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Mood change in response to an innocent victim as a function of empathy and belief in a just world

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MOOD CHANGE IN RESPONSE TO AN INNOCENT VICTIM AS A FUNCTION OF EMPATHY AND BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD

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Just world research has found that high just world observers will derogate innocent victims in order to maintain their belief in a just world. How such individuals react when victimized themselves, however, has not been investigated. The present study examined the relationship between belief in a just world (BJW) and mood change after subjects were exposed to an innocent victim within empathy-inducing and traditional observer conditions.

The learned helplessness model of depression emphasizes the role of perception of noncontingency in depression. Following from this model, it was hypothesized that high JW subjects, because of their higher need to perceive contingency, would experience greater depressed mood change when asked to empathize with an innocent victim in a helpless situation.

127 female undergraduates were divided into high, medium and low BJW groups and completed the following pre-measures: 1) rating of the "average female college student" along 15 bipolar adjectives; 2) Depression Adjective Check List (DACL); and 3) Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL). Subjects then read either observer or empathy-inducing instructions prior to a 5-minute audiotape of a policeman and an innocent female victim who reports receiving a series of threatening phone calls. Post measures were: 1) adjective rating of the victim; 2) DACL; 3) MAACL; 4) attribution scale and 5) Likert item measuring expectation of future noncontingency.

Analysis of variance results for a 3 (high, medium and low BJW) by 2 (observer/empathy) by 2 (pre-post) design indicated a significant overall derogation effect. For all mood measures (anxiety, hostility, depression) there were highly significant increases after exposure to the tape manipulation. However, differences between levels of BJW were not found for derogation or mood measures. There was no differential mood change between observers and empathizers. The attribution scale was not found to be a meaningful measure of the universal/personal attribution for helplessness dimension.

These results are compared to those reported in the current literature on just world and empathy research. The results are also discussed in relation to a similar study which used a male population.

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

Motivation and desire for personal effectiveness and control over important life events occupies a well-acknowledged position in viewing the individual human situation within clinical and social psychological theory and research (Brehm, 1966; Burger & Cooper, 1979; Kelley, 1971; Langer, 1975; Lerner, 1970, 1977; Walster, 1966; Wortman, 1975, 1976; Wortman & Brehm, 1975). The perception of an orderly relationship between behavior and outcomes is essential to effective coping (Bulman & Wortman, 1977; Seligman, 1975), enabling the individual to set goals and impose some type of meaningful order on the world (Lerner, 1977; Lerner & Miller, 1978).

Thus, as the perception of control is considered a beneficial experience for the animal or human (Burger & Arkin, 1980; Kelley, 1971); lack or loss of control is seen as both undesirable and debilitating (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; Seligman, 1975; Wortman & Brehm, 1975). Negative reactions to loss of control have been found as a generalized phenomenon not only in relatively artificial settings (Burger & Arkin, 1980; Hiroto, 1974; Overmier & Seligman, 1967), but also in more realistic situations involving reactions to success and failure (Kuiper, 1978;

Luginbuhl, Crowe & Kahan, 1975) and the effects of victimization on observers and victims (Lerner, 1970, 1971a; Walster, 1966).

Evidence of a control motivation (Kelley, 1971; Pittman & Pittman, 1979, 1980) has been found in perceived control phenomena (Langer, 1975) and in general attributional biases in efforts to maintain control over the environment (Kelley, 1971; Miller & Norman, 1975).

> People minimize the role of chance in producing various outcomes, exaggerate the relationship between their behavior and "uncontrollable" life events, and tend to be unaware of the extent to which their behavior is controlled by external factors. (Wortman, 1975, p. 43).

For example, in games of chance gamblers will behave as if they have expectations of control (Langer, 1975). In fact, people often fail to differentiate between chance and skill situations. Langer refers to the tendency to perceive causal relationships when contingency does not in fact exist as the "illusion of control". In a sense, such biases are complementary to the biases of helpless individuals who have learned to underestimate personal effectiveness (Seligman, 1975).

The perception of control is beneficial and adaptive for the organism (Kelley, 1971; Seligman, 1975). Subjects rated exposure to unpredictable aversive stimuli less negatively if lead to believe they had control, that did those correctly perceiving the situation as uncontrollable, and showed no subsequent performance deficit (Glass & Singer,

1972). Furthermore, research indicates that individuals prefer self-control (Pervin, 1963) and if allowed to control aversive outcomes, will in fact rate the experience as less aversive than if administered by the experimenter (Geer & Maisel, 1972; Wortman, 1975). Lefcourt (1976) concludes that prediction and control of aversive stimuli decreases negative response.

Desire for Control and Causal Attributions

Kelley (1971) links man's need to predict and control to man's inferences about the causes of observed behavior.

> The purpose of causal analyses - the function it serves for the species and the individual - is effective control. The attributor is not simply an attributor, a seeker after knowledge. His latent goal in gaining knowledge is that of effective management of himself and his environment. He is not a pure "scientist," then, but an applied one. (p. 22)

This assertion receives support from findings that deprivation of control leads to increased attributional activity (Pittman & Pittman, 1980).

Causal attributions, however, are influenced by the need to believe one is able to control the environment (Langer, 1975), and in this way introduce biases into causal inferences (Kelley, 1971). Pancer (1980) identified attributions for success and failure along a stability/modifiability continuum, "ability" being stable and "effort" a more controllable factor. The greater need to perceive control over performance outcomes and importance of the task lead to more attributions made to controllable

causes (effort).

To the extent to which attributions are bases for future control attempts, individuals will attribute success to personal factors and failure to external forces (Kelley, 1971) and overestimate their degree of control over random events (Langer, 1975; Wortman, 1975). Conversely, control motivation theory suggests one is apt to underestimate the extent to which behavior is controlled by external factors. Indeed, evidence indicates actors will exaggerate personal control and deny situational constraints (Miller & Norman, 1975).

Individual Differences in Desire for Control

Evidence supports the existence of individual differences in motivation for control and attributional style (Burger & Cooper, 1979; Pittman & Pittman, 1979).

Rotter (1966) developed the Internal-External Locus of Control scale to measure the degree to which an individual believes reinforcements are contingent upon his behavior. Within his social learning theory, perceived control is operationally defined as a generalized expectancy for internal rather than external control of reinforcements (Lefcourt, 1976). Those internally oriented perceive both positive and negative events as a consequence of one's actions and behavior, thus, under personal control. Conversely, those who exhibit an expectancy of external control would see similar events as unrelated to one's behavior and out of one's control (Rotter, 1975).

Burger and Cooper (1979) developed a paper and pencil personality measure of the "general desire for control over the events in one's life" (p. 382). The Desirability for Control construct was hypothesized to account for some of the variation in learned helplessness reactions (Burger & Arkin, 1980). The researchers found that those subjects high in the desire for control (DC) display greater cognitive and affective deficits in response to helplessness training than low DC subjects.

More generally, the authors suggest that to the extent that the person has a high desire for control, he will react more strongly than low DC persons to loss of control and may be more susceptible to learned helplessness (Burger & Cooper, 1979; Pittman & Pittman, 1980).

High DC individuals are described as assertive, decisive, and active. High DC subjects were found to exhibit the illusion of control phenomenon in a chance situation, whereas low DC subjects did not (Burger & Cooper, 1979).

In a similar vein, Rubin & Peplau (1973) created the Belief in a Just World Scale based on Lerner's (1970) just world hypothesis which states that people are motivated to believe that they will get what they deserve and likewise, deserve what they get. Those high in belief in a just world have been shown to react differentially in situations which disconfirm their belief in a contingent world to those not suscribing to this belief (Miller, 1977; Rubin & Peplau, 1973). A more extensive examination of this construct

will be provided in later sections of this review.

Reactions to Uncontrollable Life Events

Walster (1966) notes with realism that "people have no real control over many of the things that happen to them" (p. 73), for such reasons as limitations in abilities, chance factors or external forces (Wortman & Brehm, 1975).

Congruent with previous discussion, people will exaggerate their influence over uncontrollable life events (Wortman, 1976). Further evidence suggests that individual victims of unfortunate circumstances may even blame themselves for their fate rather than admit to chance factors. Indirect evidence comes from studies of guilt in innocent victims such as cancer patients (Abrams & Finesinger, 1963), parents of terminally ill children (Chodoff, Friedman & Hamburg, 1964), victims of natural disasters (Lifton, 1963) and women who have been raped (Medea & Thompson, 1974).

Acknowledgment that unfortunate circumstances may befall a person through no fault of his own may present an extremely unpleasant thought (Lerner, 1970, 1971a). In some cases, a person is more able to feel he could avert future misfortune by assigning causal responsibility (Walster, 1966) or perceiving the situation as having been caused by his own prior mistakes, behaviors or intentions (Lerner, 1970).

While some theorists emphasize the nonfunctional nature of self-blame (Abrams & Finesinger, 1963) and effects of such an attribution on self-esteem (Comer & Laird,

1975; Wortman & Brehm, 1975), others (Chodoff, Friedman & Hamburg, 1964) point to the defensive purpose of self-blame in denying that suffering is impersonal and meaningless. Medea and Thompson (1974) discuss self-blame as a means of providing an illusion of safety in anticipation of future situations. Bulman and Wortman (1977) suggest that self-blame may be less painful than admitting to a random world. In sum, these studies raise the question as to whether the illusion of control is adaptive or dysfunctional for the individual (Langer, 1975).

Little actual research has been carried out which specifically explores attributional explanations of victims of unfortunate life events and subsequent affective reactions mediated by different attributions (Lerner & Miller, 1978; Wortman, 1976). Several researchers have questioned the interaction of personality dispositions in attributions for uncontrollable events (Comer & Laird, 1975; Wortman, 1976).

The present research project represents an attempt to address this issue 1) by examining the relationship between the strength of control motivation and reaction to exposure to uncontrollable outcomes, and 2) by measuring variation in subsequent affective responses due to differential involvement and attributional mediators.

The remainder of this review will discuss the reformulated learned helplessness model of depression

(Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978), and focus centrally on the just world theory (Lerner, 1977) and the convergence of these theories in explaining affective reaction to the perception of noncontingency in cases of unjust suffering.

Learned Helplessness Model of Depression

> A person or animal is helpless with respect to some outcome when the outcome occurs independently of all his voluntary responses (Seligman, 1975, p. 17).

Learned helplessness theory was ignited by studies (Overmier & Seligman, 1967; Seligman & Maier, 1967) which investigated the relationship of fear conditioning and instrumental learning. Naive dogs were able to learn, when placed in a shuttle box, to escape shock by jumping over a barrier. However, animals exposed initially to inescapable shock did not master the escape task and displayed passive acceptance of aversive shock. Such failure to initiate further responding when the environment was again controllable exemplifies the motivational deficit engendered in learned helplessness reactions (Seligman, 1975). Similar results have been replicated in "cats, rats, mice, birds, primates, fish, cockroaches and man" (p. 28).

Hiroto (1974) utilized Seligman's experimental paradigm with humans, successfully producing motivational and cognitive deficits associated with learned helplessness effects. College students were exposed to pre-treatments of controllable or uncontrollable aversive noise prior to an escape-avoidance learning task. The uncontrollable noise

group exhibited passivity in the subsequent controllable situations, suggesting that they expected future outcomes to be uncontrollable. Such lack of initiative in responding leads to cognitive deficits, where failure to test new contingencies impedes learning that new tasks may be controllable.

Additional studies with humans (Hiroto & Seligman, 1975; Miller & Seligman, 1975) provide further support for a learned helplessness theory of depression.

From accumulated research, Seligman (1975) formulated the learned helplessness theory to encompass both animal and human data regarding exposure to uncontrollability:

> This, then is our theory of helplessness: the expectation that an outcome is independent of responding (1) reduces the motivation to control the outcome; (2) interferes with learning that responding controls the outcome; and, if the outcome is traumatic, (3) procudes fear for as long as the subject is uncertain of the uncontrollability of the outcome, and then produces depression. (p. 55-56)

Note that it is the expectation of future helplessness and not merely exposure to noncontingency, that is critical in producing motivational, cognitive and emotional deficits. A measure of expectation of future noncontingency was included in the hypotheses tested in the present research.

Miller and Seligman (1973) found that individuals scoring high on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) did not utilize information from a skill task to make better prediction of future success, leading the authors to conclude that the individual perception of noncontingency between acts and outcomes is a significant variable in de-

pression. Seligman (1975, 1978) has proposed his theory to be primarily relevant to reactive types of depression.

Dissatisfaction with Learned Helplessness Theory (1975)

Wortman and Brehm (1975) have pointed out inadequacies in Seligman's theory and put forth a combination of reactance theory and learned helplessness theory to achieve a better explanation of existing data.

Reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) asserts that individuals will respond to perceived attempts to restrict their personal control with increased motivation to reassert control. To the extent that an individual has an expectation of behavioral freedom in a particular situation, he will react differentially to uncontrollable outcomes (Wortman & Brehm, 1975). Similarly, the degree of threat is related to the level of reactance.

Wortman and Brehm cite several areas of difficulty within learned helplessness research, such as methodological and interpretational difficulties, and more importantly, evidence that subjects exposed to helplessness training may actually become more controlling or show facilitation effects (Hanusa & Schultz, 1977; Roth & Bootzin, 1974; Tennen & Eller, 1977; Wortman, 1976).

In response, they propose an integrative viewpoint which takes into account the extent to which a person expects to be able to control important events. For those with a high expectation of control, experience with uncontrollable outcomes should at first motivate attempts to reestablish

control as a response to the threat of loss of control. The magnitude of the threat is proportional to the importance of the outcome, a point ignored in Seligman's theorizing. Those people with no expectation of control will not be motivated to exert control, becoming helpless more quickly. Thus, the greater reactance, the greater persistence in the face of uncontrollable outcomes.

Most notable, however, Wortman and Brehm raise the issue of types of attributions which an individual can make for the cause of his helplessness and their effects. They hypothesize that attributions of failure to unchangeable factors such as personal or internal characteristics will increase resultant feelings of helplessness more than external attributions.

Other critiques have expressed dissatisfaction with learned helplessness theory and its supporting evidence (Blaney, 1977; Buchwald, Coyne & Cole, 1978; Costello, 1978; Rizley, 1978). More recent literature has emphasized cognitive factors in helplessness-induced depression (Huesman, 1978; Rizley, 1978), and several reformulations based on attributional analyses and alternate explanations of learned-helplessness phenomena have been proposed (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; Hanusa & Schulz, 1977; Koller & Kaplan, 1978; Miller & Norman, 1979; Pittman & Pittman, 1980; Roth, 1980; Zuroff, 1980).

Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale's Reformulation

Seligman and his co-authors acknowledge their own

dissatisfaction with early learned helplessness theory. They respond with an outline of inadequacies which they address systematically through an attributional framework. "In brief, we argue that when a person finds that he is helpless, he asks why he is helpless" (p. 50). Causal attributions are a determining factor in the generality and chronicity of learned helplessness deficits.

Previous models have considered uncontrollability to be defined as response-outcome independence (Seligman, 1975). Yet such a definition fails to distinguish instances when an individual does not possess an efficacious response, but when others around him do, from cases in which all individuals lack a controlling response (Klein, Fencil-Morse & Seligman, 1976; Kuiper, 1978).

For illustration, consider the following examples:

Case 1: Spring melt and heavy rains have combined to threaten flooding of a residential section of town. In spite of Mr. Jones' and his neighbors' efforts to sandbag, extensive water damage results to his home.

Case 2: In another part of town, Mr. Smith's newly-remodeled basement is also standing in several inches of water. Despite his attempts to remedy the situation, this is the third time his basement has been flooded as a result of his of incompetency in installing the plumbing in the new basement.

Note that in both cases, flooding and damage occurs independently of Mr. Jones' or Mr. Smith's responses. Yet, in the first case, neither Mr. Jones nor anyone else can control the flooding. As for Mr. Smith, while he is unable to prevent his flooding problem, presumably someone more knowledgeable about plumbing would be able to.

As events are perceived as noncontingent, causal attributions for this state of affairs leads to differential expectations for future response-outcome relationships, determining the chronicity, generality and intensity of helplessness deficits (Abramson, et al., 1978). The reformulation would classify case 1 as an example of "universal helplessness". Since flooding is as likely to happen to Mr. Jones as to his neighbors, he is likely to attribute causes to external factors. On the other hand, Mr. Smith exemplifies "personal helplessness". "Outcomes are more or less likely to happen to themselves" (p. 52) than to others, suggesting Mr. Smith would attribute to internal or personal factors that his basement is flooded. One would expect, then, that the differential attributions would produce different helplessness deficits. "Since 'I' is something that I have to carry around with me, attributing the cause of helplessness internally often, but not always implies a grimmer future than attributing the cause externally" (p. 56). While both types of helplessness situations may produce cognitive and motivational deficits, findings indicate self-esteem deficits occur only in cases of personal helplessness (Abramson, 1977; Garber & Hollon, 1980). Assessment of this attributional variable will be included in the hypotheses of the present research project.

Initial learned helplessness theory (1975) offered little insight or explanation as to why helplessness deficits may generalize to either broad or narrow ranges of new

controllable situations, or why differences in duration of helplessness effects occur. The authors introduce the dichotomy of stable/unstable attributions as a way of explaining whether effects will be long-term or transient (Abramson, et al., 1978). This distinction meshes nicely with other attributional analyses in the literature which utilize four attributional categories: 1) ability, in this framework an internal-stable attribution; 2) effort, internal-unstable; 3) task difficulty, external-stable; and 4) luck, external-unstable (Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest & Rosenbaum, 1971). To complete the framework, attributions may be classified along a global/specific continuum, where global attributions promote generalization of deficits to a wide variety of outcomes, and specific attributions will affect only situations closely related to the original (Abramson et al, 1978).

Overall, then, internal, stable and global attributions promote most significant deficits with generalization to a wider variety of situations (Coyne, Matalsky & Lavelle, 1980; Miller & Norman, 1979) and extend longer into the future. Additionally, perceived importance has been shown to be related to degree of deficits (Bachus, 1979). Support for attributional mediators in the 1978 reformulation has appeared in recent literature (Abramson, 1978; Raps, Reinhard & Seligman, 1978). Seligman (1978) defends the consistency of such a model of depression in that depressives and non-depressives made helpless show similar deficits (Price, Tryon & Raps,1978).

Attributions for Failure and Success

Several researchers (Bradley, 1978; Miller & Ross, 1975) have examined evidence for self-serving biases in attributions for causality. Findings suggest that individuals will accept responsibility for success (internal attribution), acknowledging such factors as ability or skill, However, in circumstances of failure, individuals will tend to attribute their fate to external factors beyond their control, thus, avoiding blame and decreasing responsibility in a self-protective manner (Kuiper, 1978; Larson, 1977; Luginbuhl, Crowe & Kahan, 1975). This pattern of attributions for failure and success serve to enhance feelings of control (Kelley, 1971).

In a review of the research in this area, Miller and Ross (1975) found evidence of a self-enhancement bias for success, but only equivocal evidence for a self-protective motivation in attributions for failure. Zuckerman (1979) suggests that evidence that individuals tend to accept credit for success and deny failure is mediated by the need to maintain self-esteem. When self-esteem needs are aroused, evidence for self-serving biases is strong (Larson, 1977). Bradley (1978) also found support for defensive attributions when the variables of choice, ego involvement and public versus private attributions were taken into account.

Self-defeating Biases

It would appear that depressives tend to attribute failure to internal factors (Comer & Laird, 1975; Klein,

Fencil-Morse & Seligman, 1976; Miller & Norman, 1979; Tennen & Eller, 1977), suggesting a self-defeating bias rather than a self-serving bias as found in normal populations. Such a characteristic attributional style would facilitate deficits as outlined in the Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale reformulation. Evidence is supportive that depressives generally attribute failure to internal, global and stable traits (Hammen & Krantz, 1976; Klein et al., 1976; Rizley, 1978) and success to external and specific factors. Rizley found depressives tend to over-attribute causality to the self. Klein et al. were able to demonstrate that depressives exhibited greater performance deficits when attributing failure internally than externally.

These trends, then, are congruent with predicted deficits and attributional mediators outlined in the Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale 1978 reformulation. Such individual differences between attributions of depressives and non-depressives (Comer & Laird, 1975; Kuiper, 1978) are significant in examining the learned helplessness model of depression.

Emotional Deficits of Learned Helplessness

According to theory, (Abramson et al., 1978) loss of a desired outcome or occurence of a negative outcome leads to affective deficits that do not result from expectation of uncontrollable success. Evidence is supportive of this distinction (Griffith, 1977).

Gatchel, Paulus and Maples (1975) examined mood correlates of learned helplessness with the use of the

Multiple Affect Adjective Check List. After exposure to inescapable noise, as in the Hiroto and Seligman (1975) experiment, subjects exhibited mood changes similar to symptoms found in characteristics of depression. Inescapable noise subjects rated themselves as more depressed, anxious and hostile following helplessness trials. Griffith (1977) showed that noncontingent failure changes mood in the direction towards depression, while exposure to uncontrollable success effected changes away from depression. Other studies have examined high and low helplessness subjects, finding high helpless subjects to be more depressed, and low helpless subjects more hostile (Pittman & Pittman, 1979).

Evidence of mood change has been criticized (Buchwald, Coyne & Cole, 1978; Wortman, 1976) for being nonspecific in relation to actual depression, as well as for the transiency of such effects.

Nevertheless, evidence of increased emotionality has been cited as support for a model of reactive depression in man (Miller & Seligman, 1975; Seligman, 1978). Reactive depression is rooted in feelings of loss of control over outcomes (Seligman, 1975). Miller and Norman (1979) describe the chronology of reactive depression within an attributional view. As an individual is exposed to noncontingent negative outcomes, causal attributions shift from external, variable and specific to internal, stable and general attributions. As this shift affects future expectancies, deficits occur which sustain this maladaptive

attributional style and actual success is disregarded.

Researchers and clinicians, however, have been quick to question the relevancy of learned helplessness to clinical depression, highlighting the many definitional difficulties in depressive disorders (DePue & Monroe, 1978). Thus, while advocates put forth learned helplessness theory as having potential in clarifying the nature of depressive disorders, complexities remain (Huesman, 1978).

Seligman (1978) justifies examination of mild depression as a widespread problem in its own right and treats helplessness depression as a subclass of depression. He heartily encourages further and more definitive research with clinical populations.

The present research will focus on depressed mood reactions to uncontrollable life events, representing a subset of learned helplessness situations in which uncontrollable outcomes are primarily chance-determined rather than skill oriented.

In a related vein, Lerner (1970, 1977) suggests that one way of coping with the presence of a chance-determined environment is to actively maintain a belief that the world is in fact just.

The Just World Hypothesis

Consider reading a daily newspaper. Within it are many examples of undeserved suffering: a hit-and-run accident; an innocent child abused; factory layoffs; cancer

patients without cures; communities devastated by wind or water.

> We do not want to believe that these things can happen, but they do. At least we do not want to believe they can happen to people like ourselves - good decent people. If these things can happen, what is the use of struggling, planning and working to build a secure future for one's self and family? No matter how strongly our belief in an essentially just world is threatened by such incidents, most of us try to maintain it in order to continue facing the irritations and struggles of daily life. This is a belief we cannot afford to give up if we are to continue to function. (Lerner, 1970, p. 207)

The occurence of such unforeseen and unpleasant circumstances to acquaintances or even strangers produces a conflict between admitting to injustice or assuming the unfortunate person in some manner deserved the consequences. Just world research examines the variety of ways in which people attempt to maintain their belief in a just world.

In a recent review of just world literature (Lerner & Miller, 1978) Lerner acknowledged the roots of his theory in the observation that individuals tend to resent victims of circumstance and may in fact blame them for their own fates. He suggests that this may be due to the desire to believe one lives in a just world, a world in which we can get what we deserve and deserve what we get (Lerner, 1970, 1977; Lerner, Miller & Holmes, 1976). His theory represents a social psychological approach to the perception of contingency and effectiveness in one's environment, perhaps a more common sense understanding of issues similar to those

raised within the learned helplessness literature.

Early research employed laboratory recreations of just world situations. In his initial study, Lerner (1965) sought to measure this need of observers to see a fit between outcomes for a particular individual and his personal worth. Briefly, subjects observed two students who drew randomly for a cash prize. Results indicated that subjects tended to see the winner of the draw as having worked harder to deserve his prize than had the loser, in spite of personal preferences (rated attractiveness) for a particular student.

Belief in a just world implies a personal perception of deservingness, a distinct relationship between what happens to a person and his behavior, a response-outcome contingency. When a person is exposed to injustice in his environment, then, as in the examples in the newspaper, such an obvious inconsistency will be threatening. An arbitrary world is both unpredictable and frightening in its implications that a person is no longer able to control his rewards and punishments by means of his own actions (Rubin & Peplau, 1973).

A person motivated to maintain this belief in a just world in spite of evidence to the contrary may restore contingency and alleviate his anxiety in one of two basic types of cognitive justifications: 1) attempt to compensate the victim (Lerner, 1970; Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lincoln & Levinger, 1972); or 2) derogate the victim, thereby re-establishing a fit between behavior and deservingness

(Lerner & Matthews, 1967; Rubin & Peplau, 1973; Shaw & Skolnick, 1971; Walster, 1966).

With this general overview in mind, the basis for such a justice motive will be addressed, followed by a more extensive review of the just world research findings.

The Justice Motive

Lerner (1977) cites the common movie theme of the "good-guys" versus the "outlaws" and their predictable interactions as evidence that themes of justice and deserving are "uniquely central, powerful and universal in Western civilization" (p. 4). The "deserving" hypothesis (Lerner, 1977; Lerner, Miller & Holmes, 1976) explains the seemingly contradictory social behavior regarding people's compassion or rejection of innocent victims.

Lerner (1977) criticizes social learning theory by submitting that internalization of cultural norms is inadequate alone to account for the development of a belief in a just world and focusses additionally on development of the individual locus of justice. The "personal contract" (Lerner, 1977; Lerner, et al., 1976) evolves as an infant matures from the "pleasure-pain" stage which is dominated by the principle of immediate gratification to the more mature notion of delay of gratification, or the "reality principle". The child learns to forestall immediate gains in lieu of a better payoff in the future. With the help of a stable environment, the child is able to visualize attainment of future outcomes which are more desirable and attractive, if

he is able to endure some amount of frustration in the present (Lerner, 1977). This basic idea of "entitlement" develops with age into a commitment to deserving exhibited in adulthood, where it may be applied to increasingly broader areas of living. "For most people, most of the time, the personal contract forms the basis of their goal-seeking and psychological stability" (p. 6).

With some thought it becomes apparent that observation of others' success with the personal contract is a means of evaluating one's own contract. Preserving justice for others is a way of preserving justive for oneself. The more important the contract to the individual, the greater motivation to eliminate threats to it, thus, the need to believe in a just world.

Experimental evidence with children's responsiveness and perception of deserving (Braband & Lerner, 1973) supports this developmental model. Long and Lerner (1974) found that children high on a measure of willingness to delay gratification were more aware and responded to relative deserving in other children more than those low in this measure, supporting a relationship between commitment to deserving and ability to delay gratification.

Studies with adults have also found evidence suggesting people perceive a "norm of deservingness". Subjects were more likely to help someone who both needed and deserved help than to help someone judged as having more than he deserves (Miller, 1977; Simmons & Lerner, 1968). However, when concern for personal deserving become threatened,

response to the needs of others may be compromised (Lerner et al., 1976).

Early Studies

Lerner and Simmons (1966) is a prototype experimental situation in which a clearly innocent victim is observed to suffer through no fault of her own. Female subjects were asked to observe another "experiment" in which a student received painful shocks. They were made aware that the "victim" had signed up to earn experimental credit just as they had, only later learning that her participation would involve strong negative reinforcement for pair-associate learning. Subjects watched a 10-minute videotape of the student receiving painful shocks with instructions to attend to cues indicative of the subject's emotional arousal. At this point, one group of subjects were given a chance to help the victim, by voting to assign her to another 10 minutes of strong positive reinforcement, a neutral condition or continued aversive shock. Of this group, half were told that the subject would receive positive reinforcement as a result of the vote (known reward), while the other half were uninformed of the victim's fate (uncertain reward). Other experimental subjects were not given such an opportunity to compensate the victim.

In addition, four conditions varied the degree of observed suffering. Subjects were lead to believe that 1) the observed event had occurred in the past (past event); 2) the victim's suffering was terminated at the end of the

observed 10 minutes (end-point); and two conditions constructed to increase perceived suffering, 3) the victim would undergo another 10 minutes of shocks (mid-point); and 4) subjects were told that the victim had agreed to undergo aversive reinforcement very reluctantly, and decided to go ahead only so the other students could receive credit for their participation (martyr condition). All subjects were subsequently asked to describe the victim's personality according to 15 highly evaluative bipolar adjective pairs. This rating was compared against an earlier rating of the "average female college student" on the same adjectives.

Results indicated that if given the opportunity, subjects compensated the victim by assigning her to positive rewards. However, those subjects with no opportunity to compensate the victim had no choice but to devaluate her (Lerner, 1971a; Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lincoln & Levinger, 1972). Characterological devaluation, ascribing negative attributes to a person, implies that person has acted in the past to make others suffer, and may act so in the future, so the present suffering may be seen as "deserved" (Lerner, 1974).

As expected, a greater degree of injustice, as in the mid-point and martyr conditions, resulted in most harsh derogation. Further studies have established a relationship between degree of injustice and severity of derogation (Jones & Aronson, 1973; Lerner, 1970; Walster, 1966). Least negative ratings coincided with the known reward condition, while

subjects in the uncertain reward condition, despite voting to compensate the victim, evaluated her negatively. The authors suggest that devaluation will occur when the observer is not reassured that justice has actually been reestablished.

Condemnation of altruistically motivated victims (Lerner, 1971a; Lerner & Simmons, 1966; McDonald, 1977; Simons & Piliavin, 1972) would seem to contradict common sense. Further research by Lerner (1970) examined observers' reactions to a student who agreed to undergo a condition involving either shock or no shock. Results indicated that when observers believed there would be no shock involved the martyr was rated as more attractive than a non-martyr. She was rated less attractive when subjects believed she would suffer yet in the future, suggesting that someone suffering for altruistic motives is more threatening to a belief in a just world than someone with less admirable motivations.

In sum, research suggests that innocent victims will be devaluated in cases in which 1) the person obviously suffers; 2) the victim is not compensated for this suffering; 3) the victim has done nothing wrong to merit such a fate (Cialdini, Kenrick & Hoerig, 1976; Kenrick, Reich & Cialdini, 1976; Lerner & Simmons, 1966).

Two Worlds

Despite evidence of a justice motive, societal indifference towards disadvantaged groups is difficult to ignore.

Lerner (1977) postulates the existence of two worlds to account for this. In one, the just world, the personal contract allows people to organize their behavior towards their goals. In the world of victims, however, injustice predominates and personal contracts are not fulfilled. Justice theory assumes that citizens of the just world are at the same time still vulnerable to cues of injustice from the world of victims. People would be willing, the theory goes, to give of themselves for the purpose of regaining a just world for all. Yet, to the extent that one can not remedy all instances of injustice, they will remain vulnerable to the world of victims. Hence, people are responsive to others' needs to the extent that it does not begin to compromise their personal deservingness (Lerner, 1977). Beyond that point, indifference or derogation may be the only means left to deal with such threats to belief in a just world.

Helping the Victim

Under what conditions, then, will a person be motivated to help a victim of unfortunate circumstances? Simmons and Lerner (1968) found that having been treated unjustly oneself will increase motivation to assist others in the same situation and decrease willingness to assist a person who has been "fortuitously benefitted". A person whose belief in a just world has been threatened by his own experiences will try to create evidence by helping others that the world is in fact just (Simmons & Lerner, 1968).

Observers are most willing to help in cases in which suffering can be alleviated most easily, such as an isolated event or a unique victim (Lerner, 1977). They will be more likely to help an individual rather than a group cause, and help in a situation that promises to be of short duration as opposed to chronic suffering (Miller, 1977), because ineffective efforts to help will challenge the person's belief in a just world (Lerner, 1977). Miller notes further than individuals possessing a stronger belief in a just world may feel more responsible for responding to injustice than those whose belief is weaker.

There is even evidence to suggest that individuals with a high belief in a just world will behave more deservingly by helping others when they themselves are in a time of need, such as before finals (Zuckerman, 1975). This adds support to Lerner's theory, suggesting that individuals believe that deserving inputs are rewarded even in cases where there is no obvious connection between the response and outcome.

Conditions of Justified Self-interest

A final point of justice theory to be discussed here concerns deserving and the realistic difficulty in our world of allocation of resources. We often follow rules of "parallel competition" (Lerner, 1977) in which the opportunity is equally available to all persons to pursue limited resources. "According to the norms of justified self-interest, the winner deserves to win - as long as he didn't cheat -

and it was a 'fair' competition" (p. 19). To test this, subjects were given a chance to choose between an experimental condition involving shocks and a control condition with no shocks (Lerner & Lichtman, 1968). In this case, subjects who chose the control condition, thereby assigning a partner to receive shocks, felt no need to derogate the victim. Another study (Lerner, 1971b) with males replicated these findings that even if one causes harm to another, as long as conditions of investment, risk and opportunity are equivalent, one can feel justified in acting in one's best self-interest.

In summary, the research reviewed thus far illustrates the variety of ways in which people attempt to maintain their belief in a just world when confronted with injustices. The person is faced with a conflict in which he must either become aware that the world may be cruelly injust or arrange his cognitive constructions and attributions such that "the only people who suffer in this world are those who deserve such a fate" (Lerner, 1970, p. 277). Research findings would seem to support the latter choice.

Perception of injustice is closely related to attribution of causality or blame, such that maintenance of a perception of deservingness may influence attributions of causality (Chaikin & Darley, 1973; Lerner, 1965; Simmons & Lerner, 1968; Walster, 1966).

Further Conditions of Victim Derogation

A recent review (Lerner & Miller, 1978) outlined conditions under which observers will devalue or derogate the "character or personal attributes" of a victim who has suffered innocently.

1) If subjects are able to provide behavioral justification on the victim's part for having brought injustice upon himself, it is not perceived as an injustice and presents less threat (Lerner & Matthews, 1967). Lerner (1974) reports a study in which MacDonald (1971) presented subjects with a case report of a stabbing incident. The innocence of the victim was varied such that in one case she appeared more behaviorally responsible for her fate than in another. Results indicated that she was in fact derogated significantly more in the condition of less behavioral responsibility. Thus, an innocent victim is more threatening.

2) A high status or attractive victim is a special case. Undeserved suffering of more attractive or respectable victims may be more threatening due to increased difficulty in assuming a characterological fault. In such instances it may be preferable to individuals to attribute behavioral responsibility to the victim than to suggest characterological deficits (Lerner, 1970).

Jones and Aronson (1973) examined such issues in a mock jury rape case. Character of the victim was manipulated by identifying the woman as married, a virgin, or a divorcee. As expected, jurors assigned the defendant to greater punishment for the rape of a virgin (most respectable) than

for the rape of a divorcee (least respectable of the three). At the same time, however, the virgin was held most behaviorally responsible.

3) As mentioned previously, when the victim and observer are both involved in a situation in which the norm of justified self-interest can be applied, no derogation is found (Lerner & Lichtman, 1968, Lerner, 1971b).

4) Lastly, an important variable in determining a positive or rejecting reaction is identification with the victim. When observers believe they themselves may be in a similar situation as the victim is presently in, they tend to pay more attention to external causes for suffering, rather than derogate the victim (Chaikin & Darley, 1973; Stokols and Schopler, 1973). The issue of defining identification and empathy will be discussed shortly.

In sum, observers find it least difficult in an ambiguous situation to ascribe behavioral responsibility, especially for a respectable victim. Such an attribution implies control over future outcomes. If unable to find any actions which have lead to unpleasant outcomes, characterological derogation will occur, i.e. "He must have deserved it." While this attribution may require considerable displacement, it serves to overpower the threat of randomness or chance, over which one has little control. "Attribution to some random 'chance'...would be to deny that its causes could be understood, making future accidents unpredictable and therefore unavoidable" (Chaikin & Darley, 1973, p. 274).

Individual Differences in Belief in a Just World

While research findings generally support just world theory, individual differences do appear. Lerner, Miller and Holmes (1976) reported that one third of the subjects in Lerner and Simmon's (1966) study did not derogate the victim at all. Rubin and Peplau (1973) developed the Belief in a Just World Scale to assess such individual variation in the construct as earlier defined by Lerner (1970). They assumed a measurable dimension which would be predictive of reactions to victims, whether persons would be more or less likely to derogate innocent victims. Similarly, such individuals scoring high or low in belief in a just world would have a greater or lesser need to perceive a contingent environment where both good and bad outcomes are always deserved.

Rubin and Peplau made use of the 1971 draft lottery to test the extent to which high just world (HJW) individuals would perceive "justice" in randomly chosen winners (high draft numbers) and losers (low draft numbers). It was hypothesized that high JW individuals would admire the "winners" more and evaluate the "losers" as deserving of their fate. Low JW individuals should not exhibit differential evaluations. It was further hypothesized that high JW subjects would experience a drop in self-esteem if they were to "lose". Results indicated that overall participants were more sympathetic of losers than winners. Among high JW subjects, however, this pattern did not occur. In fact, they tended to resent losers more than winners. While bad versus good outcomes had an overall effect on self-esteem, it was not

significantly related to just world scores. Here is an instance in which overall derogation of victims was not upheld, yet taking into account individual differences yielded predicted effects for those high in belief in a just world.

Other correlational measures in the same study suggested just world scores are highly related to belief in God and inversely correlated with locus of control (high JW individuals score internally). A strong correlation with authoritarianism emphasizes that those high in just world believe "that strong and powerful people are good, and weak and powerless people are bad" (Sandford, 1971). Lerner, Miller and Holmes (1976), however, report some earlier unpublished factor analytic research which indicated that belief in a just world and authoritarianism measures did not tap the same construct. Other reported results are supportive of the construct validity of the Just World scale. "Responses of people who were high on the 'Just World Scale' correlated with the belief that people can exercise control over their lives through effort and self-sacrifice" (Lerner et al., 1976, p. 141).

With the introduction of the Just World scale, just world research began to examine more closely the relationship of individual attitudes and reactions to victims (Miller, 1977; Zuckerman, 1975). In a further discussion and review of just world theory and research, Rubin and Peplau (1975) affirm that high JW individuals will express more derogation of victims than low JW persons. From their findings they describe a high just world person as trusting, authoritarian,

religious (Russell & Jorgenson, 1978; Sorrentino & Hardy, 1974), tending to ascribe to the Protestant ethic (MacDonald, 1972) and generally exhibiting an internal control of reinforcements. No clear sex differences have been found (Rubin & Peplau, 1973). Zuckerman and Gerbasi (1977a) have found high JW individuals to be more trusting, as would be expected in that they exhibit more faith in the general fairness of the world despite evidence to the contrary. High just world individuals exhibit trust toward others as well as towards authority and government.

Lastly, it was hypothesized that personal experience with injustice may soften belief in a just world, across the variables of sex, age and social class, but evidence to date has been unable to verify this point (Rubin & Peplau, 1975).

Belief in a Just World and Locus of Control

Several studies have indicated a relationship between the belief in a just world construct and internal locus of control (Lerner, 1970; Rubin & Peplau, 1973; Zuckerman & Gerbasi, 1977b). Such a relationship would support Lerner's theory that belief in a just world results from a person's motivation to believe desired reinforcements are under his control. A closer comparison of the characteristics of individuals with a strong belief in a just world and internals (Rubin & Peplau, 1975), however, found these constructs to be discrepant, suggesting the relationship is not as clearcut as originally thought.

Recent factor analyses of Rotter's Internal-External Locus of Control Scale (1966) have identified several component factors (Collins, 1974; Mirels, 1970; Zuckerman & Gerbasi, 1977c), suggesting it is multidimensional in nature. Collins (1974) identified four factors, belief in a difficult world, a just world, a politically responsive world and a predictable world, which have been replicated in other analyses (Ryckman, Posen & Kuhlberg, 1978; Zuckerman, Gerbasi & Marion, 1977).

Zuckerman and Gerbasi (1977c) noted that just world factor items do incorporate "deservingness", or a contingency between output and payoff, as well as a control orientation. Theoretical similarity to personality measures and correlational data indicate this factor taps the same construct described in just world theory (Lerner, 1970). Internal scores on the just world factor correlated positively with authoritarianism, dogmatism, intolerance for ambiguity and blaming women for their inferior state (Zuckerman & Gerbasi, 1977c). Such measures have also been shown to relate to high just world scale scores. From additional correlations with new items, Collins (1974) found that individuals scoring high on the just world factor of the I-E scale "believe in a strong causal relationship between the characteristics of the person (effort, ability, etc) and what happens to him" (p. 390).

However, Zuckerman and Gerbasi (1977c) and Zuckerman et al. (1977) suggest just world factor items are relatively independent of the other I-E factors, belief in a difficult

world, a politically responsive world, and a predictable world. Discontinuity between attitude and personality measures related to the just world construct, such as religiosity, authoritariansim, respect for social institutions, lack of activism, which are not generally associated with an internal locus of control lead the authors to conclude, "an apparent inconsistency between a belief in a just world and a belief in internal control suggest that the Internal-External just world items should be replaced" (Zuckerman & Gerbasi, 1977c, p. 173).

In conclusion, such factor analyses of the Internal-External scale have contributed to the understanding of the belief in a just world construct. Yet, findings that high JW subjects score internally are seriously confounded by a high loading on the just world factor items which are inconsistent with a generalized internal locus of control.

Belief in a Just World - Attributions of the Victim

Just world researchers have been concerned with the broad implications of their findings for attitudes towards social injustice and political issues (Lerner, 1970, 1977; Lerner, Miller & Holmes, 1976). In contrast, the scope of the present project is examination of implications of the belief in a just world for the victims of uncontrollable life events. How do high just world individuals react when they are the victims?

Lerner and Miller (1978) have criticized just world research methodology for lack of experimental realism and

involvement, unclear manipulation of behavioral responsibility and innocence of the victim, inadvertent variations of the victim's state of need or characterological information and experimental demand characteristics. The present study was designed so far as possible to avoid such criticism and at the same time provide a clear test of the hypotheses. For these reasons, this project used an example of a victim of a randomly-occuring crime (threatening phone calls) as the experimental manipulation.

Causal Attribution for Chance Outcomes

Walster (1966) examined the causal attributional process for accidents and other chance outcomes. The greater severity of an accidental occurence, the greater need of people to assign responsibility (Phares & Wilson, 1972; Walster, 1966).

> And when we hear of an accident, for the most part we sympathize with the helpless victim of fate. Often, however, if we feel the accident is a serious one, and we reflect on it at some length, we begin to have vague feelings that perhaps this accident was not beyond the victim's control. (Walster, 1966, p. 73)

Viewing accidents as caused by external factors implies that such misfortunes could happen to oneself. Walster proposes that observers attribute responsibility in a self-protective manner, attributing increasing personal responsibility to the actor, or victim. In this way one is protected against the threatening idea that in the future one could fall prey to similar chance circumstances (Lerner, 1970; Walster, 1966). Note, this is distinguished from the self-

protective function of external attribution for failure in a skill-oriented situation as discussed earlier in this review (Miller & Ross, 1975).

Lowe and Medway (1976) assert that such self-protective attributions that minimize the role of chance for negative outcomes, as discussed by Walster, will be maximized when relevance of the situation to the observer and potential occurence are high, as well as when actual causal data are left ambiguous. Furthermore, individuals who tend to endorse personal factors as causal determinants of their own behavior attributed more ability and less luck to others for negative outcomes, and more blame and less favorable traits for more severe consequences.

These data are compatible with just world data indicating that high just world individuals, who perceive a close fit between their behavior and outcomes, attribute personal responsibility to an innocent victim for his or her fate (Lerner, 1965; Rubin & Peplau, 1973).

Similarly, Sosis (1974) found that people who perceive themselves as in charge of their own fate tend to project their internality onto accident victims, judging a victim as personally responsible for his fate. Likewise, internals attribute more responsibility to others than externals (Phares & Wilson, 1972).

Shaver (1970) points out that several studies have been unable to replicate Walster's results (Shaw & Skolnick, 1971; Walster, 1967). Shaver proposes, instead, that obser-

vers will attribute misfortunes of others to chance, as a defensive attribution to avoid future blame or responsibility should the observer ever find himself in a similar situation.

Counter to Shaver, Lerner (1970) sides with Walster (1966) in the observation that to the extent to which innocent suffering is dissonant with belief in a fair and orderly world, observers will change their evaluation of the victim by attributing personal responsibility, creating a fit between behavior or character and the observed outcome.

Attributions of Victims for Negative Uncontrollable Outcomes

From the point of view of the victim, then, these two theories make differential predictions.

Defensive attribution (Shaver, 1970) would suggest that a victim would attribute his suffering to chance factors. "The defensive attribution hypothesis suggests that people will prefer to believe in a capricious world rather than believe that they themselves are responsible..." (Chaikin & Darley, 1973, p. 269), and avoid self-blame for future misfortunes they may experience.

Within the Lerner paradigm, the control motivation postulates that a potential victim would attribute negative outcomes to behavioral or characterological factors, rather than chance factors, as chance is least controllable of these attributions. "People make causal attributions in order to enhance their feelings of control over their environment" (Wortman, 1976, p. 23). Brickman, Ryan and Wortman (1975) found support for the tendency to see acci-

dents as controlled by behavioral rather than external events. Thus, Lerner and Walster defend a defensive bias in the victim against viewing accidents as caused by external or chance factors.

In an experiment examining these two divergent hypotheses (Chaikin & Darley, 1973), severe consequences of an accident were more likely to be attributed to non-chance factors than mild consequences, replicating Walster's (1966) results. An accident with mild/severe consequences was observed by subjects who later thought they would be either perpetrators or victims in a similar situation. Perpetrator-relevant subjects derogated the victim of a severe accident, whereas victim-relevant subjects did not. Most important, however, future victims were more likely to avoid chance attributions. By making future situations avoidable, they acted to avoid future harm, while future perpetrators acted to avoid future blame. In a sense, then, support was found for both theories, suggesting observers and victims may make different attributions in similar situations.

In this design, however, the accident involved clear roles of perpetrator and victim, unlike some real life situations. Furthermore, since empathy and identification were confounded to some extent, an articulate picture of the victim's reaction to the accident was not achieved.

Uncontrollable Life Events

In her discussion of uncontrollable life events, Wortman (1976) states,"Individuals seem very uncomfortable

with the notion that such outcomes occur by chance" (p. 38), suggesting that people would rather blame themselves for a negative life event than admit to a random environment. However, few research studies have examined causal attributions for negative life events and conditions under which victims blame themselves.

Most critical, it has remained unclear in the literature whether such control biases and exaggeration of personal responsibility are adaptive or hinder effective coping by the individual (Lerner & Miller, 1978; Wortman, 1976).

Bulman and Wortman (1977) examined the causal attributions of spinal cord injury victims for their accidents. In particular the authors examined the relationship between causal attribution of blame and subsequent effectiveness of coping. Clear relationships emerged between self-blame and effective coping. Conversely, external attributions for the accident was associated with poor coping as rated by hospital staff. Bulman and Wortman interpret their findings as consistent with a need for control in such patients. Self-blame provided an order to the world and meaning in suffering in denying the operation of chance.

Obviously such a population is unique, and does not suggest that self-blame is functional in all cases. In fact, as previously reviewed, Seligman and his associates (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; Seligman, 1975) feel that self-blame and internal or personal attributions for situations in which a person is helpless may be maladaptive. In their

recent reformulation (1978) personal and universal attributions for helplessness were hypothesized to lead to motivational and cognitive deficits. Affective deficits have been related only to attributions of personal helplessness, internal attributions for lack of control Abramson et al. characterize depressives as possessing an internal, stable and global attributional style for failures. Rizley (1978) has confirmed that depressives attribute failure internally and over-attribute causality to the self.

The present study sought to explore the victim's attributions for uncontrollable outcomes and relationship to subsequent mood change. Three levels of belief in a just world (high, medium and low) were compared. For this research half of the experimental conditions were asked to observe a "victim", as in a typical just world study, and the other half were given empathy-inducing instructions to facilitate identification with the victim and her plight. In this manner, it was assumed that empathic instructions could produce subjects reactions as similar as possible to those of actual victims.

Empathy and Identification with the Victim

Lerner and Matthews (1967) discovered that identification with the victim tends to promote compassion rather than rejection. Subjects will not derogate a victim they identify with (Lerner, 1974). However, in this context identification refers not to similarities in personality, "identification with a victim requires the perception of

the same possible common fate and not the perception of similar attributes" (Lerner & Mattews, 1967, p. 324).

Stokols and Schopler (1973) found that anticipation of future ineraction with the victim served to mitigate derogation effects. And some evidence (Chaikin & Darley, 1973) would suggest that potential victims exhibited more external blame to perpetrators of the situation. Some life events outside of the laboratory, however, may not have obvious perpetrators of injustice.

According to Lerner (1977), identity relationships are produced through empathic involvement with the observed victim. Aderman, Brehm and Katz (1974) manipulated empathy within a just world framework. These experimenters replicated Lerner and Simmons (1968) study with three sets of instructions, 1) original instructions, 2) "watch her", empathy-inhibiting instructions; and 3) "imagine yourself", empathy-inducing instructions which encouraged the subject to imagine herself in the place of the victim. Derogation effects were found in all but the third condition, suggesting that empathy inhibits derogation. Interestingly, though, empathizing observers described their mood as more aggressive after viewing the innocent victim than other conditions.

Lerner and Miller (1978) suggest that differential effects may be attributed to the subjects' concern with self and attention being directed to the experimenter rather than to the victim. These explanations are congruent with the actor-observer hypothesis (Jones & Nisbett, 1971) which

argues that actors (victims) will be more likely to attribute situationally (to external causes) and observers will attribute dispositionally, to the character of the person, in inferring causes of observed behavior.

Jones and Nisbett hypothesize that actors and observers exhibit differential causal attributions as a result of differences in the information available to them. Actors tend to see situational variables as salient, because being aware of their own prior history of behavior, they are aware of inconsistencies and instabilities in themselves. The observer, however, has less information and may assume a behavior to be typical of an actor, biasing his attributions in the direction of dispositional characteristics (Nisbett, Caputo, Legant & Maracek, 1973).

Regan and Totten (1975) examined whether empathic set influenced attributions in a similar manner to actor-observer differences. The authors hypothesized that an empathic set would encourage subjects to attribute situationally, rather than dispositionally for an actor's behavior. Their results provided support for this hypothesis. In empathy conditions, then, situational aspects of actors became more salient, whereas non-empathic subjects continued to attribute dispositionally. They concluded that observers could, in effect, be turned into actors.

Subsequent research has indicated that empathy induction leads to a sharing of self-enhancing attributional biases (Miller & Ross, 1975), while standard observers

attribute dispositionally for both success and failure (Gould & Sigall, 1977).

Brehm and Aderman (1977) replicated earlier findings (Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 1974) that empathy-inducing instructions lead observers to evaluate a victim more favorably than standard instructions, thus, inducing the actor's perspective. Such studies provide the basis for empathy-based observer-observer differences which can be utilized in examining reactions of victims by using subjects instructed to be empathic.

Miller and Norman (1975) found results that were discrepant from actor-observer attributions, however, reporting that actors accepted more behavioral responsibility and acknowledged greater disposition in their behavior than observers.

> The tendency for actors to assume responsibility for their behavior and to indicate that their behavior was consistent with their dispositions, may be seen as a manifestation of the need of the actor to perceive himself as exercising effective control. To the extent that actors allocate responsibility for their behavior to external causal agents (personal or impersonal), their perceived causal potency is threatened or reduced. (p. 512)

Miller and Norman's findings suggest that desire for control and need for contingency in the environment may mediate attributional processes in the actor.

Recent research has supported this contention (Burger & Arkin, 1980; Pancer, 1980; Pittman & Pittman, 1979, 1980). Individual difference, as measured by the Desirability of

Control Scale (Burger & Cooper, 1979) in the need to control life events, produce differential deficits after learned helplessness training. High DC subjects report more depression than those low in desire for control (Burger & Arkin, 1980.)

> These results indicate that individuals with a high desire to control events in their lives may be more susceptible to learned helplessness than are persons low in this motive. (Burger & Cooper, 1979, p. 391)

Pittman and Pittman (1979, 1980) have also demonstrated a relationship between a high expectation of control and performance deficits and depressed mood. Subjects wil lower expectancies displayed significantly less marked deficits.

Wortman (1976) has framed this relationship within a social-psychological perspective, "There is also the possibility that self-blame or devaluation is a response to uncontrollable outcomes adopted only by people with certain personality dispositions" (p. 46).

Overview

The present study attempted to show that persons high in belief in a just world are more susceptible to depressed mood when they themselves are victims of uncontrollable life events (Burger & Arkin, 1980; Burger & Cooper, 1979; Pittman & Pittman, 1979, 1980). In a manner similar to that outlined in the Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale (1978) reformulation of learned helplessness theory, the high just world individual's need to perceive a contingent world

should lead him to attribute negative uncontrollable events to personal or characterological factors before he will admit to chance factors in his environment and confront the threatening idea of relinquishing his perception of control. Such personal attributions for helplessness are linked to emotional deficits (depressed mood) within the reformulation.

On the other hand, as demonstrated in the just world literature (Lerner, 1970, 1977; Lerner & Simmons, 1966), observers of victims should deal with this threat by derogating the victim.

To the extent that those low in the need to believe in a just world are less concerned with a rigidly contingent environment, exposure to uncontrollability was predicted to be less threatening.

Hypotheses

1) High just world subjects will express more derogation of the victim, as measured by a comparison of the adjective ratings of the "average female college student" with ratings of the "victim", than low just world subjects.

2) For observer conditions, the amount of derogation will correlate positively with how much subjects believe the unjust situation will continue in the future.

3) More depressed mood change pre-test to post-test will occur in empathy conditions than in observer conditions.

4) Within empathy conditions, high just world subjects will exhibit more depressed mood change pre-test to post-test than low just world subjects.

5) Within observer conditions, high just world subjects will exhibit less depressed mood change from pre-test to post-test than low just world subjects.

6) Within empathy conditions, a high degree of depressed mood at post-test will be positively related to strength of belief in future noncontingency.

7) Within empathy conditions, a high degree of depressed mood at post-test will be positively correlated with attributions to personal helplessness.

8) Belief in a just world will correlate positively with desire for control.

CHAPTER II

Methods

General Design

The present study employed two primary variables. The first, belief in a just world, was divided into three levels (high, medium and low thirds) defined statistically from screening data on the Belief in a Just World Scale. Across the belief in a just world factor, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions which varied instructional set. Half of the subjects received empathy-inhibiting (observer condition) instructions prior to the experimental manipulation. The remaining half received empathy-inducing (empathy condition) instructions.

Thus, subjects participated in one of six experimental conditions according to their level of belief in a just world and observer or empathy instructional set to which they were randomly assigned.

Subjects

198 female undergraduate students in introductory psychology courses at the University of Montana completed the Belief in a Just World Scale screening measure in class at the beginning of Winter quarter. Subjects from high, medium and low thirds of this distribution were later recruited by phone for participation in the study. They were randomly assigned to Observer or Empathy conditions at this time. After subject loss due to no-shows and a tape recorder malfunction which invalidated data from seven subjects,

complete data was obtained for 130 subjects.

Data from three subjects were subsequently not included in analyses because of their high level of depressed mood at pre-test. Criterion for exclusion was scores on both DACL and D-MAACL depression measures at pre-test which equalled or exceeded two standard deviations above the mean reported for a normal college population (Lubin, 1967; Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965).

Correlational analyses included 127 subjects, divided into 65 observers and 62 empathizers. Analysis of variance computations included 108 total subjects. 19 subjects were randomly discarded from the total 127 to achieve equal cell sizes of 18 per group.

Subjects earned one hour of experimental credit for their participation.

Materials

Materials developed for this research included:

1) Cover story - (see Appendix I) A preliminary paragraph described the project as investigating "social observation" and "emotional cues", a composite of background preparation given by other researchers in similar studies (Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 1974; Brehm & Aderman, 1977; Gould & Sigall, 1977; Lerner & Simmons, 1966).

2) Instructional set - (see Appendix J and K) Empathy-inhibiting instructions were modeled after original Lerner and Simmons (1966) instructions and recent modified versions

(Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 1974; Brehm & Aderman, 1977; Gould & Sigall, 1977) which emphasize an observer role. Empathy-inducing instructions were developed from the same sources as cited above, and encourage the subject to be "empathic" with the victim. Both sets of instructions were made relevant to this particular experimental situation.

3) Case transcript - (see Appendix A) A transcript of a woman reporting receiving a series of obscene and threatening phone calls to a police officer was developed from the "What To Do About Annoying Telephone Calls" pamphlet distributed by Mountain Bell and from a personal interview with Al Baker, Missoula City Police Detective in charge of the Sex Crimes Division. Specific dialogue was constructed to produce a learned helplessness-like situation involving an innocent victim (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; Lerner, 1971a).

In this case, receiving these telephone calls (negative outcome) was portrayed as unrelated or noncontingent upon the victim's responses. The interview was ended by the policeman in a manner suggesting that there would be no easy solution, in this way facilitating expectation of future uncontrollability.

From the perspective of just world theory, information in the dialogue communicated the necessary conditions which define an innocent victim: 1) the subject is unable to help the victim, 2) the person obviously suffers, and 3) it is a

random occurence and unrelated to the victim's objective behavior. The information included in the tape did not readily suggest a behavioral or characterological justification for her suffering. The transcript was developed to fit the above criteria for this study and to be a credible, although not necessarily typical, example of such a crime.

This transcript was acted out by an age-appropriate professional actor as the police officer and a female graduate student. The simulated interview was present to the subjects as "real".

4) Attributional measure - A 10-item scale was developed to measure personal (internal) versus universal (external) attributions for helplessness. Five items were scored in the internal direction and five in the external direction. (see Appendix L) All items were theoretically constructed according to the self-other dichotomy proposed in the Abramson et al. 1978 learned helplessness reformulation:

> When people believe that outcomes are more or less likely to happen to themselves than to relevant others, they attribute these outcomes to internal factors. Alternatively, persons make external attributions for outcomes that they believe are as likely to happen to themselves as to relevant others. (p. 52)

Responses were measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale with ends anchored with 1=Disagree and 7=Agree. A factor analysis was computed post-hoc. (see Results section)

5) Strength of expectation of future noncontingency - (see Appendix M) Responses to the question, "How many more

harassing phone calls do you think this woman will continue to receive after having reported her problem?" were rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale with ends anchored at 1=none and 7=6 or more.

6) Expectation of future harm - (see Appendix M) Responses to the question, "How likely do you think it is that the caller will do physical harm to the woman?" were rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale anchored at 1 = not likely and 7 = likely.

7) Level of involvement - (see Appendix M) A question was designed to check the manipulation of empathy-inhibiting and empathy-inducing set. Subjects rated their level of involvement on a 9-point Likert-type scale, with ends anchored with the statements 1 = "I listened to how this woman reacted in this situation during the audiotape: and 9 = "I put myself in this woman's place during the audiotape".

8) General Subjective/Objective preference - (see Appendix M) Subjects were asked their general preference for viewing a similar situation from an objective or subjective point of view. The read the following statement: "If I were to read an article in the newspaper about someone in a similar situation as this woman I would generally:" and then checked one of the following statements, "be more concerned with the facts" or "consider the woman's point of view".

9) Credibility - (see Appendix M) Subjects rated the credibility of the manipulation on a 9-point Likert-type

scale, "I feel this was a believable example of women who receive a series of threatening phone calls", with anchors 1 = No and 9 = Yes.

10) Prior experience with obscene calls - (see Appendix N) Subjects were asked if they had ever received any obscene phone calls and to describe how long they continued and how many calls they received. Subjects were also asked if they had any close relatives or friends who had received such phone calls. These questions were included to assess the possible effects of prior exposure to this type of situation.

Instruments

Several scales were utilized for screening and pre-post test comparisons.

1) Belief in a Just World Scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1973) - (see Appendix C) The original scale used by the authors contained 16 items, 13 of which were used in a new scale with seven additional new items. The same authors (1975) reported internal consistency of .80 with a sample of 180 male and female college students, with a mean score of 3.08 on a 6-point Likert-type scale anchored with "disagree" and "agree". A 26-item version used with another college population yielded an internal consistency of .81, with a mean score of 3.79. Present research utilized the 20-item scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1975).

2) Desirability for Control Scale (Burger & Cooper, 1979) - (see Appendix D) This 20-item scale was developed to measure "desire for control over events in one's environment"

(p. 383). Responses are rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale with seven statements ranging from "This statement doesn't apply to me at all" to "This statement always applies to me".

The authors reported an internal consistency (Kuder-Richardson 20 reliability) for the 20 items as .80 and .81. Test-retest coefficient was .75 at a six-week interval. They also reported discriminant validity from the locus of control construct (r=-.19) with the Rotter I-E Scale and a low correlation (r=.11) with need for social approval as measured by the Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. A factor analysis yielded five factors: 1) general desire for control; 2) decisiveness; 3) preparation-prevention control; 4) avoidance of dependence; and 5) leadership, all of which accounted for 55% of the variance.

3) 15 bi-polar adjectives - (see Appendix E) This rating scale is standarly used by Lerner (Lerner, 1971a; Lerner & Simmons, 1966) to yield a measure of victim derogation. Subjects rate the "average female college student" along a 9-point Likert-type scale with 15 highly evaluative bi-polar adjective pairs. This index of attractiveness has a possible range of 15 to 135. Subsequent ratings of the victim on the same adjectives are subtracted from the first rating to yield a comparative measure of derogation or attractiveness. These two ratings were used in the present study as pre-post test measures of derogation.

4) Multiple Affect Adjective Check List, Today Form - (Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965) - (see Appendix G and H) The MAACL consists of 132 adjectives scored on three subscales, anxiety (21 items), depression (40 items), and hostility (28 items), with remaining items as fillers. Subjects are asked to check all of the adjectives which describe their feelings "Now-Today". This form was designed to measure self-reported day to day affect or mood changes and instructions can be adapted also for studies with repeated measures of mood change (Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965) as in the present study. It has been used recently in studies on learned helplessness and control (Burger & Arkin, 1980; Gatchel, Paulus & Maples, 1975; Pittman & Pittman, 1979, 1980).

Zuckerman, Lubin, Vogel and Valerius (1964) report split-half reliability for a college population ranging from .79 to .92 for the three scales. A seven-day retest coefficient was low (.15 to .21) as would be expected if measures reflect transient mood change as intended. In a similar population these authors found high correlations between the three scales (.72 to .75). However, validity data showed differential effects on anxiety, depression and hosility scales in response to different types of stress.

For the purposes of the present research, subjects were instructed on the initial administration of the MAACL to "describe how you feel now" and after the experimental manipulation instructions were given to answer the check list by describing "how you feel after listening to the

audiotape".

5) Depression Adjective Check List (Lubin, 1967) - (see Appendix F) There are seven forms of the check list, comprised of 32 to 34 adjectives scored in both positive and negative directions. Internal consistency for females on forms A, B, C, and D range from .85 to .88. Split-half reliability coefficients for normal females for the same forms range from .92 to .93. Alternate form reliabilities ranged from .86 to .91 for females. The Today form of the DACL is proposed by Lubin (1967) as a measure of transient depressive mood. It has been used recently (Raps, Reinhard & Seligman, 1980) in a learned helplessness experiment as a repeated measure tapping mood changes induced by helplessness training. It has also been used similarly by Kuiper (1978).

Lubin reports that the General form which taps "how you feel in general" correlates more strongly (.42 to .55) with the MMPI Depression scale than the Today form, "how you feel now - today" (.32 to .47), suggesting the Today form measures more transient mood states.

Directions similar to those for the MAACL were used with this scale (see Appendix F) Forms C and D were administered as pre-post measures of mood change. Intercorrelations for these two forms for normal females is reported by Lubin as .91.

Dependent Measures

The primary dependent measures were scores on the Depression Adjective Check List and Depression subscale of the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List which were repeated measures. A comparison of adjective ratings of the "average female college student" and the victim yielded a measure of relative derogation. A measure of attributional mediation was included with a 10-item scale constructed to measure personal versus universal attributions for noncontingency. Strength of expectation of future noncontingency was also assessed. Finally, a check was made on the manipulations of involvement (instructional set), and credibility of the tape manipulation on a Likert-type scale.

Procedure

In the first week of the Winter Quarter, the Belief in a Just World Scale and Desire for Control Scale were administered to males and females in introductory psychology courses at the University of Montana. They were asked to provide demographic information such as name, age, year in college and major. Females were then recruited by phone from high, medium and low thirds of the females' distribution of scores on the Belief in a Just World Scale. Subjects on the division between thirds were not contacted. Each subject was assigned randomly to either empathy or observer conditions across all BJW levels and assigned a subject number which was placed on the appropriate experimental packet.

Packets contained either "observer" or "empathy" instructions.

Subjects in all experimental conditions were run simultaneously in groups of 10 to 15 on the nights of January 29 and February 2, 3, and 4 in 12 total experimental sessions. Both a male and female assistant were present for all sessions and were blind to the experimental conditions and hypotheses. The assistants handed out packets according to a prepared list of matched names and assigned numbers. The audiotape manipulation was held constant for all subjects with instructional set varied within the experimental packets.

Subjects were instructed to fill out the experimental packet until they reached STOP, at which time they would receive further instructions. They completed the following items: 1) a cover sheet which included a modified consent form (see Appendix B), and information regarding age, sex, year in college and college major; 2) a rating of the "average female college student" on 15 bi-polar adjectives; 3) Depression Adjective Check List; 4) Multiple Affect Adjective Check List. Subjects read the cover story and then reached STOP. When all subjects were finished to this point the experimental assistants asked them to turn to the next page and read the instructional set, but to go no further. The tape was then played and afterwards subjects were asked to complete fully the remainder of the experimental packet.

Post-measures included: 1) ratings of the "woman in the audiotape" (victim) along 15 bi-polar adjectives; 2) DACL;

with instructions to rate their feelings "now after listening to the audiotape"; 3) MAACL with similar instructions; 4) attribution scale; 5) strength of expectation of future noncontingency question; 6) expectation of future harm; 7) observer/empathic self-rated involvement; 8) general subjective/objective bias; 9) credibility of the tape manipulation; 10) previous experience with obscene phone callers; and 11) subjects were asked finally, to write what they felt the experimenter was trying to test.

Debriefing: After each session subjects were debriefed as a group regarding the general purpose of the experiment, and all questions were answered. Subjects were informed that this was not an actual case and that usually such phone calls can be handled effectively by measures recommended by the telephone company. Subjects were asked to refrain from discussing the results with other students who had not yet participated. Subjects were told some of the possible benefits of the research and thanked for their participation. A summary of the findings of the study was sent to participants who were interested. All students received experimental credit for their participation.

Data Anaysis

Results were analyzed by a 3 x 2 factorial analysis of variance with repeated measures for three levels of Belief in a Just World (high, medium and low) and two levels of instructional set (observer/empathy). The Ullrich-Pitz ANOVA program was used to analyse the data for derogation and mood measures. Hypothesis 1 was tested by the main effect for Just World factor levels and victim derogation. Support for Hypothesis 3 was tested by the two factor interaction of Observer/Empathy x Pre-posttest comparison for both depression measures. Hypotheses 4 and 5 involved the three factor interaction for Observer/ Empathy x High, Medium and Low Just World x Pre-posttest for depression measures. 19 subjects were randomly discarded to achieve equal cell sizes of n=18 for the Ullrich-Pitz program.

Hypotheses 2, 6, 7 and 8 were analyzed by correlational methods. Data analysis for Pearson correlations used the Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS) computer program (1975). Correlations were based on n=127, and also broken down into observer group correlations (n=65) and empathy group correlations (n=62).

CHAPTER III

Results

Manipulation Checks

Pilot data for the tape manipulation are summarized in Table 1. A second tape was made after the initial pilot work and was used in the study. It received higher ratings for believability ($\bar{x}$=7.3, n=10) and credibility of the woman's response ($\bar{x}$=6.7, n=10) than the first tape (believability, $\bar{x}$=6.8; credibility of woman's response, $\bar{x}$=5.6; n=5).

In the actual study, mean credibility rating for the tape manipulation was 7.06 (n=127) on a 9-point scale, with higher scores indicating increased credibility. Highly significant increases in anxious, hostile and depressed mood for all groups after exposure to the tape would suggest that believability of the tape was sufficient for involvement in the experimental situation.

Subjects rated their participation as observing or empathizing along a 9-point continuum (observer=1, empathy=9). Self-ratings correlated highly with actual group assignment (r=.52, df=125, $p<.001$). A t-test further indicated significant differences between mean ratings of participation for observer groups ($\bar{x}$=2.85, n=54) and empathy groups ($\bar{x}$=5.35, n=54) (t=6.74, df=106, $p<.001$). Additional correlational data indicated there was only a slight relationship between observer/empathy group assignment and general preference for objective/subjective viewpoint (r=.06, df=125, $p>.05$) which further supports the effectiveness of the

TABLE 1

Pilot Data - Tape Manipulation

Tape #1 (n=5)	$\bar{X}$
1) This was a believable example of women who receive a series of threatening phone calls.	6.8*
2) The policeman in the taped recording responded to the woman in a similar way to how most policemen would respond.	6.8
3) This woman's response to the situation of receiving such threatening phone calls was realistic.	5.6
4) The audiotape you have just heard could be an example of a recent interview in Missoula.	7.8
Tape #2 (n=10)	
1) The audiotaped interview was a good example of a woman receiving a series of threatening phone calls.	7.3
2) The policeman in the audiotaped interview responded to the woman in a similar way to how most policemen would respond.	6.1
3) The woman in the audiotaped interview responded to the situation of receiving such threatening phone calls in a similar way to how most women would respond.	6.7
4) The audiotape you have just heard could be an example of a recent interview in Missoula.	6.9

*Likert-type scale 1=Strongly Disagree
9=Strongly Agree

instructional sets. General objective/subjective preference was unrelated to dependent measures of mood (see Tables 2, 3 and 4). For empathizers, however, subjective bias was related to more universal attributions for helplessness (r=.26, df=60, $p<.05$).

Dependent Measures

A Belief in a Just World (3 levels) by instructional set (2 levels) by pre-post (2 levels) analysis of variance was calculated for the adjective ratings and all mood measures. Summary data for the analyses of variance are in Tables 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.

Correlational analyses for total subjects and observer and empathy groups are summarized in Tables 2, 3 and 4.

Derogation (see Table 5)

Analysis of variance for pre-ratings of the "average female college student" and a post-rating of the "woman in the audiotape" (victim) along 15 bi-polar adjectives revealed a significant main effect for derogation (F=8.43, df=1,102, $p<.005$). Overall, women rated the victim significantly lower than initial ratings of the average female collefe student.

Hypothesis 1 predicted that high just world (HJW) subjects would derogate more than low just world (LJW) subjects. The BJW x Pre-post interaction was in the predicted direction but did not reach significance (F=1.43, df=2,102, p=.243).

Hypothesis 2 predicted for observers that derogation would be positively related to strength of belief that the unjust situation would continue in the future. This was confirmed (r=-.20, df=63, p<.05), supporting the contention that derogation increased in severity as subjects believed the phone calls would continue. However, the correlation accounted for only 4% of the variance and the relationship cannot be considered a strong one.

Additional correlational evidence suggests further that for observers (n=65), derogation was significantly related to personal attributions for helplessness (r=.24, df=63, p<.05) and conversely, universal attributions were associated with more positive ratings of the victim. It must be kept in mind, however, that this correlation accounted for only a small portion of the total variance. This relationship was not found to be significant for empathy groups.

Mood Measures

A 3 (BJW) x 2 (observer/empathy) x 2 (pre-post) analysis of variance was computed for scores on the Depression Adjective Check List (DACL) and three subscales of the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL): depression (D-MAACL), anxiety (A-MAACL) and hostility (H-MAACL). There were highly significant increases in affect after exposure to the tape manipulation for all groups on all mood measures.

TABLE 2

Total Group Intercorrelations

	High, Med, Low BJW (1)	Observer/ Empathy (2)	Belief in a Just World (3)	Desire for Control (4)	Adjective Rating-pre (5)	DACL-pre (6)	Anxiety-pre MAACL (7)	Depression-pre MAACL (8)	Hostility-pre MAACL (9)	Adjective Rating-post (10)	Adjective Change (11)	DACL-post (12)	Anxiety-post MAACL (13)	Depression-post MAACL (14)	Hosility-post MAACL (15)	Universal/Personal Attributions (16)	# Future Calls (17)
1																	
2	02 [a]																
3	88**	-02															
4	-12	08	-13														
5	02	-11	03	-05													
6	-05	13	-05	-20*	-06												
7	-07	15*	-06	-13	-10	74**											
8	-02	09	-04	-17*	-07	84**	79**										
9	-14	07	-15*	-16*	-19*	62**	72**	74**									
10	-13	-06	-08	08	21**	-07	00	04	04								
11	-12	02	-09	11	-54**	-02	07	09	17*	71**							
12	-10	15*	-17*	-11	-02	19*	25**	23**	18*	-07	-05						
13	-10	25**	-15*	-06	-09	34**	49**	37**	35**	-05	02	63**					
14	-12	10	-16*	-13	-03	39**	45**	50**	45**	-05	-02	73**	79**				
15	-17*	14	-21**	-05	-22**	35**	45**	39**	47**	-13	05	52**	77**	75**			
16	-20*	07	-18*	02	02	-05	02	02	01	22**	18*	11	07	04	-04		
17	-16*	00	-15*	15*	05	03	09	03	03	04	-01	-03	-12	-13	-12	19*	
18	-07	05	-16*	-05	00	20**	13	15	15*	-20*	-17*	07	02	02	07	03	32**
19	00	52**	01	01	-05	03	05	02	02	13	15	40**	34**	25**	29**	25**	03
20	-13	06	-04	00	14	03	-03	-03	-10	17*	04	05	04	-01	-10	18*	01
21	-04	-02	01	-01	02	04	11	11	02	14	11	25**	20*	24**	09	42**	14
22	-18*	04	-20*	11	02	00	-05	-02	-04	10	07	-10	-15*	-22**	-11	20*	17*
23	-08	-01	-07	14	-05	-12	-10	-11	-04	-03	01	09	01	02	03	09	-06

a=decimals omitted n=127 *$\leq$.05 **$\leq$.01

TABLE 2 continued

Total Group Intercorrelations

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
Likelihood of Harm (18)																				03	-18*	-04	07	-14
Observer/Empathy Rating (19)																					06	25**	00	06
Objective/Subjective (20)																						22**	-05	09
Credibility (21)																							-08	12
Personal Experience (22)																								-01
Friends Called (23)																								

TABLE 3

Empathy Group Intercorrelations

	High, Med, Low BJW (1)	Belief in a Just World (2)	Desire for Control (3)	Adjective Change (4)	DACL-post (5)	Anxiety-post MAACL (6)	Depression-post MAACL (7)	Hostility-post MAACL (8)	Universal/Personal Attributions (9)	#Future Calls (10)	Likelihood of Harm (11)	Observer/Empathy Rating (12)	Objective/Subjective (13)	Credibility (14)	Personal Experience (15)	Friends Called (16)
1																
2	86**[a]															
3	-24*	-22*														
4	-19	-14	16													
5	-07	-15	-13	-04												
6	-17	-26*	02	-03	58***											
7	-15	-21	-05	-07	68***	74***										
8	-26*	-33**	04	05	45***	68***	72***									
9	-32**	-29*	06	14	25*	11	12	06								
10	-17	-14	13	16	-14	00	-12	00	21*							
11	-08	-15	-01	-19	-02	00	-04	05	05	42***						
12	-08	-02	03	26*	39***	20	24*	14	39***	16	-02					
13	-13	-05	16	14	11	01	06	-13	26*	-03	-18	09				
14	-08	-08	-05	19	33**	20	28*	05	51***	19	04	44***	25*			
15	-31**	-25*	10	03	-15	-21	-19	-06	24*	11	05	-04	00	-05		
16	-10	-08	14	-02	17	07	13	09	10	-09	-08	-04	30**	-05	00	

* ≤ .05 n=62

** ≤ .01 a=decimals omitted

*** ≤ .001

TABLE 4

Observer Group Intercorrelations

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
High, Med, Low BJW (1)		90***	01	-02	-12	-04	-09	-09	-05	-15	-05	05	-13	00	-06	-05
Belief in a Just World (2)	90***		-02	-01	-18	-05	-11	-08	-04	-15	-12	07	-02	08	-15	-07
Desire for Control (3)	-02	-01		01	-10	-20	-22*	-17	-04	-04	-13	-13	-19	04	11	13
Adjective Change (4)	-01	-18	01		-06	06	03	04	24*	-20*	-13	00	-07	01	12	03
DACL-post (5)	-12	-05	-20	-06		64***	77***	55***	-06	07	17	36***	-02	18	-07	01
Anxiety-post MAACL (6)	-04	-05	-20	06	64***		83***	83***	-01	-23*	03	31***	03	21*	-13	-04
Depression-post MAACL (7)	-09	-11	-22*	03	77***	83***		76***	-05	-14	06	24*	-07	21*	-25*	-06
Hostility-post MAACL (8)	-09	-08	-17	04	55***	83***	76***		-15	-21*	07	38***	-08	12	-16	-02
Universal/Personal Attributions (9)	-05	-04	-04	24*	-06	-01	-05	-15		17	-01	07	08	33**	15	09
# Future Calls (10)	-15	-15	-15	-20*	07	-23*	-14	-21*	17		20*	-09	05	09	22*	-03
Likelihood of Harm (11)	-05	-12	-12	-13	17	03	06	07	-01	20*		02	-19	-14	08	21*
Observer/Empathy Rating (12)	05	07	-13	00	36***	31***	24*	38***	07	-09	02		-02	14	-01	19
Objective/ Subjective (13)	-13	-02	-19	-07	-02	03	-07	-08	08	05	-19	-02		19	-09	-10
Credibility (14)	00	08	04	01	18	21*	21*	12	33**	09	-14	14	19		-10	26*
Personal Experience (15)	-06	-15	11	12	-07	-13	-25*	-16	15	22*	08	-01	-09	-10		-02
Friends Called (16)	-05	-07	13	03	01	-04	-06	-02	09	-03	21*	19	-10	26*	-02	

n=65

a=decimals omitted

* p<.05
** p<.01
*** p<.001

TABLE 5

Means and Analysis of Variance for Adjective Ratings (Derogation)

Belief in a Just World	Observer Pre	Observer Post	Empathy Pre	Empathy Post
High	89.17*	85.17	92.11	83.50
Medium	94.44	89.33	87.94	80.94
Low	90.39	88.39	88.67	89.11
Total group $\bar{X}$	91.33	87.63	89.57	84.52

n=18 per cell

* higher numbers reflect more favorable ratings

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	MS	DF	F Ratio	
Belief in a Just World (A)	99.36	49.68	2	0.28	0.764
Observer/ Empathy (B)	320.23	320.23	1	1.78	0.182
A X B	689.18	344.59	2	1.91	0.151
S(A X B)	18384.70	180.24	102		
Pre-Post (J)	1035.78	1035.78	1	8.43	0.005**
A X J	350.84	175.42	2	1.43	0.243
B X J	24.67	24.67	1	0.20	0.660
A X B X J	113.95	56.98	2	0.46	0.636
S(A X B X J)	12537.20	122.91	102		
Total sum of squares	33556.00				

**≤.01

Depression (see Table 6)

ANOVA results for DACL scores showed significant main effects for pre-post increases in depressed mood over all levels of BJW and instructional set (F=34.98, df=1,102, p<.00001). The main effect for instructional set was also significant (F=4.89, df=1,102, p<.03). Empathizers exhibited greater depressed affect over both pre and post-test measures than did observers.

Hypothesis 3 predicted empathizers would exhibit greater depressed mood change than observers. The instructional set x pre-post interaction, however, was nonsignificant (F=.03, df=1,102, p=.86). Thus, hypothesis 3 was not supported.

Hypotheses 4 and 5 predicted a 3-way interaction for BJW x observer/empathy x pre-post, such that HJW empathizers would exhibit more depressed mood change than LJW empathizers (Hypothesis 4) and in contrast, LJW observers would display greater change than HJW observers (Hypothesis 5). This prediction was not supported (F=.97, df=2,102, p=.62). Thus, pairwise comparisons were not necessary.

Somewhat similar findings were shown in the ANOVA results for D-MAACL scores (Table 7). The main effect for treatment was highly significant (F=56.32, df=1,102, p<.000001). An exception, however, was the failure to replicate the observer/empathy main effect found for DACL scores (F=1.23, df=1,102, p=.27). Thus, support for observer/empathy differences in depressed mood is mixed.

TABLE 6

Means and Analysis of Variance for Depression (DACL)

Belief in a Just World	Observer		Empathy	
	Pre	Post	Pre	Post
High	7.28*	9.44	8.78	12.33
Medium	6.72	11.06	8.17	10.56
Low	8.00	10.83	8.72	12.67
Total group $\bar{X}$	7.33	10.44	8.56	11.85

n=18 per cell

*higher scores reflect greater depressed mood

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	MS	DF	F Ratio	Prob
@A	32.01	16.01	2	0.84	0.561
B	93.35	93.35	1	4.89	0.028*
AxB	26.73	13.37	2	0.70	0.504
S(AxB)	1948.44	19.10	102		
J	554.24	554.24	1	34.98	<0.001***
AxJ	3.18	1.59	2	0.10	0.463
BxJ	0.46	0.46	1	0.03	0.859
AxBxJ	30.79	15.39	2	0.97	0.616
S(AxBxJ)	1616.33	15.85	102		
Total sum of squares	4305.54				

@A-Belief in a Just World

B-Observer Empathy Set

J- Pre-Post

*≤.05

***≤.001

As found with DACL scores, the observer/empathy x pre-post interaction (Hypothesis 3) was nonsignificant for D-MAACL scores (F=.32, df=1,102, p=.58). Furthermore, the BJW x O/E x pre-post interaction (Hypotheses 4 and 5) were not supported by ANOVA results (F=.53, df=2,102, p=.60) and pairwise comparisons were not computed.

Examination of group means (Tables 6 and 7) show evidence of a nonsignificant trend that low JW groups were more emotional generally over both pre-post measures. This was a consistent finding over all mood measures.

Hypothesis 6 predicted that within empathy conditions a high degree of depressed mood at post-test would be positively related to strength of belief in future noncontingency. No significant relationships were found between these variables (DACL - r=-.14, df=60, p>.05; D-MAACL - r=-.11, df=60, p>.05).

Hypothesis 7 proposed that within empathy conditions a high degree of depressed mood at post-test would be related to attributions of personal helplessness. This was not supported by correlational data. For DACL scores, in fact, there was a significant correlation in the direction opposite that of the prediction. Increased depression at post-test was related to universal attributions for helplessness (r=.25, df=60, p<.05). A similar correlation for D-MAACL scores did not reach significance (r=.12, df=60, p>.05).

TABLE 7

Means and Analysis of Variance for Depression (MAACL)

Belief in a Just World	Observer		Empathy	
	Pre	Post	Pre	Post
High	11.61	15.78	13.94	17.72
Medium	11.56	16.67	11.89	17.00
Low	13.17	16.83	12.94	19.11
Total group $\bar{X}$	12.11	16.43	12.93	17.94

n=18 per cell
*higher scores reflect greater depressed mood

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	MS	DF	F Ratio	Prob
@A	55.84	27.92	2	0.47	0.635
B	73.50	73.50	1	1.23	0.270
AxB	29.86	14.93	2	0.25	0.783
S(AxB)	6120.06	60.00	102		
J	1176.00	1176.00	1	56.32	<0.001***
AxJ	13.36	6.68	2	0.32	0.732
BxJ	6.69	6.69	1	0.32	0.580
AxBxJ	22.12	11.06	2	0.53	0.596
S(AxBxJ)	2129.83	20.88	102		
Total sum of squares	9627.26				

@A-Belief in a Just World ***≤.001
B-Observer Empathy Set
J-Pre-Post

Anxiety (see Table 8)

No specific hypotheses were made for anxiety measures. ANOVA results revealed a marked pre-post increase in anxiety (F=57.13, df=1,102, $p<.000001$). There was also a main effect for observer/empathy set (F=7.46, df=1,102, $p<.01$) indicating that empathizers were more anxious overall than observers.

The observer/empathy x pre-post interaction approached significance (F=2.5, df=1,102, p=.113). Thus, there is some suggestion that empathizers tended to become more anxious than observers.

For observers, anxiety at post-test correlated negatively and significantly with strength of belief in future noncontingency (r=-.23, df=63, $p<.05$). Increased anxiety was associated with belief that the woman would receive fewer calls in the future, but, of course, the relationship was too weak to be of practical significance.

Hostility (see Table 9)

No specific hypotheses were made regarding hostility scores. However, it is of interest because of its inclusion in previous research investigating observer/empathy differences in evaluation of a victim (Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 1974) as well as learned helplessness and deprivation of control studies (Burger & Arkin, 1980; Gatchel, Paulus & Maples, 1975; Pittman & Pittman, 1979). Wortman and Brehm (1975) have linked hostility theoretically to learned helplessness phenomena and Lerner and Miller (1978) have suggested that

TABLE 8

Means and Analysis of Variance for Anxiety (MAACL)

Belief in a Just World	Observer		Empathy	
	Pre	Post	Pre	Post
High	5.83	8.33	6.94	10.44
Medium	5.72	8.22	7.33	10.33
Low	7.00	8.83	7.67	11.61
Total group $\bar{X}$	6.19	8.46	7.32	10.80

n=18 per cell

*higher scores reflect greater anxious mood

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	MS	DF	F Ratio	Prob
@A	37.34	18.67	2	0.86	0.571
B	161.89	161.89	1	7.46	0.007**
AxB	0.57	0.28	2	0.01	0.988
S(AxB)	2213.92	21.71	102		
J	447.78	447.78	1	57.13	<0.001***
AxJ	0.57	0.28	2	0.04	0.965
BxJ	19.56	19.56	1	2.50	0.113
AxBxJ	6.12	3.06	2	0.39	0.683
S(AxBxJ)	799.47	7.84	102		
Total sum of squares	3687.22				

@A-Belief in a Just World

B-Observer Empathy Set

J-Pre-Post

**≤.01

***≤.001

a relationship may exist between hostility and derogation.

ANOVA results indicated a highly significant pre-post main effect for increased hostile mood (F=95.69, df=1,102, p<.000001). There was a nonsignificant trend suggesting that LJW subjects were more hostile overall than HJW (F=2.10, df=2,102, p=.125). Correlational evidence also points to a relationship between LJW scores and increased hostility at post-test (r=-.21, df=125, p<.01), although the magnitude of the relationship is small.

The main effect for observer/empathy did not reach significance (F=1.57, df=1,102, p=.21).

Desire for Control

Hypothesis 8 predicted a positive correlation between Belief in a Just World and Desire for Control scores. In fact, a marginally significant negative correlation was found (r=-.13, df=125, p=.07), suggesting there exists only a minimal overlap between these two constructs.

Universal/Personal Attribution

Factor Analysis - (see Tables 10, 11 and 12) The Personal versus Universal Attribution for Helplessness Scale contains 10 items which pertain specifically to the situation of the victimized woman in the audiotape. Five were worded to describe personal attributions for the woman's helplessness, "Something about this person may have had to do with why she was receiving threatening phone calls." Five items were worded as universal attributions, "Women who receive

TABLE 9

Means and Analysis of Variance for Hostility (MAACL)

Belief in a Just World	Observer		Empathy	
	Pre	Post	Pre	Post
High	5.67	9.67	6.33	10.39
Medium	6.11	10.50	7.56	11.94
Low	7.89	11.11	7.28	12.56
Total group $\bar{X}$	6.56	10.43	7.06	11.63

n=18 per cell
*higher scores reflect greater hostile mood

Analysis of Variance

Source	SS	MS	DF	F Ratio	Prob
@A	104.69	52.35	2	2.10	0.125
B	39.10	39.10	1	1.57	0.210
AxB	10.18	5.09	2	0.20	0.818
S(AxB)	2539.44	24.90	102		
J	962.67	962.67	1	95.69	<0.001***
AxJ	1.19	0.60	2	0.06	0.942
BxJ	6.69	6.69	1	0.67	0.578
AxBxJ	12.34	6.17	2	0.61	0.548
S(AxBxJ)	1026.11	10.06	102		
Total sum of squares	4702.50				

@A-Belief in a Just World
B-Observer Empathy Set
J-Pre-Post

***$\leq$.001

these kinds of bothersome phone calls can't really do much about them." The full scale can be found in Appendix L. Data from 51 subjects in empathy conditions were used in the factor analysis computations.

Five factors with eigenvalues greater than one were computed from the correlational matrix (Table 10). Seventy-seven percent of the total variance was removed by these five factors. Rotated factor loadings were computed (Table 12). If the absolute value of a loading in the factor pattern was greater than |.35| it was considered salient.

Factor 1: This factor accounted for 22% of the variance and consists of four items which all load positively. These items are worded such that they are attributions which deal with effort and action on the woman's part in handling the phone calls, endorsing the woman as trying as hard as most people would have to discourage the caller.

Factor 2: This factor accounted for 15% of the total variance. The two items loading on this factor relate to the average reaction to such a situation. Endorsing that the woman reacted more emotionally than most women was inversely loaded, while the item "Everyone receives an obscene phone call sooner or later" was positively loaded.

Factor 3: This factor accounted for 13% of the total variance. The two items which loaded substantially were related to the external control of the situation by the caller.

TABLE 10

Intercorrelations Among Test Items for Attribution Scale

Item	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1									
2	.12								
3	-.22	-.11							
4	.04	.54	.21						
5	-.15	.04	.10	-.08					
6	.20	.24	-.07	-.02	.18				
7	-.02	.40	.03	.39	.18	.20			
8	.05	.20	-.05	.17	.15	.04	.05		
9	.01	.04	-.08	.10	.17	-.07	.32	-.41	
10	.06	.51	.18	.41	.08	.50	.33	.06	-.10

n=51

TABLE 11

Universal/Personal Attribution Scale

Factor Loadings for Unrotated Principal Components

Item	Factor I	II	III	IV	V
1	.141	-.303	-.664	-.124	-.073
2	.797	-.085	-.114	-.196	.174
3	.098	.165	.734	-.054	-.431
4	.689	.082	.220	-.520	.092
5	.185	.255	.230	.750	.337
6	.496	-.192	-.302	.570	-.388
7	.662	.403	-.038	.017	.227
8	.242	-.631	.267	.094	.576
9	.077	.844	-.329	-.030	.139
10	.784	-.124	.067	.104	-.409
Eigen-value	2.537	1.522	1.371	1.234	1.064
Pct. of Variance	25.37	15.22	13.71	12.34	10.64

n=51

TABLE 12

Universal/Personal Attribution Scale

Orthogonally Rotated Factor Loadings

Item	Factor I	II	III	IV	V	Communality h^2
1	.066	-.003	-.623*	-.331	-.266	.57339
2	.788	-.100	-.186	.019	-.236	.72461
3	.067	-.014	.863	-.065	-.099	.76419
4	.861	-.037	.192	-.168	.036	.80899
5	-.028	-.010	.103	.892	-.147	.82784
6	.025	-.024	-.172	.177	-.887	.84918
7	.664	.272	-.029	.351	-.121	.65307
8	.255	-.830	-.157	.273	.125	.86903
9	.200	.831	-.140	.259	.170	.84579
10	.501	-.079	.193	-.048	-.718	.81312
Pct. total var.	21.698	14.741	13.278	12.356	15.219	
Pct. common var.	28.072	19.072	17.178	15.986	19.690	

Percent total variance removed by 5 factors 77.29

n=51

* Loadings greater than |.35| were considered salient

Factor 4: Twelve percent of the total variance was accounted for by this factor, although only one item which related to the typicality of the crime loaded at all highly.

Factor 5: This factor accounted for 15% of the variance. Two items loaded at opposite poles of this factor. They related to the personal responsibility of the victim (personal attribution) in receiving the phone calls.

It would appear from the variety of factors found that use of the attribution scale to tap the bipolar dimension of personal/universal attributions as defined in Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale (1978) is premature. Furthermore, such a scale may often need to be constructed for a particular experimental situation, as in this case, which may hamper generalizability to other research settings. It should be noted, however, that Factor 1 does appear to tap universally oriented items, while Factor 5 is oriented towards more personal attributions.

Data Analysis - Attributional data yielded differential results for observer and empathy groups. For observers (n=65) there was a positive correlation between universal attributions and more positive ratings of the victim. Conversely, strongest derogation was related to attributions of personal helplessness (r=.24, df=63, $p<.05$) although this correlation did not account for much of the variance. The relationship was not significant for empathy conditions (r=.13, df=60, $p>.05$).

For empathy groups, there was a negative and significant correlation between BJW and attributions (r=-.29, df=60, $p<.01$) such that high JW subjects gave more personal attributions. For empathizers, women who had received calls themselves made more universal attributions for helplessness (r=.24, df=60, $p<.05$). As reported previously, increased depressed mood at post-test was significantly related to univeral attributions for helplessness (r=.25, df=60, $p<.05$) within empathy groups. This is the converse of the prediction of Hypothesis 7. However, it must be noted that all of these relationships are rather weak.

Strength of Belief in Future Noncontingency

Hypothesis 2 predicted that the amount of derogation would be related to the degree to which observers believed the victimization would continue in the future. This was supported (r=-.20, df=63, $p<.05$) although the relationship was a weak one. A small but significant relationship was found for observers' strength of belief in future noncontingency and post-measures of anxiety (r=-.23, df=63, $p<.05$) and hostility (r=-.21, df=63, $p<.05$). It is not clear why increases in anxiety and hostility would be related to the expectation of fewer calls in the future. This relationship was not found for empathy groups.

For all subjects (n=127) there was a significant and positive relationship between strength of belief in future noncontingency and universal attributions (r=.19, df=125,

$p<.05$) although this did not account for a large amount of the variance.

As would be expected, expectation of future calls and liklihood of physical harm were positively related ($r=.32$, $df=125$, $p<.01$). People who had received calls themselves had a greater expectation of future noncontingency ($r=.17$, $df=125$, $p<.05$) although this relationship was weak.

Likelihood of Physical Harm

Rated likelihood of physical harm to the victim was not correlated significantly with any of the dependent measures of nood. Thus, expectations of violence did not appear to have a biasing effect on dependent measures. While it did not account for much of the variance, this measure was correlated with derogation ($r=-.17$, $df=125$, $p<.05$) indicating derogation was associated somewhat with expectation of future harm.

As previously mentioned, expectation of future calls was significantly and positively related to expectation of physical harm ($r=.32$, $df=125$, $p<.05$), accounting for about 10% of the variance.

Rated Involvement

Rated involvement was substantially correlated with observer/empathy group assignment ($r=.52$, $df=125$, $p<.001$) supporting the effectiveness of the instructional sets.

For empathizers, ratings of empathic involvement were significantly and positively correlated with univeral attributions ($r=.39$, $df=60$, $p<.001$). This is supportive of

the tendency of actors to attribute situationally (universal) rather than dispositionally (personal).

Notably, self-ratings of empathic involvement for all groups (n=127) were moderately correlated with dependent measures of mood (DACL - r=.40, df=125, $p<.01$; D-MAACL - r=.25, df=125, $p<.01$; A-MAACL - r=.34, df=125, $p<.01$; H-MAACL - r=.29, df=125, $p<.01$). These results suggest that actual rated participation as empathizing may be more salient to predictions than just examination of observer/empathy group assignment. This is an important consideration for future research. Much of the current empathy research, has not included a check on the manipulation of empathic involvement.

General Subjective/Objective Viewpoint

For empathizers, (n=62), subjective preference was significantly related to attributions of universal helplessness (r=.26, df=60, $p<.05$) although this accounted for only a small part of the variance.

Rated preference for general objective or subjective point of view was not significantly correlated with any other measures, suggesting that it was not a biasing factor.

Previous Experience with Obscene Calls

Seventy-two percent of the subjects reported having received obscene phone calls personally. Fifty percent reported having a close friend or relative who had received such calls (n=127). Previous personal experience was significantly, but not highly, negatively correlated

with post-measures of anxiety and depression (A-MAACL - r=-.15, df=125, $p<.05$; D-MAACL - r=-.22, df=125, $p<.01$) suggesting previous experience moderates to some extent mood effects in this setting. Previous personal experience was positively and significantly related to universal attributions (r=.20, df=125, $p<.05$) and strength of belief in future noncontingency (r=.17, df=125, p .05) although these correlations accounted for little of the variance.

Having close friends who had received obscene phone calls was positively correlated with general subjective bias for empathizers (r=.30, df=60, $p<.01$), but the relationship was not high. For observers this measure was positively related to expectation of physical harm (r=.21, df=63, $p<.05$ and credibility of the tape manipulation (r=.26, df=63, $p<.05$). Again, though, the relationships are not strong ones.

CHAPTER IV

Discussion

Over all conditions highly significant increases in anxious, hostile and depressed mood after exposure to the experimental situation were found, indicating that the interview with the victim had a marked impact. The experimental manipulation, then, appeared to be both credible and involving.

Expected differences between observers and empathizers (Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 1974; Brehm & Aderman, 1977) in the amount of mood change were not found. Amount of pre-posttest mood change did not differentiate observers from empathizers. Lack of clear observer/empathy differences in mood change does not appear to be due to inadequate involvement on the part of the empathizers, but more likely can be attributed to the remarkable involvement (affect change) exhibited by those subjects instructed to remain objective (observers), i.e. both groups demonstrated increases in affect after exposure to the tape. In addition, self-rated empathic involvement was more highly related to the amount of affect at post-test than empathy instructional set assignment.

Previously found observer/empathy differences in derogation, such that empathizers did not derogate the victim (Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 1974; Lerner & Matthew, 1967; Stokols & Schopler, 1973), were not replicated in the present study. A highly significant derogation effect was found over all

empathy and observer groups. Interestingly, a replication of this study (with minor modifications) was later run with male subjects (Sturm, Means, Fox & Retzlaff, Note 1) and also failed to find significant observer/empathy differences in derogation, although overall there was a significant trend for the victim to be rated more positively instead of being derogated. One explanation for the failure to find observer/empathy differences in derogation may be that, as previously noted, the observers reported mood changes similar to empathizers, suggesting that the realism and intensity of the manipulation may have obscured the expected observer/empathy effects.

The derogation effect well-documented in the just world literature (Lerner & Matthews, 1967; Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Simons & Piliavin, 1972; Sorrentino & Hardy, 1973) was found across all groups in the present study. Furthermore, for observers, derogation was significantly, although not strongly, related to the extent to which subjects believed the situation would continue in the future. As previously mentioned, data for a male population (Sturm, Means, Fox & Retzlaff, Note 1) was contradictory, finding a significant overall trend for increased positive ratings of the victim as compared to the average female college student. The predicted differences in derogation for levels of belief in a just world, that high just world subjects would derogate more severely than low just world individuals, was not supported in this research. While data for both

females and males (Sturm, Means, Fox & Retzlaff, Note 1) indicated that high just world persons rated the victim more harshly, this was not a significant finding.

Marked differences between males and females in the derogation response suggest that the sex variable should be examined to increase generalizability of just world effects beyond the experimental laboratory to social situations which may involve both males' and females' responses to innocent victims.

Lerner and Simmons (1966) justified the use of same-sex observers and victims because "females would be more likely than males to exhibit compassion - thus providing the clearest test of the hypotheses" (footnote, p. 205), and this has been followed by others in the just world paradigm (Apsler & Friedman, 1975; Cialdini, Kenrick & Hoerig, 1976; Schopler & Stokols, 1973). However, more "compassionate" reactions exhibited by males in the present paradigm would call into question whether conclusions based solely on same-sex designs are justified.

More recent empathy research (Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 1974; Brehm & Aderman, 1977) has also avoided the admittedly problematic interpretation of cross-sex empathy. However, results from the present research suggest that important effects may be overlooked if sex variables in observer/empathy evaluations are not examined. Thus, both just world research and empathy research have generally ignored

sex variables which may have importance. Future research should investigate empathy between sexes as well as for same-sex subjects. Furthermore, just world research should examine reactions to male victims as well as female victims.

Hypothesized differences for levels of belief in a just world on mood change measures failed to find support. No significant differences were found between high, medium and low just world groups for depression, anxiety or hostility mood change measures. An inspection of group means for female subjects, however, reveals a consistent order effect across mood measures, such that low just world subjects reported greater anxiety, hostility and depression on both pre and post mood measures than high just world subjects, or medium groups which fell in between. Data from a similar study with males (Sturm, Means, Fox & Retzlaff, Note 1) found significant main effects for levels of belief in a just world on depression and hostility measures, with low just world subjects exhibiting the greatest depression and hostility. With all of these results ordered in the same direction, one can say with some confidence that low just world individuals overall rated themselves as more emotional than highs.

Hypotheses regarding differential observer/empathy increases in depressed mood over levels of belief in a just world were not supported. It does not appear that high just world individuals are more likely than low just world individuals to become depressed when asked to empathize with

a victim who is perceived to have little control over the outcomes in a situation.

Although it was hypothesized that Belief in a Just World scores and Desire for Control scores would be highly related, the correlation was negative and nonsignificant. This suggests that the need to believe that one "gets what one deserves and deserves what one gets" is largely unrelated to the control motivation as measured by the Desire for Control scale.

All subjects exhibited an increase in depressed mood after exposure to a noncontingent situation (tape manipulation) as would be predicted from the learned helplessness model of depression (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978). However, support for the learned helplessness model was mixed. Subjects also showed increased anxious and hostile mood. All mood measures were highly correlated, suggesting that there was little differential mood reaction. Within empathy conditions, contrary to prediction, a high degree of depressed mood (DACL) at post-test was positively correlated with universal rather than personal attributions for helplessness.[1] D-MAACL scores indicated a similar trend. This evidence is admittedly weak, but it fails to support the proposed relationship between personal attributions for helplessness and depressed affect (Abramson, Seligman &

[1]Caution should be exercised in interpretation of attribution scale scores. The first analysis of the scale in the present research revealed five individual factors.

Teasdale, 1978). Furthermore, the hypothesized relationship between strength of belief in future noncontingency and depressed mood was not supported.

Beyond finding increases in depressed mood after exposure to an uncontrollable situation, these results are not clearly supportive of the theoretical model of depression as stated by Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale (1978). The learned helplessness reformulation theorized that a belief in future noncontingency and personal attributions for helplessness would lead to increased depression. These relationships were not found to be significant. However, these measures in the present study alone do not constitute a complete test of the new attributional model.

Data for the males (Sturm, Means, Fox & Retzlaff, Note 1) revealed a significant interaction for levels of belief in a just world and pre-post measures of hostility, such that low just world individuals exhibited greater increases in hostile mood than high just world individuals. For females, overall highly significant increases in hostility were found. Such increases in hostility may be related to Wortman and Brehm's (1975) reactance theory of depression which acknowledges that hostility may preceed the development of depression. In a similar vein, Lerner and Miller (1978) suggested that anger may be an initial stage of the derogation process. The interaction found between levels of belief in a just world and hostility suggests that further

investigation of the connection between anger and derogation is warranted. Further examination of the specific interaction between depression and hostility within the learned helplessness model is also necessary.

Two methodological notes should be mentioned. First of all, it is recommended that self-ratings of observer/empathy involvement should be included in empathy research as a check on the manipulation of instructional set. In the present study, self-ratings were more powerful correlates of mood change than observer/empathy group assignment. It may be that in future research, divisions of "observer" and "empathizer" according to self-ratings of involvement may give clearer results.

Secondly, although the present study used a manipulation high in "realism", no differences were found between high just world and low just world believers in the derogation effect. In fact, in a similar study conducted with male subjects (Sturm, Means, Fox & Retzlaff, Note 1) the victim tended to be rated more positively. This pattern of results is contradictory to findings in the just world literature reported by Lerner and Miller (1978). These findings suggest that generalizing conclusions from laboratory settings such as those of Lerner in which "victims" are shocked as part of a paired associate learning task, to real world situations of victimization is questionable. In addition, experimental findings which do not examine both sexes' reactions to a victim are limited. Clearly,

further research with more realistic examples of victimization is necessary.

Summary

The present study failed to find persons high in belief in a just world more susceptible to depressed mood when asked to empathize with a victim in an uncontrollable, or noncontingent, situation.

The expected observer/empathy differences in derogation, that observers would derogate more than empathizers, was not supported, although an overall derogation effect was found. There were no differences between high, medium and low just world individuals in derogation of the victim, failing to replicate previous research findings that high just world individuals derogated innocent victims more harshly than low just world individuals. Important male-female differences reported in the evaluation of the victim clearly revealed a difference such that males rated the victim more positively overall, while females in all conditions derogated the victim. Thus, sex differences should be an important consideration in just world and empathy research.

Highly significant increases in anxious, hostile and depressed mood were found for all conditions after exposure to a victim who receives a series of obscene phone calls that she has little control over. Yet, no differential

mood reactions were found between observers or empathizers or for different levels of belief in a just world in response to the example of victimization.

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APPENDIX A

Transcript of Tape Manipulation

Policeman: Okay, just step in here, please. Have a seat there I'll close the door. Now, the desk officer says you've been having some problems with a telephone caller, right?

Woman: That's correct.

Policeman: Speak up a little please.

Woman: I probably should have reported this earlier, I don't really what to say about it.

Policeman: Just tell me what's been going on.

Woman: Okay. I've been getting calls for over two weeks now. Like I say, I would have done something at first, but I didn't know it would be like this. I didn't know he would keep calling.

Policeman: Yeah, how did it start?

Woman: I just got a call one night . It was really late and when I answered it nobody was on the other end. I just thought it was a wrong number.

Policeman: Yeah, sometimes they start like that.

Woman: Well, a few nights later it happened again, that time I couldn't hear a voice but I could hear breathing on the other end. Not really heavy breathing like you hear in the movies, but I knew there was somebody on the other end. I said "Hello", they wouldn't answer me. I wasn't really frightened, I figured it was just kids so I hung up.

Policeman: These guys like to get a reaction from you, how soon did he call again?

Woman: He called back again that same night. I just let it ring, I figured it was these damn kids. But I was laying there and I got more and more angry so I decided to answer it and really tell them off. But.....well, when I answered it, well, the caller, he was whispering something. I couldn't understand what it was, but it frightened me. I couldn't say anything at all, I just didn't know what to do.

Policeman: Yeah, sometimes they just pick some girl's number out of a phone book, and sometimes they just dial at random till they get somebody. But the thing that

really frightens a woman is when he knows their name.

Woman: Yeah, that is real scary, he does know my name. I don't know if he knows me but he uses my name a lot. After that scary call I left my phone off the hook for a few nights. So he called me during the day. He was really mad, he told me not to do it again, and kind of threatened me.....

Policeman: Is there anybody you know, somebody you're acquainted with maybe that might do something like this. Uh, like, oh, an old boyfriend, someone you met recently, someone you do business with?

Woman: He doesn't sound familiar, I don't think I know him. I do work part time as a waitress, I see a lot of people there, I don't know, it could be someone there, I don't know.

Policeman: Has the man said anything else to you?

Woman: Of course, a lot of sex stuff, pretty crude stuff, and he talks about me and him together, and he mixes it in with all of this angry stuff, warns me not to tell anybody about it, not to report it. I just don't know what to do-- he knows when I leave the house, he knows when I come back, he says he knows where I go. The other night I came home, and it was really late. I walked in the door and the phone was ringing. Of course it was him, he started asking me all these questions, "Did I have a good time", "What did I do" "What did I like to do for entertainment". I wanted to hang up but I was really frightened. I had been out with a man that night. The caller started....he doesn't want me out with anyone else....like he's jealous or something.

Policeman: This guy sounds kind of like the same pattern that happened a few months ago in that same area. But we didn't locate that guy because it depends alot on where he's calling from and how consistent his calls are. Now, you can help us if you can describe his voice, what did he sound like, was it muffled, or have an accent, or any background noise you could recognize, a bar, or maybe it was a phone booth on a street where you could hear cars.... or something...

Woman: Just muffled. Like he's trying to disguise his voice. He talks really slowly and uses a real low voice. This is getting really hard for me to handle, yesterday he called again, my girlfriend was over and she answered the phone, so he started telling her all about it. He knows when I go, when I come home, he started giving her messages to tell me that I should be staying good for him. I don't know what this guy wants...

APPENDIX B

Experimental Packet Cover Sheet

The following psychological experiment involves listenint to taped interview material. You will be asked to complete questions relevant to this material. All responses will be held confidential.

The benefits of this research will be discussed in a debriefing session after the experiment at which time any questions you may have will be answered fully.

I consent to participate in the following experiment with the understanding that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue at any time.

_____
Signature

Please complete the following information:

Age_____

Sex M F

Year in college Fr So J Sr Grad
Other_____

Academic major_____

Please complete the following pages of rating materials until you reach STOP. The experimenter will give you further instructions.

Read carefully and answer all items fully.

Thank you.

APPENDIX C

Belief in a Just World Scale

Please indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement with all of the following items by circling the appropriate number.

	Disagree					Agree
1. I've found that a person rarely deserves the reputation he has.	1	2	3	4	5	6
2. Basically, the world is a just place.	1	2	3	4	5	6
3. People who get "lucky breaks" have usually earned their good fortune.	1	2	3	4	5	6
4. Careful drivers are just as likely to get hurt in traffic accidents as careless ones.	1	2	3	4	5	6
5. It is a common occurrence for a guilty person to get off free in American courts.	1	2	3	4	5	6
6. Students almost always deserve the grades they receive in school.	1	2	3	4	5	6
7. Men who keep in shape have little chance of suffering a heart attack.	1	2	3	4	5	6
8. The political candidate who sticks up for his principles rarely gets elected.	1	2	3	4	5	6
9. It is rare for an innocent man to be wrongly sent to jail.	1	2	3	4	5	6
10. In professional sports, many fouls and infractions never get called by the referee.	1	2	3	4	5	6
11. By and large, people deserve what they get.	1	2	3	4	5	6
12. When parents punish their children, it is almost always for good reasons.	1	2	3	4	5	6

APPENDIX C continued

	Disagree					Agree
13. Good deeds often go unnoticed and unrewarded.	1	2	3	4	5	6
14. Although evil men may hold political power for a while, in the general course of history good wins out.	1	2	3	4	5	6
15. In almost any business or professions, people who do their job well rise to the top.	1	2	3	4	5	6
16. American parents tend to overlook the things to be most admired in their children.	1	2	3	4	5	6
17. It is often impossible for a person to receive a fail trial in the USA.	1	2	3	4	5	6
18. People who meet with misfortune have often brought it on themselves.	1	2	3	4	5	6
19. Crime doesn't pay.	1	2	3	4	5	6
20. Many people suffer through absolutely no fault of their own.	1	2	3	4	5	6

APPENDIX D

Desire for Control

Below you will find a series of statements. Please read each statement carefully and respond to it by expressing the extent to which you believe the statement applies to you. For all items a response from 1 to 7 is required. Use the number that best reflects your belief when the scale is defined as follows:

1- The statement doesn't apply to me at all.
2- The statement usually doesn't apply to me.
3- Most often, the statement does not apply.
4- I am unsure about whether or not the statement applies to me, or it applies to me about half the time.
5- The statement applies more often than not.
6- The statement usually applies to me.
7- The statement always applies to me.

It is important that you respond to all items.

____1. I prefer a job where i have a lot of control over what I do and when I do it.

____2. I enjoy political participation because I want to have as much of a say in running a government as possible.

____3. I try to aboid situations where someone else tells me what to do.

____4. I would prefer to be a leader rather than a follower.

____5. I enjoy being able to influence the actions of others.

____6. I am careful to check everything on an automobile before I leave for a long trip.

____7. Others usually know what is best for me.

____8. I enjoy making my own decisions.

____9. I enjoy having control over my own destiny.

____10. I would rather someone else took over the leadership role when I'm involved in a group project.

____11. I consider myself to be generally more capable of handling situations than others are.

APPENDIX D continued

____12. I'd rather run my own business and make my own mistakes than listen to someone else's orders.

____13. I like to get a good idea of what a job is all about before I begin.

____14. When I see a problem I prefer to do something about it rather than sit by and let it continue.

____15. When it comes to orders, I would rather give them than receive them.

____16. I wish I could push many of life's daily decisions off on someone else.

____17. When driving, I try to avoid putting myself in a situation where I could be hurt by someone else's mistake.

____18. I prefer to avoid situations where someone else has to tell me what it is I should be doing.

____19. There are many situations in which I would prefer only one choice rather than having to make a decision.

____20. I like to wait and see if someone else is going to solve a problem so that I don't have to be bothered by it.

APPENDIX E

Bipolar Adjective Rating - Pretest

Please describe the average female college student along the following adjectives. Circle a number for each pair.

1. intelligent ..... unintelligent
   1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

2. likable ..... unlikable
   1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

3. uncooperative ..... cooperative
   1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

4. bossy ..... easy going
   1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

5. immature ..... mature
   1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

6. imaginative ..... unimaginative
   1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

7. irresponsible ..... responsible
   1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

8. nervous ..... calm
   1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

9. patient ..... impatient
   1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

10. reasonable ..... unreasonable
    1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

11. rigid ..... flexible
    1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

12. courteous ..... rude
    1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

13. selfish ..... unselfish
    1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

14. warm ..... cold
    1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

15. sincere ..... insincere
    1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

APPENDIX E continued

Bipolar Adjective Rating - Posttest

Please describe the <u>woman in the audiotape</u> along the following adjectives. Circle a number for each pair.

1. intelligent ..... unintelligent
   1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

2. likable ..... unlikable
   1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

3. uncooperative ..... cooperative
   1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

4. bossy ..... easy going
   1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

5. immature ..... mature
   1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

6. imaginative ..... unimaginative
   1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

7. irresponsible ..... responsible
   1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

8. nervous ..... calm
   1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

9. patient ..... impatient
   1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

10. reasonable ..... unreasonable
    1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

11. rigid ..... flexible
    1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

12. courteous ..... rude
    1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

13. selfish ..... unselfish
    1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

14. warm ..... cold
    1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

15. sincere ..... insincere
    1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9

APPENDIX F

Depression Adjective Check List - Form C

DIRECTIONS: Below you will find words which describe different kinds of moods and feelings. Check the words which describe How You Feel Now. Some of the words may sound alike, but we want you to check all the words that describe your feelings. Work rapidly and check all of the words which describe how you feel now at this time.

1. ____ Cheerless
2. ____ Animated
3. ____ Blue
4. ____ Lost
5. ____ Dejected
6. ____ Healthy
7. ____ Discouraged
8. ____ Bad
9. ____ Despondent
10. ____ Free
11. ____ Despairing
12. ____ Uneasy
13. ____ Peaceful
14. ____ Grim
15. ____ Distressed
16. ____ Whole
17. ____ Buoyant
18. ____ Tormented
19. ____ Weak
20. ____ Optimistic
21. ____ Low
22. ____ Deserted
23. ____ Burdened
24. ____ Wonderful
25. ____ Crushed
26. ____ Somber
27. ____ Interested
28. ____ Joyless
29. ____ Crestfallen
30. ____ Lucky
31. ____ Chained
32. ____ Pessimistic

Depression Adjective Check List - Form D

DIRECTIONS: Below you will find words which describe different kinds of moods and feelings. Check the words which describe How You Feel Now - After Listening to the Audiotape. Some of the words may sound alike, but we want you to check all the words that describe your feelings. Work rapidly and check all of the words which describe how you feel now after listening to the audiotape.

1. ____ Depressed
2. ____ Elated
3. ____ Awful
4. ____ Lifeless
5. ____ Griefstricken
6. ____ Inspired
7. ____ Woeful
8. ____ Lonely
9. ____ Suffering
10. ____ Mellow
11. ____ Drooping
12. ____ Rejected
13. ____ Fortunate
14. ____ Dreary
15. ____ Lousy
16. ____ Good
17. ____ Fit
18. ____ Lonesome
19. ____ Unloved
20. ____ Glad
21. ____ Grave
22. ____ Sunk
23. ____ Shot
24. ____ Merry
25. ____ Wasted
26. ____ Washed Out
27. ____ Clear
28. ____ Gruesome
29. ____ Tired
30. ____ High
31. ____ Worse
32. ____ Drained

APPENDIX G

MAACL Instructions

Pretest

On the following sheet you will find words which describe different kinds of moods and feelings. Mark an X in the boxes beside the words which describe how you feel now. Some of the words may sound alike, but we want you to check all the words that describe your feelings. Work rapidly.

Posttest

On the following sheet you will find words which describe different kinds of moods and feelings. Mark an X in the boxes beside the words which describe how you feel now - after listening to the audiotape. Some of the words may sound alike, but we want you to check all the words that describe your feelings. Work rapidly.

APPENDIX H

Multiple Affect Adjective Check List

1 ☐ active
2 ☐ adventurous
3 ☐ affectionate
4 ☐ afraid
5 ☐ agitated
6 ☐ agreeable
7 ☐ aggressive
8 ☐ alive
9 ☐ alone
10 ☐ amiable
11 ☐ amused
12 ☐ angry
13 ☐ annoyed
14 ☐ awful
15 ☐ bashful
16 ☐ bitter
17 ☐ blue
18 ☐ bored
19 ☐ calm
20 ☐ cautious
21 ☐ cheerful
22 ☐ clean
23 ☐ complaining
24 ☐ contented
25 ☐ contrary
26 ☐ cool
27 ☐ cooperative
28 ☐ critical
29 ☐ cross
30 ☐ cruel
31 ☐ daring
32 ☐ desperate
33 ☐ destroyed
34 ☐ devoted
35 ☐ disagreeable
36 ☐ discontented
37 ☐ discouraged
38 ☐ disgusted
39 ☐ displeased
40 ☐ energetic
41 ☐ enraged
42 ☐ enthusiastic
43 ☐ fearful
44 ☐ fine
45 ☐ fit
46 ☐ forlorn
47 ☐ frank
48 ☐ free
49 ☐ friendly
50 ☐ frightened
51 ☐ furious
52 ☐ gay
53 ☐ gentle
54 ☐ glad
55 ☐ gloomy
56 ☐ good
57 ☐ good-natured
58 ☐ grim
59 ☐ happy
60 ☐ healthy
61 ☐ hopeless
62 ☐ hostile
63 ☐ impatient
64 ☐ incensed
65 ☐ indignant
66 ☐ inspired
67 ☐ interested
68 ☐ irritated
69 ☐ jealous
70 ☐ joyful
71 ☐ kindly
72 ☐ lonely
73 ☐ lost
74 ☐ loving
75 ☐ low
76 ☐ lucky
77 ☐ mad
78 ☐ mean
79 ☐ meek
80 ☐ merry
81 ☐ mild
82 ☐ miserable
83 ☐ nervous
84 ☐ obliging
85 ☐ offended
86 ☐ outraged
87 ☐ panicky
88 ☐ patient
89 ☐ peaceful
90 ☐ pleased
91 ☐ pleasant
92 ☐ polite
93 ☐ powerful
94 ☐ quiet
95 ☐ reckless
96 ☐ rejected
97 ☐ rough
98 ☐ sad
99 ☐ safe
100 ☐ satisfied
101 ☐ secure
102 ☐ shaky
103 ☐ shy
104 ☐ soothed
105 ☐ steady
106 ☐ stubborn
107 ☐ stormy
108 ☐ strong
109 ☐ suffering
110 ☐ sullen
111 ☐ sunk
112 ☐ sympathetic
113 ☐ tame
114 ☐ tender
115 ☐ tense
116 ☐ terrible
117 ☐ terrified
118 ☐ thoughtful
119 ☐ timid
120 ☐ tormented
121 ☐ understanding
122 ☐ unhappy
123 ☐ unsociable
124 ☐ upset
125 ☐ vexed
126 ☐ warm
127 ☐ whole
128 ☐ wild
129 ☐ willful
130 ☐ wilted
131 ☐ worrying
132 ☐ young

APPENDIX I

Cover Story

The following experiment deals with social observation and impression formation. Basically, people are likely to be viewed differently by different persons. These impressions may be important in interview situations such as job interviews, business meetings or in everyday interpersonal contact.

Psychological research has shown that people often form impressions of others based on subtle emotional cues. In a few minutes you will be listening to an actual example of an interview with a woman. You will be asked to pay close attention to the emotional cues of the woman in this situation.

STOP

GO NO FURTHER UNTIL INSTRUCTED BY THE EXPERIMENTER

APPENDIX J

Observer Instructions

The audiotape you will be listening to is a portion of an actual interview that took place recently in Missoula. As you listen, please attend carefully to everything the woman is saying. In particular, take note of her emotional state and her reactions in this situation. Be alert to any changes in her speech, tone of voice, or her general style of expression.

While you are listening, do <u>not</u> try to imagine how you would feel in her place or how she may be feeling inside. Just monitor accurately what is happening.

APPENDIX K

Empathy Instructions

The audiotape you will be listening to is a portion of an actual interview that took place recently in Missoula. As you listen, please imagine how you would feel if you were in the same situation as this woman. Your job will be to co-feel or empathize with her feelings and reactions. Try to imagine how it would feel to be in this person's shoes and how you would respond.

Do not try to sympathize or feel sorry for the woman. Just listen and keep clearly in mind that you are to let yourself react as if you were having the experience.

Universal/Personal Attribution for Helplessness Scale

Please respond to the following items as they relate to the situation you have just heard. Indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement with each of the items by circling the appropriate number.

	Disagree						Agree
1. Women who receive such phone calls are usually chosen randomly from the phone book.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Given the circumstances presented, most people would have been able to handle receiving these kind of phone calls in a better way than this woman did.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. In this type of situation, it seems as if the threatening caller has most of the control.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. I would have had just as difficult a time handling such a caller as the person on the audiotape had.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. I think this woman received more harassing phone calls than other women to whom this has happened in the past.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. Something about this person may have had to do with why she was receiving threatening phone calls.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Women who receive these kinds of bothersome phone calls can't really do much about them.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. This woman reacted more emotionally to the situation than most people would have.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. Everyone receives an obscene phone call sooner or later.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. I feel that this woman could have tried harder to avoid receiving more calls.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

APPENDIX M

Strength of expectation of future noncontingency

1. How many more harassing phone calls do you thing this woman will continue to receive after having reported her problem? Circle the appropriate number.

none ---- 1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 or more

Likelihood of harm

2. How likely do you think it is that the caller will do physical harm to the woman?

not likely likely
1 --- 2 --- 3 --- 4 --- 5 --- 6 --- 7

Observer/empathy involvement

3. Please rate your participation on the following item:

I listened to how this woman reacted in this situation during the audiotape. — I put myself in this woman's place during the audiotape.

1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6 -- 7 -- 8 -- 9

General objective/subjective bias

4. If I were to read an article in the newspaper about someone in a similar situation as this woman I would generally: (check only one)

_____be more concerned with the facts

or

_____consider the woman's point of view

Credibility

5. I feel this was a believable example of women who receive a series of threatening phone calls.

No Yes
1 ---- 2 ---- 3 ---- 4 ---- 5 ---- 6 ---- 7 ---- 8 ---- 9

APPENDIX N

Previous Exposure to Obscene Phone Calls

Have you ever received any obscene phone calls? Yes No

If so, did they continue over a period of time?

How long did they continue, and how many phone calls were there?

Have you had any close relatives or friends who have received a series of such phone calls? Yes No

If so, how long did they persist?