Ontological status of the archetypal image

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THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF THE ARCHETYPAL IMAGE

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CHAPTER I

GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND INTENT

Transcendental philosophies, that is philosophies which posit an a priori structuring of consciousness such that there are patterned dispositions of cognition, arise out of the difficulties involved with various analyses of the world. An analysis of a particular problem may yield certain results while another analysis will yield different, perhaps conflicting, results; yet both analyses will be self-justifying, coincide with the facts, or appear to have inner consistency. This conflict calls into question the ultimate validity of both analyses and militates against the possibility of even approaching an adequate or valid understanding of the world. Transcendental philosophy seeks to analyze the problems at a deeper level which will overcome these difficulties. It attempts to do this, in part, by analyzing the analysis. This is done by inquiry into the presuppositions of the analyses and specifying the horizons of their operations. Or in terms of cognition in general, it attempts to delimit horizons of cognition by an inquiry into its structuring agents. But transcendental philosophy always fails itself in that an inquiry into the structuring agents is always and ineluctably through those same agents which
finally elude analysis. Further, while transcendental philosophy uncovers and delimits possibilities, it is incapable of ascertaining the importance of any one of the possibilities. Nothing announces itself as meaningful in the equally arbitrary possibilities.

As a philosophical position, transcendental philosophy may be ultimately untenable, but, as a mode of analysis, it has been used fruitfully to clarify naïve argument and to guide discussion into productive areas. Heidegger's *Being and Time*, for example, which deals with the structure and status of man's existence and with the question of Being, grew in part out of the background of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. The analysis is in terms of man's existential horizons. Heidegger's use of transcendental phenomenology in *Being and Time* is highly sophisticated and reflects this extensive background. This sophistication allows an articulate expression of his ideas. The "philosophy-psychology" of C. G. Jung, on the other hand, emerges from a background of biology and Freudian psychology, and grows into a sort of transcendental philosophy out of his experiences with patients and his studies of cultures and mythologies. His findings of universal areas of meaning and their imagery as revealed in dreams, mythology, and in ongoing experiencing led him to posit the archetypes as transcendental factors. Jung's chief goal was not a philosophical system, but rather a methodology for helping patients. He considered his
methodology important for the "normal" as well as the sick." Because of his concern with therapeutic methodology, his "philosophy" consequently suffers. It is unsophisticated and troubled by a lack of an adequate terminology which would properly express his ideas. It is, on the other hand, innovative and speaks to central issues which are neglected by more sophisticated philosophies. In this sense, the "philosophy" of C. G. Jung is important to the philosophic tradition.

It is the intent of this paper to attend to selected areas of Jung's "philosophy" which are of ontological import and to precision them in terms of Heidegger's transcendental ontology as set forth in Being and Time. The precisioning will be toward establishing the ontological status of archetypal regions which will in turn speak to areas of difficulty or impasse in traditional transcendental approaches. The paper is not intended to be a critique of Being and Time or of Heidegger's philosophy as a whole; rather Being and Time is used as a point of departure and reference to precision an important ontological area.
CHAPTER II

THE ARCHETYPAL IMAGE

Jung calls transcendental factors archetypes. The archetypes, according to Jung, are motifs which arrange the functioning of the psyche into patterns but are not directly observable. They are a priori inborn forms of perception and apprehension which are necessary a priori determinants of all psychic processes. Whenever one observes uniform and regularly recurring modes of apprehension, he is dealing with an archetype. Anxiety and the desire to belong are such universal modes. The existentials explicated in Being and Time are in this sense archetypes. Jung states:

Just as we have been compelled to postulate the concept of an instinct determining or regulating our conscious actions, so, in order to account for the uniformity and regularity of our perceptions, we must have recourse to the correlated concept of a factor determining the mode of apprehension. It is the factor which I call the archetype or primordial image. The primordial image might suitably be described as the instinct's perception of itself, or as the self-portrait of the instinct, in exactly the same way as consciousness is an inward perception of the objective life-process.


2 Ibid., pp. 137-138.

3 Ibid., pp. 136-137.
Jung's distinction between instinct and archetype is unclear. At times the definition of archetype seems to include instinct within it; at other times a separation is emphasized in which instincts institute fairly specific actions and archetypes institute an apprehension of those acts and of the relationship with the world in general. In both cases, however, archetypes function to establish an understanding of the world; that is, their functioning is toward meaning.

Archetypes as transcendental motifs reflect what is constant and meaningful in the world. One is always faced with his own death, for example, recognition of which affects man's relationship with himself and the world. The totality of archetypes Jung calls the collective unconscious. The collective unconscious is not to be confused with the personal unconscious. The latter consists of contents acquired from personal experience but later falling below the threshold of consciousness. The former is unconscious in the sense that its contents were never conscious but are universally present as structural motifs for and prior to all cognition.

Although the concept of the unconscious is not generally part of the working terminology of transcendental

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philosophy, the theme is ubiquitous and the term itself is not entirely foreign. Husserl states, for example,

While the corresponding intentionality is being executed, while it is flowing in this manner as an objectivatingly productive living, it is "unconscious"—that is to say: it makes thematic, but it itself is, for that very reason and as a matter of essential necessity, non-thematic.5

The archetypes are thematizing forces, but, insofar as an inquiry into them is done in their theme, their thematizing is never fully disclosed. The archetypes as such remain unconscious in the sense that they are never fully called into consciousness.

As fundamental structuring forces, archetypes comprise the totality of possibilities for human experiencing and relatedness to the world. The totality of archetypes and the totality of what is possible for man are coextensive by definition. The collective unconscious itself is the horizon of all horizons.

Jung distinguishes between archetype and archetypal image. The former is not directly observable and can only be recognized in archetypal images which are the manifest product of the archetypes. These archetypal images may vary in the individuals and cultures in which they are manifest, but there are universal aspects of these archetypal images which are grounded in the archetypes as such. Ancient Greece,

5Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. by Dorion Cairns, p. 34.
for example, had seafaring capabilities to relatively distant lands while in Mesopotamia distant forests provided the sought after boon, yet both the Odyssey and the Gilgamesh Epic center around the theme of the journey to distant unknown regions. Archetypes do not refer to inherited ideas, but rather to inherited modes of psychic functioning which have the potential to become actualized as archetypal images in accordance with the individual's frame of reference and with respect to ongoing external reality. Jung states that archetypes are

... forms without content, representing merely the possibilities of a certain type of perception and action. When a situation occurs which corresponds to a certain archetype, that archetype becomes activated.6

Because Jung's concern is primarily finding a therapeutic methodology (though a relatively loose one) through which a viable existence can be achieved, his concern is initially psychology and not ontology. Though through his investigations he finds that ontology (though he does not call it that) is central to his psychology, he nevertheless writes in terms of his original goal. He finds patterns of behavior which are universal in man and seem to be the key to achieving a viable existence insofar as his findings with patients indicate these dispositions must be recognized and appropriated. If they are not appropriated, their force is

6Jung, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, p. 43.
such that they will make themselves manifest in degenerate forms and seemingly unexplainable preoccupations which will block the clear appropriation of other archetypes and militate against a viable existence. This is exampled when the wilderness is viewed as a threat to society and culture that must be controlled and destroyed rather than preserved as a region which articulates a freedom and openness toward the world and ourselves.

A cursory view of his writings would seem to indicate their basis is an intersubjectivity or some form of psychologism. This is not the case. While seldom explicitly expressed, implicit throughout his writings is the acknowledgment that the world is the final objective ground. The collective unconscious mirrors the world and carries its message. Jung;

No, the collective unconscious is anything but an encapsulated personal system; it is sheer objectivity, as wide as the world and open to all the world. There I am the object of every subject, in complete reversal of my ordinary consciousness, where I am always the subject that has an object. There I am utterly one with the world, so much a part of it that I forget all too easily who I really am. "Lost in oneself" is a good way of describing this state. But the self is the world, if only a consciousness could see it. That is why we must know who we are.7

Jung's assertion that the world is the objective ground for the archetypes and human experiencing arises in part from the notion of evolution. Dispositions toward certain

7Ibid., p. 22.
actions and modes of perception arise in the evolutionary process through interaction with the world. Life itself emerged from the world. Further, perception of the world is not arbitrary and subject to any variation at will, but rather delimited by the world itself. One cannot walk through walls.

What follows is a partial summary of certain aspects of Heidegger's existential analysis as set forth in *Being and Time*. It will provide the necessary conceptual tools for an inquiry into archetypal regions. In *Being and Time* Heidegger distinguishes between two types of inquiry. Ontical inquiry is an inquiry into things and is the characteristic inquiry of the sciences. Ontological inquiry is concerned with meaning and the question of Being. While ontical inquiry deals with the categorization of entities, ontological inquiry deals with the existentials of Being as the terms of its inquiry. Being is not an entity, a collection of entities, or the most general category of entities, but existence itself. Dasein, literally "being there," is the ontological naming of what is ontically called man. What is revealed in ontical inquiry is factual. In ontological inquiry what is revealed is factual. What is at issue in *Being and Time* is the question of the meaning of Being. However, it will be shown that the issue of meaning is inadequately dealt with in

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Being and Time and that something like archetypal regions are necessary in order to adequately deal with it as an existential force. The existential analysis of Dasein is fundamental insofar as it is concerned with all the ways in which Dasein can exist and therefore encompasses all other forms of inquiry. The existential totality constitutes the final horizon of Dasein.

An aspect of Dasein's facticity is Being-in-the-world. Dasein finds itself already in a world.

With equal primordiality Dasein also possesses—as constitutive for its understanding of existence—an understanding of the Being of all entities of a character other than its own.9

The world shows itself ontically in that its entities are subject to inquiry and ontologically in that the world is determinative for Dasein's understanding of its Being. To Be for Dasein is to Be-in-the-world. The primary mode in which Dasein relates to the world is to use it. One opens a door, hammers something, and eats something before he thinks of thinking about its "nature" or "objective" properties.10

This mode of relatedness of things Heidegger calls readiness-to-hand. Describing the world in terms of things independent of their function is thus a derivative mode and is characteristically the sole subject of scientific analysis. This

9Ibid., p. 34.
10Ibid., p. 96.
mode of relating Heidegger calls the present-at-hand. In each case, Dasein is at issue for itself. What Dasein does and what happens to Dasein matters to Dasein. "That Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being is in each case mine." And because Dasein is in each case its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, "choose" itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only "seem" to do so.

Dasein can be authentic and inauthentic. Authentically eigentlich Dasein can make its possibilities its own eigen in awareness of its own existence. Inauthentically Dasein is unaware of itself, or that is to say aware of itself only as others see it. The who of Dasein is primarily encountered as the they.

We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the "great mass" as they shrink back; we find "shocking" what they find shocking. The "they," which is nothing definite, and which we all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness.

No one is responsible for the they, and yet everyone conforms to it.

Every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed. Overnight, everything that is primordial gets glossed over as something that has long been known. Everything gained by a struggle becomes just something to

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12Ibid., p. 67.
13Ibid., p. 68.
14Ibid., p. 164.
be manipulated. Every secret loses its force. This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein which we call "leveling down" [Einebnung] of all possibilities of Being.\textsuperscript{15}

Nothing is at issue and nothing is appropriated as one's own to face.

The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distinguish from the authentic Self— that is, of the Self that has been taken hold of in its own way [eigens ergriffen].\textsuperscript{16}

In this state of everydayness Dasein conceals itself.

Dasein is involved in the ready-to-hand of the world and content operating within the everyday expectations of the day. But Dasein is capable of experiencing anxiety [Angst]. Dasein may suddenly feel uncomfortable and strange as if it did not quite belong, as if something were not quite right. It is not fear of something. Nothing is troubling Dasein. But the nothing is telling. Dasein feels as if it is not at home in its world.\textsuperscript{17} In the they-world, Dasein is at home in its expectations. But if Dasein feels no longer at home, at homeness becomes an issue and, moreover, Dasein's own Being becomes an issue. Dasein cares about what is meaningful, about what is at issue for itself, about its potentiality-for-Being. Care is the ontological condition for Being-free for authenticity.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 165.
\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 167.
\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 233.
\textsuperscript{18}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 237.
In the Heideggerian analysis, the world shows itself in terms of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand. Spatiality of the present-at-hand is in terms of ontic measured space. But Dasein, fundamentally, does not live in measured space but rather the spatiality of the ready-to-hand. Heidegger:

> The "above" is what is "on the ceiling"; the "below" is what is "on the floor"; the "behind" is what is "at the door"; all "wheres" are discovered and circumspectively interpreted as we go on our ways in everyday dealings; they are not ascertained and catalogued by the observational measurement of space.19

The spatiality of ready-to-hand entities are not encountered as isolated but in spatial contexts with other entities.

> This "whither" which makes it possible for equipment to belong somewhere, and which we circumspectively keep in view ahead of us in our concernful dealings, we call the region.20

The readiness-to-hand of an entity establishes its location and function in terms of the totality of the ready-to-hand in the region. As an example Heidegger speaks of the sun

> ... whose light and warmth are in everyday use, has its own places—sunrise, midday, sunset, midnight; these are discovered in circumspection and treated distinctively in terms of changes in the usability of what the sun bestows.21

The places of the sun indicate regions of use.

The house has its sunny side and its shady side; the way it is divided up into "rooms" is oriented toward

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19 Ibid., p. 137.
20 Ibid., p. 136.
21 Ibid., p. 137.
these, and so is the "arrangement" within them, according to their character as equipment.\textsuperscript{22}

Heidegger explicates region in terms of the use of the ready-to-hand, but in his analysis of region (at least in \textit{Being and Time}) he glosses over an aspect of region which is of fundamental ontological importance. He does allude to it although he treats it just as another example of the regionality of the ready-to-hand. Speaking still in terms of the regions indicated by the positioning of the sun, he says,

Churches and graves, for instance, are laid out according to the rising and the setting of the sun--the regions of life and death, which are determinative for Dasein itself with regard to its ownmost possibilities of Being in the world.\textsuperscript{23}

The regions in this example are different from those of previous examples. In previous examples regions were shown to be contexts of usability for the ready-to-hand: it is difficult to do hard labor at midday when the sun is at its hottest; plants that require much sunlight must be oriented to receive maximum sunlight throughout the day; certain rooms of the house are cooler or warmer than others due to their exposure to the sun. The regions of the ready-to-hand are, so to speak, navigational; they are meaningful in terms of keeping cooler or being a good gardener, but they are not

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23}Ibid.
ontologically decisive, or only indirectly so, for Dasein. The death of a tomato plant is not decisive for Dasein. Death is. The regionality of the ready-to-hand is not intrinsically meaningful to Dasein. It is meaningful only in the context of what is decisive for Dasein.

The orientation of churches and graves according to the rising and the setting of the sun is neither fully ready-to-hand nor present-at-hand. Dasein does not use the orientation of churches and graves but rather is called into a selfsame orientation which attunes itself to the regions of life and death—an intrinsically meaningful attunement which is decisive for Dasein. This region does not reveal itself to Dasein as something to be used, but as something to be listened to, as something which bears a decisive message. Neither is this sort of region present-at-hand. An ontic measurement of the orientation would not reveal its significance for Dasein. Indeed, it is very close to Dasein. This ontologically decisive region is what Jung calls an archetypal image.

It should be noted that in his later writings Heidegger seldom deals with the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, but turns instead more towards what has here been called archetypal regions. The deficiencies in Being and Time, however, point to the deficiencies inherent in transcendental philosophies as a whole. They ultimately occlude the very thing which would make their enterprise vital—
meaning. The sources and grounding of meaning are covered over and remain hidden in the navigational possibilities which are explicated. Thus in traditional transcendental analysis the world becomes nihilated and Dasein's Self is preempted.

The region indicated by the orientation of churches and graves is determinative for Dasein. The orientation is not merely an agreed upon spatiality created by Dasein to stand for some thing which it finds important, but rather the orientation is a response by Dasein to a region of contexts which show themselves as holding importance for Dasein. The orientation is in terms of the region circumscribed by the rising and setting of the sun, a region which is of ontological import for Dasein, which Dasein did not create with the ready-to-hand, and which Dasein encounters in the world and responds toward in the building of its churches and the burying of its dead.

Just as the "whither" of the ready-to-hand allows for the belonging of the ready-to-hand in such a way that it makes possible for Dasein a circumspective and projective involvement in regional possibilities, so too archetypal regions are constituted such that Dasein is involved circumspectively and ahead of itself in ontologically articulate situations. Dasein's world not only shows itself as equipment for use (ready-to-hand) and objects for analysis (present-at-hand) but also as ontologically articulate for
Dasein. Dasein in this way is not only in a world, but in a world as belonging to it. Because the analysis of Dasein's comportment toward the world in *Being and Time* is restricted to two modes, the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand, the importance of a comportment which is not primarily characterized by analyzing objects or use of the world is hidden or treated misleadingly. The regions of intrinsic meaning, such as death and its correlation with the sun, go unexplicated as such. Instead when they inevitably arise (in the analysis of death, for example), they are fit rather uncomfortably into the existing analytical framework. The analysis thus suffers in that it fails to fully ground Dasein in "lasting" regions which are not subject to ontical or utilitarian dismissal. And it suffers in that the status of the world is relegated to limiting horizons off which Dasein, so to speak, bounces in finding its way in the world, rather than as the source of meaning and grounding force of Dasein's Being which Jung's archetypal analysis shows it to be. Jung's analysis recognizes the archetypal regions as the grounding force towards which Dasein must turn and the images of the world as directive toward that end. As a traditional phenomenological approach shows, the world provides navigational boundaries, but to think of the world merely in this way distorts the totality of what the world holds. Jung's archetypal approach shows the world to have a special significance. It directs Dasein to its regions of meaning which
allow Dasein to attune itself to "what matters" and so fully be itself. What is authentically Dasein's own is articulated in the world. Dasein and the world are bound in a belonging to Dasein's Being. That is, what is ontologically decisive for Dasein and belongs to it as its own belongs also to the world.

Meaning is an existential. It is part of the facticity of Dasein that meaning is a fundamental aspect of its Being. This is revealed not only in meaningful situations as in the regions of life and death, but also in meaninglessness. Meaninglessness matters to Dasein and reveals meaning as an existential concern of Dasein. Dasein does not merely create meaning in a meaningless world. Dasein is always already in a world in which meaning is an issue. The separation of meaning from the world occurs only in isolated ontical analysis which excludes the ontological. In ontical analysis, if objects are analyzed as apart from Dasein, then of course meaning does not appear, for meaning shows itself only when it resonates that which is able to receive meaning—Dasein. In ontological analysis, there is no subject-object schism as such and thus meaning is revealed as belonging at the same time to the world and to Dasein. Heidegger's analysis in Being and Time is accurate in that it shows that meaning belongs at the same time to the world and to Dasein, but it is misleading in that it deals with meaning from a navigational standpoint and fails to disclose fully the
intrinsic meaning of archetypal regions which ground Dasein simultaneously in itself and the world and upon which navigational meaning is ultimately dependent for its status as meaningful.

Archetypal images are not only static referents—sunrise as region of birth, sunset as region of death—but also refer to existential regions of involvement and movement among and through regions which tie together the existentialia of Dasein. An aspect of the image of the sun is that of bringing to light and making present. In its region of day, it brings illumination and presence to the things of the world. The journey of the sun across the sky connects and relates the regions of sunrise and sunset—the regions of birth and death—and corresponds to Dasein's journey whose Being in its region of day is the making present of Being. The coming into Being of Dasein and the termination of Dasein's existence are tied together through its journey.

Without the archetypes, the bearers of intrinsic meaning, navigational events would be isolated, fragmented, and void of meaning. Since they are not in themselves meaningful, they would exist as empty events towards nothing. But meaning is an existential, and the navigational events are toward the intrinsically meaningful which reaches back to embrace and unify them and to infuse them with the meaning of the regions. Thus, the "Da-Sein" is more than a mere series of things and events occurring in the space between
the horizons of birth and death; it is authentically a weaving of archetypes which ties together and unifies "Da-Sein" meaningfully.

Archetypal images are often rejected, dismissed, or ignored. Jung deals with this issue in terms of the one-sidedness of the conscious and the repression of the contents of the unconscious. Such an approach functions well therapeutically, but in terms of a rigorous ontology it falls short in that it tends to focus on the consciousness of man and in so doing does not adequately deal with the world as the "objectivating" source of these images. It is necessary, therefore, to turn to Heidegger's analysis of everydayness and death which is more fully capable of handling the ontological status of the world and Dasein's relation to it.

In everydayness, the they passes off archetypal images as something that everyone knows anyway. The they grants that sunrise sometimes symbolizes birth and because the they "understands" what sunrise means it can dismiss it as something it already knows and thus close itself off from the possibility of entering the region. The they acknowledges that sunset sometimes symbolizes death and in doing so takes an "objective" view which distances itself from what is decisive for it. The they protects Dasein from making the region its own. Archetypal images may be rejected as being meaningless to ontical analysis (of the present-at-hand) and as irrelevant to everyday functioning (the ready-to-hand).
Archetypal regions may be concealed by an analysis "in favor" of these regions if the analyst operated only from the distance of analysis and fails himself to enter into the regions of concern and make them his own. Archetypal images may be rejected on the grounds that their meaning is only ascribed secondarily and only after what is at issue is revealed previously by some analysis. But Dasein does not first of all analyze the world; rather it first inhabits it and moves in and through its regions. The analysis is dependent upon and grounded in these regions and not vice versa. Dasein is struck with and taken into an involvement with a sunset before it analyzes it. Archetypal regions resonate and are somehow meaningful for Dasein before it is at all clear or articulate what is meant. But the regions, too, seem to lead into and call for articulation. As the sun slips past the horizon and the world begins to darken, Dasein may be turned toward its own nightfall and to circumspective concern toward what is at issue for itself. They may reject these regions, as for example when Dasein flees from a facing of its death into the more comfortable oblivion of everydayness, but authentically these regions involve Dasein in articulating and making its own what it is. The regions may be rejected but if appropriated openly their numinosity draws Dasein into deeper involvements with the region and with itself. The region of sunset calls circumspectively into question the nature of the journey just completed and
correspondingly calls into question each Dasein in the midst of its own journey between its horizons of birth and death.

The they appropriated the journey as that which happens between birth and death. Calling that space "journey" seems a bit odd to the they. The space between birth and death is more generally called one's life. While life may at times be a numinous term, it is more often a passive category which describes oneself without specifically involving oneself. Life is the space between birth and death which describes a status of all sentient beings and which also therefore applies to the status of oneself. As one's life, the space between the horizons of birth and death is relegated to the they. Heidegger speaks of the leveled down in-between when he says:

Dasein does not fill up a track or stretch "of life"—one which is somehow present-at-hand—with the phases of its momentary actualities. It stretches itself along in such a way that its own Being is constituted in advance as a stretching-along.24

Thus Dasein authentically is not involved isolatedly with things and events but with the totality of the "in-between" which is characterized in journey. In neglecting the archetypal regions, the they attempts to operate in terms of the navigational. Things and events lack coherence, meaning disappears, and "Da-Sein" becomes the empty "in-between" of birth and death. A journey is not passive and empty, but

24Ibid., p. 426.
implies commitment. A journey is an undertaking. Life as space does not readily admit its final horizon. In journey there is recognition of the existential movement of the journeyer, Dasein, toward the region of death. Appropriated as journey, Dasein makes its venture its own in recognition of itself.

Heidegger’s analysis shows that death plays a decisive role in Dasein’s existence. Not only is it decisive in that death is the end of Dasein’s existence and therefore is horizontal for Dasein, but it may be decisive in that it can function radically to alter Dasein’s existence in its Being-in-the-world. Death is appropriated by the they as that which happens to one sometime—everybody dies. But in making death its own, that is, appropriating death authentically, Dasein not only authenticates this "phase" of its own existence but is turned toward the authenticity of its Being-in-the-world as a whole—it is this existential turning toward the totality of its ownmost possibilities which makes death a decisive factor in Dasein’s existence. Heidegger:

Dasein finds itself face to face with the "nothing" of the possible impossibility of its existence. Anxiety is anxious about the potentiality-for-Being of the entity so destined [des so bestimmten Seienden], and in this way it discloses the uttermost possibility. Anticipation utterly individualizes Dasein, and it allows it, in this individualization of itself, to become certain of the totality of its potentiality-for-Being.²⁵

²⁵Ibid., p. 310.
The possibility of its own non-being focuses Dasein's concern toward the question of Being and it turns Dasein toward its ownmost possibilities in which it is free to make itself its own.

Death thus frees Dasein for itself. The decisive and pervasive regional "where" for Dasein freed for itself is "on the journey." Dasein is always between the horizons of birth and death; authentically appropriated, Dasein is always and everywhere "on the journey." Turned toward death, Dasein is faced with its ownmost possibilities for Being. And moreover it is faced with the question "Which of these possibilities matter in the face of the final horizon?" First and foremost, the journey matters. The appropriation of the journey as one's own, turning towards one's possibilities, makes possible an authentic asking of the question "What matters?" And it is along this journey that what matters announces itself. That is, what matters "matters" in the face of death—the face which the journey is always and ineluctably turned toward.

Heidegger's analysis pointedly shows that making death one's own turns Dasein toward its ownmost possibilities of Being and unifies "Da-Sein" by relating it to its possibilities. But not all possibilities matter "in the end," and it is a failing of the analysis that it is not able to deal specifically with "what matters." Dasein can only be fully unified, related, and meaningful when it takes up with
its archetypal possibilities specifically. Heidegger's analysis lacks a concept which would designate a movement of appropriation that is open to all possibilities and yet is particularly attuned and receptive to the specific archetypal possibilities which are ontologically decisive. The journey, properly understood, is such an ontological movement and comportment and fulfills this lack.

The end of the journey is death. Death is the final horizon for Dasein and makes possible the journey itself. But if the end of the journey is death, is this also its goal? In one sense it is—the goal is the culmination of the journey—thus death is journey's goal. But while decisively important, this goal does not belong just to the journey but to all the possibilities of Dasein. It is legitimate, then, to ask what differentiates journey as an existential, that is, to ask what is the journey's goal which it admits to in its own involvement toward it; and similarly to inquire into the nature of its path. That is, what characterizes Dasein which is on the journey, and where does Dasein go on its way toward death?

The appropriation of the journey as one's own which makes possible an authentic asking of the question "What matters?" involves a capability of Dasein which is called understanding. The viability of the question "What matters?" is dependent upon the possibility of an articulate comprehension of what is at issue and a concernful openness to
that which speaks to "what matters." The constitution of understanding is thus significant to Dasein, who is on the journey. Heidegger provides the basis for the analysis:

If the term "understanding" is taken in a way which is primordially existential, it means to be projecting towards a potentially-for-Being for the sake of which any Dasein exists.\(^{26}\)

Heidegger explicates the inauthentic and authentic modes of understanding with respect to the three ecstases of time: past, present, and future. In the authentic future characterized by anticipation, Dasein moves toward its Self in terms of coming to meet its ownmost possibilities. Inauthentically future is characterized by expecting in which Dasein waits for possibilities in terms of the daily activity with which it is concerned in everydayness. Of the authentic present characterized by the "moment of vision," Heidegger says it "permits us to encounter for the first time what can be 'in a time' as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand."\(^{27}\) The inauthentic present is characterized by "making present" in which Dasein is merely involved in its everyday activities. The authentic past is characterized by repetition in which Dasein makes its own what it already is and is toward its potentiality-for-Being in the context of what it already has been. Inauthentically past is a forgetting, a backing away in the face of what Dasein

\(^{26}\)Ibid., p. 385.
\(^{27}\)Ibid., p. 388.
existentially has been.

Throughout the analysis, what characterizes the inauthentic is an anonymous or vicarious involvement in the everyday activities with the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand. Authenticity is characterized by a resoluteness and a making one's own the possibilities of ready-to-hand and present-at-hand involvements. His characterization of the authentic present examples this point when he says of the "moment of vision" that it "permits us to encounter for the first time what can be 'in a time' as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand."^{28}

Authenticity permits an encountering. But the force of the encountering permitted by authentic appropriation is not sufficiently characterized by navigational possibilities of the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand which Dasein makes it own, rather the existential force is the encounter with that which shows itself to Dasein as being intrinsically meaningful—archetypal regions. The archetypal regions are the final horizons of the "for the sake of which" towards which Dasein has its Being. The navigational is meaningful secondarily and in terms of that toward which Dasein exists. Archetypal regions may be concealed in everydayness as being irrelevant to the "important" tasks of the ready-to-hand or the findings of the present-at-hand; but Heidegger has

^{28}Ibid.
himself shown that their decisiveness for Dasein is not obviated. The archetypal region of death bears this out. Heidegger:

Even in average everydayness, this ownmost potentiality-for-Being, which is non-relational and not to be outstripped, is constantly an issue for Dasein. This is the case when its concern is merely in the mode of an untroubled indifference towards the uttermost possibility of existence.29

In this inauthentic appropriation of death which does not make death fully Dasein's own, Dasein turns away from itself in the face of its Self. When Dasein's non-Being is revealed as its own and not to be outstripped, its Being is made forcefully and urgently meaningful. So, most importantly, beyond the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand the authentic present permits an encounter with the archetypal image which speaks decisively for Dasein. This is "moment of vision" in the fullest and most proper sense in which Dasein moves toward seeing its Self.

Authenticity, then, is not characterized merely by a resoluteness and a making one's own the possibilities of ready-to-hand and present-at-hand involvements as Heidegger's analysis asserts, but most importantly it is the awareness and the making one's own archetypal possibilities encountered "on the journey"—regions of meaning which constitute the final horizons of the "for the sake of which" and which admit to no higher functional end—thereby residing in

29Ibid., p. 299.
themselves as encountered allowing Dasein to Be in these regions nearest to itself constituting its authentic Self.

Heidegger's analysis of authenticity in *Being and Time* is misleading and deficient. The final for-which and towards-which of Dasein is constituted in the archetypal regions—the intrinsically meaningful and final ground of Dasein's Being. Heidegger's analysis of death (for example) shows dramatically and decisively the importance of archetypal regions, yet his basic framework of the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand is incapable of handling the region of death as well as other archetypal regions. Death is qualitatively different from other ready-to-hand possibilities such as using doorknobs to open doors. It is different because it is not merely navigational but intrinsically meaningful and decisive for Dasein's Self. Authenticity, then, should rightfully and in the end fundamentally involve the recognition of the intrinsically meaningful archetypal regions as the decisive force for Dasein; the making one's own of these regions and the recognition of the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand as Being toward and for the archetypal regions which ground them and grant them validity. This analysis differs from Heidegger's in that it makes a third distinction in Dasein's comportment toward the world which could perhaps be called journeying—the ontological movement and comportment toward regions of archetypal significance. And it recognizes the authenticity of all
ready-to-hand and present-at-hand involvements as dependent upon archetypal regions. Dasein does not comport itself authentically merely by throwing itself into navigational possibilities as Heidegger seems to suggest, but can only comport itself authentically when it attends to archetypal possibilities which are intrinsically meaningful and ontologically determinative.

While understanding is involved in all three ecstases of time, it is primarily related to the future. Understanding projects Dasein into its possibilities as coming toward its Self. Heidegger:

Projection is basically futural; it does not primarily grasp the projected possibility thematically just by having it in view, but it throws itself into it as a possibility.\(^{30}\)

As "on the journey" Dasein is projected futurally ahead of itself toward regions of meaning which speak to "what matters." Dasein understands itself in terms of archetypal regions in which it is not yet but in which it in some sense dwells in anticipation of becoming its Self. Authentically, then, Dasein understands itself as open to archetypal regions which lie ahead of itself on the way toward death which as journey is always open, projected, and never fully resolved.

What follows is a brief and partial summary of The Epic of Gilgamesh, a four-thousand-year-old Sumerian tale of the journey of Gilgamesh, King of Uruk. The tale will provide

\(^{30}\)Ibid., p. 386.
a basis for further inquiry into journey and into regions of archetypal images. As the tale begins, Gilgamesh is a youthful, strong king unsurpassed and unbeaten in war and in love. But his energies are wearing out his subjects and devastating the kingdom. In answer to their appeal, the gods send the people Enkidu, a "natural man," untamed and the equal of Gilgamesh. Out of their confrontation a deep and inseparable friendship ensues in which each is the other's half. Together they do battle and bring back treasures for the good of the kingdom. But in slaying the Bull of Heaven they anger the gods and one of them must die. It is Enkidu. Gilgamesh is deeply grieved. He no longer feels the unconquerable warrior, but is stultified and defeated. He is a mortal like all men.

Gilgamesh undertakes a long and fearful journey into the wilderness seeking the secret of immortality. At the mountain of the sun at whose twin peaks are both sunrise and sunset he confronts and overcomes the monster guardians who are part man, part dragon. Gilgamesh walks through the mountain of the sun twelve leagues into the absolute darkness retracing the journey of the sun and emerging into the garden of the sun which is on this side of the waters of death. The sun sees Gilgamesh and hearing of his quest warns him that he will fail. From the wine goddess, Siduri, a daughter of the sun, he receives instructions for crossing the waters of death. After crossing he is put to a test. He must remain
awake if he is to have everlasting life, but in the end he cannot keep from sleep. He is told of the plant of Youth Regained which with great difficulty he is able to pluck from the bottom of the sea. But immortality again slips his grasp as a snake consumes the plant. Gilgamesh accepts his destiny and returns home.

He was wise, he saw mysteries and knew secret things, he brought us a tale of the days before the flood. He went a long journey, was weary, worn out with labour, and returning engraved on a stone the whole story.  

With the death of Enkidu, Gilgamesh's grief turns him toward the issue of his own death.

Gilgamesh traveled over the wilderness, he wandered over the grasslands, a long journey, in search of Utnapishtim, whom the gods took after the deluge; and they set him to live in the land of Dilmun, in the garden of the sun; and to him alone of men they gave everlasting life.  

The region of the sun, the region of life and death, calls Gilgamesh to undertake the journey. It is not merely one among many equal possibilities of ready-to-hand and present-at-hand involvements which present themselves to a Dasein who makes them its own, rather it is the compelling possibility which calls Dasein. A traditional phenomenology of navigational possibilities could only explicate those possibilities but it could not specify the one possibility that mattered. Thus traditional phenomenology is ultimately

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32 Ibid., p. 94.
ontologically silent. An archetypal approach does not level down Being by showing a multitude of possibilities as equally valid, but functions on behalf of Being to reveal the meaningful. Heidegger's treatment of death suggests that he is aware of possibilities which are intrinsically meaningful, specific, and ineluctably binding; but his analysis in *Being and Time* is hampered by its attachment to the traditional phenomenological approach which empties the possibilities of intrinsic meaning. Archetypal regions are ontologically directive. They are not equally arbitrary possibilities and thus voided of intrinsic meaning as are the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, rather they are articulate and specific. They direct Dasein toward its Self by indicating existential movements of attunement which accord Dasein with the world and its Self.

Initially it can be said that myth (exampled by the Gilgamesh Epic) functions as the metaphor of Being. The regions of the sun are metaphors for the regions of birth and death. But it is not metaphor in the sense of a contrived sign which is unimportant in itself and only functions to refer to the "real" object. Myth is a way in which Being shows itself. Thus myth is of fundamental ontological importance. If Dasein functions wholly within myth, however, it operates unconsciously and thus inauthentically. That is, if Dasein is absorbed wholly in myth—in the world so to say—it obliterates itself and flees from a facing of itself.
Operating along with an ontological analysis, however, myth is a force for Dasein's authenticity. An ontological analytic provides a critical framework for the circumspective concern and existential awareness necessary for authenticity. But it must also be kept in mind that myth reveals the intrinsically meaningful regions which an ontological analysis is toward. An ontological analytic must therefore finally turn to myth to show it its way.

Traditional archetypal theory has recognized the force and decisiveness of myth, but in dealing with it in terms of a therapeutic methodology it has used it first of all "because it works" and only secondarily does it attend critically to the "ontological grounding" of myth. What traditional archetypal theory has done is to provide an opening to myth and to the regions of intrinsic meaning, but it tends to deal with them more as mental forces and in so doing covers over the world. As a rigorous and analytical force it is the task of ontological inquiry to pursue the problem where traditional archetypal theory leaves off or falls short. Yet it must be remembered that archetypal theory, phenomenology, and existential ontology are themselves in a sense myths "in their own time" and as such are subject to further circumspective and thematic inquiry by future myths. New myth must study old myth to see where it is going and in this way finds and is its destiny. Taken in this extended sense, myth is the ontological force—and the face of Being.
This analysis must turn again to the Gilgamesh Epic for further clues to its direction. Gilgamesh says to Siduri, "How can I be silent, how can I rest, when Enkidu whom I love is dust, and I too shall die and be laid in the earth forever." \(^{33}\)

Turned toward death, the journey is the compelling possibility for Dasein. The comfort of the they is compromised. No longer at home, Dasein cannot rest. Yet the journey is forbidding. At the entrance to the mountain of the sun, Gilgamesh is advised, "no mortal man has gone into the mountain; the length of it is twelve leagues of darkness; in it there is no light, but the heart is oppressed with darkness." \(^{34}\)

Unsupported by the comforting parameters and expectations of everydayness, the journey leads Dasein into difficult and uncertain regions which threaten to dissolve Dasein's resoluteness and throw it again into an inauthentic comportment which shields it from these difficulties. Gilgamesh replies to the advice, "Although I should go in sorrow and in pain, with sighing and with weeping, still I must go. Open the gate of the mountain." \(^{35}\)

Firm in resoluteness, the entry is granted and engagement begins.

Emerging from the immense darkness, Gilgamesh enters

\(^{33}\)Ibid., p. 99.

\(^{34}\)Ibid., p. 95.

\(^{35}\)Ibid., p. 96.
the glorious garden of the sun. In this region he is warned by Shamash, the sun, that he will never find the life for which he is searching. Gilgamesh has turned toward the question of death as fundamental to his Being but is unable to accept it as fundamentally his own. He replies to Shamash,

Now that I have toiled and strayed so far over the wilderness, am I to sleep, and let the earth cover my head for ever? Let my eyes see the sun until they are dazzled with looking. Although I am no better than a dead man, still let me see the light of the sun.36

Gilgamesh crosses the ocean which borders the garden of the sun and ventures still farther into the wilderness in search of everlasting life.

The "where does Dasein go" on the journey toward death is wilderness. It is venture into unknown regions. Into the wilderness the they does not venture and the way is not worn with the paths of everydayness. Dasein "on the journey" understands itself as coming toward its Self; but the Self it is coming towards is not yet. Inauthentically, Dasein waits for ready-to-hand possibilities which it knows and which do not pertain to becoming its Self. Because it knows what approaches and comports itself in waiting only because it knows, it closes off possibilities which it does not know—possibilities which would function to effect its Self.

Authentically, Dasein anticipates possibilities of

36Ibid., p. 97.
intrinsic meaning which move it toward its Self. But what its Self is it does not fully know, and, because understanding is projected ahead of itself, its Self is never fully resolved. Thus, in anticipating Dasein becomes resolute in openness. The journey is not to a goal which is the journey's resolve. Authentically, the journey is appropriated as openness to what lies ahead on its way and an endlessness which though touching many regions does not take Dasein to a point of debarkation. As long as Dasein exists, that is to say as long as it is Dasein, it is "on the journey." Within the journey's horizon of death, therefore, the journey is endless. The journey is an endlessness on its way towards death. The journey, an endless openness admitting to no resolution, takes Dasein into the wilderness.

The wilderness is the region of the open. The they turns away and recoils at the wilderness. For the they it is a lawless "no man's land" (the no man which is everyone but no one—Heidegger's "they"). But it is a lawless "no man's land" only in the sense of the laws of everydayness; it is Dasein's land. The they recoils from regions in which everydayness is not extended, and it is not extended in the "lawless" wilderness. The land of the wilderness has two faces. It is the dark abyss where powerful forces threaten to destroy Dasein unprotected by the structures of everydayness. Gilgamesh is threatened by the half-man, half-scorpion monsters. Nihilism threatens Dasein unprotected by
the rules and laws and obligations of the everyday.

The they not only recoils from wilderness, but, seeing that it is a force which rejects its rules and obligations, seeks to obliterate it. Increasingly, technology gives it the power it needs. That is why the they must build roads through and log every stretch of forest. Technology gives it the power to extend itself into the wilderness, to have a productive forest, and thus save itself from the freedom to be authentic which threatens it. Threatened as it is, the they cannot rest until it has made every stretch of wilderness everyone's own—no one's own.

The other face of wilderness shows itself as the land of hidden treasures, sacred boon, and authentic possibilities. For Gilgamesh it holds the secrets of the gods. For Dasein it holds the Self. The Self it holds is not the self apart from the world as merely in it, rather the self it holds is the Dasein who has entered into its regions and participated in its images. Dasein finds that what gives it its meaning and makes it its Self is found in the regions—in the world. The world in sharing gives as possible the Self for Dasein to make its own. The Being of Dasein and the Being of the world coincide and are shared as selfsame in the archetypal regions. The regions of life, death, and journey; and the regions and path of the sun accord in showing Dasein what its Self is.

The they realizes that the wilderness over which it
now has technological power has its treasures. In fleeing from itself the they must avoid its autochthony and so it needs the wilderness for its flight. The wilderness is seen as holding treasures and thus gives it the excuse to flee from itself. It must technologically dominate and destroy the wilderness which denies its "laws" and yet it must preserve the wilderness so that it can flee from itself. In the end it attempts both and achieves neither. Recreation sites and trailer parks are instituted so that everybody may share in the recreational boon. Campsites are positioned for maximum utilization, and paths are cut and well marked so that nobody will go astray. Nothing is at issue in recreational facilities, and so the they makes itself safe from its Self by successfully preempting any possibility of involvement in wilderness. But neither can it fully flee itself for the parameters of the everyday are extended, and "not-at-homeness" remains to confront Dasein.

The archetypal image of wilderness accurately shows Dasein the "whither" of its journey. A navigational analysis is oblivious to the message of the wilderness. Wilderness is the region in which intrinsic meaning is radically and forcefully at issue. In wilderness Dasein's very Being is at stake and it is compelled to turn toward that which grounds it. If the journey is toward the Self, the question of the existential "setting" of "beginning to achieve the Self" arises; that is in what existential context does Dasein
begin to meet and be its Self? The encounter and engagement of archetypal regions constitutes part of the "setting" as the ground of the Self. Heidegger's analysis of historicality and destiny provide further clues.

How is Dasein to understand itself as it enters into archetypal regions? What has it meant to other Daseins who have entered these regions and how have they comported themselves in meeting this force of their Being? Such questions are part of the historizing (and historicality—the ontological counterpart to the historical) of Dasein. The taking over in resoluteness current possibilities of authentic existing disclosed by the historicality in which Dasein finds itself thrown is what Heidegger calls heritage. In this authentic coming back to one's throwness as its own, "Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet chosen."\(^{37}\) What Heidegger calls fate is the awareness and the making one's own the finite Being that he is. In light of Dasein's finitude and consequently the limited nature of its possibilities, Dasein's possibilities gather significance and meaning achieves urgency and numinosity. But Dasein as fateful exists as Being-with-Others. The Others also historize and this co-historizing Heidegger calls destiny.

Heidegger:

Destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates, any more than Being-with-one-another can be conceived as the occurring together of several Subjects. Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities.38

Destiny does not arise from the fates of Dasein coming together to form a sort of collective fate, rather destiny arises in advance of individual fates in Dasein's Being in the same world resolute for definite possibilities. Dasein participates in that destiny and in the moment of vision makes it its own for "its time."39 In Dasein's day, its journey between sunrise and sunset, Dasein in an authentic comporting of itself attunes itself to its destiny which discloses regions of engagement to be in its own time. "In its own time" and "for its time" mean that what has been as specific situational involvements in time and which this Dasein has never been cannot be made its own, but what has been, Dasein is, in the sense of its destiny to be its Self for its time. What has been discloses regions of its destiny which it may enter in its own specific situational involvements in its own time in its journey between its terminal horizons as Dasein. Heidegger:

Only in communicating and struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its "generation" goes to make up the full

38 Ibid., p. 436.
39 Ibid., p. 437.
authentic historizing of Dasein. 40

The entering into destiny in one's own time is achieved in the archetypal image. Without entering into archetypal regions, Dasein cannot fully be destined. In that navigational events are in themselves empty of meaning, there could be no reaching by Dasein into the past and into the future in a gathering of itself to its Self which embraces understandingly its Being. Heidegger says of destiny, "Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities." 41 But Dasein can only be fully resolute when it is resolute for something which grounds and gives reason for its resoluteness—the archetypal regions. Grounding is an ontological precondition for resoluteness. Heidegger's failure to distinguish between navigational and archetypal factors leads to the misleading conclusion that Dasein can be fully resolute and thus fully be destined for something that is in itself empty and ungrounded. Destiny discloses regions of archetypal significance. Dasein enters the regions as they are disclosed in its own time and participates in and further finds its destiny. Destiny further discloses destiny and does so for Dasein's Self in its own time. Destiny ties together and

40 Ibid., p. 436.
41 Ibid.
unifies understandingly, meaningfully, the ecstases of time. The past as destiny gives meaningful context to what is engaged in the present as Being the destiny in one's own time and is toward the future as regions of possible involvement which are destined for Dasein in being toward its Self.

Myth shows how archetypal regions operate toward and in concert with destiny. Dasein in Being toward its Self undertakes the journey into the wilderness in search of destiny. Gilgamesh ventured into the wilderness, into the garden of the sun, in search of everlasting life. But this is not the lot of man and so as Shamash had warned him his efforts are doomed to failure. He returns to Uruk empty handed—and mortal.

But in failing to achieve immortality, he succeeds in entering into his destiny. He does not merely strive in vain only to be beaten back into a state which he should have realized beforehand. Rather he has journeyed deeply into the wilderness and entered the regions of his destiny. His "failure" has enabled him to make his destiny his own, not superficially and from afar, but emphatically in its nearness. Thus, the journey itself acts on behalf of destiny and leads Dasein to its Self—its destiny not wholly dependent upon the path or goal set forth beforehand by a less authentic Dasein on the way toward its Self.

Destiny permeates present-at-hand and ready-to-hand involvements, yet the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand
do not constitute destinies nor even possibilities for a destiny "in one's own time" except in a trivial or dependent sense. The journey is a ready-to-hand possibility but it can be toward destiny only because it is more than merely ready-to-hand. The journey is an image which bears the meaning of destiny and infuses the navigational factors—the ready-to-hand involvements of the journey—with a significance which Dasein is able to enter understandingly and with a level of decisiveness made possible by the depth of what is at stake—the way in which Dasein is to be in the world.

On the journey, Gilgamesh is asked by Urshanabi,

Why are your cheeks so starved and your face drawn? Why is despair in your heart and your face like the face of one who has made a long journey; yes, why is your face burned with heat and cold, and why do you come wandering over the pastures in search of the wind?  

The climax of the question, Gilgamesh's wandering in search of the wind, is two-edged. One edge penetrates the folly. Gilgamesh has made a long journey in search of everlasting life, a destiny that is not his and cannot be. He has undertaken a tortuous journey for nothing. His quest is as foolish as searching for wind. When wind is grasped and contained, it ceases to be wind. It does not fall into the ready-to-hand or hold itself for the present-at-hand. And this points toward the other edge. The plant of youth must inevitably

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42Sandars, trans., The Epic of Gilgamesh, p. 100.
slip the grasp of Gilgamesh. It is not everlasting life which authentically calls him; it is the destiny of the region, the destiny which so to speak blows through the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand of the region and infuses it with meaning. By entering the archetypal regions, Gilgamesh so to say breathes his destiny. As authentic he is embraced by destiny in his time and breathes the breath of destiny—the infusing wind of the regions, his ontological sustenance.

The journey is one of homecoming. It is homecoming in two aspects. Heidegger provides the basis for the analysis:

This character of Being-in was then brought to view more concretely in the everyday publicness of the "they," which brings tranquillized self-assurance—"Being-at-home," with all its obviousness—into the average everydayness of Dasein. On the other hand, as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the "world." Everyday familiarity collapses. Dasein has been individualized, but individualized as Being-in-the-world. Being-in enters into the existential "mode" of the "not-at-home."43

In the everydayness of the they, Dasein functions inauthentically as separated from its destiny. It is "not-at-home." Through anxiety and being turned towards death, Dasein recognizes it as "not-at-home." In everydayness dispersed into the they, Dasein thinks itself at home. But it is only in the recognition of "not-Being-at-home" that Dasein is able to come home, is able to turn toward its Self

43Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 233.
and undertake the journey of homecoming which leads it into the regions of its destiny, where Dasein can be what its Self is, residing in what grounds, shelters, and sustains it—its ontological, thus authentic, home.

The second aspect of homecoming is the "telling of the story." Heidegger:

Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its "generation" goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein.44

In the "telling of the story," the power of destiny becomes free and Dasein is able to have fully a destiny for its time. Part of Dasein's destiny is to have it with others. The Gilgamesh Epic tells us that Gilgamesh "was wise, he saw mysteries and saw secret things, he brought us a tale of the days before the flood. He went a long journey, was weary, worn out with labour, and returning engraved on a stone the whole story."45

At this point it may be helpful to turn briefly to a later writing of Heidegger's which illustrates the continuity of archetypal themes which make possible a destiny in one's own time. The essay "Remembrance of the Poet" concerns itself with Hölderlin's poem "Homecoming." Heidegger comments:

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44 Ibid., p. 436.
45 Sandars, trans., The Epic of Gilgamesh, p. 114.
Homecoming is the return into the proximity of the source. But such a return is only possible for one who has previously, and perhaps for a long time now, borne on his shoulders as the wanderer the burden of the voyage, and has gone over into the source, so that he could there experience what the nature of the Sought-For might be, and then be able to come back more experienced as the Seeker.46

The Seeker is the one who has heard the call of the source and has undertaken the journey which grants him entry in the regions of what is most near. Heidegger attends to the second aspect of homecoming when he says "The elegy 'Homecoming' is not a poem about homecoming; rather the elegy itself, taken as the very poetry of which it is comprised, is the actual homecoming."47 The bearing of the message to those of his homeland in a sharing of destiny fulfills the destiny of the Seeker. Heidegger further relates "The 'not' is the mysterious call 'to' the others in the fatherland, to become hearers, in order that for the first time they should learn to know the essence of the homeland."48 This commentary applies also to the lines of the Gilgamesh Epic which are in lament of his death: "As in the dark month, the month of shadows, so without him there is no light. O Gilgamesh, this was the meaning of your dream."49

46 Martin Heidegger, Remembrance of the Poet, trans. by Douglas Scott, in Existence and Being, pp. 258-259.
48 Ibid., pp. 266-267.
49 Sandars, trans., The Epic of Gilgamesh, p. 115.
region of his day brings light to the people of the homeland such that they may learn to know the essence of their dwelling. Authentically, Dasein has its Being towards archetypal regions of the world which show it its Self and make it fully destined for its time. Without (that is outside of a dwelling in) archetypal regions, Dasein is groundless and self-annihilating having its fragmented "Da-Sein" in the space between its horizons of birth and death.
CHAPTER III

SUMMARY

This paper has attempted to show the inadequacy of an ontological approach which merely explicates navigational possibilities and the necessity of turning toward something like an archetypal approach which is cognizant of ontological regions of intrinsic meaning which are specific, articulate, and directive forces functioning to ground Dasein in its Self. Heidegger's approach in *Being and Time* is largely navigational and yet its most important aspects point dramatically to something beyond a merely navigational approach—a pointing which Heidegger heeds in his later writings. The images of myth, art, and the "world itself" indicate the regions of issue. Jung has dealt systematically with these regions in terms of a therapeutic methodology and in doing so has laid much of the groundwork for dealing with them. What is needed is a broader, less limited inquiry which is not bound only to "therapy." The task of this paper has been threefold: to show the importance of archetypal inquiry for the philosophic tradition, to precision the area of that inquiry in terms of an existential analytic and simultaneously clarify the direction of the existential analytic itself, and to
initiate an inquiry into archetypal regions which would be broader than a merely therapeutic approach.
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