Organizational effectiveness in the United States Army.

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ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN
THE UNITED STATES ARMY

By

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the Organizational Effectiveness (OE) program in the United States Army. Section one describes the Army's Organizational Effectiveness Program, and explains the training and goals of the program.

The second section reviews research conducted by the Army which showed a need for OE. It also explains why OE is an important aspect in developing better managerial, leadership, and organizational capabilities in the Army.

The third section describes a survey conducted by the United States Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School (OECS). The survey served as the source of evidence for this paper, therefore, methodology and methodological problems of using secondary resources will be described in this section.

The fourth section describes factors that will increase the program's level of success based on the results of the OECS survey, and the questionnaires that they sent out. This section also contains information that was obtained by telephone from Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officers (OESOs) working at various posts throughout the Army. This section also describes factors that affect the success or failure of OE operations. The accomplishments in Organizational Development (OD) in the civilian sector of American society are noted, and the various methods used to overcome problems similar to OE are analyzed. This section also describes OE techniques and compares them to civilian techniques of OD. In this way I hope to
determine what the Army can gain from civilian OD expertise.

The fifth section gives concrete recommendations for enhancing the Army's OE program, and some concluding thoughts concerning the effectiveness and efficiency of OE.
Section 1
Organizational Effectiveness is a program used to evaluate the management and leadership climate of any size unit in the United States Army. It is "a process that leads to treating people as human beings. It is the understanding that people are an important part of an organization's day-to-day activities."\textsuperscript{1} Through attention to its organizational effectiveness, the Army hopes to improve morale, motivation, commitment, development of its soldiers, and most importantly, its combat readiness.

Organizational Effectiveness (OE) is a fairly new concept in the Army, but in actuality it is a systematic adaptation of the technique used and commonly referred to as organizational development (OD) in the civilian community. A definition of OE:

Organizational Effectiveness (OE) is the systematic military application of selected management and behavioral science skills and methods to improve how the total organization functions to accomplish assigned missions and increase combat readiness. It is applicable to organizational processes (including training in interpersonal skills) and when applied by a commander within an organization, is tailored to the unique needs of the organization and normally implemented with the assistance of an organizational effectiveness staff officer (OESO).\textsuperscript{2}

The organizational effectiveness concept and the OESO provide a consulting capability to all commanders and supervisors who wish to use it. Organizational agencies are mandatory in the sense that they must be established on major Army installations and that they be available for those commanders and supervisors who wish to use them. It is however, strictly voluntary for commanders and supervisors to ask for OESO consulting expertise.
The clients, or those that request the consulting advice of the OESO, are supervisors, staff officers, or commanders who have a problem in their area of responsibility, and seek help in solving those problems. The problems can be specific, general, or unknown. Many of the common problems in the past have been in organizational areas such as planning, control, influence, or leadership.

Organizational Effectiveness staff officers volunteer for training and are carefully selected. The selection requirements for Army officers are as follows:

- Grade of captain, major, or lieutenant colonel.
- Assigned, or projected for assignment, to an authorized OESO (ASI 52) position.
- Graduate of an Officer Advance course.
- Baccalaureate-level college degree, preferably with a major concentration in one of the behavioral or management sciences.
- Promotion potential to the next higher grade.
- Troop experience at platoon, company, or higher level.³

The Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officer Course (OESOC) is a 16-week course conducted at the Fort Ord Training Center in California. The first regular course was started in January 1976. The course provides intensive training in behavioral science and theories pertaining to management and leadership, but these do, however, focus on military organizations. Organization theory and dynamics are studied in great detail. Students are taught to use the systems approach: that is, they learn to observe and study the interdependent aspects of the entire organization.⁴ A brief explanation
of the course is as follows:

The course is based on experience or practical application, and more than 25 percent of the course time is spent in field training—consulting or teaching a military unit—on various posts, under the supervision of a qualified instructor. Instructor qualification is in itself unique. A highly selected staff of PhD's and practicing consultants have been drawn together to provide the instruction. In addition, well known author-consultants such as Dr. Paul Hersey, Dr. Tony Tiley, Dr. John Sherwood, Dr. Gus Economous, Dr. John Jones, Dr. Stan Herman, and others are brought in to present portions of the course. In addition to consulting skills, students experience and then are taught to facilitate a 1-week leadership and management development course, which has gained great popularity among middle managers.5

Training of OESOs will be stressed because it will be an important variable when attempting to determine the efficiency of the program. The OESO is trained to be a fair and impartial advisor to the client who seeks his aid. Although the OESOC lasts only 16 weeks, it is academically demanding and of excellent quality. Many who have graduates from the course have stated that it is the best learning experience they have ever had—including all military schooling through CGSC (Command and General Staff College) level and graduate school.6

The OE process works in a four step activity. When an OESO is invited to act as a consultant he will first assess the unit, then help the client plan for change, next he will help implement the change, and finally he will follow up or evaluate the changes that occurred in order to determine the success of OE.

The OESO can assess the unit in several different ways and methods. "These methods include the use of historical data,
observation, individual interviews, group interviews, questionnaires, surveys, or any combination of these methods."^7

Some of the organizational processes that OESOs are generally interested in are:
- Communication
- Motivation
- Goal integration
- Planning
- Decisions
- Leadership
- Coordination
- Control
- Influence
- Conflict management

After the assessment has been made, the OESO then provides feedback to the commander, or to the client who requested the help. Feedback is given in a nonjudgmental way: the OESO does not tell the client what to do, but rather what problems the OESO has found. Often the client has already informed the OESO what problems he is having, but wants a method to overcome the problem. For instance, a commander may feel he has a communications problem, but he does not know where the filters to communication exist. It is therefore the OESO's responsibility to determine where and why these filters to communication occur.

When the feedback period occurs, the data provided are anonymous. The client is not informed where the information came from. Also, the data feedback is confidential. It is the client's choice whether or not to pass the information up or down the chain of command. Often the OESO will try to persuade the client to pass the information down the chain of command in order to improve the organizational process.
and open up communication. As the OE reference book states:

"Sharing the same information up the chain of command is a different story—depending on who is up there—and the OESO will not attempt to influence a client in that area."  

The second stage, the planning stage, is more prescriptive in nature. During this stage the client and OESO decide how to rectify the problems found during the assessment phase. The client will inform the OESO what he is able and willing to do (generally determined by time and resources available to the client and the perceived importance of the problem). The OESO will inform the client what should be accomplished and how it should be accomplished (normally based on the OESO's experience and knowledge of organizational theory). There are many ways this planning stage can go. Some of the more typical methods planned for use are:

- Team building
- Communications training
- Role clarification
- Time management
- Performance counseling training
- Meeting management
- Transition workshops
- Leadership and management development course
- Problem solving
- Conflict resolution
- Intergroup cooperation
- Goal clarification
- Process observation

During the implementation stage normally one or more of the above methods are used to overcome problems. The client, during this stage, is directly involved and takes on the role of the leader, planner, coordinator, and innovator of the process. The OESO, on the
other hand, functions as a third party negotiator of the groups.

He may serve as an exhaust valve enabling the client to let off steam; as a radiator absorbing some of the heat of the controversy, as the shock absorber when the going gets rough; or as the fog lamps when the future is hazy. The consultant may fulfill a variety of functions. But one thing he is not; he is not the driver. His responsibility is to help his client...10

The last stage of the process is the evaluation and follow-up period. This can be done weeks or months after the third stage. It is initiated in order to determine the effects of the previous action and to determine if the client requires more consultation.

The OESO's goal is to help the members of the organization to be both self-sufficient and more efficient. The OESO has absolutely no authority. His effectiveness as a consultant is solely derived from his expertise, knowledge, personality, and his ability to persuade the client that a managerial change is necessary. The client's authority is based on his legal responsibility for everything his organization does or fails to do. The OESO's authority is based entirely on his noetic ability. The OESO is totally responsible to the client who requested his assistance. He is not authorized, and in fact, is forbidden to report his findings up the chain of command.11

When an OESO is requested to provide consulting services there are many aspects of the organization that he must analyze and study. He will observe the structure, mission, technology, and personnel of the unit.

Most missions of Army combat units are normally not difficult to ascertain during war time, but during peace time it is more difficult.
The OESO must determine what the mission of the unit is in order to determine how successful the unit is, or why it has been unsuccessful.

When studying personnel of the unit/organization the OESO determines how people interact in their work and training. The OESO analyzes such interaction as cooperation, support, mission accomplishment, effective communication, appropriate decision, and commitment toward organizational goals.

Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officers determine the structure of the unit by studying the Table of Allowances which provides the number of personnel authorized by position. He analyzes the Table of Equipment to determine if the equipment authorized is on hand and adequate for mission accomplishment. When studying the formal structure, the OESO also studies the informal structure. He analyzes, for instance, who has the commander's confidence and why. He attempts to clarify and use the informal structure to the organization's advantage.

The OESO must observe the technology of the organization to insure mission accomplishment. Included in this technology observations are "equipment, the machinery, the tools used to do the job, the physical facilities, the work space, the language used to counsel or inform, how information is passed, how messages are handled, the way a unit goes about getting resources, and so forth." 12 Technological effectiveness can be observed in many ways by the OESO and often it is related to administrative efficiency.

The OESO must also determine the environment of the organization
under study. He must analyze higher headquarters requirements, other major headquarters requirements, and even the interactions that transpire between the organization and the civilian community. The OESO will study and observe the chain of command to include officers and key noncommissioned officers. "Individually and collectively, these people are involved in some capacity with the commander in setting goals and objectives, establishing plans, supervising, directing, training, and developing the unit in general."

The OE manual's summary of organizational effectiveness states:

It is not an approach to say, 'Let us do something to make the troops 'feel' better.' It is a management approach that considers the people aspect of an organization in perspective with other critical elements. The real focus is on improving the organization's ability to accomplish its mission. If people 'feel better' after an OE operation, that's good but it's not the reason on which an OE operation is based.

Before explaining the steps that an OESO takes in determining organizational problems and solutions to those problems it is necessary to explain the assumptions, goals, and conditions that must be accepted to individuals before the process can be helpful. The following is taken from the Organizational Effectiveness Reference Book, published by the United States Army Command and General Staff College:

**Assumptions**

- Commanders have the responsibility for insuring that all decisions are consistent with mission accomplishment.
- Commanders have the responsibility for insuring that decisions are supported by understandable goals.
- Groups of individuals are the building blocks of an organization.
- Personal commitment to goals is more than just personal agreement with goals.
- The performance of soldiers is directly influenced by the way they are managed/led.
- Commands function more effectively when individual and command goals are aligned.
- Soldiers support best those things they are a part of.

Goals. Given these assumptions about soldiers in organizations, the goal of OE is to enhance those activities in the command that will result in:

- Informed and involved soldiers.
- Alignment of individual and organizational goals.
- Forward planning—better management of time.
- More realistic/achievable objectives.
- Continuous two-way flow of accurate information.
- Greater cooperation within the command.
- A climate where problems and differences are effectively dealt with and resolved.
- Management/leadership by goals more than controls.
- Timely and more widely accepted command decisions.
- A command that responds effectively to change.

Conditions. For the OE process to be successful in an organization, certain conditions must exist. There must be:

- Command commitment to initiate the OE process and to continue the process once begun.
- Command willingness to allow groups to be a part of the planning process.
- Command willingness to accept feedback (usually perceived as a personal risk).
- Command commitment to provide the necessary resources to support the process.
Section II

We may ask why OE is important to the United States Army. The following reasons are by no means all-inclusive; however, it does provide us with an understanding of why OE can benefit the United States Army.

1. With the all-volunteer Army we no longer have unlimited manpower resources. Army managers must be taught to carefully and wisely use people resources.

2. In the 1970's pressure occurred from field commanders to adopt some form of better managing and leadership techniques, prompting the Army to initiate OE.16

3. Like all large government organizations, only limited funds are available to the Army. Army managers must, therefore, be taught to use these funds for maximum return.

4. A study conducted by the Army War College in the early 1970's dealing with professionalism and leadership showed a necessity for OE.17

5. A behavioral science study conducted by the Office of the Chief of Staff in the early 1970's showed that a program like OE was required.18

6. Our society has changed a great deal in the last two decades, and one must keep in mind that the United States Army reflects our society. Leadership and management techniques have changed drastically in other organizations, but the Army has not always kept pace. The Organizational Effectiveness Program is a way
to use and understand these new techniques and principles, and a way to keep up with the rest of society. If the Army does not keep up with society in the realm of leadership and management, it will have more and more difficulties in attracting people to the all-volunteer force.

Since 1975, when about 200 OESOs were assigned to various Army levels, evaluations have been periodically conducted in order to ascertain the effectiveness, responsiveness, and acceptance of OE. The last external evaluation was started on 31 June 1979. This author has the results of that survey. Later, it will explain how it was conducted. After closely studying the results of the survey conducted, I have been able to identify many problem areas concerning OE in the United States Army.

The most important problem is to determine if OE is doing what it is supposed to do. Are people who have used the OESO more effective in their organizational process than they were before they used the OESO and the OE concept?

This paper is an attempt to determine existing variables that hinder the use and benefits of OE. Variables such as: interaction among OESOs and senior officers, confidentiality of OESO's findings, problem areas concerning the four step process, and the training received by the OESOs.

This paper will compare problem areas in OE with problem areas in civilian organizational development (OD). An attempt will be made to ascertain the degree of similarity among these problems, and how
civilians overcame the various problem areas they experienced.
Section III

The results for this paper are in part taken from a survey and evaluation conducted by the Directorate of Evaluation, United States Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School (OECS).

A questionnaire was sent out to OESOs on 21 June 1979. Its purpose was to assess the OE program and curriculum. Almost all OE students who graduated before 1979, and who remained on active duty, received a questionnaire. January 1979 was the cut-off to insure that respondents had been in the field at least 6 months. Four-hundred and thirty-seven questionnaires were mailed.

On 6 August 1979 an OE Key Manager and Supervisor Questionnaire was sent out. It generally asked the same questions that were asked in the OESO questionnaire in order to "check their perceptions against those of their OESOs and to get a sense of the climate for OE from other than the OESO's perspective." One-hundred eighty-seven key managers questionnaires were sent out based on OESO questionnaire returns.

From 20 August to 12 October 1979, follow-up visits were conducted.

Information was sought through the techniques of interviewing and observation to confirm and corroborate survey results and provide insight into subjective or qualitative aspects of the impact of OE on OE users, senior officers, key managers and OESOs themselves. During these visits a total of 92 interviews were conducted and 192 people were contacted.

Reliability and validity is normally a problem when analyzing secondary resources, and the survey conducted by the OECS is no
exception. The questions asked often do not exactly measure the variables wished to be tested. For instance, the survey never specifically asked or measured the confidentiality of the OESO's findings. The questionnaires did not ask either the OESO or the key managers if the client's problems were always held in strictest confidence. What it did ask, however, was whether key managers knew the results of OESO's findings. From that question it could be inferred that confidentiality of the client's problems was not always strictly adhered to.

There was also a slight problem determining the return rate of the questionnaires. Those responsible for the survey never stated how many questionnaires were returned and why they believed they were not returned. A telephone call to officials at the OESCS stated that the return rate of the survey was only 42 percent for OESOs and 37 percent for key managers. This is a very low response rate, often 50 percent is judged adequate. The low response rate could indicate a significant response bias. Officials at theOECS stated, however, that the return rate was low because many of the officers who had been sent questionnaires had either left the Army, or were not working in OE assignments. From this author's experience in the Army, this seems to be a most plausible reason; officers are often rotated among jobs.

For those readers who question the reliability and validity of the Army's survey and its scientific value, would perhaps feel more comfortable calling it a census. However, whatever term is
desired, it would be useful to keep in mind that the trends and findings discussed in this paper are not totally obtained from the Army's own evaluation. This author's finding and generalizations are derived from various references, resources, individual interviews, and his own personal military experience of twelve years.
Section IV

This section is subdivided into nine areas of importance that will determine the criteria for success of OE operations in the United States Army.

Key Managers Support of OE

1. Because OESOs work for key managers who are often not trained in OE, the key managers often do not understand its need or importance. If these key managers were aware of the importance of OE, they would be more responsive to the needs of the OESO, and would allow OESOs to work full time on duties that pertain to OE. Additionally, the entire officer corps must comprehend the importance, benefits, and requirements of OE in order for it to be successfully implemented at all levels of command.

The OESO survey reported that 47.6 percent of the key managers had attended the 2-week Key Managers Course, but the key manager samples reported only 29.41 percent had.23 The reason for the difference is that the same group of OESOs and key managers did not always return the survey. In other words, these figures are taken from two different groups. If key managers do not understand the benefits derived from OE, they will not support their OESO's, and often will assign them other duties well out of the realm of OE functions. In fact, "It is significant to note that one-third of the responding OESOs reported spending 50 percent or less of their time on OE activities."24

All Army officers, regardless of their rank, must be educated regarding the importance and function of OE. If Army officers have
some knowledge concerning the central aspects of OE, they will be less resistant to the concept. Bennis states:

...we can predict that an anticipated change will be resisted to the degree that the client system possesses little or incorrect knowledge about the change, has relatively little trust in the source of the change, and has comparatively low influence in controlling the nature and direction of the change. 23

All officers must have some training concerning OE. The commanders at all levels in the unit must understand OE concepts, importance, and benefits. If this occurs, then the OESO will be a most valuable asset toward organizational effectiveness. The OESO can then save a great deal of time with his knowledge and expertise by guiding the unit commander in instituting change, by reinforcing the concept of OE, and by being more objective with problems inherent in the unit. 26

It should be noted that according to OECS officials there is a 2-week course designed solely for key managers of the OESO. The purpose of the course is to familiarize them with the salient features of OE so that, at the very least, they might be able to recognize the importance of the program to the Army, and support it at their home unit.

In order to educate possible clients and senior officers, the Army also is teaching the concept of OE in all service schools, including the War College, Command and General Staff College, and the Commander's Course at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The Commander's Course is limited to all officers who are selected for battalion level
command; therefore, all battalion commanders will have some knowledge of the theory and concepts of OE.

If OE were to be adopted by the entire officer corps, the following would result:

(1) Improved interpersonal relations.
(2) Tendency among people to listen to others.
(3) More spontaneous reaction of subordinates.
(4) Greater involvement at all levels.
(5) Reduction in interdepartment competitiveness.
(6) More responsible management behavior.
(7) More systematic analysis of problems.
(8) More explanation and tolerance from bosses.
(9) A reduction in the frequency of crisis.²⁷

An additional benefit of successful OE implementation in the Army would be the influence upon external forces. The United States Army is greatly affected by external forces. These forces must not only support the Army with funds to accomplish its mission, but must view the Army as an organization offering opportunity, challenge, and a new approach to management and leadership. The public must see the Army as innovative, not totally authoritarian, and as a vehicle for individual self-satisfaction and self-actualization. The Army would also offer a more viable option for career opportunities.

In order for the Army to be innovative and enhance its image, it must reach a cross-section of our society. It must correctly analyze the external social and political environment in order to
change their internal structure. Larry Greiner and Louis Barnes state:

Because the management of an organization cannot completely control its environment, they are continually having to introduce internal organizational changes which allow them to cope more effectively with new challenges presented from outside by increased competition, advances in technology, new government legislation, and pressing social demands. Most frequently organizational changes are introduced in 'reaction' to these environmental pressures. This latter course, while more difficult to pursue because employees do not recognize its immediate importance, is a standard that can often be applied to organizations that lead rather than follow their industries. Such 'practice' organizations can be said to engage in attempting to change their environments as well as themselves.28

The Army has been the prime mover in equal opportunities and equal rights for all its members. It can also, with the support from the hierarchy, be the front runner in Organizational Effectiveness among bureaucratic public organizations in the United States.

Confidentiality

2. Managers (clients) would be more apt to request OE and OESO consultants if they were assured of the confidentiality of the OESO's findings. Although it is believed that most OESOs are very conscientious about observing this requirement, it is also suspected that the key managers they work for have ways of knowing the results and of passing them along to others (i.e., G-1 staff officer to division commander). When the questionnaire asked 66 key managers how often OESOs shared documentation of OE activities with them, 13 said never, 3 said seldom, 9 said sometimes, 16 said usually, and 25 answered
always.  

From the above information it can be deduced that if key managers know the findings of the OESO, they are apt to pass the information up the hierarchy. Officers in the hierarchy, and those especially at high command level, want to know how their subordinate units are doing.

According to officials at the OECS at Fort Ord, California, there is not a problem with the OESO keeping his findings confidential. That is not to say that OESOs are not under pressure to divulge their findings. Quite the contrary, high ranking officers are putting a great deal of pressure on the OESOs and the school to permit release of OESO findings.

Fort Ord OE officials state that confidentiality of OESO's documentation policy may have to be revised because "senior officers at Division level want to find out what is happening down there." As a result, the school is now releasing the general findings and trends found in various units by releasing case studies. Fort Ord officials are also considering authorizing OESOs to release general findings to high ranking officers (division or brigade level) concerning the general problem areas and trends found at various levels in the command.

In the Army, confidentiality might be more of a problem than in other civilian organizations. One reason for this is that the OESO works for someone normally higher in the hierarchy, and often the OESO's efficiency report is written by him. Even though the OESO is not to divulge any information concerning his findings of his client's
problems, he may do so under pressure, to look good, or to enhance his own position of importance. The problem concerning confidentiality is then compounded by the fact that the client is often in the same hierarchy and will then have his efficiency report written by the same individual as the OESO. No manager likes to have his problem be known to those of higher rank because it may reflect on his own efficiency.

Clients in fields other than the Army are also concerned with the confidentiality of the consultant. Clients may worry about the professionalism of the consultant and his honesty. They might also wonder if the consultant would protect the organization's interests by not trying to steal key individuals from other organizations, or releasing information to competitors. When contemplating the use of a consultant a client must ask: Is this consultant a professional in whom I may repose trust and confidence, or is he a self-serving, untrustworthy individual whom I will regard as an outsider? In the Army, a client is more apt to view the consultant with suspicion. As a result, the commander in need of an OESO may very well hesitate to request his aid.

For one to understand the problems and concerns of the client concerning confidentiality, one must understand the climate of organizational leadership in the United States Army.

In 1971 the U.S. Army War College conducted a study entitled Leadership for the 1970's. One of the major themes throughout the study portrayed —
The ambitious, transitory commander—marginally skilled in the complexities of his duties—engulfed in producing statistical results, fearful of personal failures, too busy to talk with or listen to his subordinates, and determined to submit acceptably optimistic reports which reflect faultless completion of a variety of tasks at the expense of the sweat and frustrations of his subordinates.  

Some Army officers are so interested in their careers that they would sacrifice their integrity in order to enhance their career and personal goals. There are four issues that bear consideration concerning careerism:

(1) Ethical relativism. This is "the blurring of right and wrong." In other words, the end justifies the means. This problem is most eloquently explained by Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage in their book titled, *Crisis in Command—Mismanagement in the Army.*

It seems clear that the exaggerated emphasis upon careerism to the point of acquiescing in almost every policy without opposition could only have happened in a military structure which has consistently failed to develop an ethical doctrine of resistance. Accordingly, such shorthand injunctions as 'it all counts for twenty,' 'don't rock the boat,' 'you can't tell the general that,' while often destructive, were useful attitudes for individual career advancement. To be sure, advancement is then purchased at the expense of a failure to examine higher orders virtually regardless of operational consequence.

(2) Loyalty. Often loyalty can mean "when a genuine, wholesome loyalty to the boss degenerates into covering up for him, hiding things from him, or not differing with him when he is wrong."

(3) "Ethical trap problem." "What becomes important is how
things are perceived, rather than how they really are."

(4) "Drive for success." Success can come at the cost of one's own moral and ethical convictions, and at the cost of disloyalty to subordinates. The drive for success perpetuates itself, and officers coming up the hierarchical ladder will mirror the standards of their predecessors. Gabriel and Savage state:

...the present climate does not appear to be self-correcting. The human drives for success and for recognition by seniors, sustained if not inflamed by the systems of rewards and management which cater to immediate personal success at the expense of a long term consolidation of moral and ethical strength would appear to perpetuate if not exacerbate the current environment. Time alone will not cure the disease. The fact alone that the leaders of the future are those who survived and excelled within the rules of the present system militates in part against any self-starting incremental return toward the practical application of ideal values.

Army officers and the units they command are very competitive toward each other, and careerism is one reason competition is so prevalent. Units are in competition almost every day. Competition can be observed in numerous ways and can center on which unit has the fewest AWOLs, the most reenlistments, and the best tactical scores.

Positive competition is both healthy and desirable, but competition in the Army, as in all organizations, can also produce some harmful effects. Concerning competition, Rensis and James Likert state: "It can cause a 'win at all cost' syndrome in which leaders become authoritarian, creative problem solving is minimal, disagreement is not allowed, and communication distortion is prevalent." Also, "Win-lose confrontation intensifies the hostile, bitter attitudes
that the conflicting parties hold toward each other."40

The Army must stop the harmful competitiveness that is so
common among Army officers and the units that they command. One
way of attacking this problem is to stop relying on statistics to
judge the effectiveness of the commander and his unit. Instead of
using statistics to judge unit efficiency, the high-level commander
must initiate goal-setting and management by objectives to determine
unit preparedness and efficiency. Commanders at all levels must
adopt a system of managing described by Likert as System 4:

The human organization of a System 4 firm is made
up of interlocking work groups with a high degree
of group loyalty among the members and favorable
attitudes and trust among peers, superiors, and
subordinates. Consideration for others and
relatively high levels of skill in personal inter-
action, group problem solving, and other group
functions also are present. These skills permit
effective participation in decisions on common
problems. Participation is used, for example, to
establish organizational objectives which are a
satisfactory integration of the needs and desires
of all the members of the organization and of per-
sons functionally related to it. Members of the
organization are highly motivated to achieve the
organization's goals. High levels of reciprocal
influence occur, and high levels of total coordinated
influence are achieved in the organization. Commu-
nication is efficient and effective. There is a flow from
one part of the organization to another of all the
relevant information important for each decision and
action. The leadership in the organization has
developed a highly effective social system for inter-
action, problem solving, mutual influence, and organi-
izational achievement. This leadership is technically
competent and holds high performance goals.41

In summary, confidentiality of the OESO's documentation and
findings is a key consideration in the success of OE. Because of Army
officers' career aspirations, their competitive nature, and the
organizational climate they work in, they are not likely to request OESO consultation if they believe their inept management practices will be released to higher authorities.

**Evaluation of the Four Step Process**

3. If there is a breakdown in one of the four OE steps, it is necessary to find out where it normally occurs and why. It is suspected that the assessment stage is relatively easy to do, but once the client becomes cognizant of his problems and the time required to solve them, he may not wish to go further. The assessment stage can also be a problem, however, because the client may be less than open with the OESO, and the true problems of the organization may not be detected. The client may also feel that once he knows the problems he can solve them himself and has no need for OESO expertise. Finally, it is possible that the OESO is good at assessing problems in the organization, but has difficulty in planning solutions.

Organizational Effective Staff Officers who responses to the questionnaire stated that they spent the following percentage of time on their various duties. 42%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>Building User Relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>Professional Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>Teaching and Other OE Related Duties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>Scouting and Contracting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to the respondents of the questionnaire, OESOs would prefer spending more time in the implementation stage. Thirty-six percent of those responding indicated implementation as their first preference. (See below a list of preferred OE activity.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred Activity</th>
<th>Ranked 1st By</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Client Relationships</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Development</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scouting and Contracting</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-OE Mission Duties</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Duties</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the following chart, the assessment and planning stage are the most likely periods when the four-step process seems to start deteriorating.
Unsuccessful OE operations are more common at the assessment and planning stages due to the nature of Army officers. That is, once commanders have decided to go into OE implementation, they have convinced themselves of the benefits of the entire OE operation, and have made a definite commitment to the program.

The agent for change must be the client, the consultant's role is only to advise and to encourage change in organizational effectiveness. Warner Burke believes that although the role of the consultant is supposed to be an advisor, he often takes on the role of the
client and is more of an "agent of change." In the Army the possibility of this happening is slight. Managers/commanders feel strongly about their command position and will not relinquish any managerial prerogatives. When the OESO attempts too strongly to be the agent of change, he is apt to be unsuccessful in the assessment and planning stages.

Organizational effectiveness staff officers prefer the implementation stage rather than the assessment and planning stage. This could indicate that they feel uncomfortable with these stages and have a difficult time obtaining the cooperation of the commander/client. A commander and his subordinates may well be less than open with the OESO as to the real problems of the organization.

If the assessment stage is to be successful, the OESO must analyze the present needs of the unit. He must determine the present level of performance and who the key trainers are, determine the organizational climate, analyze the procedures of the unit, and assess policy and decision-making procedures. When the commander and his subordinates are not open with the OESO concerning these areas, the assessment and planning stage will be unsuccessful.

Key elements must be present in order for successful changes to take place in the organizational climate of the Army. Bennis states that there are three essential elements that must be present for successful organizational change.

(1) The client (commander) should understand the consequence of change and have equal influence in developing the change. Additionally, it is extremely important that the client have
a great deal of faith in the ability of the consultant. A major problem concerning the success of an OE operation, then, is that the commander may not have any faith in the OESO. That is not to say that the OESO is not competent, but because of the Army's rank structure, and the prevailing feeling that commanders and senior officers are always right, the OESO may not be viewed as an equal, or as competent as they are. Consequently, the OESO cannot be an effective initiator of change.

The change agent can be crucial in reducing the resistance to change. As long as the change agent acts congruently with the principles of the program and as long as the client has a chance to test competence and motives (his own and the change agent's), the agent should be able to provide the psychological support so necessary during the risky phases of change. As I have stressed again and again, the quality of the client-agent relationship is pivotal to the success of the change program.

(2) "The change effort should be perceived as being as self-motivated and voluntary as possible." Bennis says that this can be accomplished by having the support and backing of top management. Here we can detect another problem. Army top management may view OE as "soft management" and look down on commanders who request OE. Also, OESOs may not have the training and experience necessary to rationally persuade commanders to change their managerial style of leadership.

(3) Bennis believes the program of change "must include emotional and value as well as cognitive information elements for successful implementation." To rely on "rational persuasion" is
not enough, a change must appeal to group sense of justice and fairness. It is believed that most officers are just and fair, but because of the rampant careerism prevailing in the Army, it is doubtful that officers can totally support a program of change as far reaching as OE.

Army Organizations That Require OE

4. It is important to ascertain at what level of the Army's organization the OESO is most often requested. If this is known, then the OESO can be trained in problem areas peculiar to that organizational level. Also important to know is why a particular level of the Army's organization is more apt to request OE consultation than others.

The response to the survey indicated that OE clients tended to be located at Battalion level. This would seem understandable, for most Army activity functions are concentrated at that level. Battalions are large enough to maneuver independently and are separate entities of organization, hierarchy, and command. When work flows down from Division it normally rests with the Battalions to accomplish it. As a result, OE is most often requested at Battalion level due to its tremendous work load, and its problems inherent in accomplishing the work.

If most of the problems and needs for OE are found at Battalion level, perhaps this is where the OESOs should be located. The opposite is the case however, the majority of OESOs are located at Division level and none of them are located at Battalion. It is
apparent that the primary reason for this is that there are not enough trained OESOs to work at Battalion, and that they must be requested at Division.

The Army is aware of this shortcoming, and, according to officials at Fort Ord, there is a short OE course provided for Battalion Personnel Officers (S-1) to help them to understand the concepts and general aspects of OE. This short course helps both the Battalion Commander and the S-1 gain some knowledge of OE and therefore creates a more favorable climate for the OESO and the OE program in general.

Because we now know where OE is generally requested, perhaps an organizational model suited for a Battalion would prove most beneficial. Such a model should consider the formal organizational structure, technology, style of leadership, personal systems (abilities, intelligence, personality traits, values, and beliefs) and goals of the formal organization.

OE Request for Command Transition

5. There are certain areas in which clients most often request the assistance of an OESO. Sixty-one percent of the OESOs reported that the primary issue confronting them was command transition. In other words, 61 percent of the OE consultant roles deal with the transition of a new commander to a unit. It is interesting to note that the majority of key managers feel that OESOs deal best with the issue concerning command transitions.

Do these statistics have any meaning? Certainly they must.
Organizational effectiveness is still extremely new to the Army and its hierarchy. It is still viewed as "soft management" by many Army officers at all levels; consequently, there is a stigma attached to an officer requesting and using the program. If, for instance, a Battalion Commander has been in his position for six months and requests OE consulting, he is going to have to justify its use to his superior, peers, and subordinates. There is a stigma attached to requesting OE, for it implies that the commander has failed in some aspect of management, something no manager likes to do. As already stated, due to the "system" officers are careful to hide organizational problems for fear that their efficiency will be questioned.

Then why is there less stigma attached to OE command transition consulting as the statistics imply? Because of the nature of the Army's organization, command transition is considered a trauma to all involved. It means a new commander with different likes and dislikes, a new way of operating and a new organizational climate. No superior, peer, or subordinate will criticize a new commander when he requests the consulting role of an OESO for command transition, for it lessens the trauma for all, and no stigma is attached to its use.

From the above discussion, it can be inferred that there is a stigma attached when requesting OESOs, but the stigma is less of a one when used for command transition. Based on OD experience all is not hopeless, however, for when OE has been operational for a longer period of time, and individuals have been educated to its benefits,
OE will be used for all purposes with less stigma attached to its utilization.

**Types of Implementation Most Often Used**

6. It might be useful to determine what type of implementation is normally used by the OESO. The responses to the survey indicated that the top five implementation techniques are action planning, transition model, communication, team building, and problem solving. 57 From this, it can be deduced that these five areas can generally be considered the major problems in the managerial and organizational structure of the Army.

Implementation encompasses a large spectrum of consideration and no one can predict consistently what type of implementation is always required. "...the field has developed largely in reaction to changes in society and organizations rather than as a result of deliberate planning." 58 Following are some key considerations dealing with implementation in general, with some salient points concerning the Army's OE program.

(1) If implementation is to be useful, the OESO must take four organizational variables into consideration. He must consider people, task, structure, and technology. This is of utmost importance, for to change one variable will certainly cause an effect on another. Harold J. Leavitt says concerning the four variables:

> These four are highly independent, so that change in any one will most probably result in compensatory (or retaliatory) change in others. In discussing organizational change, therefore, I shall assume that it is one or more of these variables that we seek to
change. Sometimes we may aim to change one of these as an end in itself, sometimes as a mechanism for affecting some changes in one or more of the others.59

A major problem for the OESO and the client, then, is that they are often able to change the people variable, but only the hierarchy has the authority to change the structure, task, and tools. Consequently, until the OESO and the client can take a more positive role in the three remaining aspects of implementation and change, OE will be an uphill battle.

It is important for the Army's hierarchy that OE officials analyze the structure and technology of Army units. As one OD author put it:

One concept of organization development calls for change in both technology and structure... and/or change in individuals and their interaction processes... rather than for efforts to change only the people, only the structure process, or only the technology of the organization.60

One aspect of OE that is not discussed much in the Army and could possibly open up a whole new concept of Army bureaucracy is the possibility of changing the bureaucratic and personnel structure of the Army organization. This paper cannot attempt to discuss this aspect of OE at any length, but it may be the cause of some of the Army's major management problems. "OD means that practitioners must pay considerably more attention to industrial engineering, job design or re-design, and the whole area of socio-technical systems."61

(2) An inherent problem with OE is that it may be initiated and utilized at one level in the command, but not higher up.
Many organizational problems originate at the next higher level of management.

A programmer may be designed to train the lower levels of management and may omit the higher levels, whose faults will consequently appear greater in the eyes of those whom they control. This is a good way of producing rebellion.62

(3) One of the most important aspects of OE is team building. Team building is "...intended to make a group effective and achieve unity of purpose."63 The Army, like most large organizations, normally has staff and line personnel vying for power, control, and prestige. The purpose of team building is to eliminate this internal conflict, and encourage people to work together for a common goal. Team building should be the first step in an OE implementation program; without it all other programs may well fail. Patten and Vail say:

...successful team building efforts which expand self-awareness, improve the individual's self-concept, diffuse openness, and enable solving and decision-making in a group situation are fundamental to starting on strategic OD, launching an MBO effort, or enabling the rewards system in an organization to act as an incentive for performance.64

Few organizations implement OD by proceeding on a step-by-step basis with team building as the first stage.65 The Army is no different, they often implement various aspects of OE without first promoting team building.

(4) Management by objectives (MBO) has been a common word in the Army for almost a decade. Management by objectives is a method of bringing together personal and organizational goals in
order to create a oneness, a common purpose, and a way of achieving 
"...satisfaction of higher-level ego and self-actualization needs."

Until the recent adoption of OE by the Army, MBO functioned in
only one way. Goals were selected by the unit commander, often with
little interaction or input from others. He selected the goals and
everyone else attempted to meet them. Perhaps the reasons for this
are that the unit commander felt he was the most qualified individual
to determine goals, or he did not have an organization that functioned
as a team. Perhaps now, with the emphasis on OE and the importance
attached to team building, MBO may finally work.

(5) Job enrichment (JE) is the least used and asked for
method of implementation in the Army's OE program. What does this
mean? Does it mean that all jobs in the Army are so enriched that it
is not a problem, or does it mean that OESOs and commanders can find
few ways to enrich the duties, responsibilities, and functions of
its soldiers and officers? This is perhaps a major question that
should be asked by all who are interested in having a well trained
and professional Army, capable of fulfilling its primary mission—
that of defending the United States. Let us assume that the answer
to the question just posed is that OESOs and commanders can find few
ways to enrich the jobs of their personnel, and then let us try to
determine why. Some of the following reasons may be:

(1) Commanders are not humanistic and have little
real concern for the needs of people, other than the basic needs.

(2) Commanders are too used to the command and
obedience style of management, and they cannot change their method
of operating. They have functioned this way for years, and it has obtained for them promotions, security, and increasingly important jobs.

(3) Army managers normally serve in command positions for only a short time (1 or 2 years), while the soldier and NCO may work in the same job for a number of years. The Army Commander, in the short time he has, must be successful, make a name for himself, receive an outstanding efficiency report, eventually get promoted, and then move on to other duties. In the short time that he commands, he has little time, even if he were inclined to, to enrich the jobs of people he controls.

If we believe that both JE and MBO are fundamentally grounded on self-control and humanistic notions. Both can become important cornerstones of OD and bases for entirely new styles of organizational management. 68

The Evaluation Stage

6. It is important to determine what evaluation indicators are used by the OESO to understand his success in an OE case. There are a number of indicators that can determine this. The key point, however, is that there seem to be myriad ways OESOs attempt to determine whether or not their OE efforts have been successful, and none of them seem to be used with any particular effectiveness.

The lack of effective methods for determining OE successes is a major shortcoming of OE. The survey showed that 160 OESOs used client's comments 8.6 percent of the time to determine the effectiveness of their OE actions. "Cut feelings" were used by 151 OESOs
11.7 percent of the time. Interviews were used by 140 OESOs only 4.4 percent of the time. Other evaluation indicators were shown, but there seemed to be no trend or systematic method for evaluating OE operations.69

If OESOs and managers cannot effectively evaluate OE operations, they will not realize what they have, or have not, accomplished. If an evaluation system is not utilized "...managers will often think about what they have failed to achieve, instead of remembering the positive effects. The provision of positive information can result in a powerful reinforcement to further action."70

Another important consideration of the evaluation stage is that it should be planned well in advance. In fact, the type of evaluation and what is to be evaluated should be considered prior to the implementation stage; that way a more effective analysis of the problem can be made. "The follow-up has not been clearly foreseen in designing the training stage. In fact, many programs have been launched in the pious hope that some benefits must surely follow if the seeds of wisdom are strewn. Sometimes this is true, but is the pay-off maximal?"71

The above discussion highlights a key problem area of the Army's OE program. The Army must better plan for the evaluation stage, formulate the stage well in advance in order to pinpoint objectives, and develop a more formulated evaluation plan or model than the haphazard method they are now using.
Training of the OESO

7. Organizational Effective Staff Officers attend 16 weeks of intensive training on OE. One must, however, ask if this is enough training for the OESO to perform the myriad duties that he must perform.

Assuming an OESO is intelligent, sincere, interested in his duties, and has grasped all of the OE training, is it still enough? Organizational Development consultants in the civilian field normally will have had years of experience behind them and usually will have worked for a large firm where additional expertise is available.72

To compound the problem even more, an OESO performs his duties for three or four years and then moves on to other assignments. In other words, the OESO, regardless of his sincerity, intelligence, and professionalism, is still a novice. "The novice can bring specialized knowledge and skills to a client, but an inexperienced consultant is often unable to reduce risk for the client and, in many cases, may actually increase the probability of failure."73

According to the survey "OESO graduates appear to be most satisfied with the emphasis on group processes and the four-step process while they generally disagree that the course needs more emphasis on self-directed study and didactic instruction."74

When OESOs were asked in the survey if the OECS adequately prepared them, most agreed that they were adequately prepared for the assessment, planning, and implementation stage. Ironically, most felt that they were inadequately prepared for the evaluation stage.75
The evaluation stage (as discussed on pages 37 and 38) requires additional educational instruction.

In summary, the training and experience level of the OESO is somewhat suspect. The system of procuring relatively junior officers as internal consultants in the U.S. Army is not the best possible system. More will be said about this later in the recommendation section.

**Senior Officers' Concepts of OE**

8. The OESO's interactions with senior officers is a problem. "A summary of the factors contributing to OE ineffectiveness..." lists lack of senior officer support and lack of acceptance as the two major problem areas."76

Many senior officers who view OE with suspicion are those who have had little or no exposure to its concepts, importance, and rewards. They believe that the concepts are idealistic values about human nature and are not totally proven, or that it is just a nice idea to make people feel good.

Those officers who style their whole managerial and leadership role on the command and obedience role must find ways of changing. "In other words, we have a field of OD today because a centuries-old leadership style (command and obedience) has become obsolete."77

The authoritarian approach to management and leadership that most senior officers were exposed to 20 or 30 years ago no longer works.

Given the nature of social systems in the modern organizational world, the command/obedience style of management is less and less appropriate to changing an organization since research shows that
this style has high probability of producing unintended consequences that are often inimical to the goals of the change.\textsuperscript{78}

The problem, as it now stands, is that there are too many senior officers who have never been exposed to the concepts of OE, and they view it as needless and worthless.

Some officers in the group of O6 and above do not believe they need OE assistance and the hard sell approach to OE may be counterproductive with these officers. OESOs must look for target of opportunities that directly address the most serious management problem perceived by that group. These senior officers think they are good leaders and their career success attests to this fact. The impact of the lack of use of OE by senior officers is noted by subordinates in their chain of command and consequently OE is not used within their organization. This is an area that needs further study and refinement of how best to approach this group of officers. Some of these officers tend to look on the OESO as a quality and valuable resource who could be better utilized in a regular Army line unit position.\textsuperscript{79}

Too many senior officers today use the power and coercion models of leadership as their primary method of achieving results. If they can be taught to change this style, and adopt what is called the consensus and insight model of managing, they would have a far more productive organization.

The consensus and insight model is based on the concept that once people who work together gain insight into the fundamental dynamics of human relationships in a context of purposive joint effort, they are ready to implement problem solving approaches...based on an understanding and agreement.\textsuperscript{80}

Additionally, "we too often assume that organization change is for 'those people downstairs,' who are somehow perceived as less
Senior officers too often feel that change is good for those below them, but not necessary for them. They fail to realize that they are frequently the cause of organizational malfunctions. Additionally, they believe that because of their high position they are the most intelligent and knowledgeable individuals, and should, therefore, make all decisions. Because of the problem discussed above, most Army officers hesitate to be open with superiors, and at times, even with subordinates. The reason for this is inherent in the nature of the hierarchy, its command structure, its performance appraisal system, and a "can do" attitude at all costs. Senior officers must be "aware that the real danger to group effectiveness is not in the 'explosions' which people believe may result when they bring problems into the open, but in the inertia which results from evading problem situations."
Section V

Recommendations and Conclusions

1. All officers must be educated in the concepts of OE. The Army is trying to accomplish this by teaching OE at all officers' schools and service colleges. The primary target area, however, must be senior officers. These officers must be encouraged to adopt OE, for if the Army is to change its concept and style of management, those in the hierarchy must initiate the change. This will not be easy to accomplish as Gabriel and Savage point out.

Major institutional changes are usually fiercely resisted in all organizations since reform means a change in both the status quo and the anticipated status quo, each of which guarantees the personal career investments and expectations of large numbers of people, in this case high-ranking officers. It is a fact of political experience, and all armies are political, that when reform is not publicly resisted it is often bureaucratically and covertly sabotaged, so that the shadow of change is often projected while the substance of organizational vested interest remains intact. Elites do not easily relinquish their power, prestige, and income, nor do individuals readily repudiate personal histories. No one who has examined the proliferation of federal agencies, their redundance, their ineffectiveness, and often their irrelevancy and sometimes malignancy can escape this conclusion. The history of political and governmental reform is not a happy one.

Only with time, education, and perhaps direction from civilian authority can the Army change its style of leadership and management. There is no easy or quick solution for changing the attitude of its senior officers. It will take time and effort to affect change. The rewards, however, will be most gratifying, for if the Army can become an organization that is innovative in its leadership and
managerial style, support from external sources in society is likely. Even more beneficial, the internal structure will be more productive, efficient, and capable of fulfilling its mission.

2. Confidentiality of OESO's findings is going to be a major problem in time to come. Some of the more senior officers believe that findings and documentations of the OESO's work should be turned over to superiors. They claim that the advantage of this is that problems inherent in the total structure of the organization may be solved, rather than just those of a subordinate unit. Additionally, organizational members will see the OE effort as an integrated and coordinated program.

The disadvantages of this approach, however, outweigh the advantages. If OE is to be successful in the Army, documentation and information obtained by the OESO must be kept in strictest confidence. Because of the nature of the Army's hierarchy and management system of rating officer performance, no other way is possible.

It is, therefore, recommended that OESO documentation be kept confidential, and that the Army continue to circulate case studies for managers and commanders to keep abreast of current leadership problems throughout the Army. It is interesting to note that all OESOs interviewed feel that their documentation concerning OE activities should be kept in strictest confidence between them and their clients.

3. It is recommended that senior officers stop relying on statistics to measure a commander's worth. Mutually agreed upon
objectives must be given true meaning instead of "lip service." When this occurs, officers will be more apt to be open and honest with superiors. Additionally, the use of performance objectives, which means that the superior and subordinate mutually agree on objectives and standards to be met, would de-emphasize careerism.

4. The OECS and OESO must give more impetus to the evaluation stage. By doing this they will be better able to judge correctly the success of OE operations. Additionally, by planning the evaluation method early in the planning stage, OESOs and clients will be better able to establish goals and use them to measure the OE operation.

5. Any successful OE operation will depend on the ability of the OESO. As stated earlier, the majority of OESOs are intelligent, capable, and truly interested in doing the best possible job. Due to their lack of rank and experience in the Army, the OESO's major problem is dealing with more senior commanders. This lack of rank and experience cannot help but be a hindrance in their effectiveness as a consultant to superior officers.

If OE is to be more than just applying formulas, and is to become a method of changing behavioral patterns of managing, then the OESO must have a rank equal to or above that of the client in order to effectively persuade the client to change his leadership style. A captain, or major, will have very little influence when dealing with more senior officers.

As stated earlier, there are many senior officers who function with the authoritarian style of leadership, and are unwilling, or
perhaps unable to change. There are, however, many senior officers who are innovative in the techniques of managing.

Considering the above discussion, the following recommendation is made: That senior officers close to retirement who have proven their worth as excellent officers, be given the option of extending their length of service, and be trained and then assigned to OE duties.

A similar recommendation, but for other reasons, has been formulated by Gabriel and Savage.

Ideally, no such person would act in organizational parallel with former peers and friends... None would ever be eligible for promotion, decoration, public citation, or any singular honor; they would serve in the anonymity traditional to the German general staff officer.

These OE officers would not be "yes" men perpetually interested in furthering their own careers. Their records would be carefully scrutinized, insuring they were the type of individuals who were of the independent and honest type. They would be the type of officers who had never feared to speak out in opposition to a superior when the need arose, even if their ratings for efficiency and integrity were at stake. "The selection of these men would be difficult. Possibly a detailed examination of records might reveal men who never lied, who demonstrated genuine creativity during their service, and who stood up for their men."

If this recommendation were followed, the Army's system, their "yes" men, and the careerism inherent in the organization would not affect these senior OEs.
Here then is a group of custodians none of whom is permanent; their assignments could not be self-perpetuating; all final selections after screening would be at random; the men chosen could not be promoted, decorated, or honored; they could not have a career. Such men would have little likely interest in corrupting the system and every likely interest in improving it.87

Other benefits derived from this recommendation were found by the Xerox Corporation. They have used selected senior executives who were about to retire, or who did retire were recalled, as consultants for organizational development. Xerox found that these men were much better able to identify with the problems of the client; consequently, the client was far more open and honest with the consultant. If the Army's hierarchy will support the concept of senior pre-retirement officers as OE consultants, the chance of OE developing into a more worthwhile and productive program will be vastly enhanced.

Without top management support and without consultants with proven track records as managers, a practice such as Xerox's is questionable. If they see them as over the hill, some managers might avoid using preretirement executives. Yet companies that do use their executives' accumulated wisdom can gain a resource edge over their competition.88

Organizational Effectiveness in the Army will have some success as it is now structured. Statistics have already shown this to be the case.

Evidence indicates that Organizational Effectiveness (OE) is beginning to pay off within the Army. Significant findings clearly show that units using OE had higher levels of unit effectiveness and open communication than units that did not. Reports of
recent applications of OE to such key issues as reenlistments, retention, and commander transition have documented measurable cost benefits as well as improved readiness. In addition, trends indicate that units using OE had higher levels of job satisfaction and commitment. OE usage has increased from 40 percent in 1978 to 58 percent in 1979.

It is strongly recommended that to make OE a truly effective program to rectify the managerial and organizational problems of the Army, the changes suggested in this paper be instituted.
FOOTNOTES


3. Reference Book 12-2, p. 3.

4. Ibid., p. 2.

5. Ibid., p. 3.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., p. 8.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 74.

10. Ibid., p. 10.


13. Ibid., p. 6.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., pp 6-7.

16. Ibid., p. 98.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.


20. Ibid.
21 Ibid.


23 Evaluation Survey, pp. 5 and 41.

24 Ibid., p. 7.


27 Ibid., p. 491.


29 Evaluation Survey, p. 49.


31 Ibid., p. 45.


33 Ibid., pp. 2-10.


35 *Lesson Plan-M932*, pp. 2-10.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.
38 Gabriel and Savage, *Crisis in Command*, p. 89.


40 Ibid., p. 67.

41 Ibid., p. 16.


43 Ibid., pp. 7-8.

44 Ibid., p. 11.


48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53 Evaluation Survey, p. 32.


56 Ibid., p. 44.


58 Burke, *Current Issues and Strategies in Organization Development*, p. 35.

60 Banks, Current Issues and Strategies in Organization Development, p. 56.

61 Ibid., p. 33.


64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.


69 Evaluation Survey, p. 15.


71 Ibid.


73 Ibid.

74 Evaluation Survey, p. 16.

75 Ibid., p. 18.

76 Evaluation Survey, p. 29.

77 Patten and Vail, "Organization Development," p. 20-5.
Ibid., p. 20-6.

Evaluation Survey, p. 56.

Lesson Plan-M932, p. 392.

Ibid.


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Gabriel and Savage, Crisis in Command, p. 115.

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