Integration of impression management and socially desirable responding: Variables that determine who we say we are

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THE INTEGRATION OF IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT
AND SOCIALLY DESIRABLE RESPONDING:
VARIABLES THAT DETERMINE WHO WE SAY WE ARE

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The Integration of Impression Management and Socially Desirable Responding: Variables that Determine Who We Say We Are (105 pp.)

Three variables hypothesized by Schlenker (1980) to mediate the use of impression management (social value of the image, probability of a successful claim, and negative sanctions for an unsuccessful claim) were investigated in a 3 X 2 X 2 factorial design. The measures of inaccurate self-report developed by Paulhus (1990; Self-deception and Impression Management Scales) were the dependent variables in the study. The three independent variables were operationalized by varying the instructions for the experiment which were delivered individually to the subjects. Subjects were pre-screened and classified with respect to self-monitoring (high/low) prior to treatment group assignment. Results suggest that increasing the social value of a moral image significantly increases impression management scores as compared to increasing the social value of an honest or unspecified image. High self-monitors exhibited more variation in impression management scores than did low self-monitors suggesting that the high self-monitors were more sophisticated in their use of impression management tactics. The measurement and operationalization of impression management variables are discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

A common link among all psychologists is the need to obtain accurate information from the individuals with whom they work. For instance, during therapy clinical or counseling psychologists attempt to develop trust and thereby create a "safe" environment for their clients. It is hoped that by creating such an environment, their clients will be willing to expose themselves as they actually perceive themselves.

Clinical psychologists conducting assessment usually recognize the need to establish rapport with the individual being tested. Additionally, they assure their clients of the confidentiality of their test results (Graham, 1987). Again, the psychologists hope that the individual will feel "safe" enough to respond to the tests accurately.

Finally, test constructors are generally concerned with the accuracy of information gathered from the tests they have constructed. Concerns with response bias, dissimulation, and social desirability have plagued test constructors for decades. Of these three sources of error, dissimulation and socially desirability have received the most attention (Furnham, 1986).

Frankel-Brunswick (1939) was one of the first to imply
that inaccurate self-reports can be attributed either to responses an individual truly believes about himself or to the willful dissimulation by an individual. Research into this distinction remains popular even into the present (Millham & Kellogg, 1980; Paulhus, 1984). In a recent article by Paulhus (1984) this distinction was made using the concepts of self-deception and impression management. He argues that these two phenomena make up the socially desirable response.

Self-presentation is the label given a set of theories in social psychology that addresses the way individuals disclose themselves to others (Goffman, 1959). Baumeister (1982) dissects such theories into two components: self-constructive self-presentation and audience-pleasing self-presentation. Baumeister uses the first category to describe the self-presentation tactics individuals might use to develop and maintain their sense of self. By using self-presentation tactics, individuals may elicit reactions from others to an ideal identity they wish to maintain. In doing so they can more readily attribute that identity to themselves. Baumeister uses the second category to describe the self-presentation tactics individuals might use to gain rewards from or influence the audience around them. He distinguishes these two processes by suggesting that people use self-constructive self-presentation when audience demands are minimal. When audience demands are present,
they may signal a change in the individual's self-presentation. He or she may attempt to ascertain the audience's expectation of him or herself and present him or herself accordingly. This second category has been labeled impression management. One difference between this formulation of impression management and the formulation by researchers in social desirability research is the attention paid to audience characteristics. Baumeister (1982) writes:

"The defining characteristics of audience-pleasing self-presentation are that it is an attempt to present oneself 'favorable' according to the audience's values, it is specific to a particular audience, and it is motivated by some desire for rewards that the audience controls or dispenses" (p. 3).

Schlenker (1980) defines impression management as "the conscious or unconscious attempt to control images that are projected in real or imagined social interactions" (p. 6). Describing the function such behavior serves he writes:

"Through public descriptions of the traits they possess, the things they are accountable for, and the ways they view the world, people can secure identities that maximize the public esteem in which they are held and the outcomes they receive" (p. 91).

Recently, impression management theory has made a large impact on social psychological research. Baumeister (1982) has suggested that experimental subjects' desire to present themselves favorably may provide alternative hypotheses for several social psychological phenomena. In his article he discusses the influence of impression management concerns in
areas such as the study of altruistic behavior, attitude expression and change, attribution, and interpersonal attraction. Support for many of Baumeister's assertions can be found in the current body of research exploring alternative hypotheses derived from impression management theory in many of the traditional areas of social psychology. However, impression management theory is only now beginning to be used to explain phenomena in other areas of psychology such as response bias and self-presentation of clients in psychotherapy (Paulhus, 1984; Friedlander & Schwartz, 1985).

One aspect of impression management theory important to the present study is the concept of identity-threatening predicaments. These situations occur when the image an individual wishes to claim for himself becomes threatened (Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981). Under such conditions the individual may try to avoid blame or disapproval (Friedlander & Schwartz, 1985). The significance of this concept to the present study is the identity-threatening aspect of accurate self-report (Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981). That is, accurate self-report is bound to include information that is unflattering to the individual and perhaps even catastrophic to the desired public image the individual wishes to create.

In the interest of obtaining accurate self-reports clinical psychologists conducting psychotherapy or
assessment attempt to create a safe environment. Test constructors attempt to minimize and/or measure inaccurate self-report in the tests they construct. The aim of the present study is to use the measures of inaccurate self-reporting developed by Paulhus (1990) to investigate the environmental cues suggested by impression management theory that may influence self-report. By this approach a few of the variables believed to mediate the use of impression management in the interpersonal context will be investigated in the context of self-report.

This line of research is consistent with one of the suggestions for future research recommended by Furnham (1986). He specifically suggests research that investigates "under what circumstances socially desirable responses are more or less likely to occur" (p. 398). Additionally, Friedlander and Schwartz (1985) identify three areas in impression management research that need to be addressed. They write:

"The major questions posed by self-presentational theorists concern (a) why and under what conditions people adopt impression management tactics, (b) to what extent these social tactics are intentional and in awareness, and (c) what kinds of identities people project."

Lastly, in a recent literature review of impression management theory, Leary and Kowalski (1990) call for research in areas directly related to the present study. They write:

"The processes involved in self-presentational
dissimulation have not been adequately investigated, and many questions call for future research attention. For example, what conditions provoke people to act against their values regarding deceit and to construct public images that are inconsistent with their self-concepts."

The present study is an initial step toward addressing each of these areas in need of research.

Finally, since Paulhus' (1984) recognizes both conscious and unconscious components of inaccurate self-report, both of the constructs he uses (self-deception and impression management) will be considered in this investigation. That is, by using both of the Paulhus scales it is possible to investigate the effects of the experimental manipulations on both subject's conscious and unconscious responses as defined by Paulhus. However, before developing specific hypotheses, the social desirability and impression management concepts relevant to this study will be described in detail.
CHAPTER TWO

Theoretical Background: Review of Social Desirability and Impression Management Theories

Social Desirability. The socially desirable response is a phenomenon that researchers have interpreted in many different ways. However, the formulations by Edwards (1957) and Crowne and Marlowe (1960) have received the most attention.

Edwards constructed a scale of 39 MMPI items (The Edwards Social Desirability Scale (SD)) that were judged to indicate socially desirable responding if answered in the keyed direction. This scale generates very similar results to scales with different content as long as the items are keyed true or false based on a method similar to Edwards' (in other words, judges' ratings of items' social desirability). Edwards himself said very little about the nature of the underlying construct of the SD scale. However, other researchers posit that individuals learn to describe themselves in socially desirable terms at an early age (Walsh, Tomlinson-Keasey, & Klieger, 1974). Their interpretation of these results suggests that the socially desirable response may be a component of the language acquisition process. As such, the socially desirable response is out of the individual's awareness and is thereby
distinguished from dissimulation. Such an interpretation is consistent with Edwards' writing about the difference between impression management and the socially desirable response (Edwards, 1970). He distinguishes impression management from self-deception by formulating the former as conscious dissimulation. For the purposes of this present study it should be noted that Edwards' use of the term "impression management" is consistent with its use in the social desirability literature, but not with its use in the social psychology literature.

Since Edwards' scale was composed of MMPI items dealing largely with psychological distress, Crowne and Marlowe (1960) argued that the scale was confounded with psychopathology. In response to this criticism, they developed a social desirability scale that was intended as an improved measure of socially desirable responding in self-reports (the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale). This scale used non-pathological items whose content was judged to be either socially desirable but infrequent or socially undesirable but common. An individual scoring highly on this measure of social desirability has to both attribute positive but unlikely characteristics and deny negative but likely characteristics about himself. Following additional research, Crowne and Marlowe (1964) later began interpreting the results of their scale as a "need for social approval." This interpretation of socially
desirable responding implied that an individual's response set on a paper and pencil test was an expression of a more stable personality construct. More specifically, Crowne and Marlowe proposed two processes that operate within the individual to create the socially desirable response. They suggested an individual with a high need for approval needed to gain approval, an approach motive, and needed to avoid disapproval, an avoidance motive. However, this formulation was attacked on the grounds that it makes little sense to interpret an individual's behavior as simultaneously approach- and avoidance- motivated (Jacobson & Ford, 1966). In the most recent formulation of this concept Crowne (1979) interprets the scale as a need to avoid disapproval.

Recently, Paulhus (1984) presented results that he argued clarify the nature of the socially desirable response. He notes that factor analytic studies of social desirability scales tend to support a two factor model. Researchers who endorse the Marlowe-Crowne formulation suggest that these factors are related to the attribution and denial components of the socially desirable response (Millham & Jacobson 1978). That is, one factor reflects the subject's tendency to attribute positive characteristics to himself and the other factor reflects tendencies to deny negative characteristics about himself. Paulhus, on the other hand, argues that these factors are best interpreted as
self-deception and impression management. He defines self-deception as those responses that are probably untrue of the individual, yet which the individual honestly believes are accurate. He notes that the Edwards scale is a marker of the self-deception factor. For the impression management factor, Paulhus argues the responses are untrue of the individual and the person knows they are untrue but willfully dissimulates. He proposes that the Crowne-Marlowe scale confounds the two factors, measuring both self-deception and impression management. Paulhus' (1984) use of the term impression management is not original, but rather is the formulation of impression management in much of the social desirability literature (Frankel-Brunswick, 1939; Edwards, 1957, 1970; Millham & Kellogg, 1980). However, similar to Edwards' formulation of impression management, Paulhus conceptualizes impression management as willful dissimulation. It is important to note, however, that the formulation of impression management in the social psychological literature is more complicated, as will be seen later.

In a series of studies, Paulhus (1984) cites factor analytic and empirical results to support the self-deception/impression management distinction. First, he administered the Self-deception and Other-deception questionnaires (Sackheim & Gur, 1978), the Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), the
Edwards Social Desirability Scale (Edwards, 1957), the Wiggins Social Desirability Scale (Wiggins, 1959), and the MMPI Lie Scale (Meehl & Hathaway, 1946) to 425 subjects. Using exploratory factor analytic methods he found that the Self-Deception Questionnaire and Edward's Social Desirability Scale loaded on one factor while the Other-Deception Questionnaire, the Crowne-Marlowe Scale, the Wiggins Social Desirability Scale and the MMPI Lie Scale loaded on another. For the first factor he noted that 5 of the highest loading 10 items are from the Self-deception Questionnaire and the other 5 are from Edward's Social Desirability Scale. Interpreting this factor, he notes that it is characterized by items referring to "sexual and parental conflicts and other deep personal concerns. These kinds of conflicts play a primary role in the psychoanalytic conceptions underlying Sackheim and Gur's view of self-deception (p. 601)." In other words, the items reflected content often associated with unconscious conflict.

For the second factor he reports that the highest loading 10 items are from the Other-Deception Questionnaire and "generally involve socially desirable but relatively infrequent behaviors (p. 601)" Furthermore, he suggests that these items involve matters for which the truth or falsity of the item as it applies to the respondent must be known by them. Thus, to endorse these items is to willfully
alter the accuracy of the self-report.

In further support of the self-deception/impression management distinction, Paulhus (1984) also reports confirmatory factor analytic results. In these analyses he tested 3 different models to determine which model provided the best fit for his data. The models he tested included a unidimensional model, the attribution/denial model and the self-deception/impression management model.

To facilitate testing these different models he revised the Self-Deception Questionnaire and Other-Deception Questionnaire to balance the keying in each of the scales. Sackheim & Gur’s version of the scales used negative keying for the Self-Deception Questionnaire and positive keying for the Other-Deception Questionnaire. Thus, high self-deception scores could be interpreted as denial and high other-deception scores could be interpreted as attribution. Paulhus balanced the keying so that both scales included attribution and denial of the items in each scale. He termed these revised scales the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR).

To test the three different models he divided the items of the BIDR into 4 separate subscales: self-deception attribution, self-deception denial, other deception attribution, other deception denial. He then combined these subscales across alternate dimensions (attribution/denial and self-deception/impression management) with the Crowne-
Marlowe and Edwards scale to produce the different models. Utilizing a chi-square difference test he found that the self-deception/impression management model provided a significantly better fit for his data than either the attribution/denial or unidimensional models.

Finally, Paulhus (1984) utilized an experimental design to examine the self-deception/impression management model. He randomly assigned subjects to either an anonymous or public exposure condition and administered the same battery of social desirability scales. He hypothesized that the scales that loaded on the impression management factor would show a marked increase in the public exposure condition while the self-deception scales would remain constant between the two conditions. He reasoned that subjects whose responses could be identified with them would be more prone to engage in impression management. However, since the subjects theoretically believed their responses to the self-deception questions, the public exposure condition would have no effect on these scales. His results supported his hypothesis with a significant interaction between treatment group and impression management, but not between treatment group and self-deception.

**Impression Management.** Social psychological impression management theory is rooted in pragmatic philosophy (Schlenker, 1980). A pragmatic approach to psychology interprets individuals' behavior by the function the
behavior serves for them. Thus, the identity individuals develop is interpreted as that identity which best serves them in a particular setting. Consequently, they may establish slightly different identities for varying situations. For example, an individual may view himself as aggressive and independent at home, but establish a passive and subservient image while working with his boss (Schlenker, 1980). As individuals mature, their responses in familiar situations become habitual. It would hardly be functional for them to calculate their actions each time they re-entered a similar situation. Thus, in many familiar situations these "ingrained responses are automatically triggered off by the appropriate cues in the situation" (Schlenker, 1980 p. 13).

This approach to impression management is based on the supposition that such behavior is functional. Theorists in impression management suggest that impression management is functional in at least two ways (Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981; Baumeister, 1982). First, they suggest impression management functions in the process of self-definition. If individuals are consistently successful at claiming some image, they will soon begin to incorporate that image into their own identity. Second, they suggest that most of the rewards individuals receive for their behavior or identity are controlled by audiences. The present study is aimed at the audience-pleasing function of
impression management.

Audiences may control tangible rewards such as money or non-tangible rewards such as power and acceptance. These rewards may be "immediate and pre-planned" (Jones & Pittman, 1980) or more generally the achievement of "power resources" for use in later interactions (Tedeschi, Schlenker & Bonoma, 1971). According to the above discussion, impression management is more likely to occur in situations where individuals are dependent on others for rewards. In these situations they may alter their behavior to present themselves in a way that they perceive the audience will view favorably.

In situations where individuals desire to have a particular image associated with them, predicaments often arise. Predicaments occur when the image an individual has claimed or wishes to claim becomes threatened (Schlenker, 1980). For instance, employees may want their boss to view them as efficient and competent. However, inevitably they will make mistakes that will jeopardize this image. The events or behaviors that will create a predicament are related to the impression the individual desires to make. The specificity of this impression is related to the information the individual has about the audience. In situations where very little is known about the characteristics of the audience, socially approved images may be the "safest" bet for the individual.
Another aspect of impression management that presents a dilemma is aptly described by Jones and Pittman (1980). They write:

"These dilemmas are often cast in moral terms as the individual assesses the relative virtues of integrity, consistency, and authenticity on the one hand, as against the virtues of adaptive effectiveness and personal security gained through power augmentation on the other" (p. 233).

However, Jones and Wortman (1973) argue that this dilemma is minimized by adaptive social responding that becomes automatic when the individual is presented with well-established cues.

The severity of a predicament is governed by two variables. First, the undesirability of the event and second, the actor's apparent responsibility for the event. For employees, a minor mistake does not constitute a great threat to a competent image since it is generally accepted that no one is perfect. However, a severe mistake that threatens the existence of the company for which they work may destroy a competent image. In this latter circumstance, the employee may attempt to minimize his or her personal responsibility for the mistake (Schlenker, 1980).

Tedeschi and Reiss (1981) propose a framework that identifies types of social situations associated with specific differential strategies of impression management. They describe some situations as identity threatening, which may elicit facework (denying or minimizing one's
responsibility for an action), or justification (admitting one's responsibility but denying that the consequences are negative or inappropriate). They describe other situations as identity enhancing. In these situations the actor is motivated to create a favorable impression by utilizing entitlements (increasing personal responsibility for meritorious events). Friedlander & Schwartz (1985) argue that the clinical interview can be both identity threatening and enhancing, thereby motivating an individual to utilize impression management strategies.

To this point the theoretical background and related issues associated with impression management have been described. Attention is now turned to how an individual arrives at claiming one image over another. Schlenker (1980) suggests very specific criteria that operate in this process. First, he suggests that different images have different values for the individual. He describes the process by which these values are assessed as "accounting procedures." These procedures can be described mathematically based on an expectancy-value formulation. To determine the value of an image he proposes two variables that are multiplied and summed to arrive at the expected value of an image. The first variable is "the strength of the person's belief that certain consequences (benefits and liabilities) will be associated with the image" (p. 96). The second variable is "the person's evaluation of each of
these consequences" (p. 96). The formula for the expected value of an image is then expressed as: 

\[ I = \Sigma (b_i \times e_i) \]

where \( I \) is the expected value of the image, \( b \) is the individual's beliefs about the consequences of claiming the image, and \( e \) is the individual's evaluation of these consequences.

Similarly, Schlenker (1980) suggests that the expected value of claiming an image can also be computed. The formula for the expected value of claiming an image is:

\[ IC = p(I) + (1-p)S \]

where \( IC \) is the expected value for claiming the image, \( p \) is the probability that the individual can successfully claim the image, \( I \) is the expected value of the image, and \( S \) is the expected value of negative sanctions associated with an unsuccessful claim. \( S \) can be expressed as:

\[ S = \Sigma (p_{s_i})(e_{s_i}) \]

where \( p_{s_i} \) is the probability that a particular sanction will occur and \( e_{s_i} \) is the value of the sanction.

These criteria for determining the likelihood that an individual will engage in impression management suggest that the audience can alter the impression an actor will claim. That is, the audience can change the expected value of some image, the criteria necessary for claiming that image, and the negative sanctions for unsuccessfully claiming the image. By changing these conditions, the audience may exert considerable influence over the behavior of the actor. A review of Paulhus' (1984) theoretical framework for the
Impression Management Scale in terms of Schlenker's (1980) accounting procedures will help to clarify this point.

The concepts of impression management described above suggest alternative interpretations of Paulhus' (1984) results regarding 1) the meaning of high scores on the scale he uses to measure impression management, and 2) change in impression management scores in his public exposure condition. Each of these will be examined in turn.

Impression management theory holds that the impression an individual wishes to create is audience dependent. That is, the image individuals project may vary depending on the their perception of what the audience will view as favorable (Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981; Baumeister, 1982). Paulhus (1984) assumes that impression management is an individual's attempt to create a favorable impression, but he never specifies the nature of this impression. Appendix A contains the 20 items that Paulhus asserts measure impression management. The face validity of these items may indicate that the favorable impression Paulhus is measuring is one of moral integrity. For instance, the first item of his scale reads "I sometimes tell lies if I have to," and the sixth item is "I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught." In many situations and for many individuals the impression they may wish to have attributed to them might be one of moral integrity. However, there are many other impressions that an individual may wish to create,
depending on his or her perception of the audience expectations, e.g., creative, uninhibited, confident (Johnson, 1981).

This alternative interpretation of the impression management scale is easily illustrated with the accounting procedures outlined above. The value of a moral integrity image depends on the perceived consequences of claiming that image and the evaluation of the consequences. Additionally, the expected value of claiming an image of moral integrity depends on the estimated probability of a successful claim and the negative sanctions for an unsuccessful claim.

Recall that Paulhus' scale for impression management is composed of items whose keyed response indicates socially desirable but infrequent behavior. Thus, for individuals to create an image of moral integrity, they are likely to need to dissimulate in their report. This constitutes an impression management predicament. A particular image is valued, yet the valued image is threatened by unsuccessful dissimulation. In fact, unsuccessful dissimulation may create an image opposite to the valued image. In this situation an alternative impression may be claimed. If an individual judges the value of an honest image to be greater than an image of moral integrity, he may be willing to endorse socially undesirable items in order to create this image. Such a response would solve the impression management predicament if the audience was judged to
appreciate honesty at least as much as moral integrity.

If Paulhus' measure of impression management is sensitive to only one specific impression (moral integrity), then scores on his scale may not reflect individual differences in impression management. Rather, scores on his impression management scale may be measuring type rather than degree of impression management. Therefore, if Paulhus' public/private experimental manipulation was such that subjects perceived an impression of moral integrity might be evaluated favorably, they may have been prone to adopt a moral impression when faced with public exposure. However, they would have done so only to the extent that they believed a moral impression was valued and only to the extent that they believed their dissimulation could not be detected. Support for this assertion can be found in research that uses the "bogus pipeline" methodology (Jones & Sigall, 1971). Using this research methodology, experimenters convince their subjects that they have a physiological measurement device that can reliably and validly assess the truth or falsity of their responses. Under these conditions, scores for impression management have shown a statistically significant decrease (Millham & Kellogg, 1980). In terms of Schlenker's (1980) accounting procedures, in the bogus pipeline scenario the valued impression is one of honesty, and the probability of a successfully claimed dissimulated image approaches 0.
The second aspect of Paulhus' study that may be reinterpreted with impression management concepts concerns his use of the public versus anonymous conditions to test the impression management factor. This approach assumes that the tendency to use impression management tactics is equal to the degree of change between these two conditions. However, other research using this methodology suggests that the identity of the observer in the public condition can affect motivation to use impression management (e.g., Christensen, 1981; Baumeister, 1982). Some subjects may be relatively unmotivated to utilize impression management tactics for public exposure, but faced with parental exposure or teacher exposure would be far more motivated to assume some impression (Schlenker, 1980).

In the Paulhus' study (Paulhus, 1984) the public condition was operationalized by asking subjects to put their name, address, and phone number on the cover sheet. They were then told that "the experimenter would be reading through their answers to 'ensure that they had read the questions carefully'" (p. 605). Finally, the subjects "were asked to give their completed inventories directly to the experimenter 'so that we will be able to recognize you later'" (p. 605). Given this operationalization, it seems likely that what is being measured may not be a general propensity toward the use of impression management tactics, but rather individual differences in sensitivity to the
experimenter's peering eye. Perhaps stated more accurately, this sensitivity represents individual differences in the evaluation of negative sanctions for not claiming an image of moral integrity for the experimenter.

The above discussion of Paulhus' study and impression management suggests another issue to be addressed. What are the specific factors that motivate subjects to create a favorable image for the experimenter? Reviewing the literature of subject motives, Christensen (1981) has identified a number of variables that affect subjects' motivation to create a favorable image. Among these are the observers' likeableness and status, power differentials between subject and observer, and freedom of response that indicates the subjects' actions are a function of their own volition. These are variables that potentially affect many experiments relying on self-report data, thereby implicating impression management in much of the data collected. (Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981)

Is impression management or socially desirable responding in self-report within the subject's awareness or not? Or, as Paulhus (1984) argues, is it both? This is a question that continues to be debated in both the impression management and social desirability literature (e.g., Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981; Paulhus, 1984). Paulhus describes self-deception as beliefs an individual has about himself that are probably not accurate. He
distinguishes between self-deceptive responding and dissimulation by the individual’s genuine belief that his responses are accurate. This view of self-deception is supported by research that finds consistency in responses to self-deception scales across varying experimental conditions.

Additionally, Millham and Kellogg (1980) operationalized self-deception as their subjects' social desirability scores under the bogus pipeline condition. These authors reasoned that socially desirable responses under these conditions reflect genuine beliefs about the self, because dissimulation "could be detected" and is therefore, presumably minimized.

Schlenker (1980) argues that impression management which is outside of the individual’s awareness may function to manage the self-concept. He cites evidence that recall of information is enhanced for information consistent with the self-concept (Markus, 1977). This notion is also supported by Millham and Kellogg (1980). They found that subjects who scored high on self-deception were able to recall less information from a negative evaluation than subjects who scored low on self-deception. Additionally, high self-deceivers were able to recall significantly more information from positive evaluation than negative.

According to these views of self-deception, scores on a self-deception scale should remain consistent under
conditions that are either very favorable or unfavorable for impression management. However, if they vary across conditions that affect impression management, then a completely unconscious formulation of self-deception will be suspect. Additionally, such results would certainly blur the impression management/self-deception distinction proposed by Paulhus (1984).

Self-monitoring. Finally, the issue of individual differences in impression management must be addressed. With respect to individual differences, most of the impression management and social desirability literature agrees that there are individual differences in the tendency to use impression management tactics or give socially desirable responses. One variable that appears to mediate impression management is self-monitoring. This variable has been related not only to the ability to adjust behavior to the social situation, but also to the ability to perceive the reactions of others to one's behavior (Tobey & Tunnell, 1981; Schlenker, Miller, & Leary, 1983). The Self-monitoring Questionnaire -Revised (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985) is the scale often used as a criterion variable in these studies.
CHAPTER THREE

Rationale For Present Study

Conditions that may affect the accuracy of self-report and methods for measuring inaccuracies in self-report have been reviewed to this point. A recent formulation and measurement strategy in the social desirability literature, the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1990), is argued to measure separate constructs of self-deception and impression management. However, in this presentation it has been argued that alternative hypotheses derived from the impression management literature may lead to other interpretations of this scale. It is on the basis of these alternative hypotheses that the use of the BIDR as a dependent measure in the present study is proposed. The rationale for its use will be developed within the accounting procedures framework of Schlenker (1980).

The first variable in Schlenker’s accounting procedures is the value of the impression. It was argued that if the experimenter is perceived as one who would look on moral integrity favorably, then the probability that the subject will claim a moral integrity impression increases. Thus, if the cues of the experimental setting motivate subjects to claim an image of moral integrity, then they will score higher on the Impression Management Scale. However, recall
that high scores on this scale also reflect dissimulation. It was argued that this construction creates a dilemma between the socially approved moral integrity image and an image of honesty. If an individual expects that an image of honesty is more valuable than a moral integrity image, then his or her scores on the Impression Management Scale will be lower. Eysenck, Eysenck, and Shaw (1974) found that special "honest" instructions significantly decreased MMPI Lie Scale scores. Although honesty is also a socially approved attribute, the dilemma present in the Impression Management Scale forces the respondent to choose non-socially approved responses in order to claim an honest image.

In a sense, without environmental cues to help respondents solve the above dilemma, they are left to guess at the valued impression or give automatic responses. However, the fact that the Impression Management Scale is generally completed in the context of an experiment provides the them with some clues. In 1934 Vernon wrote:

"The subject's answers are doubtless dictated, in part, not only by his notions as to what the test is meant to measure (notions which may be more or less incorrect), but also by his relations to the people who are going to see these answers" (p. 166).

The first experimental condition proposed for the present study is designed to assist respondents in solving the moral integrity/honesty dilemma inherent in the BIDR. By varying the stated purpose of the experiment, cues to the valued
impression will be provided to the subjects. Three levels of this condition are proposed. The first level will provide cues that increase the value of a moral integrity image. The second level will provide cues that increase the value of an honest image. The third level will not explicitly provide any cues, thus comprising a control level. The stated purpose of the study in this level will be form effects in measurement of psychological variables.

The second variable in Schlenker's accounting procedures is respondents' estimation of the probability that they can successfully claim the desired image. The bogus pipeline procedure functions to minimize the evaluated probability of claiming any image but that of honesty. In the present study a more naturalistic employment of the bogus pipeline will be used for the second experimental condition.

Subjects will be informed that two different measures of honesty, moral integrity, or an unspecified construct, will be employed. They will be informed that they will first complete a paper and pencil measure and then a specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. The Rorschach will be presented as an alternative, indirect measure of the stated experimental variable. This condition will have two levels. Either subjects will be told the Rorschach will be administered or they will not be told this. To the extent that the Rorschach is accepted as a credible measure that is impervious to faking, the subjects' estimated probability of
successful dissimulation should decrease.

The third variable of Schlenker's accounting procedures is the perceived sanctions for the unsuccessful claim of an image. Studies such as Paulhus' that use public versus private conditions assume that the subjects' evaluation of sanctions is generally greater in the public condition. Although this may be true, the reliability of this manipulation across subjects may be doubtful. It is therefore proposed in this study that a more universal manipulation of negative sanctions is the threat of being confronted with inconsistency of responding.

In the third experimental condition, the first level consists of telling subjects that the results of two different measures will be compared and any noted discrepancies will be explored with them in a brief interview. In the second level subjects will be told that when they have finished completing the tests they will be done with the experiment.

The Self-Monitoring Scale- Revised (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985) will be used as a between subjects variable in the present study. Past research indicates this variable is useful for measuring propensity toward impression management. Thus, by using this variable, specific hypotheses can be made concerning high versus low self-monitoring individuals.

Finally, Paulhus (1990) reports that males tend to score
higher on the Impression Management Scale and lower on the Self-Deception Scale than females. However, consistent sex differences in the use of impression management strategies relevant to this study have not been reported. Sex differences in impression management and self-deception scores can be controlled by balancing sex distributions in the experimental conditions. Therefore, sex will not be a between subjects variable in the present study.

**Hypotheses.** Since impression management and self-deception are theoretically distinct constructs, separate hypotheses are stated for each. Additionally, because the experimental conditions of this study are operationalizations of the variables in Schlenker's (1980) accounting procedures, hypotheses for this study are derived directly from the predictions made by these procedures. Hypotheses concerning impression management scores will be addressed first.

Significant differences in impression management scores are predicted for 1) each of the stated purposes of the study, 2) the Rorschach versus no Rorschach condition, and 3) the discrepancies versus no discrepancies conditions. The variation in the stated purpose of the study is expected to change the perceived value of honest versus moral impressions. The application of the Rorschach instructions is expected to reduce dissimulation and hence impression management scores by reducing subjects' estimated
probabilities for successful dissimulation. The application of the discrepancies instructions is expected to increase the perceived cost of dissimulation, thereby also reducing impression management scores.

The probability of successfully claiming an image and the negative sanctions for an unsuccessful claim are expressed as a multiplicative function in Schlenker's (1980) accounting procedures. Therefore, when the Rorschach condition is combined with the discrepancies condition, an interfering interaction on impression management scores is hypothesized.

Since high self-monitors reportedly show a greater propensity toward impression management, a significant difference between high and low self-monitors on impression management is hypothesized. Additionally, since past research indicates that high self-monitors pay more attention to environmental cues than low self-monitors, it is hypothesized that the stated purpose of the study condition will have a greater effect for high rather than low self-monitors. Since self-monitoring has been used only as a measure of general propensity toward impression management, no further predictions with respect to this variable and experimental conditions can be made. However, other interactions between self-monitoring and experimental condition may help to further clarify the differences between high and low self-monitors with respect to
impression management.

In keeping with the wealth of research on self-deception, no significant differences are predicted for the Self-Deception Scale scores. However, in the event that self-deception scores do change a subsidiary hypothesis is that they will follow the same patterns as have been described for impression management scores in the second two experimental conditions (Rorschach, discrepancies).

Finally, it is hypothesized that treatment condition will affect the strength of endorsement for some items. Such a phenomenon is likely to occur in this study because the variation in negative social value of the items on the Impression Management and Self-Deception Scales will likely interact with treatment condition. Such a phenomena is worth investigation for two reasons, 1) it suggests that subjects could alter the items they endorse without altering their total score, and 2) this effect might be systematically related to treatment condition.
Subjects

Seventy-two male and 72 female undergraduate students enrolled in introductory psychology and social work courses at the University of Montana participated as subjects in the present study. The subjects earned experimental credit to fulfill general course requirements in return for their participation.

Apparatus

The dependent measure for the present study was the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1990) (Appendix A). This inventory consists of two subscales: the Impression Management (IM) Scale and the Self-Deception (SD) Scale. Each subscale consists of 20 items that are responded to on a variation of the seven-point Likert Scale. The anchor points for responses are "not true", "neutral", and "very true" corresponding to scale scores of 1, 4, and 7 respectively. Additionally, the scoring key for each subscale is balanced.

Paulhus (1990) reported a range of reliability coefficients for each of the two subscales. For the Impression Management subscale he reported coefficient alphas in the range of .75 to .86. For the Self-deception
subscale he reported coefficient alphas in the range of .68 to .80.

With respect to convergent validity, Paulhus (1984; 1990) reported substantial correlations between the Impression Management Scale and traditional lie scales such as the MMPI Lie Scale and Eysenck's Lie Scale. He also reported substantial correlations with role-playing scales, such as Wiggins Sd (Social Desirability) and Gough’s Gi (Good Impression). Unfortunately, Paulhus (1990) did not present specific validity coefficients for the most recent revision of the BIDR. For the Self-Deception Scale Paulhus (1990) reported positive correlations with several measures of defensiveness and coping. These include Byrne’s R-S Scale ($r_\text{=} .51$), Ihilevich and Gleser’s (1986) Defense Mechanisms Inventory ($r_\text{=} .34$), and the positive re-appraisal ($r_\text{=} .44$), the distancing ($r_\text{=} .33$), and the self-controlling ($r_\text{=} .39$) subscales of the Ways of Coping Scale (Sabourin, Bourgeois, Gendreau, & Morval, in press).

Finally, Paulhus (1990) presented data to support the discriminant validity of the Impression Management Scale and the Self-deception scale. His own research with this most recent version of these scales has resulted in correlations ranging from .05 to .40 between the Impression Management and Self-Deception Scale.

The Self-Monitoring Scale-Revised (SMS-R) (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985) is composed of 18 items in a true false format
(Appendix B). Eight of the 18 items are keyed true and the rest are keyed false. For this shortened revised version, Snyder and Gangestad (1986) reported a coefficient alpha of .70. Convergent validity is evidenced by a correlation of .72 between the SMS-R and an alternative measure of self-monitoring suggested by Lennox and Wolfe (1984). Gangestad and Snyder (1985) reported that a cut-off score of 11 or greater corresponds to a .5 probability that the subject is a high self-monitor. Conversely, a score less than 11 corresponds to a .5 probability that the subject is a low self-monitor. They reported that using classification methodologies similar to this, they achieved an 89% correct classification rate. They also reported that for their population of college students (n = 1914), approximately 60 percent were low self-monitors and the remaining 40 percent were high self-monitors.

The multiple choice version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test (Harrower-Erikson, 1943) provides the subject with three groups of ten possible percepts for each inkblot. Subjects are asked to look carefully at each inkblot and then select one percept in each of the three groups. When they have done this they are told they may also put a check next to any other percepts that they also think is a good descriptor of the blot. Responses in each group include 5 percepts that are considered normal and 5 that are considered abnormal. Since the data gathered from this test were not
central to the research question, only cards I, II, VI, and VIII were administered. The instructions and answer sheets for the 4 cards that were used are included in Appendix C.

**Procedure**

In order to classify subjects as high or low self-monitors, 350 subjects initially participated in a screening session where they completed the SMS-R and other questionnaires from an unrelated study. This initial screening did not identify enough high self-monitors and consequently, 60 subjects from an introductory social work class were also screened. These subjects participated voluntarily. All subjects were randomly assigned to treatment group by self-monitoring classification (high/low) while sex of subjects was balanced within each group. Once assigned to treatment condition, subjects were contacted by telephone to schedule a time for participating in the study.

Subjects arrived individually for their scheduled appointments. The experimenter, who was blind with respect to the self-monitoring classification of subjects, escorted them to a small room furnished with only a table and two chairs. He then began by thanking the subject for participating in the study and then immediately delivered the set of instructions for the experimental condition previously assigned to the subject. To assure continuity between experimental conditions and across subjects, both the introductory remarks and instructions were delivered
from a script memorized by the experimenter (Appendix D).

Since each of the 12 experimental conditions required slightly different scripts, the script for each of the 12 conditions is presented in Appendix E. As an example, the script for the moral integrity X Rorschach X discrepancies presentation was as follows:

This is a study about morality. Morality is that characteristic of people which influences them to do what is right or good in many situations. Many psychologists believe that the morality of people in our society is deteriorating. But I don’t believe that is true because their conclusions are based on what I believe is a poor approach to the measurement of morality. I am trying to measure morality in two different ways. The first way is with a questionnaire which is very similar to other questionnaires you have probably completed. The other way is with a specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. This is the test psychologists are using when they ask people to look at inkblots and then tell them what they see. It is used by psychologists to indirectly measure personality. For instance, psychologists who work with prison inmates use it because inmates sometimes try to lie about what they are really like. By using the Rorschach, these psychologists get accurate information about the inmates.

I will give you the questionnaire about morality first. When you are finished with it, I will give you the specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. After you have finished both tests I will compare the results from these two tests. If there are discrepancies between your results on these two tests, I would like to talk with you about your answers on the questionnaire, so that I can understand why there are differences between your scores on the two different tests.

Now that you have learned the nature of this study, I must give you the opportunity to withdraw from participating if you want to. Do you still want to participate? (PAUSE)
Once the experimenter had delivered the appropriate instructions, he gave the subjects the BIDR. Since order effects between the IM Scale and the SD Scale have not been noted in previous studies, the IM Scale was always the first scale administered in the BIDR. Half the subjects then completed the multiple choice version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. After all of the questionnaires were completed, subjects were given the experimental manipulation questionnaire. This questionnaire assessed the effectiveness of the experimental manipulations, subjects' expectancies before and during the study, and subjects' previous experience with the Rorschach Inkblot Test. This questionnaire along with administration instructions is included in Appendix F.

At the conclusion of the study subjects were debriefed and thanked for their participation. The debriefing included an explanation of all deceptive components of the study and the purpose for the deception. Debriefing instructions are included in Appendix G.

It was hypothesized that treatment condition would affect the strength of endorsement for some items. To test this hypothesis an additional group of 98 subjects was recruited to determine the social desirability scale value for each of the BIDR items. The methodology suggested by Edwards (1970) was used to derive these social desirability scale values (SDSV). First, the 40 items in the BIDR were
re-written in the third person. Then instructions and a nine-point Likert Scale were added to the BIDR. This altered version of the BIDR which was administered in one group administration is included in appendix H.
CHAPTER FIVE

Results

The data from this study were coded and entered independently by the experimenter and a research assistant. The data were cross-checked for discrepancies which were then corrected. Missing data was extremely infrequent, but to allow equal n analysis the mean of a missing item was inserted in 12 cases across three different items.

The major dependent variables in this study were Impression Management and Self-Deception. The four independent variables were between-subjects variables: stated purpose (morality, honesty, control), Rorschach (described, not described), discrepancies (described, not described), and self-monitoring (high, low). Sex of subjects was balanced across all four independent variables but was not analyzed. For each dependent variable, the omnibus null hypothesis was tested first. Then the full 2 X 3 X 2 X 2 ANOVA model was analyzed and multiple comparisons computed with the Newman-Keuls procedure at the .05 level of significance.

The quality of Rorschach responses (good, poor) was analyzed by means of chi-squared on each of the independent variables of stated purpose, discrepancies, and self-monitoring.
Item endorsement by treatment condition was analyzed by first regressing each individual's responses onto the social desirability scale value of each item. The residuals from this analysis were used to first test the omnibus null hypothesis for each item. Those items for which the results failed to reject the omnibus null hypothesis were then eliminated from further analysis. The remaining items were then tested with the full 2 X 3 X 2 X 2 anova model.

Validation of Manipulations

As an initial step in examining the validity of the experimental manipulations, medians were computed for each of the questions on the experimental manipulation questionnaire. For all questions related to whether or not the subjects believed the stated purpose of the study and the assertions of the experimenter, the median responses ranged from 2.5 to 4.0 or from "somewhat" to "completely." For subjects who received the Rorschach instructions, the median judgment of its ability to accurately measure the stated purpose of the study was 0.0 or "uncertain" for all three stated purposes. For subjects who received the discrepancies instructions, the median response about their concern with having to discuss discrepancies was 0.0 or "uncertain" for each of the stated purposes.

Of the subjects exposed to the Rorschach instructions, 12 percent had previous experience with the Rorschach in each of the honesty and control groups. However, 25 percent of
the subjects in the morality group had previous experience with the Rorschach.

Following these initial analyses, the experimental manipulation questions were analyzed individually with the either a one-way or the full model anova. From these analyses only a few significant effects were discovered. For the first question concerning how much subjects believed the stated purpose of the study during the instructions, the only significant effect was for the Rorschach condition \( F(1,120) = 6.09, p < .05 \). Subjects found the study less believable when instructions for the Rorschach were given (\( \bar{x} = 2.96 \)) than when they were not (\( \bar{x} = 3.44 \)). For the second question concerning how much subjects believed the integrity of the study as they completed the questionnaire, a significant four-way interaction (Figure 1) emerged \( F(2,120) = 3.74, p < .05 \). To simplify somewhat, experimental condition had less impact on the belief ratings of low self-monitors than on the belief ratings of high self-monitors. Specifically, high self-monitors tended to have less confidence in the control conditions than they had in the other conditions.

**Impression Management**

The test of the omnibus null hypothesis for impression management across all treatment conditions was significant \( F(11,132) = 2.22, p < .05 \). The hypotheses concerning the stated purpose of the study were partially supported for
Figure 1. Four-way interaction of subjects' rated belief about the integrity of the study as they filled out the questionnaire on treatment condition.
impression management in that the main effect for the stated purpose of the study was significant $F(2,120) = 6.40, p < .01$. However, the Newman-Keuls multiple comparison procedure revealed significant differences only between the morality condition ($\bar{x} = 84.94$) and the honesty ($\bar{x} = 74.23$) and control ($\bar{x} = 73.98$) conditions. That is, the honesty and control conditions did not differ significantly from each other. The hypotheses concerning the differences between the Rorschach and discrepancies conditions were not supported.

The hypothesis of an interaction between the Rorschach and discrepancies conditions to reflect the multiplicative relationship between Schlenker’s (1980) probability of a successful claim and negative sanctions constructs was not supported. However, a three-factor interaction for the stated purpose, Rorschach, and discrepancies conditions approached significance $F(2,120) = 2.59, p = .079$, which is suggestive of a trend in responding based on the interaction of all three variables (Figure 2). There were substantial differences between the morality - no Rorschach - no discrepancies condition ($\bar{x} = 93.75$) and four other conditions: the form effects - Rorschach - discrepancies condition ($\bar{x} = 68.42$), the honesty - Rorschach - no discrepancies condition ($\bar{x} = 68.00$), the honesty - no rorschach - no discrepancies condition ($\bar{x} = 70.75$), and the form effects - no Rorschach - no discrepancies condition ($\bar{x}$
This pattern of differences suggests that the subjects' interpretation and consequent response to each of the independent variables was somewhat dependent on the configuration of their particular treatment condition. That is, impression management scores were significantly higher for the stated purpose of morality than the stated purpose of honesty only when the morality manipulation was by itself and the honesty manipulation was not paired with the discrepancies manipulation. The control manipulation was significantly different from the morality alone condition only when both the Rorschach and discrepancies manipulations were paired with it or were both absent.

Figure 2. The interaction of stated purpose by Rorschach by discrepancies for impression management (p = .079).
The hypothesis of differences in impression management between high and low self-monitors was supported. However, the hypothesis of a significant interaction between self-monitoring and the stated purpose of the study was not. Instead, a significant interaction between self-monitoring and discrepancies emerged $F(1,120) = 4.15, p<.05$ (Figure 3). High self-monitors scored significantly lower ($\bar{X} = 69.47$) than low self-monitors ($\bar{X} = 84.80$) on impression management in the no discrepancies condition but not in the discrepancies condition.

Figure 3. The interaction of discrepancies by self-monitoring for impression management
Self-Deception

The test of the omnibus null hypothesis for self-deception across all treatment conditions was not significant \( F(11,132) = 1.41, p = .17 \). Exploratory analyses of trends in the data were inconclusive.

Total Score

Finally, since Paulhus (1990) reported that the total score derived from the summation of the impression management and self-deception scores correlates highly with other measures of social desirability (i.e., .71 with the Marlowe-Crowne Scale) a post hoc analysis of the full anova model on the total BIDR scores was conducted. The test of the omnibus null hypothesis for this analysis was significant \( F(11,132) = 2.52, p < .05 \), and two interactions were shown to be significant.

The three-factor interaction between the stated purpose, Rorschach, and discrepancies conditions was significant \( F(2,120) = 3.46, p < .05 \). This pattern of results was very similar to that of the Impression Management Scale alone. The mean of the morality - no Rorschach - no discrepancies condition (\( \bar{x} = 188.67 \)) was significantly higher than the means of four other conditions: the form effects - Rorschach - discrepancies condition (\( \bar{x} = 152.00 \)), the honesty - Rorschach - no discrepancies condition (\( \bar{x} = 152.67 \)), the honesty - no Rorschach - no discrepancies condition (\( \bar{x} = 151.33 \)), and the form effects - no Rorschach
- no discrepancies condition ($\bar{x} = 150.17$).

Finally, the analysis on total score revealed a significant interaction between self-monitoring and discrepancies with a pattern of results nearly identical to the results for the Impression Management Scale alone $F(1,120) = 8.61$, $p<.01$. High self-monitors not faced with discrepancies scored significantly higher ($\bar{x} = 150.69$) than low self-monitors in the same condition ($\bar{x} = 172.25$). The high-low difference was not significant in the no discrepancies condition.

**Item Analysis**

Only four items were retained following the omnibus test of the null hypothesis for each of the 40 items on the IM and SD scales. The data for this analysis were the residuals that remained after the social desirability was regressed out of each individual's scores. Consequently, a significant difference reflects that the item was consistently endorsed either more or less strongly than each individual's personal conception of what was socially desirable. Since the IM and SD scales are intended to measure social desirability, significant differences among the items is interpreted as the use of significantly more or less social desirability with respect to most other items on the scale.

The only item from the IM scale to reach significance ($F(11,132) = 2.11$, $p<.05$) reads "I have done things that I
don't tell other people about." In 11 of 12 treatment groups, subjects responded to this item with less social desirability than they used in responding to most other items. All three items from the SD scale that reached significance were responded to with more social desirability than was used in answering most items. These items read "Once I have made up my mind, people can seldom change my opinion" \( (F(11,132) = 2.24, p<.05) \), "I have sometimes doubted my ability as a sex partner" \( (F(11,132) = 2.39, p<.01) \), and "It's alright with me if some people happen to dislike me", \( (F(11,132) = 2.45, p<.01) \).

Rorschach

Responses from the Rorschach were coded as good or poor responses and the number of good and poor responses summed for each independent variable of the study. This resulted in a three X two contingency table for each independent variable. A chi-square statistic was computed to determine whether the number of good or poor responses was related to treatment condition.

For the stated hypothesis the chi-square statistic was not significant. However, the pattern of poor responses was consistent with the hypothesis. Subjects in the honesty condition gave 236 good responses and 52 poor responses, while subjects in the morality and control conditions gave 247 good and 41 poor and 246 good and 42 poor responses respectively. No significant differences or meaningful
patterns were found for either the discrepancies condition or between self-monitoring groups.
CHAPTER SIX

Discussion

The results from the experimental manipulations questionnaire suggest that overall subjects believed the purpose and conditions of the study as it was described to them. The Rorschach condition was slightly less believable than was expected, which probably limited its effectiveness in this study. Additionally, the high self-monitoring subjects tended to have less confidence in the control condition as they were completing the questionnaire. This was probably due to their lack of understanding of the stated purpose of this condition combined with their greater sensitivity to impression management cues. It is not difficult to imagine subjects feeling less confident about a stated purpose they did not fully understand.

The percentage of subjects who had previous experience with the Rorschach was unexpected. However, since the Rorschach was introduced as a "specialized version," prior experience may not have precluded its effectiveness.

The significant effects of the discrepancies condition on impression management and total BIDR score are interesting in light of the relatively low ratings subjects gave to their concern about discussing discrepancies. However, it is probably not socially desirable to admit being concerned
about discussing one's answers. This may be true because honesty and consistency are valued in our culture, and discussing answers is only threatening if these two conditions are not met. Therefore, to admit concern is to admit either dishonesty or inconsistency.

Finally, the significant four-factor interaction on the second question concerning how much subjects believed the integrity of the study as they completed the questionnaire may be useful for interpreting results, but does not invalidate the operationalization of the independent variables for two reasons. First, the reliability of a single item makes the stability of these results somewhat questionable. Additionally, the variability in treatment group means for how much subjects believed the stated purpose of the study as they were filling out the questionnaires does not include values indicating disbelief or suspicion.

**Impression Management**

The main effect for the stated purpose of the study on impression management was significant, as predicted, and the mean for the morality condition was significantly higher than the honesty and control conditions, also as predicted. Thus, it appears that the stated purpose of morality successfully raised the social value of a moral impression thereby influencing the scores of individuals in that treatment group. These findings support the assertion that
Paulhus' (1990) Impression Management Scale is sensitive to a specific type of impression management, namely morality. Therefore, it should not be interpreted as a general propensity for impression management.

While the mean for the morality condition was higher than the honesty and control conditions, as predicted, the similarity between the honesty and control conditions was unexpected. Not only are these means nearly equivalent, but they are very close to the means reported by Paulhus (1990) for impression management under anonymous conditions ($\bar{x} = 66.7$ and 71.6 for males and females, respectively).

However, in all conditions of this study, subjects handed the completed questionnaire directly to the experimenter just as they had in Paulhus' public exposure condition. The honesty condition was intended to lower impression management scores and thus the lower mean is not surprising. However, the fact that the control group mean was also as low as Paulhus' anonymous groups is rather perplexing. It may be that subjects lesser confidence in the control group instructions affected scores in this condition. However, this argument is not compelling because the pattern of results observed in the four-way interaction in the analysis of the question on how much subjects believed the study as they were participating in it did not, as would be expected, carry over to scores on impression management. That is, if subjects' confidence in the instructions was the major
source of variance in impression management scores, then the honesty and control conditions should not have been equal.

The similarity of the results for the honesty and control conditions raises an interesting question. If the Impression Management Scale is a dilemma as has been argued, then why was the honesty mean not lower than the control mean? One explanation might be that Paulhus' anonymous condition and the honesty and control conditions in this study all represent an absolute baseline for the Impression Management Scale. If this were the case, then the honesty condition could not result in scores any lower. However, such an interpretation fails to account for the control mean also being at the level of Paulhus' anonymous condition.

Another interpretation consistent with the conceptualization of the impression management scale as a dilemma between honesty and social desirability is that this particular sample of subjects tended to value honesty over social desirability. If this were the case, the control condition mean might be expected to approach the honesty condition mean. However, by itself, this interpretation also fails to account for the similarity between the honesty and control conditions. If this sample was already predisposed to honesty (and considering the nature of the dilemma present in Paulhus' scale), solving the dilemma by means of honesty in the honest condition would theoretically serve to further reinforce honest responding. Thus, the
honesty condition would lower the impression management scores beyond that of the control condition.

It has been argued that neither of the above explanations, by themselves, can account for the similarity of the honesty and control means. However, if both of the above explanations were true, then the subjects predisposition to honesty could drive both the honesty and control means to an absolute baseline. A test of this baseline hypothesis might be to administer the BIDR with the instructions that subjects answer it with blatant honesty under anonymous conditions. If a mean similar to those presented here was obtained, then the similarity of honesty and control scores in this study could be attributed to an absolute baseline.

Another interpretation for the similarity between the control and honesty conditions is that the socially valued impression in this experimental setting was honesty. If the subjects perceived the experimenter as one who valued honesty over social desirability, then they may have been inclined to respond accurately in the control condition unless such an impression was contraindicated by other experimental variables.

One interpretation from Schlenker's (1980) accounting procedures is that the value of an impression is not easily manipulated in a "risky" direction. In a psychological experiment subjects might perceive a moral, socially desirable impression as a "safe" impression. To claim an
honest impression by endorsing less than flattering items, even if such is the valued impression, might be perceived as a "risky" impression. Since the experimenter-subject interaction was shallow and rather brief, the value of keeping one's less than perfect self hidden might have been greater than the value of gaining the experimenter's approval in the honesty condition. In other words, the subjects' estimation of the value of any particular impression may be more complex than simply that which the audience values.

The main effect hypothesis for the Rorschach condition was not supported by the results. However, the Rorschach condition when combined with the discrepancies condition did result in consistently lower scores than the no-Rorschach condition (Figure 2). Recall that the Rorschach was intended as an alternative to the more elaborate bogus pipeline procedure. It appears that the subjects' uncertainty about the ability of the Rorschach to accurately measure the stated variable of the study probably diminished the intended bogus pipeline effect of the instrument. In the usual bogus pipeline procedure, great pains are taken to convince subjects of the efficacy of the bogus procedure. However, these efforts to convince subjects of the efficacy of the bogus pipeline procedure should be unnecessary in light of Schlenker's accounting procedures. Recall that the variable the Rorschach is intended to operationalize in this
study is the subjects' perceived probability that they could successfully claim the valued impression. These results suggest that the instructions for the Rorschach had no consistent effect on subjects' perceived probability of successfully claiming the valued impression. However, it is clear from figure 2 that the addition of the Rorschach to the morality alone condition decreases the claim of a moral impression even when the discrepancies condition is not present. Additionally, when combined with the discrepancies condition, the Rorschach appears to further reduce impression management responding for the form effects stated purpose (Figure 2). However, when the Rorschach condition was combined with the no discrepancies condition, impression management scores increased in the form effects condition. This may be due to an effect the Rorschach had on the ambiguous nature of the control condition. Subjects in this combined Rorschach - no discrepancies condition may have been more likely to interpret the form effects instructions in a threatening manner, thereby responding with more impression management in this condition. Combining the form effects - Rorschach condition with the discrepancies rather than no discrepancies condition may have served to counteract this effect because the discrepancies instructions added additional information from which subjects could make their interpretation. This opposing effect would also serve to mediate a main effect for the
Rorschach.

Finally, the hypothesized main effect for the discrepancies condition was also non-significant. However, the interpretation of this lack of support is best described in the context of the significant interaction between discrepancies and self-monitoring.

The hypothesis concerning self-monitoring predicted an interaction between self-monitoring and the stated purpose of the study, because theoretically, high self-monitors would be more aware of environmental cues and be more inclined to respond to them. This hypothesis was not supported with respect to the stated purpose of the study. However, the significant interaction between self-monitoring and discrepancies does suggest differences in impression management processes for low and high self-monitors. This interaction (Figure 3) indicates that the low self-monitors scored lower when they were in the discrepancies condition than when they were not. In contrast, the high self-monitors scored higher when they were in the discrepancies condition than when they were not. This differential response to the discrepancies condition can be interpreted within the framework of this study and Paulhus' work. The discrepancies condition may have indicated a slight negative sanction for inaccurate responding for the low self-monitors resulting in the lower mean score for that group. However, for the high
self-monitors, the increased public exposure of the discrepancies condition may have been salient, resulting in the higher mean score. These alternative reactions to the discrepancies condition might be an indication of the high self-monitors' abilities for impression management as compared to the low self-monitors. If the high self-monitors were confident about their ability to defend their responses, they would be more inclined to give socially desirable responses. After all, it would seem to be more desirable to talk about socially desirable responses if one were not afraid of appearing inconsistent.

The above interpretation is supported by analysis of the high self-monitors' data separately. In light of the self-monitoring - discrepancies interaction, separate analyses for high and low self-monitors were computed using the full anova model with all three remaining variables. The interaction between the stated purpose of the study and discrepancies was significant for high self-monitors $F(2,60) = 5.13, p<.01$ (Figure 4), but not for low self-monitors. High self-monitors in the honesty - discrepancies condition ($\bar{X} = 86.08$) scored significantly higher than in the honesty - no discrepancies condition ($\bar{X} = 63.5$).

This interaction clearly shows that the peculiar reaction of the high self-monitors to the discrepancies condition was specific to the honesty condition. Such results would suggest that the high self-monitors may have been second
Figure 4. The interaction of stated purpose and discrepancies for impression management (high self-monitors only).

guessing the study and not actually believing the stated purpose. However, inspection of the debriefing questionnaire data and free responses do not support this interpretation. Low and high self-monitors responded to the debriefing questions at the same level.

Alternatively, if one accepts the assertion that high self-monitors are more adept at using impression management than low self-monitors, then the honesty - discrepancies condition may have become a perfect situation for high self-
monitors to claim a socially desirable image. This would be the case if the subjects had confidence in their ability to defend their responses and maintain the honest impression. High self-monitors would be more likely than low self-monitors to possess such confidence. Given the above conditions, the stated purpose of honesty with a "non-threatening" condition of discrepancies sets up a wonderful opportunity for high self-monitors to claim an "honest" socially desirable impression.

Further support for this interpretation comes from inspection of the four-way interaction on the second question of the experimental manipulation questionnaire (Figure 1). High self-monitors gave their highest ratings for how much they believed the study in the honesty-discrepancies conditions. This is consistent with previous research conducted by Schlenker, Miller, and Leary (1983). In this study, high self-monitors used more impression management when "successful results" were obtained on a test which had been described as invalid by the experimenter. In the present study, the purpose of the study was described as a study in measurement. Recall that the instructions for the honesty groups included the statement, "I am trying to measure honesty in two different ways." The high self-monitors may have been attempting to elevate the validity of the tests and their responses to them by giving high ratings to how much they believed the stated purpose of
honesty while completing the questionnaire.

Finally, this interaction between the discrepancies and stated purpose conditions for high self-monitors is helpful for interpreting the similarity between the means of the honesty and control conditions. Since high self-monitors used the honesty - discrepancies condition to claim a socially desirable "honest" image, their scores certainly had an influence in pulling the honesty condition mean up to the level of the control condition.

The separate exploratory analysis of the low self-monitors showed a different pattern of results. The only significant effect for low self-monitors was for the stated purpose of the study F(2,60) = 6.11, p<.01. Similar to the analysis for all subjects, the morality condition (\(\bar{X} = 95.08\)) was significantly higher than both the honesty (\(\bar{X} = 79.50\)) and control (\(\bar{X} = 79.83\)) conditions. These results suggest that low self-monitors may have been less sophisticated in their use of impression management. They reacted only to the stated purpose of the study. Consistent with the definition of low self-monitoring, perhaps they were unaware of the nuances of the study which influenced the responses of high self-monitors.

**Self-deception**

The results of this study support Paulhus' assertion that the SD scale does in fact measure self-deception. By Paulhus' (1984) reasoning, the lack of significant
differences across treatment conditions in this study suggests that subjects' responses to the SD scale were outside of their awareness. However, the operationalization of the stated purpose independent variable was based on the IM scale. It is possible that the valued impressions of morality and honesty simply did not have an affect on the SD scale. Had the valued impression been related to self-knowledge, an effect might have been realized. Such speculation is offered here only as an alternative interpretation and possible direction for future research into self-deception.

**Total Score**

In the interest of generalizing these results to socially desirable responding independent of Paulhus' impression management and self-deception factors, the final anova was conducted for the total BIDR score. This was judged useful because only 20 percent of the variance in impression management and self-deception is shared between the two constructs. However, the pattern of results was similar to the analysis on impression management. These results support the generalization of the findings from this study to the more traditional theories of social desirability.

**Item Analysis**

The purpose of the item analysis was to explore the hypothesis that the experimental conditions had effects at the item as well as total scale score level of analysis. It
was suggested that such effects could operate to mask treatment effects in total scale scores if the effects for items were in opposing directions.

The results of this analysis failed to support this hypothesis for two reasons. First, the number of items shown to have significant differences across treatment conditions was small, with only one for the IM scale and three for the SD scale. Second, the items did not have opposing effects. All three items from the SD scale were endorsed with more than usual social desirability across treatment conditions suggesting that they did not have opposing effects on the total SD scale score.

Rorschach

The results from the chi-squared analysis on the quality of Rorschach responses produced no compelling evidence that any of the experimental conditions had any effect on the quality of the responses. However, the pattern of poor responses for the stated purpose of the study does suggest further investigation of this phenomena. It should be noted that the multiple choice version of the Rorschach utilized in this investigation is a rather crude usage of the test. Putting possible responses into a multiple choice format certainly violates the current underlying assumptions of the test. In the context of this investigation, the multiple choice version may have lacked the sensitivity necessary to demonstrate effects for the experimental conditions. In the
normal free response format, subjects would not have the popular responses from which to choose. Thus, this version of the Rorschach is a test of the subject's ability to recognize and choose the good form responses. The magnitude of the quality of response by treatment effect observed in this study may have been more pronounced had the test been given in its free response format.

Conclusion

The results of this study clearly illustrate that impression management is a complex phenomena. As such, the assertion that a general tendency for using impression management can be measured by a simple self-report measurement scale seems doubtful. The measurement scale proposed by Paulhus (1990) may not be inappropriate for measuring socially desirable impressions which are akin to morality. However, the Paulhus scale is probably less appropriate for measuring such socially desirable impressions as confident, easy-going, friendly, etc. If researchers find impression management a useful concept for constructing bias-free measurement scales, they will have to be aware of the possible types of socially desirable impressions their measurement scales may elicit.

The complexity of the impression management process is also apparent in the treatment condition interactions of this study. Some of these interactions are best interpreted as interactions in the operationalizations of the
independent variables. For instance, subjects' interpretation of the stated purpose of the study was almost certainly affected by the inclusion of the Rorschach or discrepancies conditions. For example, the stated purpose of morality may have been interpreted as an honest-like morality when combined with the Rorschach and discrepancies conditions. These interactions attest to the sensitivity subjects had in perceiving the social environment and the experimenter's expectations.

Finally, investigation of impression management processes is further complicated by consistent differences in impression management between low and high self-monitors. The rather striking results in this study for the high self-monitors in the honesty - discrepancies condition suggests that self-monitoring should always be a part of discussions about impression management. In the present study, the hypothesis that self-monitoring would interact with the stated purpose of the study was made without an appreciation for the impression management abilities of the high self-monitors. It seems their abilities go far beyond discerning the stated value of some impression. Research about impression management which ignores this personality dimension may get results dependent on the proportion of high to low self-monitors in the study.

Impression management is a common aspect of most if not all social interactions. It can be particularly menacing to
psychologists because it threatens the validity of their work. Consequently, the ability to either minimize or measure impression management is an important area of research. This study suggests that 1) the measurement of a general propensity for impression management will tend to be contaminated by particular impressions, and 2) the conditions which will minimize impression management must be managed thoughtfully and carefully.
References


Vernon, P. E. (1934). The attitude of the subject in


Appendix A

Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR)

Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how much you agree with it.

+ + + + + + 
1----2----3----4----5----6----7
not true somewhat very true

____ 1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.
____ 2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits.
____ 3. I don't care to know what other people really think of me.
____ 4. I have not always been honest with myself.
____ 5. I always know why I like things.
____ 6. I don't know what my major strengths and weaknesses are.
____ 7. Once I've made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.
____ 8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit.
____ 9. I am fully in control of my own fate.
____ 10. It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.
____ 11. I never regret my decisions.
____ 12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough.
____ 13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference.
____ 14. My parents were not always fair when they punished me.
____ 15. I am a completely rational person.
____ 16. I rarely appreciate criticism.
____ 17. My solutions to problems are original and effective.
____ 18. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a sex partner.
____ 19. It's alright with me if some people happen to dislike me.
____ 20. I don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do.
____ 21. I sometimes tell lies if I have to.
____ 22. I never cover up my mistakes.
____ 23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.
____ 24. I never swear.
____ 25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
____ 26. I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught.
27. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back.
28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.
29. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.
30. I always declare everything at customs.
31. When I was young I sometimes stole things.
32. I have never dropped litter on the street.
33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit.
34. I never read sexy books or magazines.
35. I have done things that I don’t tell other people about.
36. I never take things that don’t belong to me.
37. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn’t really sick.
38. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it.
39. I have some pretty awful habits.
40. I don’t gossip about other people’s business.
Appendix B

Self Monitoring Scale

Circle true if you agree with the statement as it generally applies to yourself. Circle false if you disagree with the statement as it generally applies to yourself.

True  False  1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.
True  False  2. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like.
True  False  3. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe.
True  False  4. I can impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information.
True  False  5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others.
True  False  6. I would probably make a good actor.
True  False  7. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.
True  False  8. In different situations with different people, I often act like very different persons.
True  False  9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me.
True  False  10. I'm not always the person I appear to be.
True  False  11. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or win their favor.
True  False  12. I have considered being an entertainer.
True  False  13. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.
True  False  14. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.
True  False  15. At a party, I let others keep the jokes and stories going.
True  False  16. I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should.
True  False  17. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie (if for a right end).
True  False  18. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.
Appendix C

Rorschach Inkblot Test

You are going to see four inkblot pictures one after another. Begin by taking a good look at CARD I and see if it, or any part of it reminds you of anything or resembles something you have seen. Then read through each of the three groups of answers for CARD I. Now underline the one answer in Group A, the one answer in Group B, and the one answer in Group C, which you think is the best description of that inkblot or any of its parts. You, therefore, underline three answers for CARD I. When you have done this, if you wish, you may put a check beside any other answer in any of the three groups which you also feel is a good description of the inkblot or any of its parts. Then do exactly the same thing for the other cards.

CARD I

A

Underline one answer here.
An army or navy emblem
Crumbling cliffs
A bat
Nothing at all
Two people
A pelvis
An X-ray picture
Pinchers of a crab
A dirty mess
Part of my body

B

Underline one answer here.
A headless figure with arms up
Vertebra
Tiny boxing gloves
Spilt ink
Someone’s insides
Nothing at all
A butterfly flying
Lava
A coat of arms
An X-ray of the chest

C

Underline one answer here.
A Halloween mask
Storm clouds
A moth
Two people on a merry-go-round
A bell in the center
An X-ray picture of the spine
Animal heads on the sides
The stomach
Nothing at all
Eyes glaring at me

CARD II

A

Underline one answer here.
A bug somebody stepped on
Nothing at all
Two scottie dogs
Little faces on the sides
A bloody spinal column
A white top
A bursting bomb
Two elephants
Two clowns
Red and black ink

B

Underline one answer here.
An animal skin
Two bears rubbing noses
Faces of indians on the side
Blood
Nothing at all
A white lamp
An exploding firecracker
A red butterfly
Two people playing pat-a-cake
Red and black splotches

C

Underline one answer here.
Two witches
Black and red paint
Bear's heads
An empty hole
Faces carved in stone
Lungs and blood
A white sting ray
A little temple in the center
Nothing at all
An erupting volcano

CARD VI

A

Underline one answer here.
Two king's heads with crowns
An X-ray picture
Parts of the body
A totem Pole
A fur rug
Mud and water
A polished post
Nothing at all
A turtle
A landslide

B

Underline one answer here.
A dragonfly
The spinal column
A cat's whiskers
Male and female organs
An animal skin
Dirty water
A sceptre
A snake's head
Nothing at all
A spattered mess

C

Underline one answer here.
A butterfly at the top
An X-ray of the spine
Feathers at the top
A bear skin
A leaf
A table leg
Nothing at all
Gushing oil
A little man
Part of the body
CARD VIII

A

Underline one answer here.
An orange or pink butterfly
Shoulders, lungs, and stomach
Nothing at all
Just colors
An emblem
A pretty flower
Heaven and Hell
Two blue cushions
Two bears climbing
Colored clouds

B

Underline one answer here.
Flowers and leaves
An X-ray picture
Colored blobs
A horseshoe crab
Nothing at all
Blue flags
Two animals climbing
A colored coat of arms
Fire and ice
Parts of my body

C

Underline one answer here.
A Christmas tree
A medical picture
Frogs' heads
Life and Death
A mountain at the top
A design for wallpaper
Inside the mouth
Two beavers walking on colored rocks
Nothing at all
Colored ink splashed on paper
Appendix D

Introductory Remarks

Hello, my name is Craig Ravesloot. Are you (Subjects name from sign-up sheet)? Good. Please follow me. Did you have any trouble finding your way here? (Pause for response.) (Enter testing room.) Please have a seat. I am a graduate student in clinical psychology and I am conducting this research for my master’s thesis. (Begin instructional script for the appropriate experimental condition.)
Appendix E

Instructional Script for Each Experimental Condition

1. Morality X Rorschach X Discrepancies Presentation

This is a study about morality. Morality is that characteristic of people which influences them to do what is right or good in many situations. Many psychologists believe that the morality of people in our society is deteriorating. But I don't believe that is true because their conclusions are based on what I believe is a poor approach to the measurement of morality. I am trying to measure morality in two different ways. The first way is with a questionnaire which is very similar to other questionnaires you have probably completed. The other way is with a specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. This is the test psychologists are using when they ask people to look at inkblots and then tell them what they see. It is used by psychologists to indirectly measure personality. For instance, psychologists who work with prison inmates use it because inmates sometimes try to lie about what they are really like. By using the Rorschach, these psychologists get accurate information about the inmates.

I will give you the questionnaire about morality first. When you are finished with it, I will give you the specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. After you have finished both tests I will compare the results from
these two test. If their are discrepancies between your results on these two tests, I would like to talk with you about your answers on the questionnaire, so that I can understand why there are differences between your scores on the two different tests.

Now that you have learned the nature of this study, I must give you the opportunity to withdraw from participating if you want to. Do you still want to participate? (PAUSE)

2. Morality X Rorschach X No Discrepancies Presentation.

This is a study about morality. Morality is that characteristic of people which influences them to do what is right or good in many situations. Many psychologists believe that the morality of people in our society is deteriorating. But I don’t believe that is true because their conclusions are based on what I believe is a poor approach to the measurement of morality. I am trying to measure morality in two different ways. The first way is with a questionnaire which is very similar to other questionnaires you have probably completed. The other way is with a specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. This is the test psychologists are using when they ask people to look at inkblots and then tell them what they see. It is used by psychologists to indirectly measure personality. For instance, psychologists who work with prison inmates use it because inmates sometimes try to lie about what they are really like. By using the Rorschach,
these psychologists get accurate information about the inmates.

Now that you have learned the nature of this study, I must give you the opportunity to withdraw from participating if you want to. Do you still want to participate? (PAUSE)

3. Morality X No Rorschach X Discrepancies Presentation

This is a study about morality. Morality is that characteristic of people which influences them to do what is right or good in many situations. Many psychologists believe that the morality of people in our society is deteriorating. But I don't believe that is true because their conclusions are based on what I believe is a poor approach to the measurement of morality. I am trying to measure morality in two different ways. They are both questionnaires which are very similar to other questionnaires you have probably completed.

I will give you one of the questionnaires about morality first. When you are finished with it, I will give you the other. After you have finished both tests I will compare the results from these two tests. If there are discrepancies between your results on these two tests, I would like to talk with you about your answers on the questionnaires, so that I can understand why there are differences between your scores on the two different tests.

Now that you have learned the nature of this study, I must give you the opportunity to withdraw from participating if
you want to. Do you still want to participate? (PAUSE)

4. Morality X No Rorschach X No Discrepancies Presentation.

This is a study about morality. Morality is that characteristic of people which influences them to do what is right or good in many situations. Many psychologists believe that the morality of people in our society is deteriorating. But I don't believe that is true because their conclusions are based on what I believe is a poor approach to the measurement of morality. I am trying to measure morality in two different ways. They are both questionnaires which are very similar to other questionnaires you have probably completed.

I will give you one of the questionnaires about morality first. When you have finished it I will give you the other.

5. Honesty/Truthfulness X Rorschach X Discrepancies Presentation.

This is a study about honesty. Honesty is that characteristic of people which influences them to be truthful about themselves and their experiences. Many psychologists believe that the honesty of people in our society is deteriorating. But I don't believe that is true because their conclusions are based on what I believe is a poor approach to the measurement of honesty. I am trying to measure honesty in two different ways. The first way is with a questionnaire which is very similar to other questionnaires you have probably completed. The other way
is with a specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. This is the test psychologists are using when they ask people to look at inkblots and then tell them what they see. It is used by psychologists to indirectly measure personality. For instance, psychologists who work with prison inmates use it because inmates sometimes try to lie about what they are really like. By using the Rorschach, these psychologists get accurate information about the inmates.

I will give you the questionnaire about honesty first. When you are finished with it, I will give you the specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. After you have finished both tests I will compare the results from these two tests. If there are discrepancies between your results on these two tests, I would like to talk with you about your answers on the questionnaire, so that I can understand why there are differences between your scores on the two different tests.

Now that you have learned the nature of this study, I must give you the opportunity to withdraw from participating if you want to. Do you still want to participate? (PAUSE)

6. Honesty and Truthfulness X Rorschach X No Discrepancies Presentation.

This is a study about honesty. Honesty is that characteristic of people which influences them to be truthful about themselves and their experiences. Many
psychologists believe that the honesty of people in our society is deteriorating. But I don't believe that is true because their conclusions are based on what I believe is a poor approach to the measurement of honesty. I am trying to measure honesty in two different ways. The first way is with a questionnaire which is very similar to other questionnaires you have probably completed. The other way is with a specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. This is the test psychologists are using when they ask people to look at inkblots and then tell them what they see. It is used by psychologists to indirectly measure personality. For instance, psychologists who work with prison inmates use it because inmates sometimes try to lie about what they are really like. By using the Rorschach, these psychologists get accurate information about the inmates.

Now that you have learned the nature of this study, I must give you the opportunity to withdraw from participating if you want to. Do you still want to participate? (PAUSE)

7. Honesty and Truthfulness X No Rorschach X Discrepancies Presentation.

This is a study about honesty. Honesty is that characteristic of people which influences them to be truthful about themselves and their experiences. Many psychologists believe that the honesty of people in our society is deteriorating. But I don't believe that is true
because their conclusions are based on what I believe is a poor approach to the measurement of honesty. I am trying to measure honesty in two different ways. They are both questionnaires which are very similar to other questionnaires you have probably completed.

I will give you one of the questionnaires about honesty first. When you are finished with it, I will give you the other. After you have finished both tests I will compare the results from these two tests. If there are discrepancies between your results on these two tests, I would like to talk with you about your answers on the questionnaires, so that I can understand why there are differences between your scores on the two different tests.

Now that you have learned the nature of this study, I must give you the opportunity to withdraw from participating if you want to. Do you still want to participate? (PAUSE)

8. Honesty and Truthfulness X No Rorschach X No Discrepancies Presentation.

This is a study about honesty. Honesty is that characteristic of people which influences them to be truthful about themselves and their experiences. Many psychologists believe that the honesty of people in our society is deteriorating. But I don’t believe that is true because their conclusions are based on what I believe is a poor approach to the measurement of honesty. I am trying to measure honesty in two different ways. They are both
questionnaires which are very similar to other questionnaires you have probably completed.

I will give you one of the questionnaires about honesty first. When you have finished it I will give you the other.


This is a study about form effects in psychological measurement. Form effects in psychological measurement are those effects which come from the way psychological variables are measured. I am trying to measure psychological variables in two different ways. The first way is with a questionnaire which is very similar to other questionnaires you have probably completed. The other way is with a specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. This is the test psychologists are using when they ask people to look at inkblots and then tell them what they see. It is used by psychologists to indirectly measure personality. For instance, psychologists who work with prison inmates use it because inmates sometimes try to lie about what they are really like. By using the Rorschach, these psychologists get accurate information about the inmates.

I will give you the questionnaire first. When you are finished with it, I will give you the specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. After you have finished both tests I will compare the results from these two tests. If
their are discrepancies between your results on these two
tests, I would like to talk with you about your answers on
the questionnaire, so that I can understand why there are
differences between your scores on the two different tests.

Now that you have learned the nature of this study, I must
give you the opportunity to withdraw from participating if
you want to. Do you still want to participate? (PAUSE)

10. Form Effects in Measurement X Rorschach X No
Discrepancies Presentation.

This is a study about form effects in psychological
measurement. Form effects in psychological measurement are
those effects which come from the way psychological
variables are measured. I am trying to measure psychological
variables in two different ways. The first way is with a
questionnaire which is very similar to other questionnaires
you have probably completed. The other way is with a
specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test. This is
the test psychologists are using when they ask people to
look at inkblots and then tell them what they see. It is
used by psychologists to indirectly measure personality.
For instance, psychologists who work with prison inmates use
it because inmates sometimes try to lie about what they are
really like. By using the Rorschach, these psychologists
get accurate information about the inmates.

Now that you have learned the nature of this study, I must
give you the opportunity to withdraw from participating if
you want to. Do you still want to participate? (PAUSE)

11. Form Effects in Measurement X No Rorschach X
Discrepancies Presentation.

This is a study about form effects in psychological measurement. Form effects in psychological measurement are those effects which come from the way psychological variables are measured. I am trying to measure psychological variables in two different ways. They are both questionnaires which are very similar to other questionnaires you have probably completed.

I will give you one of the questionnaires. When you are finished with it, I will give you the other. After you have finished both tests I will compare the results from these two test. If their are discrepancies between your results on these two tests, I would like to talk with you about your answers on the questionnaires, so that I can understand why there are differences between your scores on the two different tests.

Now that you have learned the nature of this study, I must give you the opportunity to withdraw from participating if you want to. Do you still want to participate? (PAUSE)

12. Form Effect in Measurement X No Rorschach X No Discrepancies Presentation.

This is a study about form effects in psychological measurement. Form effects in psychological measurement are those effects which come from the way psychological
variables are measured. I am trying to measure psychological variables in two different ways. They are both questionnaires which are very similar to other questionnaires you have probably completed.

I will give you one of the questionnaires first. When you have finished it I will give you the other.
Appendix F

The actual experiment is now complete, however, this last set of questions is the most important part of my study. I respectfully ask that you answer these questions as thoughtfully and accurately as possible. (Circle the number which reflects how you felt during the study.)

1. As the study was being explained to you, before you filled out the questionnaires, how much did you believe this study was about morality?

   -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
   Not at all Not very Uncertain Somewhat Completely much

2. Before you filled out the questionnaires, if you did not believe the study was about morality, what did you suspect it might be about?

3. As you filled out the paper and pencil questionnaires, how much did you believe this study was about morality?

   -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
   Not at all Not very Uncertain Somewhat Completely much

4. As you filled out the questionnaires, if you did not believe the study was about morality, what did you suspect it might be about?

5. As the study was being explained to you, the experimenter stated that he believed the morality of people has not declined in recent years. How much did you believe him?

   -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
   Not at all Not very Uncertain Somewhat Completely much

6. If you did not believe the experimenter, what did you suspect the experimenter actually believed?
7. Before you responded to the specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test, how accurately did you expect it could measure your own level of morality?

-4  -3  -2  -1  0  +1  +2  +3  +4
Not at all accurately accurately accurately
Not very accurately accurately accurately
Uncertain accurately accurately accurately
Somewhat accurately accurately accurately
Very accurately accurately accurately

8. Have you ever studied or taken the Rorschach Inkblot Test? (Please Circle the appropriate response)

Yes  No
If yes, which?  Studied  Taken

9. How concerned were you about having to discuss discrepancies in your test results with the experimenter?

-4  -3  -2  -1  0  +1  +2  +3  +4
Not at all concerned concerned concerned
Not very concerned concerned concerned
Uncertain concerned concerned concerned
Somewhat concerned concerned concerned
Very concerned concerned concerned
Appendix G

Debriefing Instructions

Instructions for subjects immediately following the experiment

1) Now that you have finished the last questionnaire, I would like to tell you some things about my study to help you understand why the study was introduced to you the way it was, and to help you understand the phenomena I am studying.

2) This study is designed to investigate a few of the variables which affect the information people disclose about themselves to psychologists. The study utilizes theories from two fields in psychology: 1) impression management, which comes from social psychology, and 2) social desirability, which comes from the field of psychometrics or the study of psychological measurement techniques. Basically, these theories are concerned with how people present themselves to others.

3) Impression management theories suggests that people sometimes behave in ways that are dependent on the image they would like people to have of them. For instance, the professional wrestlers you may have seen on t.v. probably act in different ways than comedians you may have seen. The wrestler depends on being seen as aggressive while the
comedian wants to be seen as funny. In both cases they are probably doing things which reflect the way they really are, but nonetheless their behaviors are different.

4) Social desirability theories suggest that when responding to questionnaires, some people tend to answer in ways that are socially acceptable because that's the way many people learn to respond to questionnaires.

5) Dr. Barry Schlenker, a professor at the University of Florida, has suggested there are three things which affect the tendency of people to act in ways which will develop a particular image: 1) the social value of the image, 2) the probability that they can successfully claim the image, and 3) negative sanctions for unsuccessfully claiming an image.

My study is designed to investigate the effect of these three variables on responses to the questionnaire you filled out. I am introducing this study in different ways and then looking at the effect the different introductions have on the questionnaire responses. However, I am only looking at differences among the different groups of people who hear the same instructions. Therefore, my results will only be reported in terms of group differences. In order to introduce this study in different ways, I had to tell you some things which were untrue.

6) I told you that many psychologists believe the moral integrity (honesty) of people in our society has declined in recent years. I don't really know what psychologists believe
about the moral integrity (honesty) of people in our society. I told you that so that you would believe the study was about moral integrity (honesty). My instructions to another group of subjects indicate that this study is about honesty and a final group is hearing that the study is about form effects in psychological measurement. By introducing the study in different ways, I am hoping to increase the value of a particular image, e.g. moral integrity, honesty, none. Perhaps you can imagine how differing instructions might have different effects on how one answers the questionnaire you filled out?

7) I also told you that you would be taking a specialized version of the Rorschach Inkblot Test that could also measure moral integrity (honesty). The multiple choice version of the Rorschach you completed was an actual version of the Rorschach which was introduced in 1943. However, this version really has no validity in measuring moral integrity (honesty). This version of the Rorschach is no longer used very much today because most psychologists believe the multiple choice format invalidates the test. Also, in the instructions of my study, I indicated that the Rorschach is often used by psychologists to detect lying. While it is true that it is much more difficult to dissimulate responses to the Rorschach than other tests, that is not the main reason psychologists use it. It is a very common personality test which when used correctly can
be very useful in helping the people with whom psychologists work. I included the Rorschach in my instructions because I wanted you to believe I had a way of getting at the truth. I am only telling half the subjects about the Rorschach. The other half I am telling I have 2 different paper and pencil tests for measuring moral integrity (honesty). Again you may be able to see how telling an individual that their responses can be cross-checked for accuracy may change their approach to the test.

8) Finally, I told you that when you were finished with both tests I would be comparing your answers from each test so that I could talk with you about any discrepancies. I told you that because I wanted you to feel a need to answer honestly. However, I am not really interested in consistency. I wanted you to believe that if you did not respond accurately you would have to face up to inconsistencies. Some subjects are not being told that I will compare the results of the two tests. Once more perhaps you can see how people might approach the tests differently, depending on whether they will be questioned about their responses or not?

9) The questionnaire you filled out is the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding. It was constructed by Dr. Leroy Paulhus, a professor at the University of British Columbia. It is designed to measure inaccuracies in self-report. Thus, my study involves giving subjects different
instructions and then looking for group differences in the BIDR scores depending on the instructions the individuals heard. Do you have any questions or comments about the study?

10) Finally, I have one last thing I need to say. The results from this experiment may make an important contribution to our knowledge of how people present themselves to others under different circumstances. Additionally, I have spent more than a year putting this thesis study together and it really represents an important milestone in my career. However, I need your cooperation on with one other thing if this study is going to produce accurate data. Since this study includes deception, I respectfully ask that you do not discuss with anyone the nature of my study. All my hard work will be lost if the nature of my study becomes common knowledge in the subject pool. Will you keep your experiences here today to yourself?

11) Thank very much for your participation today. If you would like to see the results from this study, please put your name and summer address on the sign-up sheet and I will send you a copy of the report.

Instructions for subjects who withdraw from the study

I want to thank you for coming today. I understand and respect that sometimes research subjects are not comfortable
with the experiment as they learn more about what will be required of them. You will receive full credit for coming today.

I would like to tell you a little bit about the study to help you understand why I explained it to you the way I did.

This study is designed to investigate a few of the variables which affect the information people disclose about themselves to psychologists. The study utilizes theories from two fields in psychology: 1) impression management, which comes from social psychology, and 2) social desirability, which comes from the field of psychometrics or the study of psychological measurement techniques. Basically, these theories are concerned with how people present themselves to others.

Impression management theories suggests that people sometimes behave in ways that are dependent on the image they would like people to have of them. For instance, the professional wrestlers you may have seen on t.v. probably act in different ways than comedians you may have seen. The wrestler depends on being seen as aggressive while the comedian wants to be seen as funny. In both cases they are probably doing things which reflect the way they really are, but nonetheless their behaviors are different.

Social desirability theories suggest that when responding to questionnaires, some people tend to answer in ways that are socially acceptable because that's the way many people
learn to respond to questionnaires.

Dr. Barry Schlenker, a professor at the University of Florida, has suggested there are three things which affect the tendency of people to act in ways which will develop a particular image: 1) the social value of the image, 2) the probability that they can successfully claim the image, and 3) negative sanctions for unsuccessfully claiming an image.

My study is designed to investigate the effect of these three variables on responses to the questionnaire you would have filled out. I am introducing this study in different ways and then looking at the effect the different introductions have on the questionnaire responses. However, I am only looking at differences among the different groups of people who hear the same instructions. Therefore, my results will only be reported in terms of group differences. In order to introduce this study in different ways, I had to tell you some things which were untrue. I told you that many psychologists believe the moral integrity (honesty) of people in our society has declined in recent years. I don't really know what psychologists believe about the moral integrity (honesty) of people in our society. I told you that so that you would believe the study was about moral integrity (honesty). My instructions to another group of subjects indicate that this study is about honesty and a final group is hearing that the study is about form effects in psychological measurement. By introducing the study in
different ways, I am hoping to increase the value of a particular image, e.g. moral integrity, honesty, control. Perhaps you can imagine how differing instructions might have different effects on how one answers the questionnaire you filled out?

I also told you that when you were finished with both tests I would be comparing your answers from each test so that I could talk with you about any discrepancies. I told you that because I wanted you to feel a need to answer honestly. However, I am not really interested in consistency. I wanted you to believe that if you did not respond accurately you would have to face up to inconsistencies. Some subjects are not being told that I will compare the results of the two tests. Again, perhaps you can see how people might approach the tests differently, depending on whether they will be questioned about their responses or not?

The questionnaire you would have filled out is the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding. It was constructed by Dr. Leroy Paulhus, a professor at the University of British Columbia. It is designed to measure inaccuracies in self-report. Thus, my study involves giving subjects different instructions and then looking for group differences in the BIDR scores depending on the instructions the individuals heard. Do you have any questions or comments about the study?
Finally, I have one last thing I need to say. The results from this experiment may make an important contribution to our knowledge of how people present themselves to others under different circumstances. Additionally, I have spent more than a year putting this thesis study together and it really represents an important milestone in my career. However, I need your cooperation on with one other thing if this study is going to produce accurate data. Since this study includes deception, I respectfully ask that you do not discuss with anyone the nature of my study. All my hard work will be lost if the nature of my study becomes common knowledge in the subject pool. Will you keep your experiences here today to yourself?

Thank you very much for your participation today. If you would like to see the results from this study, please put your name and summer address on the sign-up sheet and I will send you a copy of the report.
Appendix H

Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding for Social Desirability Scale Value Rating

Directions: Below are 40 statements which might be used in describing another person. Please rate each of the 40 statements as to how socially desirable or socially undesirable you consider it to be when used to describe other people. We are not interested in whether the statement does or does not describe you. Just rate it according to how socially desirable or undesirable you consider it to be if applied to other people in general. Use the rating scale shown below in making your ratings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Meaning of Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Extremely Undesirable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Strongly Undesirable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Moderately Undesirable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mildly Undesirable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>NEUTRAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mildly Desirable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Moderately Desirable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Strongly Desirable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Extremely Desirable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Your task is to read and rate the social desirability of each of the statements in the test booklet using the rating scale shown above. Remember that you are to judge the statements in terms of whether you consider them to be socially desirable or undesirable when applied to other people. We are not interested in whether a statement does or does not describe you. Be sure to make a judgement about each statement.

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1. His first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.
2. It would be hard for him to break any of his bad habits.
3. He doesn’t care to know what other people really think of him.
4. He has not always been honest with himself.
5. He always knows why he likes things.
6. He doesn’t know what his major strengths and weaknesses are.
7. Once he’s made up his mind, other people can seldom change his opinion.
8. He is not a safe driver when he exceeds the speed limit.
9. He is fully in control of his own fate.
10. It’s hard for him to shut off a disturbing thought.
11. He never regrets his decisions.
12. He sometimes loses out on things because he can't make up his mind soon enough.
13. The reason he votes is because he believes his vote can make a difference.
14. He believes his parents were not always fair when they punished him.
15. He is a completely rational person.
16. He rarely appreciate criticism.
17. His solutions to problems are original and effective.
18. He has sometimes doubted his ability as a sex partner.
19. It's alright with him if some people happen to dislike him.
20. He doesn't always know the reasons why he does the things he does.
21. He sometimes tell lies if he has to.
22. He never cover up his mistakes.
23. There have been occasions when he has taken advantage of someone.
24. He never swears.
25. He sometimes tries to get even rather than forgive and forget.
26. He always obey laws, even if he's unlikely to get caught.
27. He has said something bad about a friend behind his or her back.
28. When he hears people talking privately, he avoids listening.
29. He has received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.
30. He always declares everything at customs.
31. When he was young he sometimes stole things.
32. He has never dropped litter on the street.
33. He sometimes drives faster than the speed limit.
34. He never reads sexy books or magazines.
35. He has done things that he doesn't tell other people about.
36. He never takes things that don't belong to him.
37. He has taken sick-leave from work or school even though he wasn't really sick.
38. He has never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it.
39. He has some pretty awful habits.
40. He doesn't gossip about other people's business.