state, self-preservation also means fighting for independent status. This explains why the basic objective of the foreign policy of all states is the preservation of territorial integrity and political independence.¹

Admittedly, this basic goal is seldom stated so badly. For instance, Secretary of State Dean Acheson phrased it this way: "To build our strength so that the things we believe in can survive is the practical and vitally necessary expression in times of moral dedication."² Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared that "The broad goal of our foreign policy is to enable the people

of the United States to enjoy, in peace, the blessings of liberty.\(^3\) President John F. Kennedy believed that America's basic goal was to "seek a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others."\(^4\) However articulated, it is the same goal: preservation of the national security of the nation, which is a basic premise underlying the attainment of other foreign policy objectives.

Few concepts are at once so fundamental, and yet so elusive, as this one. In common with many other ideas that must be dealt with in the study of foreign affairs, it is a relative concept. Its meaning for individual nations will be determined by numerous variables: history, geography, cultural traditions, strategy and tactics in war, the nature of the economic system, and public opinion, to mention but a few of the influences. Nations may be, and frequently have been, mistaken in their estimates of what constitutes security. Hitler, no doubt, believed that attacking Poland, France, and later Russia would promote German security. His miscalculations had disastrous

\(^3\)John Foster Dulles, "Our Foreign Policies in Asia," Department of State Bulletin, XXXII (Feb. 28, 1955), 327.

consequences for the German nation.

Security is one of those elastic terms like "due process" or democracy. Almost every nation is in favor of it in the abstract, both for itself and generally for other nations. But nations disagree violently over what it means in concrete circumstances. So great may be the different conceptions of it that security for one country can mean disaster for another. For the Kremlin, security might, and possibly does, mean nothing less than a communized world, directed from Moscow. For the United States it conceivably entails the eventual extinction of communism as a militant ideology. Such examples suggest that attempts to achieve security can lead to a strange paradox: while security is the underlying foreign policy objective of every nation, concrete efforts to achieve it are productive of endless insecurity throughout the international community as a whole.  

Still another attribute of the security concept requires emphasis. A nation's conception of security is never static. It changes over the years. The explosion of the first atomic bomb by the Russians in 1949, for instance, revolutionized official American thinking about

---

5This paradox is closely linked to the present hypothesis and is more fully discussed in the conclusion.
national security. By 1957, another major change in American ideas about security was necessitated by the success of the Soviet Union in launching Sputnik by means of a giant long-range missile. Security, then, is closely linked with technological progress. New inventions like the aircraft carrier, long-range bombers and missile-armed submarines contributed to the security of the United States.

The reader need be cautioned that preservation of national security is by no means the only basic goal of statecraft. William P. Gerberding suggests that there are two fundamental goals of foreign policy. Gerberding submits that the central concept in international politics is "the national interest." It is generally accepted that any government pursues foreign policies that it believes will be in its nation's best interest. As used by Gerberding, "national interest" means the security and well-being of the nation and its citizens. Whatever protects or

6 It has been suggested that Russian development of nuclear weapons as a means to security policy was prompted by American nuclear superiority as demonstrated at Hiroshima. For a discussion of this kind of "self-fulfilling prophesy," see Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense, op. cit., chapter 6.


8 For another conception of "the national interest," see Hans Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New York: Random House, 1951). Morgenthau pleads for an
promotes these conditions is said to be "in the national interest."

In this paper, "security" means physical safety, territorial integrity, and political independence. "Well-being" is much more difficult to define. It surely has an economic dimension, but it is much more than that. The well-being of a citizenry requires the preservation of its cultures and values, of its way of life.

The well-being of a nation is sought for its own sake; it is not a means to another end. The United States presumably desires and would be willing to assist in the creation of a free, prosperous Europe or Latin America even if such a condition were not so clearly desirable from the standpoint of American security. Similarly, the Soviet leaders may actually believe it intrinsically desirable for Eastern Europeans and Asians to live under an independent regime even if the Soviet Union had no stake in it.

If one examines the history of American postwar foreign relations, he may note several categories of policy American foreign policy which shall follow "but one guiding light--The National Interest." While he is not explicit in regard to the meaning he attaches to the symbol "national interest," it becomes clear that the author is thinking in terms of the national security interest, and specifically of security based on power. Morgenthau's concepts cannot be effectively used here, because I am not able to conclude that national interest and national security are synonymous terms.
objectives which have, at face value, a nonsecurity motive. Both the Democratic and Republican parties have supported reciprocal trade with other countries. Technical assistance to underdeveloped countries has also received bipartisan support. So have economic aid, the United Nations, disarmament, political independence of colonial peoples, peaceful development of space research and cultural interchange. These goals have formed important elements in American foreign policy since 1945. For analytical purposes, objectives in the foregoing categories are assumed to be pursued for their own sake. When a nation proposes that it intends to promote the economic development of a new state, it will be presumed that there is no intrinsic security motive.

It is conceded that a difficulty inheres in the suggested distinction between those objectives that are desired for their own sakes and those that are instrumental in character. In the realm of values, one man's set of priorities may bear little or no relationship to the next man's. As intimated above, the objective of preserving a free Western Europe is purely a defensive expedient to some Americans, whereas for others it constitutes an extrinsically important objective, which should be pursued at great cost simply for its own sake, regardless of the bearing on national security. However, these distinctions are useful
for present purposes and will recur throughout the paper.

For some policies the relationship to national security is much more direct. Among the patent security objectives are provision of military arsenals, extension of military assistance to other countries, maintenance of strong military alliances, control of markets involving strategic goods, and development of an effective intelligence network. These objectives directly enhance the nation's security.

In summary, there are two basic goals of foreign policy: to enhance the security of the nation and to provide for the well-being of its citizenry. The first goal involves defense policy--the development of a country's military potential--and the attempt to influence the actions of other countries, whether by organizing them in efforts of collective defense or by creating an environment which is favorable to that country. The second fundamental goal includes those objectives the pursuance of which bears no obvious relation to national security. In the period with which this paper is concerned, the following objectives could be included: reciprocal trade; economic aid to underdeveloped countries; participation in international organizations; space research; and cultural interchange.

It is helpful at this point to take a closer look at the realities of the first goal--national security. No
lengthy documentation is needed to prove that the policies of the United States toward Soviet Russia in the present decade have been more concerned with security objectives than have its policies toward Canada and India. Russia poses a perceived threat to the United States; Canada and India do not. The United States will naturally be less motivated by security considerations in dealing with its friends than with its avowed diplomatic enemies. Let us then compare the security objectives of the United States and the Soviet Union.

American National Security Objectives

There are six specific objectives of U.S. security policy. The first objective of U.S. policy is to find a peaceful basis for relationship with the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. Every American leader since World War II has stated this as the prime objective of security policy. As the world begins to change and as grandiose military solutions become mutually ruled out, the goal of the United States is to develop a *modus vivendi*, a more agreeable way to live with the Soviet Union in the same world.

Objective number two is the prevention of all wars. If this goal is not attained clearly all other goals—including "winning over communism"--become relatively meaningless. The anticipated cost of a large- or small-scale nuclear war, as every modern president of the
United States has realized, makes this goal one of preeminence.

Objective number three is closely related to the first two. This goal has been exhaustively discussed in and out of government. Let us use a kind of shorthand here and say that the objective calls for the maintenance of an "adequate" level of military posture that deters aggression.\(^9\) The effect of this objective is that military preparedness, quite apart from specific crises, has a tendency to escalate.\(^10\) Moreover, the continuous change in military technology creates a continuing apprehension that any temporary balance may be upset by future developments. Research must be pursued on a very broad plane to preclude the possibility that the opponent will score an unmatchable breakthrough in a weapons system. The best protection is normally judged to be to move to production oneself.\(^11\)

The fourth goal of American security policy is to

\(^9\)For a detailed discussion of this objective, see Lyndon B. Johnson,"A Special Message to Congress," Congressional Record, XXXVI (Jan. 18, 1965), 1-2.

\(^10\)Morgenthau, Singer and Phillip Green scathingly criticize maintenance of a spectrum military posture on this point.

\(^11\)The proponents of a new anti-ballistic missile system constantly argue that the Soviets have developed a "new" warhead capable of carrying several nuclear devices and that the United States must move to production a new ABM system to counteract the Soviet breakthrough.
master the arms race; to moderate it, preferably to reverse it, and to create new arrangements for military security which conform to the new realities of our age. In his first State of the Union message a few days after his inauguration, President Kennedy announced:

I have already taken steps to co-ordinate and expand our disarmament effort—to increase our programs of research and study—and to make arms control a central goal of our national security policy under my direction. The deadly arms race, and the huge resources it absorbs have too long overshadowed all else we must do. We must prevent that arms race from spreading to new nations, to new powers with nuclear capability and to the reaches of outer space.

This means a wide variety of arms control measures and control of the environment so that "Nth" countries will not acquire the ability to provoke war or entangle the superpowers.

The fifth vital American interest is in winning the battle against communism in the developing societies. There seems to be a popular belief among present-day American elites that communism must be halted in the emerging nations if the United States is to protect herself from a communist takeover. In his first major defense statement, President

---

12This objective seems wholly inconsistent with the previous objective.

Kennedy had this to say about communist "wars of liberation" in the emerging societies:

The free world's security can be endangered not only by a nuclear attack, but also by being slowly nibbled away at the periphery, regardless of our strategic power, by forces of subversion, infiltration and intimidation, indirect or nonovert aggression, internal revolution, diplomatic blackmail, or a series of limited wars.

In this area of local wars, we must inevitably count on the co-operative efforts of other peoples and nations who share our concern. Indeed, their interests are more often directly engaged in such conflicts. The self-reliant are also those whom it is easiest to help—and for these reasons we must continue and reshape the military assistance program.

The last sentence of the presidential statement suggests an interaction of objective number five and objective number three. Countries threatened by a communist regime should be given military aid with which to maintain a posture against such an incident. Secretary McNamara was more explicit:

To deal with the Communists (in the developing areas) requires some shift in our security thinking. We have been used to developing big weapons and mounting large forces. Here we must work with companies and squads, and individual soldiers, rather than battle groups and divisions. In all four services we are training fighters who can, in turn, teach the people of free nations how to fight for their freedom. At the same time our strategic weapons are becoming more and more sophisticated, we must learn to simplify our tactical weapons,

---

so that they can be used and maintained by men who have never seen a machine more complicated than a well sweep.15

The last national security objective of the United States is to be first in space; to assure that these regions will not be used as touchstones for aggressive attacks on the United States. By securing positions of dominance in space, American elites hope to pre-empt its use for military purposes by another power. This objective is closely intertwined with the first three. An insight into U.S. security policy in space can perhaps best be obtained from Robert S. McNamara's reply to congressional committee questioning early in 1963:

I think there is no clear requirement for military purposes for United States operations in space as we look at the future today. However, whether there will be a military requirement in the future, I don't know. But should one develop, it could come so quickly in a field in which the lead time for developmental technology is so long that I believe we must anticipate that possibility today by carrying out certain of the development work associated with putting a man in space for military purposes.16

Soviet National Security Objectives

In the last fifteen years there has grown up a considerable new body of Soviet strategic thought on the employment of security power. One of the striking aspects of recent strategic studies is the close attention that has been devoted to U.S. security thinking. It should not, therefore, be surprising that there exist many parallels in Soviet and American security policy. Oskar Morgenstern, for example, has pointed out: "In their approach to many (security) issues, entire pages could, by substituting the words Soviet Union and the United States for each other, be used for describing the American situation." U.S. security objectives, as we have seen,


18Oskar Morgenstern as quoted in Robert D. Crane (ed.), Soviet Nuclear Strategy, A Critical Appraisal (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, 1963), p. 44. Many argue that Soviet security policy is implemented in reaction to American objectives and vice versa. This condition of action-reaction has a tendency to reaffirm the original policy, thereby reinforcing hostile suspicions. It is suggested that this condition will continue until the two countries reach a level of hostility that verges on the brink of violence. The result is a fabricated predicament of dangerous proportions and effects. This type of argument is
might be summarized as peace, the deterrence of all wars, the defeat of aggression, peaceful solutions to conflict and disarmament. Similarly, Soviet objectives speak of preserving and strengthening peace and developing the world socialist system, of deterring world war, of curbing imperialist aggression, of peaceful coexistence and of general and complete disarmament.¹⁹

The key to the real differences in Soviet and U.S. objectives is revealed by the underlined words. Thus the Soviets are interested in peace to the extent that at any particular time it may seem the best situation within which to promote the development of communism. "Peaceful coexistence," said N. S. Khrushchev, "must be correctly understood. Co-existence is a continuation of the conflict between two social systems, but by peaceful means, without war . . . for the triumph of communism throughout the world."²⁰


¹⁹These objectives are summarized from Sokolovsky's work. They are explained and described in greater detail in the following paragraphs. V. I. Sokolovsky, op. cit., pp. 98-100, 102-107, 271-274, 384.

However, the Soviets are not—like the United States—necessarily interested in deterring all wars. They hope to deter world war because they recognize the disadvantages for them. On the other hand, they actively support so-called "just wars of liberation" as a method of promoting communism in situations where they have a strategic advantage. Premier Khrushchev's speech of January 6, 1961, belongs to that species of policy statements in which the communist leadership discloses its interpretation of communist dogma and sets forth the long-range objectives of their policy. In the speech, Khrushchev redefined the use of war as an instrument of the communist revolution. Khrushchev admonished his listeners to distinguish between various kinds of war: "A war of liberation of a people for its independence is a sacred war. We recognize such wars."\(^{21}\) By his definition, such wars fall within the framework of peaceful co-existence, and aggression occurs only when the United States—the imperialists—seek to block developing area advances by force or by non-violent methods. Among the resolutions adopted by the 22nd Congress of the CPSU were the following:

The 22nd Party Congress considers it necessary to: steadily and consistently implement the

\(^{21}\)N. S. Khrushchev, A speech delivered to a Meeting of the Party Organizations in the Higher Party School, Jan. 6, 1961, *Current Digest*, XIII, No. 1, 3-4.
principle of the peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems as the general security policy of the Soviet Union; develop and deepen cooperation with the national liberation armies fighting for independence from colonial oppression; . . . .

With regard to the developing areas, Soviet security policy speaks in terms of "national liberation movements" but does not discuss in detail the strategies appropriate to these movements. It is difficult to find evidence of substantial military expenditures in aid of such revolutions. Indeed, Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley categorically state that the Russians do not officially send arms to the emerging nations. However, the U.S. State Department, in 1962, listed military aid as totaling ten per cent of the Soviet-bloc credits to the developing areas. The bulk of this military aid purportedly went to Egypt and Indonesia. Suffice it to say, for present purposes, that Soviet interest in the emerging world has relatively few security connotations--at least at face value.

22"Resolutions Adopted by the 22nd Party Congress," Pravda, November 7, 1962, Current Digest, XIV, No. 7, 58.


The stated Soviet objective of total and complete disarmament seems to go further than the American desires in this regard. Premier Khrushchev stated on June 15, 1961:

If these disarmament proposals of ours are accepted, the peoples will forever be rid of the heavy burden of the arms race. We have stated, and I repeat, categorically, that if the Western powers agree to general and total disarmament, the Soviet Union is ready to accept any system of control. . . . In order to preserve and strengthen peace, it is necessary to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament with effective control. The Soviet Union has repeatedly proposed that nuclear missiles be ended, that all weapons, including all stockpiles of nuclear bombs and their production banned forever.25

Published views on Soviet space policy have undergone rapid change in the past two years. Prior to 1962, the Soviets claimed that their space program was directed only toward peaceful and scientific use. While they continue to articulate a peaceful intent, they now argue that demonstrated U.S. intentions to exploit space for military purposes have made it necessary for the Soviets also to consider using space for military purposes.26 Thus they


26This point will be enlarged upon in the next chapter under the subheading of space research. For instant
no longer insist that the military use of space is illegal and they point to Soviet space exploits as a clear demonstration of their superiority over the United States—a superiority which includes the capability of placing nuclear weapons in orbit and delivering them accurately to any part of the globe. The implication of their shifting attitudes toward space warfare is not yet completely apparent, although a former Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force has concluded that this is the area in which "one of us probably will find the key to the strategic superiority of the 1970's."^27

Finally, any consideration of national security policy must deal with the organizational machinery by which it is devised and implemented. It will not serve the purposes of this study to dwell upon the bureaucratic structures of national security policy-making. However, for purposes that will become apparent in the next chapter, there is a structure deemed worthy of note: the elite advisory body on national security matters.

---


28As quoted in Robert D. Crane, Soviet Nuclear Strategy, op. cit., p. 62. Developments such as this one would seem to lend credence to the action-reaction-self-fulfilling-prophesy syndrome as suggested by Kautsky, "Myth," op. cit., see note 18, pp. 26-27 of this paper.
The American National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947. Its stated function is to advise the President with respect to the "integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters of national security."\(^{29}\) Furthermore, the duties of the Council are "to assess and appraise" the objectives and commitments of the United States in relation "to its actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security," for the purposes of making recommendations to the President.\(^ {30}\)

The National Security Act also provided the United States with a tightly organized intelligence system. Section 102 (d) spells out the function of this agency. The Central Intelligence Agency shall advise the National Security Council concerning such activities as affect the national security.\(^ {31}\) Thus the CIA acts as the eyes and ears of the president, through the National Security Council, in foreign relations involving the


\(^{30}\)Ibid. at 497, U.S.C.A. 403.

\(^{31}\)Ibid. at 499, U.S.C.A. 407.
national security of the United States.

The CIA presents a peculiar paradox among the many stemming from the conflict between security and American values. At the entrance to the CIA headquarters is the inscription: "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." Yet the CIA does not confirm or deny published reports; never explains its organizations; never identifies its personnel; and will not discuss its budget, its method of operation, or its sources of information. So the citizen, as far as the CIA's managers are concerned, cannot, in fact, know the truth about an agency, the directorship of which has been described as "second only in importance to the President."

This situation confronts the American system of government with a two-sided problem: how can there be public control over functions that require secrecy; and how can the effective operation of a two-party system of government

---

32 CIA's attachment to this inscription reflects the belief of intelligence professionals in the existence of an objective "truth" in world affairs. If "all facts" are gathered, they seem to assume, then the problems of policymakers are virtually self-solving. This myth is shared by many policymakers. See P. W. Blackstock, The Strategy of Subversion (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1964), pp. 43-49.

33 CIA, "The Central Intelligence Agency" (mimeo for restricted circulation), Spring, 1961, pp. 7-9. Existence of this pamphlet, itself, seems inconsistent with the policy contained therein.

be assured when control of the Executive branch gives the party in power a potentially exclusive access to essential information in the field of foreign security policy.\(^{35}\)

The first aspect of the foregoing dilemma has certain ramifications which are significant to this study. The statute creating the CIA provides explicitly that the Agency and the National Security Council are not decision-making bodies. Intelligence agencies must have this detachment from policy in order to assure the most forthright reporting on international affairs. However, the secrecy aspect of such an agency allows its functionaries either to develop its own policies or to lose contact with the informational needs of the elite.\(^{36}\) When this condition occurs the intelligence network is no longer merely an instrument of policy but, in fact, wields "invisible" power either in the policy-making process,\(^{37}\) or in clandestine

\(^{35}\)These two problems form the crux of H. H. Ransom's thesis in Can America Survive the Cold War? (New York: Doubleday, 1963).


\(^{37}\)The concept of the "invisible" policy-maker is described in William M. McGovern, Strategic Intelligence and the Shape of Tomorrow (Chicago: Regnery, 1961), pp. 23-28.
operations in other countries. The effect of this dilemma will be explored in the next chapter.

Let us now turn to the institutional role of foreign intelligence in Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet Union understandably publishes little information about its function. The description presented here is pieced together from fragmentary information publicly accessible.

We are not directly concerned here with the Secret-Police institutions for internal security of the Soviet state against its enemies. The institutions that are directly involved in the foreign policy process are those concerned with foreign espionage. These have been part of the Secret Police throughout its history. The Central Committee for State Security is composed of subdivisions of three varieties: Main Administrations distinguished by function.

The First Main Administration (Foreign Directorate) is charged with five continuing tasks: (a) collection of strategic intelligence regarding foreign countries; (b) manufacture and dissemination of long-range propaganda;

---

38 For a good discussion of intervention in foreign internal politics see H. B. Westerfield, The Instruments of America's Foreign Policy (New York: Crowell, 1963), pp. 401-491.

39 For a concise history of Soviet intelligence institutions, see Triska and Finley, op. cit., p. 46.

40 Ibid., p. 47.
(c) surveillance of Soviet citizens abroad; (d) penetration and neutralization of anti-Soviet organizations abroad; and (e) supervision of intelligence efforts of other Soviet intelligence organizations.

According to E. A. Andreevich, the operators of the First Main Administration work through various Missions to foreign countries. I could find reliable information on the Mission in Burma to provide an example.

The Political Intelligence group in Burma was the largest (eleven members) and most authoritative. It was directed and staffed by the KGB (Committee for State Security) and was primarily an operational agency. Its primary objective was penetration and subversion of the local political regime through active participation in the domestic party struggle. Analysis and gathering of information was secondary. According to Kaznacheev, none of the policy decisions themselves were made from the mission. These emanated from Moscow, or, probably in most cases, from the Party leadership.


43Ibid., pp. 188-202.
Some account should be taken here of the context in which the Soviet Mission has been described. The circumstances both of time and place undoubtedly mean that some of the specifics are applicable only to Burma. It is to be expected that different environments would reveal different organizational emphases. However, the general structure and function of the Foreign Directorate in a developing country is representative.

The foregoing summary of Soviet-American security objectives is designed to give the reader some perspective when he encounters the "non-security" objectives of Chapter II. Each of these security objectives will be repeated in Chapter II when it becomes involved with the attainment of a particular non-security objective. The next chapter, therefore, will concern itself with three considerations: first, the nonsecurity objectives of the United States and the Soviet Union are presented; second, Soviet-American non-security objectives are compared for compatibility and divergence; and third, these objectives are analyzed in view of the various aspects of security objectives to demonstrate the effect security objectives have upon the attainment of non-security objectives.
It is to be recalled that there are five subcategories of "non-security" foreign policy objectives: foreign trade; foreign aid; aid to international organizations; space research; and cultural interchange. Soviet and American objectives in each of these subcategories are discussed below. The last part of the discussion in each of the subcategories is devoted to an analysis of the objectives in the light of national security policy.

Foreign Trade

United States Objectives

Emergence of an increasingly prosperous, internally cohesive European Common Market in the early 1960's signaled the end of a long era in American international economic relations. American policy-makers could follow one of two courses. They could endeavor to insulate the American economic system from the impact of growing competition abroad. Or, they could chart a new course in the direction of liberalized and expanded trade by endeavoring to promote the maximum exchange of goods and services throughout the
world. Under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, a number of advisors vigorously advocated the former course. According to this point of view, America's economic welfare would be promoted to the extent that segments of American industry damaged by imports would be shielded by high tariffs designed to protect the system from "unfair" competition.¹

The Kennedy Administration decided against this policy. In its view, the economic well-being of the nation would be far better served by imaginative policies seeking to expand global trade—even if this meant significant reduction in American trade barriers. The overall conclusion, in the words of a writer for the Wall Street Journal, was that "it would be folly to suppose that other nations would lower their tariff barriers against American goods while the United States is putting fresh obstacles in the way of imports."²

These were the principal factors in inducing the Kennedy Administration to sponsor a new tariff measure called the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. TEA preserved the earlier idea of reciprocal tariff reductions, but it also

¹For an argument in support of this position, see Douglas McCarthur II, "United States Trade Relations with the New Europe," Department of State Bulletin, #48 (Feb. 4, 1963), p. 178.

added new features not found in former trade legislation. The bill provided that: (1) authority be granted to the President to reduce tariff rates on a reciprocal basis; (2) authority be given to the President to eliminate tariffs altogether on products in which the United States and the Common Market countries collectively account for more than eighty per cent of global trade; (3) authority be given to American negotiators to secure reciprocal tariff agreements on categories of products instead of having to secure agreements on thousands of individual items that might be traded between the United States and other countries; (4) there be no tariff cuts on imports when a danger exists that U.S. defense industries might be damaged by tariff reductions.  

The TEA was designed to fulfill President Kennedy's conception of a "bold new instrument" for achieving American goals, which he summarized as follows:

1. to increase U.S. competition opportunities in overseas markets;
2. to discourage U.S. economic isolation;
3. to prevent domestic inflation;
4. to increase export surplus;
5. to achieve equilibrium in the U.S. balance.

---

3These and other provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 are discussed in Congressional Quarterly Almanac, XVIII (1962), 249-295.
of payments.\textsuperscript{4}

\textbf{Soviet Objectives}

The first appearance of a specifically stated Soviet foreign trade policy came in Khrushchev's formulation of the 1961 Central Committee Report. It is not surprising that resolutions on the international economic scene later adopted by the Soviet Congress assiduously followed Khrushchev's themes. According to the First Secretary himself, the report had been scrutinized and approved by each member of the Politburo.\textsuperscript{5} The Central Committee had presumably inspected and ratified the text when meeting for that purpose a week before the Congress opened.

There were six major themes regarding Soviet foreign trade policy. The following formulations are my summaries, using so far as possible the words of the original:

"Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the XXIInd Party Congress--Report by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev."\textsuperscript{6} The Central Committee Report

\begin{footnotes}


\footnote{6}Ibid., pp. 43-46.
\end{footnotes}
not only described the international environment but located the Soviet Union within it and identified tasks for the Soviet Union with regard to it. The position of the U.S.S.R. included the following trade objectives:

1. to improve mutually advantageous economic ties with the socialist countries on the basis of long-term coordinated plans;
2. to seek normalized relations with the United States, built on principles of peaceful economic competition;
3. to seek a greater volume of trade with the non-socialist countries and the reduction of obstacles to trade;
4. to expand petroleum lines in Europe;
5. to seek a Soviet-Japanese trade agreement and to develop cooperation with the great powers of Asia and Indonesia on a business-like basis.

If one were to compare the foreign trade objectives of the two countries, he would find that they are quite similar. Both countries seek to expand foreign trade with other nations of the world. In doing so, both hope that the domestic picture will improve: the Soviets in terms of advancing production; the Americans in terms of increasing internal economic competition and of meeting the balance
of payments. The Soviets seek new sources of supply to speed their rate of industrialization. They are willing to secure such supplies both from the countries of Western Europe and the United States. The Americans lowered tariffs to increase the volume of imports in order to achieve a parity in the balance of payments and to stimulate competition internally and with the European Economic Community.

There is one point of divergence. The United States maintains a list of "strategic goods" to protect its defense industries. These goods are protected by high tariffs and other restrictions. Briefly, the essence of the "strategic list" is as follows: if a certain industry is vital to national security it is desirable to ensure a market for domestic producers by granting protection. In this manner, domestic sources of supply will be built up. It is relatively easy, and I suspect quite natural, for an industry to persuade the Tariff Commission or Congress to allow them to come under the national security umbrella.7 The tuna fish industry has argued, with support of the Navy, that it is affected by national security considerations since it

supplies vessels in war time. The lace manufacturers have claimed defense status since they produce mosquito nets. "In the name of national security, the dairy lobby succeeded in restricting imports of foreign cheese . . . and the lead-pencil manufacturers claimed defense status because pencils were 'indispensable.'" The absurdity of these seemingly altruistic claims illustrates the strong tendency for vested interests to wrap themselves in the vestiges of national security policy.

These discriminatory restrictions not only decrease the volume of U.S. imports, but they have the effect of making it more difficult for the Soviet Union to sell in the West, and therefore adversely affects the expansion of East-West trade. Particular harm to East-West trade is done by uncertainty about changes in the strategic list and by divergent application of the rules by different countries. Thus chemical machinery exported by Britain or West Germany may contain items covered by American patents, whereupon the United States applies its more restrictive

---

9Vernon, "Foreign Trade . . ." op. cit., p. 80.
10Ibid., p. 79.
definition and impedes sale to the socialist countries.\textsuperscript{11} The case of the ban on exports of steel pipe is an even worse one.

In 1961, shortly before a French-Soviet trade agreement was consummated, the United States placed steel pipe on its list of strategic goods. The agreement involved sale of this commodity to the Soviet Union, who intended to use the pipe to increase the volume of oil export to Eastern and Western Europe. The French reluctantly honored the strategic ban. According to Soviet comment, the agreement would have tripled the 1957 trade volume between the two countries. The spirit of mutual understanding surrounding the negotiations was unprecedented and strategic restrictions observed by France were deplored as the only obstacles to an even closer relationship.\textsuperscript{12} It may be that the cancellation of the undertaking to supply steel pipe contributed to the failure of the EEC to fulfill the plan for gas in 1964, and so led to a fuel shortage.\textsuperscript{13} It is a matter of opinion that fear of repetition of such tactics

\textsuperscript{11}For further discussion of this transaction, see B. Balassa, \textit{Trade Liberalization Among Industrial Countries} (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 32-37.


must affect the willingness of Eastern planners to rely on Western suppliers for important items. It is a matter not of opinion but of obvious certainty that such acts will not encourage East-West trade expansion.

American relaxation of strategic trade restrictions might lead to a broader range of Western European—particularly German—exports to the Soviet Union. Indeed, many Germans argue that since the Bonn government rules out most negotiations with Eastern European states, trade relations offer a means of establishing personal contacts which may eventually wean the East Germans away from Moscow.  

The Soviets have not been innocent of the aforementioned restrictions. They simply employ a different tactic. The Russians have made attempts to increase foreign trade, but relative to their total trade volume, relations with non-socialist countries have remained quite small. When the Soviets do trade with countries outside their orbit, it is likely to be with smaller states like

---


Egypt or Burma. Egyptian cotton sent to Russia was dropped on the West German markets at low prices thus damaging the local markets for Egyptian cotton. The same has been true of Burmese rice. This evidence indicates that Soviet trade, up to the present, has been more of a "come on" device to cause dissension in the Western World than a device to create firm associations through the exchange of goods.

It will be recalled that there is a mutual design on the part of both countries to expand foreign trade to improve domestic economies. The cost of maintaining and improving a spectrum level military posture has a significant effect on the attainment of that goal. In 1963, the United States experienced a $4.3 billion deficit in its balance of payments. In the same year the United States spent $4.1 billion on nuclear weapons alone. It could be argued that a reduction of nuclear arms spending could be used to cover the balance of payments deficit. In any case, a re-allocation of resources under arms control could


18 Ibid., p. 198.
ease the U.S. balance problem by reducing the need for imports of both industrial and mineral products.

A reduction in military procurement would also alleviate some of the Soviet economic problems by freeing for civilian purposes some of the best resources in the Soviet economy. These specialized resources are needed and presently lacking for the expansion of Soviet industry.19 Arms reduction would also permit the Soviet regime to release labor for the civilian economy, as it did in 1955, when two million men were demobilized.20 Such additional manpower would make it easier to increase agricultural output. More equipment, fertilizer, herbicides and pesticides from the chemical industry, which has neglected these products to concentrate on military items such as plastics and fuels for missiles, could be used to increase agricultural production.21 There seems to be complete agreement that a cutback in arms spending, particularly in the Soviet Union, would give a tremendous boost to internal economic


development. Military spending, as it exists today, can only hinder and delay economic progress in both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Foreign Aid

United States Objectives

In his annual Budget Message to Congress for 1963, President Kennedy stressed the following principles as American foreign aid objectives:

1. to promote the economic development of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America;
2. to give assistance in relation to the ability and willingness of developing countries to help themselves;
3. to make loans on reasonable terms rather than grants and to accept payment in dollars rather than local currency;
4. to secure participation in foreign assistance by other industrialized nations and to increase

22James L. Clayton argues that defense expenditures served as a catalyst to push California's growth rate to unprecedented levels. As a result, according to Clayton, the economy of the whole state was given new impetus and a lofty position of political power. He does, however, leave the reader with the question of whether such a concentration of defense spending is really "good" for California. See James L. Clayton, "Defense Spending: Key to California's Growth," printed in Davis B. Bobrow, Components of Defense Policy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 175-190.
the role of private resources in assistance;
5. to support the steady growth of responsible, independent governments which will not be hostile to the West.23

Several significant trends in the formulation and administration of the foregoing objectives have proved noteworthy. A fundamental one has been the evolution from primary reliance upon economic assistance (1948-1952), to primary reliance on military assistance (from 1952-1959), to establishment of a rough equilibrium between these two categories (1960-1965).24

Second, the shift from outright grants to loans as the basic element in American foreign aid programs has been pronounced. During the era of the Marshall Plan, some ninety per cent of all American aid consisted of grants to other countries; by 1964, sixty per cent of all aid consisted of loans, often made on long-term bases with low interest rates.25

Third, there has been a tendency toward greater selectivity in the provision of American foreign assistance.

In the face of mounting legislative criticism of the foreign aid program, executive officials have carried out repeated reorganization of the principles which guide the extension of foreign assistance to other nations. 26 By the early 1960's, David E. Bell, administrator of AID, said that his agency was following a policy of "careful selectivity" in making aid allocations:

We are stressing aid to those countries where the United States interest is most urgent, which are in a position to make the best use of our help, and where other donors cannot supply all the aid needed. As a result, of the $2.2 billion committed to 82 countries by AID in fiscal year 1963, four-fifths went to only 20 countries. 27

As was noted above, United States foreign aid can be divided into two basic categories: military and non-military assistance. To put the matter into some perspective, the following table shows the types of aid dealt with in the annual Foreign Assistance Act.

The information in Table 1 demonstrates one fundamental characteristic of U.S. foreign aid. Military expenditures consistently account for one-half of the total foreign aid budget and have taken as much as a fifty-eight

26 For a critical look at the legislative study referred to here, see "Report of the Clay Commission on Foreign Aid," Political Science Quarterly, LXXVIII (Sept. 1963), 321-361.

27 AID, Foreign Aid . . . , op. cit., p. 10.
TABLE 1
U.S. FOREIGN AID APPROPRIATIONS, 1960-1965\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development Loans</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Grants</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance for Progress(^b)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous(^c)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Non-Military</td>
<td>1620</td>
<td>1725</td>
<td>2225</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>1620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Assistance</td>
<td>1720</td>
<td>1374</td>
<td>1450</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting Assistance(^d)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Military</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1649</td>
<td>1725</td>
<td>2160</td>
<td>1805</td>
<td>1590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Foreign Aid</td>
<td>3580</td>
<td>3390</td>
<td>3960</td>
<td>4110</td>
<td>3640</td>
<td>3340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^b\)Excludes technical assistance and development grants. Some part of this expenditure undoubtedly went for military purposes, although it was difficult to determine the percentage.

\(^c\)Includes appropriations for the Contingency Fund, International organizations, Administrative Expenses, and American schools and hospitals abroad.

\(^d\)Supporting assistance is designed to assure access to strategic military bases and to enable the maintenance of larger armed forces for the common defense. South Korea, South Vietnam, Laos and Jordan have consistently received eighty per cent of these funds.
per cent slice of the assistance appropriations. Another striking fact is that President Johnson's first foreign aid budget was sharply reduced. Military appropriations, however, remained stabilized.

**Soviet Objectives**

In his Central Committee Report to the XXIIIrd Party Congress in March, 1966, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev concluded his section devoted to the developing areas by succinctly restating the Soviet foreign aid policy formulated by Chairman Khrushchev ten years earlier: "Our Party and the Soviet State will continue . . . ."

1. to promote the economic development of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America;
2. to finance projects which contribute to the industrialization of the recipients;
3. to limit aid to loans with low interest rates;
4. to accept repayment of loans in commodities which the borrowers traditionally export;
5. to grant assistance without imposing political or economic conditions;
6. to support the steady growth of responsible, independent governments which will not be
Drawing heavily upon a perceptive article by David Beim, let us examine how closely the Soviets have followed these objectives. Early Soviet commitments can generally be classified as efforts for temporary assistance to balance American aid. Soviet aid was concentrated in spectacular projects such as stadiums, hotels and dams, which appealed to the target regimes but accomplished little more. In subsequent years most of the Soviet aid sought economic development. Beim, analyzing all communist party aid through 1963, comes to the conclusion that eighty-five per cent was devoted to establishing and maintaining economic development.

According to Beim, the Soviets hoped to develop ideological compatibility with the recipient countries by playing upon the developing areas' susceptibility to charges of Western imperialist motives and drawing maximum international attention to each commitment. However, to the

28Pravda, March 30, 1966, as translated in Current Digest, XVIII, No. 7, 23-37. To note the parallels between Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's position see the former's speech to the XXth Congress, Pravda, Feb. 17, 1956, as translated in Current Digest, VIII, No. 4, 6-7.


30Ibid., p. 794.
discomfiture of the USSR, the anti-imperialist dynamics did not extend to the adoption of Soviet political forms or support for Soviet international positions. For example, while Nassar was eager to accept Soviet assistance at Aswan Dam, he was not willing to take a benevolent attitude toward domestic communists. Quite the contrary—he suppressed the Communist Party in Egypt. Iraq, also cultivated by Soviet economic aid, similarly turned resistant toward a perceived internal communist threat. The list of disappointments could be extended. Suffice it to say, in late 1960 the Soviet Union abruptly suspended new aid commitments.

Soviet leadership resumed making new aid commitments in the latter half of 1963, now apparently hoping for recipient neutrality. By 1964, the Soviet Union again announced extensions of $890 million. This amount was consistently increased and reached a peak of $1265 million in 1965. Relative to the Soviet gross national product, this sum approximates the amount of assistance granted to the new world by the United States in that year.

According to Beim, Soviet military assistance is


primarily "a verbal contingency promise." Soviet policy appears to be restricted to the assurance that in the event they should be attacked they may be confident of Soviet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOVIET FOREIGN AID TO THE DEVELOPING AREAS, 1959-65a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Millions</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>'60</th>
<th>'61</th>
<th>'62</th>
<th>'63</th>
<th>'64</th>
<th>'65</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States dollars.</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>1265</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>1154.5</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1090</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>900</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>800</td>
<td>748.5</td>
<td>800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>700</td>
<td></td>
<td>700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>600</td>
<td>552.2</td>
<td>600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
<td>171.4</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

assistance.33 Doubtless, sizable quantities of arms have been delivered piecemeal to rebellious factions in countries as yet unfreed from "colonial bondage." But this has not formally involved the Soviet state.34 Apparently, the encouragement of social disorder through military means contradicts Soviet efforts to woo insecure regimes; this gambit is left to the Chinese.

In comparing the foreign aid objectives of the United States and the Soviet Union, a substantial amount of compatibility is evident. Both countries seek to promote economic development in the third world and to foster the growth of responsible, independent governments. A substantial proportion of the assistance granted by both countries is in the form of loans, rather than gifts. The two countries differ with respect to the segment of the economy they wish to develop. The Soviets encourage industrial development specifically. The United States seems to be


34See note 23, page 29. According to Geoffry Kent, there was a substantial increase in Soviet arms shipments, particularly to Egypt, in 1967. However, Kent qualifies his figures by stating that "it has not been Soviet policy to provide its clients with what, in Western terms, would be considered a satisfactory military capability." G. Kent, "Strategy and Arms Levels, 1945-1968," Proceedings, Academy of Political Science, XXIX, No. 3 (1969), 21-36.
indifferent as to the area in which the assistance is used. This difference is hardly significant and seemingly complementary. The most notable divergence is the manner in which the aid is distributed. The United States allocates more than half of its aid to be used for military purposes. The Soviet Union earmarks nearly all of its aid for economic development. This distinction holds ramifications for the instant thesis.

What has happened, then, is that the United States and the Soviet Union have assumed the task of "neutralization" of the developing areas as a means of supplementing the effect of mutual deterrence. A program of fostering economic development and military posture has been seized upon by both powers as a means of limiting the expansion of the other.

However, as long as aid is given as a tactic of security policy, a certain number of disastrous consequences for the future of the new world will develop. The maintenance of foreign aid as a tactical weapon of security policy has lead to impressive military expenditures in the underdeveloped countries. Military aid is bound to have an impact upon the distribution of political power within a recipient country; it can also have a deleterious effect
upon the economic system of that country. Military aid incites the country to engage in unproductive arms expenditures, which become weapons in the hands of opposing groups within each country. Each group strives to use the arms to further its own particular interest, thereby disrupting the political development of the country and deeming impossible achievement of the very goal the contributing country intends.

Political disruption and unproductive arms expenditures frustrate the economic development of the country and prevent it from entering the world market except for the sale of raw materials and agricultural commodities. All manufactured goods must continue to be purchased abroad. Instead of attempting to encourage efficiency through investment of "social overhead capital," the assisting countries have encouraged small arms races. The recipient countries are thus unable to satisfy the national demand for the goods of a modern society.

This is also the appropriate place to note the effect of a large amount of foreign aid on the United States economy itself. As was noted in the section on foreign trade, the United States has been running large

35 This point is reaffirmed by Hans Morgenthau in "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," American Political Science Review, LVI (June 1962), 301-310.
international deficits, which have averaged some $4 billion per year and which in the second quarter of 1963 rose to an annual equivalent rate of over $5 billion. This is the same year that $1.6 billion in U.S. military assistance was granted to the developing areas.

The problem arises out of the nature of the deficits themselves. These deficits have not originated in the merchandise balance of trade, which has usually shown substantial surpluses. Rather, the main deficit items have been direct military expenditures abroad and the portion of U.S. foreign economic assistance earmarked for military use. The dilemma is that neither of these two items can be reduced by domestic monetary restraint. Foreign military aid and foreign military expenditures are, therefore, direct causes of U.S. balance of payments deficits and will continue to be unless (1) the volume of trade is significantly increased to create a larger surplus or (2) military assistance is discontinued.

---


37 For convenient reference see Table 2, page 52.

Participation in International Organizations

United States Objectives

The financial troubles besetting the United Nations operations had become sufficiently grave by 1962 to require new measures for raising funds if the organization's activities were not to founder on the rocks of bankruptcy. Accordingly, the United States proposed the floating of a $200 million bond issue (American officials proposed that the United States, itself, purchase half the bonds), together with a series of steps designed to relieve the UN of its financial distress. When this request was presented to Congress, it precipitated a lengthy and sometimes heated debate between legislative and executive officials, concerning the American role in the United Nations.

In the end, Congress reluctantly accepted a modified version of the Kennedy Administration's request for massive American support in solving the UN's financial crisis. Congress authorized the Treasury Department to purchase up to a total of $100 million; the Treasury was prohibited, however, from making total purchases in excess

---


of the total purchase by all other countries. The Congressional authorization in this particular instance was important for two reasons: (1) it marked a point of careful reconsideration of U.S. objectives in granting assistance to international organizations and (2) these objectives were carefully articulated to serve as guidelines for future participation. The authorization stated that the United States:

1. was ideologically attached to the principle of strengthening international organizations;
2. but, it would take a more critical, restrained look at the work of such organizations;
3. and, it would limit, if possible, large-scale operational responsibilities of the recipient organization.\(^1\)

Let us focus upon U.S. behavior, under the above objectives, with respect to a specialized agency of the UN. The Special Fund is an international agency which has depended exclusively upon voluntary contributions from governments.\(^2\) It was set up in 1959 for the purpose of

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 92-105.

\(^2\)The Special Fund was chosen as an example for two reasons. First, it is funded by voluntary contributions. The contributing countries may lend monetary assistance, but there is no assessment involved. Second, it is an agency about which there was Soviet-American interaction. The interaction typified the effect national security policy has on Soviet-American objectives vis-a-vis international organizations.
financing preparatory and pre-investment projects in various countries to make it possible for technical assistance and development to yield maximum results. In keeping with its mandate, the Fund concentrated on relatively large projects. The sum total of government contributions was $38.5 million in 1960 and over $80 million by 1964. The United States contributed sixty per cent of the total at first, but by 1964 had reduced its share to thirty-seven per cent.43

Soviet Objectives

The attitude of the Soviet Union toward international organizations has changed a great deal in the past two decades. During the lifetime of Stalin, the U.S.S.R. largely ignored the UN, particularly its voluntary programs, or attacked them as imperialist dominated. Certainly it did not contribute to them, since the aid went to countries which were "generally on the wrong side" of the revolution. As new countries came into the UN, the power relationship changed. With the ascendancy of Khrushchev, the General Assembly became dominated by weak nations and began to deal with problems which were merely tangential to major political decisions on international affairs.

Khrushchev and subsequent Soviet leaders adjusted to the new UN. They came to accept the fact major political decisions are not made there. Vietnam is a clear example of the limitations of UN power. The Pakistani-Indian negotiations at Tashkent in 1966 illustrated again that although Security Council resolutions may lead to nothing, comparable decisions may be effectively arrived at outside the UN framework. At the same time, the large membership of the General Assembly appears to preclude serious discussion and negotiation of delicate issues. However, the expenditure of effort by the Soviet Union since Stalin testifies that they do not discount the UN as entirely impotent.

From the foregoing, it might be safely stated that the Soviet Union tries to use the United Nations to advance what it perceives to be its interests. Alexander Dallin makes this point quite convincingly:

Soviet attitudes toward the United Nations and its specialized agencies have ranged from suspicion and scorn to a desire to capitalize on them for material, and especially, political ends.44

Where these interests appear to include frustrating Western policies, Soviets prove themselves accomplished at that art. Where these interests appear to include collaboration across ideological barriers, the Soviets demonstrate

a comparable capacity. In both cases the Soviet Union has found the United Nations an important instrument of its foreign policy.\textsuperscript{45}

The attitude of the Soviet Union toward the UN specialized agencies has been generally favorable. As an authoritative Soviet account explains:

The specialized agencies play a certain role in the development of cooperation among the states in the technical, scientific and other fields. However, their role in the case of peaceful cooperation should not be exaggerated. It is limited by the special framework of its activity. More than that, the essence of certain specialized agencies is manifestly anti-democratic.\textsuperscript{46}

The U.S.S.R. by the mid-fifties began to make small contributions to the specialized agencies. When the Special Fund was established in 1959, the Soviets joined its support with a five per cent contribution.\textsuperscript{47}

The evidence suggests that Soviet support of the Special Fund was not motivated primarily by chauvinistic attitudes. In the eyes of the recipient states, the program had become largely identified with the United States. On a number of occasions, the Soviet delegation to the

\textsuperscript{45}Ibid., p. 45ff.

\textsuperscript{46}R. L. Malinin and S. A. Bobrov, Organizatsiia Ob'edinennykh Natsii (Leningrad, 1960), as cited in Dallin, The Soviet Union . . . , op. cit., p. 70.

Special Fund objected to projects in anti-communist countries like Formosa, South Korea, and South Vietnam, but never forced a separate vote on any one given project.\textsuperscript{48}

In summary, the place of international organizations in Soviet eyes is:

1. to strengthen international organizations, particularly those which will produce a political advantage;

2. to advocate limited expansion of large-scale operational responsibilities by the organizations;

3. to continue a critical approach to the work of such organizations.\textsuperscript{49}

The objectives of the Americans and the Soviets have moved to a point of convergence with regard to attitudes toward international organizations. The Soviets have gone from a position of direct ideological opposition to international organizations to a guarded support of them. The Americans have moved from unconditional support

\textsuperscript{48}Stoessinger, "Financing . . .," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 199.

\textsuperscript{49}M. Lvov summarizes various Soviet policy statements on international organization in "United Nations: Results and Prospects," \textit{International Affairs}, No. 9 (Sept. 1965), especially p. 8ff. This list of objectives was borrowed from Cd. Lvov's study.
of these entities to a rather restrained position. During the period of this study, both countries contributed to the agencies of the United Nations, but both look with jaundiced eye upon any program which might substantially injure the interests of each. Triska and Finley sum these attitudes as follows:

In a way, the United States has developed a tendency to view the economic, social, and cultural activities of the United Nations as one base for its anti-communist program. After initial hesitation, the Soviet Union accepted the challenge; compartmentalization into cultural, economic and social matters on the one hand and political matters on the other was not realistic. In a sense, the USSR came to participate in international functional organizations for the same reasons Stalin had decided to join the League and the United Nations: it was apparently to the political interest of the Soviet Union.50

Consideration of Soviet-American interaction in the Special Fund lends credence to the foregoing summary and provides a touchstone for a discussion of the effect national security policy has on participation in international organization. In 1960, it was recommended to the Special Fund's governing council that twelve UN experts and some equipment be sent to the agricultural station at Santiago, Cuba, to study the fields of tropical husbandry, soil classification, conservation and crop diversification. The proposed project was to last five years. It called

50J. F. Triska and D. D. Finley, Soviet Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 374.
for an allocation from the Special Fund of $1 million. The Cubans were to contribute $2 million.\(^5\)

The project came up for approval before the Governing Council of the Special Fund in May, 1961, a few weeks after the disastrous Bay of Pigs confrontation. Needless to say, the American attitude was not conducive to approval of a project to aid Castro's island. Cuba was perceived to be a vital weakness in United States security system. American security policy dictated that aid to Cuba would not be in its "interest." The American policy toward Cuba was to oppose "any source of aid and comfort to the present regime,"\(^5\) a policy based clearly on security ground. Yet, when the Special Fund was created, it had been agreed, at the insistence of the United States, that "political" considerations would play no part in the allocation of aid; projects were to be determined according to economic criteria.\(^3\) The non-political voting record of the Fund would have been broken had not the American President decided that the United States would lose on a separate vote. The


\(^3\)Ibid., p. 28. The unanimity rule governing the Fund's decision-making process had been unbroken up to consideration of the Cuban Project.
Cuban project was adopted, but not before Congressional and State Department opinion called into question the continuation of the large American contribution to the Fund and other UN assistance. One single project, representing one-half of one per cent of total Special Fund aid, prompted a Congressional examination and subsequent modification of U.S. objectives simply because the project ran headlong into American national security policy.\textsuperscript{54}

The Cuban Project demonstrated that it is extremely difficult for the United States to separate economic from security considerations. This condition is exemplary of Soviet-American attitudes toward international organization. The chief losers are the underdeveloped countries and those in the West who believe that strengthened international bodies can do much to promote international stability and progress.

\textbf{Space Research}

\textbf{United States Objectives}

American space efforts are a product of early military initiative in space. Space emerged as an area of

\textsuperscript{54}According to Richard Gardner, re-examination of U.S. participation in the Special Fund, as described in Hearings on the Special Fund, \textit{op. cit.}, led to a twenty-three per cent decrease in U.S. aid to the Fund. It also led to the fight that occurred over the UN bond issue as discussed supra. For an expanded explanation of this point, see R. N. Gardner, \textit{In Pursuit of World Order} (New York: Praeger, 1966), especially chapter 4.
military competition with the launching of the first Sputnik by the Soviets in October of 1957. The military implications, which were already understood by experts, suddenly became clear to all those who were willing to see. The United States then turned to the task of recouping its military position and prestige. In the next three years, the United States regained its face by surpassing the number of Soviet satellites to a significant degree. It then placed its space efforts under the aegis of the National Space and Aeronautics Administration. NASA was charged with primary responsibility for developing U.S. programs for the peaceful exploration of outer space. The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 declares it to be "the policy of the United States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind."  

President Kennedy, in a news conference on May 9, 1962, outlined U.S. objectives in outer space:  

1. to cooperate in the peaceful exploration of outer space;  
2. to accept Russian proposals for cooperation  

---

55 U.S., Congress, Senate, Special Committee on Space and Aeronautics, National Aeronautics and Space Act, Hearings, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1958, p. 381.  
56 Public Papers of the President--Kennedy, 1962, op. cit., p. 32.
in unmanned exploration of the lunar surface, in mapping the Earth's magnetic field and in establishing joint operational weather satellite systems;

3. to be first in space.

Let us see how well founded these proposals of the President are in fact. There are essentially three different objectives as articulated by Kennedy: peaceful use of space, cooperation with the Soviet Union and a prestige factor—striving to be "first."

Peace.—Though the stress on peace has obvious propaganda purposes, it does have a great deal of operational significance. Most obviously, it very strongly reinforced the decision to place the space program under NASA. And, though there is cooperation between NASA and the Defense Department, NASA has gone to considerable lengths to avoid identification with military endeavors—withdrawning from the geodetic satellite project, for example, when the Department of Defense insisted that it be classified as "secret." 57 The man-in-space program remains under NASA's management despite Air Force ambitions in this field. And, the aura of publicity surrounding the space program obviously emphasizes its civilian, scientific and

exploratory aspects.

Cooperation.—In the period under study, there have only been two instances of Soviet-American cooperation in space: a joint weather satellite system and a joint geodetic mapping system. The significance of these efforts relative to the entire space programs of both countries is discussed below.

Prestige.—The basis of this objective was explained by General Curtis LeMay, former Chief of Staff, United States Air Force: "Maintaining peace in space, as elsewhere, will be accomplished through deterrence." Lyndon Johnson endorsed this theory of "peace," though less clearly:

> If peace is to be maintained on earth, free men must acquire the competency to preserve space as a field of peace before it can be made a new battlefield of tyranny. . . . If we abandon the field, space can be pre-empted by others as an instrument of aggression.

And President Kennedy said, "Only if the United States occupies a position of pre-eminence can we help decide whether this new ocean of space will be a sea of peace, or a terrifying new theater of war." By general consent the United

---


59 Congressional Record, CIX (June 18, 1963), 1.

60 Public Papers ... Kennedy, 1962, op. cit., p. 669.
States must remain "first" in space in order to assure fulfillment of the first objective--peaceful exploration.

Soviet Objectives

E. Korovin, writing for International Affairs (Moscow), indicated that the Soviet Union desired to encourage international cooperation in space and agreed to abide by the rules of the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Korovin cited statements by Russian military leaders that the Soviet Union was totally committed to formal securance of space neutralization and demilitarization.

In a letter to President Kennedy on May 31, 1962, Premier Khrushchev proposed a joint venture between the United States and the Soviet Union. The venture was to include efforts to map the earth's magnetic field and to establish joint operational weather satellites. Two months later, on July 30, 1962, Khrushchev, in no uncertain terms, stated the Soviet objective "to fly the first Russian

61E. Korovin, "Peaceful Co-operation in Outer Space," International Affairs (Moscow), XXXII (March 1962), 32.


63A summary of this letter is printed in the New York Times, June 1, 1962, p. 32.
pennant over lunar soil."64

Thus, Soviet objectives are identical to American objectives in all respects. Both countries strive for peaceful cooperation in the conquest of space. However, the third space objective of each country, when taken together, are unmistakably contradictory; both countries seek to be "first" in space. This objective, when viewed as a matter of prestige, seems non-military in nature. Each country, quite naturally, would like to be first on the moon. Maintenance of pride, however, is a very thin façade. President Kennedy readily admitted that "I do not think the United States can afford to come in second in space, because I think space has too many military implications."65 As was noted in the first chapter of this study, if each country can maintain superiority in space, it reserves the potential to turn its advantage into a military threat. The Soviets recognize this potential and rationalize their efforts to conduct their space program on a unilateral basis as follows:

The Soviet Union, which is resolutely opposed to the utilization of outer space for military purposes, cannot ignore all those preparations of the American imperialists, and is forced to safeguard its security against an attack through

Yet both countries agree that space should not be the subject of competing claims; that cooperative experiments should be undertaken and information exchanged; and that communications among nations should be improved. It is submitted that some kinds of cooperation are virtually imperative for the success of the United States and Soviet programs. NASA faces a very practical need for stations around the world for tracking space probes and receiving telemetered data from them. There will be cooperative requirements for space laboratories and stations for the exploration of other planets in the Solar system.

However, to date, there has been little cooperation between the two countries. In 1963, a joint weather tracking satellite was launched. In early 1964, the United States cooperated with the Soviet Union in a magnetic field mapping venture. It is of significant note that both of these programs were terminated in 1965, when each nation accused the other of using the systems for military purposes. In answer to the concern some members of Congress displayed in reaction to these accusations, Secretary McNamara blithely responded:

I must admit that our operations in space for military purposes are truly quite extensive. We have weather projects, we have mapping and survey projects—all of these for military purposes. We are working on a missile alarm system based partially on the joint U.S.-Soviet satellite operations. . . . We are only indirectly receiving information from the joint operations and only then to reaffirm the data received from our own systems.67

The two instances of Soviet-American cooperation seem slight efforts in view of the overwhelming similarity in objectives. But to have even these ventures terminated because of a particular security need borders on incredulity.

The space environment for a long time will present a physical, not a social challenge; knowledge acquired by all nations will be of inestimable value to those who seek to explore space. The data becoming available is overwhelming, the interconnection of disciplines is too pervasive and the skills of a nation are too dependent, for reasonable progress, on the knowledge of the other. Surely it would be wiser to agree on the common use of national facilities, which would enhance the success of space exploration. Indeed, many argue that cooperation is a necessary prerogative for the achievement of peace.68


68 This objective is the first of those stated by both superpowers.
broadest sense," says the Director of NASA's Office of International Programs,

we are seeking to reduce international tensions to transmute dangerous rivalries and ambitions into constructive communities of interest—in Europe, Latin America and elsewhere, and to establish patterns of cooperation in the world. . . . There has been a tremendous amount of sentiment here and abroad—and especially in the small nations—for international co-operation in exploring space in the hope that this might reduce, rather than expand, the dimensions of the cold war.69

However, as long as outer space represents a potential element of national security policy, both countries will pursue space exploration along unilateral lines. As President Kennedy recognized, "we are all anxious to cooperate in the peaceful exploration of space, but to do so, of course, requires the breakdown of our nuclear barriers of hostility and secrecy."70 As long as these barriers exist, the effectiveness of reaching compatible goals of "peaceful exploration of space" is decreased by a factor of one-half.


Cultural Interchange

United States Objectives

The participants of the Twenty-second American Assembly on Cultural Affairs and Foreign Relations on Oct. 21, 1962, defined cultural affairs as comprising

the broad realm of educational, intellectual, scientific, and artistic activity. They are an essential and integral part of international relations, for they are concerned with contacts between people, the exchange of ideas, and the expression and confrontation of cultural and social ideals. 71

President Kennedy, within a month after taking office, created an Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. In a press statement on Feb. 27, 1961, he said: "... this whole field is urgently in need of imaginative policy development, unification and vigorous direction." He would look to the Secretary of State, aided by the new Assistant Secretary, "to exercise primary responsibility for policy guidance and program direction of governmental activities in this field." 72

Kennedy then appealed to the educational community, private foundations and voluntary organizations for still greater effort, noting that "these institutions represent


our national resource base for helping new countries edu­cationally and strengthening our cultural ties with old ones."\(^{73}\)

Private organizations and the academic community quickly responded to this fresh assertion of federal leadership with new ideas for program improvement, a new willingness to cooperate, and a new burst of private effort. Representatives of many foreign governments also made it clear that they welcomed this new American initiative. Trust and charitable funds were created to help finance cultural programs both in the United States and abroad.\(^{74}\)

Congress contributed to the effort by enacting the Fulbright-Hays Act in the fall of 1961 by an overwhelming majority. The new law consolidated the old Fulbright and Smith-Mundt laws and various other scattered legislative provisions, removed a variety of major obstacles to effective administration, and added several new authorities.\(^{75}\)

\(^{73}\)Ibid., p. 19.

\(^{74}\)Among these institutions were the Pan-American Fund, Asian Fund, American Friends of the Middle East, International Market Institution and the Hamilton Fund. These organizations are noted for reasons that will become obvious later.

Co-sponsor Wayne Hays of Ohio later told the newly appointed U.S. Advisory Commission on International and Cultural Affairs, headed by Dr. John W. Gardner, "this law is intended to give all the possible authority needed to develop the programs adequately. If you don't find what you need, ask your lawyers to look harder."^76

The following objectives received particular attention from the Assistant Secretary's office, working in close cooperation with other federal agencies and numerous private experts and organizations:

1. to put greater emphasis on the AID program on human resource development in Africa, Asia and Latin America as the sine qua non for social development;

2. to provide new educational techniques, curriculum reform and more books for these areas;

3. to improve schools for American dependents and to strengthen American-sponsored schools in the Middle East;

4. to encourage the exchange of educational television programs and films, and to initiate a "reverse flow" of foreign artistic presentations to the United States;

5. to strengthen cultural relations with specific

countries such as Japan, India, Spain, Poland and the Soviet Union. 77

A new phase of U.S. national effort was begun, but there were no miracles and a very great deal remained to be accomplished. Within the federal government, there were still many inherited deficiencies of organization and personnel to be overcome. And not least important was the problem of persuading the reluctant House Appropriations Committee that these activities were as vital to the success of the nation's "well-being" as military expenditures, though requiring far less money. 78

Soviet Objectives

The view has prevailed for many years in the Soviet Union that art, science, and scholarship are instruments of the State and its policies. Soviet representatives are explicit in saying that while they believe in peaceful co-existence between states with different social systems, they do not believe in peaceful co-existence at the


78C. Frankel makes this point in The Neglected Aspect . . . , op. cit., pp. 154-162. The problem of funding various non-security objectives is consistently encountered in the areas of foreign aid, aid to international organizations, and space research. It is particularly mentioned at this point because cultural programs have received the poorest monetary attention of any of the non-security categories.
ideological level.\footnote{Report of the Soviet-American Citizens Conference, Leningrad, 1964, as translated in \textit{Current Digest, op. cit.}, XVI, No. 8, 22-23.} Under the circumstances, it might well seem that genuine Soviet intellectual exchange in ideological areas such as the social sciences, literature and philosophy is impossible.

Despite these ideological barriers, the Soviets created the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in 1957, apparently for the purpose of facilitating cultural relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. According to Frederick Barghoorn, this agency operates \"... to regularize cultural relations, both with the 'bourgeois' and 'socialist' states by means of formal treaties and agreements.\"\footnote{Frederick C. Barghoorn, "Soviet Cultural Effort," \textit{Proceedings, American Academy of Political Science}, XXIX, No. 3, 156-169.}

However, the Soviets have persisted in an isolationist situation \textit{vis-à-vis} cultural interchange and have responded slowly to the demands of other nations. To take some examples from the period up to 1966, a scholar requesting permission to study contemporary Moscow dialect was turned down on the ground that there were insufficient facilities for conducting research.\footnote{New \textit{York Times}, May 16, 1960, p. 21.} Another scholar, requesting permission to study Soviet agriculture, was
turned down on the ground that he could find the information he wanted by studying Mr. Khrushchev's speeches.  

American students in the Soviet Union have encountered restrictions on travel, difficulties in obtaining material from archives, and occasional harassment from the police.  

American scholars and universities wanting to communicate directly with Soviet scholars whom they have wished to invite to the United States have waited unreasonably long periods of time before receiving an answer and have not infrequently received no answer at all.  

Last, but not least, there has remained the constant problem of dealing with Soviet organizations ostensibly established to facilitate cultural exchange.  

Frequently, these "front" groups turn out to be instruments of Soviet political policy whose sole concern is to encourage the growth of parallel organizations in the United States serviceable to Soviet propaganda objectives.  

Beyond the area of student and scholarly exchange,  

84 Frankel, Neglected Aspect ..., op. cit., pp. 118-129.  
85 See the discussion of the VOKS organization and the SOD in Barghoorn, "Soviet Cultural Effort," op. cit.  
some success has been achieved. The Voice of America may be heard in the Soviet Union. Tours of the United States by groups like the Bolshoi Ballet or the Moiseyev Folk Dancers have not only given pleasure to Americans, but have probably helped to lessen the aura of strangeness surrounding the Russian citizen. The general movement of Soviet citizens across the Russian borders has enormously increased, and the officials in the American Embassy now see more Russians in a week than ten years ago they saw in a year.87

For the purposes of this study, it could be said that the only objective of the Soviets in cultural exchange is a negative one; that the Russians continue to be opposed to exchange. However, Barghoorn suggests that this attitude has been somewhat softened.88 He submits that if the exchange serves to advance the political "image" of the Soviet Union, restrictions are relaxed. Barghoorn describes Soviet cultural objectives, under the rubric of State policy, as follows:

1. to undo the harmful effects on the Soviet image

87 Frankel, Neglected Aspect . . . , op. cit., p. 122.

88 Barghoorn, Soviet Cultural Offensive, op. cit., p. 99ff. A lack of Soviet statements on cultural exchange necessitated reliance upon such secondary material as Barghoorn's studies. It should be mentioned that Barghoorn looks upon the Soviets with a very critical eye; almost unjustifiably so in some instances.
caused by the Stalinist rudeness, secrecy and violence;

2. to disseminate the idea that Russia be regarded as the chief world center of progress, spiritual cultivation, enlightenment and humanitarianism;

3. to allow foreigners to visit the Soviet Union to dispel the falsehoods created by the capitalist press;

4. to facilitate acquisition of useful knowledge, particularly scientific knowledge.89

The difference between an open and closed society is most dramatically shown in the area of cultural interchange. American objectives are to expand the opportunities for cultural exchange and encourage such expansion in other countries. The Soviets, ostensibly, have indicated a willingness to participate in cultural exchange. In actuality, they have gone to great lengths to frustrate exchange unless it happens to be politically expedient. This is not to say there is no ulterior, chauvinistic motive behind U.S. objectives. This is merely to indicate the significant divergence between the superpowers with regard to cultural interchange.

89Ibid., pp. 335-337.
Cultural exchange, at its best, implies free movement across national boundaries for the sharing of knowledge. If one could assume that the underlying objectives of the Soviet Union were to refurbish the Russian image in the eyes of the rest of the world, one would expect the Soviets carefully, but surely, to open their doors. A cursory examination of Soviet-American exchanges indicates that this has not been the case. According to Open Doors--1964, published by the Institute of International Education, out of the 58,086 foreign students in the United States in 1963, 37 were from the Soviet Union. Of the 5,530 faculty members from other countries who spent a major part of the year in the United States, 9 were Soviets. Of the 2,427 American university members abroad, only 22 made an extended visit to the U.S.S.R. Seven of these were social scientists, 9 were medical men and 5 were natural scientists.  

Perhaps the greatest barrier to the freedom of cultural exchange results from the chauvinistic attitude of the Russians. The communist university, whether in Russia or the satellite countries, is restricted to a program of indoctrination. It must teach the social sciences, not as they are, but as the government of the Soviet Union desires

---

them to be. It would be fantasy to expect the Russians to expose students to a program which is inconsistent with that taught in Soviet schools.

The United States is not free from this criticism. According to the American Assembly, it is almost impossible to hold an international scientific convention in the United States because of the difficulties in getting prominent scientists through visa and immigration barriers. Under the present law, a scientist is almost certain to be ineligible for a visa, both because he belongs to an organization proscribed for security reasons and because he is liable to advocate subversive doctrines.

Nor are these the only factors that have played a role in impeding the realization of even the modest goals for cultural exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union. In both countries, security considerations adversely affect free exchange of scholars. Exchange of information is an integral part of nuclear strategy. Uncontrolled increase in the volume of exchange would allow


92American Assembly Report, op. cit., p. 189. This condition is not far removed from Soviet control of its educational process.

93For a discussion of the requirements for contemporary nuclear strategy, see Henry Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership*, op. cit., p. 189ff.
the Soviets to penetrate the U.S. security establishment. The United States would not be able to control the precise amount of information necessary to make the nuclear threat credible. Carefully controlled exchange gives the Soviets "enough" information to make the threat credible. Both countries, then, must restrict population movements so that each will receive the desired information about the other's nuclear arsenal. Although the Soviets claim that it is the Americans who bar certain fields of scientific investigation, particularly atomic research, from the exchange program, the fact remains that the Soviets have repeatedly nominated people to do research in the United States in these affected areas, but have used the argument of insufficient research facilities to deny parallel requests by Americans. 94

There is another area of conflict between attainment of cultural objectives and security policy. On Feb. 13, 1967, the National Student Association, largest college student organization in the United States, conceded that it had been receiving funds from the Central Intelligence Agency since the early 1950's. The President of the NSA reported that CIA funds had been used to help finance the Association's international activities, including

94This point is made by Charles Frankel in "The 'Cultural Contest,'" Proceedings, Academy of Political Science, XXIX, No. 3 (1969), 140-155.
sending representatives to student congresses abroad and funding student exchange programs.\textsuperscript{95} On Feb. 17, the \textit{New York Times} published a list of other organizations that were receiving CIA funds. The list included: International Student Conference, Leyden, Netherlands; the U.S. Youth Council of New York; the World Assembly of Youth in Brussels; The Pan American Fund; The Asia Foundation; American Friends of the Middle East; International Market Institute; and The Independent Research Service of New York.\textsuperscript{96}

These revelations prompted demonstrations and comments from the academic communities all over the world. As a Vassar sociology professor phrased it, "the CIA undermines the official goals of American foreign policy" and has "subverted the independence of some research in major universities in the United States to the point where no American scholar can now be above suspicion when he goes abroad."\textsuperscript{97}

An example of foreign reaction to these activities occurred a year later. The Asia Foundation, a private philanthropic organization, had been carrying out its operations in 14 countries between Afghanistan and Japan to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{96} \textit{New York Times}, Feb. 17, 1967, p. 36.
\end{itemize}
promote cultural projects in these various countries. The Foundation had spent nearly $1 million in India and was considering thirty proposals for new projects totaling $400,000. On Feb. 15, 1968, the Foundation was ordered to "wind up" its programs and leave India as a result of its acknowledgment that it had accepted CIA funds. The Indian authorities even refused to issue new import licenses to the Foundation for books it distributed to Indian libraries and universities.

The reported CIA rationale was that it felt a responsibility to counteract Soviet infiltration of student organizations throughout the world. If one were willing to accept the CIA statement that the Soviets, too, through their Central Security agency, were infiltrating cultural exchange programs, there can be no doubt that the two countries are creating such an aura of suspicion in an inherently innocent program as to render it relatively useless.

CONCLUSION

The various national security objectives of Soviet-American foreign policy I have formulated above conflict in obvious ways with the attainment of stated non-security objectives of the two nations. The chief problem within the Soviet-American foreign policy style is what I would call its dualism, a deep fracture between two ways of dealing with international issues. This, in turn, leads to other sets of problems.

The greatest manifestation of this dualism is a tendency to speak two different languages, neither of which is entirely convincing and which are impossible to reconcile. The first is the language of power. Here, superpower elites warn each other that failure to desist from hostile acts will be met with the full weight of national might. The second is the language of community and harmony. Leaders of both countries protest their sincere dislike of imperialism; they stress that they are disinterested nations which act out of necessity and responsibility, not selfishness; they explain that power is a tragic necessity but that peace, love, reason, bread, and friendship for all are the primary objectives.
Of course, only a symbolic eagle can hold both the arrows and the olive branch easily at the same time. When Russia accuses the United States of playing a classical game of power politics, she protests, pointing to her community ideals and aspirations for brotherhood; and the Americans find the use by other nations of traditional power plays to be nefarious and intolerable when they are her foes; disruptive and anachronistic when they are her friends.

Then, too, a kind of double standard afflicts each of these languages. In essence, both the language of security and the language of harmony are universal; they can be used by whoever wants to act in the world arena, yet Americans and Russians seem to ask for special treatment. Thus when either speaks the language of force, it does not quite avoid implying that although it recognizes power as a universal commodity and the necessary means for all nations to maintain security its power is somehow morally superior and deserves a privileged position; that it can trust itself but no others; and that others can trust it, but nobody else. The American objective of peaceful cooperation in space leaves room for various more or less convincing rationalizations of why she should be allowed to maintain superiority in the space race.

There is the same double standard in talk about
community. Americans stress reasonableness, the need to subordinate separate interests to the higher common good. But, at the same time, they suggest that their very disinterestedness thrusts upon them the task of being the trustee of the common good; they are the only people who see the whole picture and want nothing for themselves. Each of the superpowers, in defining the common good, sees to it that its peculiar geographical position or its position as the most powerful nation on earth is taken into account (for instance, limited war policy in Vietnam just happens to correspond with the possibility, enjoyed only by a superpower situated on a different continent, of waging war while keeping the home territory a sanctuary).

The contradictions in this dualism require explanation. No light is to be shed on them by talking about hypocrisy. A hypocrite is a man who deceitfully pretends that he is what he is not. Diplomats and scholars who come from a tradition of Machiavellian calculations tend to interpret all diplomacies in this way, and to see in double standards nothing but a shield behind which it is polite, profitable and practical to advance. But things here are not so simple; the conflicts I have described in the preceding chapters do not seem to come from pretenses. They come from the simple fact that the nation's value (and leaders) point simultaneously in different directions.
There is, in the Soviet-American foreign policy structure, a tension between an instinct of violence and the drive for harmony. The United States, for example, is a nation intolerant of a conflict of ends. When Americans are faced with a fundamental conflict of ends, their experience has been to resort to force--considered the most decisive of all ways to end such conflicts. In using force, they have sought not just the infliction of pain on the enemy, which Schelling sees as part of the bargaining process, but the elimination of the conflict through simple elimination of the foe. Whenever conflicts of purposes reappear, or when segments of the population feel threatened, the tendency to revert to force reasserts itself.

We thus are caught in a vicious circle. The use of force, as we have seen, suffices to corrupt or destroy national objectives or to drive them underground. Central Intelligence operators are not the best agents of good neighborly relations; napalm is not the surest agent of a dream of "and end to war . . . a world where all are fed and charged with hope."¹ The sword swishes and cuts; the words dazzle and vanish. The security effort leaves its

¹Lyndon B. Johnson, speech at Johns Hopkins University, April 1965, quoted in Marvin Gettleman (ed.), Vietnam (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1965), p. 329.
mark, even if the result is not politically effective. The real concentration of energies against real or imaginary foes acts to divert nations from establishing harmony.

And there is another, most important difficulty: when force plays a pre-eminent role in international relations, to the extent of usurping other national goals, it tends to increase the insecurity of that nation. The fate of Hitler's Third Reich, and the consequences of certain steps in Soviet policy under Stalin illustrate this kind of inverse law about national security.

These criticisms will undoubtedly elicit from the reader the query: if all this is true, how have the two superpowers managed to survive? To this question, I have two answers. First, my purpose was not to deny the co-existence but to describe the peculiarities that mar or limit it. To borrow a nice metaphor from André Gide, I was concerned with the lion's fleas, not with denying there is a lion under the fleas. Second, and more important, the United States and the Soviet Union are entering into a period in which these flaws are more of an obstacle than they were in the past. The use of force, when it manifests itself, ultimately, in weapons of mass destruction, cannot in any way serve the purposes of a constructive and viable foreign policy. The pre-eminence of security policy, as it exists in a nuclear age, can serve only to paralyze national
policy, to undermine cooperative efforts, and to drive everyone closer and closer to the brink of destruction. Theodore Draper has written that, in the Dominican crisis, the United States policy was marked "by such bungling and blundering that only the strongest power in the world can afford them." The question is: how much bungling can this power afford? If the lion cannot afford it, it must bite its fleas.

---

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


deRivera, J. The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy. Columbus, Ohio: C. E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1968.


Periodicals


Burns, Arthur L. "From Balance to Deterrence," World Politics, IX (July 1957), 494-529.


Encounter, XX, No. 6 (June 1963), entire issue.


Milburn, Thomas W. "What Constitutes Effective Deterrence?" Journal of Conflict Resolution, III (June 1959), 133-145.


______. "Scientists, Foreign Policy and Politics," American Political Science Review, LIV (June 1962), 287-301.


Newspapers (American)

The New York Times
The Wall Street Journal

Newspapers (Soviet)

Izvetsia
Kommunist
Military Thought
Pravda
Red Star

Soviet Union

All of the foregoing Soviet newspapers as translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, The Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, New York (weekly).

Governmental Documents


Congressional Quarterly Almanac. (quarterly)

Congressional Record. (daily)

U.S. Congressional Committee Reports and Hearings.


---


---


---


---


---


Pamphlets for Limited Circulation