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THE CRISIS OF MEANING IN TECHNOLOGY

By

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Preface

The three papers presented here have as their common concern technology, which is seen as a way of taking up with the world. Each focuses upon an aspect of meaning or value in the technological epoch.

The first paper, "Marx's View of Technology", explicates the notions which Marx held of technology, within the context of the industrial revolution of the 19th Century. Thus, the paper deals with the place and meaning of technology as an industrial phenomenon. I then go on to suggest the advantages and disadvantages of such a view when applied to our own century and situation.

In "The Diminishment of the Self in Labor" I investigate in depth the crisis of meaning and value which arises in that which is the direct descendant of the technology Marx analyzed. I show the effects of this particularly brutal form of technology upon the self, and how meaning is prevented from arising in this form, i.e., in labor.

Finally, in "The Development of Wittgenstein's Notions Concerning Ethics", I examine the correlation of meaning and value in ethics and technology. In delineating Wittgenstein's ethical position I find that Wittgenstein holds to a crucial dichotomy between value and fact; if this dichotomy were the most felicitous way to divide reality it would present an objection to my position in the second paper. I show how Wittgenstein's earlier position is untenable, and how indeed, he himself comes to reject his earlier position. I then briefly suggest a form for Wittgenstein's later ethical views (extrapolated from his general philosophical position) and propose a tentative criticism of them.

II
Marx's most explicit views on technology are those remarks directed towards delineating the place of the machine in the development of the capitalist mode of production. In Capital, on the one hand, Marx very strictly limits himself to those factors within the context of the historical development of the capitalist mode of production. Thus Marx's conception of technology is determined by its place within this development, and what might be said in reaction to it. In the Grundrisse, on the other hand, we find Marx's purpose more broadly defined; his comments are both notes leading up to Capital, and more widely speculative notes on technology per se and its meaning.

Let us first consider the movement within technology, the historical shift Marx explicates from Handicraft, to Manufacture, to Modern Industry. At the base of Marx's analysis of capitalism lies the labor theory of value. In the capitalist mode of production all value (as an economic entity) in a thing comes, for Marx, from the quantity of labor-time put into its production, its formation from a natural object to a man-made product. Marx distinguishes two kinds of value, use-value, which is the value a thing has in its use, and value proper or exchange-value, which is the value of a thing when it is exchanged for some other commodity. Marx views the exchange-value of a thing, "the magnitude of the value of any article", as "the amount of labour socially necessary for its production." Marx is here abstracting from the things themselves to arrive at an
economic conception. "As values, all commodities are only definite masses of congealed labour-time."\(^4\)

From this we can see that the productiveness of labor is the greater, the less labor-time is involved in production, the less the amount of crystallized labor-time in the product.\(^5\) The value of a commodity depends directly upon how much labor-time is involved in its production, or how great the productivity of the laborer.\(^6\) Now if the aim of the capitalist is posited as that of turning a profit, or of turning the greatest profit\(^7\), then his purpose in the production of commodities is to cheapen them, by means of reducing labor costs per commodity, and thus increasing the difference between labor costs and selling price, increasing the exchange value.

In Manufacture commodities can be cheapened by increasing laboring hours without increasing wages; the laborer thus produces what he is paid in a smaller fraction of total labor-time, and the owner keeps the larger surplus-value (i.e., the difference between costs to him and value).\(^8\) This tendency is seen by Marx to lead to its historical conclusion in the machine. Machines cheapen commodities, and increase surplus-value thereby. While not downgrading the importance of this factor as an impetus, insofar as it concerns the capitalist and his motivations, we will see that Marx understood there to be, as well, something like an 'internal logic', or momentum, to mechanization, to technology.

Marx had an 'organic' view of the time preceding the Manufacture era; the workman was united with his tools, and was in touch with the continuum of production, if not directing it. In Capital, where Marx is mainly concerned with the more immediate shift from manufacture to modern industry, and its implications for capital, we can pinpoint some of the changes involved in that shift. Industry was hindered

\(^*\)The capitalization of 'Manufacture' (and of 'Handicraft' and 'Modern Industry' in the sequel) conforms to the practice of Marx's translators.
from advancement as long as the instruments of production were dependent upon the personal skills and strengths of the detail workmen in Manufacture, and the manual laborers in Handicraft. It is in Manufacture that we see "the immediate technical foundation of Modern Industry. Manufacture produced the machinery by means of which Modern Industry abolished the handicraft and manufacturing systems in those spheres of production that it first seized upon."

The motivating force of this shift from Manufacture to Industry consisted of the technical requirements of the system, of the process of production which was being developed, as well as the impetus towards greater profits. At a certain stage of development Industry becomes incompatible with that from which it arose, Handicraft and Manufacture.

The increasing size of the prime movers, of the transmitting mechanism, and of the machinery proper, the greater complication, multiplicity and regularity of the details of these machines, as they more and more departed from the model of those originally made by manual labour, and acquired a form, unhampered except by the condition under which they worked, the perfecting of the automatic system, and the use, every day more unavoidable, of a more refractory material, such as iron instead of wood—the solution of all these problems, which sprang up by force of circumstances, everywhere met with a stumbling-block in the personal restrictions, which even the collective labour of Manufacture could not break through, except to a limited extent.

What Marx clearly sees in the development of Industry is the coherence and momentum of technology. In Manufacture there are independent detail machines, which emphasize the division of labor among workmen. Technology ultimately works to upset this subjectivity, this unconnectedness. With technology there is a chain or process which the subject of labor (the product) undergoes, each detail supplementing the last. While this connectedness of a complete process is correct when applied to one factory, or within an industry, Marx clearly sees that the logic of technology demands the whole system, the complete
social mode of production. He sees that a revolution in production in industry and agriculture make it necessary and inevitable that a revolution take place in more general and far-reaching terms, in means of communication and transport, for example.\footnote{13}

Furthermore Marx finds in the shift from Handicraft to Manufacture to Modern Industry a shift in the placement of the worker. We shall deal with this below. The movement is from the subjective, unorganized connections among detail workers (where a division of labor is strong), to the objective, rational deployment of men and machines in a cooperative venture prescribed by technical necessity and the instrument of labor itself.\footnote{14}

We see most clearly in the Grundrisse how it is that the means of production created under capital may eventually work to the downfall of capital. First of all one of the internal requirements of technology is that the process be a continuum, and that the division of labor, upon which the capitalist mode of production is based, is inevitably undercut.\footnote{15} Moreover, there is a shift, with the adaptation of technology by capital, in the ratio of variable-capital, or, in other words, the shift from worker primacy in production to machine primacy. The greater the development of fixed-capital (machines), the greater the imperative is for a constant flow of reproduction (production), or a continuous production process. Hence we have at this period the development of twenty-four hour production. Money is wasted when the machines are idle.\footnote{16} A continuous production process becomes necessary for the capitalist mode of production, because the value of fixed-capital is realized only in production. Wealth, which is the surplus time that the laborer spends over the time necessary for his subsistence, tends, in industry, towards being created not by labor-time, but rather
by technology, by fixed-capital. In the transformation, the production process, the laborer as individual is no longer the chief actor, as Marx notes in the Grundrisse, and

It is neither the direct human labour he himself performs, nor the time during which he works, but rather the appropriation of his own general productive power, his understanding of nature and his mastery over it by virtue of his presence as a social body--it is, in a word, the development of the social individual which appears as the foundation-stone of production and wealth. Labor, then, ceases to be the measure of wealth, and machines or technology step in to serve as the means of producing surplus-value.

I will now consider the shift from Handicraft, to Manufacture, to Industry, from the point of view of the worker's experience. What effects does the shift in technology (understood here as the production process) through these historical periods have, in experiential terms, from the perspective of the worker?

Marx notes that some political economists considered the tool a simple machine, or a machine a complex tool. This definition he considers inadequate because the 'historical element' is wanting. He states that indeed in examining the machine we find there is generally something that is like (in effect, if not in form) the tools of the workman in Handicraft. There is a difference, however, and that is that 'instead of being human implements, they are the implements of a mechanism, or mechanical implements'. So the machine takes the tool from the workman, performing much the same function formerly performed by him. The machine, however, overcomes human limits in a number of ways. It can bring a much greater number of 'tools' into play simultaneously and use them continuously. This is the main thrust of machinery at the beginning, to do a greater quantity of the same thing the workman does; many machines were modelled, then, on human activity in production.
This, however, concerns the machine only in its introductory phases as a factor of production and we soon have progressed to the point at which machines are modelled purely with regard to the production process. We have then transgressed qualitatively the limitations of individual laborers. The only apparent restrictions, in this regard, are the adaptability of materials and the goal of the production process (the intention of form).

We must go further, however, in pinpointing the logic of machine-development. The developing machine technology was formed and guided by the developing character of consumer goods. This character is that of a device. The device character of consumer goods and the developing character of machines were both technological, and were both intertwined. Both, as well, remain parasitic upon the pre-technological. 22

There are a number of effects of machinery Marx documents which are particularly relevant to 19th Century England, to the particular conjunction of the developments of capitalism and Industry. Machinery dispenses with muscle power and therefore tended to promote the employment of women and children (who would work for smaller wages than a man, as well). 23 The introduction of the machine led to a physical deterioration of the worker and a high mortality rate 24, and to moral degradation. 25 Machines also tended to prolong rather than shorten the working day, as we have already mentioned. 26

The beginning of the Industrial period may be characterized generally as a competition between the laborer and the machine, one in which the laborer was fated to lose. As Marx states, "the self-expansion of capital by means of machinery is therefore directly proportional to the number of workpeople, whose means of livelihood has been destroyed by
machinery."27 This does not necessarily mean unemployment for large numbers of people, but it does indeed seem to point to movement between different jobs and between various living places, and general social mobility or uprootedness.28

Although factors such as these are deplorable, it is necessary to point out that such conditions are not generally or always those of technology, but are those of a particular period in which the historical change from one dominant mode and process of production is particularly vicious and upsetting. Thus the introduction of machinery on a massive level may be more or less destructive of a particular social structure, but its long term effects may be regarded as beneficial, in terms of greater productivity, less physically exhausting labor, increased leisure time, and so forth.29 This reveals a useful (but not radical) distinction within technology, to wit, that technology may be either noxious or beneficial (or, perhaps, benign).30 For Marx it is equally important to say that a historical shift is necessary, prescribed by the objective, material conditions of the time, as to point out that technology is advantageous or detrimental to the people at a particular point in history. (This is not to denigrate his compassion for those people.)

It does, however, then appear (after the shift is completed), that the era of Modern Industry, and intensified introduction of technology, make possible what can be a rational use or distribution or employment of the means of production, of technology itself. Technology is seen as essentially a means; and within the historical development, as it provides more than a minimal level of subsistence for society, and as it provides leisure, it opens the possibility for rational direction of those means.31

So Marx has a two-layered view of technology. In its particular
historical generation it is taken to be immediately destructive to, or sacrificial of, the laborers at the time. Yet it is seen more broadly as a means, which can be essentially beneficent. I will now outline the major arguments which Marx makes for this deeper, more hopeful view.

Marx has been seen to suggest in places that technology, the historical development of the process of production, is of greater force than capitalism. We have mentioned some of the objective conditions making possible the overthrow of capitalism, and these are largely conditions of technological development. So we may say, at least, that technology and capitalism enter into a dialectical relationship; but it appears to be a relationship from which only technology can emerge unscathed.

Part of the cause of this is the dissolution of the division of labor; another is the movement towards value being created by technology rather than surplus labor time. Marx points out in the Grundrisse that the machine appropriates living labor, in the sense of science's knowledge of nature and its technological application. Machinery is seen in this passage as taking advantage of the division of labor, in which human labor has been broken into increasingly more mechanical movements, which are ultimately adaptable to a machine's performance of them. This is, however, before the account of the final placement of the laborer with regard to the machine, which Marx later refers to as being one of directing or operating, although within the narrow confines of the machine's requirements. We might say that the laborer comes to rule the machine in the industrial process of production, but it is an all or nothing rule, it is a unifunctional relationship, in which the laborer can only "push the button or not". He is not less important than a part of the machine (the process), but he is no more important either.
Any greater, or more manifold relationship between the man and the machine is ruled out, at least on an everyday level. 36

Let us consider what Marx means when he says that "In Manufacture the organization of the social labour-process is purely subjective; it is a combination of detail labourers; in its machinery system, Modern Industry has a productive organism that is purely objective, in which the worker becomes a mere appendage to an already existing material condition of production." 37

There are two strains in Marx's thought throughout the short passage this statement is contained in. One notes the movement from "rule of thumb" to "conscious application of science" and the "substitution of natural forces for human force." The other is a growing necessity of associated labor, or labor in common; i.e., a social form of labor or process of production, in which the "co-operative character of the labour-process is,"... a technical necessity dictated by the instrument of labour itself." 38 We also have recourse to Marx's statement that production by machinery necessitates that the process as a whole be examined objectively; i.e., without regard to its execution by human hands. 39

Industry, then, capitalist or otherwise, has a productive organism which is purely objective, meaning that the laborer is adapted to the machine. This problem is one of technology and not merely capitalism. The problem, as Marx sees it, is how to make the laborer realize his objective condition, his subjugation to the machine, and how for him to control the process, how to make the process consciously regulated by men, by laborers. 40
So Marx sees here that there is a problem with regulating the modern process of production, technological production, and this is not simply a question of changing the ownership and control of the means of production, but rather of changing (what appears to be more basic as regards this problem) the relationships of laborer and machine, of man and technology. But this is less easily said than done. For the relationship is not simply one of man and object, laborer and machine.

We cannot simply reassert the machine as an object of our intentions, bend it to our wills. This may indeed be an answer towards making technology less noxious as regards man. But when we regard technology as a force within man, a way of thought or of being, as the way in which we define reality, we see that it is more difficult to change, less accessible to tinkering. For when we set about changing the process of production, or adapting a machine to our requirements, we may succeed in making it more 'humane', but we do so in a technological manner, and remain subservient to the unthought basis of technology. We may then, by correcting a minor malfunction of technology, only all the more assert its predominance. This view, certainly wider than Marx's, corrects the instrumental view of technology, in stating that technology is not simply a means to an end. As a habit of thought, technology takes genuinely human activities and goals, and uproots them from their traditional contexts.

The question for Marx is how to regulate or control technology. As we have shown above, Marx sees technology as a means, one which is value-free, at least to the point that it can be employed both by capitalism and other, more desirable, social organizations. His approach may be characterized, then, as instrumentalist; technology is 'nothing more than an instrument', the values of which can be rationally
determined. "The life-process of society, which is based on the process of material production, does not strip off its mystical veil until it is treated as production by freely associated men, and is consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan." Yet to call Marx's approach to technology merely an instrumental one misses a good deal of what Marx saw, albeit not explicitly as technology, as being somehow crucial for his age. The sensitivity of Marx as a social scientist is illuminated by a consideration of his analysis of money and the fetishism of commodities. A demonstration that these two intertwined phenomena can be interpreted as technological will show that although technology is considerably larger and different than Marx thought, he was sensitive to see the need for explanation and analysis.

Here we must make a distinction between a thing and a device. A device is a 'technological thing'. Devices are what things are reduced to in the technological age, and so devices are parasitic of things. In a device, as opposed to a thing, there is an unambiguous means-end distinction. A device is unfunctional, it has one proper use, and is (ideally) foolproof. And a device stands ready for use, it is instantly available, always in reserve.

At Marx's time the thing-device distinction was much less clear than now. Yet Marx does make a distinction between the tool a worker directs, and the machine (tool) which determines a worker. There is something to this for our purpose, because the machine determines the worker in that it is unfunctional, because it does assert one means for one end, and because it does stand ready for use. This helps to explain what we mean when we speak of a person being 'turned into a machine'. Yet Marx does not see that this trend to machines, or towards devices, reduces the world of the worker. Rather he sees it as opening possibilities
for community. Marx is taken by the aspects of technology which he feels are freeing of the worker. This, again, has reference to Marx's conception of labor and leisure.

The fetishism of commodities has for Marx its origin in the social character of producing labor, in capitalism. What obtains in this fetishism are material relations between persons and social relations between things. There are several points to be noted. First, in capitalism men are reduced to the level of things (commodities, labor-power), and although Marx does not explicate what the relationship between men is ideally, we are inclined to accept that it should not be (exclusively) that as between things. Secondly, we find commodities raised to the level of men, in that they take on a social character, appear as independent beings, become nearly metaphysical entities in the society. We say 'nearly metaphysical' because a commodity is, strictly speaking, not a thing for Marx, but an economic entity, one which takes on fetishistic proportions in capitalism. That which begins as a use-value, a thing, becomes perverted into something other than physical. The social character of men in capitalism does not show itself except in the exchange of commodities.

Marx does not provide examples, and so we are left to ponder exactly what can be meant by the fetishism of commodities. Let us consider briefly the place of the automobile in our society. Cars have or can have a magical quality, something mystical about them. They do assert a power which is not theirs from a consideration of mere form and physical matter. These less prosaic elements are usually the ones emphasized in advertisements and commercials. This car will make one free, that car will enhance one's masculinity, a third will increase the
number of one's friends. Marx was in one sense quite right--commodities
do often provide, or are claimed as providing, a social context or rel-
ationship or quality, perhaps one's place within society. An automobile
effects a definition of one's character. In speaking of the sense of
definition which cars bestow upon one, we may refer to a more or less
superficial defining. The car, however, is merely one of dozens of
commodities, the collective effect of which one is less likely to es-
cape.

Commodities are a telic force in capitalism for Marx--they provide
a necessary goal for everyone in the society. One must exchange to
live. To an extent they provide the social relations among men; to what
degree is a moot topic, but they indeed force a good deal of social in-
tercourse to take place within the context of buying and selling.\footnote{47}

Yet this is indistinct. Commodities are mysterious because they
provide ready-made values\footnote{48} or goals, and a prefabricated form in
which men must interact. But it is not enough to say that. In addition
the values which are inherent in commodities are frivolous values, be-
cause they are bought and sold. All things are reduced to money, in
that money can procure any commodity. Money is seen by Marx to be the
"absolute alienable form of a commodity".\footnote{49} All commodities are at our
service, are available for a price. Hence the moral, or life-values
that commodities represent are available for a price. We simply choose
which value we might like and it is ours. However because it is an
easy choice, from among a variety of possibilities, no one value asserts
itself, and any value which we might choose is playfully chosen, lacking
in seriousness, and can be equally well thrown back.\footnote{50}

Commodities are in some sense necessary for survival; some form of
exchange is necessary, except in the most hybrid (Robinson Crusoe) cases. But it is not as 'survival insuring' that we know commodities generally. Survival does not provide a very useful criterion, in that it serves as a basis for most values. It is rather as choice, as alternatively available items of existence that we know commodities.

Commodities function more as expressions of self-fulfillment than as expressions of necessity. Certainly some nourishment is needed for survival, and this physical need is served by some commodity or another, but it is not in these terms that we usually interact with them. Rather we buy something in a pretty package, or something on sale, or something to increase sex appeal. This self-fulfillment is characterized by a huge area of alternatives (within which distinctions are often minute). And any self-fulfillment will be arbitrary, or gratuitous, in the context of other possible alternatives.

In summation, we find that Marx's view of commodities and the fetishism of commodities is inadequate, but suggestive. Marx's position is that an article of utility becomes a commodity because it is produced for exchange-value rather than use-value. We understand commodities to be technological products, to be devices, and this subsumes Marx's notion within it. The effect of devices is to be generally reductive of a person's world.

For Marx, commodity fetishism is essentially an inverted relationship between man and things. We, on the other hand, see commodity fetishism to be a crisis in values, the crisis of choosing from among equally ambiguous, equally available, and in the end, equally unworthy values.
FOOTNOTES

1 We shall make use of a distinction between the mode of production and the process of production, the former designating a particular socio-economic order (e.g., capitalism or feudalism) and the latter designating a socio-technological order (e.g., Manufacture or Industry). The distinction is not always helpful or clear, and in examining a social trend it is sometimes difficult to tell what is the effect of which. Marx implicitly accepts such a distinction.


3 Ibid., p. 39. Such necessity (in "labour-time socially necessary") presupposes a living standard which holds firm.

4 Ibid., p. 40.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., p. 152-153. "The restless never-ending process of profit-making alone is what he the capitalist aims at."

8 Ibid., p. 371.

9 Ibid., p. 382.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., p. 383.

12 Ibid. See also p. 386.

13 Ibid., p. 384.


15 Capital, p. 381.

16 Grundrisse, p. 703.

17 Ibid., p. 705. (Emphasis added)

18 Capital, pp. 371-372.
19. Ibid., p. 373. Note here a tendency for the direction or ordering of the process to move one step up, perhaps towards a 'technocracy'.

20. Ibid., p. 374.

21. Ibid.

22. See above for a discussion of the thing-device distinction. Also see Martin Heidegger, "Die Frage nach der Technik", in Die Technik und Die Kehre (Neske, Pfullingen, 1962) for further discussion.


24. Ibid., p. 397 et passim.

25. Ibid., p. 399.

26. Ibid., p. 403.

27. Ibid., p. 430.

28. Ibid., p. 443, for the factors involved in employment.

29. See footnote 32 below.

30. This is Albert Borgmann's distinction.

31. Capital, p. 441. Grundrisse, p. 705-06. Marx would appear to accept a division (perhaps reminiscent of 19th Century evolutionary theory) between that time which we must work, in order to survive, and the leisure time we have (after survival is insured), during which we develop ourselves, find real self-fulfillment. This is unacceptable, as it relies upon a division within the life of a person, between the necessary work, which is bad for the person, and the leisure activities, which are made frivolous in that they are epiphenomenal upon the really basic function (i.e., labor) in life.

32. See above, p. 4-5.


34. Grundrisse, pp. 703-04.

35. There would seem to be a dialectic of science creating technology (material surplus, leisure) which then leads to further advancements in science.


37. Capital, p. 386.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., p. 380.

40. Ibid., p. 80.

Capital, p. 80.

The 'thing-device' distinction is Albert Borgmann's.

Capital, p. 72.

Ibid., p. 72-73.

This is perhaps less true of modern day America than of European countries.

Here, "values" is used in a sense wider than "economic value". So, too, hereafter.

It is interesting to note, however, that the values chosen are often parasitic on 'things', on traditional values. Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels Werke Band 8 (Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1960), pp. 153-154. "Das parlamentarische Regime lebt von der Diskussion, wie soll es die Diskussion verbleiben? Jedes Interesse, jede gesellschaftliche Einrichtung wird hier in allgemeine Gedanken verwandelt, als Gedanken verhandelt, wie soll irgendein Interesse, eine Einrichtung sich über dem Denken behaupten und als Glaubensartikel imponieren?"

This paragraph intimates the structure of the modern liberal state, a state whose function is that of mediator, with no particular interest, which nurtures the relativity of all interests. Thus all positions are reduced to "interests", to ideologies.

Marx's more explicit analysis is undercut by this view; in the 20th century there is a new class of people, who have 'no' class interests, but rather serve to mediate class interests, or to serve whichever interest is predominant.

If society is understood to be composed of relative interests, and the state to be that which serves predominant interests, (but not tied to any particular interest), this leads to a constant state of reconstruction, to a continual cultural relativism.

Technology (understood as the best means to a variety of ends) then becomes the interest of every group in a state, since it is the servant of any group's interests. Moreover, nothing in the state is by nature.

For Marx it was relatively important where one stood in society, whereas here one's interests are unimportant. Marx's analysis assumes a connection between your class interests and the sort of person you are, your character.

The preceding analysis I owe to Timothy Fuller.
I do not here assert any solution to this crisis, although it may seem that I imply a reduction in commodities, or luxuries, or a return to values of the past to be such a solution. I do not see that that would be adequate, even if appropriate.
PART II

THE DIMINISHMENT OF THE SELF IN LABOR

The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical grounding for the examination of labor in our society. The paper is funded by the notion that there is a positive and a negative conception of what we do in our lives for a livelihood (i.e. work or labor), and that the first fulfills or enlarges the self, while the second is a diminishment of the self. I will show also the intimate connections between this diminishment of the self and what I call technology, as manifested in labor today.

We will first sketch generally a notion of the self which arises from Kant and then develop the distinction between work and labor, and our notion of technology. Finally, we will by way of Merleau-Ponty illuminate more specifically our particular notion of the self, the relationship of self and body, and then develop some of the implications for labor.

We ground our analysis of the diminishment of the self in labor through Kant. It is Kant's analysis of the self which will serve as the basis for our discussion. The Critique of Pure Reason\(^1\) offers several perspectives of the self, some of which may be viewed as competing. In this paper I will emphasize the connection of the self and the world for Kant, and for ourselves. This positive interpretation is derived mainly from the passage near the end of Chapter II of the "Analytic of Principles", entitled "Refutation of Idealism". This passage is amplified by Martin Heidegger in section 42 (a) of Being and Time.\(^2\) It is by way of Heidegger that we understand our positive interpretation. Kant's thesis is that "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of

\(^1\) Kant, Immanuel. The Critique of Pure Reason.

\(^2\) Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time.
my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside of me." What we distill from this is that for Kant, and for us, the unity of the self and the unity of the world are in some sense tied up with each other. Naively, they are the same unity.

We must offset this positive interpretation by touching on what may be considered the radical unworldliness of the self; this is the Kantian sense of the self revealed mainly in the "Paralogisms". He states,

That the 'I', the 'I' that thinks, can be regarded always as subject, and as something which does not belong to thought as a mere predicate, must be granted. It is an apodeictic and indeed identical proposition; but it does not mean that I, as object, am for myself a self-subsistent being or substance.

In the "Antinomy" we find Kant, perhaps unsuccessfully, trying to pull together the worldliness and the unworldliness of the self by showing it to be the origin of the causality of freedom. Thus what we have for Kant are two sides to the self, which may or may not end up on the same coin for him. In the first case there is little problem of discovering the self; it is everywhere, in fact, in greater and lesser degrees, as we experience and act in the world, as we direct ourselves outward. As Kant says, "in order to so determine it [the subject], outer objects are quite indispensable; and it therefore follows that inner experience is itself possible only mediately, and only through outer experience." The self is the frame or subject to experience, as that in which or by which we experience. In the second case we can never find the self in looking for it, it is systematically elusive (in Ryle's words), it is pure subject, it is not a thing, and it is unexperienceable. Kant also makes a distinction between the intelligible and empirical self, first in the "Transcendental Deduction" (where he also emphasizes the unity of the self as a prerequisite to apperception) and in the "Antinomy".
This paper deals with Kant's self as in the world, the empirically determined existence of man in the world. The negative self (the elusive, non-thinglike self) is used to exorcise certain prevalent conceptions which attempt to determine the self as a thing. As we shall see, labor necessitates the self being thought of as a thing, even attempts to turn the self into a thing. The conception I want to enlarge upon, the positive conception of the self with the world, the self embodied and 'beworlded', is the self in action. Our analysis understands the self as in the world, and illuminated, as it were, by the world, and yet not as a thing, or an object. The self is from one perspective intelligible and from another empirical. But in either case we must heed the lessons of the "Paralogisms" and not try to turn the self into an object. The positive sense of the self, is the self we come with, as we come with a world; it is the unity of the self and the world which must be considered in order to arrive at the parts of the whole given to us.

'The body is the mediate subject of experience, but not the ultimate subject, not the true 'I'. ' As soon as this is written, doubts arise. How is the body different from the 'I'? There are perhaps active bodies of human shape, which nonetheless may be diagnosed as lacking an 'I'--bodies in delirium, for example. Kant may, in his emphasis upon the negative aspects of the self, give away the body as not being of ultimate significance for the self. We want, rather, to affirm the embodied aspects of selfhood, especially in relation to our emphasis upon the connection of self and world. We will, therefore, tacitly accept that the body and self are one. The body is not simply the subject for or of the 'I', but as well it is the expression of the 'I', and is necessary not only for the representation of outer objects, but for the actions of the 'I' in the world. The body carries forth the meaning or freedom of the
I follow Jacques Ellul9 (although he is not altogether consistent in his usage) in making a distinction between work and labor. Work is a much older term in our language and one which bears a great many more meanings; labor is newer and more narrowly defined. Here I shall use work to denote the traditional and pretechnological actions of men, those by which they not only sustained themselves in the world (a minimal livelihood), but by which they were defined and enriched. I use work as a paradigm by which to measure and characterize the aspects of labor. Not anything pretechnological is work; laboring on the edge of physical survival would violate certain characteristics of work, as would laboring as a slave. By labor I denote the modern and technological phenomenon, that of earning a living at a job.

What is labor? That is, what is the technological form of work? We must presuppose a theoretical grasp of technology; to elucidate such a grasp would involve a much longer essay. We must presume an intuitive comprehension of technology. We lay emphasis here upon a particular sort of technology, the most detrimental kind, which is perhaps both tyrannical and noxious. The sort of labor which we refer to is then brutal and exploiting. This kind of technology and this kind of labor are not the only kinds today. Technology is, as often as not, seductive, and has clearly positive aspects. The paradigm of technology today may more properly be the prevalent consumerism of industrial societies. These two kinds of technology, the tyrannical and the seductive, are aspects of one force. We will simply state that technology is a pervasive phenomenon, one reaching to the very roots; affecting the very fabric of society and of reality. Inadequately, but concretely, we may identify with the machine. Again, inadequately, and theoretically, we may identify technology

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with 'efficiency'. These are merely slogans, however, and it is perhaps better to simply let our examination of labor point towards the implicit understanding of technology as manifest in labor.

How is labor different from work? How is the laborer different from the worker? And how is the product of labor different from the object of work? We must begin by saying that what we are dealing with is a systematic and interconnected whole. The product of labor cannot be separated from the method of labor (the process) and neither can be separated from the laborer. It should not be forgotten that as we analyze disparate elements of labor we do not have to wait upon any theoretical synthesisization of them; there already exists a synthetic de facto unity which has man as its object. Thus we may analyze into separate elements for heuristic purposes, but should keep in mind that we so risk losing that by which the phenomena gain meaning.

Technological labor throws man back into himself (in a pejorative sense). The noise of the factory work is pervasive and anonymous. There is a lack of even basic communication among laborers. There is a lack of confrontation or involvement with the materials which make up the product, knowledge of materials becomes scarcer. There is a lack of care or concern for the product itself. Thus, the qualities called for in man by labor differ radically from those called for by work. As Ellul states, labor calls for an absence, rather than a presence, an active, critical, and efficient absence. Man is subordinated to the necessities of labor, and made for its ends. The meeting of man with the world, with previously basic elements of the world, is reduced to little. Labor is unidimensional in that the man confronts a machine (instead of the materials he once worked with) in an endlessly repeated, precisely defined and dictated manner. Ellul writes,
Man as worker has lost contact with the primary element of life and environment, the basic material out of which he makes. He no longer knows wood or iron or wool. He is acquainted only with the machine. His capacity to become a mechanic has replaced his knowledge of materials; this development has occasioned profound mental and psychic transformations which cannot yet be assessed."

The worker becomes a machine, performs the function of a machine, at the rate and in the manner of a machine. Labor demands that the laborer be functional, efficient, and intensely uninvolved. The labor demands very little of his reasoning faculties—only that they be dormant. The deeper capabilities of the man are not called into play. The mind of the laborer is not involved with the labor, except in a minimal way; the activity is habitual and does not demand the use of any higher faculty. As Friedmann says, "The deeper levels of personality find no outlet in their work, which has become something quite foreign to them, so that in relation to it they are 'alienated'." The worker becomes depersonalized, becomes an 'interchangeable unit'. The labor causes a strain on the attention of the laborer; the nervous exhaustion of so many constant habitual motions is considerable, growing, perhaps, as the traditional muscular fatigue has been lessened. Ellul, furthermore, explicates what we may call the exhaustion of the will, which takes place in technological labor, a psychic extension of nervous fatigue.

We may ask, in order to further illustrate our discussion of the self in labor, how the pretechnological object of work is different from the product of technological labor. This may be divided into three mutually dependent categories: a) that which is created, b) the reasons for its creation, and c) method of creation. One virtue of labor is that it produces a better quality product than was previously made, as well as providing more of them. Technology can provide a better quality of suit, for example; that is, one that is longer lasting and better looking, and
so on, although this is not always what in fact happens. This, it can be replied, is merely bad technology, and once everything is tuned to the proper pitch in technological labor we are quite capable of producing more and better suits than were possible with work. At the same time, however, the labor lowers the quality of human being. At one time the man made suits, because he was a tailor, because someone he knew needed the suit. Now the man runs fabric through a machine, or stitches along precut lines, because he must live on the wages he earns. He is reduced to turning out numbers, not suits. Labor has become a mere means for him, whereas work was both a means and an end. He does not direct his own activities, and he does not know for whom the suits are produced. As the worker becomes quantified, or objectified, or turned into a unidimensional function, he is reduced to the same level as the other parts of the machine which produces suits. He is reduced to a thing. This appears to be a manifestation of technology generally. Ellul writes,

Once again [in vocational guidance] we are confronted with a mechanism of adaptation which deprives man of freedom and responsibility, makes him into a 'thing' and puts him where he is most desirable from the point of view of another technique, that is, where he is most efficient. When viewed against the ontological reduction of man the quality of the suit becomes of less and less concern, relative to its previous quality. The original qualitative scale involved with the suit (the choice of the man as to what suit to make and how to make it a good suit) has been obliterated, or reduced to a 'problem' of quality. The problems of ends, as Ellul states,

becomes that of analyzing individual and social requirements technically, of establishing, numerically and mechanically, the constancy of human needs. The 'problems' which arise in technology, then, are to be solved technically, the ends which must be set must above all be objectively set. "Technical modalities cannot tolerate subjectivity," Ellul says.
The laborer is systematically alienated from the product of his labor. He has no choice of what to make or how to make it. There exists a screen of implements and machines between man and the world he once knew, a gap is caused between the individual and reality. Everything he produces is similar to every other thing, and he only contributes a small part to the finished product; thus his labor is never brought to fruition, he never associates himself with a finished thing thought of in terms of its use in the world. Finally, the man is alienated in labor in another, more important, sense. That is, he exists in a servile relationship to the product and the production; he does not so much form, in labor, as he is formed. Notice that the alienation in labor to which I refer is not the same as that alienation spoken of in standard Marxian analysis. The alienation in labor of which I speak takes place in both capitalist and communist countries. Marx, himself, was quite insightful in seeing the wider sort of alienation which I wish to assert. The standard Marxian view sees alienation as a relationship between the man and the product of labor which is used against him. The view of alienation we are here asserting is one of 'ontological alienation', in which the man in his labor is reduced to the level of thinghood.

Simply stated, our thesis is this: in labor the man is no longer governed in his activity only by his own consciousness and the requirements of the material (as he once was in work), which he had to form to suit himself and his customer. In labor, rather, the man is now governed in his activity by a foreign consciousness and by the objective ('non-negotiable') requirements of the machine. He does not deal with the material, he must conform to a rigid regime of a limited activity (both physical and mental) imposed by the machine. In practice we may view these two conceptions (of work and labor) as the opposite poles of a continuum. The
question appears to be one of the priority of ends. In the creative process of work or labor we ask: Who is in control of the activity? In the case of work, it was clearly the man, whereas in the case of labor, it is clearly not the man. In labor the activity, the total process, is imposed upon the man, he is directed, he is formed.

How is it that the self can be diminished? The self is diminished insofar as the reality created or sustained by the self in interaction with the world is enlarged or diminished. We are examining a microcosm of this relationship, that is, the self in interaction with the world in labor. The relationship of self and labor is pinpointed here as that of the body in labor. In what way are the meanings of the physical activity of the body in labor a reduction of the meanings of the body at work? Primarily we view this reduction as one of a manifold of movement, circumscribed only by the requirements of the worker and the material, to the unidimensionality of a function, circumscribed by the requirements of efficiency of machine-like movements and the rates of production attuned to a machine.

While we may all have some sense, today, of what labor on a production line is like, it is difficult to get a sense of what work would be, or what it would mean. We might imagine a blacksmith as one paradigm of the worker. He is placed, first of all, within the context of his life in a village or town which is familiar to him and with him. He makes things for people whom he perhaps knows, who have come to him for a particular thing, say a horseshoe, which will have a definite place in the context. In the production of this horseshoe the blacksmith has his context in circumspection before him—he knows the horse he will fit, its characteristics, what place it has on the farm of its owner. Moreover, he is aware of his equipment, that which he uses in making the horseshoe. He knows not only the place of his tools, where he got them, what they can and cannot do, how
they fit into one another, but he also knows the wood he stokes his forge with, where it was cut, why it is best for his purpose, how long it will burn and how hot. He knows where the sand he cools the hot metal in came from, the river bank, what is upriver and down, perhaps the source of the river in the distant mountains, and what the river is like when it floods with the spring runoff. Placed in all of this we can see that his work has much meaning for him, and within it all, how what is important and valuable to him might have arisen.

We can say, as well, that what the worker does stems to a much greater degree from the interaction of self and world (he sets his own pace, evolves his own motions) than that which the laborer does. The laborer must submit himself (his body) to a highly structured formula of activity. As Marx writes in the Grundrisse,

Not as with the instrument, which the worker animates and makes into his organ with his skill and strength, and whose handling therefore depends upon his virtuosity. Rather it is the machine which possesses skill and strength in place of the worker, is itself the virtuoso, with a soul of its own in the mechanical laws acting through it...27

The problem with labor is not merely that it is an activity which must be imposed upon the laborer. What the labor demands of the laborer is that he objectify his body (himself), that he become machine-like, a tool, an instrument, a means. "He sells himself," Marx writes, "as an effect. He is absorbed into the body of capital as a cause, as activity."28 The activity (meaning now 'physical movement') of a laborer is reduced to a single intention, an imposed intention with a single meaning. (Ellul: "The technical problem is to make his gestures so automatic that they have no personal quality at all.")29 The body is treated as machine, one which can be engaged and disengaged at pleasure, the actions of which have no consequences to the intellect. Labor drives a wedge between the mind and body. As Ellul states:
But to call good that fact that the worker thinks and dreams about matters unrelated to his work while his body carries out certain mechanical activities is to sanction the psychological dissociation between intelligence and action which our technical society tends to produce and which is possibly the greatest of human scourges. We thereby admit that, when all is said and done, the ideal state, higher than consciousness, is a dreaming state.\textsuperscript{30}

In this sense the mind is considered as severed from the body, and one is not only cut off from thinking in application to action, but one is cut off from the variety of meanings which were previously inherent in any craft or skill, from thinking in the sense of dealing with a manifold of reality.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty shows that the body is a subject both for and toward a world of things; the body is orientated (naively) in regard to things. This Merleau-Ponty sees not as the orientation of Euclidian geometry, but rather as the basis for such intelligible orientation. Merleau-Ponty writes, "The truth is that homogeneous space can convey the meaning of orientated space only because it is from the latter that it has received that meaning."\textsuperscript{31} Movements reduced to their pathological derivatives are concrete movements of intention, movements of grasping, telic movements. "In the last analysis," Merleau-Ponty writes,

If my body can be a 'form' and if there can be, in front of it, important figures against indifferent backgrounds, this occurs in virtue of its being polarized by its tasks, of its existence towards them, of its collecting together of itself in its pursuit of its aims; the body image is finally a way of stating that my body is in the world."\textsuperscript{32}

This is another way of saying that the body image is dynamic, that the spaciality of my body is a spaciality of situation.\textsuperscript{33} For Merleau-Ponty objective time and space are built out of bodily time and space. It would seem clear that this is true, at least in temporal priority. I am subject, and i 'objectify' to arrive at the concepts of Euclidian geometry. But can we then assume, as Merleau-Ponty does, that there is
an ontological priority, a priority in principle, of bodily time and space over objective time and space? Merleau-Ponty admits that the objective orientation is necessary, if not sufficient for the bodily orientation. But he wants to establish the primacy of bodily orientation. What reasons might one give for this primacy? Implicitly Merleau-Ponty offers us the evidence of cases of pathological behavior. Those patients affected are seemingly reduced to only concrete behavior, and there appears to be a qualitative leap which they cannot make, between concrete and objective movements. Explicitly we are offered the evidence that meaning must grow out of the bodily orientation and situation, and extend itself to the objective.

The cases of pathological patients which Merleau-Ponty presents to us are ambiguous and inconclusive for the very point he wishes to make. One would expect the patients to lose their substantive (concrete) orientation, since this is what Merleau-Ponty sees as more basic and important. Rather they lose the objective (abstract) orientation. It will be more useful for us to understand the patient as one whose field of concern, whose context, has been diminished, and who consequently cannot deal with merely formal space, but who is rather reduced to living within a very simple, substantive context.

Merleau-Ponty's radical claim cannot stand. Objective orientation does not grow out of subjective orientation, but rather neither has primacy over the other. Merleau-Ponty himself admits that whenever we look to bodily orientation we must fall back into an explanation in terms of objective orientation. Temporally, subjective space may be prior, but this says nothing concerning primacy; one might say with equal right that objective space is the more fundamental, since it is more complex or is of a higher order. Merleau-Ponty sees objective space as 'outer' and
'impoverished' and subjective space as 'inner' and 'rich'. This is based on a subjectivistic dualism, one which ultimately finds meaning only in the intentioning self. He writes, 'The distinction between concrete and abstract movement [which leads to the subjective-objective distinction], between Greifen and Zeigen comes down to that between the physiological and the psychic, existence in itself and existence for itself.'

If, indeed, labor cultivates in man a depleted orientation, if it reduces him to a thing among things, why is this a negating of his humanness? Why is work preferable to labor as we have delimited them? Merleau-Ponty would most certainly want to assert the value of work in relation to labor, but his discussion of objective and subjective space leaves us without a solid basis for such an assertion.

Merleau-Ponty is surely right in seeing that there are two different types of space. Where he goes wrong is, first of all, in calling these two types objective and subjective, since this misleads us about their true character. Secondly, he is wrong in attributing impoverishment (the outer) to one side of the distinction (objective) and richness (the inner) to the other (subjective). These are categories of what we shall call substantive space.

So that we may avoid the problems we have discovered in Merleau-Ponty's distinction, we will replace his terms with those of our own. The objective space we will call formal (that of means), the subjective space, substantive (ends). Thus, formal orientation (geometry would be an example) allows many substantive orientations within it; the two spaces (formal and substantive) do not conflict. With Merleau-Ponty this could be otherwise. Only substantively can intentions compete; it is within substantive orientation that the laborer is reduced in meaning. We might
take a map as an example of formal space. A map can tell one how to go, but it does not tell one where to want to go. There are many possible routes and destinations lying possible upon a map. But until we bring some sort of sense, some kind of intention to the map it tells us only of the existence of a variety of possible objectives.

Technology sometimes has the appearance of a formal orientation. It looks like it is a systematic analysis of a situation and an implementation of the best means possible for the solution to the problems of that situation. It may indeed rely upon science for the analysis of a situation; however, it implicitly slips into a substantive orientation in any implementation of a solution. It is an indication of the substantive nature of technology that it leads to a diminishment of the self. A formal orientation always allows many possible intentions, even many possible worlds; technology, however, makes the demand that there is one best world, one best way to undertake something. To fully show technology as substantive would involve an explicit analysis of its positive and negative factors; we cannot undertake this task here.

Why, then, is work more desirable than labor? First, work demands a manifold of intentions, a system of ends, from the man in regard to the world. Labor constructs a unidimensionality of action, where a single end is given total priority, and the world, in turn, comes to be defined by this single end. Secondly, the (physical) object of work gives and is given meaning in interaction with a manifold world, whereas the product of labor retains only a diminutive meaning. The worker is formed into a unidimensional relationship with it, and is kept from any direct relationship to the material, as machines become interposed. The laborer is no longer concerned with the object of labor and it faces into the distance for him. Thirdly, in work a man fulfills a manifold of
intentionality in the creation of a meaning between himself and the object. In labor the man does not draw with any intention the meaning from the product, does not assign any end with the object in view, but rather the thing which he partly forms drives back towards him, and as he lets himself be made a means, as he becomes a machine, he loses the intentioning aspect, the end-assigning relationship which worked to define him. In labor the world is substantially less orientated by him, he falls into accepting the world's orientation of him. He no longer asserts himself as subject, but falls to letting himself be delimited as object. He no longer actively draws out meaning, but falls to living out that meaning which is imposed on him. This is to say that the meaning of his labor is always already decided—his task and its manner of fulfillment is decided, his rate of production is decided, and his function within the process as a whole is already decided.

Whereas Merleau-Ponty affirms the notion of intention in orientation (as 'spaciality of situation'), he does not yet go far enough, so far as to draw out the qualitative difference between the intentions involved in work as opposed to those involved in labor. At best he can show a quantitative difference of the number of intentions concerned in each. This is the case for Merleau-Ponty because, as we have observed, he places intentionality (sc. value) in subjective orientation and opposes it to objective orientation; then when faced with a problem of value (deciding between interpretations) on the 'subjective level', he has no help to offer us. This is to say he does not provide us with a focal, or valuative, context from out of which we may judge and act. What we assert is that the reduction of the manifold of intentions to a single intention in labor, which single intention is imposed upon the man as laborer, amounts to a qualitative difference between work and labor. Simply stated, the
qualitative difference affects the very function of assigning and 
drawing forth intentions itself.

The abstraction of the body in labor leads to the alienation of the 
self from the world—as well as a diminishment and disorientation of 
both self and world. The self becomes either absolutized into something 
untouched by whatever the body must undertake, or it is particularized 
into just another thing, an object, and as such is available to object-
like solutions to its problems. As a man is forced to conform to the 
dictates of technological labor the problems which arise from the dimin-
ishment of the self and the world, of his reality, are either disregarded 
as being unavailable to treatment, or labeled as some thing-like malaise 
and treated as such. As the body comes to be conceived in object-like 
terms it becomes something foreign to me, it becomes, in Marcel's term, 
"not-mine".39 This tendency is concretely exhibited in labor, as shown 
by the foregoing discussion.

What we posited concerning the self, within a Kantian interpreta-
tion, was that the unity of the self and the unity of the world were 
tied up together. It follows that as reality, as the world, is reduced 
to a single dimension in labor, the self which lives and interacts with 
that reality is likewise diminished. The horizon of the world waxes 
and wanes, and correspondingly, the horizon of the self.

Kant, however, gives away the body, so to speak, to the sciences 
and the self is thereby relegated to the purely noumenal level (which 
is unavailable to the sciences). We have corrected this tendency by 
relying upon Merleau-Ponty, who emphasizes the embodied aspects of 
selfhood. It is the integral whole of mind and body which labor divides. 
Merleau-Ponty, however, lacks a criterion for showing a reduction of 
context leads to a reduction of self; that is, he does not analyze or
exhibit the paradigm situations and events of being human which would then lend focus to a criticism of diminutive forms. We have recourse to our notion of work, which provides the critical focus lacking in Merleau-Ponty.

That which is found objectional in labor, that which diminishes the self of the laborer is as follows: First, in our paradigm example of labor, an assembly line, we find that the laborer does only one thing; he has, then, been reduced to a unifunctional laboring existence, he has become mere means. Always and already his project has been circumscribed for him, and so he has no part in a directive participation, an intentionality, insofar as his laboring goes. This leads finally to a division of mind and body, to a wedge being driven between the facts of his existence and the values which might have formed and sustained his existence, or to phrase it alternative, to a dichotomy of means and ends in his life.

Work, as we have used the concept here, is a critical tool, and not something to which we might return. Once we have a technological solution, a means to some end, we cannot simply deny its efficacy and attempt to carry on with the old methods, at least not without previously undertaking a reconsideration of the values implicit in alternative modes of production, and, perhaps, feeling a claim stronger than that which we find in technological progress.

There are mediate curatives to some of the problems addressed herein. These would involve greater and increasing participation by the laborer in the design and fulfillment of his task, undertaking larger and more meaningful parts of production, and increasing involvement with the total system of production, including the assignment of ends to be achieved. There would have to be a concrete analysis of the interplay of a specific project with leisure, an attempt to re-integrate leisure and labor into a
unified whole, and finally, a definite movement towards involvement with society as a whole.


3 Kant, Ibid., p. 275; see also p. 277, note 1.


5 Kant, pp. 345-46.


7 Kant, pp. A115-16.


11 Ellul, p. 394.

12 Cf. Georges Friedmann, The Anatomy of Work, tr. Wyatt Rawson, (Free Press, New York, 1961), pp. 8-9. "One may say, generally speaking, that rationalization has split up the inherent crafts of the artisan, in which the worker's experience consisted largely in the slowly acquired knowledge of his materials and their properties when worked by hand or tool—knowledge, too, of the qualities of different samples, and of the effect upon them of seasonal alterations, changes of weather and of temperature (today we would speak of their hydrometric state)."

13 Ellul, Ibid.

14 Ibid., p. 325.


16 Friedmann, p. 140.

17 Ibid., p. 139.

18 Ellul, p. 357.
19  Ibid., p. 321.


21  Ibid., p. 362.

22  Marx, p. 694. "The production in enormous mass quantities which is
    posited with machinery destroys every connection of the product with
    the direct need of the producer, and hence with direct use-value; . . . ."

23  Ellul, p. 431.

24  Ibid., p. 431; footnote Cf. also p. 395.

25  Friedmann, p. 132. "In such surroundings of the new environment
    created by our technical civilization, writes Dr. Paul Sivadon, the
    new relationships set up between man and world 'sometimes develop
    too quickly to be incorporated in the nervous systems of the weaker
    members of society. Thus at times contact is broken, the gap between
    the world and individual is increased, and dissociation, in fact
    alienation, may appear.' . . . Reminding us that for these natural
    surroundings a 'technical environment', as we have called it, has
    been substituted, Dr. Sivadon adds: 'Those too immature to be able
    to keep contact with the real world through this screen of implements
    and machines between man and his natural surroundings can only pre­
    serve their mental balance by means of satisfying human relationships.'
    Note that the weakness of a member of society is here defined by the
    inability or unwillingness to submit to the technical society and its
    demands. Friedmann apparently agrees.

26  Cf. Marx, pp. 692-95. Marx may be interpreted to intimate here that
    capitalism is in evolution pointed towards technological labor. He
    would probably not agree, though, that technology would become of
    relatively greater significance than labor.

27  Ibid., p. 692.

28  Ibid., p. 694.

29  Ellul, p. 399.

30  Ibid.

31  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, tr. Colin Smith,

32  Ibid.

33  Ibid., pp. 99-100.

34  Ibid.


36  Ibid., p. 102.
37 Ibid., p. 131.

38 Ibid., p. 122.

PART III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF WITTGENSTEIN'S NOTIONS CONCERNING ETHICS

In this paper I will trace the development of Ludwig Wittgenstein's ethical views as it is manifested in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the "Lecture on Ethics" and the Philosophical Investigations. I will suggest, as well, a perspective from which to understand this development as intimately bound up with technology, which I take to be the primary characteristic of our age.

The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, focal point of Wittgenstein's early period, attempts to posit a pristine, crystalline world, one in which there is a direct relationship between words and objects. This world is a logical or scientific one and ethics is a topic of which we cannot speak. Rather, ethics shows itself. The Tractatus takes its primary motivation from an insight about language, one which Wittgenstein later recants. This is the picture theory of language, a theory in which words correspond to objects, and propositions (a specific relationship between certain words) correspond to relations among objects. This theory of language leads Wittgenstein to restrict the 'world' to facts, and to restrict meaningful or sensical language to that expressing facts. Ethics is not in the realm of facts, not in the world, but rather is transcendent. It is, therefore, nonsense to speak of ethics, for when we speak we can only picture facts, and ethics is not factual. Wittgenstein's reality in the Tractatus is dichotomized into a realm of facts and a realm of values.
Ethics is clearly of great importance for the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* period, however as something transcendent, there can be no knowledge claims about ethics, it cannot be considered true or false. Wittgenstein is thus in the position of affirming the claim of ethics while yet attempting to construct a world which is purely scientific or logical, and which is consequently in no need of ethics or value. This metaphysics of the *Tractatus* has many interesting implications, but I would like to suggest only one. The division of reality into two realms, one sensical and factual, the other nonsensical and valuative, tends to act to preserve the ethical realm from destruction in the world, the factual. In an age which appears to be increasingly characterized by facts, by information, by items and details, and in which values tend to be subsumed to factual status (opinion polls would be one example), the raising of values to a realm of their own, a transcendent realm, would seem to be one way in which to preserve their authenticity, their own status.

We may find one result of this dichotomy between the realms of ethics and science in the logical positivism of A.J. Ayer. While Ayer's position is based upon a theory of knowledge rather than language, it is acknowledged to have gained much impetus from Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. What for Wittgenstein was mysterious and valuable (the ethical realm) is, however, by Ayer totally trivialized. For both, at any rate, ethics is unreachable. Once having assigned ethics to the transcendental realm, one divided from the realm of science and logic, it is a short step to holding that nothing can be said or known about ethics. Thus Ayer's position
in *Language, Truth and Logic*, where we discover fundamental ethical concepts to be unanalyzable (there is no criterion to test their validity); they are unanalyzable because they are "mere pseudo-concepts" (they add nothing to the factual content of propositions) and they are merely moral sentiments expressed, essentially a grunt of approval or disapproval. In Ayer we can see the division of Wittgenstein elevated to an extreme polarization, between subjectivism and objectivism. The unintended implication of this view is that science itself becomes emotive, and there is no answer as to why we do science. The ultimate philosophical untenability of this position does not prevent it from being instantiated on some level or another in everyday existence, and we can see that technology promotes a type of existence in which talk of values is an ostentatious display of impotence.

In "The Lecture on Ethics", written more than ten years after the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein begins by pointing to the fact that ethics is not something sharply defined, and, in fact, includes "the most essential part of what is generally called Aesthetics." He quotes G.E. Moore's definition of ethics as "the general inquiry into what is good." He widens this with some suggestions of his own, including the inquiry into what is valuable, or, into what is really important, or I could have said Ethics is the inquiry into the meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of living.

We find him here making the same point as in the *Philosophical Investigations*, paragraph 77; that is, that ethics as a concept is blurred, or not available to strict definition. After pointing to the above family of examples he makes a basic distinction, that between absolute
and relative value judgments.

Wittgenstein characterizes this distinction by several examples, one of which is the following. If someone is playing tennis poorly, and that is pointed out to him, he can say that he doesn't care to play any better than he is. However, if someone is behaving poorly, and this is pointed out to him, he can't say that he doesn't want to behave better. Because we will tell him, "Well, you ought to want to behave better." Wittgenstein says that this is an absolute judgment of value. It is absolute because it is not dependent upon any situation, it is "supernatural", or transcends the world of facts.

Absolute value judgments are not statements of facts. Relative judgments, on the other hand, as descriptive, are about facts. Since relative value judgments are always about facts, it is an aspect of them that they never can constitute a 'deciding' principle. They are always means. This point is made perspicuous when we consider Wittgenstein's example of a road. A relative value judgment can tell you which way to go (which road to follow) to best arrive at your destination. It cannot, however, tell you what destination to pursue. Thus, it is Wittgenstein's point that a set of facts never gives us a value or a goal.

We can further elucidate this point by saying that a relative value judgment is always contextual, or within a situation, whereas an absolute value judgment is a-contextual. We shall come to see that to sublime the notion of absolute value judgment to the a-contextual is to enervate the whole enterprise.

Wittgenstein identifies ethics proper with absolute value
judgments (and perhaps marks this by the capitalization of "Ethics"), and he proceeds in the "Lecture" to paint the picture of the otherworldliness of values (their nonsense, in the term of the Tractatus). Wittgenstein, as in the Tractatus, sees the world as composed of facts. The dichotomy turns in this manner: Absolute value judgments are not assertions about states of affairs and compilations of facts do not contain ethical, or absolute, value judgments. In Wittgenstein's book of the world there would not be one ethical statement. Strangely and inexplicably he adds that if a man could write a book about ethics, "which really was a book on Ethics, this book would, with an explosion, destroy all the other books in the world."15

Ethics, in the "Lecture" as well as in the Tractatus, is not something which arrives at logical or scientific conclusions. The world is facts for Wittgenstein, and it is facts we speak of in language. Ethics is transcendent. Not only can there be no proof of an ethical position, there can be no argument about one, either. We cannot sensibly say anything ethical. This, because Wittgenstein has made the logic of the world and of language logical or scientific; later we shall see that he came to recognize the manifold 'logics' in our language, and the static conception of the world involved with it.

Let us return to one of the examples Wittgenstein used to draw our attention to absolute and relative value judgments. One can act badly while playing tennis, or do something wrong in playing tennis, in at least two different ways. Phil may be acting badly by playing tennis (he promised to be somewhere else). Or Phil may be playing tennis badly, and this, in turn, in two different ways: a) by following all of the rules, but never succeeding at tennis, or b) by violating
the rules (not playing 'tennis'). \(^{17}\) Wittgenstein would appear to mean example a) of our second instance.

There are two points to be made upon viewing these distinctions. First of all, to answer "I don't care to play any better" is not the "end of the matter" as Wittgenstein says, even in the case he means (which is the least controversial). Such an answer has certain consequences and implies a certain situation. We would be inclined to ask "Why not?", to probe for some cause for this apparently unconcerned attitude. If the person really didn't care how he played, why bother to play at all? Perhaps he doesn't care about winning, and so doesn't devote a tremendous amount of exertion to the game. But we then discover some other end, one which is felt as more binding. And we might, in further questioning, find what was most valuable to our player, and how tennis fits within this context. In brief, there would be antecedents and consequences of this episode, and it would fit within a context or a situation. Secondly, such a context will always be 'more' than facts, and will, I assert, always recall an absolute judgment or value which orders such a context. \(^{18}\) This we may refer to as providing the "focus" of a context, and may be best brought into perspective by recollecting Aristotle:

If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at the rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. \(^{19}\)

Let us consider the example Wittgenstein gives of an assertion of absolute value, the "Well, you ought to want to behave better." He doesn't explicate what might be the consequences of such a judgment. It has some 'greater compulsion' than a relative judgment. Does it
have the compulsion of logical necessity? It appears that he would answer this in the negative.  

How would we go on to support our statement that he ought to act better? What we do is to call forth the man’s situation, his context, to him. We would advise him that he will hurt his family and friends by behaving in this way, offend his neighbors, lose his job or be branded an outcast. It is this factual and valuative context which serves to reinforce (or not) our ‘absolute’ value judgment. It seems questionable, indeed, whether the absolute nature of such a judgment could even come about without a proper context, in this time. It is also the case that what Wittgenstein calls relative values are part of the fabric of the social context and this context always is more than a simple statement of facts.

"I wonder at the existence of the world" is how Wittgenstein describes the experience of absolute value, how he points to it. What he points to in this and other examples is something which can never be the case, i.e., something which can never be 'pictured', (the paradigm opposite of a statement of fact). This particularly fits the example he gives of imagining what it would be like to be absolutely safe. What he wonders at is something paradoxical, an example, actually, where language is spinning its wheels, or running empty. What his language tries to portray here is something beyond 'natural' meaning. What he commits is a category mistake. His language can't make significant statements about the absolute. We can see that here Wittgenstein is still tied to the picture theory of language. What is significant (or sensical) corresponds to the world, to the facts. What ethics considers (in the sense of absolute value) can't be scientific. "Good is what God orders" is how,
in his conversation with Waismann, he expresses the total 'unreasonableness' of ethics; the essence of the good has nothing to do with the facts, it has no foundation, makes no explanation.

In consideration of Wittgenstein's turn from the periods of the Tractatus and the "Lecture on Ethics" to that of the Investigations, the most striking change is from a one-sided view of language in which propositions picture facts, to the manifoldness of language-games, where meaning is use. The changes in Wittgenstein's ethics are difficult to state precisely and without reservations, because he says so little in the Investigations about it, but I would like to propose the following: 1) Wittgenstein must discard the fact-value dichotomy (or the exclusive nature of this distinction) and 2) Wittgenstein must discard the 'absolute' nature of value judgments for a contextual one. He 'must' do these things in the sense that to do anything else would be inconsistent in relation to the greater view of the nature of language and world which he adopts. In the following we extrapolate from this view to ethics.

There is only one paragraph of the Investigations in which Wittgenstein mentions ethics, so this analysis must take into account the nature of sympathetic passages where religion, aesthetics, and language itself are mentioned. We must also consider Wittgenstein's view of philosophy.

In paragraph 77 Wittgenstein says that looking for a definition which corresponds to our concepts in aesthetics or ethics is comparable to attempting to draw a blurred shape with a very sharp outline—"Anything - and nothing - is right." He continues, "In such a difficulty always ask yourself: How did we learn the meaning of this word ('good' for instance)? From what sort of examples? In which language games?
Then it will be easier for you to see that the word must have a family of meanings."

There are a number of conclusions we can distill from this:

1) Our concepts in ethics are blurred; perhaps the same sort of haziness which one has from imposing picture after picture of faces upon one another. 26 2) Thus no strict definition is felicitous, no one definition may be able to handle all of the various possible situations. And 3) our use of ethical terms is within a family of meanings, appropriate to a variety of contexts.

This description may be directed, we take it, at one who asks for a definition of absolute good. And while it does not specifically rule out the possibility of such a 'good' existing (just the definition) it would seem to counsel that to speak in such a manner is to not take account of the nature of language. Now there may be two separate conclusions drawn from Wittgenstein's passing over much discussion of ethics in the Philosophical Investigations. The first is that he may have decided that the good really was unspeakable, and so he consigned it to silence. Or secondly, he felt that what he was saying about language, meaning, and rules was somehow decisive for ethics. We accept this second conclusion.

In the 'Lecture on Ethics' Wittgenstein uses the example of the 'absolutely right road' and says that if such a road existed it would be one which everyone upon seeing it would have to follow with logical necessity. 27 It is prudent to ask, rather, whether necessity is at all a proper attribute of something which claims us decisively.

In summation, we would answer the passage from the "Lecture" something like this: There is no absolutely right road. There are only roads. Which road to follow, and why, depends upon a great deal:
the situation or context of a person.

Does this mean that value (ethical) judgments cannot be de-
cisive? There is a problem here only if we take the logical-sci-
entific standpoint, in the realm of facts. In the "Lecture on Ethics"
this is precisely what is done. If the absolute good is defined as
that which is true of all situations, as that which is trans-contex-
tual or omni-contextual then it is impossible to imagine an objec-
tive value arising within a context. In the Philosophical Investi-
gations we have discarded the notion of one true context, one which
is impervious to values, (as was the logico-scientific in the Trac-
tatus and "Lecture") and now emphasize the manifoldness of contexts,
of different situations and language games. Thus, in the Investi-
gations, ethical value is decisive within a situation. (I preserve
here a distinction to mark off two different language-games in
calling 'objective' ethical judgment 'decisive'.)

This leads us to make several comments. First, we can see the
importance of being grounded in a context, because when this grounding
is lost, we are 'at sea' ethically. This lack of roots would appear
to be a major social phenomenon today, and consequently, there sur-
faces an ethical 'relativism', whether sophisticated or naive.
Secondly, we may find in this situation an emphasis upon ethical
differences between different cultures, and the resulting perplexity
of how to 'choose' between them. This is less of a problem in prac-
tice than in theory; however, it remains to be convincingly analyzed.

Is it the case that Wittgenstein himself is led to some form of
ethical relativism, perhaps a meta-ethical relativism, in which there
is no decisive, rational way of justifying one basic ethical judg-
ment against another?28 This does not appear to be the case.
Applying what he says concerning rules and justifications in language-games to ethics we can view ethics as a human activity available to the same sorts of analysis as language. As in language, there are no 'absolute' justifications (of an omni-contextual nature) for ethics.

The standards for justification in morality or ethics are not the same, of course, as those in science, but that is not to say that such standards do not exist. Science depends upon a special elite, whose shared training in scientific procedure, evidence, and appeals provides the basis for justification. It is this 'court' and its actions which define scientific objectivity and rationality. But its jurisdiction is limited to certain types of cases. 29

Morality, however, relies not so much on following an accepted procedure (although there are certainly accepted justifications or pleas and those unacceptable) and arriving at a conclusion all can accept, but more upon a truthful revelation of one's position vis à vis others, for a defining of one's self and of one's relation with others. There is no elite for such an activity, as there is in science. Moreover, morality and science do not 'conflict' as realms, but rather are neutral and overlap each other. Justifying an action is quite different from giving a proof in science. To give a proof one may have to re-iterate the relevant facts (and what is a relevant fact, of course, is quite highly determined) and show the movement from one to another in a scientific procedure. In other activities, morality for instance, "Giving a reason for something one did or said means showing a way which leads to this action. In some cases it means telling the way which one has gone oneself; in others it means describing a way which leads there and is in accordance with certain accepted rules." 30
This should not lead one to say that ethics is subjective. Between science and ethics we use standards differently; neither realm has access to a transcendent standard. To speak of ethics as something 'more subjective' than science is to assume that they are both the same sort of activity.\textsuperscript{31} Neither should it be assumed that one can somehow 'choose' a system of morality. If ethics is a contextual and focal activity, as language is, then it must be decisive and not open to superficial manifestations of choice. In other words, ethics must claim or call one, and do so at the ground of one's being.

Ethics may, in this age, appear to be a panoply of various codes, assorted systems for living, from among which one must choose (or not choose). The reason for this situation is that ethics as a contextual and focal activity is threatened by the reductionism of what I shall call technology.\textsuperscript{32} I use 'technology' out of terminological convenience, to group under one heading the three examples which follow. The term might certainly be used in other ways, and I do not deny the possibility that some other term might be used to group my examples. It is not, however, the purpose of this essay to discuss these matters. Technology nurtures the rootlessness of our time. Thus, ethics or morality (as that which claims one with authority) is destroyed with the destruction of contexts by their confrontation with technology. As one example, we may take consumer goods and the method of their creation, distribution and use, to be a manifestation of technology. Goods are made available at such a pace and in such quantity that the original basis for their existence fades into the distance. In consumer goods, too, we note that things tend to become reduced to devices.\textsuperscript{33} We lose the manifold interconnections (or context) which comes with a more austere form of life. In a
very real sense, the world is reduced to facts and functions and questions of value in such material surplus are considered epiphenomenal. With increasing availability, questions of ends get shunted off. Things in the world become increasingly reduced to goods, become simply means; having material wealth, it is assumed that every individual can satisfy whatever ends he desires. This availability, at the same time as offering such fulfillment, cuts us off from that which illuminates ends for us, a contextual and focal world. By making any world and any thing available to us it destroys the ground and basis of our values, and thus reduces all choices to triviality. Concurrently, consumer goods or devices are derivatives of a valuative, pre-technological world, and implicitly depend upon it for direction.

A second example is at a level where we become concerned with 'knowledge'; in this the past century has seen an equally striking change. Values have become commonly thought of as the subjective, and we oppose them to facts, the objective. This movement perhaps takes it material genesis in the phenomenal rise of the 'social sciences'. In order to qualify as 'scientific' the social sciences always begin with a quantitative methodology. Whatever is the subject of study must be reduced in some form or another to quantifiable facts, which are then submitted to statistical analysis. This is what is known as 'value-free social science'. In it, obviously, all values and views are reduced to facts; this is done by taking them from context. Implicitly, social science must rely upon some valuative orientation, which directs it to analyze something rather than something else.

Finally, the modern liberal state itself may be regarded as
tending to reduce all values to facts or 'opinions'. In the democracy of interests all ideas and values are reduced to interest, insofar as they are presented in the political arena. That interest prevails, ideally, which has the largest percentage of support. The operation of such a state presupposes a previous reduction in the functions of language; when one speaks in the political, one must speak in a manner which is capable of reduction to a predisposed calculus of interests. Failure to do this results in being taken for something one is not, being ignored, being actively ridiculed, or, rarely, in creating a new category in the calculus of interests. Again, however, we see that for a motivation within the political, we must look without it (as currently defined) for some valuative base, for something which can direct us and sustain us.

In all three cases, those of consumerism, social science, and the modern liberal state, we see that there is an explicit denial of the importance of value, and a simultaneous implicit acceptance of some value or values. This dichotomy, which is the result of presuming values to be unnecessary or superfluous, results in a crisis for all three areas.

The fact-value dichotomy in the *Tractatus* is symptomatic of the reduction and destruction of things and contexts. It is possible to consider the *Tractatus* as nihilistic in this regard, although it can be said for Wittgenstein that he felt the force of value and attempted to save it by consigning it to silence, and that he also attempted to show "how little is achieved when these [scientific or logical] problems are solved." The "Lecture" recasts the fact-value dichotomy in the radical distinction of relative and absolute judgments. Again we find that ethics is unreachable, that it is
'sublimed', and that the world is reduced to facts. And yet in both we find that value must underlie fact, that the relative is dependent upon the absolute. The Weltanschauung of Wittgenstein in the Tractatus and the "Lecture" is essentially the same sort of perspective that technology takes. Both posit a world which is clear, manageable, and not needing values or ethics. And both must implicitly refer to and rely upon values.

The Investigations is then interpreted as backing down from these views, and reasserting the manifoldness of the world, of things, in "the darkness of this time". To interpret the Investigations as effectively taking this turn it would have to be shown that Wittgenstein no longer holds to the primary of the fact-value dichotomy but comes to see that facts and values are merely one distinction of our language, one which has its uses, but which is not radical or exclusive.

There are three elements which show that Wittgenstein discards a fact-value dichotomy in his later period. First of all, we see that in the Investigations his use of language is much broader than in the Tractatus, and he has become aware of the important position of language-games; that is, of contexts, in our world. Secondly, there is internal evidence for taking this view, in that Wittgenstein is concerned to break us out of the false concepts we have; in paragraph 471 of the Investigations he speaks of facts leading us to an answer (to the question 'why?'), and so it seems that he no longer takes facts as the matter of logical space, but in some way almost animate, or suggestive. And thirdly, both ethics and science (that concerned with values and that concerned with fact) are taken as differing sorts of language-games, subsumed under language, and so both form a part of...
human activity. Both refer to human contexts, and the foci of the human Lebensform. This is not to deny that there is a significant distinction between fact and value. But it is to say that the way we use the words and act upon them does not support an exclusive dichotomy.

Wittgenstein is still very hesitant about saying things concerning ethics, and he apparently still finds it a very personal matter. He does seem to admit, however, in the Investigations, that one can show by saying, without being nonsensical. Thus he points to the Lebensform by making grammatical statements, by showing us different language-games, different contexts. This is largely the function of philosophy for Wittgenstein, this arranging of perspectives, this shift of aspect. He conceives of philosophy as pre-scientific, as not empirical, as not offering theories. Philosophy doesn't explain, but rather describes or points out; what it points out are aspects of things, and its problems are solved by arranging things, disentangling things, revealing things by putting them before us in a different perspective.

What leads to the rather hesitant style of the Investigations, the tentative nature of its conclusions, is the absence of value or direction itself, in the landscapes or perspectives Wittgenstein creates. Having shown us that the meaning of words in language is in their use, he is merely content to draw out examples of different uses. He does not tell us which are most valuable, more basic, and which trivial and superfluous. He is rather like a social scientist, one who provides descriptions of different cultures, or different rituals, and yet he does not subsume these descriptions to general laws. Nor does he, however, attempt to show us which are more important. This is what lends
the air of 'perspectivism' or 'relativism' to the Investigations.

Wittgenstein's hesitation may be attributed to two reasons. First, he may be more concerned with revealing the contextual nature of ethics (or thought), in an attempt to illuminate its nature, as against his former views of ethics as the absolute. Perhaps, though, this hesitancy on Wittgenstein's part to display the things and events which focus value was an intuitive move, much like his assigning ethics to a transcendent realm in the Tractatus and "Lecture". If this is the case, it may then be interpreted as an attempt to preserve the authenticity of value in the face of a technological world.

What can be criticized in Wittgenstein's early views concerning ethics is his disinclination to consider value as contextual, and his consequent inability to see to the heart of the ethical matter; that is, the granting of value through focal entities and events. In the Investigations we are given a contextual world, but we are not shown the focuses which shape and sustain those contexts. An analysis of Wittgenstein's developing position is, however, helpful, in that it is a progression manifesting a way from the devalued world of technology to a world which, despite its tentativeness, is one of contexts.
FOOTNOTES


2 Tractatus 1.1.

3 ibid., 6.421.

4 ibid., 2.221-2.222, 4.461-4.466, 6.42. For elucidation of the showing-saying distinction see 4.113, 4.121, 4.1212, 4.122, 6.52.

5 ibid., 6.4, 6.41.


8 "Lecture", p. 5.

9 ibid., pp. 5-6.

10 ibid., p. 6.


We may compare Wittgenstein's use of absolute and relative judgments with Kant's categorical and hypothetical imperatives. The hypothetical for Kant was an imperative of means, and the categorical one which is 'objectively necessary in itself without reference to any purpose, i.e. without any other end' (pp. 31-32) These correspond with Wittgenstein's use of relative and absolute, respectively. However for Wittgenstein the absolute is unapproachable by reason (i.e., it cannot be explained), where for Kant the categorical was precisely that which characterizes rationality.

See Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals in the Critique of Practical Reason and other works on the Theory of

12"Lecture", p. 8

13We can compare this to an aspect of natural science. A relative judgment of value (a fact) can provide an explanans, but never the explanandum; it can provide an explanation, but not what is to be explained. See Philosophy of Natural Science, Carl G. Hempel (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1966), pp. 50, 59.

14Tractatus 1.1

15"Lecture", pp. 7-8.

16Ibid. Nathan Rotenstreich ("The Thrust Against Language: A Critical Comment on Wittgenstein's Ethics", Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 11, No. 2-3, Fall 1968) compares this last quoted statement of Wittgenstein's with Hume's famous passage concerning what should be committed to the flames. Wittgenstein, however, intends to be descriptive (a metaphysical statement), whereas Hume is wont to proscription. This blunts the point of Rotenstreich's juxtaposition.

17I owe these distinctions to Albert Borgmann.

18'Absolute' is used here in a contextual sense, of course.

19Nicomachean Ethics, 1,2. The contextual nature of this absolute would not have been recognized by Aristotle, of course, perhaps precisely because it would have been so strong at the time. Also, what was true then may not necessarily be so now. Cf. also Kant, p. 28.

20Tractatus 6.37-6.375. Wittgenstein in the Investigations, and perhaps beginning in the "Lecture" plays with the word 'logical', and begins to use it to signify something other than symbolic logic. In the "Lecture", at any rate, the absolute judgment hasn't logical force, since it is of a different realm than facts. The transcending of ethics from the factual also makes it difficult to understand what force ethics does have. Wittgenstein seems to puzzle with this in the Tractatus 6.422.

21There are many topics for reflection in this regard. Consider the underground man of Dostoyevski, nearly all of Kafka. Contrast Job. See also Tractatus 6.371, 6.372.

22Tractatus 6.432-6.45.

23Cf. Rotenstrich's criticism of this 'simple' paradox. Cf. also "Lecture", p. 6.

24Waismann's "Notes" in Philosophy Today No. 1, op. cit. It is interesting to juxtapose Kant, who denies or circumvents this dilemma. p. 31.

25Tractatus 6.432.
26 "Lecture", p. 5


29 Pitkin, p. 205. I follow Pitkin's argument hereinafter.


31 Pitkin, pp. 237 and 183.

32 We may effectively differentiate between science and technology by saying that science is purely theoretical, while technology is practical. Science as theory allows many conceivable worlds; technology is the instantiation of a particular world.


35 Tractatus, p. 5


37 Pitkin, p. 219, 222 e.p.


39 Investigations, 109, 124-129, 598, 599.