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The Indonesian question before the Security Council 1946-1949

Moises Montero De Guzman

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THE INDONESIAN QUESTION
BEFORE
THE SECURITY COUNCIL 1946-1949

by

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A.B. (Journalism), San Jose State College, Calif., 1951

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirement
for the degree of Master of Arts

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This thesis has been approved by the Board of Examiners in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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Date June 2, 1952
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In preparing for this masters degree thesis, I have found it impossible to rely heavily upon the present resources, *Official Records* of the Security Council, of Montana State University, which I found inadequate. Therefore, I had to depend largely, wherever possible, on the minutes of the United States Senate meetings, articles of people associated closely with the dispute, the *New York Times*, and other resources. The conclusions I have made after each of the sixteen chapters are my own. I have tried to avoid biased assumptions, opinions, and information as much as possible. I also subscribe as my own any deduction, evaluation, and assessment of facts contained in this work which sound pre-conceived.

I give credit to Bill Smurr, Don Graff, Phil Williams, Rita Steinbrink, and others who have given much of their time to correcting the manuscript for errors in style and form. I am very sincerely indebted to Dr. Robert T. Turner, my benevolent adviser, whose exacting suggestions and encouragement, made this thesis possible.

M. de Guzman

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CHAPTER I

BACKSTAGE DRAMA BEHIND THE INDONESIAN
DISPUTE AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I

The ancient Greek geographer Ptolemy called the
East Indies the "Cold and Silver Islands," a thinly
populated archipelago where an indigenous civilization was
slowly growing. To the modern historian, the East Indies
is known as the source of great problems and wealth for
the Dutch in the twentieth century. The East Indies is
not now the thinly populated group of islands known to
Ptolemy. With 80,000,000 inhabitants, it has become one of
the most thickly populated areas in Southeast Asia.

The archipelago of the East Indies thrusts length-
wise along the Equator for approximately three thousand
miles. It is one of the tourist centers of European as well
as American travelers. Ever since the trade routes to the
Indies were blazed by men like Marco Polo, Magellan, and
Legaspi, this empire of the thousand islands has been the
glory and wealth of Portugal, Great Britain, and especially
Holland. The archipelago constitutes a great and fragmented
island empire, located between the Asiatic mainland, the
Philipines, and Australia. It extends 6 degrees North and 10 degrees South Latitude, between 95 degrees East and 141 degrees West Longitude. The archipelago is divided into four main groups:

1. The Greater Sunda Islands (Sumatra, Borneo, Java, and Celebes).
2. The Lesser Sunda Islands (Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Selor Islands, Wetar, Flores, and Timor).
3. Moluccas, by which is mean all the smaller islands to the east of Celebes, formerly known as the "Spice Islands".
4. New Guinea, being that part of New Guinea which belongs to the Netherlands.

The entire archipelago, including the inter-island seas, extends as far from east to west as New York from San Francisco, and the total land area of 743,843 square miles is almost one-fifth the area of the United States including Alaska, or twice the area of the state of Texas.

Java with the adjoining island of Madura has an area of 50,000 square miles, about the size of New York state. Sumatra occupies a land area of 162,000 square miles, about as large as the state of California.

Five-sevenths of Borneo's total area of 212,737 square miles are included in present-day Indonesia or still

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administered by the Dutch. That part of New Guinea under Dutch sovereignty has about 152,000 square miles and is about the size of the Empire of Japan in 1931.

Unfortunately the archipelago does not possess large "golden gates" like the San Francisco or New York harbors, although small natural bays and coves are numerous with shallow and deep shoals which proved to be great refuge for submarine raiders of the Allied forces during the last World War. John Gunther wrote about the East Indies:

The dominating fact about the islands is that, like Croesus and John D. Rockefeller, Fr., they are rich. They are the Big Loot of Asia. They are packed tight with natives, under the steaming sun, who both produce and buy wealth. . . . In the old days, the days of the Dutch East India Company, trade was a simple business of profitable barter: beads, which cost little, for spices and cinnamon, which brought profit.

Among the wealth of Indonesia are great amounts of cinchona from which quinine is extracted, ground-nuts, tobacco, rice, tin, oil, and coal. Indonesia produces ten per cent of the world's oil, the fifth greatest producing country in the world. Before the war when synthetic rubber was still in the experimental stage, Indonesia was the greatest source of natural rubber in the world. Gunther reported that the Netherlands Indies "if necessary. . . ."

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2 Ibid., p. 16.
3 Gunther, John, Inside Asia, p. 322.
could totally supply the world’s rubber." 4

Former Secretary of State Cordell Hull asserted in August, 1940, that:

Any change in the status of the Netherlands Indies would directly affect the interests of many countries. The islands produce considerable portions of the world’s supplies of essential commodities such as rubber, tin, quinine, and copra (dried coconut meat). Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status by other than peaceful means would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security not only the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific Area. 5

The first inhabitants of the islands were ancestors of the present-day Australian natives, but they have left only few traces in the blood of people now living in Timor and Flores islands. Next came the ancestral stock of the wooly-haired Oceanic Negroes, now living in the islands of Melanesia: the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomons, the New Hebrides, and New Caledonia.

Their race is almost vanished from the Indies, but is known that they must have passed through, for they could have reached the Pacific islands by no other route. Moreover, in certain unfrequented parts of the Archipelago, especially in the vicinity of Timor, the bushy-haired, sooty-skinned Melanesian Negroid stock still survives. 6

Besides these two racial stocks is the pygmy negro, also a prominent member of the Negroid clan. They are

4 Ibid., p. 322.
5 Business Week (August 10, 1940), p. 51. (Declaration of former United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull).
prevalent in the mountain fastnesses of Java, Sumatra, and the Celebes, and in the islands of the nearby Malay Peninsula. Far to the east of the Indies may be found the Papuans in New Guinea, probably a cross-breed of Australoid and Melanesian.

A new migration into Indonesia began about a thousand years ago. It came from southeastern Asia---South China, Burma, Siam, and French Indo-China---and brought to these "Gold and Silver Islands" the first of the Malayan people. At a later time, waves of immigration of Mongoloid people from the northern Asiatic mainland poured into the Indies and changed the racial type of predominantly Caucasoid to predominantly Mongoloid so that the majority of Indonesians today are of Malay race.

During the first seven centuries after the birth of Christ, the Hindus of India invaded several of the islands and established a number of Hindustan kingdoms. Hindu civilization flourished for five hundred years, and today the traits of Hindustan civilization are found largely in the upper class of Javanese society. Horace Bristol declared:

The Balinese are the only people in the East Indies Archipelago who have retained the Hindu religion, which in the other islands has long since succumbed to Islam. 7

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The coming of the Islamic people changed the aspect of Indonesian life when they overpowered the Hindu kingdoms at the beginning of the fifteenth century A.D.

This new faith in the first instance came from India and later was fed direct from Arabia; and [therefore] Hindu and Muslim traditions are alike the source of the strong sense of spiritual kinship which the Indonesians of today feel. 8

Islam civilization thrived along the coastal districts of Sumatra, Java, and Borneo. Islamic civilization is one of the basic forces which led to a shifting of the center of political and cultural life in Java. The Muslim missionaries were mostly merchants, pirates and conquerors, but never priests who fostered the ideal of bringing the Truth to benighted heathens.

The Chinese entered the islands as far back as the 13th century A.D., the first coming from Fukien province and mostly merchants. The Chinese who came in the 20th century were mostly Cantonese, and unlike the earlier Chinese who stayed in the islands to live permanently, the latter left the Indies as soon as they earned enough wealth to return home. The effect of the Chinese immigration was to accentuate the Mongoloid racial character-

9 Bartholomew, op. cit., p. 317.
10 Current History, IX (December, 1945), p. 542.
istics in most parts of the archipelago. The Chinese inter-married with natives; and later they got jobs in the civil government, opened business enterprises like tapioca and starch factories in West Java, near Pedalarang, and shops at various business centers in the Indies.

Asiatic immigrations other than Chinese were relatively small in proportion to the total number of inhabitants. Japanese residents in the islands according to an article in Oriental Picture, a Japanese publication, numbered approximately 7,000, in 1940. Eighty per cent engaged in small businesses. There are fewer Japanese in Indonesia than Chinese because the Dutch colonial government's fear and suspicion of the Japanese became inflamed after Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931.

Of the Caucasoid group (white race) there were 7,000 Germans in 1940, approximately 1,000,000 Dutch, and some 30,000 of European nationalities other than German and Dutch. There were 60 languages spoken in the Indies and 19 varieties of civil jurisprudence in effect. By the dawn of the 18th century, European missionaries had penetrated the Indies to compete with the Moslems, and by 1943 there were at least 2,000,000 Christians in Indonesia.

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11 Ibid., LI (August, 1940), p. 52.
12 Ibid., LI (August, 1940), p. 52.
13 Foreign Affairs, XXI (October, 1942), p. 87.
II

The first Europeans to visit the East Indies were the Portuguese who arrived in 1509 at the port of Malacca. They found the port inhabited by hostile natives and were subjected to hostile attacks. A Portuguese fleet under Alfonso de Albuquerque conquered the whole city of Malacca in 1511, and another fleet later was sent to subdue all of the "Spice Islands." The Native sultans of Ternate and Tidore islands overpowered the colonizers, however, and the Portuguese were limited to Amboina, the only island where Portuguese missionaries were safe from hostile natives.

Fifty years after the Portuguese took Amboina, the first Dutch contingents landed at Bantam, Java, in 1596. This was the beginning of extensive Dutch exploitation of the archipelago. The Indies were not new to the Dutch seafarers who, as early as 1570, had published in Holland detailed trade routes of the Indies. At that time, the Dutch had been prevented from colonizing the Indies because of the decree of King Philip II of Spain and Portugal banning the Dutch from the ports of Spanish kingdom. The Dutch revolt in Europe later led the Dutch to challenge the combined sea power of Portugal and Spain in the East Indies. However, Portuguese and Spanish traders, as well as English, entered into trade competition in the
Orient, and there was grave doubt whether the Dutch merchants would ever stay at par with their competitors.

Therefore in 1602, the Grand Pensionary, Johan van Oldenbarneveldt, organized all Dutch trading companies operating in the Indies into one privileged United East India Company for the purpose of out-selling and out-competing the English, the Spanish, and the Portuguese. The Dutch States-General granted a complete monopoly to the company for all trade east of the Cape of Good Hope and west of the Strait of Magellan which covered, indefinitely, the entire area of the Pacific Ocean and the Chinese mainland.

The company started with a sizable capital of six and a half million guilders, sufficient at that period to enable the company to compete effectively with the English and other European companies. These non-Dutch companies, endangered by the threat of Dutch monopolistic policies, found it necessary to wage war against the Dutch company. However, the English and Spanish attempt to drive out the Dutch failed; and the Portuguese were eventually expelled from the Indies, especially from Amboina, where the inhabitants voluntarily recognized Dutch overlordship. Later,

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Rate of Exchange in January, 1952: 26.329 guilders for $1—therefore the company's investment capital to present currency rate would be approximately $25,000.
Spain made war on both the English and the Dutch, but the defeat of Spain opened the way for the commercial leadership of the English in the Orient. Commercial rivalry between England and Holland flared up and was not settled until 1825 when an Anglo-Dutch accord was reached. British merchants henceforth dominated India and Malaya, while the Dutch were left alone to govern their insular empire of the East Indies.

In its early development, the Dutch East India Company acquired but a normal profit, and most of it was spent to develop extensive ports, provide medicine to combat tropical diseases, build faster and heavier ships, and exploit the Indies hinterlands. But as years went by, the company was on the brink of failure:

Huge loans were floated among the wealthy people in Holland, and it took more than twenty-five years of financial anxieties and maneuvers, before the directors could be assured of their success. 15

By the second half of the 17th century, the company became more and more involved in the political affairs of the Indonesian people. Recurring conflicts between the company and native rulers led to an increasingly aggressive internal policy by the company. From 1667-1705, the company subdued the Sultanates of Macassar, Ban-

tarn, Achin, and Djokjakarta, and became a dominating territorial power. However, the Fourth Anglo-Dutch war (1780-1784) caused an internal crisis in the Dutch East India Company. Export trade to Europe was restrained by English privateers so tightly that the financial obligations of the company's directors could not be met. Ships of the company who dared sail for Europe were at the mercy of English, as well as Spanish-Portuguese ships-of-war, which were plying the coast of China, Japan, and the Pacific and Atlantic sea-coast of the Americas.

Reorganization of the company's policies was necessary. By 1809, during another Anglo-Dutch war, the Dutch government took over the debts and assets of the company which totalled more than 120,000,000 guilders. For some time, the British occupied all of the Dutch East Indies with the exception of Java, and in 1810 the French Republic occupied The Netherlands. After the fall of Napoleon, when the Dutch fought French rule in The Netherlands, the British government showed great interest in strengthening the new kingdom of Prince William of Orange by returning the Dutch colonies in the Indies.

During the British occupancy of the Indies, a fairly liberal policy was followed. For the first time in recent history, a colonial policy was based on the premise that the Indies should be governed for the welfare of the
Indonesian people only. Under the administration of Sir Thomas S. Raffles, the Indonesians were moderately ruled. When the British returned the Indies to the Dutch, G. van der Cappellen (1819-1824) tried to maintain Raffle's liberal policy but failed mainly because of insufficient colonial expenditures. Johannes van de Bosh succeeded Cappellen, and he introduced a Culture System which was "to gain an evil reputation in Dutch colonial history." The Culture System aimed at the increase of production at all costs. It also required the assistance of the sultans in the Indies, and their help was secured by the payment to them of a percentage of the value of all crops raised in their districts. As long as the sultans maintained their quota of export crops at a high figure, their general conduct would not be subjected to a very close scrutiny.

The Culture System failed because of the inexperience of the Royal Commissaries responsible for administering the system and also because of the strong opposition of the Liberal Party in Holland to a system so openly designed to exploit the colonies.

The years between 1866 and 1870 saw the ultimate eradication of the Culture System. However, the political

\[16\] Ibid., p. 328.
\[17\] Ibid., p. 329.
\[18\] Ibid., p. 229.
opposition in Holland against the monopolistic policies of the company did not stop the increasingly absolute monopolistic grip over the Indies of the new Dutch East India Company which was revitalized with government funds and administrators. Europe at this time was in an age of alliances and diplomatic intrigues. The Dutch particularly feared intervention by European powers in the Outer Islands of the Indies Archipelago. Therefore, there was no alternative for the new company but to follow the pattern of the old company and to rule the Dutch East Indies as a "state within a state."

Once more the sultans were forced to submit to the supremacy of the company. They were also required by a "short declaration" to prove their loyalty to the new company. The company made little improvement in the native standard of living. Sanitation was introduced but was negligible. Schools were opened but were not enough to sustain the needs of the natives, and furthermore only the rich could be benefited from the improved educational system. Christian worship was emphasized, but native illiteracy retarded the spread of Christianity.

By the end of the 19th century, after the successful conquest by the Dutch company of Achin territory, the political, economic, and social supremacy of the company over the East Indies was completed.
Few historians have better described the sentiments and inner qualities of the Dutch administration of the Indies than Raymond Kennedy, an authority on Dutch colonial history, when he said:

Comparing the American colonial achievements in the Philippines, the Dutch are not a hasty people. Unlike the Americans in the Philippines, who moved in after driving the Spanish and immediately started a general reform of government, education and social life, the Netherlands proceeded very slowly in their islands. The Dutch East Indies.

The Dutch were careful not to disrupt the traditional forms of government in the Indies and tried scrupulously to avoid interfering in native life, even to the extent of leaving the natives almost uneducated. At the end of Dutch rule, 90 per cent of the Indonesians were illiterate. Some schools were opened at the lower level, but tuition fees were charged even on the grammar school level. One university, largely for the wealthy classes, graduated about twenty students a year.

In 1901, the Dutch instituted in their political administration of the Indies an "ethical policy." The aim was to give the people of the Indies an interest in the government. The forces of the French revolution,

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19 Kennedy, Raymond, *The Ageless Indies*, p. 112.
liberty, equality, and fraternity probably led the Dutch to adopt the new "liberal" policy, but in the colonies this policy was hypocritically interpreted. It led only to a theoretical equality between Europeans and Indonesians, an equality that tended toward the complete subjection of the economically weaker Indonesians to the stronger European and Chinese.

The first concrete liberalization measure instituted in the 20th century was the establishment of the Peoples Council or Volksraad, in 1916. It was composed of sixty representatives, thirty Dutch, twenty-five Indonesians, and five Indo-Chinese, including Indo-Arabians. The majority of the Indonesian delegates to the Council were appointed by the Dutch governor-general. In 1928, the Council was reconstructed, and thirty Indonesians were elected by the people and twenty-five Dutch were appointed by the governor-general. Although the Council was supposed to be a legislative organ of the Indonesians in the Dutch colonial government, the Council amounted to no more than an advisory organ of the Dutch governor-general. The Indies continued to be governed from The Hague and not from Batavia. However, the Council sys-

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tem taught the Indonesian something of the art of the art of self-government. It created self-government for regional communities, territories where the villages were connected closely in tradition and language. However, to the great task of general supervision over these regional communes was left to the Dutch.

In addition to the Volksraad, there developed a Council of the Indies. It too was an advisory body of the governor-general, and its members were appointed by the Crown and The Netherlands cabinet. There were five members of the Council of the Indies only one of whom represented the 80,000,000 Indonesians. In effect this body became a "Kitchen Cabinet", a confidential group with whom the governor-general could discuss his administrative problems unofficially.

Aside from these agencies set up to liberalize the Indonesian government, the Dutch also began the tedious work of decentralizing independent native agencies into representative native councils. The decentralization program started in Java and Madura where the two islands were divided into three provinces, each with a 14,000,000 population. In each province was a governor responsible

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to the governor-general and to the provincial council.
In later years, this provincial council elected a board
of deputies or commissaries charged with handling the ad-
ministrative affairs of the province. However, the Dutch
administrative officials, appointed by the governor-
general, supervised the provincial board of deputies or
commissaries.

The program was in effect, an "administrative
dualism" in which the civil service was divided into two
distinct classes. The upper hierarchy was Dutch and the
lower composed of native autocrats who in considerable
degree were attached to the traditional native elite.  

Nevertheless, critics of Dutch colonial admin-
istration gave the Dutch credit for exploiting the natural
resources of the Indies. In the middle of the 19th century,
after the government in The Hague took over the old Dutch
East India Company and put in its place a new and revital-
government company of the same name, the Indies were
opened for the first time to private Dutch capitalists.
The entire Dutch capital tied up in Indonesian development
amounted to 4,000,000,000 guilders, about $2,200,000,000.
The Brookings Institution declared:

They [Dutch] devoted themselves assiduously

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Emerson, Rupert, The Netherlands Indies and The
United States, p. 33.
to the development of the economic resources of the islands, especially in Java. Many of the plantation products that became the mainstays of the economy, such as tobacco, rubber, cinchona, coffee, tea, and cocoa were introduced by the Dutch and their cultivation was adopted to local conditions. 25

IV

To the people of the Indies, nationalism was a 19th century development. It first found expression in Javanese societies or clubs, most of which set up for non-nationalistic purposes. Many of them were religious, educational, and cultural in character with no common idea of nationalism or independence. The most stable organization had either a Mohammedan religious basis with Pan-Islamic tendency or an educational aim.

The first of these societies was the Budi Utomo which meant "high endeavor." It was partly an intellectual and partly an economic movement. Its aim was to preserve Javanese culture and to effect the economic improvement of the people. It was founded by a moderate and able Javanese physician named Raden Sutomo. Scarcely during its existence did Budi Utomo stand for nationalism. 26

The Taman Siswa unveiled to the Indonesian people the idea of nationalism. The founder was an obscure Javanese gentleman, but a rabid nationalist, named Suwardi Suryaningrat. Unlike Sutomo of Budi Utomo, Suryaningrat assumed the leadership of Javanese nationalism which, because of the predominance of Javanese in Indonesia, stirred in Indonesia the idea or concept of independence from the Dutch sovereignty. However, Taman Siswa disappeared in obscurity.

Sarikat Islam carried on the aim of Siswa. It was one of the first major political organizations of its kind to emphasize the unity of Mohammedanism. It originated as an association of Javanese middlemen who had suffered from Chinese competition. It held its first Congress in 1905. Though at first expressing loyalty to The Netherlands government, it later passed a resolution demanding complete independence. Sarikat Islam soon turned into an extreme leftist party, and at its second Congress in 1917, it resolved on complete independence to be worked out by parliamentary means; if such means failed, it recommended violence against the Dutch in The Hague and in Batavia. In later years, it became so influenced with western revolutionary tendencies from Moscow that The

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27 Kennedy, The Ageless Indies, P. 125.
Netherlands government dispersed the party's organizers.

In 1912 a communist party called Insulinde was formed by a handful of Eurasians (Arabians and Hindus) and Indonesians. It advocated non-cooperation with the Dutch government. Later the party was affiliated with the Communist International and adopted, as its policies, violence and the overthrow of the Dutch government in Batavia. Its party leader was so radical in 1914, at the outbreak of the first World War, that he was exiled.

Another party was founded in 1923 by twenty Indonesian students at The Hague. It was called Perhimpoenan Indonesia. Like its earlier predecessors, Indonesia disintegrated and disappeared.

The only party which effectively molded the aims of the Indonesian people for "Merdeka" (freedom) and independence was the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party). It was founded by a budding engineer named Achmed Soekarno, who was later to become the first president of the Republic of Indonesia. The party sought the complete independence of the Indonesian people, and in its early days, was patterned after Mahatma Gandhi's Congress of India. Under Soekarno's leadership,

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Bridges, Flora; "Indonesian Dilemma," Current History, XIII (September, 1947), p. 158.
however, the party organized fighting bands and clamored for independence regardless of counter-reforms which the Dutch might have offered to the party. It cherished the motto: "Merdeka! or War."

The Dutch colonial government was forced to institute stern rule over the Indies to stem the tide of nationalism. The government passed laws concerning censorship of political activity so strict that almost any outspoken Indonesian politician was sure to get into trouble with the government sooner or later. Kennedy appraised the situation:

It was a criminal offense to advocate in public the cause of independence—indeed, the very word was taboo; it was a criminal offense to criticize in print the existing government. The law even forbade use of the name Indonesia since it was identified with the nationalist movement; and singing the national anthem "Indonesian Raya" was a punishable offense.

From outside the Indies, too, came some help for the cause of Indonesian independence. The awakening of Asia's peoples from a long colonial slumber was assisted somewhat by the infiltration into Asia of the ideals of liberty and equality of the French Revolution. In Indonesian political writing appeared the names of such men as Robespierre and Montesquieu. And for Japan came hope

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31 Ibid., p. 342.
that Asiatic powers could successfully resist the encroachment of western imperialism. The clamor for Indonesian independence continued unabated, though often underground, until the Japanese occupation of the islands in 1942.

When Japan occupied the Dutch East Indies early during the second World War, they found a group of islands completely indoctrinated with ideas of nationalism and independence against foreign rule. Japan capitalized on this situation by increasing its propaganda against western imperialism in favor of its own, the Japanese Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. By 1944, however, with the tide of war turning against them, the Japanese induced the Indonesian "collaborators" to rally for a last ditch-fight against the onslaught of Allied armies in the Pacific campaign. To attract the Indonesians to their cause, the Japanese gave the former their first taste of independence.

On August 11, 1945, Soekarno, Hatta, and Radjimir, prominent organizers of the Partai Nasional Indonesia, left for French Indo-China to receive Indonesian independence from Field Marshal Count Juichi Terauchi. On August 17, in the presence of a few people, the declaration of independence was proclaimed in Jogjakarta. The cry

32 Achmed Soekarno, Sutan Sjahrriz, Mohammed Hatta, Radjimir, and others were accused of collaborating with the Japanese occupation government in the Indies during the second World War.
"Merdeka" rang throughout the Indies. In reply the Dutch broadcast orders to the Japanese military government in the Indies not to relinquish the reins of government to the Indonesian people. Notwithstanding the Dutch opposition to the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia, Soekarno and Hatta were elected to rule the Republic as president and vice-president, respectively. A constitution was adopted which called for a centralized republican government ruled by a president, a house of representative, and a council of ministers. Independence was realized for the moment, but the Dutch were still to return.

The colonial war began in September 15, 1945, when the Allied forces landed in Batavia Harbor for the purpose of accepting the surrender of the Japanese forces. The Allied military mission was headed by Admiral W. R. Patterson, British Royal Navy, deputy to Lord Louis Mountbatten, supreme allied commander for Southeast Asia. Major Frederick Crockett represented the United States, and Charles van der Plas acted for The Netherlands as deputy Lieutenant Governor-General of The Netherlands Indies Civil Administration. Prior to the arrival of the

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Allied military mission, Indonesian Republican forces entrenched themselves all over the Indies in preparation for the coming of sizable Dutch armed forces.

At the outset, the British military commander, Patterson, announced that the Republican government would be expected to take charge of the civil and other administration in non-occupied areas. Patterson also declared that Dutch troops had to be excluded from the Allied military forces who were soon to take over the surrender of Japanese forces in the Indies. But because of Dutch pressure from The Hague on the Allied High Command in Southeast Asia, the Dutch government was permitted to send Dutch marines in Indonesia. When the news of the arrival of Dutch military forces was broadcast over the Indonesian radios and printed in the newspapers, the colonial war began. The Indonesians declared a "Holy War" against the British for letting the Dutch send troops into the islands and also against the Dutch in Indonesia for expecting a "return of colonialism". The Dutch forces were headed by General van Oyen:

Concurrent with General van Oyen's arrival there began to appear in the streets roving patrols of trigger happy Dutch and Amboenese soldiers. They shot at anything suspicious, and when hunting was poor, they were not above forcing an Indonesian house and dragging off, without charges or warrants, some or all of the
inhabitants.

Disorder, lawlessness, and looting prevailed everywhere. The decision by the British high command to use Japanese troops to maintain peace and order complicated the situation. The members of the Japanese Black Fan Society, joined by ex-convicts and opportunists, were allegedly responsible for the wanton destruction of lives and property. However, the situation grew more violent. *Time* reported on January, 1946:

> Between Indonesians and Dutch, the British muddled with India, Burma, and Malaya in the back of their minds; they tread warily, favoring neither full native autonomy nor return to pre-war colonialism.

The British government three months later tried to mediate between the Dutch and the Indonesians. The first formal negotiation between the parties (The Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia) took place in February and March, 1946. The negotiations resulted in an agreement by the Dutch to recognize the Indonesian Republic as a free state within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Known as the Inverchapel Agreement, after Lord Inverchapel who had presided over the parley, this agreement was not satisfactory to the Indonesians who still

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35 *Time*, XLVII, No. 3 (January 21, 1946), p. 32.
wanted from The Netherlands a complete de facto recognition of the Republic of Indonesia's control of Java, Sumatra, and Madura. Moreover, the recognition was to be followed by a treaty establishing the status of the whole Indies as a "Free State."

The new negotiations bogged down for three months because, as the Dutch officials in Batavia said, the Dutch general election had to be held before further negotiations could continue. At this time, the British high command in the Indies announced that all British troops would be withdrawn from Java and Sumatra by November 30, 1946, regardless of the status of the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations.

Immediately, the Beel government at The Hague acted to resume the peace negotiations interrupted by the Dutch general election. A three-man Commission General, headed by former prime minister Schermerhorn, Fieke de Boer, and Maximilian van Poll, was dispatched to Batavia with full powers to negotiate in behalf of the Crown.

On October 7, 1946, a preliminary discussion between the two belligerents began under the auspices of Lord Killearn, the former Sir Miles Lampson. A draft

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agreement in line with the previous Inverchapel Agreement of March, 1946, was drawn up, later known as the Linggadjati Agreement. In seventeen articles, the agreement provided: (1) the de facto recognition of the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia over Java, Madura, and Sumatra; (2) the establishment by January 1, 1949, of a sovereign, democratic, and federal United States of Indonesia (USI) which would be composed of the Republic of Indonesia and at least two other states to be formed in Borneo and the eastern islands; and (3) the linking of the USI with the Netherlands in a Netherlands-Indonesian Union.

The grudging manner with which the Dutch ratified the Linggadjati Agreement had an adverse effect upon the Indonesian people. Thus in March, 1947, when the Dutch government ratified the Linggadjati Agreement, the Republican government accused the Dutch of imposing unilateral interpretations on the principles of the agreement. Negotiations for the implementation of the accord failed. Tension between the parties ran high, and armed hostilities were inevitable.

On July 21, 1947, the Dutch initiated the so-called "Police Action." Within a few months, the Dutch had cap-

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tured significant economic areas of Java, Madura, and Sumatra. The Republican territories were reduced to three non-contiguous areas—central Java, Western Java, and parts of Sumatra. Despite these great successes, the Dutch had neither subdued the Indonesian clamor for independence nor destroyed the Republican government. The Dutch police action stirred the cry "Merdeka! or War!"
CHAPTER II

SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATES ON THE ABNORMAL SITUATION IN INDONESIA

The Indonesian question (the dispute between the Republic of Indonesia and The Netherlands) was first brought to the attention of the Security Council at its 12th meeting held at Church House, Westminster, London, February 7, 1946. Norman J. O. Makin (Australia) presided. Representatives of Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, France, Mexico, Poland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States were present. The question had been introduced to the Council in a letter to the president dated January 21, 1946 by Dmitro Z. Manuilsky, Ukrainian SSR delegate to the United Nations (non-member of the Security Council). On February 7, the letter was read by the president to the Council, placed on the provisional agenda, and adopted immediately.

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2 Manuilsky, Dmitro Zakharevich. Born in 1883; educated at Leningrad and Sorborne Universities; and member of the Presidium of Comintern 1924.
President Makin opened the discussion by calling upon the Ukrainian delegate to explain the purpose of his letter. Manuilsky drew the attention of the Security Council, in accordance with Article 34 of the Charter, "to the abnormal situation in Indonesia." Manuilsky explained:

As is known, on March 9, 1942, the Netherlands troops surrendered to the superior armed forces of Japan, and the Japanese occupied unarmed Indonesia. When the Allies defeated Japan on August 17, 1945, the Indonesians hoped that their national aspirations would at last be realized...through the main principles of the Charter, providing for the right of every people to self-determination. However, reality proved different, that on September 29, British troops and Indian troops arrived in Batavia, . . . clashes and skirmishes continued. 3

Manuilsky further charged the British with allowing Japanese troops to continue in the islands the arrogant and luxurious mode of life they had enjoyed during the occupation and also with permitting them to coerce the Indonesians with tanks and armored cars. He pointed out that British intervention in Indonesia was contrary to Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Charter whose aim was to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. He proposed that the Council accept his resolution creating a special commission to investigate the situation

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on the spot and to establish peace in Indonesia. His resolution read:

The Security Council decided to set up a commission consisting of representatives of the United States of America, the Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, which should carry out an inquiry on the spot, establish the facts in Indonesia and report to the Security Council on the result of its work. 4

Ernest Bevin (United Kingdom) arose to answer the charges. He asked Manuilsky for facts. He reminded the Security Council that Indian and British troops were in Indonesia to accept the Japanese surrender and to free Allied prisoners of war. He then asked the pertinent question: "Who is the sovereign authority over Indonesia?" Answering his own question, he asserted that the Dutch were. He reiterated the fact that Manuilsky had not said one word about the Indonesian attacks upon the British troops "who were there on an errand of mercy." "Now," he shouted, "I am accused of attacking the Indonesian Nationalist Movement!" Concluding, he argued that if the United Nations wanted to help, it should not send a commission to Indonesia but should urge the people there to negotiate a settlement with the Dutch.

4 Ibid., p. 190.
5 Bevin, Ernest. Born in 1881; Chairman of the General Council of Trades Union Congress 1937; representative to the General Assembly, London, 1946, and Chairman to the United Kingdom delegation to the General Assembly, 1946.
Eelco van Kleeffens (The Netherlands) also attempted to refute Manuilsky's charges. He corroborated Bevin's statement that British troops were in Indonesia to accept the surrender of the Japanese. Unfortunately, he admitted, the Dutch and British had had to use Japanese troops to a limited extent, to maintain order. As to the abnormal situation in Indonesia, van Kleeffens said:

... I observe, first of all, that there is here no situation; in the second place, there is no situation threatening international peace and security; in the third place, there is no international friction which may lead to infringement of the peace; in the fourth place, I deny that there is an infringement of Article I in so far as that has anything to do with the continued presence of British troops in Netherlands Indies, because apart from Article I, paragraph 2 and 3, there is also Chapter XI in the Charter, and we are at present engaged in a sincere and wholehearted attempt to put that house in order on a very liberal basis; fifthly, there, is therefore, no case for the Security Council to deal with.

The Security Council resumed its discussion of the Indonesian dispute at its 13th meeting on February 9. Upon the request of the president to add some explanation to the charges in the letter he had presented, Manuilsky continued: first, a conflict had been going on for six months between British and Indonesian troops in Java;

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second, Japanese troops were being used; and third, not one of these facts had been contested by the Netherlands' delegate. He severely criticized the British government for failure to disarm Japanese troops as ordered by the Southeast Asia Allied High Command.

Bevin interrupted the charges at this point to ask what Manuilsky really wanted. The Ukrainian delegate replied that the Security Council should take notice that British opposition to the Indonesian nationalist movement was neither proper nor just; that use of Japanese troops was inadmissible; that the principles and rights granted by the United Nations Charter should be applied to the Indonesians; and that the Ukrainian delegation requested that a special commission of inquiry be sent.

Bevin argued, however, that the Indonesian question was a domestic problem of the Netherlands government and that it was not an international dispute at all. He reminded Manuilsky that Article 2, paragraph 7, of the

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Chapter 1, Article 2, paragraph 7: Nothing contained in the Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII: [this Chapter VII gives the Security Council power to determine "action with respect to threats of the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression."/}
Charter provided that nothing contained in the Charter should authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any sovereign state.

At the 14th meeting on February 10, Andrei Y. Vyshinsky (USSR) attacked the arguments of van Kleffens and Bevin for trying to minimize the seriousness of the Indonesian dispute. He supported Manuilsky's charges that British and Japanese troops were being used to oppress the Indonesian people. He proposed the creation of a commission of inquiry in Indonesia, even if the Dutch and British delegates did not admit to Manuilsky's description of conditions in the Indies.

Mamdouh Riaz (Egypt) during the 15th meeting on February 11, assured the Council that the presence of British troops in Indonesia was in full accordance with the orders of the Allied High Command in Southeast Asia. But he was doubtful whether the Indonesian nationalist movement was well understood by the Allies, and Riaz questioned evidences of Dutch liberalism in the Indies in the past. He quoted an item from the New York Times of February 9,
1946 which said: "Three hundred years of Dutch rule... have sternly repressed any expression of national sentiment." When Bevin charged that there were fascists and terrorists left by the Japanese in the islands after the war, Riaz emphatically reminded him that:

When a people is striving for its freedom, it snatches anything that comes to hand and uses anything that it may help it in its struggle. These terrorists and fascists are people striving for their freedom.

Riaz supported the delegates from Ukraine and the Soviet Union to urge the Security Council to take decisive action into the Indonesian situation.

After Bevin denied that Japanese troops were being used by the British as a pressure against the Indonesians, van Kleffens again attempted to rebut Manuilsky's charges. More polite than during his first appearance, he admitted that there was Dutch and British military action in Indonesia, and that he would not stand in the way of having a United Nations Commission sent to Indonesia.

At the 16th meeting on February 11, 1946, Manuilsky reintroduced his resolution:

After hearing the statement made by the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR on the situation which in Indonesia threatens international peace and secu-
rity, a situation in which British troops are being used in military action against the Nationalist Movement of Liberation, and in which enemy Japanese troops were also being used for the same purpose;

After hearing the statements made by the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, Mr. Bevin, and of the Netherlands, Mr. van Kleeffens;

After exchanging views on the question raised, the Security Council decides: to set up a commission consisting of representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands which would carry out an inquiry on the spot, establish peace in Indonesia, and report to the Security Council on the result of their work. 12

President Makin asked the Council members whether the Ukrainian delegate had the right of proposal in the Security Council. He added, however, that Articles 31 and 13 of the Charter gave to states not members of the Council the right to participate without vote in the Council discussion.

13 Chapter V, Article 31: Any member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are especially affected.

Chapter V, Article 32: Any member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it seems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations.
Riaz argued that Article 31 applied only to the question whether the Ukrainian delegate had the right to participate without vote in the discussion. However, the delegate from Egypt advised the Council members that he would support the right of the Ukrainian delegate to participate without vote in the Council discussion. Wellington Koo (China) asserted that since the Ukrainian delegate had brought the question to the attention of the Security Council, Manuilsky should be accorded the freedom to make suggestions or proposals.

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., (United States) implored the Council to work out something concerning the procedural question instead of haggling over the provision of Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter. He explained that a non-member of the Council could only suggest proposals. He warned the Ukrainian delegate that he had no right to make proposals because he was not a member of the Security Council.

At the 17th meeting on February 12, the debate on the procedural question continued in the same fiery at-

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14 Koo, Wellington. Born in Shanghai, 1888; Educated at St. John's, Shanghai, and Columbia Universities; Ph. D. (Columbia); and Representative to the General Assembly, 1946, and Security Council, 1946.
mosphere. Diaz of Mexico reminded the Security Council that cooperation among the nations represented at the Council table was urgent in order to solve the Indonesian dispute. George Bidault (France), although he supported the seating of the Ukrainian delegate, questioned the legality of his right to propose resolutions. Cyro de Freitas-Valle (Brazil) denounced the lengthy debate of the Council members, and doubted the need of an international inquiry. He supported Stettinius' previous recommendation that the Council send competent individuals rather than member states of the Security Council. He was fearful that an international inquiry would involve the problem of national sovereignty. Departing from his former objections that there was no international threat in Indonesia and that the Indonesian question was a sovereign responsibility of The Netherlands government, van Kleffens informed the Council that he did not object to the sending of a commission of inquiry. Nevertheless, he was definitely opposed to sending a commission to Indonesia to mediate in the dis-

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Bidault, George. Born in Moulins, 1899; Professor of History in Paris Lycee; and Representative to the Security Council, 1946-.

At this time, the Egyptian delegate proposed an amendment to Manuilsky's resolution:

"The presence of British troops in Indonesia shall not be used in any circumstance against the Indonesian national movement, and that they will be withdrawn from Indonesia as soon as the strictly limited purposes which have brought their presence have been accomplished; the surrender of Japanese troops; and the liberation of Allied prisoners of war and Allied nationals who are still interned."

The delegate from the United States accused the Egyptian delegate of veiling his resolution as an amendment. In all probability, Stettinius said, the Egyptian amendment was another resolution completely new in principle.

Doubting the advisability of an international commission of inquiry proposed by the Ukrainian and Egyptian delegates, Stettinius argued that:

"Because the right to investigate is so important, the United States Government feels that investigations should not be lightly undertaken. . . . I should add that in ordering an investigation, the Council should look forward and not backward. It should seek to promote a just settlement of a situation or dispute and to avoid the introduction of new complications. . . . a decision to investigate could only bring into discredit this vital function of the Council."

Koo approved Stettinius' argument that the Council should not introduce new complications in the dispute by sending

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an international commission to Indonesia. Nevertheless, he would support the Ukrainian resolution because Foo's country had interest in the welfare of 2,000,000 Chinese in the Indies.

Dissatisfied with the intention of the Egyptian "resolution", Vyshinsky proposed an amendment:

With a view to clarifying the situation in Indonesia and to hastening the re-establishment of normal conditions, a commission should be sent composed of representatives of China, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, United States of America, and the Soviet Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 20

At the 18th meeting on February 13, 1946, the Security Council decided on the procedural question: the representative of the Ukraine should be permitted to sit at the Council table without a vote, though he was given the privilege of proposition. No objection was raised. The representative of The Netherlands who earlier was bitterly opposed now reversed his position and wholeheartedly welcomed Manuilsky.

By a show of hands, the Ukrainian resolution was rejected by two votes for as against nine abstentions. The Soviet Union's amendment to the Egyptian "resolution" was also rejected by three votes for (Mexico, Poland, and

20 Ibid., p. 260.
21 Votes of states in this period were not reported in the official records.
the Soviet Union) as against eight abstentions (Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States).

The Security Council met the Indonesian dispute with varied and conflicting reactions. Manuilsky of the Ukrainian SSR maintained that the "abnormal situation in Indonesia" posed a threat to international peace and security. He firmly believed that it was the humanitarian duty of the Council to investigate the Indonesian dispute and to find the means of settling it. He therefore proposed a five-state international commission to investigate the Indonesian dispute. Manuilsky was strongly supported by his colleague Vyshinsky of the Soviet Union. Vyshinsky also suggested a commission of inquiry composed of all the members of the Security Council to study objectively this abnormal situation in Indonesia and to propose measures for settling it. Riaz of Egypt supported the two states.

The Netherlands, although admitting the use of force in Indonesia, did not believe that there was a threat to world peace and security as Manuilsky and Vyshinsky had previously contended. The United Kingdom also admitted that it had used British and Japanese forces to maintain peace and order in Indonesia. It further supported the Dutch claim that the situation in Indonesia was the direct responsibility of The Netherlands as the
sovereign authority over that territory.

The United States warned the members that the establishment of an international commission of inquiry might involve the Council in a vexed problem of territorial sovereignty (of The Netherlands). In plain language, the United States would not support the creation of an international body to investigate the Indonesian question, unless a threat to world peace in Indonesia was substantiated by concrete facts. This American warning attracted attention of non-committal members of the Security Council such as Brazil, Australia, France, and in the end China. These states either abstained or voted against the creation of an international commission pertaining to the Indonesian dispute. In the final proceedings of the Council discussion, the aim of Egypt, Ukrainian SSR, and the Soviet Union to give the Indonesian dispute or "situation" a fair and objective examination by the Security Council failed.

One issue solved, however, was the settlement of the procedural question: Could a non-member (Ukrainian SSR) enter into the discussion of a dispute being considered by the Security Council, and also had that non-member the right to propose resolutions? This question eventually was solved when the Council members raised no objection to the presence of the Ukrainian delegate. This was a new development in the history of the Security Council, for the Charter specifically stated that a non-member could only
participate without vote in the Security Council if it had brought a dispute to its attention (Article 31). Henceforth, not only could a non-member bring such an issue to the attention of the Security Council, but it could participate in the consideration of that issue and propose a solution.
CHAPTER III

THE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION OF AUGUST I, 1947

The Security Council had ended its "consideration" of the Indonesian dispute at its 18th meeting on February, 1946, but six months later at its 171st meeting at Lake Success, New York, July 31, 1947 the issue was revived. 1

Oscar Lange (Poland) was Council president, and representatives present were from Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Poland, Syria, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. At this meeting, the Indonesian dispute was brought to the attention of the Security Council by two letters from the governments of India and Australia.

The Indian letter, dated July 30, 1947, was submitted to the secretary-general under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Charter by Samaranandranath Sen, permanent

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2 Lange, Oscar. Born 1904, Tomaszow Kazowiecki; Educated at the Universities of Poznan, Cracow, Harvard, and Minnesota; LL. D. 1948; Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago, 1938-45; and Representative to the United Nations, 1946-48.

3 Sen, Samaranandranath. Born in Bengal 1944; and Secretary to the Indian delegation to 1st special session of the General Assembly, New York, 1947.
liaison officer of the Indian government with the United Nations. It called the Council's attention to The Netherlands' wide-scale military campaign against the Indonesian population. In the opinion of the Indian government, the Indonesian dispute endangered the maintenance of international peace and security within the meaning of Article 34 of the Charter.

The letter from the Australian government dated July 30, 1947, introduced to the Council by William R. Hodgson, took note of the hostilities in progress in Java and Sumatra between the armed forces of The Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. The Australian government considered that these hostilities constituted a breach of the peace under Article 39 of the Charter. It urged the Security Council to take immediate action to restore international peace and security in that part of Southeast Asia.

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5 Hodgson, William R. Born in Kinston, Victoria, 1892; Secretary of External Affairs 1935-45; and Representative to the Security Council 1946.
6 Article 39: The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Hodgson examined for the Council the unconciliatory attitude of the belligerent states concerning the grave dispute in Indonesia. Fernan van Langenhove (Belgium), speaking for his government, warned the Council not to discuss the matter unless representatives of The Netherlands, India, and the Republic of Indonesia were present. Andrie A. Gromyko (the Soviet Union) proposed that the representatives of the Republic of Indonesia should also be present in the discussion. However, he assured the Council members that the Indonesian dispute could be discussed and deliberated at that time on the understanding that the Indonesian representative should also arrive before the Council completed its deliberation. Van Kleffens questioned Gromyko's authority to employ the words "Republic of Indonesia." He asked, "What is the Republic of Indonesia?" He added that the words are misleading. He referred to the Linggadjati Agreement in order to support his argument that

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7 Van Langenhove, Fernan. Born in Mouscron 1889; Professor of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Brussels, 1920--; and Representative to the Security Council, 1947.
8 Gromyko, Andrie A. Born near Gosmel, 1909; Professor of Economics at Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1937-39; and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1946-48.
10 Department of State, Bulletin, XVIII, No. 454 (March 14, 1948), p. 325.
the "Republic of Indonesia" was a part of the projected United States of Indonesia. But, he said, the Republic was a de facto and not de jure a sovereign sovereign state. He charged that the "complete picture of the true legal status of the Republic" revealed its creation as a political weapon by the Japanese High Command in Saigon.

Hodgson contended that the Republic, according to international law, was legally a republic in the sense that it was recognized by Article 1 of the Linggadjati Agreement as exercising a de facto authority over the islands of Java, Madura, and Sumatra. He claimed further that the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, and members of the Arab League had recognized the Republic of Indonesia. The abnormal situation in Indonesia, Hodgson concluded, began with the implementation of the Linggadjati Agreement. He therefore proposed a resolution which called the two parties to cease hostilities and to settle their dispute by peaceful means under the provisions of the Linggadjati Agreement. The Australian resolution read:

On August 11, 1945, the independence of the Republic of Indonesia was declared by Field Marshal Count Juichi Terauchi in Saigon, French Indo-China, four days before the Japanese government accepted the Potsdam Proclamation as the basis of surrender terms with the Allied nations.

Department of State, Bulletin, XVIII, No. 454 (March 14, 1948), p. 325.
The Security Council,

Noting with concern the hostilities in progress between the armed forces of the Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia, and

Having determined that such hostilities constitute a breach of the peace under Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Calls upon the Governments of the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands, under Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, to comply with the following measures, such measures to be without prejudice to the rights and claims of either party:

(a) To cease hostilities forthwith; and

(b) To settle their disputes by arbitration in accordance with Article 17 of the Linggadjati Agreement, signed at Batavia on 25 March 1947.

Tingfu Tsiang (China) added his support to the Australian resolution, but he wanted to insert "or by other peaceful means" at the end of sub-paragraph (b) of the resolution. Alexandre Parodi (France) felt that it would be very dangerous for the Council to adopt a resolution without reliable and full information and debate on the substance of the Australian resolution, and he charged the Australian and Indian delegates with being the "claimants" in the Indonesian dispute, and considered The Netherlands' delegate the respondent.

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14 Tsiang, Tingfu. Born in Hunan Province, 1895; Ph.D. (Columbia University); and Chief Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1947-.
15 Parodi, Alexandre. Born in Paris, 1901; Educated at the University of Paris; and Representative to the Security Council, 1946-, and General Assembly, 1946-.
Faris Bey el-Khoury (Egypt) argued that as a de facto sovereign power over Java, Kadura, and Sumatra, the Republic of Indonesia should be recognized as such by the Council. He also favored the Australian resolution. Gromyko welcomed the opportunity to deliberate the resolution but he desired the substance of it to be studied and discussed meticulously. Herschel V. Johnson (United States) said that his government had tendered its good offices to the belligerents in order to hasten a settlement. Though he favored the Australian resolution, he wished to offer an amendment, deleting the second paragraph referring to Article 39 of the Charter and further deleting mention of Article 40 in paragraph 3. The United States amendment, which was, for all intents and purposes, a complete overhauling of the Australian resolution, read as follows:

The Security Council,

Noting with concern the hostilities in progress between the armed forces of the Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia,

Calls upon the parties:

(a) To cease hostilities forthwith, and

(b) To settle their disputes by arbitration or by other peaceful means. 18
Lawford of the United Kingdom objected to the United States amendment. He said:

It seems to me that we should be unwise, as a Council, to create a precedent which might in the future be quoted to justify action contrary to the Charter. I beg the United States representatives to believe that it is no mere legalistic consideration which has driven us to this course. 19

Hodgson told Lawford that this was not the time to delay the Council's action upon the Indonesian dispute with undue technicalities. 20

Alfonso Lopez (Colombia) informed the Council members that he would support the United States representative's amendment. Carlos Muniz (Brazil), likewise, offered his support because, as he put it, it did not pre-judge the rights and claims of The Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. Tsaiang also supported the amendment. Lange strongly favored the United States amendment, but he wanted to add the following provision to the end of paragraph (b): "and keep the Security Council informed of the progress of the settlement." Gromyko proposed that the amendment should brand The Netherlands' police action as

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21 Muniz, Carlos. Born in Mattto Grosso, 1908; Educated at University of Rio de Janeiro; Consul to Chicago, 1926; and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1947.
a breach of the peace in Indonesia because it had deliberately violated the obligations imposed by the Linggadjiati Agreement. He proposed an amendment to the United States amendment, which read:

The Security Council considers it necessary that the troops of both sides—the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia—should be immediately withdrawn to the previous positions which they occupied before the beginning of military operations. 22

Parodi proposed an insertion "without in anyway deciding the juridical question" at the end of the first paragraph of the United States amendment. Johnson welcomed the French insertion as long as the delegate of Australia decided likewise. Hodgson compromised and said he would welcome the insertion.

At the 173rd meeting on August 1, 1947, the Council continued its deliberation on the United States amendment with its various amendments and the insertion. It was submitted for adoption paragraph by paragraph. The first paragraph was adopted:

The Security Council,

Noting with concern the hostilities in progress between the armed forces of the Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia.

Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Poland, Syria, and the United States voted for it as against four abstentions

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(Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union).

The French insertion was rejected, five votes in favor (Belgium, Brazil, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) against six abstentions (Australia, China, Colombia, Poland, Syria, and the Soviet Union).

The second paragraph was adopted:

Calls upon the parties:
(a) To cease hostilities forthwith, and
(b) To settle their disputes by arbitration or by peaceful means.

There were eight votes in favor (Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Poland, Syria, the Soviet Union, and the United States) against three abstentions (Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom).

The second paragraph, already accepted, was now accepted with the Polish amendment: "and keep the Security Council informed of the progress of the settlement", with eight votes in favor (Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Poland, the Soviet Union, and the United States) against three abstentions (Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom).

The Soviet amendment to the United States amendment was rejected, two votes in favor (Poland and the Soviet Union) against nine abstentions (Australia, Belgium,

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23 See footnote 22 above.
Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Syria, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Thus the complete text of the adopted resolution was:

The Security Council,

Noting with concern the hostilities in progress between the armed forces of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia,

Calls upon the parties:

(a) To cease hostilities forthwith, and

(b) To settle their disputes by arbitration or by other peaceful means and keep the Security Council informed about the progress of the settlement.

Six months before, the Security Council had questioned the effect on international peace and security of the abnormal situation in Indonesia and at its 18th meeting, February 13, 1946, had at least temporarily discontinued further discussion of the matter.

In August, however, India and Australia reopened the Indonesian question in the Security Council under Article 35 and 39 of the Charter providing for attention of the Council to a breach of peace or act of aggression threatening international peace and security. In the discussion that followed, The Netherlands, assured of the help of Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, had claimed that there was no such thing as "Republic of Indonesia." Australia and Egypt maintained, however, that under the Linggadjati Agreement, the Republic of Indonesia had been given de facto recognition as a sovereign power over the
territories of Java, Madura, and Sumatra. The United Kingdom still asserted that intervention in any form by the Council would be disastrous and a discredit to the Security Council as a guardian of world peace and security. France also supported The Netherlands and the United Kingdom's contention that the Council had no jurisdiction in the matter.

However, France, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, in the face of much critical comment, eventually supported the right of the Security Council to take action relative to the cessation of hostilities in Indonesia. The United States amendment of the Australian resolution with its many additional amendments and insertion was passed despite the complete opposition of Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom.

The French insertion to the United States amendment, if adopted, would have made the Security Council a disinterested bystander in the Indonesian dispute. The Council then could only have inquired into the dispute without the right to propose means of settlement. The Soviet Union's amendment, if passed, would have compelled the parties to accept a *status quo ante bellum*. Dutch troops would then have been withdrawn from territories occupied since the commencement of police action on July 21, 1947. It would have placed the Republic in a better bargaining
position in any future negotiations which might develop in the dispute.

In the voting on the United States "resolution", the Soviet Union abstained twice: on the adoption of the preamble and on the French insertion which would have made Council virtually impotent to mediate in the dispute. The final adoption of the much-amended United States resolution gave the Security Council jurisdiction over the Indonesian dispute.
CHAPTER IV

THE REQUESTS OF NON-MEMBERS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

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At the 173th meeting on August 7, 1947, General Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippines expressed his government's desire to be represented in the Indonesian discussion in the Council. He informed the Council through a formal note that "the Philippines considered itself especially affected by any disturbance of peace in that part of the Pacific."

The Council president informed the members that the Philippines could be permitted to participate in the discussion without vote under Article 31 of the Charter.

On the other hand, Joseph Nisot (Belgium) told the Council members that he could not give an opinion either for or against the Philippines' request, and Sir Alexander G.

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1 Romulo, Carlos P. Born in Manila, 1901; Educated at the University of the Philippines and Columbia University; and Chairman Philippines delegation to the General Assembly, 1946.

2 Nisot, Joseph. Born in Charleroi, 1894; Educated in Law at Cambridge; Alternate Representative to the General Assembly; and Representative to the Committee of Experts.
Cadogan of the United Kingdom declared:

I should be reluctant to oppose any request made by the Philippines. It is perhaps undeniable that the Philippines is vitally interested in the maintenance of peace in that area, but there are other states which might consider themselves similarly involved.

Hodgson supported Romulo's request on the ground that India had been invited by the Security Council without any difficulty. He declared:

There is a fact that a great portion of the trade of the Philippines is with the Netherlands East Indies. If these communications are disrupted, that disruption will affect the stability, reconstruction and rehabilitation not only of the Philippines but of other parts of that area.

A vote was taken. The request was not approved, with only six votes in favor (Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Syria, and the United States) as against five abstentions (Belgium, France, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.

The Security Council discussed the second and similar request of the Philippines at its 181st meeting on August 12, 1947. The Council president informed the

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3 Cadogan, Alexander. Born in 1884; Representative to the General Assembly, 1946; and Security Council, 1946-.
5 Ibid., p. 1838.
Council members that the Philippines' request could not be placed on the agenda for discussion unless a member of the Council made such a motion. Although Hodgson endorsed the Philippines' request, the discussion was postponed for lack of sufficient copies of the Philippines' letter.

On August 14, at its 194th meeting, the Security Council resumed its deliberation of the Philippines' appeal. Cadogan withdrew his previous objection and announced that he now would support the request. Miot likewise withdrew his objection and extended his support.

By a vote of nine votes in favor (Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Syria, the United Kingdom, and the United States) as against two abstentions (Poland and the Soviet Union), the Philippines was granted the right to participate in the Indonesian dispute discussion in the Security Council.

II

Andrie Gromyko, at the 171st meeting of the Security Council on July 31, 1947, had requested that the representative of the Republic of Indonesia should also be invited to the Council discussion of the Indonesian dispute.

On August 12, a formal note of request by Sutan Sjahrir, Republican representative-at-large, to participate without vote in the Council's discussion of the Indonesian dispute was communicated to the Security Council president.
The note informed the Council that the Republic of Indonesia would accept in advance, because of its desire to participate in the discussions, the obligations of a member of the United Nations.

On the same date, the Security Council, at its 181st meeting, considered the Indonesian request. Gromyko, already on record as favoring Indonesian representation, now informed the Council that the "USSR delegation supports the proposal to allow the representative of Indonesia to participate in the discussion" of the dispute. Van Kleffens objected on the ground that the Republic of Indonesia was not a sovereign state as described by Article 32 of the Charter. Cadogan supported the Netherlands objection. Sen asserted that the de facto recognition of the Republic of Indonesia over Java, Madura, and Sumatra constituted a fixed territory by the Linggadjati Agreement. Lopez of Colombia and Juliusz Katz-Suchy (Poland) supported the Indonesian request.

Nisot argued that since the Republic was neither sovereign nor independent that the representative of the Republic could not be admitted to the Council discussion of the dispute. Hodgson replied to the French delegate by

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3 Katz-Suchy, Juliusz. Born in 1912; Educated at the University of Cracow and Warsaw; and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1945—.
as asking him whether he had had full powers to recognize the right of the Philippines to be at the San Francisco Conference from April to June, 1945, since that country had not been granted full independence until a year later.

Johnson of the United States, asserting that the Republic of Indonesia was a party to the dispute, requested the Council to accord the Republic representation to the Council discussion. Gromyko also challenged the Dutch delegate to demonstrate how many members of the United Nations had ever recognized Liberia. He admitted that the status of the Republic was a delicate subject, but he argued, this question should not bar a representative of the Republic from being present in the discussion. Tsiang wholeheartedly supported the Indonesian request, and while applauding the "distinguished ability" of van Kleffens, accused him of being too narrow in his definition of an independent state.

The request of the Republic was granted. Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Syria, the Soviet Union, and the United States voted for it, as against three abstentions (Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom).

The Republic of the Philippines was granted its full independence on July 4, 1946, by the United States of America. The independence protocol was handed to the new government in Manila in a double ceremony which also commemorated the United States independence from England on July 4, 1776.
III

After the Security Council had granted the Indonesian request, van Kleffens of The Netherlands wished to be put on record as saying that he had raised no objection to the decision of the Security Council in granting the request of the Republic of Indonesia. Nevertheless, he reserved the right to ask the Council also to admit the representatives of the states of East Indonesia and Borneo to the Security Council discussion.

The Council president asked van Kleffens whether or not there were hostilities in that part of the Indies. Van Kleffens answered no. Gromyko warned van Kleffens not to twist the meaning of the Council's decision in accepting a representative of the Republic to participate in the Council's discussion, and he reminded him that the Soviet Union had been "guided in that matter" to support the Indonesian request and by "no other consideration." Nisot, however, supported van Kleffens' request to have the two states represented at the discussion of the dispute.

At this point, the president wished to know what rules of procedure should be followed in acting on the Dutch request. Nisot invoked Article 32 of the Charter. Although he argued that this Article had not applied to the Republican request, nevertheless, he said, the Council ought to extend the same treatment to the two states. Lopez
of Colombia raised a point of order by asking: Were these states given de facto or de jure recognition? Van Kleffens answered that recognition was "the exclusive prerogative of individual states," and that East Indonesia and Borneo were members, as was the Republic of Indonesia, of the proposed United States of Indonesia, a federation of equal Indonesian states.

Cadogan of the United Kingdom bitterly assailed the right of the Council to invoke Article 32 of the Charter to admit the Indonesian representative to the Council discussion. The president reminded Cadogan that apparently he had forgotten that the Republic actually was a party to the dispute. He went on to say, however, that a state could be admitted to share in the Council discussion, and that this could be justified in four ways: (1) Rule 37 of the Security Council Rules of Procedure; (2) by connection

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10 Article 4, paragraph 1, Linggadjati Agreement: The component states of the United States of Indonesia shall be the Republic [sovereign authority over Java, Madura, and Sumatra], Borneo, and the Great East, without prejudice to the right of the population of any territory to decide a democratic procedure that its position in the United States of Indonesia, shall be otherwise defined. Department of State, Bulletin, XVIII, No. 454 (March 14, 1948), p. 325.

11 Rule 37: Any member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as the result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers . . . in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter. United Nations Security Council, Rules of Procedure, (June 24, 1946), p. 10.
of any member of the United Nations whose interests were affected by the dispute under consideration of the Security Council; (3) by Article 32 of the Charter; and (4) by Rule 39 of the Security Council Rules of Procedures.

Hodgson announced that he would again support The Netherlands' request only under Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure, and the representative of the United States, Johnson, declared:

I would be quite prepared simply to invite them to the Council table on the same basis as we did the Republic of Indonesia, in the belief that to do so was in the spirit of Article 32 of the Charter. 14

Katz-Suchy stated that his delegation would not support the Dutch request, even under Rule 39, and Gromyko warned the Council that the East Indonesian State had favored the Dutch military police action against the Indonesian people. He supported his argument by reading a portion of a cablegram from the East Indonesian government to the Dutch delegation to the United Nations. The cablegram stated:

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12 See Chapter II, footnote 13.

13 Rule 39: The Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers very competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence. United Nations Security Council, Rules of Procedure, (June 24, 1945), p. 10.

The East Indonesian government through its Prime Minister, Najamoeddin, has expressed its agreement to initiate police action against those elements of the Republic which obstruct the execution of the Linggadjati Agreement. The East Indonesian government was impeded for a considerable period in the execution of this task by breaches of the peace emanating from the Republic of Indonesia. . . . 15

At the 193rd meeting on August 22, the Security Council rejected The Netherlands' request, four votes in favor (Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) as against seven abstentions (Australia, Brazil, Colombia, China, Poland, Syria, and the Soviet Union).

IV

The request of the Philippines to participate in the Council's discussion was granted only after the Security Council convinced itself that Philippine national security was closely related to the outcome of the Indonesian dispute. The Philippines' second request formally received majority support from members of the Council. Only Poland and the Soviet Union objected.

The Indonesian request was likewise granted under Article 32 despite the strong opposition of The Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom, and later Belgium. The

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Republic of Indonesia generally was acknowledged as a party to the dispute and therefore the Council approved the right of representation in the Security Council discussion.

On the other hand, the Dutch request to seat representatives of East Indonesia and Borneo was not approved. The Council failed to favor the Dutch request for two reasons. First, the East Indonesia and Borneo states were not parties to the dispute that had developed from the attempts to implement the Linggadjati Agreement. And second, the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia were the only signatories of the Agreement, which had not recognized these states (East Indonesia and Borneo) as having de facto sovereign authority. In fact, these states were "puppet Dutch states" in the words of Republican authorities.

It is impossible to say what would have been the result had the two Dutch states been admitted to the Security Council discussion of the dispute. It is very likely that Indonesia would have been in a position where it could never have convincingly spoken as the sole Indonesian voice in the discussion of the disturbing Indonesian dispute. The presence of the two states would have rendered the dispute even more complicated than it was. Indeed, the Council might probably have been prevented from mediating the settlement of the Indonesian dispute.
CHAPTER V
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSULAR COMISSION
AND THE COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES

At the Security Council's 178th meeting on August 7, 1947, Sen of India asserted that The Netherlands, when it began military police action against the Indonesians for the implementation of the Linggadjati Agreement, had violated the principles of customary international law. He added that the Dutch had unilaterally interpreted the Agreement despite long protests by the Indonesian people. He therefore proposed that the Council set up an international commission to see that the cease-fire resolution of August 1, 1947 was properly carried out. Sjahrefoeddin, deputy foreign minister of the Republic of Indonesia, through a cablegram to the Council, dated August 7, 1947, said that the Republic would accept in advance any Council decision concerning the cease-fire order and would accept an international arbitration commission to assist ending the hostilities.

At the 181st meeting on August 12, Hodgson of Australia, observing that fighting in Indonesia between the armed forces of the Republic and The Netherlands continued contrary to the August 1 resolution of the Council, introduced a draft resolution setting up a commission to report to the Council on the situation in Indonesia in conformity with the provision of the Council's cease-fire order. The resolution provided:

Whereas the Security Council, on 1 August 1947, called upon the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia
(a) To cease hostilities, forthwith, and
(b) To settle their disputes by arbitration or by other peaceful means, and to keep the Security Council informed about the progress of the settlement;
And whereas communications have been received from the governments of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia advising that orders have been given for the cessation of hostilities,
And whereas it is desirable that negotiations should be taken to avoid disputes and friction relating to the observance of the cease-fire order and to create conditions which will facilitate agreement between the parties,
The Security Council,
1. Notes with satisfaction the move taken by the two parties to comply with the resolution of 1 August 1947;
2. Notes the action taken by the government of the United States in making available its good offices to the governments of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia and the offer by the government of Australia to act jointly with the United States in the capacity of mediator and arbitrator;
3. Resolves to establish a commission consisting of representatives of ......................... who will report directly to the Security Council on the situation in the Republic of Indonesia following the resolution of the Council of
At the 135th meeting on August 15, Tsiang of China announced his approval of the Australian draft resolution by observing that the Indonesian dispute affected 3,000,000 Chinese residents in Indonesia. Sutan Sjahrir, ambassador-at-large of the Republic of Indonesia, accused the Dutch of violating the Linggadjati Agreement. He welcomed the establishment of such a commission.

Van Kleffens countered the allegations of Sjahrir and claimed that the Republic had not "qualified" itself to accept the good offices offered by the United States, unless a commission of arbitration was sent by the Council to arbitrate the dispute. He again objected to the way in which the Council was claiming jurisdiction in the dispute.

Romulo supported Sjahrir's recommendation that an international body be sent to Indonesia to supervise the implementation of the cease-fire resolution. However, he urged that there should be points of arbitration in the dispute. Nisot again questioned the jurisdiction of the Security Council in the Indonesian dispute on the ground that it was a domestic problem of The Netherlands.

On August 18, 1947, at the 137th meeting, Gromyko announced his support of the recommendation of Sjahrir.

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A United Nations commission was urgently necessary, he said, to stop the Netherlands aggression against a helpless people.

Tsiang proposed an amendment to the Australian draft resolution by deleting paragraph 3 in the second part of the resolution, and adding the following provisions instead:

3. Notes with satisfaction the statement by the Netherlands government issued on 11 August 1947 in which it affirms its intention to organize a sovereign, democratic United States of Indonesia in accordance with the purposes of the Linggadjati Agreement.

4. Notes that the Netherlands government intends immediately to request the career consuls stationed in Batavia jointly to report on the present situations in the Republic of Indonesia, and to propose to the said Republic, and one by the Netherlands government, to inquire into the situation and to supervise the cease-fire;

5. Resolves:

(a) that the measures of consular report and impartial inquiry and supervision should be accepted by the Council as steps in the right direction;
(b) that the consular body at Batavia and the impartial state should be requested to forward copies of their reports to the Council, and
(c) that should the situation so require, the Council will consider the matter further.

Johnson of the United States informed the Council that the amended Australian resolution was acceptable to the United States delegation. Nevertheless, he emphasized

that the United States government had offered its good offices to the parties for the purpose of ironing out points of difference in the negotiation. He said that this move of the United States was within the principle of Article 33 of the Charter.

At the 192nd meeting of the Council held on August 22, van Kleffens resumed his criticisms and denunciations of the Council's jurisdiction in the dispute. He often repeated that there was no threat to international peace and security in Indonesia and that the Dutch were the sovereign authority in the Indies. Pillai of India urged the Council to hold back the tide of aggression in Indonesia. He said, "I would like to see that colonial war in Indonesia would never take place in Asia or anywhere else."

On August 22, 1947, at the Council's 193rd meeting, the representative of Australia, China, and Poland met in joint consultation concerning the amended Australian resolution. Two states, Australia and China, had agreed to a joint resolution because, as Hodgson explained, "in our opinion, the amended Australian

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4 Article 33, paragraph 1: The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution of negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
resolution did not meet the urgency of the perturbing situation." The Australian-Chinese resolution stated:

Whereas the Security Council on 1 August 1947 called upon the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to cease hostilities forthwith,

And whereas communications have been received from the governments of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia advising that orders have been given for the cessation of hostilities,

And whereas it is desirable that steps should be taken to avoid disputes and friction relating to the observance of the cease-fire orders, and to create conditions which will facilitate agreement between the parties,

The Security Council,

1. Notes with satisfaction the steps taken by both parties to comply with the resolution of 1 August 1947;

2. Notes with satisfaction the statement issued by the Netherlands government on 11 August, in which it affirms its intention to organize a sovereign, democratic United States of Indonesia in accordance with the principles of the Linggadjati Agreement;

3. Notes that the Netherlands government intends immediately to request the career consuls stationed in Batavia to report on the present situation in the Republic of Indonesia;

4. Notes that the government of the Republic of Indonesia has requested appointment by the Security Council of a commission of observers;

5. Requests the governments members of the Security Council who have career consuls in Batavia to instruct them to prepare jointly for the information and guidance of the Security Council reports on the situation in the Republic of Indonesia following the resolution of the Council of 1 August 1947, such reports to cover the observance of the cease-fire orders and the conditions prevailing in areas under military occupation or from which armed forces now in occupation may be

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withdrawn by agreement between the parties;

6. Requests the governments of the Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia to grant to the representatives referred to in paragraph 5, all facilities necessary for the effective fulfilment of their missions;

7. Resolves to consider the matter further should situation require. 6

In order to meet the Polish amendment to the original Australian resolution, Hodgson also proposed the following resolution which was approved in principle by Poland during the three-power consultation:

Whereas the Security Council on 1 August 1947, called upon the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to settle their disputes by arbitration or by other peaceful means, and keep the Security Council informed about the progress of the settlement; and

Whereas it is desirable that negotiations should commence as soon as possible with a view to a just and lasting settlement;
The Security Council,

Requests the governments of the Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia to submit all matters in dispute between them to arbitration by a commission consisting of one arbitrator selected by the government of the Republic of Indonesia, one by the government of the Netherlands, and one by the Security Council. 8

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7 Polish amendment, dated August 22, 1947: It involved decisions to:

1. Omit paragraphs a, 3, 5, 6, and 7.
2. To include the following paragraphs (3) and (4).

(3) Establish a commission composed of the state members of the Security Council to supervise the implementation of the decision of the Security Council of 1 August. (4) Keep the Indonesian question on the agenda of the Security Council.

A third resolution was introduced by Johnson of the United States. He informed the Council that Indonesia had rejected the offer of good offices by the United States. He felt that constitutional issues which might arise concerning the federal structure of the US would retard peaceful negotiation in the future. He proposed the following resolution:

The Security Council,
Resolves to tender its good offices to the parties in order to assist in the pacific settlement of their dispute, in accordance with paragraph (b) of the resolution of the Council of 1 August 1947. The Council expresses its readiness, if the parties so request, to assist in the settlement of the dispute through a committee of the Council, each party selecting one, and the third designated by the two so selected.

Gromyko considered the Australian resolution and its amendment, the joint Australian-Chinese and Australian resolutions, and the United States resolution would make it appear that it was the Council's duty to deal with the Indonesian question, but, in fact, the Council would voluntarily stand aside and refrain from further action in the dispute. He further charged that the proposed resolutions thus far were weak, repetitive, and ineffective. He also claimed that there were five so-called career consuls in Batavia, all of whom were representatives of members in the Council—Australia, China, 

France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. He con-
cluded that a selection of three or all of these pro-
Dutch consuls to form an international commission of
arbitration in Indonesia would be an injustice to the
Republic of Indonesia.

Sjahrir informed the Council that his delegation
would be prepared to accept any resolution on impartial
arbitration, provided that the Council was not by-passed.
However, his delegation confessed "to a feeling of dis-
quiet" over the Australian-Chinese resolution. He supported
Gromyko's contention that there were pro-Netherlands
career consuls in Batavia. Katz-Suchy also supported the
arguments of Sjahrir and Gromyko and added that the
Australian-Chinese resolution, if adopted, would be in-
jurious to the Indonesians. He proposed to amend the
second Australian resolution by adding after the words
"consisting of" in paragraph 3, the words "the eleven
members of the Security Council who will act in the ca-
pacity of mediators and arbitrators between the govern-
ments of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia."

Van Langenhove of Belgium, doubtful as he had
been in the past of the Council's jurisdiction of the
dispute, introduced a resolution which purported to ask
the International Court of Justice for an advisory
whether the Council was competent or not to deal in the
matter. The Belgian resolution stated:

The Security Council,

Having been seized by the governments of Australia and India of the situation in Indonesia;

Considering that in invoking Article 11, paragraph 7 of the Charter, the government of the Netherlands contests the competence of the Security Council to deal with the question which it has thus been seized;

Considering the debates which have taken place on this subject in the Security Council,

Requests the International Court of Justice, under Article 96 of the Charter, to give it, as soon as possible an advisory opinion on whether the Council is competent to deal with the aforementioned question;

Instructs the secretary-general to place the documentation submitted to the Security Council regarding the question and the records of the meeting devoted to it at the disposal of the International Court of Justice.

The joint Australian-Chinese resolution was adopted seven votes for (Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) as against three abstentions (Poland, Syria, and the Soviet Union.

The United States resolution was also adopted eight votes in favor (Australia, Belgium, China, Colombia, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) as against three abstentions (Poland, Syria, and the Soviet Union).

At the 195th meeting on August 26, 1947, the Coun-
rejected the Belgian resolution four votes in favor (Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States), one against (Poland), and six abstentions (Australia, China, Brazil, Colombia, Syria, and the Soviet Union).

The Polish amendment to the second Australian resolution was rejected, three votes in favor (Poland, Syria, and the Soviet Union), four against (Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and four abstentions (Australia, China, Brazil, Colombia).

The second Australian resolution was also rejected, there were three votes in favor (Australia, Colombia, and Syria) as against eight abstentions (Belgium, Brazil, China, France, Poland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union).

Before the Security Council adjourned, Ketz-Suchy of Poland introduced a resolution which called upon the parties to adhere strictly to the recommendation of the Council of August 1, 1947. The Polish resolution provided:

The Security Council,

Taking into consideration that military operations are being continued on the territory of the Republic of Indonesia:

1. Reminds the government of the Netherlands and the government of the Indonesian Republic of its resolution of 1 August 1947, concerning the cease-fire order and peaceful settlement of their dispute;

2. Calls upon the government of the Netherlands and the government of the Indonesian Republic to adhere strictly to the recommendation
of the Security Council of 1 August 1947.

It was adopted ten votes for (Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, France, Poland, Syria, the Soviet Union, and the United States) and one against (the United Kingdom).

The president of the Council, El-khouri of Egypt, considered the current discussion of the Indonesian dispute temporarily closed. However, he informed the members that the dispute would remain open for further discussion.

The Indonesian dispute, far from being solved by the cease-fire resolution of the Council on August 1, had continued. India and Australia, fearful lest the dispute disrupt the peace of Southeast Asia, reopened the case. They charged the Dutch with violating the Linggadjati Agreement and the August 1 cease-fire resolution. Numerous resolutions, amendments, and insertions were then offered, indicative of particular attitudes in the Council.

France's insistence that the Council had no jurisdiction over the Indonesian dispute was reflected in the suggestion that the International Court of Justice be asked for an advisory opinion whether the Council was competent to deal with the matter. France was supported by Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and opposed by Poland and the abstaining members Australia, Brazil, China, Syria, and the Soviet Union. Although

obviously doubtful of the competency of the Council to act in the dispute, France nevertheless supported the resolutions of Australia and the United States which gave the Council full jurisdiction. Had the Court ruled that the Council had no competence on the matter, the Indonesian dispute would have been an ultimate victory of The Netherlands and its supporters, who, time and again, had challenged the proficiency and jurisdiction of the Council on the ground that the dispute was a sovereign responsibility of a national power. The United Kingdom, too, prominently questioned the Council's competence so that it either abstained or openly voted against the resolutions placed before the Council which gave it jurisdiction in the dispute.

At the final phase of the discussion, the Soviet Union opposed the resolutions of the United States, China, and Australia. The Soviet view was that justice could only be done to the Republic of Indonesia if all the members of the Council acted as the commission to mediate in the dispute. However, since the Soviet Union's suggestions and claims were not given full support by the members of the Security Council, it voted against all resolutions except the Polish resolution and the Polish amendment to the Australian-Chinese resolution.
CHAPTER VI

THE AFTERMATH OF THE DUTCH POLICE-ACTION

I

On October 14, 1947, the Consular Commission pursuant to the Council's August 25th resolution, which instructed the career consuls in Batavia to inquire into the Indonesian dispute and report such inquiries to the Security Council, presented to the Council a report concerning the present Indonesian situation.

The Commission informed the Council that both parties had interpreted the cease-fire order differently. In a radio speech by Republican President Achmed Soekarno on August 4, 1947, the Indonesian forces were ordered:

(a) Don't fire unless fired upon, and do not initiate any offensive action; (b) Consolidate the present defenses; (c) Continue patrols outside the foremost defended localities for the purpose of military intelligence; and (b) Repel vigorously any attack by the Dutch.

The Netherlands interpretation was that all strate-
gie points which had been the first objectives of police action had to be occupied before the order of cease-fire was put into effect August 4, 1947. The Dutch high command felt that the location or movement of any Indonesian force within the area of Dutch strategic points was a breach of the cease-fire order, and that the Dutch were at liberty to take any measure to disperse, capture, or destroy such a force.

On August 28, the Dutch military command announced that the areas in Java, Madura, Sumatra, and adjoining islands within the van Mook line had been put under the direct responsibility of The Netherlands government. In those areas, the Dutch declared that "no authority of the present government of the Republic can any longer be recognized." The Indonesian command dismissed the validity of the demarcation imposed by the van Mook line because the Dutch had occupied several isolated localities. The Commission informed the Council that:

The actual declaration of the van Mook line on August 29, 1947, had little effect from the Republican point of view if not to announce to the world that their Dutch policy and intentions were. The Army had been working on that basis since 4 August. 3

The Commission added that the movements of the Dutch troops were in the form of spearheads. It had been

3 Security Council Official Records, Second Year, Special Supplement, No. 4, p. 10.
noticed that deep, narrow Dutch thrusts into Indonesian territories had by-passed many Indonesian troops "in the air." Being still intact, the Indonesian elements could continue to deal heavy blows to the advancing Dutch.

II.

Allegations of Breaches, Propaganda, and Organization of Troops

From August 4 to September 26, 1947, the Dutch had been charged by the Indonesian government with eight-hundred-and-eleven specific violations of the cease-fire order. A number of these were Dutch reconnaissance flights with military planes over Indonesian areas, sorties into Indonesian-held territories, deliberate attacks in company strength supported by warcraft, naval blockade, atrocities and plundering. The Dutch government demurred to the naval blockade charge since it was intended to prevent arms-smuggling into Dutch-held territories.

The Netherlands government had alleged twice that number of charges against the Indonesian troops who were said to have violated the cease-fire order: the Indonesians had committed one-thousand-seven-hundred and ninety-two infringements. These accusations involved attacks on Dutch posts, terrorizing villagers, atrocities, the mining of roads and sabotage, the kidnapping of villagers, and the firing of Dutch ships at sea. The Indonesian high
command maintained that it was justified in its action, since it had not recognized the van Hook line. Nevertheless, the Indonesians denied attacking Dutch posts, committing atrocities, and kidnapping of civilians. Both belligerents had made use of radio propaganda warfare quite extensively. This action had caused much bitterness among Dutch and Indonesian forces.

The Dutch government had been raising troops, some elements of which were largely recruited from the local population. Dutch forces were well equipped, highly disciplined, and very mobile. Indonesian troops were hampered by lack of modern equipment, but their discipline was high. Indonesian control over forces in Sumatra and Java was complete. It was reported that extremist youths had formed into bands and gave much trouble to Dutch forward command posts. The youths had called themselves Harimau Lier (flying tigers) and Naga Terbang (flying serpents).

III
General Conditions of the Populations

(a) In Republican-held Territories:

Patriotic feelings ran high among the native populace. Many times the feeling appeared openly anti-Dutch, though directed not against the average Dutchman, but against the so-called "return of colonialism." This anti-Dutch attitude
was invigorated by the commencement of the police action. The administration of the population was said to be excellent. Considerable attention had been paid to general welfare, schools, and hospitals. Austerity prevailed, nevertheless, since public goods and commodities had either been destroyed or unavailable. In Java food was plentiful but there was serious shortage of clothing. The Commission feared that prolongation of hostilities would cause rapid deterioration of food supply.

(b) The Dutch-occupied Territories:

The Commission reported that Dutch-held areas had some measure of peace and order. Economic activity had been resumed. A few Indonesian officials had been arrested. Captured Indonesian guerrillas had been court-martialled and punished. Indonesian territories which had been overrun by the police action were not effectively administered by the Dutch. The Indonesian civilians had not the demeanor of happiness prevailing in Republican-held areas. Work had begun in Dutch and foreign plantations despite fear of reprisals from Indonesian troops and extremists bands.

However, there is still great fear of Republican guerrilla bands, who operate not only against estate buildings and factories, but against the personnel, and here again, for the time being, it is difficult
for Dutch forces to maintain law and order.

IV

Situation of Foreigners

(a) In Republican-held Territories:

A large number of Chinese had directly suffered from the sudden Dutch police action. Most of these Chinese came from the wealthy class which had been the victims of looting and terrorism. Many of them had suffered atrocities at the hands of Indonesian troops and civilians. Some were accused of being Dutch spies. Nevertheless, their sufferings were largely due to their having enjoyed the best position at the time when the scorched-earth policy was inaugurated.

Other foreigners, mostly Indians and Arabs, also suffered, but their position was analogous to that of the rest of the Indonesian population under the disturbed conditions which prevailed in the territory where they had resided. The great majority of Europeans had been evacuated before the commencement of the police action.

(b) In Dutch-occupied Territories:

Chinese living in outlying areas had been subjected to terrorism. It was believed that they had cooperated with

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Security Council Official Records, Second Year, Special Supplement, No. 4, pp. 16-17.
Dutch authorities. Some of them had been forced to leave their places of residence and had been held in isolated sectors in Dutch areas by Indonesian troops or guerrillas. Both the Chinese and Indonesian natives had been underfed and ill-treated while in the hands of these bands. The Dutch had also sponsored Chinese groups to resist pillaging by Indonesian elements. The Commission also believed that this banding of Chinese civilians against Republican forces had earned them the hatred of the Indonesian people. The Commission added:

It is reliably reported that since the police action more than 1,000 Chinese, including women and children, have been murdered, over 10,000 are still missing and nearly 100,000 have been rendered homeless and destitute, out of a total Chinese population of approximately 600,000 in the affected areas of Java and Sumatra.

V

The Indonesian Scorched-earth Policy

Long before the impending aggression of the Dutch in Indonesia after the October, 1946 truce, the Republican government had stated that in case of Dutch armed attack, a scorched-earth policy would be one of the main forms of effective resistance. The Indonesian president and other high officials had declared "if the Dutch army entered Republican territories, the Netherlands Army would

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Ibid., Special Supplement, No. 4, p. 18
have to be accompanied by fire-brigades." The Commission believed that elaborate plans had been made to include not only objects of military importance such as bridges, railways, roads, and public conveyances, but also private properties belonging to Indonesians and foreigners in Indonesia. Such a policy had been begun before the Dutch could get their troops ready for the invasion of the strategic Republican territories. The Commission further reported that the scorched-earth policy had been accompanied by wanton destruction of properties by irresponsible Indonesian bands.

VI

The Van Mook Line

When both parties had called a cease-fire in accordance with the Security Council's cease-fire resolution of August 1, 1947, the Dutch lieutenant governor-general in the Indies, van Mook, defined the demarcation line between the two armed forces. The following was declared in the governor's radio-speech on Friday, August 29, 1947, at 6:45 p.m., Java time:

I. Java:

A. The part of West and Middle Java, bounded:
   1. To the North by the Java Sea;
   2. To the East by the line Kramat-Sepatan-R. Pengodo-
   Han-Djateke 1-Batakan 2-K. Sabi (all inclusive), the
   western boundary of the District of Leuwiliang, Regency
   Buitenzorg and the western boundary of the Regency Sukabu-

\[\text{Ibid., Special Supplement, No. 4, p. 21.}\]
3. To the South by the Indian Ocean;
4. To the East by the eastern boundary of the District Gombong, Regency Kebumen, the eastern boundary of the Regency and Kendal, the southern boundary of the Districts Amburawa and Salatiga, Regency Semarang, including the environs of Djubug in the District of Tengaren, Regency Semarang, the eastern boundary of the District Singakibul, Regency Crobogan, and of the District Demak, Regency Demak;
5. The part of East Java, bounded on the west by the northern and western boundary of the District Grisse, Regency Surabaya, the western boundary of the District Tjermee, Regency Modjokerto, including the environs of Watudakon, Regency Djombong, the watershed between the river-basins of the K. Brantas and the K. Konto (inclusive) running from the G. andjasmoro across the G. Biru-G., Djeruk-G., Radjegwesi-G., Kedingjangkruk-G., Tjobangton to the G. Butak across the District Pudjon, Regency Malang, the southern boundary of the Districts Malang and Tumpon, Regency Malang, including the parts of the Districts Kepandjen and Buluwang, Regency Malang, to the line Pakisaji-Gululawang-G., Buring, and the western boundary of the Regency Lumajang.

II. Madura:

The Districts Bankalan, Kabandjar and Baliga of the Regency Bankalan and the Districts Rordjun, Bunder, Pameka~{}san and Kotamampang of the Regency Pamekasan.

III. Sumatra:

A. North Sumatra:
Of the Residency of Sumatra's East Coast:
1. The territory between the B. Serangan and the 3. Asiahe (both rivers included);
2. Tandjongpura, situated on the north bank of the B. Serangan, and also the railway line and the road which connects the said town with the area as defined sub-paragraph 1, with its environs.

B. Middle Sumatra:
1. An area in the section Palembangse, including: the sub-section Ogah-Hilier and Komering-Hilier; the southern part of the sub-section Musi-Hilier and Kubestreken and Palembang and Banjusinstreken, to the north bounded by a Banjusin and the A. Teleuktenggulang (both inclusive), to the west by the pipeline Keluang-Karangpringin (situated on the A. Musi-Pangabang and across the river area of the
3. Kerut to the west of it;
2. The sub-section Lematang-Hulu and Lematang-Hilier of the section Palembangse Bovenlanden;
3. The sub-section Ogan-Hulu and the territory of the sub-section Fomering-Hulu north of the railway line and the road Baturad-Jadatapura of the section Ogan and Komering-Hulu (inclusive).

In accordance with the principles upon which the action was founded, the Netherlands Indies government's intention was that the several Republican officials and official organizations would continue their tasks in this territory subject to its general responsibility.

Since, however, the present Republican government at Jogjakarta persevered in forbidding its officials, under various threats, from fulfilling this task and moreover incited the continuance of regular acts of violence openly as well as otherwise, even after the Netherlands government had decided to cease hostilities, the Netherlands Indies government decides:

(a) That no authority of the present government of the Republic of Indonesia can any longer be recognized in the above-mentioned territories;
(b) That, consequently, the inhabitants of these territories are relieved of their duty to obey the said government and that everybody is forbidden to follow up the orders of that government;
(c) That the Republican officials in these territories can continue their work in the general government under the conditions, applying to that service, whereby they will be maintained in their functions or will be reinstated, barring proved fitness or low conduct. With regard to functionaries who are superfluous in connexion [sic] with the extent of the work, measures will be taken to employ them elsewhere;
(d) That officials under paragraph (d) if they so desire or if they disturb, directly or indirectly, can be removed to Republican territory;
(e) That Republican officials who do not wish to continue their work on these conditions are considered to be relieved of their functions.
(f) That by energetic restoration and energetic maintenance of law and order a lasting safeguard of all well-meaning citizens and foreigners of every nationality will be effected against terrorism as practised or favoured [sic] by the actual Republican government, and that guarantees will be created lest in future they shall fall victim to possible retaliation or punishment on that side.

The Government [The Netherlands] invites the inhabitants
and organizations who are willing to cooperate in the new political reconstruction to join in organized consultation, to the end that a political organization be made as quickly as possible for the above-mentioned territories which can start its task within the framework of the principles of the Linggadjati Agreement and can be represented in the central interim government, to be formed as soon as possible.

In the future the following aims will be prevailing:

(a) The complete restoration of law and order and the complete disarmament and winding up of all armed organizations which do not recognize the authority of the existing and recognized or still to be formed government organs in the said territories;

(b) The speedy cooperation between all parts of Indonesia where law and order reign, for the further political reconstruction in preparation of the United States of Indonesia;

(c) The safeguarding of the freedom of religion and of the equality of the religions sects before the government;

(d) The restoration of education on the basis of an efficient general education of the people and an efficient continuance of higher and technical education, whereby the honest cooperation of political and religious organizations working in this field will be gladly accepted;

(e) A speedy restoration of monetary and economic stability through complete cooperation in every field;

(f) A speedy restoration of law for all who were driven away from their properties, industries or trades, taking into consideration the rights and interests of those who have in good faith administered such properties, or who have owned similar industries or trades;

(g) A systematic care of labour, to the end that the most suitable work be found for everybody, taking into consideration the urgency of the quick training of Indonesian leaders in every field and of the working-power since the Japanese occupation;

(h) A regulation of social relations in such a way, that only the interests of employers and employees are brought into harmony and the biggest possible community of interests is furthered, but also regular social care in cooperation with the recognized and still to be formed organizations of both groups will be part of the political economy;

(i) A systematic reconstruction of the middle class, especially the Indonesian middle class, together with the political and social organizations which have this reconstruction in particular in their programme. 7
On September 2, 1947, three days after the van Mook declaration which outlined Dutch sovereignty over certain areas of Java, Madura, and Sumatra, the Republic government issued an announcement, of which the following is an excerpt:

(2) The Republican government states, categorically, that the Netherlands contention that its troops have finally and completely occupied certain areas of the de facto territory of the Republic is at strict variance with the truth and has given a wilfully wrong impression of the extent and nature of the Netherlands penetration of these areas in Java, Madura, and Sumatra. The Republican government asserts that up to this moment Dutch troops have succeeded only in occupying a number of towns and main roads connecting them, as well as several isolated localities. Those areas,...are not in any way under Netherlands authority, but are in fact fully controlled by the established administration of the Republican government which the people in these areas recognize as the only lawful authority.

The Republican government informed the Consular Commission that the Dutch declaration of the van Mook line aimed at: (1) extending the territory already occupied by Dutch forces; (2) extending and consolidating the Dutch military and political "stranglehold"; (3) strengthening Dutch civil administration at the expense of the Indonesian government "and in this way destroying the latter"; (4) repudiating any decision of the Security Council; and (5) creating military, economic, and political conditions which would weaken and isolate the Republican govern-

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Ibid., Supplement No. 4, p. 134.
The Indonesian government concluded that:

The only lawful authority in the de facto Republican territories of Java, Madura, and Sumatra remains the authority of the Republican government . . . and it is the duty of the Republican government to uphold its responsibility towards all those [the natives] who are supporting the Republican cause.

VII

The Consular Commission reached the conclusion that the cease-fire resolution of the Security Council on August 1, 1947, had not been effectively observed by either party. Both had diametrically opposed interpretations of the cease-fire order. The Republican government had ordered its troops to continue patrols for the purpose of military intelligence, although the Republic of Indonesia had issued a temporary cease-fire order. The Dutch government, on the other hand, had called its troops to consolidate their positions and to fire at liberty against Republican elements found within their seized territories. The attitudes of both parties concerning the cease-fire resolution meant that the Indonesian hostilities had not ceased---in complete defiance of the Security Council's orders.

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Ibid., Supplement No. 4, p. 135.
The Republic of Indonesia and The Netherlands were suspicious of each other, and their armies are poised and eager to resume large-scale fighting at a moment's notice. Another reason why there could be no possible settlement of the Indonesian dispute, in the near future, was the unilateral declaration of the van Noor line by the Dutch governor-general. The line had enclosed enormous parcels of Republican territories in Java, Madura, and Sumatra overrun by Dutch troops in the Dutch police aggression. However, the Dutch had not completely annihilated the Republican army. Republican stragglers were carrying out guerrilla activities inside Dutch territories. Further, the Republic categorically disapproved the van Noor line. This meant that the Republic would not stop hostilities if the settlement of the dispute were made on the basis of the van Noor declaration of August 29, 1947.

In Republican-held territories, there was high morale despite the present predicament. Economically, these areas were feeble, a situation accounted for by the Dutch control of former Republican commercial ports and active Dutch blockade of Republican sea-lanes. Dutch-held territories were economically self-sufficient, although in these territories peace was disturbed by Republican elements operating inside Dutch territories. There was also civilian terrorism due to Republican elements uncontrolled directly by the Republican Army High Command.

In conclusion, the solution of the dispute was
still distant. The Security Council could issue a cease-fire order, but it could not halt the fighting. It could not compel the parties to cease hostilities because the Security Council had no force to implement its aims and objectives. The Council had ordered the Consular Commission to report on the Indonesian dispute and to inform the Council that its cease-fire had been fully implemented, but the Commission could do nothing more than act as an arbitrator between two hostile states. If it wanted to end the Indonesian dispute, the Security Council had yet to find a better way of implementing its cease-fire resolution.
CHAPTER VII

THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATES THE REPORT
OF THE CONSULAR COMMISSION

At the 207th meeting on October 3, 1947, the Security Council continued its discussion of the Indonesian dispute. Alexander Cadogan (United Kingdom) was president of the Council. The discussion was focused on the first report of the Consular Commission concerning the situation in Indonesia after the cease-fire order of the Council of August 1, 1947.

Herbert V. Evatt (Australia) informed the Council that blood was being spilled in Indonesia despite the cease-fire resolution and that there was fighting between and behind the Dutch spearheads which was an acknowledged violation of the Council's order. He proposed, (as the Australian resolution), that the Committee of Three (Good Offices Committee) be put into operation in Indonesia

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1 See Commission's report as analyzed on Chapter VI.
2 Evatt, Herbert. Born in New South Wales, 1895; LL.D. (Sidney University; Deputy Prime Minister, 1946-; and Representative to the 7th Session Economic and Social Council, 1948.

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with utmost dispatch.

Gromyko accosted the usefulness of the Consular Commission as an unreliable agency of the United Nations by asserting that the Commission's report tended to condemn the Indonesian government. He further attacked the Commission on the ground that it had not qualified itself by preventing the fighting. He re-introduced a resolution calling for the withdrawal of the troops of both parties to positions occupied by them before the beginning of the police action.

Van Kleffens of The Netherlands corroborated the report of the Commission that the Indonesians had practiced violence and atrocities against foreign and native elements of the population. Disclaiming the Russian delegate's charge that the Dutch were the aggressors in Indonesia, he further accused the Indonesian government with trying to confuse the world forum by maliciously and falsely alleging violations against The Netherlands. Johnson objected to the Gromyko proposal, and van Langenhove of Belgium supported his (Johnson's) claim that the Soviet proposal could not be reintroduced again because it already had been rejected by the Council at its hundred-and-seventy-third meeting.

Romulo contended, however, that since the cease-fire

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3 See Chapter V, footnote 9.
resolution had not been observed, the Soviet proposal would be the only solution. Katz-Suchy of Poland supported the Russian proposal by asserting that the proposal was well within the scope of Article 40 of the Charter.

The discussion continued at the 213th meeting on October 22 when the Council covered the first and second interim reports of the Consular Commission. Romulo wished to remind everyone that in the first and second reports of the Commission there was an inclination to consider one of the parties (The Netherlands) with "fair generosity," and he therefore cautioned the Council against "misleading and tendentious statements" which had nothing to do with the Commission's reports.

The debate concerning the violations of the cease-fire resolution continued. Johnson insisted that the Council's main concern was to search for long-range solution of the

Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Dispute, Article 40: In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure with such provisional measures.

The second interim report was a continuation of the first interim report of the Consular Commission. The second report held that the parties had not made a sincere effort to end hostilities in parts of Indonesia. See Chapter VI.
dispute, and suggested that the Soviet proposal was the
wrong approach, because neither the belligerents had
adopted a cooperative attitude toward resolving their
differences, Johnson therefore submitted the following
resolution:

The Security Council,

Having received and taken note of the report of
the Consular Commission dated 14 October 1947, indi­
cates that the Council's resolution of 1 August
1947, relating to the cessation of hostilities, has
not been fully effective;

Having taken note that according to the report
no attempt was made by either side to come to an
agreement with the other about the means of giving
effect to that resolution;

Requests the Committee of Good Offices to
assist the parties in reaching agreement on an
arrangement which will ensure the observance of the
cease-fire resolution;

Requests the Consular Commission, together with
its military assistants, to make its services available to the Committee of Good Offices;

Advises the parties concerned, the Committee of
Good Offices and the Consular Commission that its
resolution of 1 August should be interpreted as not
pre-permitting the use of the armed forces of
either party by military action to alter substantially
the territory under its control on 4 August 1947. 6

Van Kleffens condemned the United States resolution
as too impractical and the Russian and Australian resolu­
tions as anti-Dutch. Gromyko accused the United States
delegate of diverting the Council's attention, because
"he [Johnson] misleads public opinion by creating an im­
pression that the Security Council is really trying to

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6 Security Council Official Records, Second Year,
improve the situation which in fact it was not." He also felt the same about the motive of the Australian representative.

At the 214th meeting held on October 27, the Council was confronted with two pertinent questions: (1) how could the Council compel the two parties to observe the cease-fire resolution; and (2) how could the Security Council arrive at measures with long-range objectives which would be effective in settling the Indonesian peace-deadlock? Council president Cadogan warned that the debate had dragged on too long, and he wished the members could be more serious in their discussion of the matter. P. 8

Pillai (India) concluded that according to the Commission's official statements, the Republic of Indonesia had obeyed the cease-fire resolution. He added that The Netherlands had utterly and shamelessly disregarded and circumvented the aim of the cease-fire order. Pillai further emphasized that the troops of both parties should withdraw to their positions held prior to the police action in order to ensure the effectiveness of a cessation of hostilities.

Palar of Indonesia after reading the Commission's

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7 Ibid., No. 99, p. 2606.
official report concluded that the Dutch government had sent its armies into Indonesia to work havoc and destruction upon his peaceful country. He said that peace had reigned in Indonesia until the armed might of The Netherlands came. He further added that the Indonesian delegation had been pessimistic as to whether a voluntary cease-fire agreement between the Indonesian and Dutch governments could be reached unless the Council stepped into the dispute with constructive arbitration procedures.

Katz-Suchy accused the Dutch of non-compliance with the cease-hostilities resolution and the August 25 order which called upon both parties to adhere strictly to the provisions of the former. He introduced the following resolution, because "the United States text [of the resolution], or part of it, gives a very wide field for many misinterpretations:"

The Security Council,
Having taken due notice of the report of the Consular Commission in Batavia, dated 14 October 1947, and of the annexes thereto,
Having taken into consideration the statements of both parties to the dispute and various views expressed by members of the Council since the reopening of the question [Indonesian dispute] on 31 July 1947,
Finds that the forces of the Government of the Netherlands have failed to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council of 1 August and 26 August 1947;
Calls upon the Government of the Netherlands to

9 See Chapter I, Part IV, for conditions in the Indies before the Allied "Surrender Commission" arrived.
withdraw all armed forces and civil administration from the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, instructs the Consular Commission in Batavia to supervise the compliance by the Government of the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia with the resolutions of the Council of 1 August and 26 August 1947, and with the present resolution, and report thereupon to the Security Council;

Requests the Committee of Good Offices to take into consideration, under Article 40 of the Charter, the fact that the Government of the Netherlands did not comply with the resolutions of the Security Council of 1 August and 26 August 1947;

Calls the attention of the Government of the Netherlands to the fact that the failure to comply with the provisional measures shall, under Article 40 of the Charter, be taken into account by the Security Council, and that it creates a situation which, under the requirements of the Charter, may lead to the necessity of applying enforcement measures. 10

Van Langenhove summarily condemned the speech of the Polish delegate and branded the resolution nebulous. The resolution, he said, was contemptible and contained no effective solution of the dispute.

The Security Council continued its deliberation of the Indonesian dispute at its 216th meeting now at Flushing Meadow, New York, on October 31, 1947. Tsiang informed the Council at this meeting that he could not support the Polish resolution on the ground that it offered no concrete solution of the dispute.

At the 217th meeting on October 31, the resolutions on the agenda were put up for adoption. The following Soviet resolution was rejected:

The Security Council, Considers it necessary that the troops of both parties, the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic, should be immediately withdrawn to the positions which they occupied before the beginning of military operations.

Votes for: Australia, Colombia, Poland, and the Soviet Union. Votes against: Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Abstentions: Brazil, China, and Syria.

The following Australian resolution was also rejected:

The Security Council, In order to ensure the observance of its cease-fire order,
Calls upon the Governments of The Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to withdraw their respective forces at least 25 kilometers behind the positions held at date of cease-fire order of 1 August and directs the military advisers of the Consular Commission to supervise the withdrawal of the respective forces.

Votes for: Australia, Colombia, Poland, Syria, and the Soviet Union. Votes against: Belgium. Abstentions: Brazil, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The United States resolution was not voted upon because a majority of the Council members believed that it was ineffective. The Polish delegation withdrew their resolution for a better and more effective resolution of the Council. Immediately Johnson suggested that a sub-
committee be set up whose purpose would be to study the United States resolution and, if possible, to make necessary amendments. A vote was taken by show of hands, and the suggestion was carried by seven votes for (Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) as against four abstentions (Australia, Poland, Syria, and the Soviet Union).

At the 218th meeting on November 1, 1947, the subcommittee introduced the following resolution:

The Security Council,

Having received and taken note of the report of the Consular Commission, dated 14 October 1947, indicating that the Council's resolution of 1 August 1947, relating to the cessation of hostilities, has not been fully effective;

Having taken note that, according to the report, no attempt was made by either side to come to an agreement with the other about the means of giving effect to that resolution;

Calls upon the parties concerned forthwith to consult with each other, either directly or through the Committee of Good Offices, as to the means to be employed in order to give effect to the cease-fire resolution, and pending agreement, to cease any activities or incitement to activities which contravene that resolution, and to take appropriate measures for safeguarding life and property;

Requests the Committee of Good Offices to assist the parties in reaching agreement on an arrangement which will ensure the observance of the cease-fire resolution;

Requests the Consular Commission, together with its military assistants, to make its services available to the Committee of Good Offices;

Advises the parties concerned, the Committee of Good Offices and the Consular Commission, that its resolution of 1 August should be interpreted as meaning that the use of the armed forces of either party by hostile action to extend its control over territory not occupied by it on 4 August 1947 is
Inconsistent with the Council's resolution of 1 August 1947; and

Invites the parties, should it appear that some withdrawals of armed forces be necessary, to conclude between them as soon as possible the agreements referred to in its resolution of 25 August 1947.

Taish supported and endorsed the afore-mentioned resolution. He said that since both parties still upheld the Linggadjati Agreement, this resolution was the only logical solution to bring about "moderation and conciliation between the two belligerents." Pillai believed that the resolution placed a weaker party (the Republic of Indonesia) on an unequal and unfavorable footing in any future political discussion concerning the dispute. He denounced the sub-committee resolution for its failure to condemn the Dutch aggression against the Indonesians through non-compliance with the cease-fire resolution.

Gromyko felt that there was not much difference between the United States resolution and the later resolution. He charged that the present resolution would accept and legalize the territories seized by Dutch troops prior to August 4, 1947. He concluded that the negotiation of the dispute could be effective only if the invading Dutch forces relinquished their footing in former

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Indonesian territories.

At the 219th meeting, November 1, 1947, the Council adopted the sub-committee resolution by seven votes for (Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States), one against (Poland), and three abstentions (Colombia, Syria, and the Soviet Union).

The Security Council after lengthy debates concluded at its last meeting that the August 1 cease-fire resolution had not been fully observed by either party. Australia, China, India, Philippines, Poland, and the Soviet Union accused the Dutch of willful violation of the cease-fire order. The Netherlands, with the assured support of France, maintained that the Republic of Indonesia had deliberately violated the cease-fire order.

The Security Council debated what measure it could adopt to assure observance of the cease-hostilities resolution and eventually a long-range settlement of the dispute. Australia believed that both parties should withdraw their respective forces at least 25 kilometers (about 20 miles) behind the positions they held at the time the cease-fire order was called on August 4, 1947. The withdrawal should be directed by the military advisers of the Consular Commission. Similarly, the Soviet Union suggested that both parties should withdraw to their
positions at the time of the implementation of the cease-fire resolution. In stronger language, Poland proposed a resolution which: (1) reminded both parties to observe the cease-fire resolution; (2) called the Dutch forces to withdraw to their former positions at the time the cease-fire resolution was ordered on August 4, 1947; (3) instructed the Consular Commission to supervise the withdrawal of troops of both parties; (4) requested the Committee of Good Offices to prevent an aggravation of the situation or to decide measures to seek the solution of the dispute under Article 40 of the Charter; and (5) called the attention of the Security Council the possibility of applying enforcement action against the party that violated the Security Council's August 1 resolution and this resolution.

Any of these three resolutions, if passed by the Security Council, would probably have been efficacious because the disputant would have been warned that the continuance of hostilities in defiance of the Council's orders would mean that the United Nations would enforce the cease-fire on the recalcitrant.

However, Belgium, China, the United States, and The Netherlands opposed the three draft resolution, although acceptable to the Republic of Indonesia, on the ground that they offered no concrete solution of the dispute. The Netherlands called the Soviet resolution ineffective and
and reminded the Council that it had been rejected once by the Security Council. The United States supported the argument, also in technical ground. Belgium called the Polish resolution contemptible. The Philippines strongly favored the Polish and the Soviet resolutions, and in principle the Australian resolution, because, as Romulo said, evidence showed that both parties, especially the Dutch, had violated the cease-fire resolution.

The United States contended that its resolution was much better in principle than any of the other three resolutions. The United States resolution requested the Good Offices Committee to assist and supervise the parties in reaching an agreement which would ensure the observance of the August 1 resolution. However, the United States resolution could not guarantee a cessation of hostilities, and meanwhile the Dutch would have the power to coerce the Republican government through economic strangulation. A majority of the Council members held that the American resolution was ineffective, and it therefore was withdrawn.

The Security Council finally passed its sub-committee resolution which provided, in a moderate way, the substance of the rejected American resolution. However, it was weaker in principle than the Polish resolution, and it failed to condemn the Dutch police action of July, 1947, and Dutch non-compliance with the cease-fire order. In
the adoption proceeding, Poland voted against it; Colombia, Syria, and the Soviet Union abstained; and Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States supported it.
CHAPTER VIII

THE RENVILLE TRUCE AGREEMENT

On the initiative of India and Australia, the Security Council had acted to stop the fighting in Indonesia with its cease-fire resolution of August 1, 1947. On August 25, the Council had requested that the consular representatives of the Council members in Batavia jointly prepare reports on the observance of the cease-fire order and the situation in the Republic and in areas under military occupation; the Council also tendered its good offices to the parties. On November 1, 1947, the Council had taken official notice of the report of the Consular Commission that the cessation of hostilities was not fully effective. Through its resolution of November 1, the Council: (1) called upon the parties to consult with each other or through the Committee of Good Offices to give effect to the cease-fire resolution, and, pending agreement, to cease any activity which would contravene, and to take appropriate measures for safeguarding life and

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See Chapter VII, footnote 12.

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property; (2) requested the Committee to assist the parties in reaching an agreement which would assure observance of the cease-fire order; and (3) advised the parties to the dispute, including the Commission and the Committee, that the Council’s resolution of August 1 should be interpreted as opposing the use of armed forces by either party to extend its control over territory not occupied by it on August 4, 1947.

The Republic of Indonesia at the outset of the Indonesian dispute discussion in the Council had hoped for an impartial international board of arbitration or at least a board of mediation. The Council at last granted the Republic, a Committee of Good Offices, with the full support of a majority of the Security Council.

From the time of its establishment, the Committee at all times was up against such realities as: (1) it lacked the power to act either as arbitrators or mediators; (2) it consequently did not have the power to make public its suggestions to the parties; (3) the Committee’s actions had to be unanimous in order for its “confidential” suggestions to be effective; (4) either one of the parties could veto even a unanimous suggestion of the Committee; (5) there was always the possibility of the political

Original members: Justice C. Kirby (Australia) chosen by the Republic of Indonesia; Dr. Paul van Zeeland (Belgium) chosen by The Netherlands; and Senator F. Graham (United States) elected by Australia and Belgium to be the third party member.
overthrow of either party or the realignment of political forces during the negotiation of the dispute; (6) its proposals to the Security Council could be vetoed or otherwise killed; (7) the General Assembly could not be counted on for much help; (8) the world court lacked original jurisdiction over individuals committing crimes against the Charter; and (9) no effective international police force existed to enforce the decision of the Security Council.

The Committee also found numerous other obstacles to its settlement of the dispute. The Republican government oscillated in its demands for an over-all government—a centralized system of government of the USI. Nor had the Indonesian government forgotten the bitter memories of the Dutch police action. The Committee also felt:

The underlying and not always submerged determination of some powerful economic and political interests in the Netherlands not really to use the Committee of Good Offices from any real party in the preparation for an organization of the promised United States of Indonesia (USI).

A barrier common and persistent to both parties was the

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4 Ibid., p. 3842.
long and bitter distrust of each other regarding its ability or will to keep agreements when made.

Members of the Committee upon arrival in Indonesia sought out representatives of both parties whose government seats were Batavia. The Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia selected representatives to present their cases to the Committee. The Netherlands insisted first on a truce so as to provide a more favorable atmosphere for the political settlement of the Indonesian dispute. The Republican government on the other hand demanded that the consideration of the truce and the final settlement should be concurrent because of their potentially reciprocal contributions to the success of both.

For several weeks the Committee made efforts to arrange the basis for a truce. On Christmas eve, 1947, the Committee proposed eight political principles based substantially on the van Mook line of August 29, 1947:
(1) that the Committee's assistance be used in working out and signing an agreement on the USS Renville; (2) that there should be a cessation of all activities by either party relating directly or indirectly to the organization of states or to the determination of political relationship

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5 Meanwhile, the Committee members agreed to use the troopship USS Renville as meeting place for both governments for negotiations.
to the proposed USI of territories in Java, Madura, and Sumatra which comprised the areas involved in the dispute; (3) that the parties should sign a political agreement that the civil administration functioning on July 20, 1947, be restored within three months and that in that period Dutch forces should be withdrawn to areas occupied by them on July 20, 1947; (4) that on the signing of the political agreement, provision should be made for the gradual reduction of the armed forces of both parties; (5) that after the signing of the political agreement, free economic activity, trade, transportation, and communications should be restored; (6) that provision should be made for the free discussion of vital issues for a period of at least six months and not more than one year after the signing of the agreement; (7) that a constitutional convention be chosen according to democratic procedures to draft a constitution for the proposed USI; and (8) that and agency of the United Nations should be asked to observe the conditions during this period as well as the final formation of the USI.

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6 The Dutch police action began on July 20, 1947.
7 Department of State, Bulletin, XVIII, No. 454 (March 14, 1948), pp. 330-331.
The Netherlands government informally acknowledged the Christmas message. It offered in reply twelve counter-proposals to be binding on the Dutch only should the Republicans accepted them unconditionally: (1) that the Committee would continue to assist in working out a settlement of the political dispute in Java, Madura, and Sumatra on the bases of the principles underlying the Linggadjati Agreement; (2) that civil and political liberties such as freedom of assembly, speech, and publication should be permitted; (3) that there should be no interference with popular movements looking toward the formation of states in accordance with the principles of the Linggadjati; (4) that changes in the administration of territory were to be made only with the full and free consent of the population involved; (5) that there should be a gradual reduction in the size of the armed forces of both parties after the signing of the political agreement; (6) that there should be resumption of trade, intercourse, and transportation through the cooperation of both parties; (7) that there should be a period of not less than six months nor more than one year after the signing of the vital issues should proceed, and that at the end of such period, free elections would be held to allow the people to determine their political relations with the USI; (8) that the two
parties should be permitted to examine requests for an agency of the United Nations to observe conditions between the signing of the agreement and the transfer of sovereignty from The Netherlands to the USI; (9) that provision should be fostered between the peoples of The Netherlands and Indonesia; (11) that a sovereign state, on a federal basis, should be created under a constitution to be arrived at by democratic procedures; and (12) that the United States of Indonesia and the other parts of the Kingdom of The Netherlands should be united under the queen of The Netherlands.

The Republic of Indonesia, in commenting on the Dutch proposals, informed the Committee that there was no provision for the international observation of the dispute between the signing of the agreement and the transfer of sovereignty. And it added that there was no provision for the representation of the Republic in an interim government and that there was also no mention of the Republic of Indonesia by name in any of the "Dutch-dictated" twelve political principles.

Attentive to the interests of the Republic in the twelve political principles, the Committee decided to request that both parties informally consider the following six principles as additions to the Dutch counter-
proposals:

(1) Sovereignty throughout the Netherlands Indies is and shall remain with the Kingdom of the Netherlands until, after a stated interval, the Kingdom of the Netherlands transfer its sovereignty to the USI. Prior to the termination of such stated interval, the Kingdom of the Netherlands may confer appropriate rights, duties and responsibilities on a provisional federal government of the territories of the future United States of Indonesia. The United States of Indonesia, when created, will be a sovereign and independent State in equal partnership with the Kingdom of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union at the head of which shall be the King of the Netherlands. The status of the Republic of Indonesia will be that of a state within the USI.

(2) Any provisional federal government created prior to the ratification of the constitution of the future United States of Indonesia, all states will be offered fair representation.

(3) Prior to the dissolution of the Committee of Good Offices, either party may request that the services of the Committee be continued to assist in adjusting differences between the parties which relate to the political agreement and which may arise during the interim period. The other party will interpose no objection to such a request; this request would be brought to the attention of the Security Council of the United Nations by the government of the Netherlands.

(4) Within a period of not less than six months or more than one year from the signing of this agreement, a plebiscite will be held to determine either the populations of the various territories of Java, Madura, and Sumatra wish their territory to form part of the Republic of Indonesia or of another state within the USI, such plebiscite to be conducted under observation by the Committee of Good Offices should either party, in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph (3) above, request the service of the Committee in this capacity. The parties may agree that another method for ascertaining the will of the populations may be employed in place of a plebiscite.

(5) Following the delineation of the states in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph (4) above, a constitutional convention will be convened, through democratic procedures, to draft a constitution for the USI. The representation of the various states in the convention will be in propor-
(6) Should any state decide not to ratify the constitution and desire, in accordance with the principles of Articles 3 and 4 of the Linggadjati Agreement, to negotiate a special relationship with the U.I.I and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, neither party will object.  

Both parties accepted unconditionally not only the twelve but also the above principles as the bases for negotiation and settlement of the dispute.

III

To guarantee that hostilities cease, the Committee also proposed the following provisions which were agreed to by the parties: (1) a cease-fire order would be issued simultaneously by both parties within forty-eight hours after the signing of this agreement, and this order would apply to all troops along the boundary lines described by the van Mook declaration; (2) demilitarized zones would be set up along the cease-fire line; (3) the establishment of the demilitarized zones would not prejudice the rights, claims, or position of either party under the resolutions of the Council of August 1, 25, and 26, and November 1, 1947; (4) the Committee would offer its military assistants to settle any incident which required enquiry; (5) pending the

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9 Ibid., No. 454 (March 14, 1948), p. 335.
10 Ibid., p. 334. (Technically referred to as the Truce Agreement).
political settlement, the responsibility for maintaining peace and order would rest with the civil police force of each party; (6) trade and intercourse between all areas would be permitted as soon as possible, and police officers of neither party were to act in the demilitarized zones without the Committee's military assistants; (7) both parties would: (a) prohibit sabotage, intimidation, and reprisals against persons and property; (b) refrain from broadcasts or any form of propaganda aimed at provoking troops and civilians; (c) order all troops and civilians to adhere to the truce agreement; (d) fully cooperate with the Committee; (e) cease publication of communiques concerning military movements unless both parties agreed to them; and (f) provide for the immediate release of prisoners; (8) the Committee's military assistants would conduct enquiries at once to establish whether Republican forces in West Java were continuing to offer resistance; (9) all armed forces in the demilitarized zones would be moved peacefully to the territory on the party's own side and under strict surveillance of the Committee's military assistants; (10) the agreement would binding unless one party formally notified both the Committee and the other party that it considered the truce binding.

The term civil police did not exclude the temporary use of military personnel in the capacity of civil police. However, both parties acknowledged that police forces should be under civil control.
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regulations violated and the agreement terminated.

On January 17, 1946, Raden A. Widjojoatmodjo,
chairman of the Dutch delegation; Amir Sjarifuddin, chair-
man of the Republican delegation; and members of the
Committee of Good Offices Richard Kirby (Australia),
Frank P. Graham (United States), and Paul van Zeeland
(Belgium) formally subscribed to the twelve and six ad-
dditional agreements and the truce provisions aboard the
USS Renville.

IV

The Committee, with powers vested in it by the
November 1, 1947 resolution of the Security Council, and
with the assistance of the Consular Commission, finally
persuaded the disputants to reach a temporary settlement.
On Christmas eve, 1947, the Committee proposed eight
political principles to serve as the bases of negotiation
of the dispute. These involved the cessation of hostil-
ities, the withdrawal of Dutch forces to areas they had
occupied on July 20, 1947, a reduction of forces, a res-
toration of economic activities, a proposed constitu-
tional convention to draft a constitution for the USI, and
the observance of conditions in Indonesia during the in-
terim and final formation of the USI by agencies of the
United Nations. The Republic of Indonesia agreed to these
principles, but they were unacceptable, as such to the
The twelve Dutch counter-proposals were virtually in the form of an ultimatum and demanded their unconditional acceptance by the Republic. Otherwise the Dutch would have full "liberty of action" and would resume their police action. In substance, the Dutch counter-proposals were similar to the Committee's eight political principles. However, the Republic was not mentioned as participant in the formation of the USI. The Republic also contended that the Dutch were trying to form a federal USI composed of all areas outside the de facto sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia over Java, Madura, and Sumatra. However, the Republic compromised and conceded to the demands of the Dutch since, as the Indonesians said, they would eventually secure their freedom and independence.

The Committee added an additional six principles to the Dutch twelve counter-proposals. The principles gave the Republic a vital part in the establishment of the United States of Indonesia and included the original Republican demands for a complete over-all government for Indonesia. Both parties accepted unconditionally the twelve and the six additional principles.

In order to implement the cease-fire order of the Security Council, the Committee recommended and got the
true agreement, but for all intents and purposes, the
truce left open the question of invalidating the princi-
ples agreed at in the Renville Agreement. The complicated
arrangement in the last article, providing the machinery
for denouncing the truce agreements, in effect implied
that hostilities could be resumed by either side when
the occasion was ripe. The Republic warned the Com-
mittee of the possibly grave effects of this "termi-
nation clause," but the Committee failed to plug this
significant loophole.
CHAPTER IX

THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA

I

The Chairman of the Committee of Good Offices, ¹ Coert du Bois (United States), reported to the Security Council in June, 1948, concerning political developments ² in West Java. He informed the Council that the most significant development was the Third West Java Conference in session at Bandoeng on April 23, 1948. The First and Second West Java Conferences also were included in the Committee's interim report, because they had contributed to the character and make-up of the Third West Java Conference.

The First West Java Conference had been convened by the Dutch Commissioner for Administrative Affairs of the Indies at Bandoeng from October 12 to 19, 1947. Attended by forty-five of the forty-nine Indonesian delegates appointed by the Dutch government, its purpose was to bring together from each district of West Java representatives

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¹ Coert du Bois replaced Senator Frank P. Graham when the latter was recalled to the United States.
of the main political, intellectual, religious, and agricultural groups and districts to ascertain their wishes with respect to political developments in West Java.

The Recomba, or Dutch Commissioner of Administrative Affairs in Indonesia, stated the aims of the conference to be:

1. Abolition of segregation between the Indonesian and the Netherlands sections of the West Java civil service;
2. Measures should be taken to ensure the promotion of law, order, prosperity, and education on the shortest possible time;
3. To choose a permanent contact commission whose duty is to discuss pressing problems of the islands with the Recomba.

The conference decided to call a Second West Java Conference to establish a provisional government for West Java. The election of delegates was to be in accordance with democratic principles, and all parts of the area and all sections of the native population were to be represented.

The Second West Java Conference met at Bandoeng on December 15, 1947. One hundred-and-fifty-four delegates (112 Indonesians, 16 Dutch, 18 Chinese, and 8 Arabs) attended the conference, but the Committee reported that the delegates had been "hand-picked" by the Recomba. The Second Conference provided for the convening of a Third West Java Conference to establish a provisional government for the area. West Java was to have the character of

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a Negara (State).

The Third Conference was attended by one-hundred delegates, fifty-three of whom were Indonesians elected by the Dutch Commissioner from among the delegates of the previous conferences. Forty-seven Dutch representatives were appointed by different Dutch-sponsored political organizations, such as the Indo-Eurasian Union, the Christian Civics Party, the Catholic Party of the Indies, and other groups. Republican authorities pointed out that there was no representative from the Progressive Party, a federation of progressive parties in Indonesia. The Netherlands government argued that since this conference was a comparatively small group, it did not warrant representation of the federation.

Fifteen Dutch-controlled West Java Regencies and three Indonesian-controlled Regencies were also represented among the fifty-three Indonesian delegates. The Committee informed the Council that in the opinion of the Republican government the three conferences had been a contemptible Dutch strategy to ruin and forestall the settlement of the Indonesian dispute and that there had been no active or expressed public demand for the calling of the conferences. The Committee added:

\[\text{As evidence of this opposition, a manifesto denouncing the decisions of the Second West Java Conference was presented to the representatives of the Committee of Good Offices. The}\]
manifesto was issued by a Committee of 20 influential Indonesians, Sundanese-born citizens of the Netherlands-controlled areas of West Java, population approximately 10,000,000 and was supported by approximately 250,000 signatories living in the area. 4

A provisional agenda for the Third West Java Conference was drawn by R. Djajadiningrat, Recomba of West Java, and by a preparatory committee. The agenda proposed the following resolutions:

(1) To instruct the preparatory committee to petition the Netherlands Indies government to recognize the Third West Java Conference as a provisional parliament for West Java; (2) The preparation of the provisional constitution; (3) The election of a Walli Negara (Head of State). 5

A debate followed in the conference whether the status of West Java should be that of a state. The debate was led by twenty-seven members of the Republican faction. In an informal meeting, the preparatory committee of the conference and leaders of the Republican sympathizers agreed to adopt the following resolution:

In connexion with the resolution as adopted by the West Java Conference II and conveyed to the Netherlands East Indies government through the Recomba, and whereas this resolution has delegated the Committee for the preparation to institute in the West Java Conference III a provisional government for West Java. . . . respectfully request the Netherlands government to promote the conference to a provisional body. . . . with the character of a

5 Ibid., Supplement for June, 1948, p. 21.
Negara and that the status of West Java is to be determined by a plebiscite as referred to in the Renville Agreement. 6

In reply to the preparatory committee's petition to recognize the Third Conference as a provisional parliament, the Dutch governor-general told the committee that before any action could be taken, the petition must first be approved by the conference.

In a subsequent meeting the Conference passed the following resolution by sixty-two votes for and thirty-five against:

It is the desire of the conference that the delegates at the conference forthwith, as a provisional representative assembly of West Java, draw up the provisional constitution of this state and in accordance with this constitution establish a provisional government for West Java [and] to instruct the preparatory committee to communicate the conference's desire... through the intermediary of the Recomba of West Java and to request them therefore to recognize the delegates at the conference as the provisional assembly of West Java, whose task it is to draw up the constitution of this State on the basis of this constitution and to establish a provisional government of West Java. 7

On February 26, 1948, The Netherlands government issued a decree regarding the resolution as "approved and understood."

On March 14, 1948, the provisional parliament of

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6 Ibid., Supplement for June, 1948, p. 21.
7 Ibid., Supplement for June, 1948, p. 21.
West Java passed a resolution establishing the procedures for the election of a candidate to the office of head of state. The resolution provided that the election of a candidate must have two-thirds of the total number of votes or by a simple majority of all the delegates present. The candidates were R. Wiranatokoesoema, chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council of the Republic of Indonesia and former Regent of Bandoeng, and R. Djadiningrat, Dutch Recomba. Wiranatokoesoema was elected by fifty-four votes against his opponent's forty-six. He accepted his new post and declared:

... all affairs pertaining to West Java should be dealt with in the sphere of the Republic of Indonesia, and that at his request, the President of the Republic of Indonesia should relieve him of his office as chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council of the Republic of Indonesia.

By unanimous acclamation of the conference members, West Java was named the Sundanese State. The conference further resolved to recognize the Renville Agreement.

II

T. K. Critchley, Australian representative in the

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8 Ibid., Supplement for June, 1945, p. 22.
9 The creation of the Sundanese State violated the obligation of both parties in the Renville Truce Agreement. One of the Renville provisions was: both parties agreed to delineate the States of Java, Madura, and Sumatra only through democratic plebiscite or other method in order to ascertain the will of the people; such plebiscite should be held under the guidance of an agency of the United Nations.
Committee, informed the Security Council that on January 23, 1943, a plebiscite had been held in Madura and that most important factor in the plebiscite had been the manner in which it was conducted.

In September, 1947, while the island of Madura was partly under the Republican and Dutch control, a meeting had been held between A. Tjakraningrat (Republican Resident official in Madura), Dutch authorities, and the Dutch military commander in the Indies. From the Dutch delegation's translation of the minutes of the meeting, the conferees had agreed upon the following:

1. Acting in concert they will strive with all energy to put into practice the principles of the Linggadjati Agreement;
2. The Resident of Madura, who has resumed his task in full extent, will, as soon as possible, choose Pamekasan and Sampang as seat of his administration, in consultation with the military administrator, who will do everything possible to provide the necessary office and suitable living quarters. He sees to it that all indispensable functions, specially all service posts, will be filled.

The Conferees furthered agreed that all necessary steps to secure peace and order in Madura, as well as the effective development of a de facto government, would be under the Regency. The Regency was given the task of coordinating the work of the Republican police and the

11 Ibid., p. 28.
Dutch contingents stationed in the area. However, the Indonesian police force was to be under the supervision of Dutch military authorities.

The Committee of Good Offices informed the Council that there were conflicting opinions between the Dutch and Indonesian governments whether Tjakraaningrat, who had come from the Republican-controlled area of Bangkalan for the purpose of the meeting, had any authority to act for the Maduran Republican government. The Indonesians informed the Committee that Tjakraaningrat was not delegated by the Republican government. The Dutch maintained that he had convened political meetings composed of Republican officials shortly after the Dutch forces occupied parts of Madura. The Dutch further added that Tjakraaningrat acted in accordance with the principles of the Linggadjati Agreement.

The Republican government retaliated that the population of Madura had never made any kind of popular demand for a plebiscite. It also argued that it would be impossible to have consulted the political parties in Madura since they have been rendered inactive by the Dutch occupation police.

However, the Committee informed the Council that on January 14, 1948, Tjakraaningrat summoned a meeting at Bangkalan which was to be attended by fifty prominent individuals of Madura. At this meeting, the delegates designated
eleven persons from their delegation to constitute a "Provisional Committee for the Determination of the Status of Madura." The chairman of the Committee had been head of the Cultural section of the Republican Department of Education in Madura and the leader of the local Republican National Party. The provisional committee met again in Pamekasan, on January 16 and adopted the following resolution:

Heard: the discussions in the meeting of 16 January 1948 are of the opinion:
(a) That as from 11 November 1947 the relations between Madura and the Central Government of the Republic of Indonesia have been severed;
(b) That in this connexion [sic], in the interest of the people and the country, the government has been in the hands of R. Tjakraningrat as from 21 November 1947;
(c) That this government was only of a provisional character, until its position would be definitely established;
(d) That his government was autonomous, cooperating with the central government:

Whereas:
(a) The people of Madura are entitled to independence and self-determination, in accordance with the general principles as laid down in the Linggadjati Agreement;
(b) In connexion [sic] with the present condition of Indonesia the time has now come to determine the status of Madura. 12

The Committee of Good Offices informed the Council that the plebiscite had been held on January 23, 1948 in all areas of Madura despite the overwhelming protest of the Indonesian central government (Republic). The Indonesians charged that the population of Madura was not given

12 Ibid., p. 33.
enough time to discuss the Provisional Committee's resolution. The voters were taken into three places where they voted for, against, or abstained. The result was 199,500 votes in favor of the resolution, 9,993 against, and 10,230 abstentions.

The Committee further notified the Council that:

On the question as to whether any opposition to the plebiscite was expressed, there was some difference of opinion. The Republic of Indonesia claimed that potential opponents were not given opportunity to express their views. The Republic of Indonesian claimed that some of these individuals were subsequently questioned by the military police.

On February 20, 1948, the Dutch government recognized the free state of Madura. It was to be made an autonomous state within the USI with its own contiguous area and constitution on a legal transfer of power from the Dutch government. Pending the organization of the new state of Madura, the administration of the island remained, as it had been before the plebiscite, under the sovereignty of the Netherlands. Tjakraningrat continued to act in his capacity as Resident of Madura rather than as head of the

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13 Madura island has an approximate population of 2,075,000.
15 This is questionable because the Netherlands forces occupied only strategic areas of Madura after the police action, while the rest of the areas are under the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia.
state and in that capacity he was responsible to the Dutch
government through the Dutch Recombe.

III

The political developments in Java and Madura arose
solely, alleged the Republic of Indonesia, out of an
attempt by the Dutch to create states subordinate to the
government of The Netherlands as members of the proposed
United States of Indonesia. These developments, otherwise
called the Bandoeng Conferences, were, according to the
Republic, Netherlands endeavors to establish puppet states
in seized Republican territories contrary to the Renville
and Linggadjati Agreements. The Republic further maintained
that the people did not wish to have such conferences or
to have the plebiscite determine their political relation-
ship with the USI. The conferences were not representative
of the people because only a segment of the entire
populations of Java and Madura was given time to go to the
polls. The Indonesians further claimed that the conferences
and the Kaduran plebiscite were Dutch strategy to "ruin
and forestall the negotiation of the Indonesian dispute."

During all these political developments in Indonesia,
the Committee of Good Offices never definitely informed
the Security Council whether or not the Dutch were fully
justified in calling for the Bandoeng Conferences and the
Maduran plebiscite. The Committee failed to implement the provisions of the November 1, 1947 resolution which commanded the Committee of Good Offices to assist the parties and to supervise them in reaching settlement of the disturbing dispute. In the Renville Agreement, it was provided that plebiscites were to be held under the supervision of the Committee or another agency of the United Nations. Such plebiscites must be representative and democratic.

It was a common belief of all observers in the Indonesian dispute, and eventually of the members of the Security Council, that The Netherlands government was going to establish the United States of Indonesia without the proper participation of the Republican territories of Java, Madura, and Sumatra. If these were true, the Renville and other agreements were not apt to be long-lived. And the Security Council would once again be faced with renewed hostilities in the Dutch East Indies.
CHAPTER X

THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATES ON THE

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS REPORT

The Security Council resumed its discussion of the Indonesian dispute at its 316th, 322nd and 323rd meetings, on June 10 and 17, 1948, at Lake Success, New York. F. El-Khoury (Syria) was Council President. Representatives of Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, France, Syria, Ukrainian SSR, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States were present. J. Hood (Australia), Pillai (India), Eelco van Kleffens (The Netherlands), Salvador P. Lopez (Philippines), and Falar (Republic of Indonesia) also were present.

The Council discussion centered particularly on the interim report of the Committee of Good Offices on political developments in Indonesia. The Council deliberated on this report exclusively.

1 Hood, J. D. Born in Adelaide, 1904; Educated at Oxford University; and Minister-in-Charge of Australian Mission to the United Nations, 1947-.
2 See Chapter IX.
Falak accused The Netherlands of trying to eliminate the Republic of Indonesia by circumventing the necessity of actual negotiation and settlement of the dispute. He declared that the report on the political developments in West Java and Madura had confirmed his government's beliefs that the "so-called plebiscite following the illegal and military occupation (by the Dutch) was a parody of democracy." He added:

The First West Java Conference, which it will be recalled, was convened by the Netherlands authorities, attended by delegates, all of whom were appointed, by the Netherlands. 3

Van Kleffens answered the allegations of the Republican delegate. He said that the real obstacle to a full agreement and settlement of the dispute was the negative attitude of the Republican government. He charged the Republic had denounced its previous agreement with The Netherlands for the formation of a federal Indonesian state and, eventually, the union of The Netherlands and the USI. He informed the Council that the procedures and methods of the three West Java Conferences were democratic and representative.

At the 322nd meeting, on June 17, Tsiang held that the Committee of Good Offices' interim report had not substantiated the Dutch representative's allegations that the main

3 Security Council Official Records, Third Year, No. 82, p. 11.
difficulty of a settlement of the dispute was due to negative attitude of the Republic. He said that the West Java Conferences were undemocratic and unrepresentative of the Indonesian people in those areas. He suggested that the Security Council should instruct the Committee to promote a fair and impartial plebiscite in Western Java and Madura.

Yakov Malik (the Soviet Union) informed the Council that the Committee reports had displayed a strange peculiarity. He added that all questions which the Committee dealt with in the political developments in Java and Madura had revealed a detailed and slavish exposition of The Netherlands side in the Indonesian dispute. "As regards the views and wishes of the Republicans," Malik continued, "the reports only touched them lightly, without giving either the views or conclusions of the Committee on the substance of the Indonesian Republic's appeals and legitimate claims." He further declared that the procedure of the plebiscite was undemocratic and carried "through intimidation, use of repressive measures, and other similar illegal unjustifiable practices."

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4 Malik, Yakov. Educated at Moscow Statistical Institute; Senior Scientist of Institute of Economic Research; and Representative to the United Nations Statistical Commission, 1947-.


Hood expressed his government's belief that the work of the Committee of Good Offices was indeed very slow. However, he told the Council that the Committee's "misgivings" should not be attributed to anybody in particular. He added that, as member of the Committee, Australia had a deep regard for a due and legal settlement of the dispute of her neighbor (the Republic of Indonesia).

At the 323rd meeting on June 17, van Langenhove of Belgium informed the Council that the membership of the Committee of Good Offices was made up of reliable and impartial people. He defended wholeheartedly the mission of the Committee in the dispute. Philip C. Jessup (United States) also believed in the reliability of the Committee members, and said further that the negotiations between the parties had not yet failed, since both parties were still willing to negotiate for a political settlement. The representative of the Ukrainian SSR, Vasili A. Tarasenko, charged that the Committee was afraid to give a true and objective verdict on new developments in the Indonesian dispute, as it would then have had to reveal to the whole

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7 Jessup, Philip C. Born in New York, 1897; Ph.D. (Columbia University); Yale Law School and Hamilton College; and Alternate Representative to the Security Council, 1948.

8 Tarasenko, Vasili A. Born in Chernigov, 1907; Educated at Universities of Dniepropetrovsk and Kiev; and Alternate Representative to the Security Council, 1948.
the real intentions of The Netherlands government, as well as of the colonial powers of Europe and America who were trying, in their own interests, to stifle the Indonesian Republic and restore the old colonial regime in Indonesia.

In regard to the arguments of the Australian representative (Hood) which claimed that Australia's position in the Committee was "clean", Tarasenko declared:

It goes to affirm that the Australian representative wished to dis-associate himself from the general position taken by the Committee. 9

He therefore urged the Security Council to take every step possible in the way of helping the Indonesian Republic.

The Security Council discussed the Committee's report on the political developments in the Dutch East Indies with conflicting opinions. The representative of Indonesia claimed that the political developments in Java and the plebiscite in Madura were undemocratic, illegal, and a parody of democracy. The Netherlands delegate, on the other hand, criticized the Republican negative attitude for the difficulties in reaching political settlement. He defended the legality and democracy of the Bandoeng Conferences and the methods of the plebiscite.

The Soviet Union, with support of the Ukrainian SSR, supported the Republican claims that the political developments in the Indies were conducted despite the strong

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opposition of the Republic of Indonesia. It also charged the Committee with favoring the Dutch and paying little heed to the claims and appeals of the Republic.

Australia and France defended the high integrity of members of the Committee. Australia admitted that there were misgivings over the Committee's passivity in the recent Bandung Conferences, but such apprehensions should not be attributed to any one member of the Committee. France upheld the reliability and integrity of the members of the Committee. However, both states failed to tell the Council whether the recent developments in Indonesia were necessary and justifiable.

The United States also upheld neither the impartiality of the Committee nor the fairness of political developments. It merely advised the Security Council that it could rely on the Committee in the settlement of the dispute, since both parties were willing to negotiate.

In conclusion, the political developments in Indonesia, according to the Security Council discussion, were neither just nor proper. The Council failed to warn the Committee members to maintain strict impartiality towards both parties in the political negotiations of the dispute, and failed to inquire officially into Dutch motives in providing for the Bandung Conferences. It did, in effect, nothing.
CHAPTER XI

THE DETERIORATION OF PEACE

I

Following the signing of the Renville Agreement, normal conditions in Indonesia were not restored, and there were persistent evidences of violations of the truce principles. The situation was also complicated by the rigid controls imposed by both parties on the movements of persons across the status quo line. Even so, the agreement was not completely disregarded. Approximately 35,000 regular Republican combatants were evacuated from behind Dutch forward military positions.

Although the agreement provided for the resumption of normal trade between the territories of both The Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, actually there was no significant increase in the volume of trade flowing into and out of Republican-controlled territories. The Committee of Good Offices informed the Council that it was not likely that the economic problems could be solved until a political settlement had been reached. The Committee concluded that "all in all, reviewing the present situat-
tion, the Committee has the impression that the two
governments are eyeing each other across the status quo
line with reserve and suspicion."

The Committee of Good Offices further informed the
Council that both parties, at one time or another, had
indicated that they considered the Renville Principles not
as an agreement in the strict sense but as principles
forming an agreed basis for discussion toward a political
settlement. The Dutch delegation to the peace-parley
under the auspices of the Committee contended that the
Indonesian Republic's foreign relations were conducted in
violation of the Renville Political Principles, and stated
that sovereignty remained with the Kingdom of The Nether-
lands until it was formally transferred to the projected
USI. The Netherlands government alleged that the Republic
had reached an agreement with the Soviet Union on matters
pertaining to foreign commitments, although the Committee
did not verify the truth to this.

On the other hand, the Republican delegation informed
the Committee that The Netherlands had violated one of the
Renville Principles by failing to guarantee the freedom
of the press, assembly, and publication. The Committee,

2 Ibid., p. 126.

3 Truce Agreement, paragraph 7: sub-paragraphs (b),
(c), and (e): and Twelve Political Principles, paragraph
(6).
therefore, informed the Security Council that the implementation of the Renville had not yet been definitely settled and that the question of implementation would continue "as a fertile source of misunderstandings and dispute."

The Committee declared that it would be likely that, sometime between the signing of the political agreement and the transfer of sovereignty, a provisional federal government would be instituted, in which the Republic of Indonesia would be fairly represented. Questions would arise as to how many states there would be in Java, Madura, and Sumatra (the de facto territory of the Republic). This and like problems could not be determined until the population of the areas had the opportunity to express their will through a plebiscite or some other democratic means in accordance with the provisions of the Renville Agreement.

The chief disagreements between the parties during the interim period related to the following: (1) means whereby the populations of Java, Madura, and Sumatra could be consulted for the creation of the new states; (2) the powers, great or small, which might be conferred by The Netherlands upon the provisional interim government; when and to what kind of a provisional federal government the

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4 In the sense that this would be a representative government and fore-runner of the projected United States of Indonesia.
Republic of Indonesia would be expected to transfer its governmental functions such as control over its armed forces, foreign relations, foreign exchange, and currency; and (4) the strength of the representation to be accorded to the Republic of Indonesia, as compared with that of other areas, in the provisional federal government (interim federal government created before the USI).

The Republic was very desirous of retaining what it considered its de facto sovereignty over Madura, Java, and Sumatra until the Dutch government transferred its sovereignty to the USI. It further argued that meanwhile its foreign relations should remain intact and its armed forces should be preserved.

On the other hand, The Netherlands maintained that the Republic had not achieved any degree of sovereignty, as the Republican government alleged, under the Linggadjati Agreement. It further added that The Netherlands "cannot transfer sovereignty except to a government which has been organized, functioning over all territories ultimately to be under its authority." In the opinion of the Dutch delegation to the peace-parley, the transfer of authority

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5 The opinions of members of the Security Council members and the Committee of Good Offices were on the contrary.

by The Netherlands to the USI should be gradual, and that the Dutch government in the Indies should be the supreme authority from which the provisional federal government (interim period) received its powers.

The chief problem, in the peace-parley, concerning the proposed period following the creation of the USI and the transfer of sovereignty by The Netherlands related to the division of powers between the proposed Netherlands-Indonesian Union and the USI as a member of the Union. The Committee of Good Offices reported to the Council that major issues which would divide the parties in the union were the very issues which had always divided them and which the Linggadjati Agreement had failed to resolve. However, it hoped that the parties would be able to re-examine their positions and find a formula to harmonize their differences.

II

At its 326th meeting on June 23, 1948, the Security Council debated the Committee's official reports. Palao informed the Council that the federal conferences at Bandoeng was an attempt by The Netherlands to establish puppet states to be used against the Republic before

The Committee failed to inform the Security Council what these issues were. The Committee had always maintained the secrecy of the peace-parley in order to prevent premature conclusions by the press and also by both parties.
normal elections could be brought about under the surveillance of the Committee of Good Offices. Palar urged the Council to inquire into the nature of the Bandung Conference, because it had made decisions on matters which were actually to be negotiated between The Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. He also charged that the conference was initiated by The Netherlands government in order to circumvent the immediate establishment of an Indonesian federal government.

Van Kleffens assured Palar that the conferences were neither a threat to international peace nor the impediment to the solution of the dispute. He informed the Council that the Republic had neither a monopoly nor priority in the discussion of the problems of the formation of an Indonesian federal government, since this issue was outside the political controversy between the parties. Van Kleffens added:

If the principle of sovereignty, to which Mr. Palar tries to give such a curious twist. . . . has anything at all, it is that for the present and until such time as the Netherlands government relinquishes the sovereignty of the Netherlands, that sovereignty of the Netherlands continues to rest with [Such government]. 9

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8 See Chapter IX.
Romulo advised the Security Council that the crux of the settlement of the dispute was two-fold. First, there had been progress in the negotiations then being conduct under the auspices of the Committee, but there had arisen a bitter controversy over matters with which only the Council should deal. And second, the Renville principles were being violated through the direct and indirect encouragement given by Dutch officials to separatist movements in disputed areas, especially in West Java, East Sumatra, and Madura. He accused the Dutch government of imposing a unilateral Indonesian federation without the free consent of the Indonesians. He added that the conferences in Indonesia was a hasty consolidation of all areas gained by Dutch force into political union under Dutch sponsorship.

Guy de la Tournelle of France, however, was aware of the general success of the truce, and he stressed the necessity of consolidating its foundations. He informed the Council that it should feel confident of the fair compliance of the parties with the Council's earlier resolutions. Malik informed the Council that The Netherlands and their own puppet states were discussing important political questions at Bandung which were under current negotiations between the two parties. He ably warned the Council members not to be too tolerant and to take note of this serious threat to the settlement of the dispute.
Tsiang insisted that the Netherlands government should adhere to peaceful methods of settlement; that normal economic relations between the parties in controlled territories should be resumed immediately; that the Dutch authorities, when sponsoring movements of Indonesian federation, should be bound by the customary rules of international law; and that the implementation of the political principles of the Renville Agreement towards a Netherlands-Indonesian Union should be under strict observance of the parties.

At the 328th meeting, on July 1, 1948, Palar told the Council that it should inform the Committee of Good Offices that it should be free to pursue any course of action likely to bring about a settlement of the dispute. He further declared that the working-paper proposed by the Australian

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10 The truce is currently deteriorating along the status quo line in Java, Madura, and Sumatra. Intermittent shooting of armed forces of both parties is being carried, although not in the form of military advances.

11 The Du Bois-Critchley Plan: It provided for a wide solution of the vexing problem of the delineation of state boundaries prior to plebiscites or elections. One or more electors in proportion to the population were to be elected. These electors would then get together on the next highest administrative level and elect delegates to the Constituent Assembly which would be both the provisional legislative assembly and the constitutional convention. This provisional parliament (1) would, on the basis of geography, ethnography, history, tradition, and sentiment of peoples, delineate the states of the new UI; (2) would elect the President who would appoint the Prime Minister who would, in turn, form a Cabinet responsible to the provisional parliament; (3) and would have full powers
and American members of the Committee was the only possible basis for further negotiation in the dispute. He also reminded the Council that there was a wide gap between the Dutch and Indonesian interpretation of the Renville Political Principles. Sen of India suggested to the Council that it should request full information concerning the working-paper of the Committee of Good Offices. He suggested to the Council that in making a general recommendation to the parties of the Indonesian dispute, no just and reasonable basis for the resumption of discussion should be ruled out, regardless of its source.

Van Kleffens told the Council that his government could not consider the Australian-American plan. He also warned the Security Council that the Dutch government would never agree to recognize any modification of the nature of self-government including the command of all Indonesian armed forces. The Netherlands High Commissioner would retain certain veto rights and have power to declare an emergency in a situation beyond the control of the provisional government in which case he would have the power to command the armed forces.

The Constituent Assembly, as the provisional parliament, would, with the Netherlands, frame a statute of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union which would safeguard legitimate economic, cultural, and military interests of each country in the other in all field of common interests. As the constitutional convention, the Constituent Assembly would write the Constitution of the United States of Indonesia.

The Republic of Indonesia accepted wholeheartedly the principles and substance of this plan.
and competence of the Committee, nor to any changes of procedure outside the agreed Renville Principles.

Manuilsky of the Ukrainian SSR (the month's security Council president) spoke as an individual representative of his government. He drew the attention of the Council to the ineffectiveness of the Committee of Good Offices. He argued that the Committee's task or lack of power was only a diplomatic cloak concealing a definite political plan by The Netherlands and other anti-Republican Security Council members to undermine the Indonesian Republic in the peace-parley. He warned the Council that his government would support the Republic of Indonesia to the end until the true independence of the Indonesians, the integrity of their territories, and the creation of a democratic state were achieved.

Hood suggested that the Australian-American plan should be examined by the Council. Tsiang supported Hood's suggestion and proposed it as a formal resolution. A. G. McNaughton of Canada declared that Tsiang's resolution would be a wise move. El-Khoury also placed his support.

Van Langenhove of Belgium told the Council members that his delegation would vote against the Chinese resolution if the Council considered it for adoption. Jessup supported the Belgian representative's position and told the Council members that the Committee was the best judge of whether negotiations would be assisted by the Council
and whether the working-paper should be transmitted to the Security Council. Gromyko warned those who opposed the Chinese resolution that the Council was fully entitled to demand a copy of the working-paper since it concerned a dispute being considered by the Council.

The Chinese resolution was rejected. Votes for: Canada, China, Colombia, Syria, Ukrainian SSR, the Soviet Union. Abstentions: Argentina, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The Security Council resumed its discussion at its 329th meeting on July 6, 1948. Palar declared that the Dutch government had continued in every possible way to disrupt the peace-parley under the guidance of the Committee. He also urged the Council to inquire into the economic blockade by the Dutch government against the Indonesian Republic.

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Snouck Hurgronje (The Netherlands) informed the Council that in the past both parties had negotiated some economic and financial agreements, especially regulations of maritime goods traffic but that the Republic had later rejected them. Tsang proposed an informal resolution to inquire into the alleged economic blockade by the Dutch. The text of the resolution was as follows:

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I move that the President of the Council cable to the Committee of Good Offices for an early report on the existing restrictions on the domestic and international trade of Indonesia, and the reasons for the delay in the implementation of article 6 of the truce agreement. 13

By show of hands, the Chinese resolution was adopted nine votes for (Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Syria, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and two abstentions (Ukrainian SSR and the Soviet Union).

On July 23, 1948, the Committee answered the Council resolution:

"The regulations and restrictions on the flow of commerce were intended to control movement of military supplies and to protect Indonesian producers to conserve foreign exchange resources of The Netherlands Indies. . . . 14"

At its 340th and 341st meetings on July 29, 1948, the Council continued its deliberation. Palar accused The Netherlands of having deliberately brought the political negotiations to a standstill. He further asked the Council's assistance to determine the effect of the economic blockade. Romulo asked The Netherlands' delegate van Kleffens why he had not made any attempt to refute or to deny the economic strangulation of the Indonesian Republic by the Dutch government. He warned the Council that the

Dutch objective of forcing the peace-talks to a standstill was to subject the Republic of Indonesia to a deliberate process of political attrition and economic strangulation.

Tsiang proposed a draft resolution which tried to find a "common denominator" for the re-opening of the peace-parley deadlock. The resolution stated:

The Security Council,

Having considered the Committee of Good Offices' report on the Federal Conference opened in Bandung on 27 May 1948 (S/842), Third Interim Report (S/848 and S/848/Add.1), Report on standstill in political negotiations (918) and Report on restrictions on Trade in Indonesia (919);

Calls upon the governments of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia with the assistance of the Council's Committee of Good Offices, to maintain strict observance of both the military and economic articles of the Renville Agreement, and to implement early and fully the twelve Renville Truce agreement, and to implement early and fully the twelve Renville political principles and the six additional principles. 15

The resolution was supported by Jessup, McNaughton, and Munoz. The representatives of Ukrainian SSR and the Soviet Union opposed the resolution on the ground that it evaded the real issue by equating the positions of The Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, and actually, that the resolution favored the Dutch against the Republic.

The Security Council adopted the Chinese resolution at its 342nd meeting on July 29 by a vote of nine (Ar-

The political negotiations of the Indonesian dispute were at a standstill despite some success in the exchange of prisoners under the provisions of the Renville Agreement. Approximately 35,000 Republican troops were evacuated from Dutch territories. However, the difficulty of reaching a further settlement of the dispute was made acute due by the economic restrictions of both parties.

The Security Council resumed its debate on the subject of the Bandoeng Conferences and the plebiscite in Madura. It was the opinion of some Council members that the conferences were illegal and an obstacle to a solution of the dispute. The reliability of the Committee of Good Offices as an international mediation board was also challenged by the Ukrainian SSR. It charged that the Committee's aloofness and weakness had been or cause the negotiations to a standstill and that it was (the Committee) a diplomatic cloak to undermine the position of the Republic.

In the later period of the Council discussion, China proposed that the American-Australian plan should be examined so that the Security Council could recommend measures to alleviate the points of difference.
Although the Chinese proposal was logical and necessary, it failed because of the strong opposition of Argentina, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

China persisted and proposed that the alleged economic restrictions and the standstill in political negotiations should not be overlooked by the Security Council. The adopted proposal also called upon both parties, with the assistance of the Committee, to maintain a strict observance of both economic and military provisions of the Renville Truce Agreement. It also called the parties to implement fully the twelve (Dutch) political principles and the additional six political principles. Up to this period of the Security Council consideration of the Indonesian dispute, the Council apparently believed that both parties would adhere to their obligations as contained in the Renville Truce and Political Agreements.
CHAPTER XII

THE NETHERLANDS STIRS THE UNITED NATIONS

I

The outbreak of hostilities in Indonesia for the second time followed more than a year's work of the United Nations Good Offices Committee in Indonesia. As soon as the Committee had been established by the Security Council's resolution of August 25, 1947, it had called upon both parties to settle their dispute by peaceful means. In October, 1948, the governments of The Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia had signed the Renville Truce Agreement which established a formal truce and which laid down eighteen principles as a basis for the negotiation of a final settlement of their political disagreements. Upon the signing of the Agreement circumstances generally were propitious for peace. Both the Dutch and Indonesian armies stood peacefully on the status quo line as accepted by the Republic of Indonesia. The Republican government accepted the federal principle for the formation of the United States of Indonesia.

1 The first break-down of negotiations of the dispute occurred on July 21, 1947, when the Dutch government launched its so-called police-action against the Indonesians. Such action was contrary to the Linggadjati (Cheribon) Agreement.
Queen Juliana of The Netherlands was even enthusiastic over the new development in the dispute and said that "Colonialism is dead." However, neither party was serious in accelerating the re-opening of communications, trade, and transportation for the people behind the lines. The three controversial issues involved sovereignty, separate organization of states, and the provisional government.

The Netherlands, through its centuries of rule in the Indies, maintained that sovereignty over the islands should rest with no other state but The Netherlands itself. However, under the Linggadjati Agreement, The Netherlands had acknowledged the de facto sovereignty of the Republic over the three most important islands—Java, Madura, and Sumatra. This sovereignty of the Republic was legally strengthened when British and Dutch forces chose to deal with the Republic of Indonesia in 1945, at a time when the Japanese troops in the Indies surrendered to the combined forces of the United Kingdom and The Netherlands. Both parties also disagreed concerning the status of non-Republican areas. The Republic wanted all Indonesian states to be one consolidated under a centralized government of the Republic of Indonesia, whereas the Dutch sponsored separate Indonesian state.

While the Republican forces were evacuating the territories of The Netherlands under the Renville Agreement, the Dutch presented no plan for political discussions
until the middle of March, 1943. Du Bois and Critchley, the American and Australian representatives on the Committee, opened the political negotiations by offering the parties the following: electors should be appointed whose responsibility would be to elect delegates to the Constituent Assembly, which assembly would constitute both the provisional legislative body and the constitutional convention. The provisional body or parliament would delineate the states of the new United States of Indonesia, elect the president who would appoint a prime minister who would, in turn, form a cabinet responsible to the parliament, and would have full powers of self-government.

The Republic of Indonesia accepted this plan, but The Netherlands refused to discuss it, alleging that the Good Offices Committee had violated its own rules and integrity even in submitting the plan. Then, on June 16, 1943, The Netherlands accused the Committee of leaking the plan to the press. Immediately the Dutch brooded and broke off negotiations.

Merle Cochran, the new United States representative on the Committee, tried to end the political deadlock with a plan similar to the earlier Australian-American plan

\[\text{See Chapter XI, footnote 11.}\]
except that the Dutch High Commissioner for the Indies could not declare an emergency in the interim period except with the consent of the Indonesian president or prime minister. The Indonesian government accepted this plan as basis for negotiations. The Dutch accepted it "with such drastic amendments as to change the whole nature of the plan, with another dead-end in the negotiations." A solution of the Indonesian dispute was again delayed, and unrest among the people was getting stronger each day.

On December 12, 1948, the Committee declared that the Republican government had shown its good will and gone to the limit in offering concessions towards the viewpoints of the Dutch. The Committee added:

There is strong evidence that The Netherlands government intends to form an interim federal government without the Republic before the end of the year and without further formal negotiations with the Republic under the auspices of the Committee of Good Offices. 4

With this grave situation prevailing in the dispute, 5 the Republic asked the Committee to take whatever measures it deemed necessary to prevail upon the Dutch government to

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3 Congressional Record-Senate, 81st Congress, 1st Sess., 95, Part 3 (April 5, 1949), p. 3846.
adhere to a peaceful solution of the dispute. A few days later, the Committee informed the Council that there was no possibility of bringing the two parties to a peace-parley under the auspices of the Committee. The Committee concluded:

The Committee has no confidence that even the presently unsatisfactory level of truce enforcement can be maintained as the possibility of political agreement becomes more remote. The Committee can see in the present situation only intensification of the factors already making for further economic deterioration, general unrest and social upheaval. Widespread hostilities involving the conflict of organized armed forces on large scales might be the outcome. 6

On the evening of December 18, 1948, The Netherlands government in Batavia issued an ultimatum to the Republic of Indonesia in Jogjakarta and the Committee of Good Offices that the truce agreement would be terminated in an hour's time. With such drastic action, the Committee concluded that The Netherlands had violated its obligations under the Renville Agreement, even though the Dutch government was fully cognizant of the possibility of a further negotiation of the dispute under the Committee's assistance. 7 An hour later, Dutch troops crossed the status quo line, and the fighting began again.

II

On December 19, 1948, Philip Jessup of the United

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States requested an emergency meeting of the Security Council, although at the request of the Soviet Union, the meeting was postponed for three days. In the meantime, the Council ordered the Committee to report every available information regarding Dutch military activities.

At the 388th meeting, on December 22, J. van Roijen of The Netherlands informed the Security Council that the Dutch policy in Indonesia had always been and still was the promotion of the freedom of Indonesia. This freedom could best be realized by the voluntary and equal partnership of Indonesia in the Netherlands-Indonesian Union. He added that the purpose of the present Dutch aggression against the Indonesians was to purge certain areas in central Java and Sumatra from irresponsible extreme nationalist elements and to prevent Republican infiltration into Dutch territories.

Palar of Indonesia challenged the statement of van Roijen by insisting that military action had been the intention of The Netherlands government from the very beginning of the Indonesian dispute. He denied the Dutch charge

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Van Roijen, J. H. Born 1905, Istanbul, Turkey; LL.D. (University of Utrecht); Minister without portfolio, 1945; Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1946; and Representative to the Security Council (Indonesian dispute), 1948.
that the Republican troops had been infiltrating Dutch positions.

Jessup stressed the world-wide effect of the unsolved Indonesian dispute. He declared that the Council should take note that the Indonesian dispute was not now a situation but a dispute between two armed states. He accused the Dutch of not allowing the Committee enough time to confer with the Republic and The Netherlands before they (the Dutch) commenced their military attacks.

At the 392nd meeting on December 24, 1948, Malik of the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution pertaining to the resumption of armed hostilities in Indonesia. The text of the resolution was as follows:

The Security Council,

Condemning the aggression of the Netherlands government which has again started military operations against the Indonesian Republic in violation of the well-known Renville Agreement of 17 January 1948,

1. Requires the immediate cessation of military operations;
2. Requires, as a first step towards the settlement of the conflict, the withdrawal of the Netherlands troops to the positions they occupied before the renewal of military operations;
3. Requires that the Netherlands government shall set free immediately the President of the Indonesian Republic and other Republican political leaders arrested by the Netherlands military authorities;

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4. Resolves to set up a commission of the Security Council composed of all the States members of the Security Council;

5. Instructs the commission to supervise the fulfillment of the resolution on the cessation of military operations and the withdrawal of troops, and to assist in settling the conflict as a whole between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic.

A second resolution was jointly introduced by Colombia, Syria, and the United States. The text of the resolution was as follows:

The Security Council,

Noting with concern the resumption of hostilities and

Considering such resumption of hostilities to be in conflict with the resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 171st meeting of 1 August 1947;

Calls upon the parties

(a) To cease hostilities forthwith; and

(b) Immediately to withdraw their armed forces to their respective sides of the demilitarized zones established under the Truce Agreement on 17 January 1948;

Instructs the Committee of Good Offices to report to the Security Council fully and urgently by telegraph on the events which have transpired in Indonesia since 12 December 1948, assessing the responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities. 11

Australia proposed an amendment to the three-power resolution by adding the following provision to paragraph (c):

Immediately to release the President and other political prisoners arrested since 13 December. 12

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Hodgson of Australia accused the Netherlands of a clear-cut and deliberate violation of Article 25 of the Charter. He said that the consequence, if the Council should inquire into the aggression, be the expulsion of the Netherlands from the United Nations. Parodi of France and Van Langenhove of Belgium reiterated their now familiar views that the Republic did not qualify as a state in the meaning of the Charter, and that on the basis of international law the Republic had no voice in the discussion of the Indonesian dispute. They again questioned the competence of the Security Council in dealing with the matter.

The three-power draft resolution was adopted. The number of votes for it were seven (Argentina, Canada, China, Colombia, Syria, the United Kingdom, and the United States) as against four negative votes (Belgium, France, Ukrainian SSR, and the Soviet Union). The Australian amendment to the three-power resolution was also adopted, seven votes for (Argentina, Canada, China, Colombia, Syria, the United Kingdom, and the United States) as against four abstentions: (Belgium, France, Ukrainian SSR, and the Soviet Union).

The Soviet resolution was defeated three votes for (Syria, Ukrainian SSR, and the Soviet Union) as against eight abstentions (Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
On December 27, 1948, at the Security Council's 393rd meeting, Tarasenko of the Ukrainian SSR urged the Council not to remain a disinterested spectator to the Indonesian conflict but "to take action against the Dutch aggressors who are shattering the freedom and independence of the people of Indonesia." He proposed the following resolution:

The Security Council,

Considering it necessary that the Netherlands troops should be withdrawn immediately to the positions which they occupied before the military operations against the Indonesian Republic were renewed. 13

Malik informed the Council that The Netherlands did not wish to cease hostilities against the Republic of Indonesia despite the Council resolution of December 24. He proposed that the Council put on record this "contemptible action" of the Dutch. He introduced another resolution:

The Security Council,

Noting that the Netherlands government has so far failed to put an end of the military operations against the Indonesian Republic,

Orders military operations to cease within twenty-four hours of the adoption of the present resolution. 14

Urdaneta of Colombia informed the Security Council that the only logical solution of the cessation of the

aggressive movements of The Netherlands was the adoption of the Ukrainian resolution. However, the Ukrainian resolution was rejected five votes for as against six abstentions. Likewise the Soviet resolution was not adopted.

At the 395th meeting on December 29, a Colombian resolution was introduced and discussed. The text of the resolution was as follows:

The Security Council,

Request the Consular representatives in Batavia, referred to in paragraph 5 of the resolution adopted at the 194th meeting of the Council (S/525 (1)), to send as soon as possible, for the information and guidance of the Security Council, a complete report on the situation in the Republic of Indonesia, covering in such report the observance of the cease-fire orders and the conditions prevailing in areas under military occupation or from which armed forces now in occupation may be withdrawn. 16

Malik declared that the Colombian resolution was unsatisfactory. However, the Colombian resolution was adopted nine votes in favor (Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Syria, the United Kingdom, and the United States) as against two abstentions (Ukrainian SSR and the Soviet Union).

Also at this meeting, the Council was confronted with the question of the release of politicians or political

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15 The Official Records of the Security Council contain no further information concerning the voting procedure and the names of the members voting on the resolution.

prisoners. Especially pertinent was the problem of releasing the president of the Republic who had been captured after the Dutch attacked the Indonesian government seat at Jogjakarta. C. L. Hsia of China therefore introduced the following resolution:

The Security Council,
Noting that the Netherlands government has not so far released the President of the Republic of Indonesia and other political prisoners, as required by the relative resolutions of the Council,
Calls upon the Netherlands government to set free these political prisoners forthwith and to report to the Security Council within twenty-four hours of the adoption of the present resolution. 17

The Chinese resolution was adopted eight votes for (Argentina, Canada, China, Colombia, Syria, Ukrainian SSR, the Soviet Union, and the United States) as against three abstentions (Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom).

On December 29, at the Council's 396th meeting, van Roijen informed the Council that his government had already released the following information: (1) hostilities in Java would cease on December 31; (2) restrictions on the movements of prominent Republican personalities would soon come to an end; (3) constructive cooperation for the rebuilding of Indonesia would begin soon; and (4) full communication facilities would be granted to the military assistants of the Committee of Good Offices.

Desai of India questioned the sincerity of van

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Rojen's statements that hostilities would come to an end soon and termed the information released by the Dutch government "just too short." El-Khourie also claimed that the statements of van Roijen were unsatisfactory and unintelligible. Malik said:

The statements just made by the representative of the Netherlands emanate from an aggressor who pays no heed to the Security Council's resolution, lay down a challenge to the United Nations and to world public opinion from an unbridled aggressor, whom nothing deters. 18

At the conclusion of the Security Council meetings in Paris, Malik sounded off with a tirade of accusations against the representatives of Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United States, including France. He accused them of having failed to support the Soviet Union delegation's attempt to brand The Netherlands as the aggressor and to pass an effective resolution demanding Dutch troop's withdrawal from conquered Republican territories. He also accused them of tolerating the Dutch to "visit the conquered Indonesian Republic...reminiscent-of Hitler, who also make a practice of visiting countries." 19

III

The Security Council resumed its discussion of the

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18 Ibid., No. 137, p. 47.
Indonesian dispute after its arrival in New York on January 7, 1948. The Security Council's deliberations in January dealt with on writing a working-paper to serve as the basis for negotiating a settlement of the Indonesian conflict. China, Cuba, Norway, and the United States submitted a four-power resolution (introduced by Alvarez of Cuba) at the Council's 402nd meeting on January 21, 1949. The text of the four-power draft resolution was as follows:

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions of 1 August 1947, 25 August 1947, and 1 November 1947, with respect to the Indonesian dispute;

Taking note with approval of the reports submitted to the Security Council by its Committee of Good Offices for Indonesia;

Considering that its resolutions of 24 December 1948 and 25 December 1948 have not been fully carried out;

Considering that continued occupation of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia by the armed forces of the Netherlands is incompatible with the restoration of good relations between the parties and with the final achievement of a just and lasting settlement of the Indonesian dispute;

Considering that the establishment and maintenance of law and order throughout Indonesia is a necessary condition to the achievement of the expressed objectives and desires of both parties;

Noting with satisfaction that the parties continue to adhere to the principles of the Renville Agreement and agree that free and democratic elections should be held throughout Indonesia for the purpose of establishing a constituent assembly at the earliest practicable date, and further agree that the Security Council should arrange for the observation of such elections by an appropriate agency of the United Nations; and that the representative of the Netherlands has expressed his government's desire to have such elections held not later than October 1 1949;
Noting also with satisfaction that the government of the Netherlands plans to transfer sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia by 1 January 1950, if possible, and, in any case, during the year 1950;

Conscious of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and in order that the rights, claims and position of the parties may not be prejudiced by the use of force;

1. Calls upon the government of the Netherlands to insure the immediate discontinuance of all military operations, calls upon the government of the Republic of Indonesia simultaneously to order its armed adherents to cease guerrilla warfare, and calls upon both parties to cooperate in the restoration of peace and the maintenance of law and order throughout the area affected.

2. Calls upon the government of the Netherlands to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners arrested by it since 17 December 1948 in the Republic of Indonesia; and to facilitate the immediate return of officials of the government of the Republic to Jogjakarta in order that they may discharge their responsibilities under paragraph 1 above and in order to exercise their appropriate functions in full freedom, including administration of Jogjakarta and its immediate environs. The Netherlands authorities shall afford to the government of the Republic of Indonesia such facilities as may reasonably be required by that government for its effective function in Jogjakarta area and for communication and consultation with all persons in Indonesia.

3. Recommends that, in the interest of carrying out the expressed objectives and desires of both parties to establish a federal, independent and sovereign United States of Indonesia at the earliest possible date, negotiations be undertaken as soon as possible by representatives of the government of the Netherlands and representatives of the Republic of Indonesia with the assistance of the Commission referred to in paragraph 4 below on the basis of the principles set forth in the Linggadjati Agreement and Renville Agreement, and taking advantage of the extent of agreement reached between the parties regarding the proposals submitted to them by the United States representative on the Committee of
Good Offices on September 1948; and in particular, on the basis that:

(a) The establishment of the interim federal government which is to be granted the powers of internal government in Indonesia during the interim period before the transfer of sovereignty shall be the result of the above negotiations and shall take place not later than 15 March 1949;

(b) The elections which are to be held for the purpose of choosing representatives to an Indonesian constituent assembly should be completed by 1 October 1949; and

(c) The transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia by the government of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia shall take place at the earliest possible date and in any case not later than 1 July 1950;

Provided that if no agreement is reached by one month prior to the respective dates referred to in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) above, the Commission referred to in paragraph 4(a) below or such other United Nations agency as may be established in accordance with paragraph 4(c) below, shall immediately report to the Council with its recommendations for a solution of the difficulties.

4. (a) The Committee of Good Offices shall henceforth be known as the United Nations Commission for Indonesia. The Commission shall act as the representative of the Security Council in Indonesia and shall have all of the functions assigned to the Committee of Good Offices by the Security Council on 18 December, and the functions conferred to it by the terms of this resolution. The Commission shall act by majority vote but its reports and recommendations to the Security Council shall present both majority and minority views if there is a difference of opinion among the members of the Commission.

(b) The Consular Commission is requested to facilitate the work of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia by providing military observers and other staff and facilities to enable the Commission to carry out its duties under the Council's resolutions of 24 and 23 December 1943 as well as under the present resolution, and shall temporarily suspend other activities.

(c) The Commission shall assist the parties in the implementation of this resolution, and shall assist the parties in the negotiations to be undertaken by and under paragraph 3 above and is authorized to make recommendations to them or to the Se-
Security Council on matters within its competence. Upon agreement being reached in such negotiations, the Commission shall make recommendations to the Security Council as to the nature, powers, and functions of the United Nations agency which should remain in Indonesia to assist in the implementation of the provisions of such agreement until sovereignty is transferred by the government of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia.

(d) The Commission shall have authority to consult with representatives of areas in Indonesia other than the Republic, and to invite representatives of such areas to participate in the negotiations referred to in paragraph 3 above.

(e) The Commission or such other United Nations agency as may be established in accordance with its recommendation under paragraph 4 (c) above is authorized to observe on behalf of the United Nations and the elections to be held throughout Indonesia and is further authorized, in respect of the territories of Java, Madura, and Sumatra, to make recommendations regarding the conditions necessary (a) to ensure that the elections are free and democratic, and (b) to guarantee freedom of assembly, speech and publication at all times, provided that such guarantee is not construed so as to include the advocacy of violence or reprisals.

(f) The Commission should assist in achieving the earliest possible restoration of the civil administration of the Republic. To this end it shall after consultation with the parties recommend the extent to which, consistent with reasonable requirements of public security and the protection of life and property, areas controlled by the Republic under the Renville Agreement (outside the Jogjakarta area) should be progressively returned to the administration of the government of the Republic of Indonesia, and shall supervise such transfers. The recommendations of the Commission may include provision for such economic measures as required for the proper functioning of the administration and for the economic well-being of the population of the areas involved in such transfers. The Commission shall after consultation with the parties, recommend which if neither Netherlands forces shall be retained temporarily in any area (outside Jogjakarta area) in order to assist in the maintenance of order. If either of the parties fails to accept the recommendations of the Commission mentioned in this paragraph, the Commission shall report immediately
to the Security Council with its further recommendation for a solution of the difficulties.

(g) The Commission shall render periodic reports to the Council, and special reports whenever the Commission deems necessary.

(h) The Commission shall employ such observers, officers and other persons as it deems necessary.

5. Requests the Secretary-General to make available to the Commission such staff, funds, and other facilities as are required by the Commission for the discharge of its functions.

6. Calls upon the government of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to cooperate fully in giving effect to the provisions of this resolution.

Malik declared that the above resolution would weaken the position of the Republic of Indonesia in the peace-parley by favoring The Netherlands. He explained that the four-power resolution made the Republic responsible to The Netherlands during the interim period, and that provision for the release of prisoners, especially leaders of the Republic, was formulated for the benefit of the Dutch. He further suggested to the Council that the name of the Good Offices should be changed into a United Nations Commission for Indonesia and should include all the members of the present Committee. He concluded that the above resolution was nebulous.

At the 403rd meeting, January 25, the Prime Minister of India Jawarhal Nehru, acting through the Indian representative of the United Nations, Benegal Rau,
introduced the recommendations of the New Delhi Conference. This conference had been convened in New Delhi to find a possible solution of the Indonesian dispute and, if possible, to pressure The Netherlands government into stopping its armed aggression in Indonesia. Nehru, who acted as chairman of the conference, informed the Council that the members of the conference had agreed to put teeth into any measure which the Council might take in order to bring about the settlement of the dispute. He further requested the Security Council to give due consideration to the following recommendations of the New Delhi Conference: (1) that all political prisoners in Indonesia be given their complete freedom; (2) that the residency of Jogjakarta be handed back to the Republic and allowed to function effectively; (3) that the areas of Java, Madura, and Madura be restored to the Republic by March 15, 1949; (4) that Dutch forces be withdrawn immediately from the Indonesian territories held by the Republic on December 18, and that such withdrawal be supervised by the United Nations by March 15; (5) that

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On January 20 to 23, 1949, representatives of Afghanistan, Australia, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen, including official observers from China, Nepal, New Zealand, and Thailand, met at New Delhi concerning the threatening war in Indonesia which emanated from the December 19, 1948 Dutch aggression.

Republican prisoners were imprisoned at the Dutch-controlled Bangka island.
all Dutch restrictions on the trade of Indonesia be immediately removed; (6) that the Republican government be immediately afforded all facilities of communications with the outside world; and (7) that the Council assist the parties in the formation of an Indonesian federal interim government by March 15, and that elections for a constituent assembly of Indonesia be completed by October 1. The recommendations of the Conference also warned the Dutch to transfer their sovereignty by January, 1950 at the latest.

At the 406th meeting, January 28, Palar said that the frame of the four-power resolution had forced the Republic to make compromises to The Netherlands. He also declared further that the resolution had not guaranteed the withdrawal of Dutch troops from Indonesia, and he concluded that the resolution would place the Republic at the mercy of The Netherlands. Palar endorsed the New Delhi recommendations because they were better in principle than the four-power resolution.

Van Roijen informed the Council that if the four-power resolution was to be adopted, The Netherlands would carry it out only to the extent to which the resolution was compatible with its responsibility for the maintenance of freedom and order in Indonesia.

The resolution was completely adopted after it was
adopted paragraph by paragraph. Of the twenty-five paragraphs, France rejected more than five; and France, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Soviet Union each registered more than ten abstentions.

IV

At the 416th meeting of the Security Council on March 10, 1949, the Council discussed the first report of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia. The report stated that the Dutch had not yet released Republican political prisoners and also had restrained the reestablishment of the Republican government at Jogjakarta. So far, the report declared, there had been no negotiations on the Indonesian dispute under the terms of the January 28th working-paper of the Council. However, the Commission had proposed to convene a round-table conference at The Hague by March 13, concerning the negotiation of the dispute. The Dutch also had invited the federalists and members of the Commission to attend the conference. The Commission felt that for the Dutch to hold a confer-

22 How the members of the Security Council voted on this January 28th resolution (working-paper) can be studied through the minutes of the 406th meeting of the Council, Security Council Official Records, Fourth Year, No. 9, pp. 20-25.

ence was to set up a counter proposal or substitute for the January 28th resolution. In conclusion the Commission report added that: (1) the parties had so far failed to agree on the formation of a federal interim government; (2) the Commission had not had the opportunity to function except by reporting on the subject; and (3) the Commission members had not the authority to accept or reject the Dutch invitation.

Van Roljen stressed his government's objection to the restoration of the Republican government at Jogjakarta on the ground that such a restoration would create the impression that the Republic of Indonesia had become the dominating power over the whole Indies. Further, van Roljen declared that the restoration would make the maintenance of law and order impossible for the Dutch. He verified the Commission's report concerning the proposed conference at the Hague for the purpose of drawing up necessary arrangements for the transfer of sovereignty, the establishment of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, the drafting of agreements pertaining to the union and transfer of sovereignty, and the formation of a representative federal government of Indonesia.

Paljar declared that the invitation to the Republic of Indonesia and the Commission to attend the conference obviously was not sincere because of the non-cooperative
attitude of the Dutch in past negotiations. Romulo also characterized the statements of the Dutch delegate as "just double talk or outright defiance" of the January working-paper. Benegal Rau of India and Hodgson of Australia sided with Romulo and Palar. Both warned that before accepting the invitation to attend the conference, the Council should first ask the Dutch government with sincerity its cooperation with the Council in taking action on the provisions of the January 28th working-paper.

McNaughton of Canada proposed a resolution on March 11, at the Council's 417th meeting. The text of the Canadian resolution was as follows:

It is the sense of the Security Council that the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, in accordance with the Council's resolution of 28 January 1949, and without prejudicing the rights, claims, and positions of the parties, should assist the parties in reaching agreement as to: (a) the implementation of the Council's resolution of 28 January, and in particular paragraphs (1) and (2) of the operative parts thereof, and (b) the time and conditions for holding the proposed conference at The Hague, to the end that the negotiations contemplated by the resolution of 28 January may be held as soon as possible.

It is further the sense of the Council that, if such an agreement is reached, the holding of such a conference and the participation by the United Nations Commission for Indonesia in accordance with its terms of reference, would be consistent with the purposes and objectives of the Council's resolution of 28 January 1949.

Malik of the Soviet Union opposed the Canadian

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resolution on the ground that it hampered the work of
the Security Council as the mediator of the dispute. He
declared that he would recommend a complete and uncondi-
tional release of political prisoners and their return to
Jogjakarta. The round-table conference, he claimed, was
a Dutch scheme to liquidate the Republic of Indonesia.

On March 23, at the 408th meeting of the Security
Council, the Canadian resolution was made into a directive
and was adopted. There were eight votes for (Argentina,
Cuba, Belgium, Norway, Syria, the United Kingdom, and the
United States) as against three abstentions (France,
Ukrainian SSR, and the Soviet Union).

V

At the request of Australia and India, the Indonesian
crifflict was brought to the attention of the General
Assembly at its plenary meetings on March 30 and 31, 1949.

At the 190th plenary meeting of the Assembly, the
Indonesian dispute was discussed. Hurgronje of The Ne-
thelands objected to the placing of the dispute before
the General Assembly because it would prejudice the powers
and objectives of the Security Council.

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For almost three years, The Netherlands repre-
sentatives to the United Nations had always denied the
competence and jurisdiction of the Security Council on the
Indonesian dispute. Now they supported the sphere of
authority of the Security Council pertaining to the dispute.
Sunde of Norway questioned the value of the Assembly's assistance, since both parties had already agreed to negotiate in Batavia.

Tarasenko supported Malik of the Soviet Union and argued that it was time for the General Assembly to settle the Indonesian dispute because the Security Council had not settled the issue in the past three years. He added:

It was possible to agree or to disagree to the reasons for the failure of the Council on the existing situation in Indonesia: some delegations, for instance, would deny the patent fact that the United States had supplied money, arms and other assistance to The Netherlands government, without which the Netherlands would never have been able to organize its military expedition against the Republic of Indonesia. 27

On May 2, 1949, the dispute was assigned to the Ad Hoc Political Committee for formal deliberation and study, and on May 9, Australia and India submitted a draft resolution calling for a deferment of the Assembly's discussion of the dispute until its fourth session. The text of the two-power resolution was as follows:

The General Assembly,

Noting the outcome of preliminary negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia in Batavia as announced on May, 1949, which negotiations were based on the directives of the

27. Ibid., p. 33.
Security Council March, 1949,
Expressing the hope that this agreement will assist the attainment of a lasting settlement in accordance with the intentions of the Security Council resolution of 23 January 1949,
Decides to defer further consideration of the item to the fourth session of the General Assembly. 28

Malik objected to the suggested postponement. He said that the Ad Hoc Political Committee "was faced with a definite manoeuvre [sic] on the part of those who had committed or helped to commit aggression against the Republic of Indonesia. 29

Romulo, chairman of the Ad Hoc Political Committee, placed the resolution for adoption. The resolution was adopted forty-two votes for, six against (Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia), and four abstentions (Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, and Liberia).

At the 408th meeting of the General Assembly on May 11, 1949, the resolution of the Ad Hoc Political Committee was adopted, forty-three votes for, six against (Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia), and with three

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29 Ibid., 375.
abstentions (Guatemala, Haiti, and Liberia). The discussion of the Indonesian dispute was postponed indefinitely.

V

At the outset, the Security Council had established a Committee of Good Offices composed of three members elected by the parties to the Indonesian dispute. The Committee had assisted the parties in reaching a solution of the dispute. At this time, the representatives of Australia and the United States in the Committee had presented to the parties a working-paper which featured certain procedures and recommendations pertaining to the solution of the deadlocked peace-parley. However, the parties had never approached the Committee to learn whether or not they could accept the proposed working-paper of the Committee. The Committee informed the Council that the Republican delegation to the peace-parley in Batavia was desirous of making concessions to the Netherlands delegation in the hope of halting the deterioration of peace in Indonesia. The Netherlands, however, turned down the overtures of the Republic and attacked the Republican-held territories of Java, Madura, and Sumatra at the time that a resumption of negotiations between the parties was being called for by the Committee.

The Security Council met in Paris at the request of
the United States to consider this unexpected development in the Indonesian dispute. The Soviet Union tried to pass a resolution condemning The Netherlands' action in violation of the principles of the Linggadjati Agreement and the Renville Truce Agreement. Another resolution, introduced by the United States, Colombia, and Syria, provided much the same action as did the Soviet resolution, except that the United States-Syria-Colombia resolution did not condemn the recent action of the Dutch government. The Soviet resolution failed in favor of the three-power resolution. However, the Soviet Union re-introduced a resolution which featured the principles of its earlier intention. It condemned the action of the Dutch, and demanded a cessation of hostilities within twenty-four hours after the resolution's adoption. Again the Soviet resolution failed, and the war in Indonesia continued.

At this time, China proposed a resolution, similar to the Soviet Union's latest resolution. This resolution was adopted, but it made the representative of the Soviet Union, Yakov Malik, furious. He accused the United States and its allies of tolerating the criminal action of The Netherlands and letting it continue the colonial rule in Indonesia.

Back in New York, the Council resumed its deliberations. The United States, China, Cuba, and Norway, introduced a resolution to be used as a working-paper
for the settlement of the Indonesian dispute. Although backed by a majority of the members of the Council, the resolution was opposed by the Soviet Union, Poland, and the Ukrainian SSR who argued that the resolution was intended to augment the recalcitrant attitude of The Netherlands.

On March 23rd directive of the Security Council, introduced by Canada, implemented the objectives and aims of the January 28th resolution, or the so-called Security Council's working-paper. The directive was endorsed by the United States, China, and Norway, and had the support of other members of the Security Council. The Soviet Union opposed the directive because it did not require The Netherlands unconditionally to cease hostilities and release Republican political prisoners. However, the Canadian resolution was adopted overwhelmingly.

Likewise, the General Assembly now for the first time considered the Indonesian dispute largely because of the Security Council's inability to settle it. The May 11th Assembly resolution, providing for the postponement of the General Assembly discussion, revealed the same general alignment of powers found in the Security Council. Again in opposition to the majority opinion were the Soviet Union and its associate states.
CHAPTER XIII

FORCES THAT LED TO PEACE AT THE HAGUE

With its second attack on the Republic, the Netherlands had challenged the authority of the United Nations as the guardian of world peace and security, and within a short time, the Dutch were without a friend in Asia. The United States called the Dutch action a complete defiance of the Security Council's powers. Pandit Nehru of India called on all Far Eastern nations to unite against a naked aggression aimed at reviving imperialism and colonialism. Premier Ba Mau of Burma accused the Dutch of opposing legitimate Asia nationalism and attempting to bring back colonialism in Indonesia. As a challenge to the Dutch and the western world, Mau offered to send a Burmese Expeditionary Force in Indonesia "to take up arms against the Dutch."

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2 Premier Mau inferred the Western Union composed of powers bordering the North Atlantic Sea. Nehru had also included the United States as a potent member of the Western Union.
Pakistan and India suspended and banned the Royal Dutch Airlines from their airfields and stopped the passage of Dutch Supplies through these countries intended for Indonesia. The Soviet Union and its allies angrily demanded the expulsion of The Netherlands from the United Nations and the imposition of an indemnity on the Dutch. Carlos P. Romulo bluntly accused the United States of "toying" with the Indonesian dispute in the Security Council, thus permitting The Netherlands to carry out its second criminal aggression.

The United Kingdom, at first reluctant to condemn the Dutch action, eventually its attitude changed because of its fear of formation of an Asiatic bloc of powers hostile to European possession in the Far East. 4

A New York Times correspondent said:

The British in Malaya, patiently, were apprehensive that a new surge of anti-colonialism as the result of the Dutch action may embarrass their efforts to bring Malaya to Dominion Status in a slow and orderly manner so as not to leave behind shambles such as Burma. 5

And a British High Commissioner in Asia warned Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin that "the British hands off policy in Dutch-Indonesian strife might play into Communist hands, that its failure to condemn the Dutch would have a

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5 Ibid., January 10, 1949, p. 1.
CIO's president Philip Murray reflected the strength of the American people's anti-colonial attitude when he appealed directly to the United States Under-secretary of State Robert S. Lovett, to do everything possible to stop the Indonesian crisis. He also proposed a suspension of further allocations to The Netherlands by the Economic Cooperation Administration.

On January 20, 1949, representatives of seventeen Far Eastern Powers met in New Delhi to discuss the Indonesian dispute. Although the majority of the world powers were against the Dutch government, Dutch military action continued unabated despite the December 24th resolution of the Council calling for a cease-fire. Negotiation was still at a deadlock, and the re-establishment of the Republic of Indonesia at Jogjakarta was refused by The Netherlands. The United Nations Commission reported that The Netherlands defied the January 28th resolution of the Council calling for the restoration of the Republic of Indonesia, the release of prisoners, and the transfer of sovereignty to the USI before 1950.

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8 See Chapter XII, page 172.
On March 3, 1949, a United States delegate to the United Nations told the press that the United States was in full agreement with the United Nations Commission's report blaming The Netherlands for the current political and military deadlock in Indonesia. On the following day, Romulo sent an invitation to seventeen Asian States (members of the last New Delhi Conference) to meet in New York to propose diplomatic action against The Netherlands. On March 7, Pandit Nehru warned The Netherlands that the Indian government would oppose any Dutch attempt to delay the implementation of the Security Council resolutions.

Aware of the disastrous effect on the stability of the Far East of the unsettled Indonesia war, Secretary of State Dean Acheson personally called on the Dutch Foreign Minister, Dirk U. Stikker, then on a visit in Washington, D.C. Acheson urged Stikker to reach a solution of the Indonesian dispute at the earliest possible time. On April 3, 1949, members of Congress demanded that the United States government suspend the aid allocation to The

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11 Ibid., March 4, 1949, p. 8.
12 Ibid., March 7, 1949, p. 10.
Netherlands under European Recovery Program pending the settlement of the Indonesian dispute. The bill extending the ECA for another year was passed by the Senate with Senator A. Vandenburg’s amendment. The amendment provided:

The United States government gives the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter and shall refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations is taking preventive and enforcement action. 15

II

For five months after the Dutch attack on the Republic, the Indonesian crisis continued unabated despite the Security Council’s December 24th cease-fire order. Therefore, Merle H. Cochran, new United States representative in the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, submitted to the parties a two-point proposal to reopen the peace-talk deadlock. The proposal warned the parties that the United States demanded a cease-fire order and the restoration of the Republic to its former capital of Jogjakarta. Van Roijen, the Dutch delegate to the peace-negotiation at Batavia accepted the United States proposal with two conditions: (1) the restoration of Jogjakarta could be fulfilled only if a cease-fire order

14 Ibid., March 7, 1949, p. 10.
was given; and (2) he demanded assurances that the Republic would attend the proposed round-table conference at The Hague. Mohammed Roem, head Republican delegate, told the Commission that his government could make no commitment because the Republic "was still scattered." Not until the Republican government was permitted to return to Jogjakarta could the demand of the Dutch government be implemented, Roem declared.

On May 1, 1949, Cochran proposed a compromise proposal for getting the peace-parley deadlock. He suggested that before Jogjakarta was restored to the Republic as demanded by Roem, that the Republican head delegate should be authorized by other Republican leaders to state that: (1) they favored a cease-fire order to Republican guerrillas operating in the hills; and (2) that the Republican government would take part in the proposed conference at The Hague. The parties agreed in principle to the United States compromise proposal, although a future deadlock appeared likely over definition of the Jogjakarta area. The Dutch limited the capital area to a five mile radius, excluding the city's

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17 Ibid., April 22, 1949, p. 5.
18 Ibid., April 22, 1949, p. 5.
19 Ibid., May 1, 1949, p. 41.
airport. The Republicans defined Jogjakarta as the entire sultanate of the area within the radius of 25 miles, including the city's airport.

Under the auspices of the Commission, a sub-committee composed of members of the two parties, was set up to make the preparations necessary for the return of the Republican government to Jogjakarta. The sub-committee studied the following problems: (1) the issuance of cease-fire order; (2) plans for the taking over by the Republic of civil departments in Jogjakarta; (3) plans for the formation of a Republican civil police force for the maintenance of law and order in the Sultanate of Jogjakarta; (4) trade; (5) public works; and (6) transport and communications.

On May 3, 1949, both parties agreed to call off the fighting in Indonesia for six months. Jogjakarta was restored to the Republic, and political prisoners were freed. Sjarifuddin Prawiranegara, the president of Provisional Republican government in hiding in Sumatra, approved the provisional cease-fire agreement. Roem also informed the Commission that the Moslem party and members of the Communist party unanimously approved the cease-fire.

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Ibid., May 7, 1949, p. 31. The Dutch compromised and the Republicans promised to attend the conference.

agreement. Roem also informed the Commission that the Dutch had sincere effort to end the peace-deadlock. Dutch civil personnel in Jogjakarta began to evacuate the city on June 9 and also thousands of Chinese who "did not wish to remain under the Republican rule."

Two weeks later, on June 23, the Commission informed the Security Council that the withdrawal of Dutch forces from the city had begun. The last Dutch personnel left the city on July 1, 1949. Immediately the Sultan of Jogjakarta took over the responsibility of maintaining law and order as agreed to by the parties at the outset. President Achmed Soekarno, Prime Minister Mohammed Hatta, Foreign Minister Nadji A. Salim, and other high ranking Republican officials returned from the Dutch detention island of Bangka to resume their responsibilities at Jogjakarta. On July 7, the United Nations Commission informed the Security Council of this recent accomplishment in the truce-talks concerning the Indonesian dispute. The Commission declared:

This event has established an important precedent. For the first time a government has been restored and returned to its constitutional position and to its capital through the assistance of an International Organization which has made use not

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23 Ibid., June 10, 1949, p. 5.
of armed forces but of its pacific means.

On August 1, 1949, The Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia signed a truce agreement to implement the cease-fire order which the parties had agreed to on May 8, 1949. The cease-fire order was issued simultaneously by both parties on August 3, 1949, and President Soekarno in a radio broadcast ordered Republican troops and guerrillas to observe the cease-fire order; even so, he warned the Republican forces to hold fast to their positions, because "no Indonesian will ever forget the December 19 event." General Buurman van Reeden, Dutch army commander, also ordered his troops to observe the cease-fire proclamation, but warned them "to watch for robbers and loiterers" who had joined the regular Republican elements. The order of cessation of hostilities was effected in Java and Sumatra on the night of

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27 Ibid., August 4, 1949, p. 12.
August 10, and the rules governing the cessation of hostilities were put to operation by both parties under strict surveillance of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia.

III

On February 26, 1949, The Netherlands had invited the United Nations Commission for Indonesia to attend a round-table conference at The Hague to be held on March 22 and to help in the transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia. The Commission had accepted the Dutch government's invitation as directed by the March 23rd directive of the Security Council. The Netherlands government had also issued the same invitation to the Republic which at that time had been unable to answer whether or not it could accept the invitation.

The negotiations concerning the proposed conference at The Hague were postponed until the cease-fire order and the restoration of the Republican government at Jogjakarta had been arranged. After weeks of negotiations, both parties agreed to the cease-fire, the restoration of Jogjakarta to the Republic, and to the holding of a conference at The Hague.

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On June 23, 1949, The Netherlands issued an official memorandum to the Commission and to the Republic at Jogjakarta. The memorandum contained a list of the important problems to serve as the bases of negotiation at The Hague Round-Table Conference on August 1, 1949. The problems were: (1) the projected transfer of sovereignty to the USI; (2) the proposed Netherlands-Indonesian Union on the basis of voluntary and equal partnership; (3) the solution of foreign relations, financial, economic, cultural, and military problems following the withdrawal of Dutch forces from Indonesia; and (4) the exchange of high commissioners by both partners of the Union. The Netherlands also informed the Republic and the Commission that it had invited the Federal Consultative Assembly leaders (non-Republican States) to attend the conference on an equal footing with the parties to the Indonesian dispute.

The Republican government warned The Netherlands that the FCA could not be recognized as a "party to the Indonesian dispute," although it later approved the FCA's

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Ibid., June 23, 1949, p. 13. Formerly, the conference was set to start on March 22. However, the cessation of hostilities had not been reached at that date. Again the Dutch re-set the date for August 1, 1949; however, The Netherlands government at The Hague called the date off until August 22, 1949.
participation in the conference provided that the "participation" would not prejudice the rights and claims of the Republic as provided for by the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements.

The Commission, working for the solution of the dispute under the provisions of the January 28th resolution, had called upon the FCA to participate in the negotiations with the hope that such participation might bring about a solution of the political problem. The Commission also recognized that the presence of the FCA delegation at the conference should not prejudice the rights and claims of The Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. The Dutch and the Indonesian governments understood this condition.

In preparation for the conference now definitely set to be held at The Hague on August 22, 1949, the Republic of Indonesia and the FCA, under the leadership of Sultan Hamid II, met in consultation with the Commission and The Netherlands. On July 24, 1949, the Republican and non-Republican Federalist officials informed

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31 For provisions of these agreements, consult Department of State, Bulletin, XVIII, No. 454 (March 14, 1948), pp. 323-336.
32 On April 19, 1950, Sultan Hamid II confessed he attempted to overthrow the Republic of the USI. He attempted to organize a new cabinet on January, 1950. He also confessed that he master-minded the Westerling Affair (Dutch Army Captain and Insurgent Leader) who planned to overthrow the RUSI government.
the Commission that they had reached an agreement concerning the problems to be negotiated at The Hague, and especially the creation of a United States of Indonesia (Serikat). The Republic of Indonesia and the FCA agreed to the following principles: (1) the number of units (states) in the new Republic (USI) would be determined before the transfer of sovereignty, but the territories or units would be those envisaged under the Renville Agreement; (2) the USI would be government by a constitutional president acting on the advice of a prime minister and cabinet; (3) during the transition period, after sovereignty had been transferred by the Dutch, a general election for a provisional parliament would be held for the purpose of framing a constitution of the USI; and (4) citizens would consist of 3 categories; (a) Indonesians who were now Dutch subjects or citizens of the Republic (USI); (b) Chinese and Arabs of similar status who would not object to Republican citizenship; and (c) all Europeans (whites) who wished to become citizens.

On August 2, the Republic of Indonesia and the Federal Consultative Assembly also proposed the following principles to serve as the bases for the political negotiations at the conference at The Hague: (1) the

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New York Times, August 2, 1949, p. 3.
Republic (USI) should have a two-house legislature, a	house of representatives and a senate; (2) the house
should represent the areas in proportion to their popu-
lation, but the Republic of Indonesia should have one-
third of the total representatives, and each state should
have two senators; (4) the Java Bank should be nationalized
by the USI; (5) the Indonesian army (Army of the Republic
or Indonesia) should form the nucleus of the USI's army;
and (6) there should be a union called the Indonesian-
Netherlands Union formed on the basis of the "voluntary
partnership" of the two states who were "free, sovereign,
and independent." It also provided for the transfer of
sovereignty to the USI by The Netherlands.

IV

The cessation of hostilities was finally arrived at
by both parties on August 3, 1948, almost eight months
after the Security Council had passed its December 24th
cease-fire resolution, and seven months after the
latter's working-paper (January 29th resolution). The
seat of the Republican government at Jogjakarta was re-
turned to the Indonesians on condition that the Republic
participate in the conference at The Hague.

34 New York Times, August 2, 1949, p. 3. The areas
called on this working-paper which constituted the
Republic of Indonesia were Java, Madura, and Sumatra.
In the Batavia preliminary conference, both parties agreed upon the following issues as bases for the negotiations at The Hague: (1) the formation of the United States of Indonesia; (2) a proposed Netherlands-Indonesian Union; (3) transfer of sovereignty; and (4) issues concerning future foreign, economic, cultural relations of the partners of the Union, and the military withdrawal of Dutch forces from Indonesia.

There were pertinent reasons for the development of a new congeniality between the parties. The United States government formally warned The Netherlands to cease its armed hostilities against the Republic of Indonesia, and to negotiate with the latter for the immediate settlement of the dispute, and the Economic Corporation Act of Congress was amended to cut Dutch aid until the settlement of the Indonesian dispute. The Netherlands needed money (dollars) very badly at this time for its economic and rehabilitation problems. India and sixteen other Far Eastern Powers warned the Dutch that they would face diplomatic action by these Powers if The Netherlands persisted in its non-compliance with the orders of the Security Council.

In the United Nations, despite lukewarm support by Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, The Netherlands was left isolated, and was eventually pressured into end-
ing the armed aggression and arranging for a positive settlement of the dispute. With concrete evidences from the Batavia conference, it now seemed likely that at long last the Indonesian dispute might be ended. And yet, there always remained the possibility that the forthcoming Hague Round-Table Conference might fail.
At its 421st meeting on March 23, 1949, the Council had agreed that the holding of a conference at The Hague, as proposed by The Netherlands with the participation of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, would be consistent with the purposes and objectives of the Council's January 28th resolution and its implementation.

The Round-Table Conference was formally opened on August 16 and lasted until November 2, 1949. The chairman of the conference was W. Drees, prime minister of The Netherlands. He was assisted by M. J. Prinsen who acted as the secretary-general of the conference. Members of the conference were: J. H. Kaarseveen, chairman of The Netherlands delegation; Mohammed Hatta, chairman of the Republican delegation; Sultan Hamid II, chairman of the Federal Consultative Assembly delegation; and H. Merle Cochran, chairman of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia.

The chairmanship of the Commission rotated every week to the other members R. Herremans and T. K. Critchley.
The opening of the conference was auspicious. Drees opened the first plenary meeting on August 23, and notified the conference that The Netherlands' decision to transfer sovereignty to the Republic of the USI as set forth in the Batavia preliminary conference was an "irrevocable resolution." Mohammed Hatta's address to the conferees was also conciliatory. He stated that the Indonesia tragedy of the past four years had been fundamentally a psychological problem, that, although the parties to the dispute had held to a common objective, namely to grant independence to the Indonesian people, they had differed as to the method of arriving at this objective. Although Hatta emphasized the "psychological" nature of the problem, he urged the conference members to avoid the setting-up of a super state. Rather, the state should be a voluntary association of two equal partners, the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI) and the Kingdom of The Netherlands. In addition, he stressed the urgency and expediency of the transfer of sovereignty before the forthcoming year 1950.

The chairman of the Federal Consultative Assembly, Sultan H. Faimid II, believed that the parties to the dis-
pute at the Batavia preliminary discussion had brought out into the open all their grievances and differences in the hope of reaching a quick solution of the Indonesian crisis. He hoped that the constitutional development of the new state of the Republic (USI) would have a sound financial and economic foundation.

J. H. van Learseveen, chairman of The Netherlands delegation, assured the conference that The Netherlands government would carry out the negotiations, formally and materially, toward a successful conclusion of the dispute.

Speaking for the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, T. K. Critchley stated that the conference at The Hague had been made possible only because of the "unstinted energy and cooperation demonstrated by all parties in the preliminary negotiations carried on in Batavia." He assured the conference that the commission, as directed by the Security Council, would do all that it could to help the parties find a peaceful solution.

I

A small committee, consisting of one member from each of the three delegations (the Republic of Indonesia, The Netherlands, and the Federal Consultative Assembly) adopted procedures which served as a basis for the preparation of the majority of the articles of the draft rules of procedure. At its first meeting on August 17 and 18
the small committee agreed to establish a Steering Com-
mittee composed of three members from each of the de-
legations. This Steering Committee was given broad
powers to discuss procedural and substantive problems and
to recommend measures to solve them. The chairmanship
rotated weekly among the heads of the three participating
parties.

The Steering Committee established various com-
mittees to discuss the following matters: (a) Political
and Constitutional Affairs; (b) Financial and Economic Af-
fairs; (c) Military Affairs; (d) Cultural Affairs; and
(e) Social Affairs. Informal talks constituted the pro-
cedure for expediting the greater part of the work of the
conference, and many important results were achieved by
this method. However during the concluding stages of the
conference, negotiations centered in the formal meetings
of the Steering Committee.

The United Nations Commission participated in all
the conference meetings and committees, formal or informal.
It sometimes helped the parties to reach reasonable compro-
mises, and when unresolved issues came to the attention
of the Steering Committee, the parties usually turned to
the Commission for guidance. Usually the Commission's
suggestions were accepted or considered, although at
times it was very difficult to bring the parties to a com-
promise.
There were three fields of negotiation at the conference, relevantly designated as political, economic, and military. Originally, the political problems resolved around the Republican demands for the full sovereignty of the USI with its own currency, military, and foreign services. Both the Republican and Federalist delegates demanded a political structure for the USI similar to that of the United States government: two houses in a federal congress, a federal executive, and an independent judiciary. However, the Federalists urged that powers not specifically granted to the USI should be reserved to the states. The Republic of Indonesia demanded Dutch New Guinea for its surplus population and for its economic development.

The Dutch proposed a draft statute which created a special working committee to consider the constitutional basis for the relationship between the USI and The Netherlands. The Dutch also proposed the creation of three permanent union organs: a council of ministers, inter-parliamentary commissions, and a court but the Republican delegates viewed these permanent organs as "trappings of sovereignty that would infringe on their sovereignty rather than necessary concomitants of union between two independ-

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ent nations." The Indonesians demanded a statute that would be a statement of principles to guide the union's growth rather than just technical words.

Both parties to the dispute were at variance as to the time when the union should take place. The Dutch declared that the unions should follow the transfer of sovereignty, whereas the Republicans wanted sovereignty transferred to the USI prior to any treaty-like arrangements with The Netherlands. In addition, the Dutch explained that the Council of Ministers should "guard the common interest of both parties and arrange cooperation in domestic and foreign affairs," and an inter-parliamentary commission would be entrusted with the duty of solving problems on which the council had reached a deadlock. The Union Court of Arbitration should be able to arbitrate disputes arising out of the transfer of sovereignty submitted by the partners in the Union. The Dutch concluded that there should be a common foreign policy and joint diplomatic representation with a third power.

As to the economic problem, the Dutch demanded that Dutch investments in the Indies should be protected with the veto power of The Netherlands over the future economic and financial life of the USI. To this the Indonesian

\footnote{\textit{New York Times}, September 6, 1949, p. 20.}
\footnote{Ibid., September 6, 1949, p. 20.}
\footnote{Ibid., September 10, 1949, p. 5.}
delegation was diametrically opposed. The Dutch also demanded that the USI should assume a Dutch debt of 6,200,000,000 guilders (approximately $2,000,300,000) as of August 3, 1949, but the Indonesians countered with a proposal that they should assume debts incurred up to August 1, 1942. They also recognized a pre-war debt as legal obligation between 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 guilders ($769,000). They informed the Dutch that a debt estimated at 2,000,000,000 guilders ($769,000,000) that The Netherlands had incurred in the past two years of the Indonesian revolution could not possibly be a USI responsibility.

The Dutch further proposed that the USI monetary and central banking system should be arranged "by special agreements only" and that the official rate of exchange between the two partners to the union could be altered only "through mutual agreement." They added that there should be mutual consultation before new economic or financial accords were made with any third party by either of the two partners (The Netherlands and the USI). There should be no nationalization without a complete

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7 Ibid., September 11, 1949, p. 33.
As to the military problems, the Indonesians proposed that Dutch troops should be withdrawn immediately after transfer of sovereignty, whereas the Dutch argued that it should not evacuate all Dutch troops in so short a time. Dutch troops should be allowed to remain until the USI had completed at least a year of governmental administration. The Dutch also asked to retain sovereignty over the naval base of Surabaya, in East Java, but the Indonesians wanted the base turned over the USI, fearing that a Dutch naval force in the Indies might infringe upon the sovereignty of the USI.

From the beginning of the conference, it was feared that the status of Dutch New Guinea might retard the negotiations. The Dutch proposed that New Guinea should be the responsibility of The Netherlands alone until such time as both partners to the union made special agreements after the transfer of sovereignty. The Indonesians, on the other hand, wanted the problem of New Guinea settled at the conference once and for all. At the suggestion of the Commission, however, this problem was referred to a special committee to await solution until the passing of the problem of debt.

Ibid., September 11, 1949, p. 33.
II

On September 16, 1949, the Indonesian delegation, with the Federalists' support, proposed a counter-resolution of the Dutch's previous draft (Union) law that there should be a union agreement which described the union as "form of organized cooperation." The Indonesians proposed, as a means of emphasizing the independence and sovereignty of the USI, that there should be a statute and other agreements reached at The Hague conference to be registered with the United Nations as an international pact. The Dutch delegation opposed such a plan.

The Indonesians issued a demand to counter the Dutch proposal for three permanent organs of the union (a council of ministers, an inter-parliamentary commissions, and a union court). The head of the union (crown) should be the symbol of free cooperation between the partners but should have no financial responsibility or duty. The Indonesians also proposed a joint-diplomatic representation instead of a common policy (foreign). At this point, the Indonesian dispute was on the verge of breaking up the conference, with each party accusing the other of trying to filibuster the conference's negotiation. The Belgian government, through its representative on the Commission,

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Ibid., September 16, 1949, p. 8.
suggested that the conference should temporarily meet at Brussels. Both parties agreed, and the conference moved for a week to the Chateau d'Ardennes.

The Indonesian delegation demanded again that complete independence should be given to the USI. The Indonesians would be willing to accept advice from the Dutch in matters concerning foreign trade but they wanted no treaties signed jointly with The Netherlands and the USI. Through mutual and secret negotiations by both parties, the conference at the Chateau d'Ardennes reached agreement on five points: (1) the character of the Union Statute; (2) position and functions of the heads of the Union; (3) the duties and composition of the conference of ministers; (4) the duties and composition of the Union's Court of Arbitration; and (5) the contact and cooperation among the parliaments of the union partners.

The greatest threat to the peaceful negotiation of the dispute at the conference was the economic deadlock relating to future USI monetary and trade policies. The Indonesians steadfastly declared that "there was no room for compromise on their part on economic questions." They said that "it was a case of whether the Dutch controlled their economy." 

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12 Ibid., September 24, 1949, p. 5.
13 Ibid., October 1, 1949, p. 6.
The conference returned to The Hague on October 4, 1949. The Dutch delegation withdrew its proposals for a veto over the USI's financial and economic policies and proposed instead that a percentage of the USI's proceeds from exports to "hard currency areas" should be guaranteed as interest payments on Indonesian debts. The Dutch also asked for the continuation of agreements by which the earnings of Indonesia's tin mines should be pledged as collateral for interest payments. The Dutch would grant a moratorium on the debt principal of 6,200,000,000 guilders ($2,000,300,000) and later negotiate the easiest terms for repayment when the moratorium ended. However, the Indonesian delegation steadfastly maintained its alleged legal obligation of only $769,000 (2,000,000 guilders).

The conference met during its seventh week for debates entirely on debt issue. The Dutch reduced their previous demand by the sum of 500,000,000 ($192,307,000), but again the Indonesian delegation found the offer unacceptable. The United States representative to the Commission, Kerle H. Cochran, suggested informally to parties that the sum of 4,000,000,000 guilders

14 Ibid., October 4, 1949, p. 9.
15 Rate of exchange is 26.329 guilders to the dollar.
($1,538,000,000) to be used as a basis for discussion. The Indonesian delegation accepted it with reservation, but the Dutch rejected it outright.

In addition to the debt issue deadlock, there was a series of slow downs on other issues on which the special committees of the conference could not reach a settlement. Among these pressing problems were the Union Statute, New Guinea, and whether Dutch nationals and corporate bodies in the Indies should get equal rights with the Indonesians. At this time, a report came from Batavia that peace in Indonesia was deteriorating as a result of the delay in settling the Indonesian dispute at The Hague. Sultan Hamengku Buwono, minister of defense of the Republic of Indonesia, warned the conference that the truce in Java and Sumatra was threatened by a possible armed showdown between Indonesian and Dutch troops. The Sultan blamed this ticklish situation in the Indies on "Dutch unreasonableness at The Hague." However, Dutch officials in Batavia accused Indonesian troops in Java and Sumatra of planning to surround Dutch military positions. The Indonesians in turn accused the Dutch of capturing

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16 There was no mention of the Indonesian reservations nor did the press know what caused the Dutch to reject Cochran's suggestion.

Republican soldiers. With this situation in the Indies pressing an early settlement of the dispute at The Hague, the military committee of the conference informed the leaders of the conference that agreements were reached on military problems.

On October 16, 1949, the military committee released information on the military settlements which were: (1) the UCI government would be responsible for the external and internal security of Indonesia; (2) Dutch troops not yet withdrawn should operate actively only at the request of the UCI; (3) the withdrawal of Dutch forces should take place under joint Indonesian-Dutch supervision; (4) soldiers in Dutch territory not wanting to return to The Netherlands could join the UCI army under certain conditions; (5) a committee was to be established to see that the military agreements were carried out; (6) Dutch military experts were to advise Indonesian military authorities in building their army; and (7) Dutch military equipment in the Indies would be turned over to Indonesian.

A week later the military committee announced that it had reached agreements on other issues. The Surabaya naval base in East Java would be commanded by Dutch of-
ficers responsible to the USI minister of defense. Dutch troops would be withdrawn completely from Indonesia within six months after the transfer of sovereignty; the time limit could be extended if necessity warranted. Other agreements were reached on pensions, property damages, and compensations.

Although the debt issue was not yet resolved, the committee on economic and financial problems had found two areas of agreement. The USI was to consult with The Netherlands on its monetary and banking policies, at least during the first year of statehood and to conclude trade agreements in Europe in cooperation with The Netherlands government. Ultimate authority on monetary and banking issues, however, was to rest with the Republic. There was also an agreement that compensation was to be provided in case of the nationalization of economic enterprises in Indonesia.

On the debt issue itself, the Indonesians finally agreed to assume 3,000,000,000 guilders of the internal debt plus 400,000,000 guilders of foreign credits guar-
anteed by The Netherlands. However, the Dutch delegation rejected this Indonesian concession, and the Commission eventually left the debt question to be solved by a Debt Commission composed of 4 members including H. Merle Cochran. The Commission feared that if the conference should continue too long that "the truce in Indonesia might break anytime if there was no successful conclusion of the conference."

Finally after almost two months of negotiations on the debt question, and at the suggestion of the Commission, the Indonesian delegation agreed to assume a debt of 4,300,000,000 guilders ($1,131,578,947), consisting of the entire internal debt of the Dutch East Indies government of 3,000,000,000 guilders and of an external obligation of 1,300,000,000 guilders. The Dutch delegation, after much delay, conceded to the Commission's suggestion. However, the settlement of the debt problem did not close the conference at The Hague.

On October 29, the determination of what states were to be included in the Indies, including the New Guinea

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21 The Republic of the United States of Indonesia would assume a $130,769,230 debt of The Netherlands.
24 Ibid., October 25, 1949, p. 5.
question, still remained to be settled. The Dutch wished to retain New Guinea, but the Indonesians argued that it should be part of the USI. The Commission proposed a special arrangement for a joint Netherlands-Indonesia administration and defense of New Guinea on condition that the area be specified in the Charter of transfer of sovereignty as a part of the USI, and both the Dutch and Indonesians provisionally accepted the Commission's proposal.

On November 1st, however, and one day before the end of the dispute-discussion at The Hague, an agreement that the question of sovereignty over New Guinea was written off as a dispute and that both parties would recognize the de facto position of the Dutch until a satisfactory final settlement was signed. Member-delegations to the round-table conference wound up the negotiations on November 2, 1949 with all points of difference settled.

III
(a) Provisional Constitution of the Republic
(USI)

The form of government of the new Republic should be that of a democratic state, federal in structure, and

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Ibid., October 25, 1949, p. 5. The Netherlands' Liberal Party met in Rotterdam on October 28, 1949, and the result of the meeting was a resolution which warned the Dutch government "must reject the abandonment of Dutch New Guinea." New York Times, October 30, 1949, p. 38.
governed by justice. The sovereign authority should be exercised by the government with the house of representatives and the senate. The Republic should rule the areas which comprised the whole territory of Indonesia, the territories of:

(a) The Negara Republic of Indonesia, being the territory in accordance with the status quo as defined in Renville Agreement of 17 January 1948:
   - The Negara Indonesia Timur;
   - The Negara Pasundan, including the Federal District Jakarta;
   - The Negara Djawa Timur;
   - The Negara Jatim;
   - The Negara Sumatera Timur, on the understanding that the status quo of South Asaha and Labuhan-Batu in respect to the Negara Sumatera Timur is maintained;

(b) The autonomous constitutional units:
   - Djawa Tengah; Bangka; Belitung; Riau; Kalimantan Bzara (Daerah Istimewa); Djak Besar; Daerah Bandjar; Kalimantan Tengah; and Kalimantan Timur.

(c) The other territories of Indonesia are not participant territories. 27

(b) Transfer of Sovereignty:

The Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty provided that The Netherlands unconditionally and irrevocably would transfer complete sovereignty over Indonesia to the USI and would recognize the Republic as an independent and sovereign state. The transfer should take place at the latest on December 30, 1949.

26 See Illustration II of the List of Illustrations.
(c) Union Statute:

The statute provided that the Netherlands-Indonesian Union should effectuate the organized cooperation between the independent and sovereign partners on the basis of free will and equality in status with equal rights. The union should aim at the promotion of common interests in the fields of foreign relations and defense and, as far as necessary, finance, and also in regard of subjects of an economic and cultural nature. The Head of the Union would effectuate the spirit of voluntary and lasting cooperation, and at the head of the union should be Her Majesty the Queen of The Netherlands and her lawful successors. The aims of the union should be implemented by a conference, to be held at least twice a year, of ministers designated by, and responsible to, the respective partners. The union was to be served by a permanent secretariat; two secretaries-general would be appointed by each partner, and these officials would have charge of the secretariat on the basis of yearly rotation. A Union Court of Arbitration was established for the settlement of legal disputes arising out of the union statute and other agreements between the partners. The composition of the Court was based on parity, and the chairmanship would alternate yearly between the Indonesian and Dutch members. Its decisions were to be made by the
majority vote of the judges. In case of a tie, the Court could request the President of the International Court of Justice, or another international authority, to break the deadlock.

(d) Foreign Relations:

The parties agreed that the rights and obligations of The Netherlands resolving from treaties and international agreements would be taken over by the Republic (USI) in so far as they applied to its jurisdiction. The USI reserved the right not to become a party to treaties and agreements other than those specified by the Union Statute. All Indonesians currently serving in or being trained for the Dutch foreign service should be hired by the Republic.

Both parties also agreed to coordinate their foreign policy and to consult with each other to that effect. Should one of the partners have no accredited diplomatic representation to any third power, its interests would be promoted preferably by the diplomatic representative of the other partner.

\[\text{28 Ibid., Appendix VII, p. 91.}\]
(e) Transitional Measures:

The Agreement on Transitional Measures provided for the transfer *ipso jure* of all rights and obligations in Indonesia of The Netherlands, unless otherwise stipulated by agreements in the Union Statute. In providing for legal continuity, the agreement provided that all provisions in existing laws and regulations relating to Indonesia should remain in force until revoked or modified by the competent organs of the partners. The rulers of self-governing regions in Indonesia were to be released from their oath of allegiance to The Netherlands while the Republic (USI) was to be recognized as having special position over these territories.

(f) Nationality and Citizenship:

The transitional measures provided that Dutch nationals should retain Netherlands citizenship, but they were entitled to declare their preference for Indonesian nationality if they were born in Indonesia or had resided there for at least six months. Non-Dutch citizens belonging to the autochthonous population of Indonesia were entitled to choose Dutch nationality if they were born resided outside Indonesia. However, they could choose Indonesian nationality. Both partners agreed that the nationality of citizens of one partner should not constitute an objection of one partner against serving officially
within the jurisdiction of the other partner.

(g) Most-Favored Nation Clause:

Dutch nationals, corporate bodies, products, and ships, and other objects were to enjoy treatment no less favorable than that granted to any third country. The Republic should not discriminate against Dutch special interests in Indonesia and also the national interests of economically weaker groups.

The nationals of third countries should enjoy equal rights in participation in trade with Indonesia and in that country's economic activities and development.

IV

The Hague Round-Table Conference was a success. Both the Dutch and the Indonesian governments at last and formally agreed to settle their disputes peaceably. And no small part in reaching the settlement was due to the United Nations Commission for Indonesia and especially to Cochrane, the United States representative on the Commission.

Heavy outside pressure also contributed much toward bringing together the parties at the Hague conference. First, there was the danger of a collapse of the truce in Indonesia, and daily incidents were reported to the conference. Second, there was the threat of a communist up-
rising in Indonesia. Third, the Dutch aggression had aroused a violent negative reaction in the United Nations, especially among the seventeen Far Eastern nations. Fourth, and the last, was the amendment added to the Economic Corporation Act of the United States Congress providing that no aid could be sent to any nation against which the United Nations was taking preventive action.
CHAPTER XV

THE BIRTH OF A NATION

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The Security Council resumed its discussion of the Indonesian dispute at its 455th and 456th meetings at Lake Success, New York, on December 12th and 13th, 1949. McNaughton of Canada was Council president. The following representatives were present in addition to the eleven members of the Security Council: Hood of Australia; van Langenhove of Belgium; U Tin Maung of Burma; Benegal Rau of India; van Rijjen of The Netherlands; Mohammed Z. Khan of Pakistan; Salvador P. Lopez of the Philippines; and Palar of the Republic of Indonesia.

At the 455th meeting, McNaughton proposed, after consultation with the Indonesian and Dutch representatives, a resolution recognizing the achievements of the Round-Table Conference at The Hague. The resolution congratulated the Dutch and the Indonesians for having peaceably solved their dispute and commended the United Nations Commission for Indonesia for its assistance. Although

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Lopez, Salvador P. Born 1911, Currimao, Ilocos Norte; and Adviser on Political Affairs, Philippine Mission to the United Nations, 1946-.
the resolution welcomed the forthcoming establishment of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, it further ordered the Commission to continue to discharge the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Security Council and to observe and assist in the implementation of the agreements reached at The Hague.

Van Roijen formally expressed his government's pleasure at the success of the conference. He further declared that the Second Chamber of The Netherlands Parliament already had approved the results of the conference by a vote of 71 to 29; that it had also adopted a ratification bill submitted by the government to the effect that The Netherlands government at The Hague, after due consultation with the government of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, should not fail to approach the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, or some appropriate organ of the United Nations, with a view of self-determination as provided for by the agreement on transitional measures. He concluded that he would approve the Canadian resolution.

The same feeling of pleasure was expressed by Palar.

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He reminded the Council of the concessions of both parties in the conference which had made possible the settlement of the Indonesian dispute. He wished to thank those members of the Council who had contributed so much to the settlement of the dispute. He said:

We thank them for their assistance in opening the way for the Netherlands to transfer its sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia, to which the Republic of Indonesia will also transfer its sovereignty in accordance with the agreements reached at the Inter-Indonesian Conference last summer. 3

Palar pledged his government's support to the Canadian resolution.

Sunde of Norway recalled past difficulties in the Council when his government "had not always seen eye to eye with the Netherlands" concerning the Indonesian demand for independence. He said, "But today bygones should be bygones," and he further wished to congratulate the Dutch government for its moderation and flexible statesmanship. He supported the Canadian resolution.

Still doubtful of the validity of the agreements reached by The Hague conference, Galagan of the Ukrainian SSR charged that the "felicitations" statements made by representatives of Canada, Indonesia, Norway, and The Netherlands were unfounded. He said:

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3 Ibid., p. 13.
How can it be said that Indonesia has entered upon a new period of development, a period of friendly cooperation, when the whole world knows that the war waged by the Dutch occupiers against the Indonesian people with the support of the United States and the United Kingdom continues with undiminished ferocity? 4

He accused the Dutch of continuing to wage war against the Indonesians with armed troops supplied by the United States. He implied that Dutch troops were in the Indies to exterminate the Indonesian people and forcibly to deprive them of their right to create an independent state. He suspected the result of the conference because the United Nations Commission for Indonesia attending the conference had turned to be a tool of United States policy in Indonesia and not an organ of the Security Council.

Galagan accused the United States of spending $402,000,000 to help The Netherlands (in Indonesia) through its European Aid Program. He also accused the United Kingdom of sending military aid to the Dutch forces in Indonesia to set up bases in South East Asia. He further believed that the purpose of the conference at The Hague had been to "subject them [Indonesians] to the yoke of colonial slavery and to restore the old colonial

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4 Ibid., p. 16. Republican forces had quelled a Communist uprising that began on September 18, 1948, and resulted in the Communist overthrow of Madura, East Java. Captain Paul P. Westerling was said to have made British Malay Peninsula his base of operation until he was forced to leave the Indies by The Netherlands government.
system in Indonesia" and that the results of the conference "were but a bargain by the Hatta Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia clique."

In order to counteract this so-called Anglo-American policy in Indonesia, Galagan proposed a resolution which provided for: (1) the withdrawal of Dutch troops to the positions occupied by them before the commencement of hostilities on December 19, 1948; (2) the release by the Dutch of all Indonesian political prisoners; (3) the establishment of a United Nations Commission composed of members of the Security Council to oversee the withdrawal of Dutch forces and of political prisoners; (4) the preparation and submission by the Commission of proposals within three months for the settlement of the conflict on the basis of recognition of the independence and sovereignty of the Indonesian people; and (5) the dissolution of the existing United Nations Commission.

Mohammed Z. Khan complimented the Dutch and Indonesian governments for work well-done at The Hague conference. However, he warned, the Security Council had yet to see the implementation of the agreements. Tsang appreciated the services that van Roijen had rendered to the cause of peace in the Indonesian dispute in the Council discussions of the past three years. He severely criticized the Ukrainian resolution and announced his
support of the Canadian resolution.

On December 13, 1949, the Security Council met for its 456th meeting. Rau warned the Council not to look at the results of the conference at The Hague "with a microscope." He informed the Security Council that he would endorse the Canadian resolution because it was simple. He declared:

In conclusion I should like to point out that although agreements have been drafted, they still remain to be ratified and implemented and there is much to be done by all the parties concerned. We shall require the best of all of them if there is to be a lasting settlement, and shall not get the best out of them unless we appeal to the best for all of them.  

Semen K. Tsarapkin (Soviet Union) declared that those members who approved the results of The Hague Conference were exultantly congratulating each other on their successes and were lavish in their praise and congratulation. He declared:

The agreements of The Hague were a source of such sincere satisfaction to the Netherlands colonizers, who for three centuries have been oppressing and exploiting the Indonesian people and have drained Indonesia of its wealth, should have put all true friends of the Indonesian people on their guard.  

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5 Ibid., No. 52 (December 13, 1949), p. 3.
6 Tsarapkin, Semen K. Born 1906, Nikolayev; Educated at Institute of Oriental Studies and Moscow University; and Minister Counselor, Embassy, Washington, D.C.
Mahmoud F. Bey (Egypt) expressed his government's desire to see the forthcoming birth of the Republic (USI) which the parties to the dispute had agreed to at The Hague. He informed the Council that although he had suspected the real intentions of the Dutch government in the Security Council ever since van Kleffens had spoken disdainfully of the Council's competence in the Indonesian dispute, he now felt that the Dutch government had at last a "near-perfect acceptance of the Security Council's jurisdiction of the dispute." Bey supported the Canadian resolution.

Van Langenhove of Belgium praised the achievement of the parties at The Hague and called the Ukrainian resolution "out of date" because "it seems to have been composed before the successful conclusion of the round-table conference, the results of which it does not take into account." Gerald C. Gross (United States) informed the Council that his government felt that the results of the conference were in full conformity with the principle of the Pacific Settlement of Disputes as stressed by Chapter VI of the Charter. In answering the Ukrainian

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8 Ibid., No. 52 (December 13, 1949), p. 5.
9 Gross, Gerald C. Born 1893, New York; Educated at Haverford College, Pennsylvania; and Assistant-Secretary General of the International Telecommunication Union.
and Soviet charges that his government had helped the Netherlands too strongly to bring back the old colonialism into Indonesia through American dollars and arms, Gross argued:

All of us have seen how the representative of the USSR and the representative of the Ukrainian SSR in the Council...have tried to twist the meaning of the documents which comprise the agreement reached at The Hague. They know, of course, that the meaning of the documents cannot be twisted for anyone who has actually read them. They know also that this meaning cannot be twisted for the people who themselves will soon be benefiting from these great instruments. 10

Gross supported the Canadian resolution because it "formulates in a felicitous manner an attitude which my Government warmly supports." 11

U So Nyun (Burma) supported the Canadian resolution after criticizing Tsarapkin's statement:

The speech of the representative of the USSR, to which we listen this afternoon, was couched in language with which we have become familiar. The representative of the USSR expressed greater concern and solicitude for the Indonesian people than that which people feel for itself, which only shows that one needs to be saved from one's so-called friends as much as from one's sworn enemies. 12

10 Security Council Official Records, Fourth Year, No. 52 (December, 1949), p. 5. Gross forgot to answer either "yes" or "no" concerning the implied question: Did the United States government aided in any form the Dutch?
11 Nyun, U So. Born 1898, Rangoon; Educated at Balliol College, Oxford and Edinburgh Universities; and Alternate-Representative to the General Assembly, 1948,
The Canadian draft resolution was put up for adoption. For the first time in the Security Council's discussions of the Indonesian dispute the Soviet Union used the veto power. The Soviet Union representative voted against the Canadian resolution, supported by the delegate of the Ukrainian SSR, when that resolution was voted substantively. Nine Council member states voted for the resolution: Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt, France, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The resolution was rejected.

McNaughton, the Council president, expressed regret that the Canadian resolution was not adopted. He said:

The representative of the Soviet Union had chosen at this time by the exercise of his privilege of the veto to prevent the congratulations which the vast majority of the Council members had expressed in the Canadian resolution. 13

The Ukrainian resolution was rejected, two votes for (Ukrainian SSR and the Soviet Union), and nine against (Argentina, Canada, China, Cuba, Egypt, France, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The Council discussion of the Indonesian dispute was kept open indefinitely as one of the problems on the Security Council agenda.

II

The whole world watched the ceremonies at Jogjakarta,
on December 27, 1949, when The Netherlands ended centuries of colonial rule of the Indies surrendering its powers to the sovereign, independent, and democratic Republic of the United States of Indonesia. The red and white flag of the former Republic of Indonesia, which had flown over Madura, Sumatra, and Java for the past four years of nationalistic revolution, was finally hoisted atop the flag pole of Koningsplein Palace, Jogjakarta.

The significant ceremony of the transfer of sovereignty took place in the classic banquet hall of the palace in the presence of a few high dignitaries: the High Commissioner (representative) of the Crown of the Dutch government A. H. Lovink; Hamenko Buwono IX, Sultan of Jogjakarta and Republic of Indonesia Minister of Defense; and T. K. Critchley, that week's Chairman of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, accompanied by his associates Paul Bohm (Belgium) and Karl Hisgen, Colonel, United States Army and Senior Military Observer for the Commission. H. Merle Cochran, United States representative in the Commission, had been delayed for the ceremony and therefore was not able to attend the ceremony. However, Hisgen acted for Cochran. The following day Cochran arrived in Jogjakarta.

Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations, was unable to accept the invitation of the two parties to
attend the ceremony. Nevertheless, Lie sent a letter
during the transfer ceremony which was read to the two
governments. Lie declared:

In the name of the United Nations, I con gratu lat e the peoples of Indonesia and of the Nether-
lands, and I wish them both a future of peaceful
and prosperous relations among themselves and with
their neighbors. 14

Thousands of Indonesian people, including Indone-
sian citizens of Indian, Japanese, Chinese, Arabian, and
European origin, thronged the Koningsplein Palace singing
victory songs and shouting wildly "Merdeka!" There were
joy and happiness and tears. There was also bitterness
for many of the spectators watching the hoisting of the
Indonesian red and white flag of the Republic because
thousands of Indonesian youths (some 40,000 soldiers
and civilians) had never come back from the gory fields
of battle to see the birth of their Republic. This day,
December 27, 1949, was the greatest of all Indonesian
holidays, since August 17, 1945, when the Republic of
Indonesia was created and proclaimed independent from the
Japanese government, because it marked the end of four
hundred years of Dutch rule, and because it raised the
tombstone of The Netherlands' supreme government in
Indonesia.

The following day former Republic of Indonesia
president Achmed Soekarno, now the president of the
Republic of the United States of Indonesia, returned from
The Hague where the Dutch version of the transfer of sovereignty had been celebrated.
The settlement of the Indonesian dispute came after prolonged years of armed hostilities, physical frustrations and persecutions, tedious debates and discussions by the Security Council, and heart-burning political denunciations between the governments of The Netherlands and the de facto Republic of Indonesia.

The history of the Indonesian dispute began as early as August 11, 1945 when the rabid nationalist Ahmed Soekarno announced the independence of the Republic of Indonesia after Field Marshal Juichi Terauchi of the Japanese Imperial Government relinquished his civil administration of the islands. As soon as the new Republic began to function, the Netherlands government at The Hague vowed to destroy it. Dutch forces arrived in the Indies in large numbers, and by September, 1945 Dutch and Republican forces were locked in mortal combat.

The British government, as participant in the dispute at this time brought the two parties together in
the Linggadjati Agreement which formally recognized the Republic of Indonesia as the de facto sovereign authority in Java, Madura, and Sumatra. Almost at once, however, each party accused the other of unilaterally interpreting the agreement, and of political and economic persecution. The Republic claimed that The Netherlands had violated the agreement by commencing its first police-action against the Republican government on July 20, 1947. On the other hand, The Netherlands countered that the police-action was necessary to maintain peace and order in the Indies, something which the Republic had not been able to achieve.

After almost two years of constant fighting, murder, and persecution in the Indies, the Ukrainian SSR brought these facts to the attention of the Security Council. The Council at first was not fully satisfied with the Ukrainian arguments that the abnormal situation in Indonesia was a threat to world peace. In fact, the Security Council was not at all sure that the Indonesian dispute was serious enough to warrant a Security Council inquiry. At this period of the Council's discussion, The Netherlands maintained that the Indonesian dispute was the domestic concern of The Netherlands government. France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom strongly supported the contentions of The Netherlands. The Soviet bloc,
Ukrainian SSR, Poland, and the Soviet Union, however, maintained that it was the supreme duty of the Security Council to inquire into the matter. These countries believed seriously that the Dutch were the aggressors in the dispute and that The Netherlands should be punished and chastised, it need be, expelled from the United Nations.

The United States, during this early stage of the Council's discussion was non-committal. It often supported the arguments of the imperialist Powers The Netherlands, France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. At one time it cautioned the Council of possible inopportune consequences should the Council inquire into the Indonesian dispute. The United States government further warned the Council against involving itself in the question of national sovereignty and independence.

There were also the "neutrals" in the Security Council, such as Australia, Brazil, China, and Egypt, a group of confused Powers and who were not thoroughly convinced that the Indonesian dispute was a threat to world peace and security, and it was with their aid that The Netherlands won its first and last victory in the Security Council. On the grounds that the Indonesian dispute was a domestic problem of The Netherlands and that there was no threat to peace and security in that part of Southeast Asia, the discussion of the dispute in the
Council was postponed indefinitely. The war in Indonesia consequently resumed an accelerated pace of fury and bloodshed. People died by the hundreds everyday and physical attrition, conflagration, murder, and looting were but common events day and night.

Australia and India, "neutrals" in the early stage of the discussion of the Indonesian dispute in the Council, were alarmed by the threat to peace in Southeast Asia. Both states consequently brought this situation to the attention of the Council, and for the second time the Indonesian dispute was discussed and debated. After prolonged discussions and debates, the Security Council asked the Dutch and Indonesians to accept the implications of the cease-fire resolution of August 1, 1947. The Council also established the Consular Commission and the Committee of Good Offices in Indonesia, after recriminations between The Netherlands, France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and Poland, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Soviet Union on the other. This time The Netherlands now definitely lost out on the issues of national sovereignty and "no" threat to peace and security in Southeast Asia.

However, the agencies set up by the Security Council were too weak. They could report on the developments in the dispute arising from the cease-fire res-
olution of the Council, but they could not recommend measures for settlement. Because of the weakness of these agencies, the fury of war, civilian oppression, and outright noncompliance with the order of the Security Council continued in the Indies. Even so, the Committee of Good Offices, assisted by military observers of the Consular Commission, achieved a temporary cessation of hostilities based on the Council's August 1 resolution. Although the truce was finally accepted by both parties, its implementation was impeded by the Council's long debates. And as long as the Council persisted in its confused attitude toward the truce implementation, the truce in Indonesia rapidly deteriorated.

In a direct challenge to the Security Council as a mediator of international friction, and perhaps heartened by the division in the Council itself, The Netherlands began its second police-action on December 19, 1948, thus violating the August 1st cease-fire resolution. The Netherlands action constituted a breach of the peace and a direct challenge to the Charter, and the world was aroused and embittered. A formerly moderate Security Council now turned against the Dutch. The United States virtually branded The Netherlands as the aggressor in Indonesia. The Soviet bloc, tired of Dutch tactics in the Indonesian peace-parley under the auspices of the
Committee and in the Security Council discussions, wished to apply sanctions against the Dutch. All the members of the Security Council, with the exception of "old-Dutch-guards" France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom, were in agreement that the aggressor in Indonesia was The Netherlands.

In the Security Council discussion that followed the second Dutch aggression, The Netherlands was left without support. And despite its recent criminal action, The Netherlands tried to filibuster the Council discussion on the old grounds that the situation in Indonesia was a domestic problem of the Dutch government and the Republic of Indonesia could not be treated as a state.

On December 24, 1948, the Security Council passed its second cease-fire resolution in the Indonesian dispute. A month later on January 28, 1949, the Council passed its working-paper, a set of principles to be used as bases for negotiating the dispute. The Good Offices Committee was changed into a United Nations Commission for Indonesia, stronger than the former. With the great contribution of the United States representative to the Commission, Merle Cochran, both parties agreed to a cease hostilities and to begin negotiation for a permanent settlement of the dispute.

There were factors in the dispute which the Dutch
had not foreseen when it launched its second armed aggression against the Indonesian Republic. It had not realized the effectiveness of the members' pledge to resist an attempt of one power to use armed aggression against another. It had failed to realize the moral strength of the United States national policy against any power which use aggression to alter or to achieve its national or foreign objectives. The Netherlands had not realized the growing military and economic strength of the seventeen Far Eastern Powers, led by India, who were ready to throw their forces in common goal to resist a western power's attempt to disturb the peace of Asia. The forces eventually forced The Netherlands to settle the dispute in Indonesia and once and for all to give independence to the Indonesian people.

In conclusion, The Netherlands had attempted to establish its own style of peace and administration in Indonesia. It had attempted to annihilate the hope of "Merdeka" in the minds of the Indonesians through aggression and economic attrition. On the other hand, the Republic of Indonesia, although militarily weaker than the Dutch, had challenged them like a stirred bee from a peaceful nest, stinging their foes from all sides until the latter were swollen and left immobile. Such an analogy is true, for a persevering student in this par-
ticular dispute can find sufficient evidence to sustain his arguments that the Dutch had taken the wrong road in their attempt to return to sovereign power in the great "gold and silver islands."
Illustration 1: THE VAN MOOK LINE OF AUGUST 29, 1947

SYMBOLS:
R - Republic of Indonesia
N - The Netherlands
- Status quo line

Ref:
Documents: S/586/Add. 1 (Java),
           S/586/Add. 2 (Sumatra).

New Guinea

Borneo

Sumbawa

Flores Is.

Timor Is.
Illustration II: THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC (USI)
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Primary Sources:

A. United Nations Documents:


These yearly publications of the United Nations are excellent sources of information concerning all problems of United Nations organizations. However, the student must pay particular attention to the fact that there are typographical errors as to date, information, and other relevant facts concerning a particular problem. As guides to the Security Council's works for the particular year, these books are highly recommended and are excellent.

B. General Assembly:


C. Security Council:


These documents concerning the discussion of the dispute of the General Assembly and of the Security Council are indispensable sources of information. These documents are useful and dependable.

D. Government Documents:


The two publications of the United States government which are mentioned above are excellent and highly dependable. The Linggadjati Agreement and the Report of the United Nations Consular Commission in Indonesia are wholesomely treated. However, the facts concerning this dispute are not completely dealt upon by these government publications.

The publications of the Republic of Indonesia are not to be depended upon as a source of information concerning this particular subject. However, such publications can be studied in order to know the position which the Republic of Indonesia has taken in the dispute. Beside that, the publications are highly one-sided primary sources, with due exception to "Outline of the Indonesian Question April 8, 1949," which can be classified as an authoritative document.
Secondary Sources:

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Carpenter, Frank G., Java and the East Indies. New York: Double Day, Page and Company, 1925. A well rounded book about Java as the leading and most important island in the Indies.


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