Establishing civilian supremacy in Indonesia: Problems and prospects

Srie Honora Ramli

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ESTABLISHING CIVILIAN SUPREMACY IN INDONESIA:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

by

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Indonesia's armed forces were engaged in the struggle for independence in 1945 and with the declaration of the martial law after the parliamentary system collapsed in 1957, they involved in broad political, administrative, and economic functions. By the formulation of the doctrine of *dwijungsi* (dual function), the dual role of the armed forces as both military and social-political force were formalized and its activities covered most of the political, social, and economic fields in the government especially during Suharto's presidency of more than three decades.

When Suharto had to step down in May 1998, demands were growing to end the military's role in politics and the following governments of Habibie (1998-1999) and Abdurrahman Wahid (1999- ) took measures to exert civilian supremacy over the military. Also, the armed forces were in retreat and formulated their new doctrine or the "New Paradigm" in 1998 to reduce their involvement in politics. The aim of this study is to examine the problems and prospect of a civilian government in Indonesia in the context of civil-military relations particularly in the post-Suharto era (post-May 1998). The analysis is focused on the conditions for establishing a civilian supremacy in Indonesia using the "Value Congruency" framework of civil-military relations by Danopoulos (1992). The study examined six factors as the important conditions for reaching the value congruency between the civilian and the armed forces: historical background, social composition of the armed forces, ideology, domestic problems, economic imperatives, and leadership.

The application of the Value Congruency framework to the civil-military relations in Indonesia reveal a doubtful prospect for a condition which the armed forces accept the supremacy of the civilian government. The six factors examined shows that there is a great degree of uncertainty over the issue of civil-military relations in Indonesia and it will take time for a value congruency to be reached where the armed forces would completely retreat from the political arena. The armed forces continues reluctantly to define what civilian supremacy over the military means while the civilian government has not addressed the problem completely of what should be the role of the armed forces in society.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The current political development in Indonesia is witnessing an increasing demand for a new form of civil-military relations. Considering the extent of the military’s involvement in politics, the long-term prospect of establishing a civilian government and civilian supremacy in Indonesia is doubtful. Throughout the history of Indonesia, the military has intervened in government, particularly in the period of weak civilian government of parliamentary system in 1950s or during the New Order period between 1965 to 1998.

Two of the most important studies on Indonesian military in politics, Harold Crouch’s *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (1978) and Ulf Sundhaussen’s *The Road to Power* (1982), examined the tendency of the Indonesian military to interfere in politics. Crouch suggests that the participation of the military in politics can be attributed to the armed forces’ political orientation from the very beginning of its formation. Most officers did not join the armed forces because they were interested in pursuing a professional military career; rather, they were motivated by the nationalist struggle against colonialism. The army, then, has never regarded itself as apolitical and continued to be involved in politics in the years following independence. Crouch also argues that the army’s political orientation was strengthened by its perception of the failure of successive civilian governments. Hence, it considered itself the only political force capable of ensuring order and stability.1

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In *The Road to Power*, Sundhaussen examines the armed forces' nonmilitary roles from 1945 to 1967 by using categorizations for the reasons and modes of military intervention in domestic politics. He argues that the Indonesian armed forces' active and direct involvement in politics since independence is attributable to internal and external factors. These factors, according to Sundhaussen, provided "dispositions" and "opportunities" for the military to intervene. The disposition of the military defending its corporate interests against civilian infringement was combined with the opportunity to intervene in politics by the failure of the civilian government to run the country.²

In general, most of the studies on Indonesian civil-military relations have been focused on the tendency of the military to get involved in politics, and accordingly, focus little attention on the discussion of how a civilian government can be maintained. In a larger scope, Claude E. Welch Jr. notices that scholars of civil-military relations also appear far more effective in listing causes of military coups or involvement in politics than in prescribing steps for civilian control.³ It seems far easier to examine why civilian governments fall than how they are maintained.

Therefore, the aim of this study is to examine the problems and prospects of civilian supremacy in Indonesia. Most particularly, this study will explain the factors that contribute to the existence and maintenance of the civilian government's authority over the military in the country. The examination will be done by adopting a model of civil-

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³ Claude E. Welch Jr., *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries*. (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1976), 1
military relations based on the “Value Congruency” framework by Constantine Danopoulos (1992) and “Concordance Theory” by Rebecca Schiff (1995).\(^4\)

Both Danopoulos and Schiff argue for a consideration of specific values and cultural backgrounds in the analysis of civil-military relations. Despite a rigid separation, they argue, a value consensus-based cooperation must be established between civil and military in order to prevent the military from taking over the government and in order for the supremacy of the civilian government to be maintained. With regard to the history of widespread involvement of the military in politics, these approaches are suitable in analyzing the problems and the future civil-military relations in Indonesia.

Danopoulos argues that the most important explanation for civilian supremacy or military subordination involves “the existence of congruency in values among different social groups, including the military.”\(^5\) There must be a basic consensus among different political and military elites on matters concerning methods of governing, conflict resolution and leadership, foreign and security policy goals, and the distribution of wealth. This broad consensus will lead to regime legitimacy that is most essential to the survival of civilian rule. Similarly, Schiff argues for cooperation between the “three partners” – the military, the political elite, and the citizenry – on four key points: the social composition of the military, the process of decision-making, recruitment method, and military style. Domestic military intervention, she argues, is less likely to occur within this level of integration of the three partners.\(^6\)

\(^5\) Danopoulos, “Civilian Rule,” 4
\(^6\) Schiff, “Civil-Military,” Ibid.
A broad consensus between the civilian government and military signifies that different elites and organized groups are committed to and support the existing policy and are unlikely to resort to illegitimate means to affect governmental change. The Value-based model of civil-military relations adopted in this study will be used to examine whether the value congruency between the Indonesian civilian government and the military exists, and therefore, can be maintained. It will be conducted through the examination of the setting of the civil-military relationship as the prerequisite for a civilian supremacy.

In accordance with Danopoulos' value congruency theory, the analysis will include examination of the problems and the prospects of civilian government based on the data or information of six broad factors. These factors, which serve as the setting for a civilian supremacy, are: the historical background of military in politics, the presence of a unifying ideology, the social class or ethnic composition of the armed forces, domestic considerations, economic imperatives, and the nature of leadership. These are the factors, according to Danopoulos, that are the most important to the existence and durability of a value congruency between the civilians and the military.

The focus of the study is the civil-military relations in the post-Suharto period (post May 1998). The application of the value-based model to the current situation of civil-military relations in Indonesia will not only elucidate the nature of these relations but will also be helpful in analyzing the problems and predicting the future of the civilian government. The first part of this study will examine the military involvement in politics since independence in 1945 as the historical background to the current situation of the civil-military relations. The second part of this study is the analytical framework. In this
part, the theories and approaches in the civil-military relations will be examined, focusing on three relatively different approaches of civil-military relations: the military’s tendency to intervene in politics, civilian control over the military, and the theory of sharing responsibilities.

The third part of this thesis is the examination of the current state of the civil-military relations in the post-Suharto period. This part will include: the examination of civil-military relations during Habibie’s presidency and Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency. The current political development and problems of the current civilian government will also be examined. Much of the analysis in this part will involve the problems facing the civilian government of the day - such as social and political outbreaks - and, therefore, its capacity or capabilities in dealing with these problems. This part will also include analysis of the changes and developments in the internal armed forces and their effort to accommodate the increasing popular demand to decrease their political role.

The fourth part is an analysis of the five conditions for value congruency explained by Danopoulos applied to the situation of civil-military relations in Indonesia. All of the factors examined - the historical experiences of the military, the presence of ideology, the ethnic or class composition of the armed forces, the domestic or international considerations, the economic imperatives of the armed forces, the leadership of both the armed forces and the civilians - will become the basis of analysis to determine the problems of civilian supremacy and of whether or not value congruency between the civilian and military can be established. From there, the thesis will examine whether civilian supremacy can be maintained. Based on the analysis of the problems, the prospects and the future of civilian control over the military can be predicted.
The Evolution of the Armed Forces' Role in Politics

The Revolution Period (1945 – 1949)

The army has had a political role in Indonesia from the beginning. The Indonesian Armed Forces (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI) were born as an army of national liberation. After Dutch colonialism, the Japanese occupied the country from March 1942 to August 1945. There were a small number of locals used in the Dutch colonial army -- the Koninklijk Nederlands-Indische Leger (KNIL) -- but very few became officers. In contrast, when the Japanese established various military groupings such as the Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air (PETA or the Volunteer Army for the Defense of the Fatherland), Barisan Pelopor (Pioneer Army), Seitendan (Youth Corp), Keibodan (Vigilance Corp), and Boet Giyangun (Volunteer Army), these were commanded by local officers. When the Japanese surrendered to the Allies on August 15, 1945, this large body of armed men became the front line of the Indonesian Revolution that broke out in August 1945 and lasted through December 1949, the determining period from which the Indonesian military continues to draw its inspiration and many of its views on civil-military relations.

The Indonesian government did not immediately create a national army despite the presence of many armed units operating independently in the country following the declaration of independence. Instead, the government established the People’s Security

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7 Throughout the thesis, ABRI, the army, or TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, the National Armed Forces of Indonesia) will be used interchangeably to refer to the armed forces.
8 Singh Bilveer, “Civil-Military Relations in Democratizing Indonesia: Change amidst Continuity,” Armed Forces and Society 26 (Summer 2000): 612
9 Ibid.
Body or Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR) on August 20, 1945, which was not an army but more of a security agency. The BKR was transformed into the Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (TKR) or the People’s Security Army on October 5, 1945, as the government realized that it could not operate without a national army. Two weeks following its formation, the TKR clashed with the Allied forces, with the heaviest battle taking place on November 10, celebrated to this day as Indonesia’s Heroes Day.\(^\text{10}\)

With fears of renewed colonialism by the Dutch and the realization that much more was needed to achieve coordination of the armed forces, an All-Army Conference was convened on November 11, 1945. The significant result of this meeting was the election of Colonel Sudirman, the charismatic ex-PETA Commander as the Commander-in-Chief of the TKR, an appointment that the government agreed to on December 18, 1945. Hence, it was not the government who officially appointed its military chiefs; the TKR’s leadership was established from within the army and imposed upon the political leadership. This act, among others, led to the belief in the armed forces that they were really the “Army of the Indonesian people, established by the will of the people and by the people themselves. The Indonesian Armed Forces were created from below and were by no means an institution of the Government.”\(^\text{11}\) The weaknesses of the political leadership and civilian institutions brought about the government’s acceptance of the military’s autonomy in politics and gave the military leadership much confidence when it came to civil-military relations in the later periods.

TKR was renamed Tentara Republik Indonesia (TRI) or the Army of the Republic of Indonesia on February 1946, and in June 1946, TRI was renamed again as Tentara

\(^{10}\) Ibid.
\(^{11}\) Ibid., 613
Nasional Indonesia, TNI or the Indonesian National Army. These changes were meant to reorganize all the regular and irregular forces into a truly national army. Following the creation of the TNI, the military was involved in a number of operations. First, it fought a war with the Dutch, especially following the Dutch's two "police actions,"

12 on July 20, 1947 and on December 18, 1948. Second, the TNI also put down a revolt launched by the Indonesian Communist Party, PKI, on September 18, 1948. The role of the TNI in these events was critical, especially in denying the Dutch total control of the country and thereby accelerating the Dutch relinquishment of their colony.

The fact that the war occurred after the politicians had entered into agreements with the Dutch, first through the Linggarjati Agreement on March 25, 1947, and then the Renville Agreement on January 17, 1948, also raised doubts among the military leaders about the efficacy of the politicians and their strategy of diplomacy to gain the country's independence. The conflict between the army leadership and civilian leaders in 1949 over the issue of how to deal with the Dutch shows that the army officers had more or less openly opted for perjuangan (military struggle) while many leading politicians had decided on diplomatic means to achieve national independence.

At the time, there was distrust among army units in general toward the political leadership. From the perspective of the military, the diplomatic agreements that the

12 The Dutch first launched its first "police action" on July 20, 1947 and attacked cities such as Jakarta, Bandung, and mostly the areas in Western and Eastern Java. The first police action was based upon the Dutch's belief that they could conquered most of the big cities in two weeks and the whole republican territory in six months. On December 18, 1948, the Dutch launched their second "police action," which proved to be both a military and a political catastrophe for them despite the appearance of being an easy victory. See M. C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c. 1300. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 225-230.
13 Bilveer, "Civil-Military," 613
14 Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power, 45
republic’s government negotiated with the Dutch compromised the nationalists’ military position. Those agreements were even perceived as “a very detrimental step,” which caused the republican troops to be withdrawn from areas they had under control and gave the Dutch greater scope to launch their later attacks.\textsuperscript{15} Every member of the armed forces was “deeply hurt” by the humiliation. The military goes on to complain generally “We had to sacrifice repeatedly our military position for the sake of diplomatic interests; however diplomacy had repeatedly experienced failures.”\textsuperscript{16}

After the two unprovoked Dutch attacks, the officers could and did assume that the policy of diplomacy was dead and safely buried. The armed forces devised a guerrilla military strategy which was organized as a territorial structure from the center down to the village level. It was essentially characterized by the military domination over the political system in the areas where the Dutch were not in control. The object of this structure was to organize a people’s resistance against the Dutch that would ultimately force them to give in.\textsuperscript{17}

It is clear that in the years before the republic was internationally recognized in 1949, the army was militant politically and was inclined to trust its own fighting spirit rather than the devious techniques of diplomacy. The armed forces were firmly convinced that basically it was the army and militant government officials, the Indonesian youth and the people in the villages that formed “the last bulwark of the Republic of Indonesia.”\textsuperscript{18} If this last protection fell, the political position of the Republic of Indonesia in the occupied cities as well as the negotiation processes would have been entirely lost.

\textsuperscript{15} Bruce Grant, \textit{Indonesia}. (Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1996), 89
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
Accordingly, when the Dutch “granted” independence to Indonesia in 1949, most officers regarded this not as a result of either the policy of diplomacy or the efforts of Indonesia’s friends in the USA and Asia. They were convinced that it was their military achievements that must have convinced the Dutch that Indonesia’s freedom could not be prevented by the application of force. The army’s perception clearly was – and remained – that it was their military efforts that ultimately brought about the Dutch recognition of Indonesia’s independence.\(^{19}\)

The perception of its significant role in gaining independence for Indonesia gave the armed forces a new sense of achievement and a feeling of pride. The officers were much more self-assured and proud of their achievements, and later on, distrustful of politicians, politicking, and party ideologies, and more aware of their corporate interests. Although they still had no clear perception of what the armed forces’ position in society would be, certainly something of a common political platform had emerged.\(^{20}\) To a great extent, however, the military’s experience in war with the Dutch – especially in the guerilla war – provided and shaped the military’s attitude about how they should relate to the civilian. For the Indonesian military, the guerilla war experience provided a functioning model of civil-military relations, and later on, exhibited through its territorial system, both a military and a sociopolitical function.

\(^{19}\) Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*, 45-46
\(^{20}\) Ibid.
The Period of 1950 - 1965

In the period immediately after the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch at the end of 1949 the army formally accepted the principle of civilian supremacy within the parliamentary system, and its officers assumed roles on the edge of political life. In March 1957 the civilian government collapsed, mainly due to the challenge posed by the outbreak of regional rebellions by military commanders in the provinces of Sumatra and Sulawesi and the inability of the civilian government to cope with this problem. As the weaknesses of the parliamentary system became increasingly obvious, the conviction was strengthened among army officers that they bore the responsibility to intervene in order to save the nation.

Martial law was declared, greatly strengthening the power of the military vis-à-vis the civilian politicians. The army leaders were not directly responsible for the collapse of the parliamentary system in 1957, however, they were able to turn the situation with the introduction of martial law to their advantage. Martial law enabled army officers to take on broad political, administrative, and economic functions. Although the primary reason for the declaration of martial law was due to the country's situation, in turn, it legitimized the military's reentry into politics in the late 1950s.

Indeed, the events of 1956-58 had far-reaching consequences both for the Indonesian political system and the role of the army in it. The emergency conditions had opened the way to a sudden expansion of the army's role not only in politics but also in the broader fields of general administration and economic management after the introduction of

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22 Crouch, *The Army and Politics*, 24
martial law in 1957. The military’s importance in the country’s politics was further enhanced with the military increasingly seen as the guardian of the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.  

As the army leadership was successful in suppressing the regional rebellions and by proving its indispensability in the crisis, the military had underpinned its claim to a more permanent role in the government. Convinced that its participation in the government was necessary, the army took advantage of the disrepute of the parliamentary system to press for a new government structure in which the army’s place would be central. Together with President Sukarno the army led the way to the reintroduction of the 1945 Constitution, which provided the institutional framework for the Guided Democracy.

Following this development, the Indonesian military began to devise a concept and strategy to integrate itself into the country’s political process. It was formally announced in November 1958, when the then Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Nasution, delivered his concept of the “Middle Way” at the National Military Academy in Magelang, Central Java. He argued that the armed forces were not an instrument of the government, but an instrument of the state. Indeed, the military was one of the forces of the “people’s struggle,” which made it equal to other forces in society, including the political parties. While the military would not be politically active, it also would not stand passively and see the country destabilized. He concluded by saying that the armed forces (ABRI) was “not just the ‘civilian tool’ like the western countries, nor a ‘military regime’ which dominates the state power but as one of the many forces in society, the

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23 Ibid., 33
24 Ibid., 34
25 Ibid., 24, see also Sundhaussen, The Road to Power.
force for the struggle of the people which works together with other people’s forces.”  

In other words, the military would be involved in both security and nonsecurity matters.

The military began occupying positions in areas that had traditionally been regarded as belonging to the civilian domain. Initially, the army’s political role came from its martial law powers, but soon after, officers were given substantial representation in the formal institutions of government; in cabinet and parliament, and were appointed as provincial governors and other regional officials. Army officers also played a major role in the creation of the National Front, a body to organize and mobilize all political parties and organizations, including the armed forces, to support the government’s policies. When the Dutch enterprises were nationalized in December 1957, many military officers were dispatched to manage these companies.  

In the phase of the Guided Democracy from July 1959 to September 1965, the military’s role was further increased as it emerged as the key countervailing power to the Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI), one of the political forces that had emerged since the late 1950s. As an increasingly powerful party, the PKI was “being courted” by President Sukarno as part of his strategy of “balance of power politics” during the period of guided democracy. Accordingly, when Sukarno’s balance of power politics collapsed in the face of the abortive coup launched by PKI on September 30 1965 or GESTAPU (Gerakan September Tiga Puluh, the Thirtieth of September Movement), the military struck with General Suharto and his New Order regime in wiping out the Communists. This was the beginning of what would develop over the

26 Bilveer, “Civil-Military Relations,” 615
27 Crouch, The Army and Politics, 34
28 Bilveer, “Civil-Military Relations,” 615
next 32 years – until May 1998 – that the military emerged as the key political force in the country, with all the other political groups subordinated to its interests and power. Though not a military regime, the position of the military in politics was indeed one of the most important parts in the whole political system.


By the end of the Guided Democracy period, many officers had become experienced and competent politicians. Indonesian officers had undergone a lengthy period of preparation, during which they learned the skill of negotiating, bargaining, and compromising. Their experience of nonmilitary activities before 1965 had shaped a political style more suited to the advancement of officers' interests within the existing structure than to the creation of an entirely new political order.29

Scattered through the regional administration, central bureaucracy, nationalized business corporations, parliament, and cabinet, army officers had become skillful at intra-bureaucratic maneuvering and political intrigue to achieve short-run objectives. Integrated into the Guided Democracy regime, army officers had been beneficiaries under the political system. Thus, when they strengthened their grip on the government after 1965, they did not adopt new and more democratic values and ideals but were more inclined to concern themselves with the consolidation of their power and the advancement of their existing interests.

After Suharto replaced Sukarno in 1967, the army (ABRI) developed consciously a “dual role” for itself, which included both military and social-political responsibilities.

29 Crouch, The Army and Politics, 35
At its first seminar held in April 1965, the army produced a doctrine of *dwifungsi* that declared that the armed forces had a dual role, both a “military force” and a “social-political force.” As a social-political force, the army’s activities covered “the ideological, political, social, economic, cultural and religious fields.” The social and political role of ABRI then was codified in MPR’s decree and subsequently in the enactment of Law No. 20/1982 on the national defense system. These legitimations thus enabled the armed forces to permeate further into the everyday life of the country and the everyday affairs of its citizens.

The army’s political power was exercised in part through its “territorial” organization. Alongside its fighting units, the army had developed a network of territorial units concerned with internal security and “watching over civilian activities generally.” In accordance with its “Territorial Warfare” doctrine, which had been developed from its guerrilla experience during the revolution, the army sought to “integrate itself with the people” through its territorial organization. The territorial units were organized more or less parallel with the civilian administration. This network includes regional military commands (*Kodam*) that were established in each province, military resort command (*Korem*) in the main towns, military district command (*Kodim*) at the *kabupaten* (district) level, and small military resort command (*Koramil*) at the *kecamatan* (sub district) level.

Moreover, a system of internal security functions was established as the result of the compromise between Sukarno and Suharto on the morning after the Communist coup.

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30 Ibid., 24-25
31 Grant, *Indonesia*, 90
32 Crouch, *The Army and Politics*, 222
33 Ibid.
attempt in October 1965. This new body was called the Operations Command to Restore Security and Order (Komando Operasi Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Kopkamtib) and was established under Suharto’s command for the “restoration of security and order.” The security function of the Kopkamtib was quickly expanded beyond its original purpose of tracking down the Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) supporters. It became the government’s main instrument of political control, dealing with a wide range of civilian dissidents such as student and Muslim demonstrators. Moreover, newspapers required to obtain the Kopkamtib’s permission to publish, and on many occasions this permission was temporarily and sometimes permanently withdrawn. During the election campaign, the Kopkamtib – entrusted with maintaining “security and order” – made many arrests to achieve this purpose. With its virtually unlimited power, the Kopkamtib was a key instrument in maintaining the New Order government’s authority.34

Another important “security” body under the control of the army was the State Intelligence Coordinating Body (Badan Kordinasi intelijen, Bakin). The Bakin’s role was to make intelligence assessments in fields outside those concerned directly with military affairs. It was particularly active in examinations over internal developments in political parties and the Chinese community as well as being alert for signs of a Communist revival.35

Although the army in fact dominated the government after 1966, it sought to associate civilians of various types with it. It was partly to draw on the civilians’ skills and experience, partly to create an atmosphere of domestic legitimacy, and partly to create a

34 Ibid., p. 223
35 Ibid.
favorable image among western aid donors. The appearance of a civilian-military partnership was most pronounced in the composition of the cabinet. For example, in the twenty-seven-member cabinet appointed by Suharto in July 1966, six ministers were drawn from the army and another six, including the service commanders, from the other branches of the armed forces. However, army representatives always held the key Departments of Defense and Security and Internal Affairs, as well as important economic departments. As the army’s grip on the government tightened during the next few years, however, its representation in the cabinet declined to four out of twenty-three in 1968 and three after the 1971 elections, although one more was added in 1973.

The Civilians were in a majority in the cabinet, but, they lacked the necessary political backing to exercise real power. All the cabinets under Suharto did not comprise a decision-making body, but met mainly to hear guidelines from the president and to report to him. The scope of the civilian ministers was further limited by the appointment of army officers to high positions in the civil service. Crouch records that of the twenty departments concerned with civilian affairs in 1966, army officers held the position of secretary general in ten and a naval officer was appointed in another. Of the sixty-four directors-generals appointed at the same time, fifteen were army officers and eight were from the other three services. The role of military men in the bureaucracy remained important in the succeeding years of Suharto’s presidency.

While the cabinet’s role in the early years of the New Order was essentially one of administrative coordination, many policy decisions were made by a select group of army

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36 Ibid., 241
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 242
officers who enjoyed Suharto's confidence. The deputy commander of the army, Lieutenant General Panggabean, and the minister for internal affairs, Major General Basuki Rahmat, exercised great influence as close advisers to Suharto. Complete control over Indonesia's main export commodity, oil, was left in the hands of Major General Ibnu Sutowo. A new agency, the National Logistics Board (Badan Urusan Logistik or Bulog), headed by Brigadier General Ahmad Tirtosudiro, was established with full control over the food grain trade, and Brigadier General Suhardiman took control of the giant trading corporation.\(^{39}\)

The army's domination of the government machinery at all levels enabled it to set the tone of the entire administration. Its positions of authority were shared with civilians; however, the civilians had to fit into a system in which power lay with the military. The army's control of the administration meant not only that it had strong influence over government policies at all levels, but also that officers could distribute benefits and dispense patronage to their military and civilian colleagues. Appointments throughout the administration became dependent of the approval of army officers, and power over the issuing of licenses, granting of contracts, and determination of projects enabled the army to reward those who accepted military domination and to penalize those who did not. Furthermore, the army's power to make appointments in the bureaucracy enabled it to find lucrative and prestigious positions and business opportunities to compensate recalcitrant officers removed from military commands.\(^{40}\)

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\(^{39}\) Ibid., 243

\(^{40}\) Ibid., 244
Under the New Order regime, the 1945 Constitution, with Pancasila as the nation’s philosophical basis, and the unitary character of the state, as well as the concept of territorial warfare, were strongly emphasized. This period also coincided with the phenomenon of “dwifungsi in dominance,” in which the army’s influence outside the military realm was dominant. The military was also able to reach a compromise with the existing political parties to adopt a system of proportional representation. Under this system, members of the armed forces are not permitted to participate in the election on the grounds that it would divide the military, and in turn, undermine the country’s stability. In return, however, 100 seats were reserved for ABRI in Parliament.

The armed forces leadership argued that not only was it the military’s right and duty to be involved in non-military activities but that they had been forced to do so, mainly due to the failure of other political forces in the country. The interpretation of dwifungsi was vastly expanded beyond what it was supposed to encompass primarily, for the justification and rationalization of the dominant position of the military in the country. Initially, the position was defended on the grounds that the purge of PKI and PKI affiliated personnel in various sectors of the society following GESTAPU had created a vacuum of power that could only be filled by the military. Most importantly, there was always a need to restore order and stability. This position remained essentially unchanged, as there was no force strong enough to remove President Suharto, who ruled with an iron hand until May 1998.

Pancasila is the “five principles” which are the official philosophy Indonesia. The five principles are: belief in God, nationalism, humanitarianism, social justice and democracy.

The armed forces’ seats in parliament were reduced to 75 in 1997 then reduced again in 1999 to 38.
However, the broad-based unity among almost all the political forces in the country eventually brought Suharto down on May 21, 1998. As part of the democratization process -- especially concerning the promotion of human rights -- there was a strong pressure to force the Indonesian military to reduce its political role. Overall, separating the military from politics is one big challenge. In Indonesia, the armed forces have been a major actor in the political front as part of *dwifungsi* or dual function linking their role to politics.

The road to transition will not be easy to traverse. And consequently, many important questions arise, for example, what are the roles of the armed forces in the current political framework? Will the army create a relationship where they are subordinated to civilian institutions? Will they go back to the barracks? How about their desire to withdraw from politics? What are the reforms they have undertaken in response to public demands and to clean up their discredited image? It is most important that the armed forces support the demands for greater democratization since such efforts will certainly have an implication for Indonesia's political landscape. In short, the reformation and democratization process that had hit Indonesia in 1998 called for a redefining of the civil-military relations in the country. Before answering all of these questions, the next chapter will look at the civil-military relations from theoretical perspectives.
CHAPTER II

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK:
THEORIES OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

This chapter will analyze the development of civil-military relations theories. The analysis will be divided into three parts according to three approaches to the explanation of civil-military relations. The first part looks at civil-military relations from the point of view of the military's tendency to get involved in politics. The second part looks at the theories of civil-military relations with the focus on civilian control of the military, and the last part will discuss civil-military relations theories based on the perception of a shared responsibility between civilians and the military in their respective roles in society.

The Military and Politics

For more than three centuries in the West international politics has been viewed as a military arena, while the domestic politics of nation-states have been thought of as the civic arenas. “An arena is *military*” say Lasswell and Kaplan, “when the expectation of violence is high; *civic*, when the expectation of violence is low.”1 During the Cold War period, two largely separate strands of scholarship focused on the issue of civil-military relations. On one side, scholars of international-security issues were concerned with the influence of the military high command on the making of foreign and defense policy, especially by the two superpowers. On the other, countries of the developing world (especially those of Latin America) were analyzed as the subject primarily by scholar’s

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interested in the internal politics of the particular country, animated by a concern with human rights or democratization.²

For the United States, as in most Western societies, the military’s role is to support the political aspirations of society to remain under civilian leadership and that military intervention is most preventable if nations possess effective civilian government and institutions which are separate from and at the same time provide a check on the military.³ In many ways, the Western societies have been guided by the classic formula written by Clausewitz which stated that “war is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself... [War] has certainly a grammar of its own, but its logic is not peculiar to itself... The subordination of the military point of view to the political is, therefore, the only thing which is possible.”⁴ Based upon such a concept, when the military deviates from its role of supporting the civilian leadership, it is deemed to have intervened in politics, an arena where it has no rights whatsoever. As was argued by S. E. Finer “there is a common assumption, an unreflecting belief, that it is somehow ‘natural’ for the armed forces to obey the civil power.”⁵

The military then is encouraged to develop a professional ethic and set of standards in which the officer corps be politically neutral and embody a sense of corporate unity. The purpose of learning in military institution is limited to the art of warfare, specific

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³ Rebecca L. Schiff, “Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: Israel as an 'Uncivil' State,” in Security Studies 1, 4 (Summer 1992) also see Singh Bilveer “Civil-Military Relations in Democratizing Indonesia: Change amidst Continuity,” in Armed Forces and Society 26 (Summer 2000)
⁵ S. E. Finer. The Man on Horseback The Role of the Military in Politics. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), 4
responsibilities of soldiering and sense of duty to the nation. These professional standards were developed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Western Europe. It then became the model for western militaries and greatly influenced the American armed forces.

Samuel Huntington has argued that the majority of military professionals in the West now accept civilian control as "an article of faith." There is one thing in common among authoritarian regimes according to Huntington, and that is that such regimes notably lack the kind of civil-military relations characteristic of the world's industrial democracies. He terms this characteristic as "objective civilian control" which involves: 1) a high level of military professionalism and recognition by military officers of the limits of their professional competence; 2) the effective subordination of the military to the civilian political leaders who make the basic decisions on foreign and military policy; 3) the recognition and acceptance by that leadership of an area of professional competence and autonomy for the military; and 4) as a result, the minimization of military intervention in politics and of political intervention in the military. Such characteristics emphasize the importance of civil institutions and military professionalism as the political means for preventing domestic military intervention. In short, the conditions prompting domestic military interventions are influenced by the relative positions of civil and military institutions.

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6 Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations," 638
8 Ibid.
9 See Finer, Man on Horseback, and Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations," 638
The civil-military relations theories mostly focus on the varieties of political perception and ambitious of the national army. Welch and Smith in 1974 argued that in some states, the military may continually strive to exert a dominant political influence while in others, it remains on the sidelines, "a mute servant" of the government in control.\(^\text{10}\) In some the armed forces periodically pressures the government to carry out the military’s will through alliance with existing political or social groups. Yet, the armed forces may also remain neutral from partisan strife to protect their own organizational integrity; or they may be solicited by contending groups for support in struggles for power.\(^\text{11}\)

The influence of the military on important policy decisions also differs from society to society. Welch and Smith mention factors such as the officers’ image within the society, the prevailing state of public order, the perceived seriousness of foreign threats to national security, and the confidence political leaders have in their hold on power as naturally affecting the military’s political impact.\(^\text{12}\) Accordingly, in situations in which the military enjoys high public esteem, or public order is threatened by acute unrest, strong possibility of war, or the incumbent political leaders feel threatened by challenges to their position, will increase opportunity for the military to intervene in government.\(^\text{13}\)

On the other hand, S.E. Finer argues there are six categories of motives that may lead the military leadership to involve themselves in politics: 1) the manifest destiny of the soldiers; 2) national interests; 3) class interests; 4) regional interest; 5) corporate self-

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\(^{11}\) Ibid.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., 6

\(^{13}\) Ibid.
interest of Armed Forces; and 6) individual self-interest. While a combination of these factors, rather than a single one, usually brings about military intervention, Finer also argued that a number of contributing factors do help to provide the military leadership with opportunities to intervene. These include increased civilian dependence on the military, brought about by crises or by a power vacuum in the government. Similarly, an increased popularity of the military may be a result of either military solution to a crisis or sudden decline of popularity of the civilian government. He mentions that "the less its [civilian government’s] authority the more it must rely on force." Similarly, Taufik Abdullah states that, "the possibility for a political intervention does not only exist in the military itself but it is also determined by external socio-political conditions. Political bankruptcy and demoralization in a democratic system...accompanied by an economic crisis can push the military to take action."

Overall, civil-military relations, according to Desch, are "a very complicated issue." While the West seemed to have the military’s role clearly subordinated to the civilian authorities, the trends had been reversed in many of the developing countries. In many of the developing countries cases, the military was increasingly becoming involved in politics through various modes, from outright domination through a coup to voluntary co-option of military personnel into the key positions of the government’s political machinery.

14 Finer, *Man on Horseback*, 32-71
15 Ibid., 72-85
16 Ibid., 84
Civilian Control over the Military

In general, the civil-military theory emphasizes the importance of civilian supremacy over the military to prevent the intervention of the military in politics. However, Welch Jr. argues, scholars of civil-military relations seem to be more effective in identifying the causes of military coups than in defining steps for civilian supremacy. “Far easier, it seems, to examine why civilian governments fall than how they are maintained.”19 This tendency according to Welch, is due to the differences between the characteristics of a military coup and civilian control. A military coup is usually a “sharp, clear event, easy to date and... possible to document” while a civilian control of the military “lacks sharpness,” in which it is more as a “set of relationships than an individual event.”20

Moreover, the nature and extent of civilian control changes over time, reflecting the shifting balance between the strengths of civilian political institutions and the political strengths of military institutions. Welch states that

Civilian control is a matter of degree. All armed forces participate in politics in various fashions. They cannot be precluded from the political arena, given their organizational identity, autonomy, and functional specialization. Any military has an impact on its political system...No military, in short, can be shorn of political influence, save through the rare step of total abolition. 21

The more important issue in civilian control according to Welch is one of setting the limits within which the military as an institution accepts the government’s definition of their appropriate areas of responsibility. Civilian control is not a matter of levels of social and economic development, nor of maximizing the professionalism of the military,

19 Claude E. Welch, Jr., Civilian Control of the Military Theory and Cases from Developing Countries. (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1976), 1
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 2
nor even of a distribution of political power overwhelmingly favorable to civilian groups. Civilian control means that the military lobbies as do other parts of the government that seek to carry out relatively specific sets of policy objectives. Underlying this perspective, however, is the assumption that civilian control exists if the officer corps has internalized the value of civilian supremacy as part of its ethical features and thereby accepts a subordinate role in the political system.22

Similar to Welch’s argument, Kohn maintains that the state must clearly specify the role of the military. The military cannot define its own function or purpose and that the military’s functions must be limited to focus on the external defense of the state leaving the internal and domestic security matters to the police, the courts, or even a militia. Kohn goes further in arguing that it is important to create “a countervailing power”23 that can be fostered through the creation of other armed bodies such as the militia or an armed populace. Such counteractive efforts can also be gained through the knowledge that revolt by the military would likely result in crisis and be opposed and regarded as illegal efforts by the majority of the population. Underlining his argument, Kohn maintains that civilian control requires a military establishment that is dedicated to political neutrality and “unhesitating loyalty” to the legitimate authority as crucial aspects of its professionalism.24

Michael C. Desch provides a different approach to the civilian control over the military in his book Civilian Control of the Military, The Changing Security

22 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
Environment. Here he argues that the strength of civilian control of the military in most countries is shaped fundamentally by structural forces, especially threats. These threats to the state, whether they come externally (international) or internally (domestic), affect the civilian leaders, the military organization, the state and society. 25 The best indicator of the state of civilian control, according to Desch, can be determined by whose choice prevails when civilian and military preferences diverge in facing threats. Civilian control is apparently weak when military preferences prevail most of the time. Accordingly, he considered that civilian control is “not firm” when civilian preferences prevail only some of the time while civilian control is firm when civilian preferences prevail most of the time. 26

The scholars of civilian control over the army also acknowledge that such control always occurs within a context of some form of military involvement in politics. Welch argues that a “continuum of relationships” between the power of the military and the power of civilian institutions contributes to the enunciation, development, and implement of policy. 27 He differentiates between what he calls military influence, military participation, and military control either with or without civilian partnership. A “normal” system of civilian control is where the military’s role is limited in its ability to “influence” the national policy. The degrees of involvement remain limited to those holding ranking positions, within clear and integral boundaries between military and political roles. In his own words, “The influence that exists thus depends upon

25 Desch, Civilian Control, 12
26 Ibid., 4-5
27 Welch, Jr., Civilian Control of the Military, 3-4
specialized knowledge and technical responsibilities, not upon the fact of naked coercive power."^{28}

On the other hand, his explanation of "military participation in politics" refers to the greater military involvement in politics through legislative enactment or which may come from civilian initiative itself. Such moves convert military influence in politics into military participation in politics. Leaders of the armed forces may be co-opted, placed in cabinet positions, to provide the civilian regime with a cover of stability and support. Alternatively, policy choices may be liable to military veto and therefore, the potential of civilian control being set aside to the situation of a "dual power" where political decisions are made by a combination of civilian and military leaders.\textsuperscript{29} Accordingly, such a situation is in great potential of being used by the military to grab more control over political matters and by doing so, civilian control over the military and civilian supremacy disappears. Ultimately, civilian control or civilian supremacy requires the military's own professionalism and restraint. Maintaining civilian control on a daily basis to the point that the military "choose to submit, to define their duty as advice to civilian bosses rather than advocacy, and to carry our lawful orders effectively and without complaint."\textsuperscript{30}

The Theory of Shared Responsibility

Civilian democratic control of the armed forces is too often taken as self-evident. Scholars of the civil-military relations propose several different approaches mainly aimed

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 4
\textsuperscript{30} Kohn, "How Democracies," 150
at gaining civilian supremacy over the military to prevent intervention or even a coup from the military. Existing theories and studies tend to concentrate on solving or preventing the coups and interventions of military in politics, however, by doing so, the theories tend to overlook the other, perhaps most common, civil-military problems confronting societies and their armed forces. Almost four decades ago, in his book *The Man on Horseback*, Finer states,

> Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely to ask why they ever do otherwise. For at first sight the political advantages of the military vis-à-vis other and civilian groupings are overwhelming. The military possess vastly superior organization. And they possess arms.”

Rebecca Schiff argues that the current theory of civil-military assumes the military should remain separate from civilian political institutions in order to prevent domestic military intervention. The problem with such an approach according to Schiff is that the theories are mostly derived from the experience of the United States or other western countries with the assumption that the separation of civil and military should be applied to all nations to prevent domestic military intervention regardless of their historical and cultural experience.

Similarly, Douglas Bland argues that civil control of the military is managed and maintained through the sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers. In a more specific way, he explains that civil authorities are responsible and accountable for some aspects of control and military leaders are

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32 Finer, *Man on Horseback*, 5
responsible and accountable for others. The relationship and arrangement of responsibilities are conditioned by a nationally evolved regime of "principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actor expectation converge" in the matter of civil-military relations.35

According to Douglas Bland, the theory of shared responsibility resulted from the ambiguity of the current "civil control" theories. This approach has two different assumptions. First, the term, "civil control," refers to the sole legitimate source for the direction and actions of the military. This definition therefore ignores the moral or ethical base for the civilian direction to imply that the military has no legitimate right to act on its own. On the other hand, the second assumption of civil control means it is a dynamic process that is susceptible to changing ideas, values, circumstances, issues, and personalities and to the stresses of crises and war.36 Therefore, if civilian control exists, then theorists and politicians must be able to demonstrate that control derives directly and solely from the actions and decisions of civilians, and not merely "from the nonactions of the military."37 For Bland, the measure for civilian control is not simply whose policies prevail, but who finally directs the military establishment to what goals. It is the outcomes and not the policies itself that are the key indicator of civil control of armed forces.

Similarly, both Feaver and Schiff recognize that there is something more than a simple explanation of a "superior to subordinate" relationship that occurs in civil-military

35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
Both Feaver and Schiff offer different but important perspectives for the phenomenon. Feaver argues that a theory about civilian control must explain one crucial aspect of those relations, that is, "the factors that shape how civilians exercise control over the military." The civil-military problem is about "increasing or decreasing the scope of delegation and monitoring the military's behavior in the context of such delegation. And it is about the military response to delegation, desire for more delegation, and even occasional usurpation of more authority than civilians intended." The theory of civilian control, therefore, should address these conditions under which delegation occurs and identify factors that shape the delegation in observable ways. By looking from this perspective, this framework offers a wide variety of patterns of relations between the civilian and the military.

On the other hand, Schiff advocates a civilian control approach based upon "consensus-building." She offers what she calls "concordance theory," that argues that the military, the political elites, and the citizenry "should aim for a cooperative relationship that may or may not entail separation of political and military institutions." Concordance usually takes place in the context of active agreement -- whether it is established by legislation or constitution, or based on longstanding historical and cultural values -- of civilians and the military. In such circumstances, concordance theory encourages cooperation and involvement among the military, the political institutions, and the society at large in preventing domestic military intervention.

38 See Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," in Armed Forces and Society 23 (Winter 1996), and also see Rebecca Schiff, 1995.
39 Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," 168
40 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
Though widely acknowledged by scholars and studies on the civil-military relations, the interplay between civil and military responsibilities was mostly explained in terms of distinct separation of both side’s spheres. Kohn argues that in theory, civilian control is a condition where “all decisions of government, including national security, are to be made or approved by officials outside of the professional armed forces...by popularly elected officeholders or their appointees” and that the civilian control is “absolute and all-encompassing.” In reality, however, military establishments possess significant power and achieve considerable autonomy even in those countries which have a long tradition of “civilian control.” Huntington in 1957 emphasized the shared nature of civil-military relations by noting that maximizing military security at the least sacrifice of other social values “involves a complex balancing of power and attitudes among civilian and military groups.” In a more recent work, he also emphasizes that “objective civilian control [involves] the recognition and acceptance by [civilian leaders] of an area of professional competence and the autonomy of the military.”

Basically, shared responsibility theory incorporate not only the notion of delegation (from the civilian to the military), but also the ideas of “rightful” authority of the military that derived from each countries' tradition and custom, and more importantly, the military's vested authority. According to Douglas Bland,

Vested authority is distinct from and does not necessarily follow from delegation. Military officers may have vested authority derived from the law that are not delegated to them by a defense minister from his or her stock of authority. This type of authority, which may be drawn originally from a state's

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44 Kohn, “How Democracies,” 142
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., 143
48 Huntington, “Reforming,” 4
49 Bland, “A Unified Theory,” 10
political history, cannot be easily taken away by momentary assertions of politicians. Such vested rights are more or less permanent, do not have to be conferred on officers with every change of government, and are exercised more or less independent of ministers.

As Welch and Smith argue, the military's political role is a question "not of whether but of how much and of what kind.” Many of the arguments on this are based upon the historical experience of a certain state. Military-civil relations have evolved in each country according to their particular historical processes. In the case of the developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the military was often the leading agent of modernization. Because of the struggle against colonialism, more often the armed forces became the most modern and effective institution in society. The armed forces were mainly aimed to resist western penetration and domination, eventually becoming the most ardent and strongest proponents of modernization, nationalism, and development. In such circumstances, the military was the natural leader of society in which it possessed many advantages over other groups in most of the Third World societies. Not only was the military more organized and disciplined, it also came to be identified with the "national society" as a whole rather than parochial and centrifugal interest based on race, religion, language or even regions. This differentiation is critical in understanding the generally important role of militaries in the developing countries politics compared to that obtained in the more developed world.

As has been argued by Bland, the theory of shared responsibility is an attempt to construct a general and unified theory of civil-military relations to overcome the limitations inherent in current theory and to serve more appropriately the needs of

50 Welch, Jr., and Smith, Military Role and Rule, 6
51 Bilveer, “Civil-Military Relations,” 638
political and military leaders and societies.\textsuperscript{52} Danopoulos\textsuperscript{53} also agrees that the civilian control of the armed forces cannot be accomplished by separating the armed forces from society. He maintains that civilian rule involves the existence of value congruency between different societal groups, including the military. The Value congruency process is not static and changeless, but involves a dynamic process that requires constant adjustments, reinforcement, and a lot of give and take between societal participants. Constructing and maintaining value congruency involves group participation and a sense of involvement in defining the broad methods and means of governing including conflict resolution, leadership selection, foreign and security policy goals, and the ways of generating and distributing wealth. “Exclusionary politics” will lead not to value congruency, instead, it will result in the “value variegation.” This situation, according to Danopoulos, can lead to the use of illegal means by major social groups in order to restore or gain access in the process of value articulation.\textsuperscript{54} In other words, civilian supremacy involves the interplay between military institutions and societal political processes, and can only be maintained through concrete policies and open channels of communications among the civilians and the military. Let us see the details on the civil-military relations in Indonesia on the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{52} Bland, “A Unified Theory,” 12
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
CHAPTER III
CURRENT CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Introduction

Following the economic crisis that began in mid-1997 there occurred Indonesia’s political crisis. The deepening economic crisis lead to the escalation of mass protests and greater demands for political reform. The successive outbreaks of violence from 1997 to 1998 were a form of political resistance to the Suharto’s government that was perceived as ineffective, politically corrupt, and incompetent in dealing with the worsening economic conditions. Per capita incomes per year dropped from US$ 1,200 early in 1996 to US$ 300 by the beginning of 1998; the stock-market valuation of listed companies crashed from US$118 billion to US$17 billion; only 22 of the 286 companies listed on the Jakarta exchange might have been considered solvent. By July 1998, the Central Bureau Statistics announced that 79.4 million people were living below poverty line and the government expected that figure to rise to 96 million by the end of that year.1

As economic hardships escalated, the source of legitimacy ceased to exist. Suharto had attempted to legitimize his rule based on Indonesia’s economic development, but when the economy collapsed his rule was subject to examination. Economic crisis had paved the way for Suharto’s resignation and finally ended the New Order after 32 years in power.2 This chapter deals with the development of civil-military relations in the post-Suharto era. The examination will be in two main parts. The first part will include the development of civil-military relations in the period of the Habibie presidency (1998-

2 The sudden and unexpected onset of the crisis and the replacement of Soeharto with Habibie is dealt elsewhere in Forrester and May, The Fall of Soeharto, 1998.
1999) and Abdurrahman Wahid's (Gus Dur) presidency (1999- ). Included in this part is the explanation of problems facing the government of the day such as regional outbreaks, increasing ethnic conflicts, and the economy. In the second part the focus is given to the development of the army itself in responding to the mounting public pressure to reduce political role of the military and the development in its doctrine of territoriality.

**Habibie’s Presidency (1998-1999)**

Suharto was replaced by his vice president, Habibie. From the moment he took office, Habibie came under attack from various quarters. Some critics argued that both Suharto and Habibie must resign together since they were both elected as president and vice-president at the same time. It was the MPR as the highest representatives’ body that should elect a new president to replace Suharto. Others argued and questioned the legitimacy of Habibie’s presidency because he took his oath of office at Merdeka Palace in a ceremony presided over by the Supreme Court and not in front of MPR.3

It was also clear that Habibie had come to power at the most inauspicious period of Indonesia’s history. The country was facing its worst economic crisis in 30 years with massive foreign debt, rapidly increasing unemployment and poverty, and riots that had destroyed many urban business centers severely damaging international confidence in Indonesia. At the same time, the pro-democracy groups demanded that democratization of the political system take place instantly. Habibie was under heavy pressure to eradicate the “corruption, collusion, and nepotism” that characterized Suharto’s New

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3 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “The Habibie Presidency,” in Geoff Forrester, ed., *Post-Soeharto Indonesia Renewal or Chaos?* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), 34. Stipulated by the article 9 of the 1945 Constitution, president must be inaugurated with the consent from MPR.
At the same time, there was very low political confidence in Habibie. His leadership was perceived as an extension of Suharto’s regime and his assumption of the highest position lacked political legitimacy. It was a leadership constantly under suspicions, scrutiny, and skepticism by Indonesian society.\(^5\)

To distinguish his government from that of Suharto, Habibie perceived two separate roles. First was to be transitional, to provide a mechanism whereby Indonesia might move from authoritarian rule to that of democracy. According to Budiman, Habibie was only intended to be a “seat-warmer” for the next president to follow.\(^6\) On the other hand, Habibie was also inclined to popular pressure and embarked on a form of political reformation. In the light of a serious economic crisis, the new government had no choice but to reform itself fundamentally before the situation got even worse. For Habibie, this “reformation” process served mostly as an attempt to legitimize his new rule, although, he did ensure that some of the worst excesses of his predecessor’s government were examined or amended.\(^7\)

In creating a more democratic society, Habibie addressed numerous issues including (1) the need for the leadership to seek a fresh mandate through free and fair elections; (2) expansion of political participation and sustaining civil society’s vigilance; (3) arising problems of national disintegration; and (4) questions on the new role the military will play in the current political climate.\(^8\) First of all, the regulations and laws had to be

\(^4\) Ibid., 38  
\(^6\) Arief Budiman, Barbara Hartley, and Damien Kingsbury, “Introduction,” in Arief Budiman, Barbara Hartley, and Damien Kingsbury, eds., Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia. (Melbourne, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1999), iii.  
\(^7\) Ibid.  
\(^8\) Layador, “Indonesia and the Military,” 208
reviewed and reformed, including the election law, representation in and the composition of the People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, MPR) and the House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, DPR), political parties, and local government, as well as the term of president.\(^9\)

In regard to the promotion of human rights and marking a major departure from the Suharto's era, there was strong pressure to force the Indonesian military to reduce its political role. In addition to calls for *dwifungsi* to be reviewed, the main attention was put to the military's direct role in politics, including its representation in the DPR. What the reformers strongly argued was that the representation in the national parliament should only be through the principle of "election by the people" and not through the principle of "reservation" that had been practiced in the past.\(^10\) It was a call to redefine civil-military relations in Indonesia according to the democratization process.

Changes in laws included reduction of military representatives from the previous 75 to 38 in the DPR, and abolition of the restrictions on political parties, hence, breaking the political dominance of the New Order's party, *Golkar* (*Golongan Karya*, Functional Group).\(^11\) In the electoral reform, an independent General Elections Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum*, KPU) was also established. The KPU was composed of representatives from government and political parties. Furthermore, civil servants are prohibited from joining political parties. Moreover, in an effort to make the bureaucracy more open to the public and increase its accountability, the DPR passed the Clean...
Governance Bill to require public servants, specifically government officials, to declare their assets when they begin and end their tenure.\textsuperscript{12}

The state of civil-military relations during this period was very much reflected in the relations between Habibie and General Wiranto\textsuperscript{13} as the Chief Commander of the Army. Immediately after the ceremony transferring the presidency from Suharto to Habibie on May 21, 1998, General Wiranto stepped forward to pledge the army's loyalty to the new president while guaranteeing the "safety and dignity" of the president and his family. Although initially the army had been unenthusiastic about Habibie's accession to the presidency, the military leadership recognized him as the constitutional successor. In the subsequent events, Wiranto continued to subordinate the army's own preferences to those of the president.\textsuperscript{14} From February until October 1999, Wiranto served both as Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security in the Habibie government and also as a Commander of ABRI/TNI which gave him vast institutional authority over the military as a whole and in the government.\textsuperscript{15}

Wiranto's compliance with Habibie's ultimate authority seemed to provide an indication of new thinking within the army. Since the constitution placed ultimate power over the armed forces in the hands of the president as a supreme commander, Wiranto had little choice but to accept the president's authority.\textsuperscript{16} Members of Wiranto's circle regarded that the army cannot simply step in and take over the government. As one of his

\textsuperscript{12} Layador, "Indonesia and the Military," 212
\textsuperscript{13} It is common to have only one name in Indonesia.
\textsuperscript{14} Harold Crouch, "Wiranto and Habibie: Military-Civilian Relations Since May 1998," in Arief Budiman et al., 133.
\textsuperscript{15} The Editors, "Changes in Civil-Military Relations Since the Fall of Suharto," in Indonesia 70 (October 2000): 125
\textsuperscript{16} Crouch, "Wiranto and Habibie," 134. See also Marcus Mietzner, "From Soeharto to Habibie: the Indonesian Armed Forces and Political Islam During the Transition," in Geoff Forrester Post-Soeharto Indonesia Renewal or Chaos?, 97
advisers mentioned that “ABRI can’t just do that these days.” However, it was clear that Wiranto was reluctant to risk the political disruption that would have accompanied any attempt by the army to regain its dominant position.

The relationship, nevertheless, was not entirely one-sided. Mietzner refers to this relationship as “a pragmatic alliance.” Habibie could depend on Wiranto’s support and willingness to suppress the army’s interests. The president seemed to be aware that he still needed the support from the military in dealing with other factions in the society. For example he could not afford to meet all the demands of his Muslim supporters for fearing that it would alienate the military. He refused to approve the inquiries into the military’s massacres of Muslim peasants in Lampung in 1989 or Muslim demonstrators at Tanjung Priok riot in 1984. Also, he was unwilling to release all Muslim prisoners convicted during the New Order period. More importantly, Habibie also had an interest in preserving his relationship with the military as Indonesia moved towards elections in mid 1999.

Another factor also tied Habibie and Wiranto together. Although both acknowledged the deficiencies of Suharto’s regime and supported reformation measures, they also had strong reasons for resisting a full investigation of the New Order. Both the Habibie family and ABRI were involved in joint ventures with members of Suharto’s family which had received special facilities from the government and would therefore be subjected to any investigation involving Suharto. In late November 1998, Suharto’s

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17 Ibid.
18 Mietzner, “From Soeharto to Habibie,” 96
19 For a complete analysis on the relations of the armed forces with Islamic groups in Indonesia, see Mietzner, “From Soeharto to Habibie.”
20 Crouch, “Wiranto and Habibie,” 134
21 Ibid.
legal adviser stated in a television interview that a trial of Suharto would also implicate many leaders of the present government.\textsuperscript{22}

However, being under pressure to investigate the sources of Suharto’s wealth, Habibie had ordered his first Attorney General, Sujono Atmonegoro, to make inquiries. When on June 15, 1998 he reported that there were sufficient reasons to begin an investigation, he was immediately dismissed and replaced by Andi Ghalib, a military officer.\textsuperscript{23} Ghalib then continued the inquiries, however, he “failed” to make significant progress. Such process led the MPR, despite the opposition from ABRI, to include a specific reference to Suharto in a decree calling for action against corruption, collusion, and nepotism.\textsuperscript{24} Growing public demands that Suharto be brought to trial, therefore strengthened the mutual dependence of Habibie and Wiranto to evolve into a relationship in which each needed the other. Wiranto could not afford to risk dismissal by Habibie while Habibie needed Wiranto to ensure that no challenge emanated from ABRI.\textsuperscript{25}

During this period, however, even if it seemed that the military had been weakened, it remained a relatively stronger political force vis-à-vis the presidency. The first major challenge to Habibie’s position actually came from the military when Golkar (New Order’s party) held its national congress to choose a new chair in July 1998. Among the strong contenders was the former Defense Minister Edi Sudrajat who was commonly regarded as an anti-Habibie candidate.\textsuperscript{26} It was generally assumed that if Edi Sudrajat won the chairmanship of Golkar (At that time, Golkar still controlled the MPR and DPR,

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\textsuperscript{22} See Kompas newspaper, November 27, 1998
\textsuperscript{23} According to Sujono, he presented his report to Habibie at 10am on June 15 and was dismissed at 3pm on the same day, see Tempo June 20, 1998
\textsuperscript{24} Crouch, ‘Wiranto and Habibie,’’ 134
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., also see John McBeth, “Political Update,” in Geoff Forrester, Post-Soeharto Indonesia, 23.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., Crouch, “Wiranto and Habibie.”
and the choice of the chairman would have had major political implications) he would call an extraordinary session of the MPR to dismiss Habibie and appoint a new president in his place.  

Another illustration was the role of the ABRI against the explicit wishes of President Habibie to grant independence for East Timor. While a negotiated settlement had been reached for referendum in East Timor, elements of the army orchestrated the campaign of violence and intimidation of the East Timorese people. The army was deeply implicated in the many events of violence and destruction in the period before and following the territory's ballot on self-determination. Wiranto has been criticized for having failed to contain the activities of pro-integration militia in East Timor. The general belief however is that Wiranto was both well aware of what had been happening and that by failing to act against it and despite the explicit wishes of Habibie, he had endorsed - or even ordered - the activities.

In general, the early post-Suharto period shows an extraordinary transformation of the position of ABRI in Indonesia's political life. In the circumstances of widespread social discontent toward the military, any move by ABRI to increase its role in government would almost certainly have met with massive public opposition. The army leaders were clearly aware of the likely consequences of a military grab for power and were seemingly not confident of their capacity to deal with mass disaffection and violence. While the common belief among many officers was that ABRI should not make the same mistake in

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27 See Anwar, “Habibie Presidency,” 45, and also Crouch “Wiranto and Habibie,” 133
29 Damien Kingsbury, “The Political Resurgence of Tentara Nasional Indonesia,” in Susan Blackburn, ed., Pemilu: the 1999 Indonesian Election. (Melbourne, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1999), 104
30 Crouch, “Wiranto and Habibie,” 146
facing Indonesia’s crisis, there are some considerations that the reason behind ABRI’s seeming retreat from politics is due to the thought from some officers that it would be best for ABRI to allow civilians to make a thorough mess of the country first. After that, they believe, the Indonesian people and the world would welcome a military return to power.31

Abdurrahman Wahid’s Presidency (1999 - )

At the end of 1999 Indonesia seemed to have completed a successful transition to democracy. Free elections had been held for the national legislature (DPR) and the MPR32 had chosen a new president, a traditionalist Muslim cleric Abdurrahman Wahid (commonly called Gus Dur) and vice-president Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Indonesia’s first president Sukarno, for the 1999 - 2004 term.

Gus Dur, whose party Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, National Awakening Party) holds only 11 percent of the DPR seats, had appointed a “national unity cabinet” containing representatives of all the major parties.33 As a product of political bargaining, his first cabinet also included five generals: Wiranto as Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, Lieut. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as Minister of Mines and Energy, Lieut. Gen. Agum Gumelar as Minister for Transportation, Rear Admiral Freddy

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31 Ibid., 147
32 MPR comprises of members of DPR plus regional and special group representations
33 R. William Liddle, “Indonesia in 2000 A Shaky Start for Democracy,” in Asian Survey 41,1 (January-February 2001): 208. The June 1999 elections result was: PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, Indonesian Democracy Party - Struggle) won 34% of the vote and 153 seats in parliament; Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups) 22% of the vote and 120 seats; PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party) 11% and 61 seats; PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, Development Unity Party) 10% and 58 seats; and PAN (Partai Amanat National, National Message Party) 7% and 34 seats. Two other parties with significant support were PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang, Star and Moon Party) 2% and 13 seats and PK (Partai Keadilan, Justice Party) 1% and 6 seats.
Numberi as Minister for Administrative Reforms, and Lieut. Gen (Ret.) Soerjadi Soedirdja as Minister of Home Affairs. Significantly, for the first time since the 1950s, the post for Minister of Defense went to a civilian, Juwono Sudarsono, a former minister for Education and a respected University of Indonesia international relations scholar. This situation however showed that at a time when the calls for a reduced role for the military in politics, the appointments of TNI generals in the cabinet showed the army’s continued political influence.

In general, however, the new government’s first priority remained the establishment of civilian supremacy over the military. Not long after he took office, Gus Dur immediately introduced a series of measures to exert civilian control over the military. Such measures included the instruction to the National Human Rights Commission to investigate military involvement in the atrocities committed in East Timor both prior to and after the August 1999 referendum. This led to the president’s unexpected suspension of Wiranto as the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security in February 2000. When he was suspected of being connected with the bloody massacre surrounding East Timor’s vote for independence. Gus Dur’s act marked what was seen as a new direction in the political role of Indonesia’s military and signified a critical juncture in Indonesian politics.

While Gus Dur increasingly moved to limit the political power of Wiranto in particular and TNI/ABRI in general, there were a number of instances in the 1999 period when the balance of political power still seemed to be as much or even more firmly with the military. Illustrations of the continuing influence of the TNI included the occasion

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34 He was replaced temporarily by Soerjadi Soedirdja and soon after, Gus Dur appointed General Yudhoyono for this post
when after Gus Dur announced in November that the troubled province of Aceh should hold a referendum on independence, the then TNI chief spokesperson, Major-General Sudrajat immediately contradicted him. He said that the president did not have the authority to make such a policy and that the matter would have to be referred to the MPR. Later, Gus Dur said that he would instead offer Aceh the option of applying Shariah (Islamic) law, a proposal which was quite different from his earlier statement.35

Furthermore, little progress was made in reforming the armed forces in 2000 beyond the dismissal of Wiranto. So far, his effort to establish civilian supremacy is reflected in Gus Dur’s interventions in the internal military promotion and appointment processes without any consultations with the parliament and the military itself. Under Gus Dur’s government, there have been four major reshuffles of senior military personnel. In November 1999, a reshuffle was announced involving more than one hundred senior officers. In February 2000, a second reshuffle moved seventy-four senior officers. In June, another 122 senior officers were transferred. Finally, in August yet another, though somewhat smaller, reshuffle was announced.36 Such efforts were perceived with hostility by the army officers who considered that Gus Dur’s actions were based on his own political considerations of armed forces affairs. “The President must consider the larger interests of the people and nation, rather than only temporary interests,” stresses the Army Chief of Staff General Endriarto Sutarto in his “warning” to the rumors of another

35 Kingsbury, “The Reform of the Indonesian,” 311
36 See The Editors “Changes in Civil-Military,” 126. Also Kompas October 9, 2000: Gus Dur has had spectacular record in firings and mutations of military officers from the highest positions of chief Commanders to the lowest ranks. In September 2000, he fired two generals from their positions; one as Chief Police Commander and the other was the Deputy Commander of the Army.
Gus Dur impending military reshuffle recently to replace high-ranking military officers in order for the president to gain advantage over his political foes.\(^{37}\)

In an interview with Prof. Liddle, Gus Dur admitted that he was having great difficulty to find genuine reformers who would help him establish the foundations of civilian supremacy. One of his principal candidates is the outspoken reformist Lieutenant General Agus Wirahadikusumah\(^{38}\) who has managed to alienate himself from virtually the entire officers' corps by publicly threatening to expose the army's corrupt financial practices. While stating his support for the armed forces to end its involvement in politics, at the launch of the book \textit{Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan TNI} (New Indonesia and TNI's Challenge) in October 1999, he also asserts that the \textit{dwifungsi} doctrine as “a bastard whose birth could not be prevented...It was to be temporary, but instead it became institutionalized; officers grew to enjoy their positions.”\(^{39}\) Wirahadikusumah is apparently committed to ending corruption and to other important reforms such as abolishing the army's territorial structure, nevertheless, his personal style is highly authoritarian. In another interview, he mentioned that if the president appointed him armed forces commander or army chief of staff, he would tell the president to take a nap and let him, Agus, do what needed to be done.\(^{40}\)

Perhaps the most obvious sign of the lack of progress in the establishment of civilian supremacy was the MPR decision to allow the proportion of 38 members of the armed forces as representatives in the mostly elected 695 members of the parliament until at the

\(^{37}\) \textit{The Jakarta Post}, May 19, 2001

\(^{38}\) He was the Assistant for General Planning at the Armed Forces Headquarters in 1998, by 1999 was appointed by Gus Dur as the Regional Army Commander for Sulawesi Region. In February 2000, he was appointed as the Commander for Army Strategic Reserve.

\(^{39}\) Quoted in Kingsbury, “The Reform of the Indonesian,” 315

\(^{40}\) Liddle interviewed Wirahadikusumah in Jakarta July 26, 2000
latest 2009, which means another five-year term after the projected 2004 legislative election.41 The more likely causes of this decision according to Liddle did not necessarily come from the pressure of the armed forces itself, but resulted from calculation by party leaders in Indonesia's multiparty system that without a majority party they may need armed forces support, within or outside of the MPR, at some point in the future.42 Given these developments, it is possible that the military's eventual return to center stage in politics will not necessarily be by force, but by invitation from the civilian politicians.

For many observers, Gus Dur's presidency reflects a “bizarre period in office of Indonesia's fourth president.”43 He is a man that is so contradictory that “even his closest aides say they cannot understand him half the time.”44 Two strokes and diabetes have left Gus Dur with one blind eye and only 20 percent vision in the other. He relies on a group of close aides and family members to brief him, read him documents and even describe the body language of people he is meeting. He has been unwilling to build a broad base of support and adopt a set of policies responsive to the interests of the constituency. Instead, he has acted impulsively on most occasions and inconsistently without any consultation with his own staff or his political allies.45 He suspended his Coordinating Minister for Political and Security just hours after agreeing to let the former armed forces chief remain active in the cabinet. Another evidence of this behavior could be seen in the controversial sacking of State Minister of Investment and Promotion of

41 Liddle, “Indonesia in 2000,” 212
42 Ibid., this interpretation has been offered by some of the party leaders in a series of interviews with Liddle in Jakarta, September 2000.
43 Time, July 17, 2000
44 Ibid.
45 Time International, February 28, 2000
State Enterprises L. Sukardi who is widely regarded as an honest and progressive individual ostensibly for corruption and failing to cooperate with the other economic ministers.46

After twelve months in office, Gus Dur is widely regarded as a “failed president.”47 Most observers and politicians concur that his personal legitimacy continues to decline and that the main obstacle to his removal is the fear that his likely replacement, Megawati Sukarnoputri, would be an even worse president. At the MPR’s annual session in August in which the president is required to deliver a progress report, concern was raised by MPR members about the firings of several cabinet ministers and also about several alleged financial improprieties. The president was allegedly involved in the diversion of US$4 million from the state agricultural procurement agency *(Badan Urusan Logistik, Bulog)* and a possibly illegal US$2 million gift to Gus Dur from the Sultan of Brunei.48

A large DPR majority (332 out of 500) voted to demand a direct explanation from the President, however, when Gus Dur appeared before the DPR, he arrogantly refused to answer the members’ questions. Instead, he stated that he would provide the DPR leadership with a confidential explanation and that he had no further responsibilities to the legislature.49

Again, the outlook of Gus Dur’s political survival has become increasingly bleak following the House of Representatives’ (DPR) issuance of a second memorandum of censure against him on April 30, 2001.50 Leaders of the 10 factions at the DPR

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46 *The Jakarta Post,* “Gus Dur Fires Two Ministers,” April 25, 2000
47 Liddle, “Indonesia in 2000,” 209
48 Ibid.
49 See *Kompas,* July 21, 2000
50 *The Jakarta Post,* May 10, 2001
(including the armed forces faction) agreed on May 16, 2001 that the country urgently needed an effective and acceptable government to lead the country out of the current crisis. Similarly, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) speaker, Amien Rais said after a meeting with the chairpersons of six DPR factions, that both he and top legislators were of the same opinion that the president had so far failed to give a positive response to the second memorandum of censure handed down by the House on April 30, 2001.51

Whereas in October 1999 Indonesian people were optimistic for the new government, the Gus Dur presidency was largely disappointing for most by the year of 2000. Throughout the year, the president seemed distracted from important matters of national concern, as indicated by his several policy missteps and frequent foreign trips. For sure, the economic conditions remain stagnant with the currency again dropping to more than Rp. 12,000 per U.S. dollar while the government is also being burdened with $74.2 billion foreign debt and $60 billion in domestic debt, making the total amount of public sector debt greater than the country’s gross domestic product (Rp. 1,290.6 trillion at current market).52 Nevertheless, one important trend remains: the military so far is still reluctant to stay away from politics and continues to exert its influence in the whole political process. Another illustration is when one of Gus Dur’s aides mentioned that the reason why Gus Dur has not given any comments about the censure was that he was still waiting for a report and recommendations from a team of Cabinet minister led by Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, General Susilo Bambang

51 The Jakarta Post, May 22, 2001
52 The Jakarta Post, May 14, 2001
Yudhoyono.\(^{53}\) Again, such move provides evidence of increasing dependency of civilians on the military during a crisis.

**The Regions**

Indonesia is a multi-ethnic nation composed of hundreds of distinct ethnic groups with their own languages, cultures, and oftentimes political history. Indonesia is also divided along religious lines with the majority of its populations being Moslem. The religious minorities tend to live in clusters, with large groups of Christians in parts of Sumatra and eastern Indonesia and other smaller minorities such as the Hindu Balinese in Bali. Because of the economic opportunity, some regions with the most developed economy tend to be the most culturally mixed, ethnically and religiously. These ethnic and religious differences are often coupled with aspirations of independence. In the past, riots have occurred and were directed against particular ethnic or religious groups or were intended to separate from Indonesia. Violence in Aceh, Irian Jaya, Madura, East Timor, and Ambon are lingering political problems of this nature. The task of whoever leads Indonesia is to reconcile these forces. Threading together a highly divided nation is an enormous task.

Besides the multi-ethnic composition of Indonesia, the transmigration policy from Suharto has been blamed for the current national disintegration problem. It is important to notice that the economic inequality experienced by provinces with rich resources is another factor. Much of the serious social conflict Indonesia has experienced in recent years can be put down to the process of rapid development in these areas. The West

\(^{53}\) The Jakarta Post, May 2, 2001
Kalimantan (Borneo) atrocity in 1997 and 1999 may be partly related to the uncontrolled land grab by big plantation company. Aceh’s secessionism is fuelled by inequalities around the huge LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) plant in Lhokseumawe and Irian Jaya’s secessionisms by the huge Freeport copper mine. Historically, military option has been the instrument of the state in suppressing independence aspirations in these troubled regions. In the end, the military option added to the resentment of the local people to the central government in Jakarta. Another consequence is that human rights abuses committed by the military contributed to the feelings of social injustice of the people. As an Indonesian scholar, Gerry van Klinken, argues, “for much of the indigenous population in those areas, the state is alien, violent, and rapacious.”

For the government of the day, there are three major challenges in regards to the regions. First of all is to overcome the separatist movements; second is to work out a new balance in the distribution of autonomy, and finally, to maintain order and the rule of law. The most pressing threat at this moment is the separatists in Aceh and Irian Jaya. For more than thirty years, Suharto and the army brutally suppressed the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, Free Aceh Movement) that has been active since 1976 to struggle for separation from Indonesia. It is now believed that GAM has control in as many as half the villages and rural areas of Aceh, the westernmost of Indonesia’s provinces. In November 1999, a broad alliance of pro-independence Acehnese including GAM, university students, non-governmental organizations, and religious leaders, mobilized more than half a million people for a rally in the provincial capital. The repeated

54 Gerry van Klinken, “Democracy, the Regions and Indonesia’s Future,” in Susan Blackburn, ed., Pemilu: the 1999 Indonesian Elections. (Melbourne, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1999), 26
55 Liddle, “Indonesia in 2000,” 213
performance in the year 2000 drew a smaller crowd, but there were reports of intimidation and harassment from the police that had prevented many people from attending.\textsuperscript{56}

The example of the successful East Timor Referendum in 1999 combined with more than two decades of misrule and military atrocities in Aceh, stimulated many people’s support for GAM and increasing calls for independence. Perhaps unwilling or probably unable to respond with a massive military onslaught and reluctant to tarnish its image further, the military withdrew a number of battalions from Aceh. In its place, the Mobile Brigade and the Police were ordered to secure order in the province and after months of negotiations, in May 2000, the army took a highly unusual step and signed a three-month cease-fire with GAM. Unfortunately, this move, which was intended to undermine support for independence, angered pro-independence hardliners and led to an escalation of gangster-style violence in the province.\textsuperscript{57}

The situation in Irian Jaya, which is located in the far eastern part of Indonesia, is perhaps less serious nonetheless more critical than Aceh. Compared with GAM, the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM, Free Papua Organization) is much more poorly organized and not as sophisticated in terms of its equipment, training or substantial military campaign. However, it is still a very critical movement mostly because most indigenous people in Irian Jaya have never felt a part of Indonesia. While the Acehnese fully participated in the independence revolution of 1945 to 1949, the Irianese were incorporated into the Republic of Indonesia in 1963 after the Dutch agreed to transfer the territory to an interim United Nations administration which then turned it over to

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} The Editors, "Changes in Civil-Military," 131
Indonesia. Since its incorporation into Indonesia, the Irianese are more reluctant than ever to live under what they consider "foreign rule." Suharto's fall was greeted with popular protests and renewed calls for the creation of an independent Papua Barat. The feeling of exploitation is still the prevailing sentiment as leaders in Irian Jaya expressed their feeling that what "they (Indonesia) want is our land, not our people."

President Gus Dur visited Irian on January 1, 2000, and offered to rename the province Papua - although not West Papua as the name used by the movement leaders - as a symbolic concession to local identity. He also accepted the movement's demand to fly its own flag as long as it was below the Indonesian flag; a decision that was heavily criticized and condemned by the MPR. Like Aceh, Papua is rich in natural wealth but unlike Aceh, its economy and infrastructure lag far behind those of other parts of Indonesia. Here, again the fruits of local resources are tasted mainly in Java, and the gulf between the productive enclaves and backward hinterlands motivates resentment and secessionism.

The second challenge is to work out a new distribution of authority between the center and the regions. Integrating the whole society includes efforts within decentralization and autonomy. To some leaders from the outer islands, autonomy including a larger share of locally generated revenues that now go to the capital city will

59 Quoted from Layador, "Indonesia and the Military," 214
60 Donald K. Emmerson, "Will Indonesia Survive?" in *Foreign Affairs* (May-June 2000)
61 Ibid.
62 The "outer islands" refers to the other islands outside Java.

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help to quench resentment that has fuelled sporadic rebellions. The DPR passed a Bill in 1999 that provides autonomy to regional administrations and legislatures from the central government. Likewise, a Bill on profit sharing has been passed in the same year. It stipulated that earnings from the forestry, general mining, and fishery sectors will go to the provincial government with the central government receiving the remainder.

However, this legislation was hastily pushed through the DPR by the Habibie government in an attempt to win voter support before the June 1999 general election. Moreover, Gus Dur's government further implemented this legislation in a program of comprehensive decentralization of fiscal and decision-making authority to approximately 350 districts and municipalities, the governmental level below the province. As a result, the legislation is not responsive to the most important regional demands for autonomy which came mostly from the provinces and not the districts and municipalities.

The third challenge from the regions is to maintain order and rule of law. Sectarian clashes in Ambon and ethnic violence between the Dayaks and Madurese in West Kalimantan have exacerbated the government's political-social concerns on the one hand, the separatist movement and religious and ethnic clashes on the other. As violence escalates, the number of politically displaced people will increase. In Maluku alone, 25,000 people have fled their homes and 300 people have been killed since January 1999. This phenomenon lead to economic displacement with the economic crisis as the backdrop.

63 Layador, "Indonesia and the Military," 214
64 The Jakarta Post, April 21, 1999, "House to pass bill on regional autonomy" and April 24, 1999, "Provinces get much higher share of wealth"
65 Liddle, "Indonesia in 2000," 214
66 The Jakarta Post, April 15, 1999, "64 bodies remain unburied in Maluku."
The outbreak of sectarian violence in the Maluku in early 1999 escalated over the course of the next eighteen months. In late 1999 President Gus Dur assigned Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri to resolve the conflict, primarily because the strong showing of her party (PDI-P, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) there in the June election demonstrated that Megawati enjoyed support from both Christians and Muslims. Megawati however, showed little interest in the Maluku affairs, and the violence spread. On the other hand, the army responded with an extraordinary troop build-up. There are at least fifteen different external battalions posted there, comprised of eight thousand Army troops and four hundred from the Mobile Brigade. Though sent to restore order, it has become clear that a number of these military and police units have taken sides, hence, deepening the conflict even further. Finally, the president declared a state of Civil Emergency beginning on June 27, 2000. The Maluku incident was made worse by the intervention of the Laskar Jihad (Holy War Army), a group of Muslim militants trained in West Java and allegedly funded by members of the Jakarta military and civilian political elite, in the conflict. Gus Dur’s order preventing the Laskar Jihad from leaving Java was disregarded by local authorities, further providing evidence of his increasing ineffectiveness.

Suharto left the country in a politically chaotic situation occurring in conjunction with the economic crisis. The weak successor government had to face a sudden political explosion and civil society resurgence. People demanded greater democratization while at the same time civil disorder is increasing by continuing violence and riots, increasing

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67 The Editors, “Changes in Civil-Military,” 131-132
68 Ibid.
69 Liddle, “Indonesia in 2000,” 215

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separatist movements and ethnic problems. Problems in Irian Jaya, Aceh and other center-regions conflicts are yet to see the light of the day. Nevertheless, these problems cannot be solved in the matter of one year. Above all the psychological baggage, which includes political pain and frustration, will probably take generations to heal.

The Army’s Response: Confronting the Lost of Credibility

Indonesian military officers had commonly regarded themselves as the “people’s army” with the commitment towards the interest of the nation and respected by people. After more than three decades serving as the force of Suharto’s New Order, the military had the conviction that they had played an important role in the path of economic development and prosperity. There was a strong perception of their role in the government as something that is permanent and necessary for the continuation of safeguarding the country. The armed forces were, therefore, “ill-prepared” for the growing public condemnation that hit them following the fall of Suharto in May 1998.²⁰

The military establishment is now open to public scrutiny and has been subjected to criticisms because of the role they played in maintaining Suharto’s domination for more than three decades. Accordingly, the matter of gradually detaching their involvement in politics and the demand for the army to go back to the barracks continually besieged the institution. The military had no choice but to let democratic process flow. Yet, there are still concerns about the kind of role the army envisions for themselves.²¹

The involvement of the armed forces (ABRI) so firmly at all levels of the state structure makes the efforts of forcing them to loosen the grip on power seem impossible.

²⁰ Crouch, “Wiranto-Habibie,” 127
²¹ Layador, “Indonesia and the Military,” 216
There were, however, revelations about the military's past behavior. By late 1998 the armed forces' leadership was on the defense and struggling to preserve a political role while answering charges of its engagement in systematic torture, kidnapping, rape and murder during the Suharto dictatorship. Complete opposition to military participation in politics was rapidly becoming the popular demand and rule. Students who once appealed to the Armed Forces to side with them now condemned the military as "enemies of the people."72

A poll conducted in August 1998 in the cities of Jakarta, Surabaya, and Medan under the sponsorship of the respected Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education and Information found that 46.5 percent of respondents felt of ABRI that the interests of society were not the main priority of the armed forces in their work and 74.3 percent believed that the military should withdraw from politics.73 This survey also revealed a deeper level of discontent with the armed forces based on the respondents' perception that military officers tend to sided with business interests in industrial and land disputes.74 Another survey of 1,500 middle class Jakartans by the Kompas newspaper September 1998 also found that a significant 81 percent of respondents were against active armed

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72 Kompas, November 14, 1998: “Massa di Solo Bakar Baju ABRI” (Masses burnt ABRI’s Uniform)
73 David Bourchier, “Skeletons, Vigilantes and the Armed Forces’ Fall From Grace,” in Arief Budiman et al., Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia, 155
74 Ibid.
forces officers taking up civilian posts, even at the lowest level of the administrative hierarchy.\textsuperscript{75}

It was not only through the opinion polls that the military realized how the wave had turned against them. In many parts of the country there were increasingly daring protestors and demonstrations confronting local army and police units. In the months of September and October 1998, protests were taking place outside military headquarters in cities of Irian Jaya, Sumatra, and Java, mostly demanding the military to return to the barracks.\textsuperscript{76} Bouchier argues that the scale and intensity of public attacks on ABRI in the last months of 1998 and early 1999 appeared to point to more than a temporary outburst of constrained emotion. More importantly, the continuing ABRI’s public disgracing and exposure of systematic human rights violations in the media appeared to indicate a significant shift in the constellation of power. The armed forces (ABRI) could no longer take for granted its self-proclaimed right to take part in or to enforce its will in political decision-making. Instead, there appeared the shift from traditional acceptance of the military as guarantors of stability to regarding them as the very source of instability.\textsuperscript{77}

For the first time in its history, the armed forces was forced onto the political defensive. Rather than simply denying the past human rights abuses, military commanders began to apologize. Initially, the armed forces' acknowledgement of the serious past abuses was to put the blame on the behavior of individuals, but the extent of ABRI's confession inevitably led to the conclusion that human rights abuse “had

\textsuperscript{75} Kompas, October 4, 1998, “Pengambilan Pendapat Kompas: Mayoritas masyarakat menginginkan Dwifungsi dihapuskan” (“Kompas Opinion Poll on Armed Forces Image: Majority of Public Want Dual Function Abandoned”)

\textsuperscript{76} Bourchier, “Skeletons, Vigilantes,” 156

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 166
practically become a normal part of the behavior of many ABRI members. In their own excuse the army leaders increasingly argued that the armed forces' past behavior had to be understood in the context of the New Order regime within which the troops were only carrying out orders of the legitimate government. As the then Chief of Staff for Political and Social Affairs, Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono argued, “What ABRI did at that time was part of its mission to maintain security and order, which was officially given by the state, and was naturally in line with the New Order government’s political format.” It must be acknowledged that ABRI’s poor image in the past had many things to do with its dominant role in politics at that time Yudhoyono said again in January 1999. On the other hand, Agus Wirahadikusumah even has gone so far as to state publicly that the military cannot escape responsibility for the blackest side of the New Order regime. In the main, the armed forces' leadership had reluctantly acknowledged the abuses and pledged itself to reform and in recognizing the widespread antagonism felt toward the military, the armed forces leaders had no other choice than to rethink their doctrine.

The New Paradigm

It is important to note that the “New Paradigm,” the framework through which the army intended to reform itself, was not merely a product of post-Suharto

78 Ibid.
79 Indonesian Observer, September 3, 1998
80 The Jakarta Post, January 14, 1999
81 Quoted from The Editors, “Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite January 1, 1998 - January 31, 1999,” in Indonesia 67 (April 1999), 142
"demoralization." This approach had actually been under discussion for at least a year before Suharto resigned as President, but it was only made public after this resignation when notions of reform were increasingly demanded. Despite his defense of what the armed forces had done in the past, the main proponent of and the key figure within military reform was Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. He is famous for presenting papers for internal seminars at military institutions on the armed forces reform. Many of the reform officers were close to Wiranto, and their reformist thinking was encouraged by the contributions to public debate by "democratic-minded" retired officers such as Generals Sumitro, Rudini, Sayidiman, Hasnan Habib, and Maulani, who often wrote columns in magazines and newspapers and spoke at seminars and conferences. Agus Wirahadikusumah on the other hand, later came to be considered the more public and radical leader. Broadly, the "intellectual" officers had argued for the armed forces reformation based on two factors. First, they argued that Indonesian society had undergone vast changes as a result of the successful economic development under the Suharto regime. This development had been accompanied by the spread of education and the rise of a middle class that was no longer willing to accept military domination. Second, the process had been stimulated further by the expansion of a global communication system which made it impossible to isolate and hide developments in Indonesia -- including human rights abuses -- from international debates and the outside world. These officers then argued that these developments had created a legitimacy

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82 Crouch, "Wiranto-Habibie," 137
83 See also Kingsbury, "The Reform of the Indonesian"
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
problem for ABRI, which had no choice, but to adjust to the new situation it faced. Ultimately, they believed that it was no longer possible for ABRI to return to the military domination of the 1960s and 1970s.  

The fall of president Suharto, therefore, presented the “reformer” officers such as Wiranto and Yudhoyono with the opportunity to formulate their ideas more openly. For the first time on August 21, 1998 Wiranto spoke publicly of his ideas for the armed forces’ future. He maintained that the military was at a “strategic turning point,” and that it was ready for “power-sharing” with civilian forces, and that it did not necessarily need to play the central role in politics. However, he also stressed that the army would be content with a supporting, notwithstanding influential, position. There would be, he said, a change of approach from “dogmatic and security-oriented approach to an analytical and systematic one.”

The armed forces announced its “New Paradigm” on September 1, 1998 (in a seminar held in Bandung which was attended by most senior officers as well as prominent retired officers and civilians) as the formal program of the military reform movement and can be broadly categorized as the efforts to separate the armed forces from the civilian and political functions. This new paradigm basically contains four vague principles:

1. The military does not need to be at the forefront of politics
2. It will shift from “occupying” (key positions) to “influencing” (the political process)
3. It will exercise this influence indirectly rather than directly, and

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87 Crouch, “Wiranto-Habibie,” 138
88 The Editors, “Changes in Civil-Military,” also see Kompas, June 3, 1999 “Membangun Format Baru Hubungan Sipil-Militer” by Wiranto (Building a New Format for Civil-Military Relations)
89 Quoted from The Editors, “Changes in Civil-Military,” also in Crouch “Wiranto-Habibie,” 139
4. It is prepared for “political role-sharing” with non-military partners

The New Paradigm appeared to envisage a reduction of ABRI’s political role and the administrative follow-up to these promises began quite promptly. On the Armed Forces’ Day (October 5, 1998) the Commander-in-Chief announced that the National Police would be separated from the Armed Forces by April 1, 1999. The armed forces then would reclaim its original and historic name - Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI, or Indonesia National Army), a move largely seen as an attempt by the military to show that it is a national institution. In view of the election that was going to be held in June 1999, the military leadership pledged the army’s neutrality with regard to the political parties. Wiranto made an explicit statement that this pledge meant a full break with the New Order’s party Golkar for which over the previous three decades the military had always provided the real support. It should be noted that in the past it was common for retired officers to be elected as Golkar representatives in both the national and regional legislatures. The TNI’s acceptance of fewer seats – a drop from seventy-five seats to thirty-eight – allocated for them in the DPR also showed its relative retreat from daily politics.

Still within the spirit of reform, the military also announced that about four thousand armed forces personnel that were assigned to secondary non-military governmental positions would be required to either retire from military service and assume civilian status, or return to active military duties. Since the late 1950s, the armed forces officers were placed in civilian positions under the doctrine of kekaryaan or the

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90 The Police Force was to be integrated with the Attorney General’s Office and become an independent institution under presidential authority in January 2001
91 Crouch, “Wiranto-Habibie,” 141
92 The Editors, “Change in Civil-Military,” 144
seconding of military personnel to civilian posts. Originated during the declaration of martial law at the breakdown of parliamentary democracy in the late 1950s, this doctrine allowed the army officers the management of nationalized Dutch-owned enterprises providing the army with new sources of revenue.93 The seconding of army personnel continued and expanded to positions in the bureaucracy, state enterprises, and the legislative and executive branches.

The overall number of active service personnel seconded to government positions had actually declined, from 8156 in 1980 to about 6000 in 1995.94 This development however was not a signal of changes in the structure of power. Many of the seconded personnel were not occupying critical positions and their positions were regarded as rewards for their long and faithful service. Kekaryaan, according to Douglas Kammen, is important for providing revenue sources and employment for the army, in that “Excess and poorly qualified officers could be seconded to non-military duties, with administrative and economic opportunities providing employment and some compensation for shortened military careers and frustrated ambitions.”95 However, as Lowry quoted one of the then Chief of Staff for Social and Political Affairs, “a reduction in ABRI’s representation in the executive does not matter so long as ABRI is still included in the decision-making process.” In other words, secondment of ABRI personnel is still vital to the structure of power; the numbers however, are negotiable.96

94 Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, p. 188
95 Kammen, paper presented in Bali 2000
96 Lowry, The Armed Forces, p. 188
The abolishment of *kekaryaan* means that Armed Forces Headquarters would no longer see to it that officers be seconded to non-military posts and such officers would have to go it alone after retirement from military service. In clarifying this new policy, Wiranto maintains that the acceptance by military men of civilian posts would be based on their own “capability and accessibility” and that these men must follow “the same selection process as anyone else, not as representatives of ABRI in its dual-function role.” At the same time, these changes would have serious implications for the armed forces as an institution. Senior military officials are well aware that they have essentially abandoned members of the *Keluarga Besar ABRI* (The Big Family of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia), and left them to their own. Moreover, the return of active-duty military personnel from the civil service has placed renewed pressure on an already bloated officer corps for scarce jobs particularly for middle ranks.

The speed of reform in this context remains slow. Following the formulation of the New Paradigm, indeed the army leaders increasingly envisaged the eventual elimination of ABRI’s social and political function, however, they also insisted that the process be gradual. In several interviews, even the reform-minded officers usually emphasized the fragility of Indonesian society by referring to the continuing religious, ethnic, and racial conflict. Even regularly, they make comparison between the situation in Indonesian with countries such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, again stressing the possibility of political reform followed by civil war and national disintegration. Although one of the key aspects in the New Paradigm was to allow other components of society to contribute to a public debate on the issues of the army’s reformation process, ironically, Yudhoyono

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97 The Editors, “Change of Civil-Military,” 144
98 Kammen, paper in Bali 2000
maintains that “the current national psychology is still not conducive to make this possible.”

Ultimately the conclusion drawn by the reform-minded officers is that reform is necessary but it must be implemented gradually. As Harold Crouch has noted:

Whatever the theoretical arguments in favor of reform, the interests of many ABRI (TNI) officers are tied to the old system. Most officers are more concerned with the short-term implications of reform for them personally. In the absence of adequate military pensions, officers have become accustomed to a system which channels them into civilian positions as their military careers draw to a close. For them dwifungsi is an ideology with very practical considerations.

The military's distancing itself from an active and direct role in politics however, does not necessarily mean that it has completely withdrawn from the political realm. In spite of its attempt to reform, the military is likely to continue to be politically omnipresent and still exercise significant political influence within the country.

The Military Territorial Structure

If kekaryaan provides a useful lens through which to consider the changing nature of civil-military relations, a second and far less noted army doctrine of territoriality must also be examined. The Editors of Indonesia magazine explains:

The doctrine of territoriality has its origins in the guerilla war conducted by the TNI against the Dutch colonial regime in 1945-49. In that era, the military survived by the horizontalization and localization of its operations, and its necessary deep involvement with its popular base.

99 Yudhoyono in Gatra Info Service, July 2, 1999: “Not Being Indifference,” also see Kingsbury, The Reform, 320
100 Crouch, “Wiranto-Habibie,” 139-140. Crouch also noted that military salaries are still very low. The official monthly salary of a lieutenant general is about Rp. 1.5 million – or about US$150 at the exchange rate in May 2001. A lieutenant colonel appointed to the second-level regional legislature in Surabaya received Rp.2 million per month – or three times his military salary (Republika, November 13, 1998)
101 Quoted from Kammen, paper in Bali (2000)
In keeping with Indonesia's overall defense strategy, a large proportion of the army - about 150,000 personnel in 1995 - was allocated to territorial commands spread across the archipelago. This territorial structure had evolved over the years but gathered momentum in the early 1960s as the army struggled to contain the growing influence of the PKI (Indonesia Communist Party, *Partai Komunis Indonesia*). Further refined in the early years of the New Order, the structure has now become so large that the number of troops needed to fill vacancies exceeds the army's personnel strength.\(^{102}\)

The largest territorial unit of the Indonesian army is the Regional Military Command (*Komando Daerah Militer, Kodam*), each of which is commanded by a two-star general. These commanders are among the most politically important officers in the Indonesian military. Each *Kodam* consists of four to six Sub-Regional Military Commands (*Komando Resort Militer, Korem*), headed by an officer with the rank of colonel. Below the *Korem*, there are approximately 280 District Military Commands (*Komando Distrik Militer, Kodim*), each commanded by an officer with the rank of lieutenant colonel.\(^{103}\)

Supporting the territorial commands are the bulk of the army's combat units. Each *Korem* is allocated between one to three infantry battalions, and the remaining infantry, cavalry, artillery, air defense, engineer and logistic support units are retained under *Kodam* command. In addition to the *Korem* forces, each *Kodam* has a quick-reaction battalion and some have combat support units of cavalry, artillery, air defense and engineers to reinforce the forces of the *Korem* commanders should that be necessary. The important element, however, is the territorial command structure incorporating

\(^{102}\) *Lowry, The Armed Forces*, 91

intelligence and social-political functions and extending down to village level, which allows directed use of the forces available.\textsuperscript{104}

Neither the doctrine nor practice of territoriality were seriously changed in the years following national independence. According to Douglas Kammen, initially there were three distinct functions of the territorial military apparatus. First, it provides a military check on the civil administration; second, it facilitates the movement of military personnel from the military structure to the civil service (kekaryaan); and third, it places the military in the midst of society.\textsuperscript{105} In short, the presence of the territorial structure gives the military leadership the potential to intervene in the political process.

The territorial structure of the army is a logical expression of the policy of total people’s defense and the combined conventional and guerilla strategy. But given the assessment that Indonesia has faced no believable external military threat for the last thirty years and more, the territorial system remains ultimately justified in terms of national defense. In response to charges that it has failed to address regional violence and aspirations, the military elite responded by attempting to extend the army's territorial structure.

In May 1999, the then Minister of Defense Wiranto announced that there would be a phased return to the pre-1980s system of seventeen Kodam, in accordance with the “new defense paradigm” designed to ensure that the Kodam are closer to the populace.\textsuperscript{106} The first such move was taken with the creation of Kodam XVI Pattimura (in Maluku) on

\textsuperscript{104} Lowry, The Armed Forces, 92

\textsuperscript{105} Kammen, paper in Bali 2000

\textsuperscript{106} The Editors, “Current Data,” 132. There were 17 Kodams which was reduced into 10 Kodams by General Murdani (the then Commander of the Armed Forces) in 1985.
May 1999.\textsuperscript{107} This move is significant for at least two reasons. First, it represents an attempt to appear responsive to local dynamics, and will likely be accompanied by appointment of putra daerah (native sons) to many of these command posts.\textsuperscript{108} Second, the expansion of the Kodam structure necessarily requires the creation of new staffs including assistants, deputy assistants, section heads, and so on, and thereby is a possible outlet for the swollen size of the officer corps. The expansion of the territorial structure must be understood as a partial compensation for the elimination of kekaryaan. A loss of jobs from kekaryaan is made up for by an increase in the territorial structure. As the Editors of Indonesia states:

> The primary reason for the return to the old system of seventeen Kodam was not that it would enable the military to make a better response to local violence nor that the military saw the chance as a means of strengthening its political position. Rather, the return to the old system would allow for the creation of new posts and hence additional jobs, something badly needed to accommodate the bloated size of the officer corps and to offset the loss of jobs caused by the abolition of kekaryaan.\textsuperscript{109}

On the other hand, the territorial structure which parallels that of the civil bureaucracy, and extends even further down into society, gives the military permanent power and influence in every region of the country right down to the village level.

Although some argue that territoriality has become an “obsolete” doctrine compared with any genuine modern military, it is “the real foundation for military power in Indonesia.”\textsuperscript{110}

\textsuperscript{107} The number XVI is a return to the Kodam numbering in use prior to 1985 reorganization of the territorial structure.

\textsuperscript{108} The Editors, “Changes in Civil-Military,” 145-146. It is common to appoint a “native son” as the Kodam commander for each region to promote greater regional “acceptance” to the military and also to reduce the effect of “Javanization” of the armed forces.

\textsuperscript{109} The Editors, “Current Data,” 132

\textsuperscript{110} The Editors, “Changes in Civil-Military,” 147
It is obvious that the issue of territorially is scarcely mentioned amid all the talk of reforms and "new paradigms." And any effort from the civilian politicians to debate on this issue would carry the risk involved in going for "the heart of military power." As a guiding philosophy, the notion of territorially placement was firmly fixed in most TNI thinking. It was a core element of dwifungsi while at the same time being the means by which the doctrine could not be practically removed. Nevertheless, the resolution of the problem of the territorial doctrine and structure is perhaps the single most crucial determinant of the future political position of the military. Crouch firmly states that even if the president were a civilian and the military withdrew from legislatures and the bureaucracy, the military will continue to have the capacity to wield enormous political influence as long as its territorial structure remains intact.

While dwifungsi came under attack and kekaryaan was abolished, the territorial structure has never been placed under scrutiny of any kind or the subject of serious public debate. Indeed, it is quite extraordinary especially in considering that the vast bulk of day-to-day relations between the military and society occur at and within the parameters of territorial structures. Territorial units were involved in crackdowns in ethnic conflicts in Lampung (Sumatra), Sampang, Majalengka (both in Java), and elsewhere in the regions. Territorial units even intervene in labor disputes, and territorial units seek bribes and paybacks from business.

It may be suggested that the retreat of civilian's attention in the territorial issue of the military may mean an even more intrusive presence of the military in areas of military-

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111 Ibid.
112 Kingsbury, "The Reform of the Indonesian," 319
113 Crouch, "Wiranto-Habibie," 145-146
114 Kammen, paper in Bali 2000

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societal relations. What more the military can do remains to be seen, but it is extremely likely that active as well as retired officers will also respond by deepening their reach into society. In his paper presented at the seminar “In Search of a new Format for Civil-Military Relations” in the University of Indonesia May 1999, Agus Wirahadikusumah addressed the issue that can be best described as ABRI’s position at this moment. In a disturbing passage, he writes:115

Urging the military to return to its basic function... is the ideal for Indonesia’s future, and even ABRI is considering this. But this is not a simple matter. At least not at the present moment. In addition to the fundamental questions already outlined, this matter is also related to socio-psychological aspects of ABRI personnel who have enjoyed “special” privileges all this time. Without a substantive change in the military’s self-perception, the Indonesian military will continue to be an independent force, will not be content to live in the barracks, and so will be easily tempted by power. Because of this, at present the most logical arrangement is for a civil-military partnership in the form of political power-sharing...

115 Quoted from Kammen, paper in Bali 2000
CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF THE CONDITIONS FOR A CIVILIAN SUPREMACY IN INDONESIA

Introduction

Indonesia’s military has been involved in the nation’s political, social, and economic affairs through its doctrine of *dwifungsi* or dual function. Their involvement however has been recently considered as a hindrance to the application of democracy and civilian supremacy. According to Danopoulos, civilian supremacy can only be established and maintained when value congruency between the civilian government and the armed forces can be reached. While value congruency is important for making sure that the military accepts and acknowledges civilian supremacy, its establishment can be associated with certain societal conditions. These conditions, Danopoulos argues, are present in the 12 developing countries\(^1\) where the civilian governments largely have maintained control over their military. These conditions are the historical experience of the armed forces, the social class and ethnic composition of the armed forces, the presence of ideology or religion, the geo-political or international considerations, the economic imperatives of the military, and leadership. This chapter will analyze these conditions in relation to the civil-military relations in Indonesia. Based on the analysis in the first part, the prospect of civilian supremacy in Indonesia will be analyzed in the second part.

\(^1\) These 12 countries are four Asian (Sri Lanka, India, Malaysia, and the Philippines); one South American (Guyana); one Caribbean (Jamaica); two Middle Eastern (Jordan and Saudi Arabia); one North African (Morocco); four Sub-Sahara Africa (Cameroon, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia).
Conditions for Civilian Supremacy

A. Historical Experiences

For all of the nation-states, historical experiences influence the temperament, values, and attitudes of a society. In many Third World countries’ cases, the nature of institutions that emerged after independence, as well as the basic processes of government and even political and cultural attitudes, were influenced by their colonial power. The history of an armed force also serves as an excellent explanation for the existing civil-military relations of a nation. Danopoulos argues that in countries where civilian supremacy is established and maintained, most commonly their independence was gained through relatively peaceful negotiations and gradual processes, not through an armed struggle or revolution.² The absence of an armed struggle for independence means an absence of strong and well-organized military organization, which would demand an important role, once these countries gained their independence.

A negotiated and gradual approach to independence means that the colonial power dealt with those indigenous forces that were more open to the colonial power’s political values and practices. This approach then culminated in the emergence of pre- and post-independence elites which favor strong ties to the ex-colonial power. In the case of India for example, Sarbit Johal mentions “India’s colonial experience had left legacies of British constitutionalism, which profoundly influence independent India’s political and military leaders. Among the internalized British norms of constitutionalism were civilian supremacy over the armed forces, an independent judiciary, individual rights, and

In a similar case, Malaysia’s small and British trained armed forces “remain non-political, and it did not become associated or identified with the Malay nationalist movement as the civilian nationalists responded to perceived ethnic political threats prior to independence.” Therefore, when Malaysia was granted independence in 1957 from the British, the army could not claim that it had saved the independence revolution.

On the other hand, the Indonesian armed forces were a national liberation army. It had been a major player in the armed struggle for Indonesia’s independence from the Dutch in 1945 to 1949. Most literature dealing with the Indonesian military is in agreement that the Indonesian armed forces were not formed by the government but were born out of the independence revolution. One of the defining characteristics of the Indonesian armed forces was that they were not initially a conventional army. It fought as a guerrilla force, which largely relied on the goodwill and cooperation of the local people. Additionally, from the initial days of the revolution the military interacted with the politicians who fought for independence through diplomacy and negotiations. Yet, the army has always perceived that the independence struggle through diplomacy and negotiations was too weak and compromising vis-à-vis the Dutch. In the military’s perception it was their efforts that ultimately brought about recognition of its independence from the Dutch. Consequently, they see themselves as a vital actor in the social and political affairs in the post-independence period.

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A prominent historian, Salim Said explains clearly the history of the armed forces in Indonesia:

It was a self-created army in the sense that it was established neither by the government nor by a political party. Instead, the military created, armed and organized itself out of the shambles of the Japanese trained Indonesian militia following the surrender of the Japanese and the proclamation of independence in 1945, when the newly created-organized government was reluctant to raise an army.5

This self-creation characteristic would serve as one of the justifications of its involvement in politics. Thus, since the beginning there was a seeming institutional independence from the civilian institution and direction. The army’s experience during the revolution era had instilled ABRI with a very strong perception that it was a uniquely qualified force to protect and save the nation. The perception that the armed forces had helped create the nation, led to its firm belief that its functions are not limited to merely military security functions. The armed forces have the duty to “ensure national unity and guard the national ideology in all fields.”6 As a result, the armed forces consider their participation in other areas, especially in politics, to be as important as its “traditional” defense and security functions. From this point of view, it would seem to be difficult to expect that the armed forces would completely withdraw from their participation in politics.

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B. Social Class and Ethnic Origin

Another important factor, Danopoulos argues, in which value congruency between the military and civilian areas can be effected is through the recruitment patterns for the military. The recruitment patterns can lead to either a close relationship between the dominant social and military elites or to a pluralistic arrangement where the diversity of a country's ethnic groups is also reflected in the composition of its officer corps. He maintains that in truly multi-ethnic societies in which no ethnic group is dominant, representation by all ethnic groups in the military is strongly emphasized as a way of preventing social and military fragmentation that may lead to "praetorianism." While in Malaysia the relationship between the civilian ruling elites and the armed forces is characterized by close and personal bonds or even familial connections, the truly multi-ethnic societies of Tanzania and India represent a different picture. In these last two countries, a balanced and often meticulous ethnic representation in the officer corps is emphasized. Daniel Zirker refers to "the strict formula of balanced recruitment and promotion" of the armed forces as the one of the pillars of continuous civilian rule in Tanzania.

When it was first established, PETA officers (see chapter 1) dominated the Indonesian armed forces and largely colored the outlook of the armed forces in its later development. These officers were trained with "anti-colonial, anti-Dutch and even anti-Caucasian" as the driving force. Because the main nationalist struggle took place in the

7 Danopoulos, *The Civilian Rule*, 7
8 Ibid.
9 Mauzy, "Malaysia: Shared Civilian-Military," 233
11 Singh Bilveer, "The Civil-Military Relations in Democratizing Indonesia: Changes amidst Continuity," in *Armed Forces and Society* 26 (Summer 2000), 624
island of Java, the armed forces tended to be dominated by Javanese officers, a phenomenon that has continued until the present time.

Following the crushing of regional revolts in 1956, the Central Government, especially president Sukarno and the Armed Forces Headquarters dispatched officers, mainly from Java, to command the various regional units. Suharto further reinforced this policy in order to strengthen his position politically at the center by placing only trusted officers, not only as regional commanders, but also for commanding the more important battalions, especially in areas that were politically, militarily, and economically important. To a large extent, this led to the phenomenon of “Javanization” of the officer corps. This situation has been furthered exacerbated by the fact that all the military academies are located in Java.12

In recent years, the composition of the officer corps remains largely Java-centric.13 There exist some differences though. Instead of the ultra-nationalism of the PETA-type, the officer corps today is a product of the military academies rather than a nationalist struggle. There is indeed a noticeable difference in public perceptions of the officers of the so-called “1945 Generation” who fought in the revolution, and the post-independence, academy-trained officers.14 While leadership by the 1945 Generation was accorded legitimacy by both civilian and military because of the key role of the armed forces in the revolution and subsequent national crises, the leadership by post-independence officers in politics was increasingly seen as less valid. Mostly because they lack direct links to the legitimizing experiences of the earlier period.

12 Ibid.
14 Kristiadi, “The Armed Forces,” 108
Moreover, the post-1945 officers have different professional orientations than their predecessors. The prominent military historian, Nugroho Notosusanto in 1998, captures this value change of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{15}

From either formal or informal sources, we can conclude that there is a changing value system [in ABRI]...[T]hose who were born after the Independence War and brought up in relatively better conditions that the generation before...are more political, pragmatic, and realistic. They are less idealistic and ideological. They tend to prefer education fields or other positions that will give more profit.

Ideally, the armed forces’ hierarchy was meant to be based on merit and professionalism. However, the system has been badly damaged since Suharto started to intervene in the armed forces’ recruitment system in the beginning of the 1990s. Since that period, professionalism has been replaced by favoritism, meaning that politically ambitious military officers could take an easier route to promotion by building a good relationship with the president. These officers then secured strategic positions in military as well as in civilian bureaucracy. However, such selection processes within the military definitely were not aimed at producing independent, responsible, and professional military leaders. This process only led to the corruption of ABRI’s value system and produced officers that were loyal only to one person, the president.

Kristiadi argues that because of such practices in the past, the post-Suharto period inherited “a rotten ABRI.”\textsuperscript{16} The Editors of Indonesia magazine note that the highest echelons of ABRI structure was dominated by officers that were “fully creatures of Suharto’s New Order.”\textsuperscript{17} During the last years, when the call for reformation and

\hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{16} J. Kristiadi, “The Future Role of ABRI in Politics,” in Geoff Forrester (ed.) \textit{Post-Soeharto Indonesia Renewal or Chaos?} (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999), 55
\hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{17} The Editors, “Current Data,”
reduction of the armed forces’ political involvement emerged, there was reluctance on the part of the army for this development. These ABRI officers who have benefited personally from political involvement are reluctant to give up the opportunities that such involvement provides. Therefore, though the intellectual leaders have set the tone of ABRI’s policy statements for a reform, in practice there has been little actual withdrawal from bureaucratic positions.

Creating a condition that can lead to the “value congruency” between the civilian and the military elites is actually reflected in the army personnel reshuffles and structural changes by Gus Dur.\textsuperscript{18} These efforts, however, had been criticized by many high ranking and senior officers as the civilian government’s infringement on the military’s internal affairs and corporate interests, particularly when the reshuffling was done without any consultation with the armed forces’ committee of rank and position.

In a system still dominated by patrimonialism, it was to be expected that Gus Dur would also move to build his own loyal following within the armed forces.\textsuperscript{19} However, while in the armed forces itself, a significant faction within the TNI could be considered “reformist” including the then Commander of Army Strategic Reserve Force, Agus Wirahadikusumah, and Territorial Commander Major-General Agus Widjojo, this group had no clear plan of action and was indecisive in its commitment to pushing its cause in public. Wirahadikusumah and Widjojo for example have their differences on the issue of

\textsuperscript{18} Discussion of this topic is in chapter 3

\textsuperscript{19} In particular Gus Dur favors the navy and Air Force officers by his appointment of Admiral Widodo as the Commander-in-Chief, the first time in the history of the armed forces this position is given to a non-army officer.
whether the territorial structure of the armed forces should be abolished or not. In other words, there was still no sense of unity of purpose or agreed agenda within the reform camp.

Such cases also reflected the varying degree of enthusiasm on the part of many officers in pushing what was far from certain to be a successful or clearly defined process. In large part, the success of the reformist group would depend on the success of Gus Dur's presidency. If he could negotiate peaceful settlements to the many civil problems that plagued Indonesia, this group would have a better chance of success. However, if Gus Dur – and consequently the process of democratization – failed, this group would lose much ground within the TNI. The result is that a number of officers stayed “on the side lines” and were not committed to the reformation process. These developments reflect tensions along two lines: tensions between the President and the armed forces over the redefinition of civil-military relations, and between pro-status quo officers mostly from senior military classes and pro-reform officers from more junior classes and also a division within the rank of the reform officers itself. As a result these tensions will not be conducive to establishing a value congruency between the military and the civilians.

21 Ibid.
C. The Role of Ideology and Religion

Value congruency between the armed forces and civilians can be promulgated and generated from adherence to the ideology. An ideology serves as a framework for action, analysis, justification and rationalization, as well as a blueprint for the present and the future. Danopoulos argues that whether in countries based on religion or in secular states, the influence of ideology or religion is of considerable importance as a unifying force and generator of value congruency. In countries such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Jordan, Islam is credited by leaders as controlling their military at a time when their dynastic rule appeared out of fashion. While in a more secular setting, the successful promotion of nationalism, village socialism and Kiswahili by Julius Nyerere provided a unified force for Tanzania to accept civilian supremacy.

In terms of its ideology, Indonesian military officers were accustomed to believing that they were the “people’s army” whose commitment was to the interests of the nation. The Sapta Marga or Seven Pledges stated that first and foremost, the Indonesian soldier is a patriot and citizen, only then, a soldier. The soldier’s allegiance was not to the government or the military, but to the state and national ideology Pancasila. Their threat perception then is directly affected by this outlook in which “any threat to the national ideology was to be vehemently opposed because it was believed to be a threat to its existence as a unitary state as proclaimed by its founding fathers.”

22 Danopoulos, Civilian Rule, 1992, 9
23 Ibid.
24 Singh Bilveer, “Civil-Military Relations,” 627-628
This belief in Sapta Marga accumulated and was interpreted in the dwifungsi doctrine as the central pillar of civil-military relations legitimizing military involvement in social and political affairs. It was this outlook of the officer corps that played a critical role in shaping its self-perception, which was best epitomized by the code of conduct developed by the Indonesian military. To a large extent, the military see their existence and connection with the whole national system. Therefore, Claude E. Welch’s statement that “all armed forces participate in politics in various fashions...any military has an impact on its political system,” is a reality in Indonesia.25

Accordingly, Indonesia’s constitution and laws grant privileges to the armed forces that are incompatible with the concept of civilian supremacy over the military. In the past, the main legal responsibility for domestic security, law, and order fell to the military, and it had the freedom to determine when and how far this responsibility would be carried out. In general, the armed forces succeeded not only in legitimizing its political role but also making it part of the constitution.26 Nonetheless, dwifungsi is a constitutionally provided privilege giving the military an institutionalized role in politics.

In a time when the armed forces are required to reform their outlook, they must undergo a difficult process of transformation. The biggest problem facing the armed forces in the post-Suharto era according to military analysts, is that “their doctrine is not in accordance with the current political outlook of the society...their understanding on policy, politics, and democracy does not seem to be the same as to what the civilian’s

26 For example, Law No. 80/1958 gives the military a role as a decision-maker in the National Development Board; Law No. 20/1982, calls the military a social force that acts as a “dynamizer and stabilizer” in line with other political forces.
understand of these things.” The armed forces have reiterated their commitment to reform, setting the agendas such as the new paradigm doctrine, leaderships, and so on. However, the armed forces’ formulation of their new paradigm is still unclear and mostly was designed only to improve its tarnished image. The four points of the new paradigm are considered by most political analysts as the reflection of ABRI’s old conception of itself as “being the only one who knows about everything in managing this country.”

One example is the fourth element of the new paradigm required ABRI to engage in joint decision-making with other political forces. But who was/were to be the armed forces’ partner and how could the armed forces have a partner if it was to maintain equal distance from all political forces? “If the military talks about power sharing, what’s on their mind is the sharing of executive, judicial, and legislative power with the civilian... They have never thought that power sharing means to let the civilian occupy the three powers while ABRI remains as the guardians of the state.” There seem to be many misperceptions between the armed forces and the civilians on how and what are the present and future roles of the armed forces in society. The condition is mainly due to the unclear and vague new doctrine of the armed forces itself.

The armed forces’ doctrine of dual function has been legitimized by law, therefore, reduction of the army’s role as social and political actor must also be institutionalized and requires systematic changes to the existing constitution and laws based upon both the civilian and the armed forces’ understanding of each other’s role in society. Claude Welch writes that “one must recognize that legal prescriptions do help to legitimate
civilian control — and his legitimation may give pause to potential coup-makers when they consider the act of intervention."

D. The Geopolitical and International Considerations

Value congruency between the military and political elites may be fostered by forces operating outside the borders of the nation-state or by that state’s efforts to influence or control outside forces. While the first instance refers to a direct or indirect intervention of foreign governments into a state’s domestic matter, the second instance involves the state’s pursuit of a policy of defending its territorial integrity or becoming involved with its neighbors in a regional dispute. Direct and indirect intervention of France in terms of security and economic ties to Francophone African countries such as Cameroon is credited by Frederic Torimiro as having played a role in the survival of civilian rule whereas regional problems and considerations also have significant impact on maintaining civilian government in countries such as India and Sri Lanka. These forces operating outside the borders of a nation-state and efforts made to influence or control such forces, according to Danopoulos, may help foster value congruency between the military and political elites.

30 Welch, Jr., Civilian Control, 9
31 Danopoulos, Civilian Rule, 10
33 Danopoulos, Civilian Rule, 10
34 Ibid.
Indonesia has faced no plausible external military threat for the last thirty years, however, for Indonesian armed forces, the first dilemma of the post-Suharto era emerged in the problems caused by regional violence and ethnic conflict in East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya. Suharto left Indonesia with an army that has a battered public image, and has to cope with persistent communal and racial violence, separatist movements and social cleavages, exacerbated by the worst economic recession in 30 years. Without any foreseeable potential threat from outside, the armed forces tend to be more concentrated on the potential threat of disintegration from the inside.

Faced with such problems, the civilian government and the military in many cases showed their different perceptions of the way to overcome these problems. General Bambang Yudhoyono once said “now we are inheriting the republic, we don’t want to be responsible for its falling apart.”35 The above statement expresses the sentiment of the armed forces towards the civilians and also implies the responsibility of the military in terms of power sharing. The assertion rests on the deep-rooted distrust of the armed forces of civilian capabilities in dealing with regional outbreaks. Historically, the armed forces had been involved in the numerous operations in the military that were conducted to suppress outbreaks of rebellions in the outer islands and dissent within the army years after attaining independence. The army was called upon to quell these revolts and rebels and these various uprisings were interpreted largely by the military as having been caused by the inability of civil politicians to solve the latent problems.

There seem to be inherent differences in the outlook of the civilian government and the armed forces on how to deal with the regional problems in Indonesia. While Gus

35 Quoted from Rowena G. Layador, “Indonesia and the Military at the Crossroads,” in The Indonesian Quarterly 27, 3 (1999), 227
Dur’s government tended to show little interest and was slow in responding to the ethnic conflicts and regional violence, the army, however, usually responded with an extraordinary troop build-up in the areas such as in Moluccas. Clearly, there have always been doubts expressed by the military about civilian capabilities to govern based upon their perception of the fragility of the state’s unity which would always need “someone capable to lead and manage the country as well as have the required national outlook.” Such perception will make it more difficult to restrain the armed forces from always participating in political and civilian matters.

E. Economic Imperatives

Danopoulos sees the survival of civilian rule in the developing world as inexorably connected to the ability and willingness of the civilian leadership to respect military corporate interests and dispense generous salaries and other benefits to their officers. Economic policies, which allocate the armed forces a “sufficient” portion of a country’s wealth, go a long way toward satisfying “military corporate interests.” Corporate interests however, according to Ulf Sundhaussen, does not only refer to salary and fringe benefits. It also refers to the military’s desire to maintain a degree of autonomy over what they regard as internal military affairs and protect it from the interference of other forces and institutions especially the civilian. It was in defending its corporate interests against the civilian infringement, Sundhaussen argues in his study of the Indonesian

36 Ibid.
37 Danopoulos, Civilian Rule, 19
military between 1945-1967, that provided the disposition for the armed forces’ involvement in politics during that period.39

In its further development, however, these corporate interests have been narrowly interpreted as the means for the armed forces’ employment system to develop through its doctrine of *dwifungsi, kekaryaan* (secondment), and *territoriality* (see chapter 3). During the years of the New Order, military officers were placed in senior bureaucratic positions in almost all government departments. The military’s extensive business involvement – which was gained not by following competitive market rules to win tenders, but through the government’s appointments – was also another factor that caused it to sink deeper into partisan politics. Combined with its increasingly dominant political role during the last three decades, the military’s business became so complex that each of the forces had its own business network.40 The corruption of ABRI’s value system was reflected in the behavior of many military officers. One illustration of this corruption was the widening gap between the living standards of the higher-ranking military officers and those of the rank and file. This gap was not caused by the slight difference in their actual salaries, but was due to the fact that higher-ranking officers had more chances and opportunities to do business.41

All of these factors are making the reformation process complicated. Despite the introduction of the new paradigm, military appointments to important positions continued. Military officers were “elected” to replace retiring military officers as governors in several provinces while at lower levels, provincial governments continued to

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39 Ibid.
40 Kristiadi, “The Future Role,” 53
41 Ibid.
recruit military officers to important positions. The reform itself would not necessarily reduce the number of positions held by people with military backgrounds. More importantly, it would also not necessarily end the practice of putting pressure on civilian agencies to “request” the appointment of officers in civilian positions. For example, Crouch mentions that the Jakarta provincial government secretary revealed that 150 active military officers were employed in the Jakarta administration in 1998.\(^{42}\)

While the four major reshuffles of senior military personnel by Gus Dur in November 1999 to October 2000 can be seen as an important effort to reform the military, it was certain to have important repercussions within the officer corps. Taken together, these moves posed a direct threat to the institutional interests of the military and the personal interests of senior officers. The fact that the army’s territorial command structure remains largely intact after two years of transition indicates that the army is extremely well placed to remain a key political player in the region. Indeed, no other organization, least of all political parties or civic organizations can claim a structure that stretches from the provincial down to the village level except the state bureaucracy itself. Moreover, given the current financial constraints posed on the country, the capacity of civilian actors such as political parties to open local branches is low. The territorial spread of the TNI is likely be an asset desirable by political parties at election time. It may open the prospects for the armed forces to become powerful kingmakers in years to come. Hence, instead of the armed forces’ imminent “return to barracks,” it could signal its return into politics “through the back door.”

\(^{42}\) Crouch, Harold, “Wiranto-Habibie: Military-Civilian Relations Since May 1998,” in Arief Budiman et al., Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia. (Melbourne, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1999), 142
F. Leadership

The most important condition for a value congruency to be established is the quality of leadership. For Danopoulos, the role of leadership in restoring political authority is significant in establishing political and social order. Borrowing from Oran R. Young's classification of leadership, Danopoulos defines that:

*Structural* leadership acts in the name of a firm, a nation, or a well established and legitimate social structure... The *entrepreneurial* leader on the other hand, may or may not represent the state, but uses his or her negotiating skills to frame issues and work out deals and arrangements that may not have been otherwise possible... the *intellectual* leader ‘relies on the power of ideas’ and ‘produces intellectual capital’ which can provide the framework for handling issues and finding acceptable solutions.

Danopoulos identifies that the leaders from the countries that he studied showed to have more than one of these three qualities. He mentions Julius Nyerere and J. Nehru as leaders with considerable intellectual negotiating skills and coalition-building abilities to keep together the multiethnic and diverse societies of India and Tanzania. Similarly, in addition to his use of Islam, King Hussein of Jordan is known to have substantial negotiating skill and intellectual qualities which have made it possible for him to work out deals and find solutions to difficult and seemingly irreconcilable social problems.

The resumption of civilian rule under President Habibie and Gus Dur has been important for democratization and for establishing civilian supremacy in Indonesia. These changes in the government, however, cannot be seen, as a cure-all solution that will prevent any future opportunities from arising that will enable the military to again intervene in politics. The present government by Gus Dur remains unstable when he was

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43 Danopoulos, *Civilian Rule*, 12
44 Ibid., 13
45 Ibid., 15
46 Ibid.
considered to have failed to solve the country’s varied problems: the economy is barely holding together, continuing ethnic conflicts, and the separatist inclination of provinces as Aceh and Papua. His presidency began with hopes of reform after years of dictatorship in Indonesia. However, it soon became caught up in scandals and political power struggle. His controversial and inconsistent behavior in managing the daily affairs of the state seems to propagate more uncertainty about Indonesia’s course toward economic and social improvement.

Moreover, in Indonesia’s multi-party system, he failed to build a broad-based support from the variations of factions in the parliament when his party occupies only about ten percent of the seats. Although, he broadly based his first cabinet on national unity by including representatives from all of the winning parties in the parliament, he reshuffled it just months after it was formed. He then established what can truly be called “Gus Dur’s own cabinet.” For many months he has openly clashed with parliament which in turn has censured him twice over allegations of involvement in two affairs of corruption. For political support, he basically maintains and relies on his root organization of the traditional Islamic scholars or Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) by maintaining his regular meetings with a wide network of his ulama friends. His erratic leadership has alienated him from most of his allies that had supported him in the first place, while the country continued to suffer in economic apathy and separatist rebellions. Now his “allies” are withdrawing their support and criticizing him for his “arrogance and incompetence,”

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47 See Kompas March 23, 2000
48 Gus Dur was the leader of NU before he became the president. NU is the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, claiming to have about 30 million members.
49 Ulama means Islamic scholar or person with a deep knowledge about Islam.
mostly for not being able to solve problems that are considered crucial for Indonesian democratization, such as the economy and the separatist movements.\textsuperscript{50} The erosion of Gus Dur’s power was further underlined when his own cabinet and the armed forces refused to support his attempt to declare a state of emergency.\textsuperscript{51}

Pressure to overthrow the President has been increasing both in the parliament and the street. Demonstrations by either the supporters of or against his impeachment have become daily events in the capital city, Jakarta as well as other cities. In order to maintain and fight for his position, the President again relies on the massive militia – mostly from his supporters at the NU – to back him up from the street.\textsuperscript{52}

Based upon Danopoulos’ perspective, Gus Dur would be categorized only as a \textit{structural} leader while lacking the ability to be either an \textit{intellectual} or \textit{entrepreneurial} leader. He relies on the popular support of his traditional supporters of the NU, while neglecting the importance of achieving political consensus through negotiations and accommodations. What gets into the heart of Gus Dur’s predicament, according to one prominent Muslim scholar Nurcholish Madjid, is that Gus Dur brought his habits as the leader of the NU – within which he was treated as the charismatic and more mystical leader – into the presidential palace. “Gus Dur is committed to democracy principle, but he is not a democrat himself. He is a ‘Gus’ [a title given only to high-level \textit{kyai} or \textit{ulama}. While Dur is the abbreviation of his given name, Abdurrahman]” and “That implies an immunity.”\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{50} See Kompas...
\textsuperscript{51} See Kompas May 29, 2001
\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Time} magazine, May 30, 2001, notes that the group of people from the “Brave Movement to Die Defending Gus Dur” was on the street, demanding to the parliament to stop the impeachment process.
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Time}, July 17, 2000
Most observers believe that Gus Dur will not survive impeachment from parliament. While the most viable candidate for his replacement is the Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri, many perceive her as lacking political skills as well as support and credentials from the Islamic groups. Few are seeing Megawati as the answer to Indonesia's continuing economic and ethnic turmoil. On the other hand, the military remains the ultimate arbitrator while warning the politicians to keep their differences off the street and maintain stability. Although in the short term, military coup does not seem likely to take place; an expansion of the political instability at the center accompanied by unraveling in the provinces would certainly raise the temptation among the generals to reassert a more direct grip on political power.

Prospect for Civilian Supremacy

What do these factors above mean within the context of civil-military relations and civilian supremacy? The analysis of the conditions above shows that there seems to be little hope for a value congruency in which the military accepts and acknowledges the supremacy of the civilian government. The armed forces' historical experiences as the savior of the nation will always provide confidence and legitimacy to take part in the government politically. Moreover, the regional and domestic conditions of Indonesia give the military its "crisis card" that can be used and display its effects at any important point in time. The military has used this card to deal with the decline of its prestige and to boost its political presence. Even worse, this card could also become a significant factor in bringing down a government. Some of the main reasons for rejecting the
civilian government authority and capabilities are the prolonged instability in regions and clashes between ethnics in many areas.

Even if the military’s dual function had eventually been abolished in the face of stronger public criticism, the military can still shake the foundation of the government through its defense function. This “crisis card” is a weapon not based on the political function of the military but on its defense function. By having this “card,” the military can affect the fate of the government indirectly without applying it outright political interference. It remains an important question whether any civilian government especially Gus Dur’s government with its weak internal solidarity, could really withstand the pressure if the military played the crisis card over the problems in Aceh, Ambon, or Papua sabotaging any attempt against civilian policy in these areas.

In this sense, in seeking to build the new norm of civilian-military relations, problems of the military have to do not only with the abolishing of the dwifungsi but also on how the military defense functions are shaped. Such reform will definitely require the change and reform or even the elimination of the armed forces’ territorial structure. Whether reform of the military can be stretched to reach this primary area is the essential question in achieving sustainable democratization in Indonesia’s political system.

The lack of civilian expertise in defense matters will also create a serious dilemma for the civilian administration. A significant aspect of civilian participation in military matters involves coordinating and harmonizing defense requirements with other national priorities. This is not a simple task because it requires establishing a balance between civilian control, managerial efficiency and security knowledge. There are not enough civilians with sufficient knowledge and expertise of military strategy, tactics, and the
technical aspects of running such a vast institution. This difficulty of finding civilian experts in military matters will be one justification for the military retaining some control over defense policy-making.

More importantly, the future of democratization and the establishing and maintaining of civilian supremacy depends on the shape of civilian politics. Creating an organizational environment that maximizes civilian control and military professionalism under democratic regimes involves restructuring the relationship between the executive, legislative and security branches of government. While civilians in one branch of government are continuously monitored and challenged by civilians in another, establishing civilian control can only be achieved after a consensus emerges among the civilian elite on matters such as national leadership and policy. In practice, civilians will have to establish their own "authority" over their fellow civilians before they can control the military.

From the conditions described above, it may take time for a value congruency to be produced within which the military would not be brought into political discord among political elites. What is missing among the Indonesian civilian politicians is the building of such a common political rule among them. As seen under the Habibie and Gus Dur governments, as long as each political force keeps trying to "persuade" the military to gain the advantage over its rival in the practice of emerging democratic party system, the prospect for weakening the military's political power as the general public wishes is low. The meeting of the MPR in August 2000 presented a crucial opportunity for civilians to strip the military from its seats in national and regional parliaments. Despite considerable pressure to remove officers from the legislature by several political parties, the
opportunity was missed when the largest parties failed to support the achievement of this important milestone in the consolidation of civilian supremacy over the armed forces. The result was the continuing presence of the armed forces representatives in the parliament.

Another important matter that is missing in the effort of redefining the civil-military relations to the establishment of civilian supremacy is the legal basis of the armed forces position. In the past Indonesia’s constitution and law provided the armed forces with privileges to be responsible for domestic security and legalizing the armed forces as a functional group participating in all aspect of state affairs. Given such legitimation of the past role of the armed forces, it is clear that the removing of the armed forces from political affairs requires systematic changes to the constitution and the laws. The constitution and laws, rather than acting as mere legal disincentives for the armed forces’ political role, must be changed to provide a constructive and clear role for the armed forces in democracy. As Danopoulos maintains “civilian control cannot be accomplished through abstract principles and sweeping political pronouncements.”54 At a time when the armed forces appears to be in search of a new purpose, constitutional amendment and new laws can be an instrument for assisting the armed forces to readjust their role outside politics.

Somewhat more effective are constitutional, but nonetheless, coercive sanctions that discourage and punish military insubordination. Court-martial trials must be widely accepted as a legitimate instrument of control of the armed forces. Reluctance to impose appropriate sanctions for fear of aggravating military antagonism will definitely erode

54 Danopoulos, Civilian Rule, 1992, p. 20
civilian supremacy over the long-term while it does not necessarily eliminate the immediate military intervention in politics. In recalling the civil-military relations during the Habibie and Gus Dur governments, little has been done in regard to the investigations and trials of the officers allegedly involved in many human rights abuses in the past. Civilian control ultimately rests on the normative acceptance of the legitimacy of civilian rule by the military. By not doing so, the civilian government cannot expect and take for granted that its armed forces have internalized the value of civilian supremacy.

At present there is a great degree of uncertainty over the issue of civil-military relations in Indonesia. The armed forces continues to be unenthusiastic in defining what civilian supremacy over the military will mean in a nominally democratic Indonesia. The civilian government, specifically Gus Dur himself, has not addressed the problem explicitly. Although in many cases, the President appears to believe that civilian supremacy means civilian control over not only the policy process, but also of the appointment of military personnel.

The armed forces leaders who are pro-reform have led the internal reformation in the armed forces in making this institution more professional and non-political. Such effort can be seen as mostly divorced from day-to-day politics and reluctant to accommodate a reduction of its seats in the MPR and DPR as well as its representation at the regional and provincial levels. What this indicates is that since the onset of democratization there has been a quantitative change in civil-military relations in Indonesia. This, however, does not mean that a “back to barracks” policy has taken place. There is still strong belief in the armed forces that it should be represented in the key social and political arena and that it can play a meaningful role.
From this perspective, it is apparent that the internal reform of the armed forces has taken place within the parameters of the deep-seated culture of an armed forces that has been systematically ingrained since 1945 with its inevitable important role for maintaining the survival of the country. Regardless of the seemingly quantitative reduction of its dominance in government and political affairs, the armed forces demand their qualitative presence. More importantly, the armed forces remain persistent that they must be given the opportunity to engage in society in a new setting, although they also assert their intentions to negotiate the operationalization of this engagement with the civilians.

Even though difficult, the condition for a value congruency, then, is not impossible. What this assessment makes clear is that a strategy needs to be developed that recognizes the interconnectedness of the issues at hand. This is critical in understanding the resilience of officers' roles in government and in developing strategies to refocus the military's role in defense. Therefore, the most likely long-term solution to the armed forces' political role entails a comprehensive settlement based on dialogue that will require concessions from both the civilian government and military echelons. The chances of a successful long-term strategy will be higher if it carries a combination of incentives along with disincentives. These push and pull factors should focus on the spheres on the armed forces' political activity identified in its new paradigm. Defining the military's role in politics is not something that cannot be negotiated. For sure, historical experiences can be an important starting point for a long process of determining how and what should be the role and position of the military in a democratic society; however, the process itself depends on the functionalization and organization of the
government. In this case equal dialogue and communications between the civilian and military is the utmost factor based upon an honest, open, and justified political intention. Otherwise, the military will always be dominating the political arena and will be ever-present as a balancing power among the civilian leaders.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

Indonesia’s military has been entwined in the nation’s political, social, and economic affairs after independence. The political assertiveness of the military is based on its defining historical experience and political events that rendered civilians ineffective. One assertion in history is that the armed forces had carried out the resistance leading to Indonesia’s attainment of independence. Another assertion rests on the numerous operations the military conducted against outbreaks of rebellions in Java and the outer islands. These rebellions however, were interpreted by the armed forces as having been caused by the failure of politicians to solve the nation’s underlying problems after the independence. Aside from their historical role, it was the military itself who developed the institution and from its earlier stage, the organization of the armed forces showed the central government’s lack of authority.

It may seem that the expansion of the military’s political role was not a planned process; rather, it took the form of a series of responses to particular political crises and events in the aftermath of independence. These expansions however, were formalized into doctrines and concepts that describe the armed forces’ purpose as a military force as well as a political force. For instance, the doctrine of dwifungsi entailed the armed forces representation in the Cabinet, civil service, and the parliament. The doctrine also expanded to reject explicitly any notion of the military’s apolitical stance and asserts its rights as savior of the state and defender of the nation’s ideology of Pancasila to justify a permanent political role in society.
For more than 32 years, the Indonesian political landscape was dominated by two main actors – the armed forces and President Suharto. Although in the last years before Suharto’s fall, the dominance of the armed forces in Indonesian political and social life had begun to be questioned. However, such moves had only little effect on the social and political status of the military. During this period, the armed forces were too powerful to be challenged. However, the events of May 1998 and afterwards in Indonesia have forced the armed forces to adapt institutionally as well as functionally to the needs of political reform in the post-Suharto era. The growing demands of civil society for a reduction of the armed forces political involvement called for the armed forces’ complete exit from politics.

The current development of civil-military relations in Indonesia is a new chapter in its history. There are several aspects characterized the phenomena. First, the military is facing a task of redefining its role while civil society is increasingly becoming more assertive of the military’s reducing its role in politics. There are signs that the military will not return to an active and direct political role while the civilian government appears to have made progress in increasing civilian authority over military affairs. This has been sufficiently demonstrated by President Gus Dur’s moves on the reshapings of key defense and military portfolios by appointment and promotions of senior military officers. These moves include the decision that for the first time in Indonesia’s political history, the Ministry of Defense was in the hands of a civilian. Moreover, the reduction of the seats allocated for military representatives in parliament, and most importantly the elimination of the *kekaryaan* function of the military personnel to civilian positions.
showed some of the efforts for establishing civilian supremacy and the decreasing presence of military in politics.

On the other hand, however, there are still indications that the armed forces’ current cutback from politics may be temporarily. More than three years after Suharto stepped down, the armed forces showed no sign of having developed a comprehensive strategy or concept of their own about their new role other than its very vague description of this in the New Paradigm. Such disinclination, however, led to the consideration that by keeping its new role unclear, the armed forces can have the flexibility to again step in and intervene whenever they consider civilians to have failed to manage the country.

In the broader picture, little has been done to disengage the armed forces from the political realm. From the previous chapters, it can be seen that the armed forces’ response to democratization in Indonesia since May 1998 consisted of policies to promote confidence and trust building of the society to the blemished image of the armed forces. Such effort was aiming at placing the society at ease about the military and its intentions. However, the measures aimed at undertaking more fundamental and structural-oriented policies and changes with the purpose of reforming the armed forces were so far partial. The armed forces continue to maintain their invasive territorial command structure and apparatus; a vast and concentrated hierarchy that shadows the civilian government at all levels. And by doing so, the Indonesian military will be continuously involved in rural and regional development. This legacy of the military’s aggressive push for power since the early 1960s gives it the means to continue to exert pressure both on the local population and on regional and local government.
In addition to this situation is Indonesia’s lack of strong civilian political institutions – the important prerequisite for augmenting civilian supremacy. Indonesia remains a bureaucratic polity in a highly patrimonial state. Politics, power, and participation in national decision-making are limited almost entirely to the political elite, a group consisting of individuals from the top echelons of society, the bureaucracy, and the military. Moreover, politics in Indonesia continue to exhibit patrimonial tendencies and the widespread practices of corruption, collusion, and nepotism. The growing and increasing reservation over Gus Dur’s popular legitimacy and his government’s long-term viability has also added to the vulnerability of the civilian government. While multitude of economic and political problems continue to trouble the country, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) have raised the possibility that the President might be impeached for his incompetence and mistakes in governing by the time he gives his accountability speech in front of the parliament in August 2001.

The current state of civil-military relations, nevertheless, is the result of the lack of the favorable conditions important for establishing civilian supremacy in Indonesia. From the analysis in chapter four, it can be seen that the important conditions for achieving value congruency between the civilian and the military as the main basis for civilian supremacy hardly exist. The result was that since the post-Suharto era, this relationship has been characterized by mutual suspicions from the civilian questioning the military’s sincerity to carry out reforms and rejecting its political role while the military has historically deep-rooted doubt of civilian capabilities in government. This condition is also exacerbated by the ambiguity of the politicians themselves. On one side, the reformation and democratization processes demand the military completely
withdraw from politics. On the other side however, the support and participation of the military in politics are still needed by the civilians especially in their consideration of the political landscape that has resulted in a situation where no political party can gain the majority of the vote. The current situation of the nominally democratic Indonesia with widespread diversities in its population and culture requires the civilians to largely rely on the support of the military to achieve national unity and stability.

In such situation, it seemed that while there had been significant political changes in Indonesia since May 1998, the armed forces’ disengagement from the political process was slow in coming. The structure of the armed forces’ involvement in politics is such that its complete removal from politics in the short-term is unlikely. The push for reform from within the armed forces continued, although with a “reform leadership” divided between the less and more radical demands of transformation. Their main point of contention, that is the future of the territorial structure of the TNI, was in a sense, the key to Indonesia’s further democratization and certainly to planning for the military economic and political devolution.

Though both the civilians and the military talk about the armed forces’ reforms, there is no clear statement of the military’s complete withdrawal from the political arena. It is clear that the military can no longer claim to be the unifier and savior of the nation. They are beat up and over stretched, as people no longer revere them as they used to be. However, prior to enacting a role in transition, the trust and confidence of the civilians and the military must be built first. Confidence building programs and actions must be instituted to accomplish this task within which crucial steps towards role transition and eventually consolidation can be achieved.
Changes toward a more democratic condition in Indonesian society in the post-Suharto period have been important for democratization process. However, it is important to emphasize that they cannot be seen as an overall solution that will prevent any future opportunities from arising that will enable the armed forces to again intervene in politics. The present civilian government led by Gus Dur remains unstable while it continues to struggle to resolve the country's varied problems. Indeed, the process toward democracy is not a tractable endeavor while the nation is facing economic, social, and political crisis. At the time of increasing political and economic expectations, the civilian government's important task remains how to organize society in addressing these problems simultaneously. In turn, civilians must be able to manage this problem without a total break down of law and order that may threaten the unity of the nation without creating a pretext for military's increased role in politics.

Democratization in Indonesia will continue to be challenged by divisive issues that impact the current political and economic landscape. If military influence in Indonesia is to be curtailed, it is therefore important for the politicians and other non-party groups to continue to force the transformation pace and for any future elected government to take advantage of the momentum of the reformation process. Another task is providing the legal basis of the armed forces' role in society. The role of the military is still unclear as the institution itself faces the popular demand for change. It will be a political shock for the military to completely depart from the social and political spheres after decades of political predominance. In this case, therefore, a well-defined role for the military in the post-Suharto era must be drawn-up, and this definitely requires a consensus-based approach between the two sides.
In short, the civilians and the military should develop new definition of the military’s role as well as to determine the political boundaries. While at the same time, the civilian polity has to be strengthened by providing adequate political space and freedom for airing political grievances. All together, the civilian government must increase its capability to govern without relying too much on the military. The armed forces itself must addressed and re-orient its mission and doctrines, emphasizing the value of professionalism, and more importantly, addressing human rights issues by the civilian and military leadership.

Will there be civilian supremacy in the long run? It will be difficult to say for certain. To a greater extent, both the civilian and the military acknowledge that some form of civil-military partnership is more palatable. In other words, the military will have to be a partner in Indonesia’s journey towards democracy. The main problem however, remains how to define the division of labor between what is military and what is civilian. Where do military operations end and when does civilian authority begin? This is the area that has been so far limitedly discussed between the two sides. Fundamentally, the civilians will have to earn the legitimacy currency by putting the nation in order and creating conditions that are favorable for the achievement of value congruency between the military and the civilians. Although few people in Indonesia believe that the armed forces has the answers to Indonesia’s problems, any failure of civilian institutions will make the possibility of military re-intervention more likely.
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