Yugoslavia's Communist party: Implications of the nationalities problem

Steven Majstorovic

The University of Montana

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YUGOSLAVIA'S COMMUNIST PARTY:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM

By
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B.A., University of Montana, 1985

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts
1987

Approved by:

Forest Wheezer
Chairman, Board of Examiners

Commissioner
Dean, Graduate School

6-10-87
Date
Yugoslavia is a federated, multi-national state in which ties of ethnicity exert greater hold on its people than do ties of political loyalty to the state. However, Yugoslavia's postwar communist regime has partially succeeded in mollifying ethnic sensitivities by not eroding their bases. Instead, the ethnic republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro were created within the political body of Yugoslavia and vast jurisdiction has been conceded to the republics. Yugoslav politics has been correspondingly shaped by a delicate balance of power among the federal units, a balance in which the ethnic factor is the primary consideration, no matter what the issue may be. As a result, Yugoslavia's interethnic balance serves to focus this study on the behavior of ethnic groups, and whether their political behavior parallels the patterns of confrontation and competition which exist between nation-states in an international balance of power system.

Yugoslav nationalities policy has been characterized by a gradual devolution and decentralization of power from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) to the Communist parties of the republics. During the Croatian Crisis (1968-1971), the Croatian party leaders led a nationalist movement which called for the establishment of Croatia as an independent nation. As the ultimate arbiter in Yugoslavia, Tito was instrumental in removing rebellious Croatian party leaders from the LCY. During 1970s ethnic conflict continued to be a growing problem for the LCY. The Muslim population of Bosnia-Herzegovina was declared to be a national group, and in the autonomous province of Kosovo, secessionist and irredentist agitation by the predominantly Albanian population was on the rise. In April 1981, Kosovo exploded in violence and the province was put under a state a martial law. Without Tito as a unifying influence, the current situation in Yugoslavia is indicative of LCY impotence in the face of interethnic conflict in the post-Tito era.

Therefore, the Yugoslav republics have gained sufficient autonomy to effect a balance of power arrangement in Yugoslav politics, and within the context of Yugoslav Marxism, ethnonational forces are the primary determinants of political behavior, while economic factors are of secondary consideration.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Balkans have a long history of ethnic, religious, and nationalist strife. In particular, the area which after World War I became Yugoslavia (The Union of South Slavs) has been a historic crossroad for conquest and occupation. Slavic tribes settled in what is now Yugoslavia during the sixth century and ruled themselves until the Ottoman Turks began their Balkan expansion in the twelfth century. After the collapse of the medieval kingdoms of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, the South Slavs were ruled variously by Austrians, Hungarians, Italians, and Turks.

The division between the jurisdiction of the Christian powers and the empire of the Muslim Turks marked a major cultural divide which reinforced the earlier cleavage between Catholic and Orthodox South Slavs. By the time the South Slavs were brought into a common state in 1918, they had become accustomed to thinking of themselves as distinct peoples (Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Montenegrins). The additional presence of certain non-Slavic peoples (Hungarians, Albanians, Germans, and Italians), together with Slavic Bulgarians and Macedonians, further complicated the picture. Thus, the nationalities problem became a
burning issue for the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia and has continued to occupy center stage for postwar Yugoslavia.

Because Yugoslavia is a new country, ties of ethnicity exert greater hold on its people than do ties of political loyalty to the state. The interwar kingdom foundered on its misconceived denial of these differences among its Slavic peoples—ethnic groups were treated as members of a single Yugoslav nation. Yugoslavia's postwar communist regime has partially succeeded in mollifying ethnic sensitivities by not eroding their bases. Instead, the ethnic republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro were created within the political body of Yugoslavia and vast jurisdiction has been conceded to the republics. Yugoslav politics has been correspondingly shaped by a delicate balance of power among the federal units, a balance in which the ethnic factor is the primary consideration, no matter what the issue may be. As a result, Yugoslavia's inter-ethnic balance serves to focus this study on the behavior of ethnic groups, and whether their political behavior parallels the patterns of confrontation and competition which exist between nation-states in an international balance of power system.

In two cases—Bosnia and Voyvodina—the local populations were so heterogeneous that the Communist party hesitated to establish them as separate republics. Voyvodina was therefore established as an autonomous province, a unit that, at least initially, had less self-
governing power than the republics. After some hesitation, Bosnia was established as a republic, but its Serbs, Croats, and ethnic Muslims (categorized as a distinct national group in 1968) were declared to have equal title to the republic. In the southern part of Yugoslavia, in a region Hitler had granted to Albania and which various Yugoslav resistance movements had wrested back by force, the Yugoslav communists established the autonomous region of Kosovo-Metohija. This region is juridically a notch below Voyvodina, and the population today is predominately Albanian.

If the federal units were ethnically homogeneous the political landscape would complex enough. But, interethnic relations are further complicated by the dispersion of nationalities throughout the country. (see Table 1) For example, 14 percent of the population of Croatia is ethnically Serbian, and 17 percent of the population of Macedonia is ethnically Albanian. Serbs in Croatia and Albanians in Macedonia have played volatile roles during the past fifteen years, inflaming relations among ethnic groups and among the federal units. Moreover, some of the dispersed ethnic groups have played a role out of proportion to their numbers. The Croatian Serbs are overrepresented in the Croatian party, police, and militia. Serbs have also long played a central role in the governing apparatus of Albanian-populated Kosovo.²
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republic</th>
<th>Number of inhabitants in thousands</th>
<th>Percentage of largest nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YUGOSLAVIA</td>
<td>22,418</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Hercegovina</td>
<td>4,128</td>
<td>39.5(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>4,582</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>1,921</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>68.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>5,673</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1,887</td>
<td>90.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1,595</td>
<td>76.9(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voyvodina</td>
<td>2,029</td>
<td>54.6(c)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a = Muslims
b = Albanians
c = Serbs

Despite its federal form, the Yugoslav political system was initially a tightly centralized Stalinist model. At the Sixth Party Congress in 1952, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) assumed its new name, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). The new name was a tacit admission of the non-unitarian characteristics of Yugoslavia's ethnic makeup, and the LCY tentatively began a process of decentralization which has so far proven distinctive among communist systems.\(^3\) Since decentralization, the republics and autonomous provinces have increasingly become spokesmen for their titular nationalities (except in the cases of Bosnia, Voyvodina, and perhaps, Kosovo).

The interrepublican struggles, which have become the cornerstone of Yugoslav politics, have been played out on four levels: among the republics themselves in areas where republics, have exclusive jurisdiction; within the arena of the federal center (government and party) on issues in which the jurisdiction of the center is pivotal; between groups of republics with the federal center taking one side in the struggle; and among various factions within the republics, with a faction from one republic allying with a kindred group in another republic to defeat legislation proposed by its antagonists. Major policy departures, such as the legitimation of a separate Muslim nationality in 1968, have always required the sanction of the center and, often, the initiative of factions at the center.\(^4\)
Unlike the Soviet Union, a federation dominated by the Great Russian majority, power in Yugoslavia is somewhat evenly dispersed along ethnic lines. Since Serbians comprise 40 percent of the population (see Table 2), most alliances between republics are anti-Serbian and tend to be sensitive to real or imagined Serbian cultural and political hegemony. In a country with six republics, two semi-autonomous provinces within the Serbian republic (Voyvodina and Kosovo), twenty four subnationalities, four major languages, and three major religions, fear of possible Serbian chauvinism is a consistent feature of Yugoslav politics.

President Josip Broz Tito ruled Yugoslavia for more than thirty-five years. His death in May 1980 was perceived by most Yugoslavs as the end of an era. Some observers believed his death would catalyze revolt throughout the country and mark the end of Yugoslavia as such. Although the transition to post-Tito Yugoslavia has not been without controversy, the succession has been accomplished with less conflict than was once thought possible.

The 1974 Constitution is Tito's solution for succession and LCY infighting. He adopted the Swiss model of a collegial presidency and hoped a rotating collective leadership would keep Yugoslavia stable and integrated. However, this solution has failed to cope with the problems of growing nationalism and party decentralization. The new Yugoslav constitution granted greater sovereignty to the
TABLE 2.
Population of Yugoslavia by Ethnic Group, 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>8,136,578</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>4,428,135</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>2,000,034</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenes</td>
<td>1,753,605</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>1,731,252</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonians</td>
<td>1,341,420</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Yugoslavs&quot;</td>
<td>1,216,463</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegrins</td>
<td>577,298</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>426,865</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
<td>148,604</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>101,328</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovaks</td>
<td>80,300</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>54,721</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>36,642</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vlahs</td>
<td>32,071</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruthenes</td>
<td>23,320</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechs</td>
<td>19,609</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>15,116</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>12,809</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undeclared</td>
<td>46,716</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>22,418,331</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

republics and, technically, it even granted the right of secession. Tito mistakenly surmised that although the legal and economic system would be confederated to an appreciable degree, the centralizing forces of the LCY would buttress the state and the regime.

The collective leadership fashioned by Tito publicly proclaimed its determination to follow in Tito's path. But, the new leadership proved unable to prevent a loosening of the Yugoslav system for two primary reasons. First, without Tito, the LCY lacked an ultimate arbiter and was therefore tangibly weaker than before. For instance, the Croatian republic was on the verge of secession between 1968-1971. Tito was instrumental in removing rebellious Croatian party leaders from the LCY. Today, Croatia is again a hotbed of separatism, and the Catholic Church's role has been compared to the role of the Polish Church. The divided party leadership cannot assert itself because, in many cases, the will of the party cannot be discerned from interrepublican conflict over ethnic questions.

Second, the explosion of violence in Kosovo in April 1981, when discontented Albanians went on a destructive rampage and also attacked Serbs, produced a nationalist backlash throughout Yugoslavia. The current situation is indicative of LCY impotence in the face of interethnic conflict in the post-Tito era. Although Kosovo is the historic cradle of the Serbian nation, Albanian immigration over the past century has had a marked demographic effect.
The 1974 Constitution has inspired the Albanian majority to push for republican status within Yugoslavia. This suggestion has met vehement resistance among Serbians within the Serbian republic and in Kosovo. As Albanian nationalism collides with Serbian outrage over alleged atrocities committed by Muslim Albanians against Orthodox Serbs, LCY indecision has exacerbated the crisis. While the federal government struggles to maintain the status quo, Kosovo province remains under a virtual state of martial law. The impasse in Kosovo has reopened questions about the utility of federalism as a solution for interethnic tensions and distrust. Some Yugoslav academicians have suggested Yugoslavia has the potential of becoming a second Lebanon.

Therefore, the object of this inquiry is to determine if the LCY has lost the capacity to govern and if Yugoslavia's present federal system is vulnerable to dissolution, or, whether the Yugoslav republics have gained sufficient autonomy to evolve into a new political structure which resembles an international balance of power system. In order to interpret contemporary politics in Yugoslavia, Yugoslav nationalities policy and three interethnic crises during the period from 1968-1987 will be analyzed and discussed. In addition, the insights of noted international relations theorists (particularly the systems analyses of Morton Kaplan) will be employed to demonstrate that Yugoslavia's domestic political system has acquired many of the features of an international balance of power system.
In the interstate universe, according to Morton Kaplan (author of *Systems and Process in International Politics*), only the loose bipolar and balance of power systems have actually had historical precedence. The other four systems which Kaplan mentions (the tight bipolar, unit-veto, universal, and hierarchical systems) are intended as analytical constructs.7

But in the intrastate system, five of the six systems Kaplan describes have had historical referents--only the unit-veto system has not. Austria-Hungary (1867-1918)--with separate stamps, currency, parliaments, tax collections, and judicial, educational, and transportation systems--is perhaps one of the clearest historical examples of a tight bipolar system. The Austrian and Hungarian halves of the empire regularly clashed over questions of foreign policy and engaged in continual rivalry within the state. The Soviet Union closely resembles the universal system, described by Kaplan as a semi-unified political system under a world government, in which a central actor dominates peripheral actors enrolled on a formally voluntary basis. In the Soviet Union, the great Russians dominate a multiethnic realm in which the non-Russian republics enjoy the formal right of secession. Switzerland figures as Kaplan's hierarchical system, in which national actors (German, French, and Italian language groups) cease to be the primary foci of loyalty and function instead as territorial subdivisions or intermediate levels of organization.8
Finally, Yugoslavia evolved gradually from a configuration which paralleled a loose bipolar system (1918-1965, a system in which two antagonistic national actors are the focus of political activity, while other national actors are peripheral to the system) to a balance of power system since 1965 (a system in which the relationships between actors are characterized by shifting alliances, and where no one national actor is indispensible to the system or can dominate the decision-making process).

In order to apply a modified version of Kaplan's typology to Yugoslavia, ethnic groups rather than states will be designated as actors in the system. In addition, the state, rather than a group of states, represents the boundaries of the conceptual system. Perhaps, the use of bipolar and balance of power models as analytical frameworks will help to bring into focus the patterns of Yugoslav politics.

'It is the thesis of this study that in a federated multi-national state governed by a Marxist-Leninist party, the centralizing forces of the party will inevitably succumb to the centripetal and fragmentary forces of nationalism and interethnic conflict, unless there is one ethnic group which comprises a substantial majority within the party and the population.' Therefore, this study also intends to establish that, within the context of Yugoslav Marxism, ethnonational forces are the primary determinants of political behavior, while economic factors are of secondary consideration.
NOTES


3Ibid.


8Ibid.
CHAPTER II
YUGOSLAV NATIONALITIES POLICY

Ethnic Perspective and Background

Nationalism is a very real phenomenon in Yugoslavia and animates much of social life. Tensions have reached the boiling point in nearly every republic in recent years. Typically, sporting events provide a ready spark for manifestations of ethnic hatred and Serb-Croat competitions are frequently marred by outbursts of ethnic slurs and name calling. For instance, after a soccer match in the Croatian city of Split, young Croats pushed several cars bearing Belgrade license plates into the sea. Since Belgrade is not only the capital of Yugoslavia but also the capital of the Serbian republic, the Croats assumed the cars belonged to Serbs.¹

In Yugoslavia, not only interregional rivalry but also regional opposition against centralized political power tends to be expressed and mobilized in ethnic terms. Regional leaders in Yugoslavia have frequently adopted this tactic, even though economic and ethnic interests are not always equally well served by the same solutions. Regional elites deliberately play the role of national leaders and present issues in ethnic terms. Croatian leaders have done this vis-a-vis the Serbs, Kosovan-Albanian leaders vis-a-vis
the Serbs, Macedonian party leaders vis-a-vis the Serbs, and Serbian leaders vis-a-vis almost everyone else.

But, Yugoslav politics is not simply reducible antagonisms between Serb and non-Serb. The Serbs share many common interests with the Montenegrins as well with the Macedonians, and they have repeatedly courted the Bosnian party as a natural ally. It should be noted that Montenegrins, Macedonians, and a third of the Bosnians share a common religion with the Serbs—Eastern Orthodoxy. It would not be accurate to leave the impression that non-Serbs constitute a camp. Croats have been increasingly worried over the steady Slovene infiltration of the northwest corner of Croatia's Istrian peninsula, along the border with Slovenia. This is at least in part an economic issue, but Croatian apprehension is ethnic in source and is voiced in ethnic terms.

Despite the plethora of variations possible in Yugoslav interethnic strife, the Serb-Croat rivalry remains the pivot of ethnic competition and is viewed by both Serbs and Croats in religious terms. The identification of the churches with nationalism goes back to the time of the Ottoman occupation, when the Orthodox churches were the guardians of national culture as well as the political viceroys. In independent Montenegro, which successfully resisted the Ottoman Turks for five hundred years, the Orthodox Church arrogated the role of protector of the nation. At the same time, the
Catholic Church in Croatia, which had been absorbed into the Habsburg empire, maintained a political role.\textsuperscript{4}

In World War II, the Ustashe (uprising) Croatian-fascist government of Ante Pavelich found a ready ally in the Catholic Church. During the war, Croatian priests played active roles in fomenting and overseeing the slaughter of one million Serbs and thousands of Jews and Gypsies.\textsuperscript{5} Even today, communist officials continue to complain that Croatianess tends to be identified with Catholicism and Serbianness with Orthodoxy. Although growing secularization is normally expected in a modernizing society, Yugoslavia experienced a waxing xenophobia and a rebirth of religious sentiment among the young in the late 1960s, especially in Croatia.\textsuperscript{6} The reassertion of religious feelings underlines the closeness of the ethnic-religious relationship in Yugoslav politics.

Therefore, in mobilization systems like the Leninist one-party systems of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, interregional politics, like every other political aspect, cannot be distilled from the ethnic, religious, and ideological milieu. This is especially true of interethnic and interrepublican relations, which are framed and channeled by an explicit, developed nationalities policy based on and derived from the underlying ideological presumptions of the system. The very federal arrangement which permits the wide degree of autonomy enjoyed by
Yugoslavia's republics had first to be justified before it could be advanced.

The Yugoslavs maintain they have a nationalities policy. This claim suggests they view their multiethnic composition as potentially problematic, and political involvement in this sphere is considered legitimate. The LCY also claims to have resolved the nationalities question. This claim can be understood in either of two ways: (1) that nationalism, as politicized ethnicity, has been by and large eliminated; or (2) that institutionalized patterns of cooperation and mutual accommodation have become a stable part of the political landscape, allowing nationalist excesses to be contained, defused, or even bypassed. The first interpretation is the way in which the Yugoslav communists themselves understood their claim until the Eighth Congress of the LCY (1964). Since then, however, the second interpretation has dominated Yugoslav thinking on the subject. In other words, the contemporary Yugoslav claim amounts to the faith that under Yugoslavia's brand of socialism, conditions are created which will make possible a future solution for the nationalities problem.\(^7\)

The admission that a solution for ethnic turmoil is still in the future reflects the new candor and modesty which have characterized LCY statements on the subject of nationalism, especially since the Kosovo riots of 1981. However, the LCY still asserts Yugoslavia is on the right track and that it has devised a system which gives national
groups free rein to advance their separate interests, and eventually draw together around a common interest. Thus, the Yugoslav communists believe they have constructed a model of political organization worthy of emulation. It is a bold claim, since it carries the implication that only under some form of socialism is interethnic harmony possible.

Marxism and the National Question

Karl Marx considered the existence of ethnically heterogeneous communities as a question to be resolved. That it was a question had become clear for the Habsburg empire, which had suppressed a vigorous Hungarian revolution in 1848-1849. Hegel had already outlined a view of history in which lower ethnic forms of life gave way to higher forms and heterogeneity was expected to melt away before the waxing Volksgeist of historical peoples. However, for Hegel this reduction in heterogeneity was limited to the material realm, while the discrete national character and consciousness of particular ethnic groups would remain. But, before Marx, few had raised ethnic heterogeneity from the level of a policy question a posteriori to a status as a question a priori. Marx's formulation of the question at once implied and required an answer, a resolution, a correct approach. Thus, the LCY's concern and preoccupation with the national question is in the critical tradition of Marxist thought, and a discussion of Marxism and nationalism is
therefore necessary for a historical perspective on Yugoslav nationalities policy.

Marx's approach to multinationality stemmed in part from his dialectical view of history, in which each historical stage manifests internal contradictions and tensions that are resolved at a higher stage, thus propelling history forward. Marx also presumed true conflict is economically motivated—the corollary being that ethnic strife is a sham, a veneer behind which the exploitative middle classes can mobilize and manipulate their proletarian and peasant populations.

Nationalism, rooted in ethnic prejudice and collective consciousness based on a shared language, was linked by Marx with the bourgeois-capitalist stage of historical development, eventually to be transcended by the passage to socialism. In this view, proletarian internationalism is not problematic but automatic, even ineluctable. Marx's supposition that national differences would dissolve with modernization and political and economic unification implies that the idea of nation is an expression or form of the social organization of the market. It is not necessarily obvious that Marx drew from this the inference imputed to him by the Soviets—nationalism and internationalism are opposed. Rather, Marx seems to have viewed proletarian nationalism (or the authentic nationalism of a socialist country) and internationalism as being in some sense symbiotic. Thus, Marx's insistence that workers have no
country was not a boast or a program. It was a protest against the exclusion of the proletariat from the privilege of full membership in the nation. It is worth noting that Yugoslav officialdom concurs with this interpretation of Marx. The LCY can insist nationality is indeed an important factor in the consciousness of the working class, that the working class still is national.

If the Yugoslav position seems to lead directly to "national communism," which has until recently been treated as a rather profligate child by Soviet Marxists, it is nevertheless consistent with the tradition in which Marx was working. Yet, it is clear from the Communist Manifesto that Marx and Engels thought national consciousness and nationalism would evaporate as a result of modernization. This concept stems from the underlying Marxist assumption that a change in behavior will lead to a change in mental attitude. Thus, the elimination of conflicts rooted in class society will stimulate cooperation across ethnic lines and create positive feelings among ethnic groups within the system.

However, it is not obvious Marx and Engels thought the world would eventually speak only one language. The current universality of English, like the earlier universality of Latin, only demonstrates that people of different states require some common medium, and it is likely to be the language of the dominant power. Although Marx and Engels welcomed the subjugation of "less civilized, unhistorical
peoples" (e.g., Slavs and Blacks) by the more advanced races (e.g., Germans and Americans), they stopped short of explicitly advocating coercive ethnic assimilation.

The Austrian Marxists, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, were the first Marxists to articulate a political program dealing with the creation of harmony in an ethnically diverse state. They were inspired in this endeavor by their desire to prop up the faltering multinational Habsburg empire. The Austrian Marxists designed a centralist scheme with concessions to cultural autonomy and guarantees of free use of language. Renner described the nation as a spiritual and cultural community and emphasized the centrality of language in the formation of group consciousness. Bauer underlined national character as a social bond and spoke of the nation as a collective with a common culture and a shared destiny. Bauer's definition not only blurred the distinction between state and nation, citizenship and nationality, but also implied a minimization of the importance of compact territory.

The Austrian Marxists' formulations were closer in spirit to Hegelianism than to Marxism. Their notions of nationalism allowed for the intrusion of the semimystic concepts of character, culture, consciousness, spiritual community, and destiny. Renner and Bauer considered nationality to be basically a matter of folk culture and language. Therefore, they were content to offer reassurances of cultural autonomy, while withholding both
administrative and political autonomy as potentially disintegrative concessions.\textsuperscript{15}

However, Lenin seemed to be less sympathetic to nationalism than the Austrian Marxists were. He asserted that "both the example of all progressive mankind and the example of the Balkans" demonstrated that the national state is the rule and norm under capitalism. \"The state of diverse composition is something backward or an anomaly.\" He believed that for the proletariat, national demands are generally subordinate to the interests of the working class; for the proletariat it is important "to insure the development of its class."\textsuperscript{16}

In 1913, Stalin undertook, on Lenin's request, to produce an analysis of ethnicity as a political factor. Stalin focused his work on a critique of the Austrian Marxists. He warned that exclusive stress on national character was leading Bauer and Renner away from the real essence of nationality, which is a complex phenomenon emerging not only on the basis of a shared language, but also within a compact territory and within the context of a common economic life.

In addition, given the Marxist tenet that modernization not only creates a world culture but also results in the disintegration of distinct national cultures and the evaporation of national antagonisms, Stalin concluded that the notion of cultural autonomy, infused with notions of preservation of culture, was inherently reactionary. He not
only considered the concept of cultural autonomy to be founded on a seriously flawed analysis of nationality, but also deemed it politically nefarious. Stalin's harsh treatment of Soviet Georgians, his own ethnic identity, underscored his views on nationality.

However, Stalin was unable to trumpet centralism, since such a policy had unmistakably failed in tsarist Russia, and because the liberation of the proletariat could not be allowed to restrict the self-determination of any nationality. Therefore, Stalin offered as the ideal solution a system of regional or territorial autonomy. He believed this solution would permit the nationalities to enjoy their rights of self-determination and self-administration without obstructing the drawing together of nations which is concomitant with the creation of a unified market stimulated by modernization.17

Marxism and Federalism

The adaptation of federalism to a Marxist-Leninist system posed an ideological hurdle insofar as Marx's writings are unmistakably hostile to federalism. Marx and Engels believed the interest of the proletariat would be better served in a unitary state than in a federal system. Marx was convinced decentralization could only serve the interests of regional bourgeois elites. He argued centralization would create the preconditions for its own transcendence—the withering away of the state. In
opposition to liberal democrats who were backing federation, Marx told the Communist League in 1850 that "the workers must use their influence not only for the one and indivisible German republic, but for a decisive centralization of force within it in the hand of the state power." 

Lenin was originally hostile to federalism. He believed federalism weakened economic links and was an unsuitable model for any state. Stalin echoed these sentiments in a March 1917 article entitled Against Federalism. Reiterating the Marxist maxims about the preferability of centralism, Stalin concluded that "federalism in Russia does not and cannot solve the national question; ... it merely confuses and complicates it with quixotic ambitions to turn back the wheel of history." Up to the very eve of the October Revolution, Lenin considered the right of secession a sufficient guarantee for the composite nationalities of the Russian empire. State and Revolution, completed shortly before the Bolsheviks came to power, represents a turning point in Lenin's views on federalism. Although he still asserted federalism was in general "a hindrance to development," he insisted federalism might represent "a step forward in certain special conditions" and "among these special conditions the national question appears prominently." 

Although Soviet federalism was compromised by a refusal to extend the principle to the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union—as enshrined in a resolution of the Eighth Party Congress (1919) that the central committees of the Ukraine, Latvia, and Lithuania had no legitimate basis on which to stake out autonomous realms—it nonetheless quickly became a point of doctrine.21

In the early years of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), the Soviet example was snubbed. It was only in the wake of the adoption of the popular front policy at the Comintern's Seventh Congress (1935) that the CPY abandoned its program of seeking to break up Yugoslavia into small national states. After the Congress, the CPY began to move in the direction of an endorsement of federalism.22

In conclusion, it is evident that Soviet and Yugoslav federalism is not congruent with classical Marxist tenets, and is thus revisionist. However, the CPSU and the LCY would undoubtedly claim that objective conditions warranted a change in approach and federalism was now historically correct.

Development of Yugoslavia's Nationalities Policy

From the time of the CPY's founding in 1919 to the period immediately preceding World War II, the Yugoslav communists reexamined and altered several of their basic premises regarding nationalities policy. This period can be characterized by three distinct phases: (1) 1919-1923, advocacy of centralism and unitarism, buttressed by the concept of the tri-named people (Serbs, Croats, and
slovenes); (2) 1923-1928, internal contention between the left and right wings of the party—with the Serbian-dominated unitarist right wing opposed to the Croat and Slovene controlled federalist left wing; and (3) 1928-1934, the Comintern phase, marked by submission to the Comintern dictum that Yugoslavia should be broken into separate, homogeneous nation-states.23

After the triumph of the Nazis in Germany in 1934, the Comintern undertook a critical reappraisal of its nationalities strategy and conceded it had erred. As a result of the attempt to prevent the further spread of fascism, the CPY determined the national question could be resolved within the framework of the Yugoslav state. The possibility of a Yugoslav solution necessarily entailed the soft-pedaling of a Balkan federation of homogeneous nation-states. However, the CPY simultaneously resolved to establish Communist party organizations for Croatia, Slovenia, and Montenegro, although this decision was tempered by the continued adherence to the principle of party centralization. Secession was still considered a right, but it was no longer seen as inherently progressive. The danger was all too great that separatism might play into the hands of the fascists.24

But, as late as the Fifth National Party Conference (November, 1940) in the Croatian capital of Zagreb, the CPY shrank from formal endorsement of federalism. It was only at its next session at Jajce25 on November 29, 1943, that
the Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), in which the CPY was heavily represented, promised a federal order for postwar Yugoslavia.\(^\text{26}\)

Despite the agonizing appraisals and reappraisals which had punctuated the CPY's torturous groping over the nationalities question, the party adopted a relatively bland attitude immediately after the war. In 1948, Tito tried to convince a skeptical Slovenian audience the national question had been settled to the general satisfaction of Yugoslavia's peoples. In the post war period, Yugoslav communists generally assumed a new socialist nation was in the process of being created.\(^\text{27}\) The federal system was perceived to be an ephemeral formality and relinquished little authority to the republics. Yugoslavia's national heterogeneity was the sole rationale for the establishment of federalism, with each republic except Bosnia-Herzegovina named after and consecrated as the official political embodiment of a discrete national group. The CPY believed the process of homogenization would erode the basis for the federal system, and in the ripeness of time, national differences would wither away (a prerequisite for the withering away of federalism and eventually the state).\(^\text{28}\)

During the 1950s, "Yugoslav" was touted as an ethnic-national classification in its own right, sometimes as a supranational category. This Yugoslavianism (\textit{Jugoslovenstvo}) and Brotherhood and Unity (\textit{Bratstvo i
jedinstvo) campaign reached its culmination at the Seventh Congress of the LCY in 1958. Although the new party program denied the intention of assimilating the composite groups into a homogeneous Yugoslav nation, the concept of "Yugoslav culture" endorsed by the congress implied an expectation of homogenization.

The 1961 census introduced the category "Yugoslav" as an ethnic alternative. However, only 317,124 persons declared themselves to be Yugoslavs rather than Serbs, Croats, or any of the other traditional groups. The Croats and Slovenes in particular, but also the Muslims and other nationalities, felt threatened by the specter of renewed Serbian unitarism thought to be lurking under the robes of ambiguous Yugoslavianism. They countered the prevailing view of an integral Yugoslavianism with the idea of organic Yugoslavianism. The emergent controversy between the two rival interpretations remained unresolved until the Eighth Congress of the LCY (December 1964) finally and resolutely disavowed any assimilationist intent. A spokesman for the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC) warned that the insistence on the withering away of Yugoslavia's nation, voiced in the wake of the Seventh Congress by advocates of integral Yugoslavianism, reflected narrow-minded chauvinism and creeping unitarism. Tito condemned "the idea that the unity of our peoples means the elimination of nationalities and the creation of something new and artificial."
The Eighth Congress signified a turning point for Yugoslav nationalities policy and for interrepublican relations. Henceforth, it was no longer assumed Yugoslavia's nations were in the process of disintegration and Yugoslav socialist patriotism was clearly detached from Yugoslavianism. As a consequence, the republics at last came into their own as fully legitimate agents of popular sovereignty, and federalism was finally completely accepted by the LCY as genuinely appropriate. This change in nationalities policy provided the preliminary impetus toward the transformation of Yugoslavia into a system in which the republics could advance their distinct interests in an autonomous manner.

The Eighth Party Congress represented the first open discussion of the nationality question in postwar Yugoslavia. No longer did the LCY pretend Yugoslavia's national groups were somehow different from other national groups either in consciousness or behavior. Stalin's distinction between bourgeois and socialist nations was openly repudiated as an un-Marxist doctrinal innovation.

The reassessment of Yugoslavianism created doubts about the whole notion of such a self-identification. In June 1969, the Belgrade weekly magazine, NIN, conducted a survey asking people what they thought it meant to be a Yugoslav. By September 1969, the resulting article was under fire for unitarism, supra-statism, and negation of the equality of the peoples of Yugoslavia. In the 1971 census, only 273,177
persons declared themselves to be ethnically Yugoslav, a 14 percent decline from 1961.35 Doubts remained as to whether this figure reflected anything more than mixed marriages or the sentiment of unpoliticized Muslims. Even the supposition that there was something immanently progressive about calling oneself a Yugoslav was questioned. Many Yugoslavs felt insulted if someone suggested a person was more patriotic simply because he declared himself a Yugoslav.36

However, in the 1981 census, some 1,216,463 citizens of Yugoslavia declared themselves Yugoslavs, a substantial increase over the 1971 figure.37 This development led some members of the party to applaud, but provoked doubt and skepticism in other quarters. Dushan Bilandzhich, a member of the central committee of the Croatian party, assailed the impression that Yugoslav nationality was somehow superior to Croatian. He argued there is no possibility of a Yugoslav nation being formed. Furthermore, he accused some newly converted Yugoslavs of antifederalist motives expressed in admiration of centralized administration. Bilandzhich implied the process of Yugoslavization was working specifically against the Croats and noted the disappearance of 30,000 Croats in Voyvodina. He also openly discarded the classical Marxist thesis of the withering away of nationality under communism and argued the reasons for affirming a Yugoslav nationality were insufficient and not persuasive.
Bilandzhich awakened a chorus of criticism. His critics were distressed by his assertion that Yugoslavianism reflected centralist tendencies and quickly replied in kind. They insinuated Bilandzhich's real concern was shown in his lamentation over the decline of Croats in Voyvodina. His doubts about Yugoslavianism were portrayed as latent Croatian nationalism.38

However, since the early 1970s, the LCY has given renewed emphasis to Yugoslav socialist patriotism, with an organic interpretation. Yugoslav socialist patriotism lacks the supranational, assimilationist property of the earlier Yugoslavianism campaign, and is depicted as the identification with, feeling for, and love of the socialist community. The sentiment is ordinarily construed as the emotive bond which ties the individual to the collective.39 However, some Yugoslav Marxists understand socialist patriotism to involve collective affinity at two levels. Devotion toward the narrow homeland—one's republic, and devotion toward the wider homeland—Yugoslavia as a whole. Wider patriotism does not exclude narrow patriotism, but actually presumes it. Thus, ethnonationalism thrown out the front door is quietly allowed entry through the rear.

Elements and Practices of Yugoslav Nationalities Policy

Yugoslav nationalities policy has eight major elements. First, the system recognizes the ethnic particularity and full equality of all nationality groups and guarantees the
right of cultural-linguistic self-determination. Second, the system is organized as a federation with extensive decentralization and the right of political self-determination, including, in theory, the right of secession. Third, the LCY asserts the need to equalize economic conditions throughout the federal units and recognizes the equal claim of all nationalities to economic resources and standards. Fourth, ethnic tensions are defused through self-management, a grassroots system, at least in theory, for defusing social issues at the lowest level possible. Fifth, religious organizations are advised to abstain from outspoken involvement on behalf of particular nationality groups (though the creation of an autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church in 1967 enjoyed active LCY support because it provided an institutional symbol of Macedonian ethnicity in the face of Bulgarian claims that Macedonians are merely Bulgarians). Sixth, decentralization translates interethnic relations into interrepublican relations. Seventh, dual consciousness is affirmed—ethnic consciousness and Yugoslav consciousness (Yugoslav socialist patriotism). And, eighth, separatism and unitarism are considered two forms of the same perilous deviation.

Contemporary Yugoslav nationalities policy combines radical decentralization and generous guarantees to the ethnic cultures with a negative perception of nationalism which often finds expression in shrill denunciations of neofascist nationalism and antisocialist chauvinism. The
operating assumption of Yugoslav nationalities policy is that any exclusively nationalist sentiment is antisocialist. Any revival of excessive ethnic pride (such as might be manifested in the singing of certain songs) is by definition anticommunist and potentially pro-secessionist. The reason for this fear of nationalism is, at least in part, that Yugoslavs, as Marxists, view nationalism not primarily as a spirit with which a nation is infused (nor even perhaps as a political doctrine extolling the nation as a supreme value and representing it as the dominant principle of societal organization) but as a relationship between two or more national societies, in which at least one society aspires to dominate, exploit, or despoil the other.

Thus, for Yugoslavia's Marxists, nationalism is a social relationship in which distinct national communities face each other with mutually exclusive demands tinged with resentment of the unmatched gains of the other. It is with this view of nationalism in mind that Tihomir Vlashkalich, president of the central committee of the League of Communists of Serbia (LCS), told his colleagues in 1976 that "to be a nationalist today, in conditions of national freedom and equality, means to be against the national freedom of others, to be against equality, and, finally, to even be against the freedom of one's own nation, because nationalism today can only serve interests in favor of hegemony and exploitation, and that is certainly not the working class."42
However, the LCY's abhorrence of nationalism is balanced by a scrupulous respect for the national sensitivities, linguistic rights, and cultural needs of all of Yugoslavia's national groups. Yugoslav nationalities policy recognizes two broad categories: (1) the nations (narodi), consisting of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and, since 1971, Muslims; and (2) the "protected nationalities" (narodsnosti) consisting of Albanians, Hungarians, Turks, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Romanians, Ruthenes/Ukrainians, Czechs, Gypsies, and Italians, amounting to 2,700,000 persons or 12 percent of the total population in 1981.43 (See Table 2) Yugoslavia's recent record on national rights is commendable for all groups except Gypsies. Only Macedonia's constitution accords the Gypsies equal status with the other national groups. In all the other federal units, the Gypsies, though guaranteed their legal rights as individuals, are treated as outcasts and denied any collective rights.44

As an example of Yugoslav national rights policy, Bulgarians who live in Macedonia enjoy daily broadcasts in Bulgarian. Several Bulgarian language publications are available—among them, the weekly Bratsvo (now twenty years old); Drugarcher, a magazine for youth; and Most, a journal for literature, science, and culture. Children of all nationalities are provided the option of schooling in their native languages through the high school or technical school level. Until recently, all Yugoslav pupils were obliged to
study a language other than their own. The revocation of this requirement resulted in massive loss of interest in Serbo-Croatian among minority students.

Guarantees to minority national groups are especially evident in the more heterogeneous autonomous provinces. In Kosovo, all provincial laws are published in authentic texts in Albanian, Serbo-Croatian, and Turkish. State organs conduct public procedures in either Serbo-Croatian or Albanian or, if specified by statute in a given locality, in Turkish. However, official use of Albanian only dates from the early 1970s. In Voyvodina, provincial laws, declarations, and proposals appear in Serbo-Croatian, Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian, and Ruthenian. All the republics guarantee their minority groups the right to establish organizations, to promote their communal interests, and to exercise their cultural rights—as long as the exercise of these rights does not become overtly nationalist or secessionist.

Yugoslavia recognizes three official languages: Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian. Because of Croatian sensitivity to differences of orthography, spelling, and vocabulary, the Serbian and Croatian variants of Serbo-Croatian are usually both given. They are treated as distinct languages for legal purpose. But, for all practical purposes, the British and American variants of English are more distinct than Serbian is from Croatian. Thus, all treaties between Yugoslavia and other states are
published in at least four languages—Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian. All federal buildings in Belgrade are scrupulously identified in all four languages and the ingredients or instructions of many household commodities are, by law, painstakingly given in the four languages.45

The national groups are also safeguarded in other ways. The constitution guarantees the proportional representation of nationalities within the officer corps of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), although there is clearly Serbian domination of the officer corps.46 The constitution also makes important concessions to the national banks of the republics. In addition, the republics are assured participation in international treaties affecting their interests.47

The federal units play an important role in nationalities policy, not only in the administration of various cultural and educational programs, but also through the extension of substantial subsidies to minority institutions. For example, the Croatian republic increased subsidies for its national minorities (except for Serbs in Croatia) by 20 percent for 1980. These subsidies were earmarked for the Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, Ruthene and Ukrainian Councils, for newspapers in those languages, and for the support of the Italian Union and Italian-language drama in Croatia.48
Yugoslav nationalities policy necessarily assumes an economic dimension because of the Marxist tenet that political equality is impossible without economic equality. Given the marked disparities between the wealthier northern republics and the poorer southern republics, the establishment of institutional mechanisms for the channeling of resources to the underdeveloped regions is viewed as a political imperative. This theme has developed a sense of urgency since the inflammation of Albanian nationalism in Kosovo. Therefore, it is not surprising that Yugoslavia's social plans underline the need to accelerate development in Kosovo and the underdeveloped republics.

Thus, Yugoslav nationalities policy can be understood as a multifaceted assault on the roots of internal discord, and a comprehensive program of socialization to Yugoslav socialist norms of brotherhood and unity. Although Yugoslav nationalities policy clearly tackles problems at the economic base, this is not in itself considered sufficient to effect the desired metamorphosis of the superstructure. The system has yet to snuff out all traces of neo-Hegelian idealism.

In one of his last works, Edvard Kardelj (the LCY's chief theoretician), concluded that changes in group behavior follow and often require changes in group consciousness. Therefore, it is not enough to introduce constitutional and institutional changes. Changes must also take place in the collective consciousness.
words, the Yugoslav equivalent of the New Soviet Man must develop before problems of an interethnic character can be considered to have been resolved once and for all.
NOTES

1NIN (Belgrade) April 13, 1975. pp. 51-52.


12Ibid., p. 416.


19 As quoted in Ibid., p. 147.


24 Ibid.

25 Jajce is pronounced "Yaitse." In Serbo-Croatian, the letter "J" is sounded as a "Y." However, if a "J" follows a "D" as in Djilas, then the normal "J" pronunciation should be employed.


27 Purivatra, "Tito's Contribution," pp. 75-76.


32 Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, p. 167.

33 Purivatra, "Tito's Contributions," p. 69.

34 Irwin, "Yugoslavia and Ethnonationalists," p. 119.


42 Purivatra, "Tito's Contributions," p. 75.


CHAPTER III

THE CROATION CRISIS: 1967-1972

The Eighth Congress of the LCY, held in December 1964, had the task of assuaging the surfacing tensions in interrepublican relations. The Eighth Congress was the occasion for the first open discussion of the national question and for a somewhat nebulously worded agreement to undertake economic reform. As the Congress began, Croatian liberals immediately started to argue the case for economic optimalization (the use of profit criteria in investment), and questioned the lack of circumspection with which investment resources had been funneled into the south. Drawing on support from Slovenia and Macedonia, the Croats achieved a partial victory at this congress. But, the consensus reached was a flimsy and even superficial one. Rival and contradictory economic orientations were incorporated into resolutions adopted at the Eighth Congress.¹

The reform and the subsequent political devolution, which led to the present day institutional configuration of Yugoslavia, were to a considerable extent the handiwork of the liberals. They had won by wrenching control of the system from the conservatives.² By 1972, however, the liberals lost the reins of power to a coalition of party centrists (Titoists).
The liberal coalition applied pressure both through its representatives in Belgrade and through vigorous self-assertion within the areas of its collective geographic jurisdiction. Between 1965 and 1966, they were able to push reforms which dramatically reduced the prerogatives of the federal government in the economic sector. Federal subsidies to industry were slashed—a clear victory for Croatia and Slovenia and a setback for the centralists, whose strongholds at that time were not only in Serbia but also in Kosovo and Montenegro. Profitability became the chief criterion for the allocation of resources.3

The market reform of 1965 effectively ended the golden age of political factories, and central investment planning was abandoned. Yet, the Serbs were not unconditional losers. They continued to dominate the national banks, and the reforms were not inimical to Belgrade's larger corporations. Moreover, the distinction between advocacy of pluralist decision making through republican coalitions or along territorial/ethnic lines was blurred by the temporary alliance of proponents of both approaches in the fight against unitarism.4

At the same time, concern over the slide toward political pluralism was growing among Serbs. The Serbs are sensitive to accusations of Serbian hegemony and harbor lingering resentment against the Croats for the establishment of an independent Croatia in World War II, and the concomitant massacres of Serbs.5 It is important to
remember the LCY established itself on the wreckage of the Serbian Chetniks, who under the leadership of General Drazha Mihailovich had waged successful and heroic warfare against the Germans. This mixture of historically rooted emotions is combined with the conviction of many Serbs that centralism provides the greatest good for the greatest number. Serbs feel they are indeed the only true internationalists in Yugoslavia, and have been abused and exploited by the other nationalities.

By 1969, there were other changes in republican orientations. Voyvodina, which had been associated with Croatian and Slovenian demands for further decentralization of the economic system, began to back off. Montenegro steadily became more anti-Serbian, if not exactly pro-Croatian. And Croatia, shorn of support to the north and east, began actively courting Kosovo. Yugoslavia was beginning to take on the characteristics of an international balance of power system.

At the Tenth Session of the Croatian central committee in 1969, amid criticism of Belgrade's continued unitarianism which underestimated the seriousness of the national question, the Croats launched a campaign aimed at further devolution of authority to the republics. Eventually, the intersection of economic grievances with the perception of cultural threat propelled the Croatian leadership beyond the bounds of tolerable political behavior, provoking a systemwide crisis.
Economic Exploitation

Despite the economic reforms, the Croats quickly became disgruntled. Change was too slow and not always in the direction favored by the Croats. They also claimed economic resources and credits were more concentrated in Belgrade than ever before. In the course of September and November of 1971, Hrvatski tjednik, the weekly newspaper of Matica Hrvatska\(^{11}\) (The Croatian Cultural Society), published a series of articles which attempted to show how Belgrade's banks had monopolized credit in Dalmatia and squeezed out the indigenous Croatian banks.\(^{12}\)

By 1971, it had become impossible to divorce economics from politics. It seemed clear to an increasing number of Croats that they were being exploited because they were Croats. The Croats noted that Generalexport, a Belgrade company which was knee deep in the Croatian hotel industry, was permitted to set up its own airline long before permission for a Croatian airline was granted.\(^{13}\) Since this was Yugoslavia's (i.e., Serbia's) second airline, the Croats could only conclude the forces of unitarism were still entrenched.\(^{14}\) More disturbing to Croats was Shime Djodan's argument that Croatia had been forced to accept a deficit in trade with every other republic in the Yugoslav federation, even while netting a sizeable surplus in foreign trade. Djodan, an economist and leading Croatian nationalist, identified Croatia's interests with liberalism and
associated Yugoslav conservatives with centralism (i.e., Serbianism).\textsuperscript{15}

**Perceived Cultural and Demographic Threats**

Croatian nationalists who anxiously warned Croats of impending Serbianization were convinced the threat was real. The Serbian menace was thought to take three forms: the Serbianization of the Croatian language, the demographic displacement of Croats by Serbs, and the perceived Serbian catering to Dalmatian sentiment in order to split Croatia in two. These three movements were read by the overwhelming majority of Croats as symptoms of a Serbian threat. Population movements can be explained as strictly economic phenomena, and linguistic homogenization is a typical epiphenomenon of modernization. Even the stirrings of Dalmatian ethnic self-identity might have been interpreted as a genuine manifestation of endogenous currents. However, the Croatian public did not view these developments as isolated features. Increasingly, the talk was of Croatia's need to defend itself.\textsuperscript{16}

In December 1954, the cultural associations of those federal units in which Serbo-Croatian is the *lingua franca* (Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Voyvodina, Bosnia-Herzegovina) convened to make arrangements for collaborating on the creation of a common orthography for the entire country and to produce a definitive Serbo-Croatian dictionary.\textsuperscript{17} *Matica Srpska*, the Serbian cultural organization, had succeeded in
persuading other participants that creation of a unified standards dictionary and orthography was in the interests of all national groups. When the first two volumes of this dictionary were finally published in 1967, they inflamed the Croatian public. Common Croatian vocabulary and expressions were often relegated to the status of a local dialect; the Serbian variant was presented as the standard, the Croatian as the deviation.  

In reaction, the Croats set about compiling a new Croatian dictionary and began the "purification" of the Croatian language from Serbian infiltration. Ironically, in the Dictionary of the Croatian Language first published in 1901 and considered authoritative in 1968, Croatian academics conceded that Serbian roots and culture were the source of over 90 percent of Croatian words. Croatians were angered by Matica Srpska's insistence that Croatian is only a dialect of Serbian. Serbian academicians argued the language of Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, and Bosnian Muslims is a single language with negligible variations. But, Croatian scholars answered this reasoning with the observation that the Serbian position would stifle the autonomous development of Croatian, Montenegrin, and other languages—even Serbian.  

From a purely linguistic point of view, Serbo-Croatian is obviously a single language. But this was an ethnic and political controversy, not a linguistic or scientific one. In autumn 1971, the publication of the new Croatian
Orthography (Hrvatski pravopis) with a new dictionary of the "purified Croatian language" precipitated Serbian condemnations. Serbs warned this new dictionary would exacerbate growing ethnic tensions between Croats and Serbs, not help heal them.22

Croats also began to speak of a demographic threat. Croatia's population was proportionately older than the population of any other republic except Slovenia. Moreover, the large emigration of Croatian workers to Western Europe, which had formerly been viewed as an economic opportunity, was suddenly construed to be a Serbian plot to move younger Croats out of their homeland. This situation was compounded by another variable—the increasing influx of Serbs into Croatia. These Serbian immigrants were believed to be taking the places relinquished by the Croatian emigration. Croatian nationalists entreated the LCC to prevent any more Serbs from moving into Croatia.23 Simultaneously, concerned Croats organized to "reclaim" immigrants of earlier centuries who had been hitherto written off as Serbian. The immigrants were recast (as they were during World War II under the fascist Pavelich regime) as "Orthodox Croats,"24 thus confounding the traditional canon that a Croat is Catholic and a Serb is Orthodox.

The Serbian Orthodox Church has always resented the tenth century forcible transfer of Dalmatia from Byzantium's jurisdiction to the authority of Rome. As the 1970s began, Serbian interest in Dalmatia was more openly expressed. The
Serbian Orthodox Church published a book entitled *Serbs and Orthodoxy in Dalmatia and Dubrovnik*. During 1971, a ring of Serbian nationalists printed and distributed pamphlets which called for the immediate organization of autonomous Serbian provinces in Dalmatia and Croatia.\(^{25}\) The central committee of the LCC considered it necessary to condemn Dalmatian autonomism as a unitarist, anti-Croatian ruse. Thus, Croatian nationalists had reason to believe Dalmatian autonomism was reviving, and Serbian interference was tangibly present.\(^{26}\)

The Dalmatians continue to view themselves as distinct from other Croats. In most cases, this view is as harmless as a Texan's pride in being Texan. But, the Croatian central committee took pains to make it absolutely clear that no province in Croatia had any ethnic or historical basis for seeking autonomous status. Dalmatian autonomism could lay no claim to any category of legitimacy, because it was nothing less than "treason" against the Croatian nation.\(^{27}\)

**The Croatian Reaction**

Threatened, as they saw it, with the suppression of their language, the obliteration of their people, and the usurpation of their land, the Croats reacted aggressively. They repudiated the antimony of nationalism and patriotism, and challenged the socialist doctrine that Yugoslav patriotism is immeasurably superior to ethnic nationalism.
The Croats also began to look for institutional-legal measures to safeguard the Croatian nation from the Serbs. The argument made was the Croatian nation would cease to be manipulated and exploited only if it realized its statehood, and only complete sovereignty could guarantee interrepublican equality. Otherwise, Croatia would continue to serve as a "plaything" for other Yugoslav actors. In a classic expression of balance of power thinking, one Croat even argued "Croatia must be set as the criterion at every moment, in every undertaking. Nothing can be done to benefit others that would at the same time be contrary to Croatia's interests." The dividing line between statehood and secession or self-interest and rejection of fellow Yugoslavs was often fuzzy.

Until late in 1969, the leaders of Slovenia and Voyvodina supported the Croatian leadership's demands for further decentralization of the banking system and reform of the foreign currency exchange systems. The catch phrase "5 to 1" began to acquire popularity among Croats as early as 1968. The phrase signified the widely held view that Croatia's demands for change were always opposed by the other five Yugoslav republics and therefore Croatia stood alone.

In May 1968, Stipe Shuvar, a conservative leader within the LCC, blasted Croatian nationalism as emotional, irrational mysticism "dragged up from the trash heap of history" (Trotsky's phrase). In response, Shuvar was
personally upbraided by friends and acquaintances for being a "Serbophile, a Yugo-agent, and a unitarist." However, Shuvar refused to budge and condemned the revival of "Croatian petit bourgeois nationalism." He asserted Croatian nationalism was characterized by the conviction that all of Croatia's misfortunes were caused by the activities of the other Yugoslav nations (especially the Serbs); by dependence on, and willingness to serve, various foreign imperialistic force (Orthodox Russia); by a mystic belief in the superiority of the Croatian nation; and by the tenet that Croatian nationalism can only blossom with the carving up of Yugoslavia. The thrust of Shuvar's portrayal was unmistakable. Croatian nationalism is misguided, ethnocentric, and dangerous. But Shuvar's capacity to influence Croatian public opinion was minimal.

Many Croats, especially intellectuals and liberal party officials behaved with unalloyed obtuseness toward their non-Croat colleagues, especially the Serbs. At a meeting of the Yugoslav council on Visual Arts, the Croatian delegation walked out when they were defeated by a 5-to-1 vote on the issue of moving the administrative headquarters to a different republic capital every two years at the time of biennial meetings. The Croats dismissed the arguments of their colleagues from the other republics that biennial shifts were not only uneconomical, but self-defeating since close contact with foreign cultural groups and exhibitions--one of the organization's principal purposes--could best be handled in Belgrade where all the embassies are located.

Visiting academicians attending scholarly conferences in Zagreb, the Croatian capital, were likely to find
themselves being corrected by militant Croats for use of Serbian words instead of Croatian. The new Croatian dictionary was replete with archaisms and exotic neologisms designed to eliminate anything which might be construed as a Serbian expression. A meeting of teachers and writers demanded the revision of school history books, particularly to refute overwhelming evidence of Croatian collaboration with the Nazis. They wanted to give greater emphasis to specifically Croatian achievements and called for devoting two-thirds of the time allotted to history lessons to Croatian culture and history.36

Until the end of 1969, the Croatian party leadership had not taken a clear stand on the nationalist revival, primarily because neither of its two principal factions had been able to get the upper hand. Milosh Zhanko, a conservative member of the party, exhorted his colleagues to keep the interests of the entire country uppermost in their minds and to subordinate Croatian interests to Yugoslav interests. As a result, he polarized the Croatian party, alienated most of his passive supporters, and provoked a counterattack.37

At the Tenth Plenum of the central committee of the LCC (January 15-17, 1970), the president of the central committee, Savka Dabchevich-Kuchar, led the attack on Zhanko. She claimed the struggle against unitarism and the struggle against nationalism were two sides of the same coin. But, because of the influence of deluded unitarists
like Zhanko, the LCC had devoted its energies exclusively to the struggle against nationalism. She concluded the Croatian party organization would have to devote greater attention to combating unitarism. Dabchevich-Kuchar interpreted Zhanko's position as disloyal, and the LCC rebuffed him for antiparty views, stripped him of his posts, and attested that "the struggle against nationalism cannot be waged from unitarist battlements."  

After the Tenth Plenum, the LCC drew steadily closer to the ideology of Matica Hrvatska and the nationalists. An internal alliance was being forged to replace the moribund interrepublican alliance with Slovenia, Voyvodina, and Macedonia. The Tenth Plenum was a turning point in that it was the first time a republican central committee had rendered an assessment of problems of further policy development (and of the state of interethnic relations) independently of central party organs. The LCC was coming into its own, speaking for Croatia as a body of Croatian politicians.

The Croatian revival reclaimed the heroes of the past. Croats began reexamining their history, searching for leaders who had been swept under the carpet by the communist regime. Stjepan Radich, founder of the Croatian peasant party in the interwar period, became overnight the most popular politician in Croatia, with Miko Tripalo, the secretary of the central committee in second place, and Tito, possibly a distant third.
Matica Hrvatska went on the offensive, bent on "de-Serbianizing" the Croatian language. In June 1971, Matica Hrvatska organized an open meeting to discuss the Zadar Review (Zadarska revija). The discussion became intense and bitter, with Matica Hrvatska complaining that the Review's language was "impure," a concatenation created by the contributions of a staff drawn not merely from Croatia but from various parts of Yugoslavia. Matica Hrvatska also pressured Yugoslav Railways, objecting that its exclusive use of the ekavian variant (Serbian) was prejudicial to the Croatian language. Under additional pressure from the LCC in Zagreb, Yugoslav Railways agreed that by September 1971, all railway notices, schedules, and forms would also be printed in the ijekavian variant (Croatian). Hrvatski tjednik protested that the buses servicing the Zagreb airport were marked "Jugoslovenski Aerotransport" (correct Serbian) rather than "Jugoslavenski Aerotransport" (correct Croatian). The pettiness to which such disputes can descend was shown by the Croatian transport administration, which issued notices that the road between the settlements of Skrad, the "Goranka" tavern and Stubica would be closed. The reference to the tavern was to avoid having to name the village where it was located—Srpske (Serbian) Moravice.

Every federal unit was struck by nationalist outbursts in the early 1970s. There were strong anti-Serbian feelings among all the non-Serbian nationalities. Nationalist discontent was most visible in Croatia and Kosovo and
followed in decreasing intensity by Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Voyvodina.

Serbian nationalism was a particular problem among the Serbs of Croatia. It escalated at this time as a response to the wave of Croatian nationalism, as an adjunct of persistent Great Serbian chauvinism centered in the Serbian republic, and as a reflection of the traditional, religiously derived distrust Croatia's Serbs have long felt toward their Croatian cousins (particularly after the World War II massacres of Serbs in Croatia).46

Prosvjeta, the Serbian cultural society in Croatia,47 started to change its character around 1969 and became a stronghold for Serbian nationalists and former Chetniks. Exploiting this institutional base, Croatia's Serbian nationalists sought in 1970 to create a Serbian autonomous province within Croatia and demanded a separate network of special Serbian schools. Some Croatian Serbs even broached the idea of seceding from the Croatian republic and attaching themselves to the Serbian republic.48 Although nationalist sentiment was most systematically organized in Croatia, it is apparent that by the early 1970s, this dangerous system-threatening sentiment had spread throughout Yugoslavia.49

The Croatian National Movement Accelerates

The various factions in the Yugoslav debate over the federalization of the LCY--democratizers, liberals,
nationalists, humanists, and conservatives—had their counterparts within the LCC. There were the liberals, such as Savka Dabchevich-Kuchar, Miko Tripalo, and their coterie, together with technocrats and economic reformers; the nationalists, such as Shime Djodan, Marko Veselica (a Croatian economist), and the exploding membership of Matica Hrvatska; and the group of centralist-humanists known as the Praxis group. In addition to these three groups were the conservatives, including Milosh Zhanko and Stipe Shuvar.

The nationalists had, by early 1971, found natural ideological allies in the liberals. When, in February 1971, the conservative members of the Croatian executive committee demanded that resolute action be taken against Matica Hrvatska and Dabchevich-Kuchar, the liberals blocked the action. However, the conservative anti-nationalists scored a victory, in July 1971, when they succeeded in having Shime Djodan and Marko Veselica expelled from the party as ringleaders of ethnocentric turmoil. But this victory was an isolated triumph, for the tide was turning against the conservatives.

Membership in Matica Hrvatska soared to 41,000 members in fifty-five branches by November 1971 (up from 2,323 members in thirty branches in November 1970). The nationalists also made steady inroads among establishment news organs. Even Vjesnik, the Croatian party publication, drew closer to the nationalists. Radio-Television Zagreb began to carry all of Savka Dabchevich-Kuchar's speeches in
their entirety, while systematically curtailing programming from other Yugoslav stations and information regarding other parts of the country.\textsuperscript{53}

In this politically fluid situation, the Croatian conservatives employed any and all available means in their struggle for control of the Croatian party. Ironically, they found allies in the humanists of the \textit{Praxis} group,\textsuperscript{54} who possessed an ideologically rooted antipathy toward decentralization, nationalism, and even federalism (which the humanists considered a unnecessary compromise with Marxism).\textsuperscript{55} When the Croatian district court of Sisak banned the May-August 1971 issue of \textit{Praxis}, because of an article which contained a searing indictment of the rising nationalist movement in Yugoslavia (particularly in Croatia) and which linked nationalism with the efforts of an "unproletarian"\textsuperscript{56} new middle class to consolidate its position, the conservatives took the issue to the Croatian Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{57} Both sides in the contest knew exactly how \textit{Praxis} figured in the struggle:

The consistently outspoken and hostile attacks of the \textit{Praxis} collaborators on the spirit of nationalism had made it increasingly urgent for the nationalist ideologues to discredit \textit{Praxis} in the public eye and to impair...its further activity....It is unlikely, therefore, that \textit{Praxis}' strategic value in the struggle against "nationalist deformations" went unnoticed by the federal authorities, and it cannot be doubted that calculations such as these played some role in the Croatian Supreme Court's 1971 decision to overturn the Sisak District Court's ban on the contested issue of \textit{Praxis}.\textsuperscript{58}
At the same time, Tito was watching developments in Croatia with increasing concern and, early in July 1971, traveled to Zagreb to talk with Croatia's leadership. Tito revealed to them his misgivings that Croatia was sliding back to the atmosphere of the prewar era and implied the republican leadership was losing control of the situation. "Are we going to have 1941 all over again?" Tito asked. "That would be a catastrophe." Of special concern to Tito was the cult of Stjepan Radich. "Radich's organization was a kulak organization, he hated communists and did not represent the interests of the working class. We offered to cooperate with him, but he did not want anything to do with us," said Tito.

Clearly, Tito remained the ultimate arbiter in interrepublican and--so it seemed--intrarepublican affairs. When he brought the full force of pressure to bear, a republican leadership almost always had to yield ground. But, since Tito increasingly believed Yugoslav stability was best guaranteed when Yugoslavia operated as a self-regulating system of broadly autonomous federal units, the republics perceived his interventions as setting limits of legitimate activity rather than aborting independent decision making.

Therefore, the response of Croatia's nationalist communists to Tito's July lecture was not to cave in but to conclude Tito was poorly informed and needed to be enlightened. The nationalists managed to ameliorate Tito's
fears in a carefully orchestrated reception for him in Zagreb in September 1971. Tito made an about-face and told his Zagreb audience, "I have been able to convince myself just how absurd certain stories about Croatia are—that there is no unity here, that people here think differently, that chauvinism blossoms and thrives here. None of that is true."62

Croatian nationalism now took a dangerous turn, riveting its attention on ethnically mixed Bosnia to the south. In the gathering storm, it was inevitable that Croatian eyes should turn to Bosnia. This territory had been part of Croatia during the reign of fascist Ustashe Croatia, and some twenty percent of its population consisted of ethnic Croats. Although today Bosnian Muslims make up a plurality of Bosnia's population, it should be noted that Bosnian Serbs comprised over half of the population before the Ustashe massacres of Serbs during World War II.63 Matica Hrvatska asserted Croats were being denied their rights in Bosnia and other republics and, therefore, sought to set up branches in Bosnia and Voyvodina to cater to the needs of Croats in those areas. But, viewing this as cultural imperialism, neither Bosnia or Voyvodina would permit branches to be set up.64

The End of the Nationalist Coalition

Ultimately, the nationalist groups gathered around Matica Hrvatska explicitly demanded complete Croatian
independence. Secession became mainstream political sentiment in Croatia.\textsuperscript{65} In ethnically heterogeneous communities, friction between Croats and Serbs was commonplace, and there were reports that in some communities residents were "arming themselves in anticipation of a physical showdown."\textsuperscript{66}

By failing to suppress \textit{Matica Hrvatska}, the liberal Croatian party leaders lost their chance to save themselves.\textsuperscript{67} Croatia had threatened the territorial integrity of two fellow federal units (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Voyvodina) and alienated a third (Serbia) by their chauvinist pose towards Serbs in Croatia. The nationalists had gone too far and thus the appearance of an anti-Croatian coalition was to be expected. The presence of the anti-Croatian coalition permitted the effective quashing of the movement by the federal government in league with the Croatian conservatives.\textsuperscript{68}

In late October 1971, Vladimir Bakarich, a prominent Croatian conservative and former president of the LCC, journeyed to Sarajevo to court Bosnian support. He hoped to escalate the intra-Croatia party contest to the federal level in order to defeat the coalition of Croatian liberals and nationalists. Branko Mikulich, a Bosnian Croat and president of the Bosnian party, was sensitive to the nationalist propaganda coming from Croatia and receptive to Bakarich's entreaties.\textsuperscript{69} Affected by the escalation of intraparty conflict, Miko Tripalo made a show of force. He
remarked, "The policy we are pursuing in Croatia cannot be changed. Our opponents think policy can be changed by replacing a few leaders. In order to achieve that, it would be necessary to replace thousands of leaders in Croatia. ... We have taken our fate in our hands and we will keep it in our hands." 70 Within the same time period, Tito was meeting with army leaders in Bosnia. Whether he also met with Bakarich and Mikulich is unclear. However, he was being shown "suppressed TV reels of Croatian Communist mass meetings, with only Croatian flags [missing the communist red star] and with nationalist and anti-Tito slogans, shouts, songs and signs." 71

Matica Hrvatska and Croatian student leaders knew the Croatian conservatives had undertaken a concerted effort to enlist Tito's support in throttling the nationalist-liberal coalition. 72 Therefore, the Croatian Student's Union, in a dramatic gambit, organized a massive strike designed to undermine the conservative move by making it clear conservatism lacked a popular base. Some three thousand students met in Zagreb on November 22, 1971, and unanimously voted to begin a strike at 9 A.M. the following day. Ostensibly, they protested existing federal regulations governing hard currency, banking, commerce, linguistic policies, and military training. Since Slovenia and Voyvodina had backed out of an intrarepublican alliance with Croatia, the LCC had been courting leaders in Kosovo and Macedonia. Thus, it is interesting that representatives of
the Native Macedonian Student's Club and of the Native Club of Kosovan Students, who were present at the pre-strike meeting, firmly supported the Croatian students. Within a matter of days, at least 30,000 university student across Croatia were on strike.

Until the autumn of 1971, Tito had hoped it would be possible to effect a compromise with the forces in power in Croatia, and to let things develop more or less on their own. If the suppressed newsreel footage was not enough, the student strike helped convince Tito compromise was impossible. Liberalization, decentralization, and appeasement of Croatia had only fed the Croat's ever increasing hunger for autonomy. Yugoslav military intelligence later uncovered evidence some of the party leaders had been in contact with Croatian Ustashe emigre groups in West Germany.

Tito considered sending troop into Croatia, but eventually he decided to decapitate the Croatian party leadership. On December 1, 1971, Tito convened a joint meeting of the party presidiums of the LCY and the LCC at Karadjordjevo, Voyvodina. At this meeting, the Twenty-first Session of the LCY presidency, it became obvious just how isolated nationalist-liberal Croats were. The Serbian and Croatian conservatives led the assault, supported by ideological bedfellows from Voyvodina and Montenegro. Bosnia, Slovenia, and even Kosovo (whose party was at that time still controlled by the Serbs) criticized Croatia's
exclusivist nationalism and called for stern measures. The Croatian leaders were upbraided for their "unhealthy" liberalism, nonchalance with respect to counterrevolutionary groups, and use of student organizations to advance their political aims. The Croats were told to put their house in order. But, given the denunciation of the liberals, the Twenty-first Session could only strengthen the hand of the conservatives on the Croatian central committee.

Finally, on December 12, 1971, Miko Tripalo and Savka Dabchevich-Kuchar resigned their posts under pressure. In protest of Tripalo's resignation, five hundred student militants demonstrated four days in downtown Zagreb. They demanded the creation of a separate Croatian state, a response which only served to further implicate the liberals and strengthen Tito's hand. Helmeted riot police were sent in to occupy strategic points in Zagreb, while helicopters surveyed the streets from above. If necessary, the army was prepared to move in. A follow-up conference to the Twenty-first session declared that "nationalism has become ... the focal point for everything in our society that is reactionary, anti-socialist and anti-democratic, bureaucratic and Stalinist."

In the aftermath of the crisis, literally tens of thousands of members were expelled from the party, most for failure to toe the party line, while Shime Djodan, Marko Veselica, and the editor of Hrvatski tjednik were sentenced to long prison terms. Matica Hrvatska was shut
down and its fourteen publications were put out of commission. The backlash climaxed at the end of 1973 with a purge of writers, film-makers, university professors, and former liberal leaders. However, Tito moved to undercut the popular bases of the Croatian nationalists by granting many of their economic demands, even though these demands were secondary to their ethnic and cultural aspirations. In a sense, Belgrade conceded that Croatia had been exploited and Croatia's contribution to the federal budget had been proportionally the largest.

The Croatian crisis can be analyzed as a period in which the political actors tested the limits of Yugoslavia's federal system and, in some cases, attempted to transcend them. The processes of alliance building became pronounced, and alliances existed as tangible understandings and were consciously pursued. Thus, when Slovenia and Voyvodina backed away from the Croatian nexus, Croatia sought new allies in Kosovo and Macedonia.

However, interrepublican conflict in Yugoslavia cannot be characterized one-dimensionally. The Croatian crisis suggests that in a multinational state, fundamental confrontations are likely to be manifested on three levels: (1) the federal or central level, as a conflict between republican actors within a federal context; (2) the interrepublican level, as an unmediated conflict between the units themselves; and (3) the intrarepublican level, as a struggle between factions within the unit and a
confrontation between cross-migrated diasporas (such as the Croatian Serbs or the Bosnian Croats) and their host cultures.

The Yugoslav federation had weathered the crisis—but not without demonstrating the vulnerability of a system which is founded on the perceived self-interests of various ethnic groups, and on an ultimate arbiter like Tito.\textsuperscript{85} Without an emotional attachment to the political aggregate (Yugoslav patriotism), the Yugoslav multiethnic state seemed at the time of the Croatian crisis to have become a collection of jealous, warring competitors in a balance of power system.\textsuperscript{86}
NOTES


3Ibid.


11The literal translation of Matica Hrvatska is Mother of Croatia.
12 Irwin, "Yugoslavia and Ethnonationalists," p. 121.


16 Irwin, "Yugoslavia and Ethnonationalists," p. 122.


18 K. Mirth, "Croatian and Serbian or Serbo-Croatian?" Croatia Press 21, No. 253-54 (June 1967): 5-8.


21 Mirth, "Serbo-Croatian?" p. 10.


26 Schopflin, "Croatian Nationalism," p. 137.

27 Ibid.


32 Ibid p. 127.
Ante Pavelich, the leader of the World War II fascist Independent State of Croatia, and his followers (Ustashe) promulgated the superiority of the Croatian nation. The campaign was given the tacit support of the Vatican. See Lazo M. Kostich, The Holocaust in the Independent State of Croatia (Chicago: Liberty, 1981). In 1985, Pope John Paul II suddenly canceled a trip to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav authorities asked Pope John Paul to visit Jasenovac, a site at which thousands of Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies were massacred after forced conversion to Catholicism—these brutalities were usually overseen by Croatian Ustashe priests. If the Pope would have visited the memorial at Jasenovac, he would have had to acknowledge the role of the Vatican in Yugoslavia during World War II. In addition, many of the accusations against Austrian President Kurt Waldheim are related to the events in Croatia and Bosnia during World War II.


The Economist, October 22, 1971, p. 9.

Mirth, "Serbo-Croatian?" p. 9.


Meier, "Yugoslavia's National Question," p. 54.


Jakov Bachich, "Why the Croatian Student Strike?" Croatia Press 268 (December 1971): 8; and Alvin Z. Rubenstein, "Whither Yugoslavia?" Current History 64 (May 1973): 204.


Ibid., p. 220.

Singleton, Roots of Discord," p. 178.


Politika (Belgrade), August 20, 1971, p. 5.

Sher, Praxis, p. 182.

Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, p. 298.

69 Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, pp. 302-04.
70 Singleton, "Roots of Discord," p. 178.
72 Rusinow, Yugoslav Experiment, p. 306.
74 Schopflin, "Croatian Nationalism," p. 141.
76 Irwin, "Yugoslavia and Ethnonationalists," p. 125.
79 The Yugoslav National Army is the only institution in Yugoslavia not vulnerable to republican control; it is centralized and controlled by the Presidency of the LCY in Belgrade. For a concise discussion of the makeup and capability of the JNA see Phillip A. Karber and Jon L. Lellenberg, "Yugoslav Security After Tito," Strategic Review 8 (Spring 1980): 44-58.
80 "Programme of Action Adopted by the Second Conference of the LCY," Review of International Affairs 23 (February 5-20, 1972): 16.
82 Meier, "Yugoslavia's National Question," p. 54.
83 Rubinstein, Yugoslav Secession Crisis, p. 109.
CHAPTER IV

NATIONALIST STRIFE: 1970-1987

Croatian nationalism and its political consequences represented the principal threat to the integrity and stability of the Yugoslav federation in the late 1960s and early 1970s. But by the end of the 1970s, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo had become the loci of new ethnonationalist conflicts. The Muslim question and the persistence of separatist sentiment among Yugoslavia's Albanians are today the primary areas of nationalist disequilibrium in the Yugoslav system.

The conservative linkage of the Croatian nationalist movement with the rising middle class (stigmatizing it as "unproletarian") is thoroughly inapplicable to the situation in Kosovo. Nationalist discontent in Kosovo is to an appreciable degree a product of perceived economic deprivation. The "unproletarian" label is also irrelevant to the situation in Bosnia, where the Islamic community has figured as the chief advocate of a nationalism which is divorced from mere religious identity.

Therefore, a discussion and analysis of the Muslim question and of separatist pressures in Kosovo is useful in illustrating the depth of ethnic strife in Yugoslavia--strife which is at times related to the dominant Serb-Croat rivalry, and at other times completely independent of it.
Moreover, an examination of Muslim problems and Albanian nationalism will aid in determining whether Yugoslavia does indeed resemble a balance of power system.

The Muslim Question

Long before Muslim consciousness became politicized, the question of Bosnia's status in the federation was recognized as critical to the stabilization of interrepublican politics. If Bosnia had been allowed to remain part of Croatia, leaving intact the eastern boundaries set by the World War II Croatian Ustashe state, the Croatian republic would have been assured of overwhelming economic hegemony in the federation. However, the incorporation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into Serbia was equally unthinkable to a generation which had languished under Greater Serbian exploitation and had devoted more than two decades to the struggle against Serbianization. It was also unlikely a division of Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia could provide a basis for interethnic harmony. Therefore, a separate status for Bosnia was necessary to insure postwar stability in socialist Yugoslavia.

In the early postwar period, the Muslims were viewed as the least "national" of Yugoslavia's peoples, even as potentially anational (if they did not identify themselves as either Serbs or Croats). Throughout the postwar era, antagonistic groups advanced rival theories about the origins of the Bosnian Muslims. The Bogomil theory is a
variant expostulated by Croatian nationalists. They hold that certain ethnic Croats embraced a Manichaean religion known as Bogomilism, were thereafter persecuted by both the Catholic and Orthodox churches, and converted to Islam when the comparatively liberal-minded Turks subsequently conquered the region.\textsuperscript{4}

An alternative theory espoused by Serbs asserts the Muslims are in fact Serbian settlers who abandoned Orthodoxy and adopted Islam during the time of the Turkish occupation.\textsuperscript{5} Serbian ethnologists also claim some Serbian immigrants in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries converted to Catholicism, so that many of today's Croats in Bosnia are Serbs by origin.

Muslim nationalists have advanced a third theory. They argue Bosnian Muslims have a Turkish origin and trace their antecedents to immigration from Anatolia. This theory contests the customary belief that the Bogomil sect was a spin-off from Christianity. Instead, they contend the Bogomils were a non-Christian sect whose doctrines were related to Islam. According to this theory, the only thing Slavic about the Bosnian Muslims is their language, which they absorbed from the indigenous population.\textsuperscript{6} However, Tito endorsed all three theories of Muslim ethnogenesis in an effort to deny exclusive legitimacy to any one theory.\textsuperscript{7}

In February 1968, the central committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina (LCB-H) resolved that "experience has shown the damage of various forms of
pressure and insistence, in the earlier period [1940-1968], that Muslims declare themselves ethnically to be Serbs or Croats because, as was demonstrated ... and as contemporary socialist experience continues to show, the Muslims are a separate nation." Thus, the 1971 census was the first in which "Muslim" was treated as a fully recognized nationality. Inevitably, Bosnian Serbs and Croats felt threatened by the specter of a new ethnic force. As a result, the 1971 census witnessed considerable nationalist agitation in Bosnia (only partially in reaction to the Croatian Crisis). Some groups pressured citizens to declare themselves "Muslims, in the ethnic sense," while other groups pressured the Muslims to declare themselves "Yugoslavs, ethnically undeclared." 

The Macedonian party was sensitive to emerging Muslim nationalism because a segment of Macedonian-speaking citizens are Muslim, although the majority of Macedonians are Orthodox. In early 1971, the League of Communists of Macedonia (LCM) insisted that "Muslims who speak Macedonian are Macedonian" and that they were, as they viewed themselves, "Macedonians of Islamic faith." "Historically and scientifically," the secretariat of the central committee of the LCM maintained, "it is quite clear that Muslims of Slavic extraction living in Macedonia, who speak Macedonian, are nothing other than Macedonians."

Nova Macedonija, the official organ of the Macedonian party, warned that "the thesis about Muslims of Slavic
origin in Macedonia, as parts of a nascent Muslim nation, conceals an immediate threat of the reawakening of an old hegemonism vis-a-vis Macedonian nationality, history, and culture." The LCM adamantly denied Muslims in Macedonia have any ethnic tie whatsoever with Muslims in Bosnia. The party believed there was nothing peculiar about Macedonians being either Orthodox or Muslim, adding that Albanians living in Macedonia can be Muslim, Catholic, or Orthodox.  

Kosovo entered into the fray when the Kosovan party offered that "Muslim ethnic affiliation cannot be connected with this or that republic or spoken language, because every citizen, without regard to where he lives, enjoys the same freedom of expressing his national or ethnic affiliation, which cannot be confused with religious affiliation." Kosovo had repudiated the Macedonian position that Muslims who speak Macedonian are, ipso facto, Macedonian, and allowed for the possibility that a portion of Macedonia's population might indeed be Muslim—in the ethnic sense.  

Most important to the debate, and to the possibility Yugoslavia was evolving into a system of shifting interrepublican alliances, is that the position advanced by each republic was the theory most appropriate to its own conditions. Each unit attempted to impose its own theory on the other units and to seek adherents within other units, even though any theory was only germane to a particular republic. Bosnia wanted religiocultural heritage accepted as a sufficient basis for national identity. Macedonia
preferred to emphasize language and ethnic descent, while Croatia favored ethnic descent. Kosovo, with a mixed population of Albanian, Turkish, and Macedonian Muslims, plus Orthodox Serbs, Albanians, and Macedonians, and even some Catholic Albanians, decided to articulate what superficially appeared to be the most tolerant approach.\textsuperscript{12}

Eventually, the Serbian party lent oblique support to the Bosnia-Kosovo coalition when Latinka Perovich, secretary of the central committee of the LCS, declared it a matter of LCY policy that all people in Yugoslavia must be free to determine their own ethnic affiliation. This vaguely formulated statement amounted to a reprimand of Macedonia and Croatia and succeeded in bringing the question of Macedonian to a temporary close.\textsuperscript{13}

The Kosovan-Macedonian quarrel over Muslim nationality resurfaced in the months preceding the 1981 census. A noted Macedonian historian, Niyazi Limanovi, argued the Albanians of Kosovo were utilizing Islam in a strategy to de-Macedonize Macedonia. Limanovi concluded there were some 50,000 Muslim Macedonians in Macedonia who had previously reported themselves to be Albanians, Muslims, or even Serbs. He insisted they should declare themselves to be Macedonian Muslims in the forthcoming census. Ali Hadri, a Kosovan historian, remonstrated against Limanovi's attempt to pin the Macedonian label on Muslims in Macedonia and asserted ethnic identity was a matter of individual determination—a right guaranteed by the Yugoslav constitution.
After the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Bosnian Muslim clergy became increasingly active spokesmen for Muslim ethnic interests. They repeatedly sought permission to establish cultural institutions to stimulate Muslim national identity. More recently, nationally conscious Muslims have renewed efforts to found autonomous cultural institutions. Citing the existence of Matica Hrvatska and Matica Srpska, Muslim nationalists demanded the establishment of a Matica Muslimanska and the organization of Muslim cultural-artistic societies. But the LCY has consistently blocked such endeavors, calling them efforts to obtain a "privileged status" and to establish a power base from which to pursue a policy of "discrimination against the other religions."

A new generation of Muslims, educated to think of Bosnian Muslims as a national group and encouraged by contacts with the Middle East, has begun to look to Islam as a basis for political mobilization. In April 1983, Yugoslav authorities uncovered an illegal organization of Bosnian Muslims described as working for the creation of an Islamic republic in Yugoslavia and having illegal ties with "reactionary" Muslims abroad. Eleven persons, including two imams, were put on trial and sentenced to prison for terms averaging more than eight years.

Some Bosnian Muslim clergy have tried to draw a line between "positive political activity" and "negative political activity" on the part of religious organizations,
and thus claim for the Islamic community a legitimate role in the political constellation. This has often been combined with a desire to stress religion, which is, after all, the source of Muslim ethnicity. But the LCY, which fears the identification of religion and nationality, wants to have it both ways—to derive a new nationality from a religion but yet to deny that derivation and suppress demands based on it.

The rising tide of Muslim nationalism in Yugoslavia probably owes more to indigenous factors than to any external effects. The era of the Croatian Crisis was an important catalyst for Muslim nationalism, insofar as Croatian calls for the annexation of all or part of Bosnia provided the sort of cultural threat which quickly inflames ethnic sensitivities. However, Muslim nationalism in Yugoslavia did predate the worldwide Islamic revival by several years.

It is somewhat ironic that Tito, in one of his last public addresses (November 25, 1979), claimed "the nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina can be proud of their successes ... because they have succeeded in outgrowing mutual conflicts and frictions among nationalities." The famous Yugoslav-Montenegrin dissident, Milovan Djilas, chided "the problem has been solved--but not definitively." From a functional point of view, it can be argued the Bosnian Muslims are a balance of power mechanism which serves to keep the Croats and Serbs from destroying each other. This seems to be the
view of the LCY, even if it does fear the growth of rampant Muslim nationalism. The crux of the Muslim question is that the nationalist fever in Bosnia continues to spread among a group which constitutes only 40 percent of the republic, though elements in the remaining 60 percent continue to have serious doubts about the validity of the Muslim claim to nationality.

Albanian Nationalism in Kosovo

Albanian nationalism is a problem for Yugoslav interrepublican relations for at least five reasons: (1) it directly affects Kosovo's relations with Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro (since Kosovo was long dominated by Serbs, and since there are also many Albanians in Macedonia and Montenegro); (2) Albanian agitation for republican status for Kosovo has an impact on the interrepublican balance of power (Kosovo is the central force for the upgrading of Yugoslavia's autonomous provinces); (3) the nationalism of one ethnic group has an incendiary effect on the others; (4) the threat of secession is not merely a matter of concern to the federation as a whole but also to its several parts; and (5) Kosovo represents ultimate test of the validity of Yugoslav nationalities policy and, in particular, of the Marxist premise that economic equality causes nationalist tempers to abate.

Nearly one-half of the world's Albanians live in Yugoslavia. Most of Yugoslavia's Albanians live in Kosovo
(about 1.2 million), with the remainder in Macedonia (350,000) and Montenegro (50,000). There is also an important pocket of Albanians in Belgrade. During World War II, the Kosovo region was attached to Italian-dominated Albania. For several years after the war officially ended, Albanian guerrilla groups held out in Kosovo, desperately resisting reincorporation into Yugoslavia. In the winter of 1956, the Yugoslav secret police attempted to confiscate the weapons of Kosovo’s Albanians. This project provoked resistance and resulted in the deaths of a number of Albanians before an estimated nine thousand firearms were confiscated. However, the deterioration in Kosovo’s political equilibrium is normally traced to 1966, when revelations of Serbian dominance of the governmental, party, and security apparatus in Kosovo inflamed resentment among the Kosovan Albanians.

After reviewing conditions in Kosovo, the Fourth Plenum (1966) of the central committee of the LCY warned of Greater Serbian tendencies within the ranks of the LCY. The consensus was that Greater Serbian nationalism was an unnecessary stimulus to existing Albanian separatism and had to be expunged. Albanian separatism was identified as a problem at this time, even though Kosovo had not yet been shaken by ethnic riots. These developments sent Serbian conservatives and nationalists into a rage. They castigated Albanian nationalism and irredentism in Kosovo, and lamented that Serbs had become the victims of systematic reverse
discrimination insofar as employment in Kosovo was concerned. Yet, despite the resistance of Serbophile conservatives, Serbian domination of Albania was waning.25

The LCY agreed in the spring of 1968 to substitute the neutral term "Albanian" for the term "Shiptar," which the Albanians considered pejorative26 but which had been the standard vocabulary in official as well as unofficial business.27 In early November 1968, the LCS proposed that the designations of the party organizations of the autonomous provinces be changed. Shortly thereafter, the "LCS for Voyvodina" became the League of Communists of Voyvodina (LCV), and the "LCS for Kosovo" became the League of Communists of Kosovo-Metohija (LCK). In mid-November 1968, the Sixth Congress of the LCS authorized the provincial party organizations to pass their own statutes. The Albanian component was immediately strengthened in the Kosovan party. However, Albanians and Hungarians were still significantly underrepresented in the respective party organizations of Kosovo and Voyvodina.28

Despite the attempts by the LCS to mollify Albanian resentment, Kosovo exploded in violence on November 27, 1968. Hundreds of demonstrators smashed shop windows and overturned cars in Prishtina (Kosovo's capital), and the anti-Serbian protest quickly spread to other towns in Kosovo. Some of the rioters demanded annexation by Albania, and crowds could be heard chanting "Long Live Enver Hoxha!" (the ruler of Communist Albania). The protestors drew up a
list of demands which included dropping "Metohija" (a Serbian word, although "Kosovo" is also a Serbian word but part of the Albanian language) from the official name of the region. They demanded the redesignation of Kosovo as a republic, the extension of the right of self-determination to Kosovo (the right of a republic, not of an autonomous province), and the establishment of an independent university in Prishtina. 29

In early December 1968, the disturbances spread to some Macedonian cities, and the LCY responded swiftly and decisively. The ring leaders of the apparently well-organized demonstrations received jail terms of up to five years, and those held chiefly accountable for unrest in Macedonia received sentences of up to seven years. By mid-February 1969, thirty-seven LCY member had been expelled from the party for participation or in support of the demonstrations. 30

The federal government was not prepared to indulge in the partition of Serbia, but some concessions had to be given to the Albanians. The demand for republican status was flatly turned town. However, both Kosovo and Voyvodina were granted some of the prerogatives of republics and the modifier "socialist" was appended to their official designations (hence, the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo). 31 Kosovo-Metohija was renamed Kosovo, and the Kosovars were also given permission to fly the Albanian flag alongside the Yugoslav. Flying their national flag was
something Tito did not allow the Croats, but in the case of Kosovo, Tito felt the threat of separatism was not as imminent as the possible rebirth of Greater Serbian hegemony over Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{32} Belgrade took steps to improve the economic situation in Kosovo, and to promote more Albanians to positions of authority. Finally, there followed the creation of an independent University of Prishtina in 1969, and the rapid Albanianization of both faculty and student body in what had been a branch of the University of Belgrade.\textsuperscript{33} Eventually, the introduction of an irredentist intelligentsia from the University of Tirana in Albania would prove to have dire consequences for interethnic relations in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{34}

For the Serbs, the demographic threat in Kosovo is particularly poignant because the region contains many shrines of the medieval Serbian kingdom of Tsar Dushan.\textsuperscript{35} Most importantly, it was at Kosovo "Polje" (the Field of the Blackbirds) where the Serbian army was crushed by the Turks in 1389, and the battlefield had retained great patriotic pride for Serbs in the same way the defeat at the Alamo inspired Texans.\textsuperscript{36}

However, Kosovo is now overwhelmingly inhabited by Albanians, who have by far the highest birthrate of all of Yugoslavia's peoples.\textsuperscript{37} Moreover, as a result of the turmoil, Albanian and Serbian neighbors became openly hostile and Prishtina university polarized along ethnic lines. Serbs and Montenegrins were often attacked on the
streets, had their farms and crops destroyed, and many Orthodox churches and shrines were reduced to rubble by the predominantly Muslim Albanians. Consequently, thousands of Serbs and Montenegrins streamed out of Kosovo, most of them professionals and specialists with higher education. Even the dead were not immune to the ethnic hatred, as Albanians broke up Serbian and Montenegrin gravestones and unearthed graves in Kosovo. Relations between Albanians and Macedonians also remained tense as separatist Albanians in Macedonia were systematically suppressed and arrested.

The problems with Albanian nationalism exhibited some of the same characteristics which marked the Croatian crisis. First, there were instances of anomic and collective violence manifested in the demonstrations of 1968, the mutual incitement of the two national groups, and the Serbian exodus itself (although the exodus of Croatian Serbs was rather minimal compared to the number of Serbs fleeing Kosovo). Second, there were repeated instances providing evidence that members of the local nationality were prepared to organize in defense of their aspirations. For example, four Kosovan Albanians were imprisoned for plotting the secession of Kosovo and its attachment to Albania. Third, conflict in Kosovo, as in Croatia, was transmuted to the elite level. Thus, at the Twenty-ninth Plenum of the LCK in June 1971, Serbs and Montenegrins exchanged broadsides with Albanian delegates over questions of rights for the Serbian minority in Kosovo and alleged
separatist plots.\textsuperscript{41} Finally, the Kosovo outbreak in 1968 exemplifies conflict accommodation as practiced in communist Yugoslavia—jail the troublemakers but grant their non-disintegrative demands.

The Kosovo Crisis

Interethnic tensions remained high in Kosovo during the 1970s. The heavily Albanianized security forces enjoyed only a brief respite between 1969 and 1973. In 1973 Albanian separatists launched their first large-scale propaganda offensive since the demonstrations of November 1968. Yugoslav security forces discovered evidence of an underground separatist organization known as the Revolutionary Movement of United Albania, but the security forces were unable to uproot it. This group, together with the so-called Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Albanians of Yugoslavia, which may have enjoyed Albania's support, undertook what the federal government labeled "serious propaganda actions" in 1973-1975.\textsuperscript{42} The group called for the secession of Kosovo and those parts of Macedonia and Montenegro inhabited by Albanians. The crux of the secessionist plan was to form a Greater Albania which would be specifically anti-Serbian in nature. This "Marxist-Leninist" party was apparently uncovered by Yugoslav security organs in early 1975.\textsuperscript{43}

Another underground group, dubbed the National Liberation Movement of Kosovo, was discovered during the
summer of 1975. Two of its leading members, both students at the University of Prishtina and heavily influenced by Albanian faculty members, were given lengthy prison sentences. Five more student groups were discovered between 1979 and 1980. Security organs turned up still another such organization early in 1981, which, according to Yugoslavia's minister of the interior, had been operating in conjunction with the pro-Albanian "Red Front" organization.\textsuperscript{44}

In addition to organized and semi-organized activity, sporadic violence repeatedly broke out in Kosovo during the 1970s, and organized Albanian separatism was spreading to Macedonia. Between 1978 and 1981, Yugoslav security organs uncovered and suppressed two illegal Albanian separatist organizations operating in Macedonia. However, the situation was complicated by another factor. The increasingly Albanian-dominated provincial leadership in Kosovo was loathe to allow Serbian involvement in anti-separatist efforts, partly because of a natural ethnic empathy for Albanians and party because of a fear the problems might incite the leadership of the Serbian republic to retract some of the political powers the LCK had acquired.

Thus, the provincial leadership engaged in a massive cover-up, the scale of which was only appreciated after the province exploded in violence in the spring of 1981.\textsuperscript{45} Certainly the LCY was well aware that trouble was brewing in Kosovo. The arrests of several hundred Albanian
nationalists in 1979, on charges of distributing subversive material, and a telltale eruption of ethnic turmoil in Kosovo in May 1980 were powerful reminders the festering discontent retained political significance. But Belgrade had only sketchy information about the Albanian separatist movement; the Kosovan ministry of the interior, which was well informed about the strength and escapades of at least some of the underground organizations, was withholding its intelligence.46

The information problem involved not merely the Serbia-Kosovo relationship but, in fact, was also an internal problem for Kosovo. District committees in the province were routinely withholding information from the provincial committee. In addition, the growing tendency to publish internal information in Albanian alone tended to leave local Serbs ignorant of important aspects of basic issues.47

Despite the evident latent instability in Kosovo, few observers were prepared for the virulence of the nationalist and ethnically inspired riots which shook the province in March and April of 1981. When Albanian students at the University of Prishtina went on a rampage on March 11, officials denied any ethnic link, and claimed the riot was sparked by dissatisfaction with bad cooking in the university cafeteria. Although some two thousand student were involved, the first wave of riots attracted little attention.48
Subsequently, on April 1, violent riots broke out at the University of Prishtina (whose full-time student body numbered 37,000 at the time). Beginning with marauding protestors who smashed factory equipment and shop windows and set trucks on fire, tensions quickly escalated into open street battles. Some rioters even used kindergarten-aged children as shields against police. Most of the children were girls not in school because of the parochial proclivity of Albanian families to keep their female children from attending school. Miners from the nearby coal mine and workers from the electric power station in a neighboring town joined the students as the disorder spread to the general area around Prishtina. By April 3, the riot had spread, and hardly any municipality in Kosovo abstained from the violence. Many of the demonstrators, between ten and twenty thousand, were armed. In the ensuing clashes with the riot police, perhaps as many as 2,600 persons were killed, many by firearms.

The revolutionary overtones of the Albanian riots were unmistakable. Rioters demanded either republican status for Kosovo or outright secession. In the official viewpoint, these demands amounted to the same thing. The Yugoslav regime rushed in tanks and armored personnel carriers, imposed a curfew throughout the province, cut off telephone connections with the rest of Yugoslavia, and established control points on all roads into Prishtina. Commandos and soldiers armed with machine guns moved in to patrol the
streets, and helicopters hovered overhead. Some two dozen ringleaders were jailed immediately, and a state of emergency was declared. On April 5, Prishtina's factories were reopened, though a ban on public meetings remained in effect.

But pacification failed, as local Albanians continued to scrawl anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav graffiti on public walls, to distribute insurrectionary pamphlets, and to disrupt instruction in public schools. Trains were derailed, and the power station at Kosovo Polje and numerous other installations and buildings suffered varying degrees of damage in a rash of unexplained fires. Eventually, the schools, closed once and reopened two weeks later, were closed for a second time, and the school year was declared over. The Belgrade media openly asked why the University of Prishtina had been encouraged to grow so large, when it was inconceivable its graduates could find jobs commensurate with their training and ambitions, and when most of the students were only fluent in Albanian and not Serbo-Croatian.

By the end of May 1981, unrest had spread to Montenegro and Macedonia, although Albanian activity was generally restricted to the distribution of insurrectionary and irredentist literature, writing revolutionary slogans in public places, and engaging in various acts of desecration. Even Serbia had problems, with Albanian nationalists stirring up trouble in communes throughout Southern Serbia.
Albanians also created disorder in Zagreb, while in the Slovenian capital of Ljubljana police were able to abort a demonstration of Albanians only at the last minute.\textsuperscript{56}

Arson, terrorism, sabotage, and pamphleteering became a way of life in Kosovo. There were some 680 fires attributed to arson during 1980 and 1981. Violent student demonstrations continued to break out thorough 1982. Hundreds of students clashed with security police in February and March 1982 riots, leaving numerous injured. Three bombs were set off in downtown Prishtina between October and November 1982, the third exploding in the vicinity of the headquarters of the LCK. As 1982 drew to a close, the situation had deteriorated into an uneasy state of martial law, with the authorities unable to guarantee public safety or the security of property.\textsuperscript{57}

A state of siege prevailed in Kosovo, as 30,000 troops and police (most of them from Croatia and Slovenia) patrolled the province as an occupation force. All incoming and outgoing traffic was scrupulously checked, and the movement of outsiders into the province was largely proscribed.\textsuperscript{58} Belgrade hastened to ban textbooks imported from Albania, which were discovered to have insurrectionary overtones, and undertook to translate the more "reliable" Serbian textbooks into Albanian for the use of the Kosovars.\textsuperscript{59}

The ranks of the party were also infected by nationalism, and by July 1982 some 1,000 LCK members were
expelled from the party (including the Albanian provincial party chief). Some of the expelled party members were also guilty of being participants in the riots. Several basic organizations of the LCK were simply dissolved outright. By May 1983, more than 1,100 Albanians had been imprisoned for anti-Yugoslav activity, often with fifteen-year sentences. The LCY central committee purged the Kosovan party of six of the nineteen members of the provincial presidium. In addition, editors of the radio and television station in Prishtina were fired, as were more than two hundred faculty members at the University of Prishtina.

Party spokesmen also began to express misgivings about the radical devolution of authority to the autonomous provinces, arguing the provinces should coordinate their policies more closely with the Serbian republic. But members of the Voyvodinan party vented strong opposition to suggestions the prerogatives of the autonomous provinces be curtailed.

The 1981 Kosovo riots were a rude awakening as they signified the repudiation of more than ten years of intense efforts to accelerate development in this backward region. They demonstrated the primacy of the ethnic community. The rioters and all who sympathized with them showed a preference to live under Albanian despotism rather than to remain part of Yugoslavia, however more relatively open the latter might be. Clearly, it was this separatist and irredentist dimension, as well as the possible impact the
outbreak might have on other discontented nationalities, which troubled Belgrade most.

The incipient revolt in Kosovo had driven additional Kosovan Montenegrins and Serbs out of Kosovo, precipitated a nationalist backlash among Macedonians and Serbs, and sparked the proliferation of nationalist excesses throughout the other seven federal units. Some 10,000 Serbs and Montenegrins left Kosovo between April and the end of October 1981. Most of them fled to Serbia, often to Belgrade, bearing tales of Albanian atrocities which reminded many of the Croatian *Ustashe* in World War II.

The Kosovo Crisis sent tremors through the Tito-less LCY hierarchy. At first the regime awkwardly tried to play down the riots and attempted to persuade the public the riots amounted to no more than the work of traitors, whose actions were "unanimously condemned" even by the local Albanians. This transparent facade could not be maintained for long and the admission of the scale of violence led to immediate criticism of the entire LCY policy towards Kosovo. However, aside from purging Kosovan officials who had compromised themselves, the LCY had no new ideas to bring to bear. If a policy is considered to be a failure, it would appear the regime can only fall back on naked force. In fact, Yugoslav police organs have attempted to exploit the crisis in order to push through certain repressive measures and tighten the political screws.
The prolonged disquiet in Kosovo disproves the Yugoslav claim that a unique formula for interethnic harmony has been found. The crisis also worked against party liberals. Insofar as the central party leadership had discovered that the directives issued to the Kosovan party were not being carried out, the conclusion can be readily drawn that the party was in revolt, and the devolution favored by liberals as a means of ethnic appeasement can be turned around and exploited as a tool of rebellion. Thus, the Kosovo Crisis has thrown the whole Yugoslav system off balance. It has also dramatically strengthened the position of those in the LCY who fear devolution and decentralization have gone too far and favor a more literal application of the principle of democratic centralism.

The Kosovo Crisis also constitutes an indictment of Yugoslav-Marxism itself. The LCY has continued to operate on the Marxist-Leninist premise that nationalism under socialism is merely an epiphenomenon of economic inequalities; and it has, therefore, been pumping large amounts of credits into Kosovo. Yet, despite incontestable economic gains in absolute terms, Kosovo has steadily slipped further behind relative to the other federal units. In the case of Kosovo, the policy of economic leveling has been a failure in a much more critical sense. Since Albanian nationalism is obviously more than politicized resentment at economic inequality, the LCY's policies are misguided.
It could be argued that prompt concession of the nationalist's minimum demand—creation of an Albanian socialist republic within the Yugoslav federation, to include not only all of Kosovo but also areas of Montenegro and Macedonia inhabited by Albanians—could avert further turmoil and defuse backing for the maximum demand. Of course, the maximum demand constitutes secession of Kosovo and those parts of the two neighboring republics and their annexation to Albania. However, the sheer violence and depth of ethnocentrism spreading throughout Kosovo suggests it is too late to consider the minimum demands.

Recently, the few Serbs and Montenegrins left in Kosovo have started to become more demonstrative in their protests against the Albanian majority. On April 24, 1987, police briefly clashed with about 10,000 people and used truncheons to control a crowd. The incident occurred when thousands of Serbs and Montenegrins gathered outside the Hall of Culture in Kosovo Polje. Slobodan Milosevich, the head of the LCS, was listening to complaints about alleged harassment of minorities by Albanians. About 300 delegates from the crowd were admitted to the hall to talk to Milosevich. The clash began when the police (comprised primarily of Kosovan Albanians) tried to disperse the crowd away from the hall.

Although Albanian, Croatian, and Muslim nationalism have all proved destabilizing to the Yugoslav system, Albanian nationalism differs in one fundamental respect from
the Croatian and Muslim examples. Kosovo lies astride an independent Albania which, despite its despotic backwardness, exerts an undiminished attraction for Kosovo's Albanians. Enver Hoxha's demise has failed to reduce the level of irredentist sentiment. For this reason, more than any other, the question of Albanian nationalism remains today the most trying and most intractable problem on Belgrade's agenda.
NOTES


5My father, Radovan Majstorovic, is a Bosnian Serb. He can trace his family roots back over five-hundred years in the mountainous area in Northeastern Bosnia. Interestingly enough, people with the surname Majstorovic are Orthodox if they live in the mountains and Muslim if they live in the valleys (during the time of the Ottoman empire, Serbs living in the mountains were often successful in resisting Islam). In World War II, many Muslims joined the Ustashe and participated in the killing of Serbs. However, Muslims refused to murder Serbs who shared their surnames, because these Serbs were considered blood relatives by the Bosnian Muslims. To complicate matters, a noted Croatian Ustashe cleric with the surname of Majstorovic was responsible for the conversion and massacre of many Serbs. Thus, even the most scientific ethnogenic study would fail to unravel the complexity of Muslim nationalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina.


7Ibid., p. 440.


9Irwin, "Islamic Revival," p. 446.

10Ibid.

11Ibid.

12Civich, "Religion and Nationalism," p. 201.

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14 Ibid., p. 449.
15 Ibid., p. 453.
17 Irwin, "Islamic Revival," p. 452.
18 Ibid., p. 454.
20 Ibid., p. 112.
25 Baskin, "Crisis in Kosovo," p. 70.
27 Baskin, "Crisis in Kosovo," p. 70.

35For the Serbian point of view on the ethnogenic history of Kosovo see Alex N. Dragnich and Slavko Todorovich, The Saga of Kosovo (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).

36The battle at Kosovo polje involved an army of 50,000 Serbs against a quarter of million Turks. After the battle, all the Serbs were dead and the Turkish forces were reduced to 50,000 combatants. Both Prince Lazar and the Turkish Sultan were killed in the battle, the Sultan at the hand of Lazar's second in command—Milosh Obelich. The legends surrounding this battle reinforced and continued a centuries old Serbian military tradition—a tradition which is often a source of insecurity for non-Serbs throughout Yugoslavia.


44Ibid., p. 18.


48Baskin, "Crisis in Kosovo," p. 61.


Ibid., p. 67.


Dragnich and Todorovich, Saga of Kosovo, p. 172.

Baskin, "Crisis in Kosovo," p. 62.


Baskin, "Crisis in Kosovo," p. 64.

Haderjonaj, "Kosovo," p. 5.


Ibid.


Burg, "Elite Conflict," p. 171


CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

Tito's actions which ended the Croatian crisis and swept the liberals out of office affected interrepublican relations in an important way. Tito refused to scuttle the liberal reforms; yet he did not trust the liberals to administer them. He let the conservative factions carry out the liberal's vision, thus confirming the quasi-confederal nature of the system, without allowing autonomous centers of power to become foci of politicized collective activity.

Ultimately, Tito hoped to hold together a "liberal" system not by force but by a common ideology, the ideology of "conservatism." In the wake of Tito's death, the LCY, shorn of the arbiter who had kept rival factions in check, proved unable to agree on a common policy. The LCY's control slackened as ethnonationalism inspired republican parties to take advantage of growing confederalism.

Yet it is a testament to their political savvy that Yugoslav policy-makers did not permit the Croatian crises to deflect them from what was the only route which might conceivably lead to real stability— that of devolution and decentralization. Nationalism is both an integrative and disintegrative force, and only a polycentric structure is apt to have any chance of long term success in a multiethnic system.

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Therefore, the Yugoslavs are quite justified in claiming they have created a federalism which is virtually unique in form. Possibly the most distinctive aspect of Yugoslav federalism is the principle of unanimity in decision-making in party and governmental organs. Since 1970, no decision at the federal level has been taken until all the federal units acquiesce. Other elements of style include the practices of interrepublican mutual consultation, the pooling of information, the principle of proportionality, and the reliance on compromises and reciprocal concessions.²

The Yugoslavs make a further claim. They argue that if they have not solved the problems attendant to a multiethnic polity, at least they have set the ship of state on course by virtue of their radical federalism and a profound ideological reexamination characterized by original thought and innovative reconceptualization.³ When confronted by manifestations of ethnocentrism and ethnic hatred in Yugoslavia, regime apologists brush aside these criticisms with the observation that the Yugoslav system has resolved the national question in essence and form. Thus, Marxism beats a hasty retreat from the world of real politics and material conflict to the ethereal, idealist realm of essences and forms. But the mood at the Twelfth Party Congress in June 1982 was sober and "realistic." This atmosphere prevailed because of the widespread "suspicion" throughout the LCY that federalism is irrelevant to the
Kosovo problem, that federalism (or even devolution to confederalism) cannot solve the "national question," and perhaps the Yugoslav national question is ultimately "insoluble."  

Therefore, this study illustrates what Marxists did not anticipate, but what the Yugoslavs have discovered. Decentralization and devolution in a Marxist-Leninist multinational state is inevitable if there is no ethnonational group which wields a majority of power. Even more unanticipated, under conditions prevailing in Yugoslavia today, The Union of South Slavs has developed into a structure which resembles an international balance of power system.

**Yugoslavia: A Balance of Power System?**

Interrepublican relations in contemporary Yugoslavia are characterized by flexible coalitions which are primarily motivated by ethnonational concerns. The political behavior of these federal units closely approximates the behavior of states in an international balance of power system. In a domestic, just as in an international balance of power system, one cannot expect component actors to be moved by exhortations to the good of the community. Each group will attempt to pursue its interests by subordinating the common good to its own communal interests and also by subordinating the good of other communal groups to the good of the whole. However, an element of restraint is built into such a
system; the overall survival of the system serves the interest of each actor (except, perhaps, in the case of Kosovo).  

A requirement for the stability of the system is that no single actor (Serbia in the interwar period and up to the time of the Croatian Crisis) is indispensible to the formation of a winning coalition, and cannot therefore impose its will on the decision-making process. Such a condition prevails in Yugoslavia today. Thus, policy outcomes in matters of interrepublican importance have come to depend on the free combination of republican actors in shifting alliances and flexible coalitions.

It is possible that most common historical pattern, both among and within states, is the loose bipolar system. This system generally presumes two permanently hostile core powers, around which lesser powers cluster in a non-random fashion which approximates equal distribution of allies. Within a multi-national state, this configuration results if ethnic groups are polarized on salient and durable issues, and if these groups divide into two fairly stable camps; or, in a state constituted by a number of regional ethnic units, if two predominant units command the allegiance of various smaller units. The critical axes along which an ethnically diverse state may polarize include religion, alphabet, and language.

Therefore, when a society is riddled with reinforced cleavages (as in Yugoslavia, where the prosperous, Catholic,
ex-Habsburg, Latin-alphabet, industrialized north vies with the underdeveloped, Orthodox and Muslim, ex-Ottoman, Cyrillic-alphabet south) and when one actor (Serbia in the interwar period) attempts to spread its language and culture to the rest of the society, a bipolar configuration is a natural result.

According to Morton Kaplan, the bipolar system is characterized by polarization, with most significant actors adhering to one of the two blocs and a universal actor presiding over the inevitable conflicts of interest. He argues that neither bloc can permit its rival to achieve preponderant strength; that each bloc seeks to further its own interests first, but will support the universal actor (the central government) when such support will help to weaken or constrain the rival; and that the universal actor will seek, through mediation and whatever coercive capability it possesses, to resolve or dampen interbloc conflicts and to assuage differences between the blocs. If unchecked, Kaplan asserts the universal actor will strive to impose a directive, monolithic unity on the system.

Kaplan's bipolar description was meant to elucidate the processes of the Cold War system, with the United Nations in the role of the universal actor. However, bipolar politics in no way presumes, a priori, the presence of a universal actor. Yet, at the same time, Kaplan intended his model to have a degree of universality which would transcend mere description of U.S.-Soviet competition. The LCY,
headquartered in Belgrade, functions as a kind of universal actor within the Yugoslav system. But, unlike the U.N., which can always be paralyzed by veto, the central party of Yugoslavia has retained considerable powers, even during the devolutionary days of the Croatian crisis.

Between 1918 and 1941, and again from 1945 to 1965, Yugoslavia functioned as a loose bipolar system. Interwar Yugoslav politics was monopolized by the Serbs and Croats. Their electoral aspirations were championed, respectively, by the Serbian Radical party, under Nikola Pasich, and the Croatian Peasant party (CPP), led by Stjepan Radich. The government, though not a Serbian creation, was dominated by the Serbs, who staffed the new government with the leaders of the old Serbian pre-World War I kingdom. The Serbs denied the national identity of the Macedonians and Montenegrins, viewed Croats and Slovenes as no more than regional "tribes" of the Serbian nation, and attempted to run the state on a unitary basis.\(^7\)

As early as 1919, Radich supported Croatian secession. The Croatian question lay at the heart of the constitutional debate, and Croatian politicians exerted pressure in Belgrade to make some accommodations.\(^8\) Toward the end of 1924, pressured by the CPP, Nikola Pasich, the Serbian prime minister, briefly entertained the possibility of cutting off Croatia and permitting the CPP to establish an independent republic there. However, the imposition of royal dictatorship in 1929 (along with the flight to Italy by Ante
Pavelich and a group of militant Croats organized into the fascist Ustashe party) was symptomatic of the increasing bifurcation of Yugoslav politics into centralists (Serbs) and decentralists (Croats). Tragically, by 1934 even Yugoslavia's King Alexander was convinced of the untenability of the political status quo, and may have been planning to divide Yugoslavia into a Serbian unit and a Croatian unit when an Ustashe assassin cut him down.

In the immediate postwar period, after the reconstitution of a unified Yugoslavia under Marshal Tito, the state authorities revived the centralist solution and resumed the attempt to forge a Yugoslav identity, albeit one which was meant to transcend mere Serbian ethnic identity. Belgrade aspired to "reduce the incompatibility between blocs." As a result, by the 1960s the picture had become quite different from what it had been in the interwar years. Previously unacknowledged groups such as Macedonians, Bosnians, and the Albanians of Kosovo were granted de jure recognition and, with it, some institutional instruments for ethnic interest articulation. Yet despite these changes, the system remained bipolar. Croatia and Serbia remained the major actors in the system until the advent of the Croatian Crisis, which brought balance of power interethnic politics to Yugoslavia.

The fundamental principle of balance of power politics is that no single actor has sufficient power to dictate terms unilaterally to the other actors. In Kaplan's version
of the balance of power system, there is no universal or
supranational actor capable of marshaling authoritative
legitimacy (the U.N. does so only occasionally), winning
elite consensus (as did Metternich's Concert of Europe),
or effectively utilizing armed force (the U.N. in Korea).
Any national actor which strives to transform itself into a
supranational actor by attempting to launch an incipient
world state (Napoleon I) is opposed by those capable of
resistance. In addition, Hans J. Morgenthau argues that
the balance of power model can also be divided into two main
patterns, a pattern of direct opposition between actors
(Serbia and Croatia) and one of competition (Slovenia and
Croatia) among them.

Therefore, Yugoslavia's road to balance of power
politics lay in the rise of political consciousness in
federal units other than Serbia and Croatia, and in the
massive devolution of power to the republics during the late
1960s. This devolution enabled republics other than Serbia
and Croatia to wield autonomous power in the political
arena.

The following discussion, which recapitulates the
fluidity of interrepublican alliances during the Croatian
Crisis, should serve to illustrate balance of power behavior
in Yugoslav politics. During the Croatian Crisis, Croat
leaders concentrated on decentralization of the party.
Backed by the Slovenes and the Macedonians, the Croats kept
momentum on their side. The Ninth Party Congress registered
the victory of the Croatian-led nationalist-liberal coalition by devolving appreciable power to the republican parties. The nationalist-liberal coalition was based on premises of common interest and mutual trust. These evaporated after 1969, as the Croatian party (along with pressure from Matica Hrvatska) went beyond the desires of its coalition partners.\textsuperscript{17} Having lent Croatia support against Serbia in previous confrontations, Vojvodina, Slovenia, and Macedonia backed away from an alliance with Croatia. However, Miko Tripalo and Savka Dabchevich-Kuchar allowed their supporters to push them further to the political right toward ever more radical, nationalist positions. Tripalo and Dabchevich-Kuchar were unable to dissociate themselves from their more radical followers, who demanded Croatia's secession and even aggrandizement of Croatian territory at the expense of other republics. Defusing the Croatian Crisis entailed the removal of Tripalo and Dabchevich-Kuchar and the bridling of Croatia's radical students.

In conclusion, the balance of power model predicts that an actor who goes too far and whose ambitions threaten the territorial integrity of the other members of the system will be isolated and brought to heel. The Croatian Crisis of 1971 confirms this principle. Moreover, in this crisis, as in LCY debate over the Muslim question and the Kosovo Crisis, the federal units displayed autonomy, flexibility, and the power to affect federal policy. Therefore,
analyzing Yugoslavia as a balance of power system is a useful, and perhaps necessary, conceptual construct for interpreting Yugoslav politics since 1965.

However, it must be conceded that Yugoslavia is a unique laboratory for observing political behavior in a Marxist-Leninist multinational state, one which does not contain a majority ethnic group within the population. Perhaps, the thesis of this study will be thoroughly tested when the Soviet Union experiences what is evidently an inevitable demographic shift, one which is inexorably eroding the dominance of the Greater Russian majority in the Soviet political system.

The U.S.S.R.'s dilemma can be anticipated in Soviet Central Asia. In December 1986, several hundred students in Alma Ata, capital of the Soviet republic of Kazakhstan, demonstrated violently after a Russian replaced an ethnic Kazak as the republic's party leader. The situation was serious enough to warrant the use of Soviet troops to keep order. The analogy to Kosovo is rather obvious. The populations of the Soviet Union's Asian republics are predominantly Muslim, and their population growth far outstrips that of the Greater Russians. Thus, it is conceivably only a matter of time before the U.S.S.R. has to confront a situation which is not too dissimilar from the quandary the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia encountered and the LCY now faces.
To present Yugoslavia as a balance of power system is neither to deny the reality of the deterioration of interethnic relations in the mid-1960s nor to assume the antipathy which has characterized interethnic relations is a permanent feature of the system. However, it is not merely because of Yugoslavia's ethnic divisions that the federal system operates as a balance of power system. Yet, it is undeniable that ethnicity and nationalism are the primary factors which influence the choice of alliance partners and the endurance of coalitions.

Milovan Djilas wrote that, "by 2024 Yugoslavia will become a confederation of four states: Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia, with Serbia itself being a federative state." Djilas' four emergent states were all expected to evolve from the present socialist republics. But there is not only an institutional prediction to his prognostications, there is also an ethnic dimension. Djilas predicted both Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina would disappear as autonomous territories—the former because of the close ethnic affinity between Serbs and Montenegrins, and the latter, perhaps, because Muslim self-consciousness is neither so developed nor so tenacious as Serbian, Croatian, or Slovene nationalism.

However, neither in interstate politics nor in the study of multinational states can external actors be ignored. The Soviet Union, as Yugoslavia is fully aware,
would welcome an opportunity to establish a hegemonic hold over Yugoslavia. Belgrade continues to fear the Kremlin might, under certain circumstances, allow its proxy, Bulgaria, to annex all or part of Macedonia.21

Therefore, Yugoslavia's overall rating for political performance would have to be considered a solid medium. This is considerably less that its apologists would have the world believe, but it is commendable in a country with four major languages and large differences in levels of development. Whether Yugoslavia will improve as a system depends chiefly on two factors: its ability to transform itself into a fully legitimate regime (which might require the abandonment of the one-party system)22 and the federal government's ability to recruit in Tito's words, "men from the republics who are not republicans."23 Tito's appeal suggests a need for system transformation. But Yugoslavia's present political configuration may not be capable of achieving more than a medium rating for political performance.24 It is thus conceivable that the Yugoslav system has reached the limit of its potential for conflict accommodation. "Someday," writes Milovan Djilas, "the lid may blow off."25

Perhaps the noted Marxist philosopher, Tom Nairn, best characterized Marxism's deficiencies when challenged by the Hegelian, non-material, and semimystic elements of modern nationalism:

The theory of nationalism represents Marxism's great historical failure. It may have had others
as well ... Marxism's shortcomings over imperialism, the State, the falling rate of profit and the immiseration of the masses are certainly old battlefields. Yet none of these is as important, as fundamental, as the problem of nationalism, either in theory or in political practice. It is true that other traditions of western thought have not done better. Idealism, German historicism, liberalism, social Darwinism and modern sociology have foundered as badly as Marxism here. This is cool comfort for Marxists. The scientific pretensions and the political significance of their ideas are greater than those of such rivals, and no one can help feeling that they ought to have coped better with such a central, inescapable phenomenon of modern history.26
NOTES


5George Liska, "Continuity and Change in International Systems," World Politics 16 (October 1963): 120, 126, 131-32.


8Ibid., p. 34.


13Ibid., p. 23.


15Kaplan, System and Process, p. 23.


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