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Factors influencing the United Nations' role in the decisions on the future of British and French Togolands

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FACTORS INFLUENCING THE UNITED NATIONS' ROLE IN THE DECISIONS
ON THE FUTURE OF BRITISH AND FRENCH TOGOLANDS

by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The most rapidly evolving trust territories in Africa have been French and British Togolands, even though native organizations and parties have supported such diverse political goals as Togoland unification, tribal unification, the continuation of the present administrative arrangement and the integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast. In 1957 British Togoland was united with the Gold Coast as the independent state of Ghana, a milestone in trusteeship history marking the first time that the United Nations' goals of self-government or independence for trust territories had been reached; and at present French Togoland enjoys self-government with the promise of independence in 1960.¹

The political evolution of the Togolands has been largely a result of the conflicting pressures by the native groups of the Togolands and the Administering Authorities, Britain and France, upon the United Nations in an effort to influence that organization's decisions concerning the two Territories' future. While the demands of these pressure groups have been answered only in varying degrees, their active agitation prompted the United Nations to continue searching for a solution to the Togolands' problems. These consisted primarily of severe boundary

restrictions between the two Togolands and the diametrically opposed goals of various native groups pertaining to the future of British and French Togolands.

But the native forces would never have had an opportunity to place pressure upon the United Nations if the trusteeship system had not supplied the United Nations with different goals than those found under the mandates system. Indeed, the political development of British and French Togolands is one of the primary examples of the processes that are taking place under the trusteeship system which, unlike the mandates system, allows the natives to petition the United Nations directly and has the goals of "self-government or independence."^2

The vigorous political activity in the Togolands, with its diametrically opposed native movements, was the result of historic factors reaching back to 1884. In that year Germany established a protectorate on the West African coast of Guinea between the British colony of the Gold Coast to the west and the French protectorate of Dahomey to the east.3 This formed the basis for German Togoland. In 1899 the final boundaries were established^4 and remained permanent until 1914, when the colony was seized by the French and British in the opening days of World

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War I, with Britain gaining control of most of the territory.\(^5\)

While the Germans ruled Togoland for only fifteen years after the colony had been expanded to its full extent, they were successful in developing the economy and in constructing a partial transportation system of roads and railroads. In many respects Togoland was a model colony.\(^6\) In later years, after France and Britain permanently divided the area, the name "Togoland" came to symbolize the ideal community to southern Togolanders, the lost "Golden Age."\(^7\) Many of them had either forgotten or ignored those aspects of policy and administration which were far from ideal and associated all that was desirable with the historic "Togoland." Part of the political activity since World War II was centered around a desire to return to a united Togoland.

Actually there were many things about German Togoland which were not utopian. The boundaries were one of these. They had been established arbitrarily, without regard for tribal divisions. The Togoland-Gold Coast boundary cut across two large tribal areas, the Dagombas of the North and the Ewes of the South.\(^8\) This caused a good deal of discontent, enough that British and French occupation was well received at first by these and other small tribes divided by the Gold Coast-Togoland border. Britain controlled most of the country and those groups which


\(^7\)Coleman, *loc. cit.*

\(^8\)Hoskins, *op. cit.*, p. 417.
had been divided by the boundary found themselves under one administra-
tion. The Dagombas were completely reunited and the Ewes enjoyed almost
complete unity for the first time since the intervention of Europeans. Even tribes which had not been split by the border were fairly content. British and French rule was not as harsh as German rule, and from 1914 until 1920 the two powers did not establish any real boundary between the two sectors under their control. In the field of currency, for example, the British sterling flowed freely through both sectors and became paramount. It was only when Togoland was redivided that disillusionment with British and French rule began.

Unfortunately, the British and French reapportioned Togoland after World War I in preparation for its transfer to the mandates system. Britain retreated westward allowing France to control nearly two-thirds of the colony. As a result the large Ewe population of nearly a million was cut almost in half, leaving three-fifths of their total population under British administration in the Gold Coast and British Togoland and two-fifths under French control.

The British decision to relinquish most of Togoland came as a result of secret negotiations and was apparently a conciliatory measure.

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9Coleman, op. cit., p. 8.


11Coleman, op. cit., p. 6.

12Hoskins, loc. cit.

13Buell, op. cit., p. 363.
Britain had profited extensively elsewhere, securing all of Tanganyika, and the relinquishment of most of Togoland was an excellent diplomatic gesture. It gave France control of a well developed colony with a rich cocoa economy and very good transportation routes, as compared to most of Africa at that time.

It was not practical, however, for Britain to relinquish all of Togoland. Such a step would weaken its control over the Volta River, which formed the boundary between the Gold Coast and Togoland for some distance and which had good power potential. Further, it would incur the wrath of the large Dagomba tribal nation in the North which would be under one administration so long as Britain kept the western edge of Togoland, as well as the Ewes who were irritated at the prospect of Britain withdrawing from any part of the Ewe area it then controlled. Under the circumstances, Britain found it feasible to allow France control over most of Togoland, but not all of it.

This decision created strong resentment among those groups to be divided by the new boundary. Angriest were the Ewes, who had enjoyed almost complete unification during the short time that Britain controlled most of Togoland. As Togoland was to become part of the mandates system, the final decision on the division of the colony needed the League of Nations' endorsement. Appeals were made to the League and the United States to prevent the division. In April of 1921, President Harding


\[15\] See Ethnic Map, p. 6.
received a cable from southern Togoland stating vividly that Togoland was being "handed to the French contrary to Wilson's fourteen points against the wishes of the natives. We still protest French mandatory. Intervene immediately. Save us."\textsuperscript{16}

Despite the protests and agitation of the Ewes of the South, French control of the capital city, Lomé, and most of Togoland was confirmed by the League of Nations in 1922.\textsuperscript{17} The League was not in a position to reject British and French plans for the former German colony. It was only with difficulty that any form of mandates system was devised in the first place, so strongly was the concept opposed.\textsuperscript{18}

Though agitation continued after the boundary settlement, the border actually constituted no real barrier and goods and peoples crossed with little difficulty. Agitation would probably have disappeared completely had it not been for two continual sources of irritation, one stemming from the boundary delimitation and the other from taxation.

When the final boundary between the French and British Territories was determined, some farms and villages were divided. To correct this, Britain and France stipulated that inhabitants living on either side of the boundary could move their property to the territory of their choice, providing they declared their intent within six months after the

\textsuperscript{16}Buell, op. cit., p. 361.


boundary delimitation. Where lands were split by the border this would mean selling some land and buying new, an idea contrary to tradition for many natives. Among the Ewes, for example, land owned by a family was considered a sacred trust, not to be sold or mortgaged. Therefore, the controlling authorities' proposal for easing the situation offered no solution, and divided villages and lands were a source of irritation as late as 1936. Even though the British-French Togoland border was not difficult to cross, it symbolized administrative separation.

A second source of constant irritation to the natives was the export tax. Because trade routes between British Togoland and the Gold Coast were poor and British Togoland had no seaport, most of the cocoa from the upper southern area of British Togoland was shipped via the French Togoland railroad to the seaport of Lomé. The railroad had originally been built by the Germans to reach the cocoa-rich uplands of Togoland. British Togoland cocoa growers who shipped to Lomé were forced by the British to pay the same export tax as those who used the Gold Coast seaports. Since native growers in French Togoland were not subject to a


22 See Political Map, p. 9.
tax, the growers on the British side felt they were being treated unfairly.\textsuperscript{23}

While there was discontent, no serious problems arose from the administrative separation of Togoland until World War II. Then the French Vichy Government, which controlled French Togoland from 1940 to 1942, closed the border.\textsuperscript{24} This created an economic crisis in British Togoland. Having no seaport, the Territory was now left dependent upon the seaports of the Gold Coast, which meant transporting goods over undeveloped routes leading across the unbridged Volta River. At the same time, the closed border also prevented normal trade movement, made it impossible for natives to farm lands which did not lie in the sector where they resided, and severed relations between segments of those tribes which were separated by the boundary.

After the Vichy Government lost control, the border was reopened, but severe restrictions were put on the transfer of goods and money. As late as 1949 the United Nations found that the different economic systems, exchange control and customs difficulties imposed constraints which the frontier population did not easily bear.\textsuperscript{25}

The importance of conditions in the Togolands during and after World War II can hardly be overemphasized. Along with the influences

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23}Buell, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 363.
\end{itemize}
rendered by the growth of nationalism throughout the world since World War II and the important position of the United Nations in trusteeship affairs, conditions in the two Territories have given a tremendous stimulus to political activity. At the outbreak of World War II no major political organizations existed in British and French Togolands. By 1955 there were seven of major significance and two of minor significance.

These political groups can be divided into three major forces: the integration movement, the status quo movement and the unification movement. The unification movement was prompted by dissatisfaction with the Togoland partition and the hardships it created during and after World War II. It was divided into two camps, Ewe unificationists and Togoland unificationists, both wanting union under one administration. Ewe unification was favored by those Ewe tribal members wanting to unify their tribal area, which stretched continuously across the southern regions of French and British Togolands and the southeastern sector of the Gold Coast. The move for Togoland unification was largely supported by southern tribes of both Togolands who saw certain advantages to uniting the two Territories, and included many Togoland Ewes.

The Ewe unificationists were the first to organize a party. In 1939 the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise was formed in the southern area of French Togoland. It has been the only major political party in that Territory to represent unification. While it originally adhered to Ewe unification, the party shifted its position in 1952 to support Togoland

\[26\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 77.}\]
unification. This was a tactical maneuver worked in cooperation with the closely allied All-Ewe Conference and brought about by the feeling that Ewe unification was a futile cause, whereas Togoland unification was a real possibility.27

The All-Ewe Conference was a pan-Ewe cultural organization which originally advocated the ultimate unity of all Ewes under one government, and was not a political party.28 It held its inaugural session at Accra in the Gold Coast on July 9, 1946, and claimed to be comprised of representatives from the various Ewe unions in the Togolands and the Gold Coast, in addition to the headchiefs who were the traditional rulers of all the local "states" of French Mandated Togoland, British Mandated Togoland and the Gold Coast Ewe area.29 While its strength was not actually this extensive, it was the major Ewe organization during the early years after World War II.

Ewe unificationists turned to history for support of their position. They stated that the Ewe tribe should not be divided by boundaries as it had a common historical origin. Many centuries ago the Ewes migrated from east of the Niger30 to the town of Nautja in southern

27 Coleman, op. cit., p. 33.


29 Togoland under French Administration and Togoland under British Administration: Petition from the All-Ewe Conference Dated 9 August 1947, U.N. Doc. T/Pet.6/5, T/Pet.7/6 (Lake Success: 1947), p. 5. Taken from Readex Microprint, referred to as (R.M.) in following footnotes.

French Togoland, where they lived as a tribal unit until three hundred years ago when many migrated to escape the rule of a despotic chief.\textsuperscript{31} The pro-Ewe unification groups further substantiated their demand for Ewe unification by pointing out that the Ewes spoke the same language, had practically the same local customs and enjoyed essentially the same cultural background.\textsuperscript{32}

These statements were not entirely true though there was support for the Ewe unification position. The Ewes did have a common historical background and a sufficiently high degree of cultural uniformity to justify calling them a tribe. However, dialects varied from one sub-tribe to another, and Ewes from the West sometimes had difficulty understanding those from the East and vice versa. Further, certain religious cults and rituals were peculiar to particular sub-tribes. Moreover, after leaving Nautja three hundred years ago, the Ewes had split into small independent political units which numbered more than a hundred at the end of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{33}

Until the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise and the All-Ewe Conference changed their platforms from Ewe unification to Togoland unification in 1952, Togoland unification was chiefly a British Togoland concept. The original instrument for support of Togoland unification was the Togoland

\textsuperscript{31}\textcite{Manoukian, loc. cit.}
\textsuperscript{32}\textcite{U.N. Doc. T/Pet.6/5, T/Pet.7/6, op. cit., p. 2.}
Union Party created in 1943. Before the advent of the Togoland Congress, it was the only party of significance in the British Territory. This gave it an excellent opportunity to spread its doctrines. In 1951 the party was replaced in a sense by the Togoland Congress, which was formed as an umbrella organization embracing the Togoland Union and the smaller Togoland National Farmers' Union and Togoland Youth Organization, all of British Togoland. It also included representatives from the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise of French Togoland.

There were two other Togoland unification parties, both of minor significance, the Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise and the Mouvement Populaire Togolaise. The Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise was established in 1951 by young men who were former members of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise. They had rejected that party because they felt it did not show enough dynamism in its actions. Unlike the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, the Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise favored Togoland unification from the time of its conception, though Togoland unification remained primarily a British Togoland idea until the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise and the All-Ewe Conference altered their positions in 1952.

The Mouvement Populaire Togolaise was not organized until 1954,

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34 Coleman, op. cit., p. 33.


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when a group of former Parti Togolaise du Progrès members who had re­
jected the status quo position of that party joined together. Like
the Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise, the Mouvement Populaire Togo­
laise very actively supported Togoland unification.

Though Togoland unificationists did not always work together,
they generally supported their position with the argument that Togoland
had been arbitrarily divided without the consent of its people. Togo­
land separation had destroyed the community of interest and the harmony
which the Togolanders had had during the long period they were under
German rule. Further, it prevented the Togoland people from enjoying a
common cultural and political association and injured their economic
position. Togoland unification would satisfy British Togoland's need
for the railroad transportation system of French Togoland and would
bring together two territories with similar problems stemming from a
one-crop economy based on cocoa.

The Togoland unificationists' arguments were not entirely sub­
stantiated by fact. The Togoland unification movement began apparently
as a result of the severe border restrictions imposed since 1940 and
was based on an idealized concept of the old German state. While mem­
bers of the movement could legitimately point to practical reasons for

37Coleman, op. cit., p. 31.

38"Special Report on the Togoland Unification Problem and the
Future of the Trust Territory under British Administration," Trustee­
2 (1955), p. 54.

39Coleman, op. cit., p. 5.
Togoland unification, there was little historical support for the concept. Togoland existed as a complete unit only from 1899 to 1914, and was composed of a great diversity of tribes. The most desirable aspects of Togoland unification would be the resulting unity of a large number of Ewes and some smaller tribes and the formation of a sounder economic unit.

The second of the major movements in the Togolands, the status quo group, was composed of those people in French Togoland who favored a continued close relationship with France. Drawing adherents from both the northern and southern sectors of the Territory, the movement generally opposed both Togoland and Ewe unification, though there was apparently some willingness to accept Togoland unification under French administration. In southern French Togoland the move to maintain the status quo can be traced to France's effort to develop an elite administering class. This elite group enjoyed a privileged status as government officials. Along with others who had profited under French rule they were in a position to lose a great deal should France relinquish control of French Togoland, or if Togoland were united under anything but French rule. Their argument was that the French Territory would profit in terms of economic and social development through close association with France. This class of people formed the Parti Togolaise du Progrès in 1946 to oppose unification.


41 ix Reports of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust
In northern French Togoland the status quo was supported by the Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo, which consisted mostly of the traditional elite and some Western educated persons. This party was established in 1951, mainly in opposition to unification. Its members were afraid of domination by the Ewes and other southerners. Ewe unification would sever them from the coast, leaving them dependent upon the Ewes for trade, and Togoland unification would bring together many of the Ewes and other powerful tribal elements of both Territories.

While arguing that a continued close relationship with France would bring added benefits for French Togoland in terms of economic and social development, the status quo groups also argued that Ewe unification might lead to the "disintegration" of Togoland. The only legitimate unification, said the Parti Togolaise du Progrès, would be that of the two Togolands; but it would not be practical for French Togoland to unite with the economically deficient British Togoland. This was also the argument of the Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo.

The proposals of the Parti Togolaise du Progrès, echoed by the Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo, were that France should

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42 Coleman, op. cit., p. 78.
43 Ibid., p. 29.
continue to rule French Togoland. However, it should guarantee the na­
tives a large part in the effective management of all aspects of their
country's affairs and should recognize that its purpose was to promote
French Togoland's progress and not confine the people within the narrow
limits of servitude. Further, the status quo groups not only favored
eventual self-government, but also a continued association with the
French Union, which has led to their further title of "unionists."

There were merits to the status quo as defined by its adherents,
such as continued economic aid and eventual self-government; but the
arguments against Togoland unification especially were questionable.
There were factors against Ewe unification, it is true. Ewe unification
would have brought together the richest and most advanced areas of the
Togolands, leaving the rest of the Territories economically barren.
This would certainly have been detrimental, though it is unlikely it
would have led to the destruction or "disintegration" of the Togolands,
as implied by the Parti Togolaise du Progrès. Contrary to the party's
further arguments that Togoland unification would be detrimental to
French Togoland, it would seem that Togoland unification might have been
beneficial to both areas. Territorial unification would have given Brit­
ish Togoland transportation routes and an outlet to the sea. Though it
was true that British Togoland lagged behind French Togoland in develop­
ment, French Togoland would have benefited from the rich cocoa areas in
the British Territory. Together the two might eventually have become

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self-sustaining, as they had been during the last few years under German rule, particularly with economic assistance from the Administering Authority. The Togoland unificationists, after all, did not ask for independence, but one administration.

The third and last of the major native groups was the integration movement. Integration was a proposal whereby British Togoland would be dissolved into the Gold Coast. Prompted by political forces in the Gold Coast, it gained support in all parts of British Togoland, particularly in the North where many of the people were tribally related to natives in the northern Gold Coast. No real move for integration began until it became apparent that the Gold Coast would soon be an independent country. The Gold Coast and British Togoland lie side by side and the British administered the small Territory as part of the Gold Coast. Politicians in the colony, once they had realized their objective of eventual independence, became concerned over the possibility that British Togoland would be separated from the Gold Coast when the colony emerged from its colonial status. With assistance from Britain, which felt it was impractical to rule British Togoland independently from the Gold Coast, they worked hard to impress upon the Territory's people the desirability of merging with the colony when it became independent.

The major party behind the movement for integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast was the Convention People's Party. It was the majority party in the Gold Coast and largely responsible for the

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48 Beer, loc. cit.
Gold Coast's advancement toward independence. After it was relatively sure of this goal, the party turned its attention to British Togoland, with the hope of integrating it into the Gold Coast.\footnote{Coleman, op. cit., p. 39.} Branches were established in the southern areas of British Togoland to spread the doctrine of integration, urging the people to support union with the Gold Coast at the moment the colony became independent.

The Convention People's Party argued that the integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast was the logical result of the geographic, ethnic and economic circumstances of the Trust Territory.\footnote{"General Assembly Resolution 750 (VIII): The Togoland Unification Problem," Trusteeship Council, Official Records, Thirteenth Session, 50th Meeting, 1 March 1954, no. 11, p. 186.} This was only partly true. Ethnically, British Togoland and the Gold Coast were tied by the occurrence of two large tribal groups in both countries, the Dagombas of the North and the Ewes of the South.\footnote{See Ethnic Map, p. 6.} Further, they had had a common administration since 1914, which had resulted in the development of similar though not equal institutions of education, health and government. These were not equal in that British Togoland was generally neglected in favor of development for the Gold Coast.\footnote{F. M. Bourett, The Gold Coast: A Survey of the Gold Coast and British Togoland, 1919-1951. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 114.} The joint administration tended to strengthen what common ethnic ties of language and history existed, whereas the separate institutions which had evolved in the two Togolands since their division
resulted in the weakening of their ethnic ties. Basically, though, ethnic factors gave little justification for either Togoland unification or integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast.

The Convention People's Party had even less support for integration as a logical result of geographic and economic circumstances. In the South the two regions were separated by the Volta River, which was unbridged, and north of the Volta there were no particular geographic factors to unite the areas. Until the Volta could be bridged, geography was against integration. It was more feasible for British Togoland to use the transportation system of French Togoland, which gave the rich cocoa areas of both Territories an outlet to the sea. Even if the Volta were bridged, good transportation routes between the Gold Coast and British Togoland were lacking.53

Another party which supported integration was the Northern People's Party of the northern Gold Coast. While in opposition to the Convention People's Party on most matters, it gave vigorous approval to integration.54 The Party argued that the northern peoples of both British Togoland and the Gold Coast had common tribal ties which would be severed if the Territory did not become a part of the Gold Coast when the British colony received its independence.55 This was a valid

53See Political Map, p. 9.
54Coleman, op. cit., p. 38.
assertion, for many of the northern tribes of British Togoland had counterparts in the Gold Coast, though the British-French Togoland border also divided some groups.\textsuperscript{56}

Later the Northern People's Party grew hesitant about integration, fearing that the northern peoples would be subject to domination by the heavily populated areas of the South, unless some autonomy was maintained. They demanded a federal relationship with the southern Gold Coast for the northern areas of British Togoland and the Gold Coast.\textsuperscript{57}

Of the parties and organizations which interacted with each other and with the Administering Authorities to influence the United Nations' decision on the future of the Togoland Trust Territories, the All-Ewe Conference was the most important during the preliminary developments after World War II. The pan-Ewe organization's petitions to the United Nations in 1947 resulted in the first consideration of Togoland's problems by the United Nations and began the evolutionary process which thus far has resulted in the release of British Togoland from trust status and its inclusion in the independent state of Ghana, formerly the Gold Coast, and in the French promise of independence for French Togoland in 1960.\textsuperscript{58}

In one of its petitions to the United Nations the All-Ewe

\textsuperscript{56}"Special Report on the Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 8.


Conference asked permission to support its written petitions by an oral presentation before the United Nations. Permission was granted and at the second session of the Trusteeship Council in 1947 an All-Ewe Conference representative, Sylvanus Olympio, appeared to demand the unification of the Ewe tribes into an Eweland under one administration. Unhindered by strong opposing native forces, which were only beginning to evolve, the All-Ewe Conference representative made a strong case for Ewe unification that the British and French could counter only in part. Most important, he unwittingly set in motion events which, while they did not bring Ewe unification, brought vast economic, social and political changes to the lives of the people of both British and French Togoland.

CHAPTER II

THE ALL-EWE CONFERENCE PRESENTS ITS CASE

The division of Togoland during World War I and the administrative separation of the eastern and western parts was abhorrent to many of the natives of Togoland. It resulted in discontent and some agitation, which was heightened when the boundary was closed for a time during World War II. This discontent and agitation continued unabated with the application after the boundary was reopened of severe restrictions dictated by protectionist policies.¹

Militant groups developed asking for some type of reunification. Their demands were countered by the formation of native groups in French Togoland which supported continued French rule and of native groups in British Togoland urging the integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast. Britain and France lent strong support to the latter organizations.

Much of the political conflict resulting from the divergence of demands was fought out in the halls of the United Nations. The fact that the future of the trust territories depended upon the United Nations' decisions was not lost to the various groups, who realized the

importance of impressing their views upon the organs of the United Na-
tions concerned with trusteeship matters.

The variety of groups lobbying in the United Nations and their
highly diversified demands created a major problem for the world organi-
ization. It was difficult for its organs to determine correct courses of
action, or to determine if in some instances any action should be taken.

The first native group to take advantage of the United Nations' position of ultimate responsibility for trusteeship matters was the All-
Ewe Conference, which wanted the unification of the geographically con-
tiguous Ewe subtribes into an Ewe nation. The All-Ewe Conference was
able to present its case directly to the Trusteeship Council and make a
strong impression upon that body. Although the native organization was
not successful in obtaining Ewe unification, it set the stage for con-
centrated efforts by various Togoland groups and the British and French
to force certain decisions from the United Nations and to influence
other decisions.

Prior to appearing before the second session of the Trusteeship
Council, the All-Ewe Conference sent petitions to the United Nations
which were impassioned pleas for unification of the Ewe people under a
single administration. The Conference argued that the partition of
Togoland and the consequent division of the Ewes had been accomplished
without determining the wishes of the Ewe people and that the division
was a serious blow to their existence. The All-Ewe Conference said that
unification was necessary for economic, social, political and educational
progress.\textsuperscript{2} It stated that the Ewes were a people of the same origin, who spoke the same language, Ewe, and who were socially united by the closest ties of kinship, language and culture.\textsuperscript{3}

The All-Ewe Conference then turned its attention to administration. It attacked the differences between British and French administration, saying that they severely hindered Ewe unity. The British prepared people for self-government and took account of the indigenous culture, making provisions for its development. On the other hand, the French colonial policy led in an entirely different direction. It called for the conversion of colonial peoples to full French citizenship, and therefore aimed at giving the people French culture rather than developing the indigenous culture. The differences between British and French colonial policies was resulting in a division of Ewe culture which the Ewes felt was unjust. This, the All-Ewe Conference said, had in turn led to a widespread dissatisfaction among both the literate and illiterate.\textsuperscript{4}

The native organization further argued that geographically and economically the Ewes were injured by the boundary divisions. British Togoland had no seacoast and had to depend upon sending its goods to Accra in the Gold Coast. The All-Ewe Conference said that while Accra

\textsuperscript{2}Togoland under British Administration and Togoland under French Administration: Petition from the All-Ewe Conference Dated 26 July 1947, U.N. Doc. T/Pet.6/3, T/Pet.7/4 (Lake Success: 1947), pp. 3-4. (R.M.)


\textsuperscript{4}Ibid., pp. 1-2.
was on the sea it had no port facilities. Furthermore, all traffic over the two main roads from Eweland to Accra had to cross the river Volta, which had not been bridged. If Eweland existed as a unit, all the Ewes would be able to ship their goods to the French Togoland port of Lomé, which had port facilities and was closer for the larger portion of Ewes than Accra. At the present time they could not do this because the French Territory was separated from British Togoland and the Ewes of the Gold Coast by strict frontier regulations which made trade practically impossible.5

In attempting to make its arguments as strong as possible, the All-Ewe Conference asserted that its group was composed of the head chiefs, who were the traditional rulers of all the local states of French Togoland, British Togoland and of the Gold Coast Ewes. It asserted, too, that the representatives of the various Ewe unions in all three areas were a part of the organization's membership.6

The Trusteeship Council also received a petition from the Belgian Congo branch of the All-Ewe Conference. This group's arguments were quite similar to those presented by the parent organization, but went further, saying that the frontier between British and French Togoland cut indiscriminately through local states, villages and farms, thus separating sections of people from their chiefs, relatives and farms. It would be impossible for the Ewes to learn to exercise self-government when divided by borders and under different administrations. The branch

5Ibid., p. 20.
6Ibid., p. 15.
organization suggested unification under the British system.  

Before its second session the Council received one petition favoring unification besides those from the All-Ewe Conference and its branch.  This was from Augustino de Souza of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, who was an important native figure in the Lomé area of French Togoland.  Signed also by traditional chiefs and notables, the petition asked for essentially the same thing as the All-Ewe Conference petitions.

Some of the Trusteeship Council members were impressed by the petitions, particularly the Iraqi representative. Most agreed that the seriousness of the assertions indicated that they should give the All-Ewe Conference the oral hearing it demanded.

In answer to the written petitions and in preparation for the oral presentation by an All-Ewe Conference representative, the British and French drew up a joint memorandum.  A very long, very impressive, and very logical document, it attempted to dispel some of the impressions conveyed by the petitions and to supply solutions for those


10 Ibid., p. 37.
conceded to be true.

In this document, the British and French noted first that the Ewes were a minority of 800,000 centered in the southern areas of the Gold Coast, British Togoland and French Togoland. They explained that the Ewes had nothing in common with the natives of the North or of the greater part of Togoland for that matter. There were, however, certain tribes of Middle Togoland, such as the Agotime and Adangbe, which had adopted the Ewes' language to a large extent and identified themselves with that tribe.\(^{11}\)

The Administering Authorities agreed that the Ewes did have bonds of common origin, language and customs in spite of what they termed the "extreme independence" of Ewe sub-tribes. They said these bonds had been rapidly growing in strength. Within the last fifteen years most of the Ewe divisions of British Togoland and the Gold Coast had formed themselves into confederacies for the purposes of local government, and spontaneous pan-Ewe movements had occurred among the educated Ewe communities in the large towns.\(^{12}\)

The British and French also said in their joint memorandum that there was reason to believe the All-Ewe Conference expressed the objects and views of the mass of the Ewe people, both educated and uneducated. But they wondered if the Ewes' request for unification was actually based on the characteristics that distinguished the Ewes from the


\(^{12}\)Ibid., p. 26.
neighboring peoples and on their increased awareness of their common identity. The Authorities wondered if the request for unification were not based instead on the substantial grievances, produced by the partition of Eweland, which had stimulated unification demands since 1940. They admitted that there were significant differences in the colonial policies of the two countries and many of the complaints concerning the boundary divisions were legitimate, though not long-standing. These difficulties stemmed from troubles that arose during World War II.\textsuperscript{13}

In the view of the British and French, not only was it true that the demands for Ewe unification lacked longevity, but Ewe unification itself was undesirable. A unified Eweland would be impractical. Under the most favorable circumstances it would be likely to remain an enclave of West Africa, limited in human and material resources. Besides, some of the Ewes lived in the Gold Coast, which was a colony of Britain and outside the jurisdiction of the trusteeship system. And even if Ewe unification were practical, it would be a mistake to unify the Ewes, for this could stimulate other demands for tribal unity and result in a movement to divide the continent into a "mosaic" of rival countries.\textsuperscript{14}

The Administering Authorities believed it would be more practical to remove as many of the obstacles as possible which hindered the movement of individuals and goods across the border and to introduce measures which would assure cultural and social unity. The removal of border obstacles would require the abolition of permits and other

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., pp. 26-27 and 31.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., pp. 33-34.
formalities and the establishment of a zone where all disabilities resulting from the customs frontier would be removed. Also, the Authorities recognized that steps should be taken to insure that the same individuals were not taxed in both Territories for the same reasons. To assist cultural unity they would introduce English into the primary and secondary schools of French Togoland and French into the primary schools of British Togoland. A university fund would be established to give especially qualified students an opportunity to study in the institutions of higher learning in either of the Territories. Such steps would help relieve difficulties created by the border and by dual administration.15

The British and French program, presented in their joint document, culminated with the statement that they would establish a standing consultative commission to handle Ewe affairs. The commission, under the joint chairmanship of the Gold Coast Governor and the Commissaire de la République of French Togoland, would consist of two representatives from each Territory. The commission's task would be to secure the coordination and the necessary impetus needed to carry out programs suggested by the British and French. To insure that adopted programs covered all spheres affecting the well-being and progress of the Territories' peoples, the British and French would see that periodic discussions were held between technical officers of the two Territories and between local administering officers from each side of the frontier. Whenever appropriate, African representatives would be invited to participate in these

15 Ibid., pp. 34-35.
discussions. Effective action by the standing consultative commission, Britain and France believed, would remove the difficulties created by the frontier and guarantee the Togoland people all the advantages which in the past had been significant in their advancement.\textsuperscript{16}

A little over a week before a representative from the All-Ewe Conference was designated to speak before the Council, another native group entered the picture with the purpose of disavowing the petitions sent by the All-Ewe Conference and its forthcoming oral petition. The pro-French, status quo Parti Togolaise du Progrès informed the Trusteeship Council that the All-Ewe Conference delegate enroute to the United Nations represented only a single party and had no mandate from the population. The delegate, Sylvanus Olympio, was solely a representative of the Ewe petitioners and was not qualified to speak on behalf of the majority of French Togolanders.\textsuperscript{17}

The Parti Togolaise du Progrès further said that the Ewes were only a small minority among all the tribes forming the population of Togoland; actually it was the Parti Togolaise du Progrès which represented the majority of the people. As a representative of the majority it approved of the Franco-British memorandum with its plan for a joint commission rather than any type of unification. The establishment of an Ewe state, the party stated, would lead to the disintegration of Togoland. The only legitimate unification was of the two Togolands.

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., pp. 35-36.

However, this was not practical. French Togoland would suffer from unification with the underdeveloped British Togoland. The only time Togoland unification would be desirable was when the two Territories had achieved a high enough degree of economic, political and social maturity to enable them to manage their own affairs.¹⁸

On the eighth of December 1947, Sylvanus Olympio spoke before the Trusteeship Council as the oral petitioner for the All-Ewe Conference. He told the Council that the Ewes were a very sizable population in Togoland and the Gold Coast, numbering about one million (the British and French estimate was 800,000—see page twenty-nine), and their importance should not be disregarded. Olympio said the Ewes' difficulties began with the first division of their area between the Gold Coast and German Togoland. Although the Volta River formed a natural boundary between the Gold Coast tribes and the Ewes, the boundary had not followed the Volta River all the way to the coast, but had jagged across the river to include in the Gold Coast Ewe peoples on the eastern side. The British and French had done nothing to right this when they acquired Togoland, but had further divided the Ewes by a British-French Togoland boundary. Even though protests were made when the Ewes learned about the intended division, the two powers went right ahead with the plan. Olympio noted that in the years afterwards the Permanent Mandates Commission had had to deal with many problems created by the frontier.

Moreover, the press and the public had often criticized the boundary line on the grounds that it was not based on natural considerations such as language, race, and local customs.\textsuperscript{19}

At the present time agitation for unification of Eweland was becoming more and more intense, he said. During World War II difficulties had arisen between the French and British governments, and contact between Ewes living in the British and French zones had become very difficult and sometimes impossible—especially from 1940 to 1942. This state of affairs had finally culminated in the creation of the All-Ewe Conference, backed by Ewe peoples in all territories.\textsuperscript{20}

Turning his attention to the joint memorandum submitted by the French and British, Olympio challenged many of the comments made by the Administering Authorities. They had said that a separate Ewe state would mean "Balkanization" of Togoland. He said he agreed to the need for larger groupings and this made it essential that the Ewe country should not remain split into three parts.\textsuperscript{21}

On the subject of the adverse effect of unification on other tribes he said that it was true there were important tribes in northern Togoland which were ethnologically different from the Ewes. However, their population was only 600,000 (the British and French estimated


\textsuperscript{20}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 324.

\textsuperscript{21}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 325-26.
about 730,000\(^{22}\) and they would undoubtedly enjoy living together under one administration. However, this was a hypothetical consideration anyway, for all the Ewes wanted was the unification of Eweland, not Togoland.\(^{23}\)

Referring to the recommendations of the Administering Authorities in their joint memorandum, Olympio said his people found them hopelessly inadequate, though it did appear that the Administering Authorities sincerely wanted to help them. He noted that the customs barrier between French and British Togolands was one of the greatest stumbling blocks in international trade and commerce, so important in the development of a country. The customs barrier also affected social, cultural and religious contacts. While the joint memorandum mentioned removal of the customs barrier, no date had been proposed for such an action.\(^{24}\)

Olympio also was critical of the memorandum for its failure to make any specific mention of the necessity for harmonizing the administrative machinery and the differing methods of administration which he believed "in all cases should recognize native institutions."\(^{25}\)

Lastly, he found the proposal in the joint memorandum for a standing consultative commission inadequate. The commission was given no power to consider the integration of affairs outside the economic and cultural sphere. Further, the manner in which the two representatives

\(^{22}\)Ibid., 13th Meeting, 10 December 1947, no. 35, pp. 397-98.

\(^{23}\)Ibid., 11th Meeting, 8 December 1947, no. 33, p. 324.

\(^{24}\)Ibid., pp. 326-27.

\(^{25}\)Ibid., p. 327.
of the inhabitants were to be chosen for the commission was not defined. Moreover, the permanent secretariat of the commission, whose job would be to coordinate the efforts of the two Administrations, was to be appointed by the two governments without deference to the wishes of the Ewe people. The whole idea of a standing consultative commission, Olympio felt, was a makeshift solution that did not meet the basic problems. For the Ewe people to have true and orderly progress they must have a common educational system, the same political organization throughout the land, and economic unity. These could only be brought about through the complete unification of Eweland under one administration.26

The Trusteeship Council gave serious consideration to Olympio's speech and questioned him in detail on such subjects as the All-Ewe Conference's views on government, health, education, economics, unification, population, tribal groups and so on. Olympio conceded that health facilities were not at a disadvantage due to being under two systems, but conversely he felt that the diametrically opposed educational systems tended to divide the country further and were not desirable. He restressed the economic handicap imposed by the French-British Togoland boundary. Boundary regulations prevented movement from one area to the other without a passport, and currency and exchange controls prevented a man from working in one Territory and supporting his family residing in the other. There were also restrictions on the shipment of some

26 Ibid., pp. 327-28.
goods across the border and the prohibition of others.\textsuperscript{27}

In view of his earlier demand for a unified Eweland, Olympio made a surprising comment on unification. He said the All-Ewe Conference accepted the suggestion by the Administering Powers that there would be no great advantage in cutting Eweland from the rest of Togoland. It would rather have a united Togoland under one administration, including that part of the Gold Coast occupied by the Ewes.\textsuperscript{28} This was an evident political maneuver on the part of Olympio to gain support from Trusteeship Council members who might fear the detrimental effect of Ewe unification upon the remaining area of the Togoland Territories, for the All-Ewe Conference continued to favor Ewe unification as opposed to Togoland unification until 1952.\textsuperscript{29}

Olympio was not questioned about his change in policy on Ewe unification, but was asked instead why he thought Britain would allow part of the Gold Coast colony to be included in a united Togoland. He said that his people had such a good relationship with the United Kingdom Government that they thought the British might be persuaded to give up that part of the Gold Coast occupied by the Ewes as a means of bringing all Ewes under one administration.\textsuperscript{30}

The Trusteeship Council was not fully convinced of the necessity

\textsuperscript{27}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 331-33.

\textsuperscript{28}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 337-38.


\textsuperscript{30}"Consideration of Petitions Presented," \textit{op. cit.}, 12th Meeting, 9 December 1947, no. 34, p. 348.
for any type of unification. For example, the United States representative asked Olympio if the removal of present economic barriers by a customs union would not overcome economic difficulties; and the New Zealand delegate did not feel that the Council could form any opinion until they had heard more from the Administering Powers and from peoples which the All-Ewe Conference did not represent.31

After the questioning of Olympio was concluded, members of the Council questioned the Administering Authorities in great detail. Much of the discussion centered upon the division of the two Togolands. In answer to queries, the Administering Authorities explained that it was necessary that exchange controls be maintained at the present time because of differences in the economies, but hoped the necessity for restrictions would soon disappear.32

Concerning tribal unity, they felt it was regrettable that it had not been preserved, but no serious crisis had been caused by the frontier in the past because it had not constituted a barrier. It was the control of French Togoland by the Vichy Government which had created difficulties, this and the natural hardships brought on by World War II. The nature and origin of these hardships were economic and social and not at all political.33

Questioned on Ewe nationalism, the British and French said it was an elite-originated movement that had secured support from the

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31Ibid., 11th Meeting, 8 December 1947, no. 33, pp. 338-39.
32Ibid., 12th Meeting, 9 December 1947, no. 34, p. 351.
33Ibid., pp. 353-54.
masses because of economic and social dissatisfaction. Surprisingly, they felt that it was more than a local nationalist movement and was part of a great spirit of political exultation which had taken place throughout Africa since the war. But their opinion, particularly that of the French, was that feelings were mixed in Togoland at the present time and it would be dangerous to choose any particular current as the main stream and pursue a policy favorable only to this current.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 354-56.}

The British and French thought the suggestions in their joint memorandum would dispel the strong nationalist movement by doing away with many of the conditions resulting from the frontier and by bringing the Ewe people in closer contact with each other. They argued that the standing consultative commission, suggested in the memorandum, would not be just an economic, social and cultural commission as Olympio foresaw it, but would also be political. After all, it would have the power to implement the program and exert influence on the two Administrations in order to insure adherence to the program. Pressing the point further, the Administering Authorities emphasized that the commission would be representative. They assured the Trusteeship Council and the All-Ewe Conference that the Ewe population would be fully represented on the commission by their own people. For example, the French Togoland representatives would be chosen from the natives who were officers of the Representative Assembly of French Togoland.\footnote{Ibid., p. 358.} Of course this raised the question of what would happen if the Ewes lost their majority in the
Representative Assembly, a point not considered by the Trusteeship Council. Would non-Ewes sit on the consultative commission then?

The Administering Authorities' conclusion was that it would be foolish to change administrations for one of the Territories, the necessary result of unifying the Territories under British or French administration. They were referring to Olympio's statement in which he outwardly abandoned the Eweland concept and said the All-Ewe Conference would rather have a united Togoland under one administration than cut Eweland away from the rest of Togoland. Changing administrations, said France and Britain, would mean a change for one Territory in the official language and in administrative techniques. Besides, the French representative added, the questions of frontiers and unification lay outside the competence of the Trusteeship Council.  

France was quite concerned about unification, for it stood to lose a larger and better developed area than Britain, particularly under the concept of Togoland unification. And while the All-Ewe Conference had not stated which Administering Authority it would prefer, the majority of Ewes probably favored British administration. Under British administration, even if Britain refused to relinquish the Ewe areas of the Gold Coast, which was likely, all Ewes would still be under one control.

The feelings of the Trusteeship Council members on the various arguments and proposals differed considerably. The reaction of the anticolonialistic American representative, Gerig, was predictable. He felt that the frontier was not very defensible and disagreed strongly with

36 Ibid., pp. 370-71.
the French contention that the questions of frontiers and unification
were outside the consideration of the Trusteeship Council. He noted
that on two occasions the Mandates Commission had made recommendations
in reference to the frontiers and the mandatory powers had followed
them. He could not see that the Trusteeship Council had any less author­
ity than the Permanent Mandates Commission had had. He accepted the
proposals of the British and French, but as steps toward ultimate unifi­
cation.

The Chinese representative said his records showed that the
frontier between the two Togolands had been drawn arbitrarily and he
wondered why nothing had been done to correct this. He said that the
longer separate administrations were maintained, the more difficult it
would be for the people to advance toward unification. He thought a
possible solution might be the joint administration of Togoland.

The Iraqi delegate was quite irritated about the whole division
problem. He wanted to know why it was that the Togolese at large had
not been consulted on the division of Togoland, particularly as protests
and objections had been going on since 1884. He wondered if military
strength gave the right to a power to impose partition on a country and
disregard the wishes and aspirations of the population. Did this con­
stitute a right in international law? He doubted that the Administering

38 Ibid., 12th Meeting, 9 December 1947, no. 34, p. 379.
39 Ibid., pp. 368-73.
Authorities' plan would satisfy the aspirations of the population.\textsuperscript{40}

The Belgian representative took a much more moderate position. He did not think that a frontier necessarily meant a barrier. Secondly, he thought that consideration had to be given to the non-Ewe peoples of Togoland. He believed that the Trusteeship Council should support the Administering Powers in their intention to put an end to the genuine frontier difficulties.\textsuperscript{41}

The delegate from the Philippines was concerned about the two distinct educational systems and felt a single educational system would go far in bringing about unity.\textsuperscript{42}

The New Zealand representative took a position much the same as that of the United States, but slightly more radical. He was grateful for the proposals put forth by the British and French, but did not think they could be regarded as a final step. In his view they were merely a "palliative."\textsuperscript{43}

Forsyth of Australia frankly favored the Administering Authorities' proposals. He believed that great weight should be given to the advice of Britain and France who would naturally have a long-standing knowledge of the people, their problems and their capacities. He thought they had presented a practical attack to the problem, but wished

\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., 13th Meeting, 10 December 1947, no. 35, pp. 400-02.
\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., pp. 408-10.
\textsuperscript{42}Ibid., p. 394.
\textsuperscript{43}Ibid., pp. 412-14.
that they had expressed a more positive tone.\textsuperscript{44}

The Mexican delegate felt the matter could not be decided until the first Visiting Mission had had a chance to travel through Togoland and to present its findings.\textsuperscript{45} One of the designated powers of the Trusteeship Council is to provide for "periodic visits by United Nations missions to the respective trust territories at times agree upon with the administering authority."\textsuperscript{46}

In view of the conflicting opinions among the Council members, it was obvious that there would probably be difficulty in arriving at a solution that would be satisfactory to most of the members. As was normal procedure, once discussion was completed the matter was referred to a drafting committee on resolutions. At this time the committee was composed of the Trust Powers of Australia and the United States and two non-Trust Powers, Iraq and China.\textsuperscript{47}

When the draft resolution was presented to the main body of the Trusteeship Council, disagreement broke out over two major points. The first of these concerned the frontier: had it been a hardship to the Ewes since the beginning of World War II, or for a more enduring period of time? The French and British argued that the hardships had existed only a short time, but the majority disagreed and overruled the

\textsuperscript{44}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 418.

\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 390.


\textsuperscript{47}"Consideration of Petitions Presented," \textit{op. cit.}, 13th Meeting, 10 December 1947, no. 35, p. 423.
Administering Authorities on this issue. It was important to Olympia that they did. Part of his appeal for unification of some kind was based on the contention that the boundary had long been a source of discontent.

The second point of discord concerned the formulation of the standing consultative commission suggested by the British and French in their original joint memorandum. The draft resolution, as it came out of committee, followed the outlined proposals for the commission made in the memorandum, which left the native representatives to the commission without any power. In part the proposals said that to insure that the program of cooperation between the two Territories covered all spheres affecting the well-being and progress of the peoples it would be necessary to organize periodic discussions between technical officers of the two Territories and periodic meetings of the local administrative officers from each side of the frontier. The two native representatives from each side would be invited to participate in these discussions and meetings "whenever appropriate." This meant that the commission's power lay in the hands of the British and French who would apparently direct matters and call in the native representatives if they should feel it necessary.

48 Ibid., 17th Meeting, 17 December 1947, no. 45, pp. 555-60.


50 "Ewe Petitions: Observations Submitted by the Governments of France and the United Kingdom," op. cit., p. 35.
When the draft resolution following the Administering Authorities' concepts came out of committee it was challenged by a majority of the delegates to the Trusteeship Council. They felt that the native representatives should not be mere figureheads, but should "normally" take part in discussions between technical officers and in periodic meetings between the local administrative officials, rather than to be invited when the Administering Authorities felt it was appropriate.\textsuperscript{51}

The final version of the Trusteeship Council resolution was not a real victory for any one group attempting to influence the Council; however, if anything, it did give more weight to the suggestions of the Administering Authorities than to the demands of the All-Ewe Conference. This was logical. Britain and France had shown a willingness to take action on the Ewe complaints and had come forth with a fairly comprehensive program. These factors weighed in their favor. However, the All-Ewe Conference was successful in creating an awareness of the Ewe problem and in attaining action on the part of the Trusteeship Council and the Administering Authorities that was not a rejection of the unification concept.

An examination of the Trusteeship Council resolution reveals fairly clearly the relative influences of the All-Ewe Conference and the Administering Authorities of Britain and France in their interaction upon the Trusteeship Council, though it does not indicate what influence, if any, the Parti Togolaise du Progrès had on the Council at this time.

In essence the resolution said the following: the Trusteeship Council is aware that the petitions of the All-Ewe Conference represent the wishes of the majority of the Ewe population. The Council realizes that the existing frontiers dividing the Ewe people have been a cause of real difficulty to them and have aroused resentment on their part. The Council welcomes the measures proposed by the Administering Authorities and considers them as representing an earnest and constructive initial effort to meet the immediate difficulties described in the Ewe petitions. It recommends that the British and French foster the association and cooperation of the Ewe people. The two should assist the Ewes in developing their capacity for self-government through free discussion among themselves and increased opportunities for education. In the future, the Trusteeship Council wants a more precise statement of the proposed measures to be undertaken. It asks that the Administering Authorities consult with each other and with Ewe representatives with a view toward developing further measures for fulfilling the wishes of the Ewe people. In conclusion, the first Visiting Mission should devote special attention to the Ewe problem and toward measures to cope with the problem.\(^5^2\)

The resolution shows that the Council accepted the proposals of the Administering Authorities generally, but with the reservations that they must relieve the situation so far as possible and that these were only preliminary steps toward a solution of the Ewe problem.

The All-Ewe Conference had been given an opportunity to plead its case, but the Conference had been far from victorious. The majority of Trusteeship Council members were impressed by the All-Ewe Conference's unification plea, which they felt was representative of the dissatisfaction among the greater majority of the Ewe people. But there was no strong indication that the Trusteeship Council considered either Ewe or Togoland unification as necessarily the answer. Conversely, there was no indication that it was willing to accept completely the proposals put forth by Britain and France; those proposals were regarded rather as steps toward an ultimate solution. The predominant feeling among Council members was that no final decision could be made on Ewe or Togoland unification until more information was secured. The most effective method for the Council to get information on conditions in the Trusteeship Territories was through the use of visiting missions, which the Council was empowered to send periodically at times agreed upon with the Administering Authorities concerned.53

Until such a time that the first Visiting Mission to the Togoland Territories had made its visit and presented its findings, the Trusteeship Council would not take any further steps. This resulted in a considerable delay. It was some time before the Council determined what member nations of its body should be represented on the four-man mission. It was another year before the Mission which was also scheduled to visit the Cameroons was sent. A mission was already slated to

visit Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi during 1948, and the weather in West Africa was bad for traveling during the early part of 1949. In November of that year the Mission finally left for West Africa and visited the Togoland Trust Territories during December. It was in July of 1950, or more than two and one half years since its considerations in December of 1947, that the Council pondered the question of unification for a second time.

The delay gave opponents of the unification concepts an opportunity to organize and marshal their forces, which was only short of disastrous from the viewpoint of the All-Ewe Conference. At the same time, a strong movement for Togoland unification developed during the two and one half years, also weakening the All-Ewe Conference's position in favor of Ewe unification. This was a position which it continued to maintain until 1952 despite Olympic's speech encompassing the larger prospect of Togoland unification including the Ewe areas of the Gold Coast.

When the Trusteeship Council did reopen the Togoland unification question, the situation was quite altered and much more confused as the Council was confronted by an increased number of native parties and


organizations with dissimilar demands. From amongst these demands and with apparent dependency upon the Mission's report, the Trusteeship Council arrived upon a new decision affecting the evolutionary processes in British and French Togolands.
CHAPTER III

THE DECISION FOR AN ENLARGED CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

At the second session of the Trusteeship Council, which was held in December of 1947, the All-Ewe Conference of British and French Togoland and the Gold Coast attempted to convince the Trusteeship Council that unification of the Ewe tribal areas was essential. It was unsuccessful. However, the way was held open for some kind of unification in the future, dependent partly on the findings of a first Visiting Mission to be sent to West Africa.

As a mission was already scheduled to visit East Africa in 1948, the West African Mission was delayed until 1949. During 1949 it was again delayed, this time by weather conditions, and it was not until November of that year that the Mission departed. It toured the Togoland Territories during December and thereafter submitted its report, which was considered during the Trusteeship Council's summer session of 1950. At this time the whole unification question was reopened.

The Council was confronted by a multiplicity of native forces, each hoping to influence the United Nations. The All-Ewe Conference's use of the Trusteeship Council in 1947 in an effort to secure Ewe unification had made Togoland unificationists and anti-unificationists aware of the United Nations' position as a powerful force in the future of the

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two Trust Territories. The two and one-half years between the Council's unification considerations of 1947 and 1950 gave them ample time to develop cohesive programs for promoting their concepts.

With the Administering Authorities of Britain and France, the native groups formed a strong interacting element affecting the United Nations. It was very evident by 1950 that the increased role which the United Nations played in the future of the world's trust territories, as compared to the role which the League of Nations had played in the future of the mandates, was having its effect upon the political activity of the natives in the Togoland Trust Territories. They saw in the United Nations an opportunity to promote their own concepts for the future of the two territories and worked actively toward this end.

The pressure applied by the tribal groups and the Administering Authorities upon the Trusteeship Council as the major body concerned with trusteeship affairs in 1950, along with the findings of the United Nations Mission to West Africa, resulted in a new decision for Togoland's unification problem. It was decided that the Standing Consultative Commission established to solve boundary problems in the Ewe areas should become a Togoland commission with enlarged powers and membership.¹

The first Visiting Mission to West Africa, upon whose findings the Council was dependent, was chosen by the Council and consisted of representatives of the United States, Iraq, Mexico and Belgium.²


²"Continuation of the Discussion of Arrangements for a Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa: Item 5 on the Agenda,"
Belgium and the United States represented those countries which administered trust territories and Iraq and Mexico those that did not. This composition was significant, for with the exception of Belgium, each country participating in the Mission had shown itself to be sympathetic to the Ewe cause. Khalidy of Iraq, who was the Mission chairman, had been particularly active in his support of Ewe unification.

It was unfortunate that the Mission was scheduled to leave in November. Besides visiting British and French Togolands, the Mission also had to visit the Cameroons. Thus it was given only twenty days to travel through both Togoland Territories in order to finish before Christmas. Normally, visits to a trust territory have averaged about three weeks. Within the twenty days the first Visiting Mission was supposed to make a thorough study of the "political, economic, social and educational conditions," to pay particular attention to the "petitions relating to the Ewe problem," and to "investigate on the spot . . . petitions dealing with the conditions of the indigenous inhabitants." While Togoland is not large, 33,700 square miles, it was


Ibid., p. 549.


impossible for the Visiting Mission to make a thorough study of all these problems in the short time allotted.

Considering the volume of work assigned, the Mission's "Special Report on the Ewe problem" was surprisingly complete. It had two weaknesses, however, both indicative of the Mission's need for more time to conduct the survey. The report necessarily depended largely on French and British materials, which may or may not have been accurate, and on the petitions received, which may or may not have been representative of the attitudes of the population.

One of the first concerns of the Visiting Mission in its report on the Togoland Trust Territories was the work of the Standing Consultative Commission. This Commission had been established in 1948 to secure the necessary cooperation and impetus needed to carry out programs suggested by the British and French to relieve conditions created by the British-French Togoland border, which was reputed to have injured the economy, cultural unity and political structure of the Ewe tribal nation. Though the Ewes sent two representatives from each of the Territories, the Commission was mainly a meeting place where technical officers consulted each other and local administrative officers met to consider plans of action. While the Ewe representatives to the Commission took part in these meetings and consultations, they had no power to see

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that the Administering Authorities implemented the very programs they had promised. The Mission's report indicated that while the Commission was operating well as a coordinating body, the British and French had not initiated all the programs which the two powers had originally spoken of and others were only partially carried out, thereby limiting the areas in which the Commission could work.

The British and French had spoken of removing as many as possible of the obstacles which hindered the movement of individuals and goods across the border. While they had relaxed restrictions to the point where a resident of one Territory farming in the adjoining Territory was permitted to export foodstuffs produced on his farm without payment of duty if he had a certificate of permission, the governments maintained the right to restrict or prohibit the export of foodstuffs in time of shortage. When the first Visiting Mission made its tour, the export of cattle, sheep, goats, pigs and maize was absolutely prohibited. Further, persons traveling from one zone to the other were required to declare and possibly submit to an examination all produce and other articles they were importing or exporting.\(^9\) It was obvious that many of the hindrances to the movement of individuals and goods across the boundary still existed. The Ewe representatives wanted it understood that they ultimately sought the complete removal of the customs barrier.\(^10\)


\(^10\)Ibid., p. 74.
As a second step toward relieving border difficulties, the British and French had suggested that eventually a conventional zone should be established along part of the border, designed to remove all disabilities resulting from a customs frontier. The Ewe delegates to the Commission pressed for early implementation of a conventional zone, but it seemed that the Administering Authorities were not willing to implement it in the foreseeable future.

While the British and French had not made promises to ease exchange control, the four Ewe native representatives to the Joint Consultative Commission felt some steps should be taken in this direction. They believed that the continuation of currency and exchange control had caused considerable inconvenience in the transfer of proceeds from the sale of crops, and laborers had a difficult time returning across the border with money they had earned in the other Territory. The Administering Authorities agreed to initiate some changes in the exchange control system to make the situation more amenable.

The Administering Authorities were true to their promise of mitigating the incident of double taxation, though there were still some taxation problems. In his 1947 oral petition to the Trusteeship Council, Sylvanus Olympic of the All-Ewe Conference had complained of taxation by both the British and French of natives who worked in both Territories. Now the Administering Authorities issued instructions to the effect that receipts for personal tax in one Territory provided

\[ \text{\cite{Ibid.}, p. 75.} \]
\[ \text{\cite{Ibid.}, pp. 74-75.} \]

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exemption from payment of the corresponding tax in the other Territory. However, some tax problems still existed such as the difference between types of taxation, rates, and methods of collection in the two Territories.13

The British and French completely failed to carry out their program of closer educational cooperation between the two Territories, which was to center around programs of mass education, scholarships, the exchange of pupils and teachers, and the use of the native tongues in teaching. No scholarships had been awarded, no exchange of teachers had taken place and the French Commissaire practically rejected any teaching of the native tongues, saying that experiments in the extended use of the vernaculars had yielded disappointing results.14 There was no mention of teaching French in British Togoland or English in the French Territory, another idea originally suggested by the Administering Authorities in order to bring the two Territories closer together.

The areas in which the British and French had made the most progress were in the equalization of postal, telephone and telegraph rates, establishment of agricultural and veterinary cooperation, coordination of traffic regulations and the development of mutual cooperation in medicine and health.15 These were mainly technical fields and specialized areas where the technical and administrative officers who met at the Standing Consultative Commission could work together without

13Ibid., pp. 75-76.
14Ibid., p. 76.
15Ibid.
conflicting with the policies of the British and French governments.

In those fields of most significance for bringing the Territories closer together, such as the coordination of education systems, and the removal of boundary restrictions and exchange control, the Administering Authorities showed a reluctance to make major changes, though some had been promised. It was evident that the British and French were not willing to give full-hearted support to those measures which they had said would remove the difficulties created by the frontier, and were supposed to guarantee the peoples all the advantages of "greatest importance to their advancement in the social, political, economic and educational fields." Such proposals, if enacted, could be construed as preliminary steps toward eventual Togoland unification, which both countries felt would be contrary to their own interests. Therefore, they had limited the realms in which the Commission could implement the programs of cooperation originally suggested by the Administering Authorities.

The first Visiting Mission made several observations concerning the major organizations of the two Territories. It found that there were four significant groups on the political scene at that time: the All-Ewe Conference, the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, the Togoland Union Party and the Parti Togolaise du Progrès. Of these, the All-Ewe Conference and the closely allied Comité de l'Unité Togolaise held to the concept of Ewe unification under one Administering Authority, which they

suggested should be chosen by a vote of the people. This was a strong coalition, for the All-Ewe Conference was a cultural organization with a large membership among Ewes in the Togoland Trust Territories and the Gold Coast, while the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise was the major political party in French Togoland.

The Togoland Union Party, the major party of British Togoland, continued to support Togoland unification as it had since its conception in 1943. The Mission explained that this party adhered to Togoland unification rather than Ewe unification because many of its members were not Ewes, but belonged to the Buem tribe. These natives, for fear of domination by the Ewes, were also against any unification of Togoland which might include the Ewes of the Gold Coast.

The last of the major parties which were active in Togoland affairs at this time was the Parti Togolaise du Progrès of southern French Togoland. This party's views had altered somewhat since 1947 when it asked for the continuation of French administration in French Togoland and had rejected any form of unification until the Territories had developed considerably more economic, political and social maturity. Some of its members now said they were not against immediate unification under French administration.

In its report the first Visiting Mission also discussed the

18 Ibid., pp. 77-78.
19 Ibid., p. 78.
petitions it had received. It said that the large majority of those on the subject of unification favored either a unified Eweland or a unified Togoland under one administration. However, there were a few requests for other forms: the unification of the Tchokossi, Bassari and Konkomba tribes respectively, all in the North; the separate unifications of northern and southern Togolands; and the unification of the two Togolands under the administration of the Trusteeship Council. In all, about seventy-five pro-unification petitions were received, almost all from the southern parts of the two Territories.\(^{20}\)

The Mission received only eight petitions which were specifically opposed to unification. These were all from French Togoland\(^{21}\) where the Parti Togolaise du Progrès exercised some influence.

The great predominance of unification petitions was important in the Mission's conclusions. It seems unlikely that the Visiting Mission was able to get a clear picture of the population's attitude toward unification in the twenty days it traveled through both Togolands. It had to depend mainly upon the attitude of crowds which greeted it, quite possibly stimulated by agitators, and upon the petitions it received. The large number of Ewe and Togoland unification petitions evidently impressed the Mission, for its conclusions mirror closely the tone of these petitions. Further, the Mission devoted special attention to two All-Ewe Conference petitions, one on education and the other on the Joint Consultative Commission.

\(^{20}\)Ibid., pp. 78-79.

\(^{21}\)Ibid., p. 84.
The more important of these two petitions concerned the Standing Consultative Commission, and the Visiting Mission commented that it raised certain questions regarding the scope of the Commission. The All-Ewe Conference complained that the Administering Authorities were no longer using the Consultative Commission for its original purpose of dealing with the Ewe problem and satisfying the "legitimate claims and aspirations of the Ewe people." Instead, they had decided to call the Commission the "Consultative Commission for Togoland Affairs" and had declared at the third session of the Commission that the Commission's frame of reference was the Trust Territories and not the Ewe area. While the Mission did not draw any conclusion as to the questions this petition raised concerning the scope of the Commission, the petition indicates an attempt by the Administering Authorities to widen the considerations of the body and perhaps its membership, thereby dissipating the strength of the Ewes and frustrating demands for both Ewe unification and Togoland unification.

The conclusions which the first Visiting Mission reached from its investigation of the Togoland Territories were that almost impassible frontiers separated neighbors and related peoples in the Territories. The people suffered "materially and morally," and privations were imposed. In spite of some improvements, the different economic systems, exchange control, customs difficulties and other factors had caused hardships for the frontier population which were not easy to bear. While the measures taken by the Administering Authorities were "an appreciable

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22Ibid., p. 81.
step forward," they were insufficient to solve the whole problem.\textsuperscript{23}

The Mission found that Togoland unification now had support among large segments of the population, though the majority of the Ewe people seemed to favor the formation of an Eweland comprising the southern areas of the two Territories plus the Ewe districts of the Gold Coast. Further, the Mission found that the unification movement as a whole had become so strong in the South that the Mission felt it had gained the intensity and dimensions of a nationalistic movement, making it necessary that a solution be sought with urgency "in the interest of peace and stability in that part of the world."\textsuperscript{24}

These conclusions of the Visiting Mission demonstrate the belief it had in the popularity of the Ewe and Togoland unification concepts. But its judgements that the desire for unification was widespread in the South and must be regarded as a deeply rooted political force were necessarily of a subjective nature. There were certain factors to support these contentions, it is true. The Togoland Union Party of British Togoland, which favored Togoland unification, was the only political party of any significance in that Territory, and no opposition to its views had developed in the southern area. In French Togoland, the Ewe unificationist Comité de l'Unité Togolaise was the strongest party at the moment, though it faced strong opposition in the form of the Parti Togolaise du Progrès. While the strength of these parties gave some indication that unification was popular, the final decision on its

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., p. 82.

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid., pp. 82-83.
popularity had to be established by determining the people's attitudes through a more direct means. In the short time available to it, the only more direct means which the Mission had was personal contact with the people and petitions from them. This left the Visiting Mission open to influence by the politically active and vocal unificationists, which could easily result in a distortion of the over-all popularity of the unification forces.

Though the Mission believed that there was a strong desire for unification, it was troubled by the diverse forms of unification which were demanded.²⁵ This points out the basic problem of unification groups at this time. While they were well-organized and had a strong influence upon the United Nations, they could not agree on any one type of unification and dissipated their strength on conflicting requests.

The result of this lack of unity is obvious in the further conclusions of the first Visiting Mission. It felt that the various requests for unification somehow had to be satisfied to an appreciable degree. If they were not, the Visiting Mission felt there was danger of intensified agitation, perhaps stimulated by nationalistic forces in neighboring territories or even outside forces of a different nature,²⁶ which it did not define. But it appreciated the difficulty of arriving upon a solution for Togoland in view of demands for varying types of unification and the lack of interest in unification in the North, where in the British sector some hostility toward unification existed.

²⁵Ibid., p. 81.
²⁶Ibid., p. 82.
Therefore, the Mission said, it would not suggest any kind of immediate unification, but instead such steps which would relieve tension and at the same time allow for possible reconstruction of a unified Togoland at some future date.\textsuperscript{27} Apparently the Mission favored Togoland unification, though it did not say why, but its failure to promote any type of immediate unification can in large part be blamed directly upon the inability of unificationists to unite toward one goal of unification.

The Visiting Mission suggested instead of unification, increased efforts to reduce or even abolish the customs barrier. Further, it thought the British and French should intensify their collaboration with a view to coordinating fiscal, economic, cultural, educational, health, transportation and public service policies in order to eliminate non-political grievances of the native populations. Most important, Britain and France should guide the political development of their respective territories toward the reconstruction of a single Togoland, either as an independent state or as part of a larger confederation. In this process, the Mission considered the Standing Consultative Commission a valuable institution that should be developed further.\textsuperscript{28}

Strangely enough, the Mission seemed to reject the concept of Ewe unification, though there was strong support for it, in favor of Togoland unification. There is no positive explanation for this, but there were objections to Ewe unification which probably affected the Mission's thinking. The formation of an Eweland would block the

\textsuperscript{27}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{28}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 82-83.
hinterland of Togoland from the coast. Also, Britain showed no willingness to relinquish any part of the Gold Coast to assist in the creation of an Eweland. Furthermore, unification was being requested by other tribes besides the Ewes, making it more than an Ewe movement.

As members of the Trusteeship Council, the British and French had an excellent opportunity to study the Mission's findings before the Council reopened the question of unification in July of 1950. As a result of this the Administering Authorities were able to prepare a document based partly on the findings of the Mission and devised to fulfill the suggestions made by the Mission.

The British and French argued that no fundamental political changes could be made in the Togoland Territories at the present time. The Ewes and other inhabitants were far from agreeing on a political and administrative plan and there was divergence in the ranks of the Ewes themselves. Furthermore, since the publication of the Mission's report, representatives of the northern sections of both Togolands had expressed strong views against unification proposals. More important, the Visiting Mission had not been able to propose any concrete answer in its report. The Administering Authorities felt that these factors meant no further progress could be made toward a solution of Togoland's problems until it could be established what the native population really wanted. The best way of determining their wishes, Britain and France said, was through enlargement of the Standing Consultative Commission,²⁹ which the

Mission had considered a valuable institution that needed further development.

The Administering Authorities proposed that an enlarged Consultative Commission would have the following responsibilities: It would be charged with the task of submitting to the governments all practical means of satisfying the inhabitants of the two Trust Territories "within the framework of the British and French administrations." It would have the duty to advise the British and French of additional measures which might be taken in the fiscal, economic and cultural spheres, and in matters of education, public health, transportation and technical cooperation. This would be done with a view to minimizing the inconveniences caused by the existence of the frontier.\(^{30}\)

The Administering Authorities made the further proposal in their joint document that an enlarged Consultative Commission should be fully representative of all the peoples of both Territories, so it could truly ascertain their wishes. Before it had merely been a commission to bring the Ewes of British and French Togoland closer together. The British and French suggested that an enlarged Consultative Commission should be headed by co-chairmen, the Governor of the Gold Coast and the Commissioner of the Togo Republic (French Togoland). Each chairman would be assisted by an official vice-chairman. The Administering Authorities conceived of a commission body with seventeen representatives from British Togoland and twenty-eight representatives from French Togoland.\(^{30}\)

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\(^{30}\)Ibid., p. 4.
Fifteen of the seventeen British Togoland representatives would be elected by the people and the other two would be chosen by the Togoland Union Party and All-Ewe Conference. Twenty-six of the twenty-eight representatives from French Togoland would be popularly elected, the other two chosen by the Parti Togolaise du Progrès and the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise.31

The proposal by the British and French would completely alter the purpose of the Standing Consultative Commission, changing it from an Ewe commission to a Togoland commission. This appeared to be in line with the Mission's suggestions that the Administering Powers should guide the political development of their Territories toward the reconstruction of Togoland and that the Standing Consultative Commission should be developed further.32 The only fundamental difference was that the Administering Authorities added a restrictive clause, which provided that the enlarged Commission proposals designed to satisfy the aspirations of the inhabitants of the two Trust Territories should be "within the framework of the British and French Administrations."33 This clause would prevent the unification of Togoland under one administration.

Because the proposal by the British and French fulfilled most of the suggestions of the Visiting Mission, the two countries hoped it would be accepted by the Trusteeship Council without alteration. And if

31Ibid.


the restrictive clause were approved, they would have thwarted native
efforts to unify the Ewe area or the two Togoland Trusteeships.

Following the publication of the Mission's reports, four politi­
cal parties and groups asked for and received the opportunity to speak
before the Trusteeship Council when it reopened the unification question.
Of these, the All-Ewe Conference was the first to present its arguments
to the Council. Its representative, Sylvanus Olympio, spoke first on
the position of the northern natives. He disagreed with the Visiting
Mission's claim that some northerners opposed any sort of unification.
He pictured their attitude more as apathy and indifference. But whether
this was true or not, he said, the majority of the Ewes wanted unifica­
tion and nobody could dispute this.34

Olympio tried to smooth over the differences between his group
which favored Ewe unification, and the Togoland Union Party which wanted
Togoland unification. He admitted that the Togoland Union Party was
opposed to inclusion of the Ewe people of the Gold Coast with those of
the Togoland Territories; but he felt there was no serious divergence of
views in that both were convinced that the Ewe people of Togoland must
cease to be artificially divided.35 This was a weak argument, for while
it now appeared that the All-Ewe Conference and the Comité de l'Unité
Togolaise were not against Togoland unification, if it included the Ewe
areas of the Gold Coast, they were very much opposed to Togoland

34"Examination of Petitions," Trusteeship Council, Official Re­
unification excluding the Ewes of the Gold Coast. The Togoland Union Party, on the other hand, was not willing to include the Gold Coast Ewes in a unified Togoland, as many of its members were Buems, who feared domination by the Ewes, should all of them be united.\(^6\)

The All-Ewe Conference was vehement in its opposition to the Anglo-French suggestion of enlarging the Consultative Commission. It realized that an all-Togoland commission would probably mean the end of hopes for Ewe unification. Their representative, Olympic, asserted that the proposed enlarged Commission would have limited powers. The British and French said the body should have the power to determine solutions only within the framework of British and French administration. Thus it did not have the right to consider unification. Moreover, the Commission lacked political power. Lastly, the Ewe people could not agree to being represented as a minority on a commission which would determine their future. Therefore, there should be no enlarged Consultative Commission. Instead, the Ewe people ought to be united under one administration, and the northern tribes could devise their future through some type of standing consultative commission.\(^7\)

In his above protest against an enlarged Consultative Commission, Olympic apparently rejects Togoland unification; but it must be remembered that as the representative of the All-Ewe Conference, his first objective was Ewe unification, which the proponents of Togoland

\(^6\)"Reports of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa," op. cit., pp. 77-78.

\(^7\)"Examination of Petitions," op. cit., pp. 148-49.
unification rejected. Until Togoland unificationists showed a willingness to include the Gold Coast Ewes in their unification concept, he had to continue to adhere exclusively to Ewe unification.

Olympio's speech became the focal point of heated debate in which the French delegate became angered by the opinions expressed by certain other delegates and even went so far as to attack verbally the United Nations Secretariat. He asserted that Olympio had been in direct contact with certain officials in the Secretariat of the United Nations and wanted to know who they were. Dr. Ralph Bunche, as the Acting Assistant Secretary General in charge of the Department of Trusteeship, asked if this question implied any reflection on the Secretariat of the United Nations. The French representative replied that it did not, but his assurance lacked conviction. It was obvious that the French were very sensitive about the unification question.38

The next petitioner who spoke before the Council was Asare, representing the Togoland Union, British Togoland's major party. He confined most of his statements to the Anglo-French frontier. While the majority of his arguments were not new, he did place a new stress on the political aspects of the Togoland partition. He said that the two different colonial systems were defeating the legitimate political aspirations of the population, who would not and could not be either British or French.39

Like Olympio, Asare spoke out against the concept of an enlarged

38 Ibid., pp. 149-50.
39 Ibid., p. 150.
Consultative Commission. He told the Council that the Commission would not unite Togoland. Instead of being enlarged, the present Commission should be dissolved, the frontier removed and a Togoland Assembly set up, having legislative and executive power. This would be the nucleus of Togoland’s central government.\textsuperscript{40}

Antor, who also spoke for the Togoland Union Party, went beyond the demands of Asare and asked for Togoland unification under one administration, to be decided by a plebiscite. Prior to the establishment of such administration, he believed a constitution for a united Togoland should be drawn up by the Togoland people. The goal would be self-government in five years.\textsuperscript{41}

The pro-French Parti Togolaise du Progrès completely ignored the question of an enlarged Consultative Commission. Instead it turned to unification, which was denounced by its representative. He claimed that most of the Ewes in British Togoland were against a change in administration as were many of the French Ewes. He said that neither Ewe nor Togoland unification was desirable. Ewe unification would separate the Ewes from the northern tribes with which the Ewes had formed a single administrative, cultural, social and territorial unit for two generations. Togoland unification would force another change of administration on people who had already suffered one change of administration as a result of World War I.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{40}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 151.
\textsuperscript{41}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 152.
\textsuperscript{42}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 152-53.
The representative of the Parti Togolaise du Progrès was subjected to severe questioning after he finished his speech. The Iraqi delegate, who had been the chairman of the first Visiting Mission, was particularly sharp in his questioning. He insinuated that the Parti Togolaise du Progrès had gotten its funds from the French, that it had lied about the size of its membership, and that its members were recruited principally from among the minor officials of the French administration who opposed unification because they were afraid of losing their posts. 43

The representative for the Parti Togolaise du Progrès admitted that a large number of his party's members were government officials, but he said this was also true of the other French Togoland party, the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise. 44 However, his statement was inaccurate, for his party had a singular reputation for being composed of natives who held positions in the French government service or otherwise benefited from the presence française. 45

Both Belgium and France protested the Iraqi delegate's line of questioning. The French delegate felt it was highly personal. 46 At this stage a definite division in the Council appeared between France and Iraq, which became more pronounced at the following meeting when the

43Ibid., p. 153.
44Ibid., p. 154.
46"Examination of Petitions," op. cit., p. 154.
Iraqi delegate asked Garreau of France if the French government intended to grant self-government to the French Trust Territory. Garreau refused to answer this question, saying that he did not intend to be subjected to such questioning.\textsuperscript{47} The tranquility and compromising spirit which had characterized the Council's consideration of the unification question in 1947 had obviously vanished.

The last oral petitioner was Ayeva, who alleged to represent the chiefs and population of northern French Togoland.\textsuperscript{48} His group, so new that it still lacked an official title, was making its debut in the political arena. Later it became known as the Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo, which wielded almost absolute power in northern French Togoland. Ayeva spoke against any form of unification. He said that unification necessitated two things, a single Administering Authority and the subjugation of the other tribes to a unified Ewe people. He stated that in the opinion of the northern peoples the Ewe movement was subversive and entailed a change in the status of the people of northern French Togoland which they did not want. They desired to pursue their normal development under French trusteeship.\textsuperscript{49}

Following the oral petitions was a "question and answer" period during which the French representative tried his best to discredit the All-Ewe Conference. He told Olympio that leaders should not run the risk of unleashing disaster and chaos upon the country they wished to

\textsuperscript{47}\textit{Ibid.}, 21st Meeting, 6 July 1950, p. 167.

\textsuperscript{48}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{49}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 168.
govern. He wondered what part was being played by the Communists in the All-Ewe Conference movement and what connection there was between it and the Gold Coast Convention Movement. (He was speaking of the Convention People's Party which was working for Gold Coast independence.) The French representative claimed that many of the leaders of that movement were avowed Communists.50

Following the "question and answer" period was a period of general discussion. Some of the Trusteeship Council members expressed severe criticism of the Administering Authorities' plan for an enlarged Consultative Commission. They were particularly critical of the clause that would limit the power of the enlarged body to a determination of the people's desires "within the framework of British and French administration." This would seem to exclude Ewe or Togoland unification.

The British representative made a direct effort to save the Administering Authorities' plan from possible rejection. He stated that it had been put forth in good faith and to demonstrate this good faith the British and French were willing to compromise. He noted that there had been some concern about the limited powers of the enlarged body, that it could only determine the people's wishes within the framework of the British and French administrations. To allay such concern, the British and French were willing to add the words, "not precluding the unification of any parts of the two Trust Territories,"51 in effect giving the enlarged Commission the power to consider unification if it

50 Ibid., 22nd Meeting, 7 July 1950, pp. 173-75.
found that this was what the people wanted. This was an important compromise on the part of the Administering Authorities and gave their plan for an enlarged Consultative Commission a good chance for acceptance. It cleared the way for unification in the future, which the majority of the Council was not willing to exclude as a possibility. Furthermore, the proposals of the British and French now seemed in line with the suggestions of the Visiting Mission, a Mission with a liberal majority.

All of the native groups present before the Council agreed to accept the amended plan except the All-Ewe Conference. Olympio noted that the willingness to allow possible unification excluded any form of unification which would include the Ewes of the Gold Coast. As such the amended plan rejected his organization's hope for a unified Ewe tribe.\textsuperscript{52}

With only the All-Ewe Conference opposing the Franco-British amended plan it was quickly supported by the majority of Trusteeship Council members. While most of them sympathized with the various unification demands they felt that the confusion in Togoland demanded thorough study, and the proposals of the Administering Authorities might form the basis for a just solution of the Togoland problems.

Iraq, China and the Philippines formed the opposing Council minority. They were against the Administering Authorities' proposals and believed that the Ewe people should be united under one administration as they felt this was the desire of the vast majority of Ewes.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{52}Ibid., 25th Meeting, 12 July 1950, p. 218.

\textsuperscript{53}Ibid., 26th and 27th Meetings, 13th and 14th of July, discussion by China, Iraq and the Philippines; also see: China, Iraq and Philippines: Amendments to the Draft Resolution Submitted by Argentina
The final vote on the United States-Argentina resolution incorporating the Administering Authorities' plan for an enlarged Consultative Commission was eight to two in favor of it. Iraq and the Philippines voted against the resolution, China abstained and the U.S.S.R., boycotting the United Nations at this time, was absent.\(^5^4\)

The resolution was a clear victory for Britain and France. It stated that the Trusteeship Council, after considering the report of the Visiting Mission, hearing the oral statements by the petitioners and taking note of the plan put forth by the Administering Authorities, accepted the British and French plan. The Council felt that an enlarged Consultative Commission, as described by the Authorities, had as its purpose the "real wishes and interests of the inhabitants of all parts of the two Trust Territories."\(^5^5\) In effect, outside of Britain's and France's attempt in their original proposals to prevent an enlarged Consultative Commission from being able to consider unification, the two countries had their entire program accepted by the Council.

Of course the Council was not entirely without the suspicion that the British and French might try to renege on some parts of the program. The Council said it hoped that the Administering Authorities would proceed along the lines they had proposed and would take the appropriate steps to carry forth the plan. In view of this the Council

\(^5^4\)Ibid., 27th Meeting, 14 July 1950, p. 238.

wanted the British and French to inform it at the next session on the steps which had been taken. 56

The resolution shows what effect the interaction of the various forces had had upon the Trusteeship Council, so far, in determining its action. The activities of the unification and anti-unification forces had caused the first Visiting Mission to draw certain conclusions which affected the thinking of Trusteeship Council members. At the same time the Mission's conclusions had a strong influence on the Administering Authorities. They felt compelled to devise a plan which closely followed the Mission's suggestions, but which excluded the possibility of future unification. Unificationists were not satisfied with either the Mission's report or the proposals of the British and French. Their representatives' protests before the Council, supported by sympathetic members of the Council, resulted in a compromise proposal by the Administering Authorities which said that different forms of unification could be considered by an expanded Consultative Commission. The compromise made the entire Franco-British plan acceptable to the Council and all native representatives present, except for Olympio of the All-Ewe Conference. Thus, through the interaction of political groups upon one of the organs of the United Nations, a new plan for the future of Togoland was devised and accepted, known officially as the Enlarged Standing Consultative Commission.

Of the forces involved in the Council's Togoland considerations, the Ewe unificationists had fared the worst as a result of the Trusteeship Council's resolution. The enlargement and alteration of the Consultative Commission meant that it would be a Togoland commission rather than an Ewe commission, which almost certainly spelled defeat for the creation of an Ewe state. It was unlikely that non-Ewe representatives in the Enlarged Consultative Commission would accept the formation of a nation which would block the rest of Togoland from the coast.

Of course the Ewe unificationists could not place much blame for the Council's acceptance of the British and French plan on anyone but themselves and Togoland unificationists. If all the unificationists had been able to settle upon one type of unification demand, particularly Togoland unification, the outcome might have been altogether different, for the majority of the Council members had shown themselves to be sympathetic to the unification cause and honestly concerned with finding a solution. As it was, the multiplicity of demands, unification demands particularly, left the Council confused and unwilling to make any drastic alterations in the Togolands' existing situation. Under the circumstances the only answer seemed to be the enlargement and alteration of the Standing Consultative Commission.

Even though the Trusteeship Council gave its sanction to the creation of an expanded Consultative Commission, the future of the Commission was doubtful. Its success was dependent upon three uncertain factors: the honesty and fairness with which the Administering Authorities would conduct the election of representatives, the willingness with
which they would implement the Commission's suggestions and the participation of the unificationists in the elections and the meetings thereafter. A failure by the Administering Authorities to do their part, or of the pro-unification forces to participate, would most assuredly mean the failure of the Enlarged Standing Consultative Commission.
CHAPTER IV

THE ENLARGED STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

The Enlarged Consultative Commission was accepted by the Trusteeship Council in 1950 as a way of meeting the widening scope of the Togoland problem without rejecting the possibility of Ewe or Togoland unification in the future. After the All-Ewe Conference had presented its arguments for Ewe unification in 1947, resulting in the establishment of the Standing Consultative Commission, demands developed both for Togoland unification and for maintenance of the status quo. It was hoped that the Enlarged Consultative Commission, proposed by the French and British as an answer to recommendations by the first Visiting Mission, would determine what the majority of people wanted and at the same time suggest measures which might be taken to mitigate inconveniences created by Togoland's division.

The Commission was a compromise and the logical result of the efforts by conflicting native groups to take advantage of the important position which the United Nations held in trusteeship affairs, and of efforts by the Administering Authorities to protect their interests. Nevertheless, it was doomed to failure almost from the moment of its acceptance by the Council.

Its success was dependent upon the honesty and fairness with
which the Administering Authorities conducted the election of representatives to the body, their willingness to implement the Commission's suggestions and the participation of unificationists in the elections and the meetings thereafter. The methods of election became a point of dispute almost immediately. Numerous petitions were sent to the Trusteeship Council complaining about the electoral system devised by the French for choosing representatives and also about discrimination by them. The most significant of these petitions was from the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise of French Togoland which favored Ewe unification.¹

Normally this petition would have been considered by the Trusteeship Council. However, the matters discussed in it were of an immediate nature and the Council was not in session; therefore, the petition was forwarded to the General Assembly's committee on trusteeship matters, which was in session. The Fourth Committee's consideration of the communication began that body's gradual encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Trusteeship Council.

The Comité de l'Unité Togolaise's petition asserted that the French had devised a two-stage method of choosing members for the Enlarged Consultative Commission which did not give the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise fair representation.² For this reason the party would not participate in the second stage of the election. The Communication said that under the French system the representatives were chosen by electors,

²Ibid., p. 2.
who in the rural areas were selected by village chiefs. This was unfair, the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise believed, because the chiefs had been selected originally by the Administration and were officials of the Administration. Therefore, they owed their allegiance to the French Government and would naturally select electors who were friendly to the French. The friendly electors would then choose representatives who were pro-French and favored the continuation of French administration. The Comité de l'Unité Togolaise stated that composed of such representatives, the Enlarged Consultative Commission would be an organ of the Administering Authorities.\(^3\)

The party also complained about the election methods at Lomé, an Ewe stronghold. In that city the elections were to be held in one stage, with a single representative chosen by popular ballot.\(^4\) The pro-Ewe unification party asserted that the French were trying to limit the voters who would choose this representative by allowing only those people to vote who had been able to pay their taxes in 1949 and 1950.\(^5\)

The Comité de l'Unité Togolaise gave the election system as the main reason why it would not take part in the second stage of the election in which the electors chose representatives to the Commission. However, the party was concerned about discrimination, too. It claimed that French officials were openly intervening in the electoral campaign

\(^{3}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^{4}\text{Addendum to the Petition from Mr. Augustino de Souza Concerning Togoland under French and under British Administration, U.N. Doc. T/Pet. 7/160, T/Pet.7/194/Add.3 (Lake Success: 1950), p. 15. (R.M.)}\)

\(^{5}\text{Ibid., p. 5.}\)
and were prohibiting meetings of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise. Members had been arrested and the population was being intimidated.6

The Fourth Committee was very concerned. The charges made in the petition were extremely serious. Moreover, the failure of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise to submit candidates for the Enlarged Consultative Commission would destroy the Commission's representative nature. Further the petition was discussing a problem which had already had an effect upon conditions in British Togoland. The unificationists of British Togoland, where elections had been completed, also had decided not to participate,7 apparently out of sympathy for the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise.

Most of the members of the Fourth Committee thought the matter should be investigated immediately. Iraqi, Filipino, Indonesian and Yugoslav delegates expressed concern. The Filipino delegate, for example, felt the matter should be immediately investigated, owing to the repercussions already evident. Not only was the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise not participating in the elections, but unificationists in British Togoland had decided to boycott the Commission. He believed they were only doing this in protest of French discrimination against the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, since there were no complications in British Togoland. However, the situation in French Togoland and the repercussions

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it was causing were serious enough to warrant a thorough investigation of election conditions in French Togoland.\(^8\)

A draft resolution was drawn up to the effect that such an investigation should be carried out.\(^9\) This was accepted by all but Belgium, France and Great Britain, which abstained.\(^10\) The three constituted only a very small minority of the Fourth Committee which consists of all members of the General Assembly.\(^11\) The French representative stated that his country could not accept a resolution that was discriminatory since it failed to take into consideration petitions sent by the anti-unification Parti Togolaise du Progrès.\(^12\)

The resolution was forwarded to the General Assembly and passed there.\(^13\) Briefly, it said that the General Assembly wanted to impress upon the Administering Authorities the necessity of conducting the election in a democratic manner in order to insure a true representation of the people. The resolution recommended that the French promptly

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\(^12\) "Report of the Trusteeship Council (A/1306)," op. cit., 162nd Meeting, 31 October 1950, p. 126.

investigate the complaints made by the president of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise and by other petitioners.\(^\text{14}\)

The French appointed a Procureur Général to conduct an investigation. After he had completed his survey, he appeared before the Trusteeship Council to review the contents of a report he had prepared\(^\text{15}\) and to give further information.

The Procureur Général, Paulin Baptiste, thought that the assertions made by the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise were largely invalid. First he considered the complaints made against the two-stage election system for representatives to the Enlarged Consultative Commission. He said that generally the complaints about the election system were not justified. In Togoland, where the people were backward, the two-stage election was more practical than election by universal suffrage. Furthermore, it was not undemocratic, as had been asserted. The chiefs who selected the electors were not virtually civil servants, loyal to and dependent upon the Administration. While there had been isolated instances of misinterpretation of instructions by the local chiefs, that did not mean they had deliberately discriminated against the unificationists. Besides, these instances had not been serious enough to have an effect upon the selection of electors.\(^\text{16}\) In the opinion of Baptiste


\(^\text{16}\) Ibid., p. 6; and "The Ewe Question," Trusteeship Council, Official Records, Eighth Session, 330th and 331st Meetings, 26 and 27 February 1951, pp. 120-25.
there were no serious faults in the two-stage election system.

Baptiste also discussed the tax receipt problem in the Lomé area. The Comité de l'Unité Togolaise had said that tax receipts for two years had been required before one could vote and that this had the effect of limiting the voting franchise. Baptiste thought it was regrettable that tax matters should be brought up in connection with elections. All people should have the right to express their views. But he discounted the possibility that this limitation on voting had been serious enough to affect the outcome of the election.

The Procureur Général brushed aside the complaints of disturbances, arrests and illegal prosecutions in the French Territory. He agreed that some disturbances had occurred which were infringements on the freedom of assembly, but not to a degree which would distort the expression of the will of the people. From the documents he had studied, Baptiste concluded that most arrests were made only when public order had been threatened or disturbed. He doubted that there had been any illegal prosecution. The Procureur Général believed it was unlikely that the judges could be coerced into such action. Under the French Constitution the judiciary was absolutely independent of the executive and the legislative, and the judges were very jealous of their power.

It was Baptiste's belief that the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise's

17See page 81.


poor showing in the first stage of the election had been its own fault and was not due to discrimination or other such factors. As he viewed it, the election campaign had hinged on the issue of unification versus the status quo. The Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo and the Parti Togolaise du Progrès of southern French Togoland frankly favored the status quo, while the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise of the southern area favored unification of the Ewe peoples. The Ewe people strongly supported Ewe unification, but moving northward from the Ewe area there was increasing opposition to the concept. Tribal groups did not wish to be deprived of an outlet to the sea, as might occur if an Ewe state were created. Under the circumstances, stated Baptiste, they had voted for the status quo parties.20

The Procureur Général thought that the nonparticipation of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise in the second stage of the election was not really due to discrimination by the authorities, but was caused by fear of defeat. He said that the Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo, founded in the North, exploited the local aspirations of the northerners and had their complete support. Therefore, neither the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise nor the Parti Togolaise du Progrès entered into competition with it in that area. Unable to make headway in the North, the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise could not capture more than a strong minority of the French Togoland seats in the Enlarged Standing Consultative Commission even if it swept the South. When the party received

setbacks at Atakpamé and Anécho in the South,\textsuperscript{21} it quit the fight rather than lose face.\textsuperscript{22}

This was a reasonable explanation of what had occurred, except for one possible weakness. Even though the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise refused to participate in the second stage of the election, the stage in which the electors selected representatives to the Enlarged Consultative Commission, it still won six out of the nine seats allotted to the South. This would indicate that Baptiste overemphasized the setbacks to the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise in the South during the first stage when electors were chosen, and if the party had participated in the second stage of the elections it might have taken all the seats there. But Baptiste felt this would not have happened. He believed that the six seats won by the party without any campaigning during the second stage were roughly representative of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise's strength. Active campaigning would not have altered the voting of the electors.\textsuperscript{23}

The Procureur Général concluded by saying it was regrettable that the party had not accepted the six seats it won. This left the French with no choice but to assign them to the Parti Togolaise du Progrès, the only other party on the ticket in the South.\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{21}See Political Map, p. 9.
  \item \textsuperscript{22}U.N. Doc. T/846, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 25-26.
  \item \textsuperscript{23}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 26.
  \item \textsuperscript{24}"The Ewe Question," \textit{op. cit.}, 331st Meeting, 27 February 1951, p. 125.
\end{itemize}
The core of Baptiste's report and of his speech before the Trusteeship Council was that most of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise's complaints and similar expressions by other French Togoland unificationists were without foundation. The Comité de l'Unité Togolaise used such complaints as an excuse for quitting the election when the party found it was unable to win more than a small minority of French Togoland's seats to the Enlarged Consultative Commission.

The Administering Authorities forwarded a proposal based on the findings of the Procureur Général. He had discounted most of the assertions made by the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise. Therefore, the British and French thought that the party should be forced to take part in the Commission. They would widen the membership of the Enlarged Consultative Commission to make room for the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, whose vacant seats had been filled. This would be done in such a way as to keep the number in proportion to the original election results. The British and French noted that the All-Ewe Conference was also boycotting the Commission. As its seats were still open, they thought the Conference should be urged to take its rightful position after a proportional adjustment was made.  

The Administering Authorities hoped to convene a second session of the Enlarged Consultative Commission as soon as possible. The British delegate said they attached great importance to the necessity for arriving at a decision regarding the Ewe question. To insure that a fair decision was reached they wanted all groups to be fully represented.

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25Ibid., 338th Meeting, 8 March 1951, pp. 193-94.
The British and French drafted a resolution to put their plan into effect. This time, however, they were not able to capture the favor of the Council. Too many of the members felt that such a plan of enlargement would have no success when many of the natives were against the Commission's continuation. Instead, the Council accepted a draft resolution initiated by the United States and Iraq.

The disparity between the Franco-British draft resolution and the United States-Iraqi draft resolution was not extreme. The significant difference was that the latter draft emphasized the urgency of finding a solution to the Ewe question. It gave no encouragement to the further enlargement of the Consultative Commission, saying that now was the time to move toward a substantive solution of the problem, rather than to concentrate on completing the membership of the Enlarged Consultative Commission.

The United States-Iraqi draft resolution was put to a vote first. It was adopted by nine votes to none, with three abstentions—France, Britain and Russia. The British and French did not bother to submit their draft to a vote, feeling it was useless to do so when the other

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26 Ibid., p. 194.


29 "The Ewe Question," op. cit., 338th Meeting, 8 March 1951, p. 194.
draft resolution had already been adopted.\textsuperscript{30}

The Administering Authorities accepted the Trusteeship Council's
decision with good grace, but were reluctant to see the Enlarged Con-
sultative Commission discarded. The French delegate thought the Admin-
istering Authorities still might be able to use the Commission to carry
out the task of determining the wishes of the Togoland people. The
British delegate agreed.\textsuperscript{31} The tenacity with which the British and
French clung to their abortive plan may seem somewhat ridiculous. How-
ever, they had put a good deal of time and effort into the creation of
the Enlarged Commission; and, in all fairness to them, they had at least
suggested a possible plan of action. This was more than could be said
for the Trusteeship Council.

The Council, in accepting the American-Iraqi resolution, failed
to suggest any method of coping with the Togoland situation. It merely
recommended that whether or not the composition of the Enlarged Consulta-
tive Commission was completed, "the Administering Authorities should
formulate as soon as possible substantive proposals for a practical
solution to the question . . . ."\textsuperscript{32} In effect they threw the entire
burden of responsibility upon the British and French.

This was not an entirely deplorable position for the Administer-
ing Authorities. At the same time that they were given the unenviable

\textsuperscript{30}Ibid., 339th Meeting, 9 March 1951, p. 197.

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., pp. 197-98.

\textsuperscript{32}"The Ewe Problem," Res. 306 (VIII), Trusteeship Council, Offi-
task of solving a difficult situation, they were also given the dominant policy-making role. The unificationists would have to depend upon them for a solution to the Togoland problem. The Enlarged Standing Consultative Commission was apparently destroyed for all practical purposes, but if the Administering Authorities could devise a new plan that was acceptable to the Council, the most unificationists could do if they were not satisfied was take defensive action against it.

The unificationists were truly the losers. Ewe unificationists in French Togoland had rejected the Commission, which may or may not have been because of dishonesty on the part of Britain and France during the elections, only to find themselves dependent upon those two countries for a plan to replace the Commission. Furthermore, in the past year, from the summer of 1950 to the summer of 1951, the unificationists' position relative to that of the anti-unificationists had been weakened. In French Togoland the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise now faced an aroused northern populace, which feared the effects of possible Ewe unification. In the form of the Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo, this population had united with the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise's old rival, the Parti Togolaise du Progrès, to work for the defeat of Ewe unification. In British Togoland, unificationists were also being challenged by the northern peoples, who feared the Togoland Union's proposal of Togoland unification which could separate them from their fellow tribesmen in the Gold Coast. Unless unificationists quickly settled their differences and worked toward a common goal they were likely to lose all possibility of unification in any form.
It seemed that the most that unification groups could do at the moment was to wait anxiously for new proposals by the British and French and hope they would be more palatable. If they were not, the unificationists would again have to bring their cases before the United Nations.
CHAPTER V

THE JOINT COUNCIL: A NEW SOLUTION FOR TOGOLAND

The decision to enlarge the Standing Consultative Commission had resulted in failure when the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise of French Togo­land refused to take part in the second stage of the election of represent­atives to the Commission. Its refusal, on the ground that France was discriminating against it, destroyed the representative character of the enlarged Commission. Further, the refusal resulted in a boycott by unificationists in British Togoland, where elections were completed. They refused to take part, in sympathy for the Comité de l'Unité Togo­laise.

When an investigation by a French Procureur Général concluded that the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise had actually refused to take part in the second stage of the elections because of its poor showing during the first stage, the Administering Authorities had suggested that the boycotting groups be forced to participate. The Administering Authori­ties' proposal was rejected, but no plan was submitted by the Trustee­ship Council to replace it. Instead, the British and French were di­rected to "formulate as soon as possible substantive proposals for a practical solution to the question" of unification.1

1"The Ewe Problem," Res. 306 (VIII), Trusteeship Council, 93
Whatever the reason for its action, the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise's decision to boycott the election indirectly forced the Administering Authorities to start anew. They were faced with a difficult task, but it was advantageous to be developing a plan, instead of waiting anxiously for the opposition to propose a solution, the position of the Ewe and Togoland unificationists.

In July of 1951, the British and French presented their new plan to the Trusteeship Council; it was a proposal for a joint council, which was a worked-over version of the Enlarged Consultative Commission with the added power to suggest projects of common interest on which the Administering Authorities should spend money and to decide the priority for such projects. In the memorandum which they had prepared, the Administering Authorities said that the joint organ would not have any executive or legislative power over the two Trust Territories, but would provide the representatives of the people with an opportunity to discuss and consult with senior administrative and technical officers from each side and to advise the British and French on programs of development in the economic and social fields. The Administering Authorities argued that the joint body would be an effective organization assuring the legitimate aspirations of the people. It would link the people together and allow close collaboration between French and British authorities.2

After presenting their proposal, the British and French in the


same memorandum discussed their reasons for dismissing other possible solutions: Ewe unification under one administration, joint administration of an Eweland or of Togoland, Togoland unification under one administration, and a plebiscite. They felt that Ewe unification was not desirable for a number of reasons. Only a minority of the population in the Ewe area actually wanted an Eweland. Secondly, a separate Ewe area would handicap the northern peoples, barring them from free access to the sea and hindering their development. Lastly, there was no indication that Ewe unification under French trusteeship would be acceptable to the inhabitants of the British area or vice versa.  

The Administering Authorities stated that Togoland unification was not practical. There was again the problem of deciding who would administer the Territories. Natives of French Togoland had expressed opposition to unification because it would mean a change in the Administering Authority for one of the Territories, retarding the development of that Territory. Togoland unification was also impractical because of the attitude in British Togoland where some natives wanted integration with the Gold Coast, others wanted unification under a single administration and still others wanted unification and independence. Furthermore, would those Ewes in both Territories aspiring to Ewe unification reconcile themselves to Togoland unification? In the light of such disagreement, the British and French said, Togoland unification was as impractical as unification of the Ewe sub-tribes of British and French

Togolands.\textsuperscript{4} Britain and France felt that a joint Anglo-French authority over an Eweland or a unified Togoland did not reflect the wishes of any important segment of the population, but they had considered it to insure that no possible solution was overlooked. They believed that joint administration would result in numerous problems. Not only would there be many of the difficulties mentioned above in connection with Togoland or Ewe unification under one administration, but there would be the added difficulties of adjustments in currency, trade and customs, legal and judicial systems, and the staffing and organization of central and local governmental systems.\textsuperscript{5}

A plebiscite would not be practical either, the Administering Authorities asserted. First it would be necessary to select the alternatives that should be offered to the people. Then a decision would have to be made on whether the people should vote on Ewe unification or Togoland unification. If the plebiscite were only on Ewe unification, it would not be possible to justify withholding the vote from non-Ewe peoples whose interests would also be affected. If the plebiscite were on Togoland unification, there would be difficulty in wording the question to be asked. No single proposal could be formed into a question which could be answered with a simple yes or no. The issues were many, Britain and France stated, and it would be impossible to place the matter before the voters in a way that would not be misunderstood.

\textsuperscript{4}Ibid., pp. 14-15.
\textsuperscript{5}Ibid., p. 16.
According to the Authorities, an "elucidation" of the people's wishes through an assembly of elected representatives would be clearer and more satisfactory than a plebiscite.\textsuperscript{6}

The Franco-British memorandum caused a strong reaction among native groups in the Togoland Territories. Forces representing the unification and status quo movements asked for an opportunity to appear before the Council during the pending consideration of the memorandum. Therefore, when the Trusteeship Council reopened discussion of the Togoland problem it was again confronted by representatives of the unification and the status quo movements and by the British and French, each concerned with influencing its decision. The speeches of the Administering Authorities were mainly a reiteration of their joint memorandum, except for the addition that the joint body would also be able to consider proposals of the Administering Authorities in regard to requests for technical assistance from the United Nations, independent specialized agencies and other sources.\textsuperscript{7}

The two native organizations present were the Togoland Congress Party representing the unificationists and the Parti Togolaise du Progrès representing the status quo movement. The Togoland Congress was a very significant association of parties and groups formed on the seventh of January, 1951. Among its member organizations were the Togoland Union and the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, which favored Togoland and

\textsuperscript{6}Ibid., p. 16-17.

Ewe unification respectively. The union of these two parties in an association was a major step toward the consolidation of the unification forces. While the formation of the Togoland Congress did not solve the question of Ewe unification versus Togoland unification, it did bring the two movements closer together. Unfortunately, the All-Ewe Conference did not join the Congress. Among other members were two small groups in British Togoland, the Togoland Youth Organization and the Togoland National Farmer's Union.\(^8\) The latter organization was quite active in the marketing of cocoa.\(^9\)

The Togoland Congress was opposed to the Administering Authorities' proposal for a joint council. Antor, speaking for the Togoland Congress, said his organization represented the great majority of traditional rulers and recognized native and political groups. All the Congress members were against the joint body proposed by the Administering Authorities and they could not be counted on to support it. The joint council was just another of the Administering Authorities' "well-known tactics" in their conspiracy to discredit the unification movement, misrepresent the aspirations of the people and distort the meaning of the Charter to their own ends.\(^{10}\)

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\(^{10}\)"The Ewe Problem," op. cit., 380th Meeting, 24 July 1951, no. 12, p. 297.
The people he represented, Antor stated, would only accept the immediate establishment of two district councils for the northern and southern sections of British Togoland and the establishment of a separate legislature for British Togoland composed of the northern and southern councils. Beyond this they proposed a central representative assembly, with or without legislative powers, for all of Togoland. This central representative assembly would decide upon the administering country, which in turn would be advised by the United Nations' commission residing in Togoland. Antor claimed if administration by this country failed, in what respect he did not say, the Togoland Congress members wanted self-government for Togoland.\textsuperscript{11}

A representative of the Parti Togolaise du Progrès, the status quo party of southern French Togoland, also spoke before the Council. His organization rejected unification, claiming that the majority of people in French Togoland would be dissatisfied with any type of unification under one administration. It agreed that the program of unification for Togoland aroused sympathy, but no one wanted it to be achieved at the cost of a change in administration.\textsuperscript{12} Many of the party's members were officials in the French administration, and it is evident they feared that the unificationists' demands, which included administration by one country, might result in British administration and thus involve the loss of their jobs.

The Parti Togolaise du Progrès was not unequivocally in favor of

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 300.
the Administering Authorities' plan for a joint council. When the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise had refused to accept its six seats on the Enlarged Consultative Commission, these seats had been given to the Parti Togolaise du Progrès. Therefore, this party held a dominant position on the Enlarged Consultative Commission. Its representative stated that the proposed joint body did not differ substantially from the existing, although inactive, Enlarged Consultative Commission. Such being the case, he thought the Commission should be maintained for two more years to avoid the unrest which new elections might entail and to allow the other parties time to think over the Togoland problem.\(^\text{13}\)

At the conclusion of the speeches, the British representative brought to the attention of the Council a draft resolution that his country and France had submitted to implement their plan for a joint council. He did this with a seeming disregard for the arguments of the natives which had just been presented and without allowing time for discussion of the oral petitions.\(^\text{14}\) Immediately thereafter, the United States, Thailand and the Dominican Republic submitted a joint draft amending the Franco-British draft.\(^\text{15}\) It was obvious that both drafts had been written before the native petitioners had spoken. Apparently the petitioners were addressing a Council in which most of the members

\(^{13}\)Ibid.

\(^{14}\)Ibid., p. 301.

had already decided their positions.

The Franco-British draft resolution stated that the Trusteeship Council approved the joint memorandum presented by the delegations of France and the United Kingdom. It welcomed the establishment of a joint council with powers and functions in all matters of common interest within the economic, social, educational and cultural fields. The Anglo-French draft further said that the Council urged the various elements of the population to give their full support to the body.16

The three-power draft of the United States, Thailand and the Dominican Republic was fundamentally the same as the Franco-British draft in all but one important aspect. Whereas the Administering Authorities' draft said the joint council should be able to exercise its function with respect to "all questions within the economic, social, educational and cultural fields . . . ,"17 the three-power draft said the body should exercise its functions with respect to "all questions of common concern to the people of the two Trust Territories, including questions of political, economic, social, educational and cultural development . . . ."18 The Administering Authorities' draft resolution limited the fields in which the joint council would be able to exercise its functions, while the United States, Thailand and Dominican Republic draft resolution included all questions of common concern and


specifically listed political development as one of these.

The authors of the three-power draft resolution supported it on at least three bases. They felt the Franco-British draft was too limited and the joint council needed the power to function in the political field, particularly in view of the difficulty in deciding whether a question was economic or political. Further, they defended their resolution by saying that the establishment of a joint council with wide powers of suggestion would provide a stop-gap measure until such a time as the natives could reach agreement on unification.¹⁹

Two countries, Iraq and Russia, were vehemently opposed to the Administering Authorities' proposal for a joint council as conceived in either of the draft resolutions.

The Iraqi delegate was convinced that the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise's petitions concerning the violations of human rights were true and he said that from reading the petitions one could not help wondering whether the French Administration was able to carry out its governmental responsibilities without resorting to force, subjecting women and children to brutal treatment and abolishing the freedom of assembly. As far as he was concerned, the joint council was just another means for the Administering Authorities to forestall any form of unification. He felt the proposed joint council would be no more effective than the Enlarged Consultative Commission had been, because it lacked executive and legislative powers. Its recommendations, therefore, would not be binding on the British and French. Moreover, the election of members to the

¹⁹"The Ewe Problem," loc. cit.
new joint body would presumably give rise to the same incidents and the same circumstances as had accompanied the elections to the Enlarged Consultative Commission. He thought it was odd that two European powers with long experience in solving problems arising in colonies should be incapable of finding a satisfactory solution to the Togoland problem but must suggest such a weak proposal as the joint council.  

The Iraqi delegate also bitterly accused the Trusteeship Council of giving aid to the Administering Authorities and being partly responsible for the lack of an effective solution to the unification question. He asserted that the Council had done nothing but sanction the decisions of the Administering Authorities.  

After the speeches were completed, a roll call vote was taken on the three-power draft resolution submitted by Thailand, the Dominican Republic and the United States. All Council members voted in favor of it except Iraq and Russia, which abstained. Only Russia commented on its abstention, but the Iraqi position was evident from its representative's previous speech. Soldatov of Russia said he had abstained because the draft resolution disregarded the desire for unification by the Ewe tribes and for the establishment of an independent Togoland state. It appeared that Soldatov regarded these as one and the same, but this was only an example of the Russian efforts to appeal to all 

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20 Ibid., pp. 302-03.
21 Ibid., p. 303.
22 Ibid., p. 304.
23 Ibid.
unificationists at the same time.

Both Britain and France voted for the resolution which amended their own. The British delegate stated he had done so to give evidence of his country's desire to work with the Trusteeship Council, to carry out its wishes and to do its utmost toward serving the interests of the Togoland people. The French representative said he had voted for the amendment in the same spirit as had the United Kingdom. Without questioning the sincerity of the British and French, it suffices to say that their statements were good propaganda.

Why did the Trusteeship Council accept the modified version of the Franco-British plan? After all, it did not solve the Togoland problem and the joint council it initiated was not drastically different from the preceding committees that had failed. Possibly the answer lies in part in the composition of the Council. With six trust-administering nations and six non-trust-administering states in the Council, Britain and France always had a good chance of securing the backing of at least half the Council. Possibly part of the answer might also be found in the persuasive arguments presented by the British and French. However, the most likely explanation is found in the opinions expressed by Liu Shih-shun of China when he explained why his delegation had voted for the extensively amended Franco-British draft resolution.

The Chinese representative stated that the Ewe question should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants of the two Territories. But it had to be admitted that, "as a result of the

Ibid.
conflict of opinion on the subject among the people of Togoland," the
Council had not been able to devise a satisfactory solution. Therefore,
his delegation had voted for the draft resolution as amended, "in the
hope that it would pave the way for a satisfactory solution." 25

The very inability of the Togoland people, particularly the uni-
ificationists, to agree on one goal for Togoland again led the Trustee-
ship Council to accept the recommendations and plans of the Administer-
ing Authorities. Undeniably, the majority of the Council accepted the
demand for unification as legitimate, but none besides the Iraqi and
Russian delegations were willing to make a major decision in favor of
some type of unification when the Togoland people were so divided on
what was best for themselves. When the Togoland natives could not agree
on a single demand, the Council turned to the Administering Authorities,
pressing them for a solution.

In their efforts to influence the United Nations, it seemed that
at this moment Britain and France had been very successful. It is true
that their draft resolution had been considerably altered by amendment,
but this was because they had tried to restrict the powers which the
joint council would have, not because their plan for a joint body had
been rejected. All the native groups were losers: the unificationists
because their demands for unification had been rejected, and the status
quo groups because they had hoped to see the continuation of the En-
larged Consultative Commission for at least a little longer. Moreover,
the native groups were the victims of a change in attitude among

25 Ibid.
Trusteeship Council members. The immediate submission of two previously drawn draft resolutions, as soon as the native groups had presented their oral petitions, indicated the lack of consideration presently being given to the arguments of the native organizations. The Council was becoming unresponsive to their many claims and counterclaims, and its attitude of concern was being tempered by feelings of misgiving. The Ewe problem had dragged on too long without a solution, with too many groups making conflicting assertions and demands.

Once the proposal for a joint council had been accepted by the Trusteeship Council, it was the Administering Authorities' task to put it into effect. This was a lengthy process, particularly with the need for elections, and the Joint Council had not yet been initiated when the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly met in the winter of 1951-1952 to ponder the Trusteeship Council's annual report.\(^26\)

In the course of the Fourth Committee's considerations, the Ewe and Togoland unification problem came up for discussion. Though generally it was the Trusteeship Council's task to consider petitions, the Fourth Committee delved into matters discussed in a number of the petitions received from the Togolands since the Council's latest session. Thus the Togoland problem was reopened and the joint council concept reconsidered. Furthermore, as part of this consideration, the Fourth Committee accepted requests by native groups to speak before the Committee.\(^27\)


\(^27\) "Request for Hearings," *ibid.*, 202nd Meeting, 15 November 1951, p. 8.
From this point forward the Fourth Committee played an increasing role in trusteeship matters.

Both unification groups and those favoring the status quo spoke. The unificationists' purpose in appearing before the Committee was threefold: to forestall the establishment of the Joint Council, to complain about the handling of the Togoland problem by the Administering Authorities, and to present arguments for their particular types of unification.

The All-Ewe Conference's speaker, Sylvanus Olympic, centered his speech on a condemnation of the French method of handling the Ewe problem, and the attempts by the Administering Authorities to prove that the Ewe unification movement did not exist. He declared that the French had used almost every conceivable weapon against the Ewe people, including undemocratic elections, arbitrary arrests and the suppression of free speech and assembly, to prove that the Ewe problem was a minor one and that the Ewe people were a trouble-making minority. An unrelenting campaign had been waged in both Togoland and the United Nations to prove that the Ewe unification movement did not exist.

The newly organized Togoland Congress, which consisted of unification parties and organizations from both Territories, spoke in favor of Togoland unification and against the Joint Council. It thought the Joint Council would be useless. What could it do to stop the two Trust

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28 See the speeches by the All-Ewe Conference, Joint Togoland Congress and the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, "Report of the Trusteeship Council (A/1856)," ibid., 226th Meeting, 13 December 1951, pp. 161-65.

29 Ibid., pp. 161-62.
Territories from being swallowed by the French Union and the Crown Colony of the Gold Coast? Togoland should be given unification with a view to eventual self-government and independence.\(^\text{30}\)

The Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, which was the Ewe unificationist party of French Togoland, made an effort to present a solution to the obvious conflict between Togoland and Ewe unification goals. Its representative, Aku, believed that self-government for Togoland would bring the two forces together. He thought it was essential for the development of Togoland that the two objectives be merged into one common aspiration, and he stressed that the desire for self-government was gaining strength due to the policy of oppression and injustice practiced by Britain and France.\(^\text{31}\)

Aku was convinced that self-government for Togoland was more desirable than setting up an elected commission such as the Joint Council. The methods used by the Administering Authorities made it impossible to have a fairly elected council, for the British and French were using all means, fair and foul, to prevent the emancipation of the people.\(^\text{32}\) This was the first time that self-government was openly suggested by a major native party to a United Nations organ and indicated the growing disillusionment among unificationists with the Administering Authorities.

Significantly, all unification groups spoke against initiating the Joint Council. If the proposal for its establishment were accepted

\(^{30}\text{Ibid.}, \text{ pp. 163-64.}\)

\(^{31}\text{Ibid.}, \text{ p. 165.}\)

\(^{32}\text{Ibid.}\)
by the Fourth Committee, would they boycott it as they had the Enlarged Consultative Commission? The Trusteeship Council had already shown some concern about this in its resolution, asking the natives to give full cooperation to the establishment and operation of the joint body.

The native groups who favored the status quo spoke a few days later. They paid lip service to unification, but rejected it as impractical. The Parti Togolaise du Progrès of southern French Togoland said it favored a close relationship between the two Togolands, but not independence. As Togoland's resources were limited, it needed the assistance of the Administering Powers.33

The representative of the Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo, the only political party in northern French Togoland, said that the chiefs and people of his area fervently desired unification of Togoland, but they could not see how this could be brought about with two Administering Authorities. Therefore, his party thought it wisest to accelerate the political, economic, social and cultural advancement of the Togolanders so that they might quickly reach the stage of self-government or even independence. Once self-government had been attained, the union of the two Territories might be contemplated.34

From the speeches the representatives of both the above parties gave, it was apparent that even those in favor of the status quo were finding it necessary publicly to favor Togoland unification in order to maintain popularity. This suggests that the desire for Togoland

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33 Ibid., 233rd Meeting, 21 December 1951, no. 12, p. 211.
34 Ibid., pp. 211-12.
unification had become widespread in French Togoland where these two parties drew their support. But the increased approval of Togoland unification did not help the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise which continued to adhere to Ewe unification until the following summer of 1952. If this French Togoland party had joined the Togoland unification movement much earlier, it is quite possible that the outcome for both French and British Togolands would have been different. As it was, the status quo parties of French Togoland, by claiming to favor Togoland unification "at some future date," could gain support by masquerading as the champions of Togoland unification. While the demands for Togoland unification were stronger than ever before, the Togoland and Ewe unification parties were, as a group, perhaps weaker due to the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise's lack of popularity among non-Ewe groups who were set against Ewe unification.

The Fourth Committee and ultimately the General Assembly accepted the joint council concept. As in the Trusteeship Council, the main reason was the confusion that reigned in Togoland. Though the unification groups had made a stronger effort than ever before to present a unified front, it was obvious that they were still at odds. Furthermore, other groups spoke of unification only in terms of a distant goal. One could not make a final decision on unification under such conditions.

The Fourth Committee's resolution was nearly identical to the Trusteeship Council's resolution, but emphasized the Administering Authorities' responsibility in the reaching of a solution to the problems of the two Territories. The resolution accepted the creation of a joint
council and urged the Administering Authorities to exert every effort to achieve a prompt, constructive and equitable settlement of the Togoland problem. It noted that according to statements made by certain native groups there was an atmosphere of tension in the Togolands resulting from the delay in arriving at an adequate solution. Lastly, it stressed the importance of having all parties and groups consulted in the determination of a satisfactory procedure for election of representatives to the Joint Council.  

The success of the proposed Joint Council was very important to the United Nations. Two plans, the Standing Consultative Commission and the Enlarged Standing Consultative Commission, had already fallen by the wayside. The failure of the Joint Council would hardly make it sensible to introduce a fourth plan encompassing some type of joint organization, and under the confused circumstances existing in the Territories it seemed impractical to take such a far-reaching step as Togoland unification. But the increasing agitation and political activity emphasized the need for some solution. If the Joint Council failed what could replace it?

The native groups in the two Togolands were concerned with the outcome of elections for representatives to the Joint Council and the exact form the body would take, especially the unificationists, for their position was particularly critical. Should they fail to win a majority of seats in the Joint Council, little would be gained by taking

part in its meetings. But to boycott the body, even if discrimination had occurred during the elections, would be dangerous. Native arguments were no longer making as significant an impression, particularly in the Trusteeship Council, which had been saturated by arguments and contradictory claims. If the Ewe and Togoland unificationists boycotted the Joint Council, would the United Nations give heed to their statements, or would the international organization turn its back on unificationists in disgust? There was a good chance that the unification groups would not capture a majority in the Joint Council. It seemed quite possible that the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise would win only a few of the French seats, for even disregarding the strong possibility of French discrimination, the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise was far weaker than it had been. Its insistence on supporting Ewe unification had only served to weaken its position, particularly when the northern people of French Togoland became more concerned with the effect of such a step on the North. Though the situation was brighter for the unificationists in British Togoland, it was a question of whether a unificationist success in the British Territory could counteract the failing popularity of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise.

Even if the Ewe and Togoland unification groups were able to capture a majority of seats in the Joint Council, there was still the question of the Joint Council's duties. Would it be allowed to use the full extent of its outlined powers, or would the body be hamstrung by the British and French? With all these considerations in mind, unification groups had good reason for extreme anxiety.
Status quo groups and other anti-unificationists also were vitally interested in the outcome of the Joint Council. If unification groups captured most of the seats in the Council, Togoland or Ewe unification could soon be a reality. Either might have an adverse effect upon natives who worked for the Administering Authorities. Togoland unification or Ewe unification would also be injurious to the northern peoples. The former would result in domination of the northern tribes by the politically aggressive southerners. Moreover, it would probably sever the northern British Togolanders from their tribal relatives in the Gold Coast. Ewe unification, on the other hand, would cut the northern peoples from the sea and rob Togoland of much of its richest area.

Britain and France also had a large stake in the outcome of the Joint Council. Both countries obviously wanted to retain control of their respective Territory. The Territories, after all, were rich cocoa-producing areas, and French Togoland along with Dahomey gave French West Africa a needed outlet to the sea.

To all groups, therefore, the fate of the Joint Council was vitally important. While not one of them was particularly enthusiastic about its inception, all were concerned with the part it would play in the success or failure of their goals. Yet, though none were enthusiastic, the Joint Council was, paradoxically, a result of their own efforts to direct the decisions of the United Nations as to the Territories' future.
CHAPTER VI
THE FAILURE OF THE JOINT COUNCIL

In an effort to take a constructive step toward resolving the confused situation in the Togolands, the United Nations had accepted the British and French proposals for a joint council in January of 1952.\(^1\) This council was to replace the unsuccessful Enlarged Standing Consultative Commission.

The United Nations and the native groups awaited the formation of the Joint Council with anxiety. The United Nations was concerned that it might fail as had the Enlarged Consultative Commission. This would leave the United Nations with the problem of seeking a new proposal, which would probably be extremely difficult, or to attempt to patch together the Joint Council. The native groups were particularly concerned about the election of representatives to the Council which would possibly determine the fate of unification.

There was some hope of success for the Joint Council at the time of its acceptance. Unificationists were not in as good a position to initiate a boycott as they had been when they boycotted the Enlarged

\(^1\)"Report of the Trusteeship Council: Reports of the Fourth Committee (A/2061) and the Fifth Committee," General Assembly, Official Records, Sixth Session, 361st Plenary Meeting, 18 January 1952, no. 12, p. 349. See adoption of draft resolution V.
Consultative Commission. A second boycott might seriously injure their position with the United Nations which very much wanted the Joint Council to be a success. Conversely, the bitter accusation of discrimination during the election of representatives to the Enlarged Consultative Commission had directed the attention of the United Nations to that problem and thus made it likely that the Administering Authorities would take more precautions to insure fair elections. Further, status quo groups were unlikely to create difficulties as they were closely allied with the French. There was a question, however, whether the northern tribes of British Togoland, who felt themselves more closely tied to the Gold Coast than to the rest of Togoland, would be willing to take part in the Joint Council. Their failure to take part would immediately injure the effectiveness of the Joint Council as an all-Togoland body.

While it seemed that the Joint Council had a fairly good chance of fulfilling those functions for which it had been established, which were to advise the two Administering Authorities on matters of common concern to the people of the two Trust Territories, it was for all practical purposes as much a failure as the Enlarged Consultative Commission. From the very beginning it would appear that the Administering Authorities were not anxious to see its implementation, partly in fear that unificationists would win a majority and partly because a Joint Council might bring the Territories closer together. While it was not apparent at the time, it later became obvious that Britain preferred


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that British Togoland be integrated into the Gold Coast. Constitutional reforms during 1951 and 1952 in the Gold Coast made future Gold Coast independence imminent. This created a dilemma. Britain administered British Togoland as an integral part of the Gold Coast. This would be impossible once the Gold Coast was independent, yet to administer British Togoland separately would put a strain on British finances, since the Territory was economically weak and without a seaport. Britain, therefore, wished to see it integrated into the Gold Coast when that colony became independent, for British Togoland would then be part of an area with a British-imposed heritage and probably within the British Commonwealth of Nations. France was not anxious to implement the Joint Council because it wanted no threat to its continued control over the cocoa-rich Territory or to its gradual inclusion in the French Union.

The first delay in establishing the Council came during the early part of 1952. While the Trusteeship Council was considering the proper time for a second mission to West Africa, it was informed by the British representative that Britain would not be able to hold an election in its Territory for the Joint Council until June or July of that year. The British were in the process of democratizing the central government of the Gold Coast and were ready to embark on a parallel program in local government which would include British Togoland. It would be about August of 1952, therefore, before the natives would be able to participate in the Joint Council. This meant it would be seven months

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from the time the General Assembly accepted the proposal for a joint body until the Council was put into effect.

While the election of members to the Joint Council was pending, petitions were sent from both Territories of Togoland complaining of restrictive action by the Administering Authorities and attempts to nullify the unification movement. From the Togoland Congress, an alliance of unification groups, came the first strong accusation that the British government was attempting to integrate the Territory into the colony of the Gold Coast, which was already receiving extended powers of self-government. The Congress, fearing that integration was imminent, urged the immediate implementation of the Joint Council. Only recently its representatives had spoken against the joint council proposal, demanding instead immediate unification. Now the Congress urged the implementation of the Joint Council in the same breath that it accused the British of trying to integrate British Togoland into the Gold Coast. Evidently it reasoned that any step toward unification was better than a vacuum which might facilitate integration.

Petitions from French Togoland were mostly from unificationists who complained of French actions aimed at destroying the unification movement. Their leaders wrote that intolerable restrictions had been placed on political democracy since the beginning of 1952. For example, the unificationist Comité de l'Unité Togolaise could hold no meetings,


\[\text{\textsuperscript{5}Ibid.}\]

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except in private homes.  

The accusations made in the petitions from French Togoland culminated in a strongly worded petition from the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise in which its representative Augustino de Souza stated that since France was using undemocratic methods in the selection of representatives to the Joint Council, his party would not participate in the Council pending the arrival of the second Visiting Mission. He said that the French had made a pretense of consulting the population on the manner in which they wanted members elected to the Council. Afterwards France rejected all proposals for considering the views of the political parties on this question. Instead, it held to its plan of having representatives appointed by members of the Conseils de Circonscription, advisory bodies at the local administrative level. According to De Souza, the Conseils de Circonscription, ostensibly representative native organizations, were actually appointed by the French Government. Therefore, they would choose only administration-approved members for the Joint Council. As France was following the same undemocratic method of choosing representatives which it had used for the defunct Enlarged Consultative Commission, the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise would not

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participate in the Joint Council until the second Visiting Mission had had an opportunity to investigate the situation.⁹

De Souza's accusation concerning the Conseils de Circonscription was not entirely true. Members were not, in any sense, actually appointed by the French. They were elected by electors who in turn were chosen by the villages in accordance with their traditional ways of designating village chiefs. However, in 1956 the third Visiting Mission did find that the selection of electors by the traditional methods used to select chiefs resulted in undue influence by the chiefs during the choosing of electors. In turn, the electors chose the chiefs as representatives to the Conseils de Circonscription.¹⁰ As the chiefs depended upon some support from the Administering Authority for their position as headmen in the villages, it is only natural that they would tend to be pro-French in their attitudes as representatives on the Conseils de Circonscription. Therefore, it is possible that the Conseils de Circonscription would choose a larger percentage of pro-French natives than would be selected under a scheme of general adult suffrage. However much De Souza may have overstated his case, there was some justification for his concern about the selection of representatives to the Joint Council by the Conseils.

The refusal of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise to participate in the Joint Council was not the only instance of native boycotting. The northern peoples of British Togoland absolutely refused to even elect

representatives. They desired integration with the Gold Coast and wanted nothing to do with matters concerning the Trust Territories jointly.\footnote{Special Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa, 1952, on the Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem, U.N. Doc. T/1034 (New York: 1952), p. 98. (R.M.)} By this action, the northern peoples robbed the Joint Council of any chance to be representative and deprived it of any opportunity it may have had to solve the Togoland problem through meetings of groups with diverse interests and objectives.

Approximately a month after the Joint Council had been finally implemented, the second Visiting Mission made its tour of British and French Togolands in late August and early September of 1952. This Mission, chosen without dispute by any members of the Trusteeship Council, except Russia,\footnote{"Arrangements for a Periodic Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa," \textit{op. cit.}, 409th Meeting, 27 March 1952, no. 5, p. 180.} constituted a more conservative group than the first Visiting Mission. Two trust-administering countries were selected, Australia and Belgium, and two non-trust-administering countries, China and El Salvador. While Australia was not particularly conservative in matters of trusteeship policy, Belgium had a reputation as the one nation which could be depended upon to stand firmly behind the British and French in favor of the status quo. It was more conservative than any nation that had been on the first Mission. Though China and El Salvador were fairly sympathetic toward the unification movement, they were not nearly as vocal in their sympathy as the Iraqi member of the first Mission.
The findings of the second Visiting Mission were interesting in light of its more conservative membership. In its report to the Trusteeship Council, the Mission noted that the Joint Council, during the four meetings it had held before the arrival of the Visiting Mission, had substantially deteriorated. At the first meeting of the Joint Council, only four of six members were present from British Togoland and fourteen out of fifteen from French Togoland. The Mamprusi and Dagomba-Nanumba areas of northern British Togoland had not elected representatives and the Comité de l'Unité Togolaïsè of French Togoland refused to appoint its representative. (In addition to the elected representatives, each major party and organization was allowed to appoint one representative.) No work of any significance had been accomplished at the opening meeting of the Joint Council.  

At its second meeting, the Council's deterioration was already apparent. The co-chairman from British Togoland asked the Joint Council to present the Administering Authorities with a plan for equal representation in the Council for both Territories. He was supported by two of the elected representatives from the French Territory. But the majority from the French Territory, representing the Parti Togolaisè du Progrès and the Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo, refused to consider such a proposal. This angered the British Togoland representatives who were very serious about wanting equal representation for their Territory.

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The Mission's report revealed that at the third meeting of the first session the Joint Council lost any semblance of a representative organization. Members from British Togoland again asked for equal representation. When refused, they left the Council, followed by the two sympathizers from the French Territory. The Council then consisted only of the pro-French bloc.

Those representatives remaining continued the meeting. At this time and during the fourth meeting they made many recommendations designed to ease border restrictions and tie the two Territories into a closer association with each other. They agreed that there should be a free movement of food supplies and other goods between the two Territories and they asked that individuals crossing the border be allowed to carry one hundred pounds or fifty thousand francs from one Territory to the other. They thought that the time limit for British Togoland vehicles in French Togoland should be raised from twenty-four hours to one week. The Joint Council members recommended that persons living in one Territory should be allowed to become members of cooperative societies in the other Territory and to sell their produce through such societies. The members also thought it would be an excellent idea to have the native languages taught on the primary level in all schools in British Togoland and in the schools of southern French Togoland. Evidently the Joint Council felt that teaching the natives to read and write the vernaculars would bring the two Togolands closer together in that the

15 Ibid., pp. 103-05.
16 Ibid., pp. 106-09.
Ewe language was the main language of the southern Togolands and the western interior of British Togoland. These relatively mild suggestions by the joint body would have facilitated closer relationships between the two Territories.

However, each of the above recommendations was rejected, some completely, others to some extent. The French authorities thought that restrictions on the free flow of foodstuffs had been relaxed as much as possible. The French opposed lengthening the time that British vehicles could remain in the French Territory, saying that such a step would allow British Togoland transport owners to truck goods all the way to Lomé and Palimé in French Togoland, injuring truckers from French Togoland. The French also rejected teaching the native languages, saying that there were too many dialects. The British and French thought one hundred pounds or its equivalent in francs was too great an amount to be carried from one Territory into the other and they would not permit the free transfer of more than sixty pounds. The French said the question of exchange control was beyond the sphere of Togoland affairs. The only recommendation the Administering Authorities accepted was a minor one asking for an increase in the number of scholarships available at the secondary and higher educational levels.

At the fifth meeting of the Joint Council nothing of a

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substantive nature was accomplished and the Council ceased to be operative. Any further action of the Joint Council awaited the findings of the Visiting Mission and conclusions by the Trusteeship Council and by the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly.

The second Visiting Mission's resume of the Joint Council's meetings thus revealed that the Joint Council was not an effective organization. Boycotts had left it completely unrepresentative and those in attendance, having only the power to suggest measures, were unable to secure any real concessions from the Administering Authorities. The French, particularly, were unbending, even though pro-French natives were the only members left on the Joint Council. It was unmistakably clear that while the French and British had suggested the organization, they were unwilling to give it the support it needed to be successful. It was also apparent that, for the French at least, the Joint Council and the ill-fated bodies that preceded it were no more than politically expedient organizations designed to pacify the United Nations.

When the second Visiting Mission made its investigation of the Togolands, it questioned the major political parties for their opinions concerning the Joint Council now that it was inoperative. The Parti Togolaise du Progrès thought the Joint Council was a satisfactory organ which might be considered in the future as the nucleus of a parliament for a unified Togoland. This status quo party was finding it more and more expedient to speak in favor of unification as an eventual goal.

19 Ibid., pp. 110-11.
20 Ibid., p. 112.
rather than to reject it completely. At the same time, the party held a strong position in the Joint Council and therefore supported the Council.

The Comité de l'Unité Togolaise and the All-Ewe Conference, which had in the past favored Ewe unification, also spoke in favor of the Joint Council, although they had boycotted it. Their representatives informed the Visiting Mission that the Council might be a useful body if it had equal representation from British and French Togolands and if free democratic elections based on universal suffrage were conducted. The disproportionate representation and the unfair means of selecting representatives constituted the two major reasons they had not taken part in the Joint Council.

The very fact that these two groups were willing to see the re-establishment of the Joint Council indicates a change in their position. An all-Togoland organization such as the Joint Council meant almost sure death for the Ewe unification program, yet the two organizations were willing to accept the Council. Evidently they were concerned about the possibility that by having boycotted the Joint Council they would be blamed along with other unificationists for its present inoperativeness. They needed the continued support of the United Nations. Furthermore, it was possible that with the death of the Joint Council no new plan would be forwarded, leaving all unification aspirations unanswered. It was better to have a revised Council than nothing at all.

At a time when the Togoland unificationists might have made

21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., pp. 86-87.
peace with Ewe unificationists, they chose a separate path. The Ewe unificationists were making a very big concession indeed when they decided to work for a revised Joint Council which would be an all-Togoland organization. The Togoland unificationists, by demanding a completely independent Togoland, made reconciliation impossible. The Togoland Union Party and a small group known as the Ewe Youth Action Movement, both of British Togoland, said they would accept no more joint committees, councils, or other compromises which might be proposed. They wanted nothing less than independence for a unified Togoland. This very distinct disagreement between the demands of the Ewe and Togoland unification groups reopened a breach between them which had been partly mended when parties of both types had worked together to form the Togoland Congress. It was not until the following year, 1953, that the breach closed and the Togoland Congress, with the sanction of the Togoland Union, was able to give support to the reimplementation of the Joint Council.

In view of the second Visiting Mission's rather conservative composition, its recommendations regarding the Joint Council were surprisingly liberal. The Mission felt, as a result of its investigation, that the Joint Council's powers should be specifically numerated in the Council's terms of reference. The Council should have explicit freedom to discuss political, as well as economic, social and educational

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23Ibid., p. 112.

matters. A body with these powers and provided with sufficient funds might form the nucleus of a single legislative body, once the Territories achieved self-government. With the full cooperation of both Administering Powers and of the native political groups, the Joint Council could become a valuable institution.  

Significantly, the Mission was impressed by the complaints of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise and the All-Ewe Conference about the lack of equal representation and by their demands for universal adult suffrage. The Mission said that the natives should be fully consulted on possible modifications of the Joint Council. These modifications should include changes in the function, powers and, most important, the composition of the Council. The second Visiting Mission believed the membership of the Joint Council could conceivably consist of an equal number of representatives from each of the two Territories. On the question of universal adult suffrage, the Mission pointed out that universal adult suffrage was used by the British in electing representatives to the Council and suggested it might also be used by the French. That the Mission, which was a conservative body, should have made these suggestions indicated that it was impressed by the validity of the complaints made by the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise and the All-Ewe Conference.

The Trusteeship Council held a short special session for the specific purpose of considering the Mission's report on Togoland

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26Ibid., p. 131.
problem. Most of the Trusteeship Council members agreed with the Mission that the terms of reference for the Joint Council should specifically provide the body with power to discuss political, economic, social and educational matters. Further, they felt that the Administering Authorities should consult with each other and with representatives of the people to bring about possible modifications in the composition, function and powers of the Joint Council. The majority of the Trusteeship Council naturally relied heavily upon the findings and conclusions of the second Visiting Mission, feeling that that body was in the best position to know the situation at the moment. Even Britain and France accepted the Mission's report, finding it diplomatically embarrassing to oppose the findings of a relatively conservative Mission.

However, a few of the Trusteeship Council members were dissatisfied with the Mission's report. Most significant of these was China, which had been a Mission member. While China's delegation endorsed the findings of the Mission's majority, it felt that the report was incomplete. Because of a lack of time the body had failed to study the problem thoroughly and to make specific proposals for a solution.

After the Trusteeship Council's special session, the Visiting Mission's report and the Trusteeship Council's remarks on it were


considered by the Fourth Committee in a long and heated session during December of 1952. The Joint Council was discussed in a calm manner, but the Mission's report was attacked with vigor by the more radical elements of the Fourth Committee. For example, the Russian delegate accused the Visiting Mission of being a "servile instrument" of the colonial powers and the Iraqi delegate thought the second Visiting Mission was open to serious criticism both in regard to its methods and its report. It had failed to attend a major unification demonstration at Lomé in fear of disrupting order. More important, the Mission had failed to find out what form of unification enjoyed the most favor with the people, even though the United Nations had asked it to devote sufficient time to study the problem thoroughly. Further, the report itself was contradictory. All documentation showed that the people favored unification, yet the Mission's conclusions favored maintenance of the status quo. The Brazilian delegate also believed the report did not provide the guidance expected by the Committee.

Petitioners from the All-Ewe Conference and the Togoland Congress joined in the attack on the Mission. The All-Ewe Conference's representative asked what purpose there was in the Visiting Mission's leaving New York and going to Togoland when it did not investigate acts of violence and the prohibition of popular demonstrations, but merely


31 Ibid., 308th Meeting, 16 December 1952, no. 32, p. 414.
collected petitions from the natives and denials on the part of the Administering Authorities.\textsuperscript{32}

Though there was much criticism of the report, the Fourth Committee eventually accepted most of the Mission's findings and drafted a resolution to this effect. The Committee's resolution was quite similar to the Trusteeship Council's, but ignored the question of equal representation for both Territories. The French representative had objected vigorously to that suggestion, saying that it was completely illogical. If the two Togolands really constituted one country, it was hard to see why they should be represented on the Joint Council like two different states in a federal body.\textsuperscript{33}

Why did the Fourth Committee, so critical of the Mission's report, accept most of the conclusions of the second Visiting Mission? Apparently the major reason was that it had no alternative. Though the United Nations had been seeking a final solution since 1947, it had not been able to devise any solution favorable to a majority of Togolanders. Therefore, it had relied on the Mission. The Mission had been no more successful in finding a solution and as a result suggested the continuation of the Joint Council in an altered form as the most feasible temporary measure. While the Fourth Committee was not satisfied, it collectively knew less about the situation than the Mission and was incapable of presenting any better plan. Under such conditions, it could do nothing but accept the second Visiting Mission's conclusions.

\textsuperscript{32}Ibid., 300th Meeting, 10 December 1952, no. 32, p. 359.
\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., 303rd Meeting, 12 December 1952, no. 32, p. 385.
Normally, when draft resolutions have been affirmed by the Fourth Committee, they are passed by the General Assembly without much question. However, in this instance one important amendment was proposed by Venezuela and Argentina to alter that part of the draft concerning the reestablishment of the Joint Council. The amendment recommended that the Joint Council be reconstituted as soon as possible by means of a direct election based on universal adult suffrage exercised through secret ballot.\(^{34}\)

With the support of the United States, the amendment was accepted by a vote of fifty-five to nothing with five abstentions.\(^{35}\) The General Assembly wanted to assure the native people a fair election and a truly representative Joint Council. The unification groups had succeeded in creating doubts regarding the manner of election of representatives to the Joint Council.

Once the United Nations voted for the reimplementation of the Joint Council in a revised form and under altered election conditions, the Administering Authorities found all kinds of reasons for not implementing the body immediately. These tactics continued until the idea of a revised Joint Council was finally dropped.

Several factors may have affected the Administering Authorities' attitude toward the revised Council. The new Joint Council, as


envisioned by the United Nations, would have more extended powers than any of the previous bodies, and would probably have applied heavier pressure on the Administering Authorities for alterations in the status quo. There was also the new election system to be considered. The United Nations asked for universal adult suffrage in the election of representatives to the revised Joint Council. This was fine in British Togoland, for British elections were already conducted under this system; however, it meant a decided change in French Togoland. Unificationists there had accused the French of using an indirect method of election in order to discriminate against the unificationists and elect representatives who favored the status quo. If this were true, France would naturally have found the request for universal suffrage abhorrent. Any alteration in the election results after the initiation of universal suffrage could be taken to mean that France had discriminated against opposition groups in the earlier elections. Further, if France had done this, it would be afraid that new elections might mean the defeat of the status quo groups.

In British Togoland, a revised Joint Council would affect the movement for integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast, which was just beginning to gain strength. Britain supported this movement, as it felt that once the Gold Coast was independent, the British could not profitably continue to rule the small, land-bound Territory, and it preferred to see the Territory remain within the British sphere of influence rather than become part of an ill-defined Eweland or Togoland possibly under French domination. Further, Britain had to consider the
practical need to satisfy the Gold Coast's desires. It was diplomatically advantageous to support the large native element in the Gold Coast Government wanting to integrate British Togoland into the colony, among which were many Gold Coast Ewes whose proposals for separation from the Gold Coast and unification with the Togoland Ewes had been flatly rejected. In integration they saw an opportunity to be united with at least some of the Togoland Ewes. Britain's support of integration resulted in an evident effort to stall the reestablishment of the Joint Council until, through economic aid and various other means, integration became so popular among British Togolanders that a joint Togoland congress would be unwarranted.

The first suggestion that the Administering Authorities were not eager to reimplement the Joint Council came during the summer of 1953, a few months after the General Assembly resolution encouraging renewed efforts to make the Joint Council viable. On the fifteenth of July the British representative explained to the twelfth session of the Trusteeship Council that his country accepted the General Assembly's resolution; however, it was really rather early to expect the principal bodies and political parties in the Trust Territories to have informed the Administering Authorities of their views on the constitution and functions of an organ to succeed the Joint Council. This was plainly an attempt to stall, for the General Assembly had not said that the Administering Authorities should create a new organization.

The French representative made little mention of the Joint Council in his report given at the same session. He talked mostly of the progress which had been made in the French Territory and devoted the rest of his time to the proposition that the Visiting Mission was wrong in asserting that the frontier problem was not only economic but also political. This was a basic argument of the French, stemming back to World War II. The French asserted that unification agitation originated from economic difficulties created by severe restrictions along the border, particularly during World War II. If the economic difficulties were solved, the people would again be content. There was no reason to assume that the agitation was due to deprivation of political rights. Indirectly, the French representative's speech implied his government's opposition to consideration of political questions by a joint body and thus indicated French opposition to the position taken by the majority of the members of the United Nations.

The Trusteeship Council accepted the reports by the Administering Authorities with little comment and proceeded to other subjects. The records reveal no explanation for the Council's failure to press the Administering Authorities for quick action, but perhaps they felt that it was not diplomatically wise to do so.

The Joint Council, or a similar organization, was still not operative in December of 1953 when the Ewe and Togoland unification problem was considered in great detail at the eighth session of the Fourth

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37 Ibid., pp. 329-30.
38 Ibid., 483rd Meeting, 21 July 1953, no. 11, p. 344.
Committee. There was, therefore, extensive discussion regarding the Joint Council and related problems.

Various native groups were present to speak to the Committee. The Committee gave particular attention to accusations made by the All-Ewe Conference and the Togoland Congress. The representative of the All-Ewe Conference said that France was using increasingly repressive measures to prevent his organization from holding meetings or pursuing normal political activities. The Togoland Congress' representative spoke at length on the need for reestablishment of the Joint Council. He noted that in the nearly twelve months since the General Assembly had decided the Joint Council should be implemented in a revised form, the two Administering Authorities actually had done nothing towards its constitution. Instead, the British were doing all they could to integrate British Togoland into the Gold Coast.

France and Britain defended their delay in speeches which were somewhat contradictory. The French delegate explained that his country and Britain had nearly completed a thorough survey of the views of representative elements of the population which indicated that the majority of the populace opposed reestablishment of the Joint Council. Partially contradicting this statement, the British speaker said that at least a majority of the people in his Territory saw value in the establishment

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40 Ibid., 365th Meeting, 13 November 1953, no. 31, pp. 320-23.

41 Ibid., p. 317.
of an institution such as the Joint Council and the remainder might be prepared to view it with benevolent indifference. However, it was essential to proceed with care and patience so that the situation which had arisen in 1952, when the Joint Council had convened with perhaps undue haste, would not recur.\(^4^2\)

The Fourth Committee, not impressed by the Administering Authorities' arguments, again urged the reestablishment of the Joint Council. A draft resolution to this effect was passed by the Fourth Committee and accepted with minor changes by the General Assembly.\(^4^3\) In its final form the resolution recommended the establishment of a new Joint Council with the power to consider and make recommendations on the question of unification, as well as on political, economic, social and educational problems affecting the two Territories. It reemphasized the General Assembly's recommendation in the resolution a year before, that the Administering Authorities adopt measures to promote common policies on political, economic and social matters of mutual concern to the Trust Territories.\(^4^4\) The resolution was a direct rejection of the French assertion that a majority of Togoland's people opposed reestablishment of the Joint Council.

In spite of the evident wishes of the General Assembly in this

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\(^4^2\)Ibid., p. 320.


matter, the British and French still had not implemented the Joint Coun-
cil in the spring of 1954, when the Trusteeship Council convened. The
Council could no longer avoid concerning itself, and the problem was
given lengthy consideration.

The arguments of the Administering Authorities made it obvious
that they were avoiding the reimplementation of the Joint Council. Sir
Alan Burn of Britain said his country was ready to help constitute the
Council, provided sufficient agreement could be found among the people
of British Togoland on its election, composition, functions and terms of
reference. But no steps should be taken for the moment. At the present
time, he stated, the British were negotiating with the government of the
Gold Coast on a new constitution. After this was completed there would
be a general election throughout the Gold Coast and British Togoland to
choose members for a new common legislative body. Burn said indications
were that the unification groups would run candidates for the seats from
British Togoland. The strength shown by the unificationists in the
elections would supply useful supplementary information as to the wishes
of the people.45 He was implying that if the unificationists fared
poorly, the people did not generally favor unification and there would
be no need to set up the Joint Council. The British were apparently
preparing to present the United Nations with a fait accompli.

The French representative objected strongly to establishment of
the Joint Council again. He said it was not wanted by the people of

45 "General Assembly Res. 750 (VIII): The Togoland Unification
Problem," Trusteeship Council, Official Records, Thirteenth Session,
505th Meeting, 1 March 1954, no. 11, p. 184.
French Togoland. All the French Togoland representatives to the French Parliament, twenty-one of the thirty members of the Territorial Assembly, almost all the local Conseils de Circonscription and thirteen out of the fifteen former members of the Joint Council vehemently opposed the reconstitution of the Joint Council. The attitude of the pro-unification Comité de l'Unité Togolaise had only provoked resentment and mistrust from the majority parties who had steadily and faithfully shouldered the responsibility for the failure of the various bodies set up to solve Togoland's problems. Furthermore, the French representative asserted, the majority parties were worried about the attitude of the various parties in British Togoland and hesitated to take any stand on the problem of unification versus integration, as integration was primarily a concern of the other Trust Territory.  

It was absolutely clear now that the Administering Authorities were against implementation of a revised Joint Council. It was also clear that they were intent on destroying any hope of unification. Up until 1952 the unification groups had been largely responsible for their failure to achieve unification. Their own inability to agree had left the United Nations no alternative but to accept the proposals of the Administering Authorities. But during 1952 the platforms of the Ewe unificationist Comité de l'Unité Togolaise and the All-Ewe Conference were altered to support Togoland unification, bringing unification groups closer together.  

And after the winter of 1952, when the United

46 Ibid., p. 185.

Nations had demanded universal adult suffrage to insure a representative joint organ and had asked that any joint body be given extremely wide powers of recommendation, the weight of blame for the failure of either Ewe or Togoland unification shifted to the British and French. From this time on, it became more and more apparent that the two countries would not allow themselves to be forced into actions which would aid the cause of unification and that they were actually giving support to anti-unification forces.

In addition to the Administering Authorities, native groups also spoke, one of which was making its first appearance. This was the Convention People's Party, the major political party in the Gold Coast. Since 1951, when it had become evident that the Gold Coast was definitely moving toward independence, this party began to take an active interest in the future of British Togoland. In August of 1952, its southern British Togoland branch issued a resolution supporting both the unification of the two Togolands and their ultimate integration into a federal Gold Coast. By 1954, this position had altered to become a strongly supported demand for British Togoland's integration into the Gold Coast under a unitary form of government.

The southern British Togolese branch of the Convention People's Party argued at the 1954 session of the Trusteeship Council that integration was the natural and logical solution in view of the geographic, ethnic and economic circumstances of the Trust Territory. The natives

September 1956, p. 33.

of British Togoland were not prepared to take part in a joint body which might jeopardize the Territory's future association with the Gold Coast. The people the party represented, however, would not object to the revival of the Joint Council if its powers were limited to frontier problems. But they could not accept a council with political powers which might jeopardize the political future of the Territories.49

Other groups favoring integration also spoke before the Council, but did not refer to the Joint Council. Pro-unification elements ignored the Trusteeship Council altogether, in favor of the Fourth Committee.

Though the Trusteeship Council was concerned about the Joint Council, it did not again urge acceptance of the body. It no longer seemed feasible to insist upon the Joint Council's reimplementation. France was in uncompromising opposition and Britain spoke of the need for further delay. The Council's attitude also may have been influenced by the failure of any native groups present to urge the reactivation of the Joint Council. In this respect, the pro-unificationists' unofficial boycott of the Trusteeship Council during this session, because they felt the Council was controlled by a conservative majority, was not politically sound. While the Trusteeship Council did not reverse its earlier position in favor of reestablishment of the Joint Council, it did postpone any decision on the matter until the next session.50


50Ibid., p. 199.
At the following session, the idea of a revised Joint Council was finally abandoned. The British did not think the Joint Council should be reimplemented because it appeared that the majority of British Togolanders were against unification. An election in the Gold Coast and British Togoland under a new constitution had just been completed and candidates in British Togoland favoring integration had won a majority of the Territory's seats. The British believed that a revised Joint Council to consider the economic, social and political problems of the two Territories would be pointless when the majority of natives in British Togoland did not favor unification.\(^{51}\)

The French representative reiterated what he had said at the last session. The great majority of the French Togoland people were against the idea of a Joint Council. It would be impractical to reconstitute it merely to satisfy two minority groups in the two Trust Territories.\(^{52}\)

In view of the intransigence of the Administering Authorities the Trusteeship Council had no choice but to abandon the Joint Council. Moreover, the strength of integration as indicated by British election statistics, made it appear possible that unification was no longer favored by the majority in the British Territory. Even Asha of Syria, the most strongly pro-unification of the delegates then on the Trusteeship Council, conceded the death of the proposal for a revised Joint Council.


\(^{52}\)Ibid., p. 225.
though he was bitterly disappointed that a properly representative Joint Council had never been established. 53

There were several factors which caused rejection of demands for a revised Joint Council. Unificationists failed to vigorously support the Council program at every opportunity. Their tacit decision to boycott the Trusteeship Council in favor of the Fourth Committee, because of the Council's relatively conservative composition in recent years, had left the Administering Authorities, status quo groups and integrationists free to present their position to the Trusteeship Council without serious opposition from any native groups. The Trusteeship Council itself, by not forcefully insisting on effective revision of the Joint Council incurred some of the responsibility for the failure of its own program. Apparently it felt that nothing could be gained by insistence, except the animosity of the Administering Authorities. Also, there was some indication that the Council had begun to lose faith in the Joint Council as a solution, as the integration movement in British Togoland gained impetus.

The most important factor in the defeat of demands for a revised Joint Council, however, was the delaying tactics of the French and British. They were able to stave off reimplementation of the Council until 1954 when the British could with some justification say that unification of the Togolands was no longer as popular in British Togoland as the integration of the British Territory into the Gold Coast. 54 The first

54 Ibid., p. 224.
general elections in British Togoland, which were held in 1954, supported the British contention and almost forced the Trusteeship Council to reject a revised Joint Council. What sense was there in creating a body to bring the Togolands closer together if British Togoland wanted integration with the Gold Coast? Plainly, the role of the integration movement was significant.

There is much evidence that the British actively supported the integration movement from the time of its conception in 1951, and that together with the Gold Coast Government and two major parties in the Gold Coast, the Convention People's Party and the Northern People's Party, they promoted integration so well that in 1954 the pro-integration candidates captured a majority of the seats from British Togoland to the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly. The factors which led to the growth of the integration movement are very important, partly because of the movement's place in supplying the impetus leading to the final rejection of the Joint Council, but much more significantly because this movement led to the destruction of the hopes for Togoland and Ewe unification.
CHAPTER VII

THE MOVE FOR INTEGRATION OF BRITISH TOGOLAND
INTO THE GOLD COAST

The move in British Togoland for integration of the Territory into the Gold Coast was by 1954 the strongest obstacle to unification. From 1947 through 1951 the unification movement in British Togoland had not been dangerously challenged; but from 1951 on, during the same years that the Joint Council was accepted, became inoperative and its reestablishment was delayed, the demand for integration grew rapidly until it threatened the entire unification movement.

Immediately after World War II unification had little opposition from native groups, and from 1947 to 1952 the major factor holding back the movement was the failure of its adherents to agree upon one type of unification. During this time, however, revolutionary changes were taking place in the Gold Coast. Nationalistic forces, working hard for Gold Coast freedom, were able to secure dramatic constitutional revisions during 1951 and 1952 at the central, regional and local governmental levels. Confident that independence was imminent, Gold Coast nationalists turned their attention to British Togoland and the possibility of permanently attaching it to the Gold Coast.¹ They worked

diligently to convince the people of British Togoland that the integra-
tion of the Territory into the Gold Coast was desirable.

The major native forces in this mildly imperialistic effort were
the Convention People's Party, the majority party in the Gold Coast Gov-
ernment, and its opposition, the Northern People's Party. They were as-
sisted by the British, who greatly increased funds available to the Gold
Coast Government for development of British Togoland. Also, through
constitutional changes developed by the British in cooperation with the
Gold Coast, British Togoland was given an increased role in government
and elected its first representatives to the Gold Coast Assembly. With
such policies in its favor, the integration movement developed rapidly.
By 1954 Britain could claim, though not yet without dispute, that inte-
gration was more popular than Togoland unification.

British assistance to the integration movement had begun with
the constitutional revisions which left Gold Coast nationalists free to
turn their attention to the future of British Togoland. Since British
Togoland first became a mandate, it had been ruled as an integral part
of the Gold Coast, though distinguished by its position as a mandate and
later as a trusteeship. Now constitutional revisions in 1951 and 1952
advanced the Gold Coast toward independence, giving it a high degree of
self-government. But at the same time these revisions created a dilem-
ma. Britain could not continue to administer British Togoland as an
integral part of the Gold Coast once the Gold Coast became independent;

2 Duncan Hall Hessel, Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeships
to administer it separately would strain British finances, since the Territory was economically weak and without a seaport. Britain, therefore, preferred integration, which would make the Territory part of an area with a British-imposed heritage and within the British Commonwealth of Nations. With this in mind, the British began working with Gold Coast integrationists.

British Togoland unificationists became concerned about integration very early. In late 1950, they were disturbed by a British plan to create a native legislature for the Gold Coast which for the first time would include representatives from British Togoland. The Togoland Union Party, one of the participants in the larger Togoland Congress, informed the United Nations that Britain was making a determined effort to incorporate British Togoland into the Gold Coast, through its plans for a new legislature.3

Unificationists' concern deepened when Britain took active steps to implement its plan for integration. During the spring of 1951 the Togoland Congress sent a petition to the United Nations in which it asserted that British district commissioners were trying to persuade the people, against the will of the native rulers, to vote for members to the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly. The Togoland Congress felt there should be a separate legislature and budgetary autonomy for British Togoland.4 The unificationists believed, perhaps rightly, that each

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4Petition from the Togoland Congress: Third Addendum to the
step which brought British Togoland into the Gold Coast Government was a move toward integration and away from unification. Ultimately the United Nations might well be faced with a fait accompli which would preclude any real consideration of unification.

At the 1951 session of the Trusteeship Council, the Togoland Congress Party tried to make an issue of integration. Its representative told the Council that constitutional changes in the Gold Coast and the establishment of a cabinet of eight African ministers signified the growing independence of the Gold Coast. Such advancement clearly meant that British Togoland could not continue to be ruled as an integral part of the Gold Coast and still be under British trusteeship. The Congress' representative stated that while the British Togoland people bore no ill will toward the inhabitants of the Gold Coast and sympathized with their struggle for independence, they did not want to become a part of the neighboring colony. It was only just that the Gold Coast people should recognize British Togoland as a separate entity and respect its status as a trust territory.5

The Administering Authorities defended the British move for closer association of British Togoland with the Gold Coast. The French delegate, whose country favored integration because it would destroy the unification movement and leave France a free hand in its Territory,

spoke for both of the Administering Authorities. He said that any separation of British Togoland from the Gold Coast would undoubtedly prove a serious setback to the development of the British Territory and affect a large number of the inhabitants. Integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast was more desirable than Togoland unification, which would establish new frontiers by separating British Togoland from the Gold Coast.6

At the same session in which the Administering Authorities talked against unification and defended integration, they presented the plan, never effectively implemented, for a joint council to facilitate relations between the two Togolands. There was nothing contradictory about this, as the Administering Authorities had been asked to present a plan which would work toward unification. This did not mean that they favored such a plan. What the action did imply was that Britain and France would probably do very little to promote the success of a joint council.

The Trusteeship Council was not impressed at this time by the arguments in favor of integration and concentrated its attention on the feasibility of establishing a joint council. There was no proof that integration was supported by a substantial portion of the British Togoland population and the Council was concerned with finding the solution most satisfactory to the natives.

Late the next year, 1952, the second Visiting Mission went to British and French Togoland. It found very little agitation for

6Ibid., 379th Meeting, 23 July 1951, no. 12, p. 296.
integration in British Togoland, where, as yet, the integration movement had made little headway. Instead, the Mission found that unification had gained wide recognition in both Territories. Even the anti-unification parties found it wise to state that eventual unification was desirable. The only strong vocal opposition came from the northern areas of British Togoland where many native leaders favored closer ties with the Gold Coast.

The Trusteeship Council's special session in November of 1952 to consider the Mission's report on the Ewe and Togoland unification problem did not provide time for a thorough consideration of problems since the Fourth Committee wanted a report on the subject in time for discussion before Christmas; therefore, the integration question was not directly discussed. The most direct reference to it came when the New Zealand delegate noted that the northern peoples of British Togoland had expressed opposition to unification.

In contrast to the Trusteeship Council, the Fourth Committee discussed integration thoroughly when it considered the Trusteeship Council's special report to the General Assembly which included the Mission's report. The time factor was not as important as it had been during the Trusteeship Council session, so the Fourth Committee was able to

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consider each aspect of the Togoland situation.

The records of this Fourth Committee discussion indicate that the integration question was a fairly important issue even at this early date. The British representative stated that the northern peoples of British Togoland had close affinities with neighboring tribes in the Gold Coast and were against unification of the two Togolands. Furthermore, unification was opposed by the majority of non-Ewe tribes in southern British Togoland, for they felt a strong attachment to the Gold Coast. He said that about half the people in the British Trust Territory actively desired complete integration into the Gold Coast and even a larger percentage rejected Togoland unification. Establishment of a unified Togoland, the British delegate estimated, would be actively opposed by three-quarters of the population.\(^9\)

In contrast to this, the Togoland Congress said the British were attempting to build an integration movement artificially. For example, they were trying to persuade the population that it would be to their advantage to join the pro-integration Convention People's Party of the Gold Coast,\(^10\) which had branches in British Togoland. This was the majority party in the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly and was in a position to give economic assistance to British Togoland. Beyond this, stated the party, the British had created a Trans-Volta/Togoland Region

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\(^10\)Ibid., 301st Meeting, 11 December 1952, no. 32, p. 366.
with the purpose of placing southern British Togoland people in a minority position which would gradually lead to the loss of their separate identity.11

There was some truth in what the Togoland Congress asserted. The Trans-Volta/Togoland Region, established in 1952, consisted of the heavily settled area of the Gold Coast lying on the right bank of the Volta River12 and the southern area of British Togoland.13 The Trans-Volta part of the Region contained fifty-five percent of its total population, thus leaving the British Togoland area in a minority position. However, this was not serious, as the southern British Togolanders held fifty-seven percent of the seats in the council for the region.14 It is therefore more likely that the Togoland Congress feared the integrative effect of the Region's formation, rather than the minority position of the British Togolanders. The majority of the inhabitants in both the Trans-Volta area and southern British Togoland were Ewes. The fact that they were joined as a region with a regional council which had the power to advise the Gold Coast Government and the regional administration on matters affecting the welfare and interests of the Region's

11Ibid.

12See Political Map, p. 9.


14Coleman, op. cit., p. 19.
inhabitants tended to unite the two areas. It could well happen that Ewes of British Togoland would find it more advisable to accept combination with the Gold Coast Ewes rather than to continue to fight for unification with French Togoland. This would take most of the power from the Togoland Union Party, which drew much of its strength from its large Ewe following, and some power away from the more inclusive Togoland Congress which was an alliance of parties from both British and French Togolands, including the Togoland Union Party.

The Togoland Congress had already been faced with an example of the integration movement's drawing power. The All-Ewe Conference, with Ewe membership from both Territories and from the Trans-Volta Region of the Gold Coast, split over the integration question in 1952. That year the All-Ewe Conference dropped its demand for an Ewe state as futile and sought other means to bring about Ewe unification. The leadership was divided on how such unification could be achieved. The Conference's founder, D. A. Chapman, and other leaders espoused the integration of British Togoland as the first step in Ewe liberation from colonial rule. A much larger faction, represented by Sylvanus Olympio and by Augustino de Souza of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, thought it was more practical to support Togoland unification. Though the All-Ewe Conference had never joined the Togoland Congress, its split was a matter for Togoland Congress concern. If Ewe unificationists were divided on the


"Coleman, op. cit., p. 33."
relative desirability of integration and Togoland unification, what
effect would the integration movement have on those non-Ewe groups in
British Togoland who were not enthusiastic about either Togoland or Ewe
unification?

In its presentation to the Fourth Committee, during December of
1952, the Togoland Congress Party also attacked the Convention People's
Party. It asserted that the People's Party had extended its organiza­
tion into the Trust Territory in order to promote artificially the move­
ment for a closer relationship with the Gold Coast. The Togoland Con­
gress thought these activities should be condemned by the United Nations
as unjustified interference.17

For all practical purposes, the Fourth Committee disregarded the
arguments for and against integration. Concerned with the apparently
increasing demand for unification which the second Visiting Mission had
noted, and absorbed with reestabishment of the Joint Council for Togo­
land Affairs, the Fourth Committee missed the significance of the inte­
gration movement. This was unfortunate for the unification groups. An
investigation of the integration problem might have caused Britain and
the Gold Coast to retrench. As it was, their promotion of integration
went unchecked.

To the dismay of unification groups, the integration movement
grew unhindered throughout the early part of 1953. Unification peti­
tions concentrated increasingly on integration and on its advocates'

17"The Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem: Special Report of
the Trusteeship Council (A/2289)," op. cit., 306th Meeting, 15 December
1952, no. 32, p. 404.
activities against unification. For example, the Togoland Congress insisted in one petition that Nkrumah, leader of the Gold Coast Convention People's Party and head of the Gold Coast Government, was trying to incorporate British Togoland into the Gold Coast through the establishment of the first local government for the Territory. By themselves, these petitions were ineffective and the unification groups did not follow them up with a request to be allowed to send representatives to appear before the Trusteeship Council. Unification groups were conducting an unofficial boycott of the Council, which they felt had become reactionary with the change in part of its membership. By doing so, they damaged their own cause.

When the Trusteeship Council met again in June of 1953, the British and French, therefore, were faced with no organized native opposition. Taking advantage of this opportunity, the British representative praised the Trans-Volta/Togoland Council, presenting it as an excellent example of the economic and political progress being made in southern British Togoland. To make his point, he quoted from the speech made by Prime Minister Nkrumah of the Gold Coast to the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly shortly before the opening of the Trans-Volta/Togoland Council on the eleventh of July, 1953. The British representative thought the speech clearly exemplified the policy of Britain regarding the development of the Territory. However, he did not point out that

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19"General Assembly Resolution 652 (VII): The Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem (T/1067/Rev.1, T/Pet./L.1 to 6, T/Pet.6 and T/L.4
it also could be taken to represent Britain's best effort to destroy the move for Togoland unification through efforts to woo the natives of southern British Togoland.

In that speech to the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly, the Prime Minister praised the Trans-Volta/Togoland Council as a body which for the first time gave elected representatives from the Volta Region of the Gold Coast and from southern British Togoland the opportunity to meet and discuss matters affecting the welfare and interest of their areas which had just been combined as the Trans-Volta/Togoland Region. This Region was to be the focal point for a vast development program planned by the British and designed to improve economic conditions in British Togoland. Nkrumah noted that the Gold Coast Government was now prepared to build a tarred road from Accra in the Gold Coast across the Volta into the cocoa areas of British Togoland. Soon it would build a bridge to span the Volta River so that natives no longer need ferry their goods across the river to reach Accra, their only port of export. A million pounds were being made available by the Gold Coast Government for this purpose. Another million pounds would be made available for other development projects.20

It is significant that the initiation of the Trans-Volta/Togoland Council and programs of economic assistance to southern British Togoland based on it coincided with Britain's obvious desire to link the

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Territory's future with that of the Gold Coast now that the colony's independence was imminent. The Trans-Volta/Togoland Council brought the southern part of the Territory into a closer relationship with the Gold Coast at the same time that Britain and France were holding back the reimplementation of the Joint Council which was intended to bring closer association between the two Togoland Territories. The development program, backed by Britain, accelerated economic progress and by implication promised that integration with the Gold Coast would be profitable for the people of British Togoland and proved that integration was feasible. It was quite clear that the British and Gold Coast governments were promoting integration. The very fact that the Gold Coast Government, with monetary assistance from Britain, should speak of building a tarred road from Accra across the Volta River into British Togoland and should also speak of bridging the Volta River suggested that they were prepared to fight any unification which would sever the British Territory from the Gold Coast.

The Trusteeship Council failed to consider the implications of the British regional program. Like the Fourth Committee, its members were concerned primarily with the reimplementation of the Joint Council. Furthermore, they thought it advisable to consider the Togoland situation in conjunction with the yearly reports of the Administering Authorities which had not yet been received.\(^{21}\) And, perhaps even more serious,

as the unification groups continued to bypass the Trusteeship Council in favor of the more liberal Fourth Committee, no one came before the Council to make an issue of the integration movement or Britain's and the Gold Coast's part in it.

Only a few days after the Trusteeship Council adjourned, the All-Ewe Conference spotlighted the integration movement as a "plot" with a disclosure designed to embarrass the British and Gold Coast governments. It revealed a document marked "Most Secret," which it claimed had been stolen from the Gold Coast Government. Supposedly inspired by the British Colonial Office for the purpose of guiding Gold Coast politicians, it was a working plan for the annexation of British Togoland.

The document, probably written in 1951, began by explaining that British Togoland was being administered in two sections, as part of the Gold Coast Colony and as part of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, the Gold Coast Colony and the Northern Territories being two of the three administrative divisions of the Gold Coast. Outwardly, it appeared that Britain was the Administering Authority, while in fact British Togoland was administered by the self-governing Gold Coast. The authors of the document urged great care to maintain this outward appearance until integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast


23Coleman, op. cit., p. 17.
was acceptable to the majority of British Togolanders.24

The blueprint then discussed plans to be implemented immediately in order to make integration acceptable. The administration of the Trust Territory as part of the Gold Coast, while it was still a trusteeship, was proving to be very complicated and an obstacle to constitutional advancement in the Gold Coast. So long as British Togoland remained a trusteeship, the United Kingdom had to continue to demonstrate that it was maintaining control of the Territory.25 This meant that if Britain wanted to follow its past policy of administering British Togoland as part of the Gold Coast it had to demonstrate that it was the ruling force in the colony also, obviously impracticable as the time for Gold Coast independence grew nearer. As Britain wanted British Togoland to remain within the British sphere of influence, it felt that the only desirable solutions were the dissolution of British Togoland's trusteeship status and the Territory's integration into the Gold Coast or the designation of the independent Gold Coast as the Administering Authority, both alternatives requiring the affirmative action of the United Nations. Separate administration of British Togoland by Britain was considered economically impractical. Of the alternatives remaining, the British believed it was more practical to work for independence of British Togoland as part of the Gold Coast than for a change in administering authority.26

24 Middleton, op. cit., p. 9.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
If integration were to be successful, the document continued, the Territory would have to emerge from its trust status no later than the Gold Coast attained complete self-government. The necessary consent of the General Assembly, the document asserted, would require conclusive proof that such a step would be in accordance with the "freely expressed wishes of the people concerned." Neutralization of both the Ewe unificationists under Sylvanus Olympio, who had made the first plea before the Trusteeship Council for Ewe unification, and of Togoland unificationists belonging to the Togoland Congress would be essential.27

The "Most Secret" document stated that this neutralization should be accomplished by two means. Ewe unification leaders would have to be persuaded that the only way to achieve Ewe unification would be through integration with the Gold Coast. In other words, the sooner self-government was achieved, the sooner Britain's restraining hand would be removed and the Gold Coast would be able to prevail upon the French to support unification. Togoland unificationists, on the other hand, would have to be neutralized by securing the support of the Togoland Congress' leader, who should be promised a position in the legislative assembly.28

The document added that these tactics would not be sufficient in themselves but should be augmented by economic assistance. The largest expenditure should be in the southern section of British Togoland and the Trans-Volta area of the Gold Coast in order to weld those areas solidly together. For this purpose, at least one million pounds would

27Ibid., pp. 9-10.
28Ibid., pp. 10 and 12.
be necessary. The expenditure of these funds would be associated with
the establishment of a Trans-Volta/Togoland Council.29

It was believed that the northern area of British Togoland
should also receive some benefits to keep them content, but it would not
be necessary to expend large sums as most of the people in this region
had close tribal ties with the Gold Coast and were already largely in
favor of integration. Further, it was necessary to keep expenditures
there at a minimum so that people across the border in the Northern Ter-
ritories of the Gold Coast did not become jealous.30

The document concluded that a total of 1,500,000 pounds was
needed for the development program. It said that this was not a large
sum in light of the benefits to be received. Unless British Togoland
were integrated into the Gold Coast, the Volta River Project might be
impossible to achieve.31 This project to harness the Volta River for
hydro-electric development was extremely important since the Volta River
is one of the primary rivers of Africa. A gorge course in the lower
Volta offers possibilities for major development. A 1950 scheme had
even envisaged a dam larger than Boulder in the United States.32

There was no proof that the "Most Secret" document was genuine,
but plans discussed in it were similar to certain actions the British

29 Ibid., p. 12.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 L. Dudley Stamp, Africa: A Study in Tropical Development
had just taken, such as the establishment of the Trans-Volta/Togoland Council and the sudden expenditure of funds in that region. Also, the document in many ways paralleled the speech by the Gold Coast Prime Minister to the Gold Coast Assembly in 1952. Most significant, the British failed to deny the genuineness of the document.

The All-Ewe Conference's disclosure was followed by a voluminous increase in petitions stressing activities which might be regarded as steps toward integration. By late fall, 1953, when the Fourth Committee again convened, unification groups had succeeded in making the United Nations more conscious of the policies of the British and the Gold Coast governments than it had ever been heretofore.

Unificationists attended the fall and winter session of 1953-1954 in full force, speaking at length on the unification and integration problems and on the "Most Secret" document. A representative from the All-Ewe Conference stated that publication of the document had led to angry demonstrations in both British Togoland and the Gold Coast, especially among the Ewes. According to him, the natives realized that the execution of the plan would mean the end of the unification movement and the permanency of the international boundary between the two Trust Territories. Rejecting integration and hoping for unification, the people were willing to accept the Joint Council as a step toward the latter, if the Council were truly representative and democratic. They realized the need for an organ such as the Joint Council, through which they could speak with authority and be heard with respect.33

33"The Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem: Special Report of
A representative from the Togoland Congress was present also. He too discussed the "Most Secret" document, labeling it proof that Britain was attempting to integrate British Togoland into the Gold Coast. He said that further evidence of this was the actions of regional officers and government agents who toured their various districts in the Trust Territory urging people to abandon demands for establishment of a revised Joint Council. In light of these activities, the Togoland Congress' speaker demanded a review of the trusteeship agreement which permitted the Territory's administration as an integral part of the Gold Coast. His demand for a review was significant in that it touched on a problem which bothered the British and Gold Coast governments and caused them to work diligently for integration. They realized that with independence pending for the Gold Coast it was only a matter of time before the United Nations would feel it necessary to revise the trusteeship agreement and administratively separate the Togoland Trust from the Gold Coast. As the two governments desired integration, they wanted no discussion of revision until they could prove that the British Togoland people wanted to be part of the Gold Coast. Fortunately for them, the Fourth Committee did not agree with the Togoland Congress that there was need for review of the trusteeship agreement at that time.

The British representative made a short speech defending the British administration and the government of the Gold Coast, but he did

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not deny the authenticity of the "Most Secret" document and similar other secret papers that the unificationists claimed to have "found." He stated that the petitioners were trying to give the feeling that these secret plans and documents embodied the policy of the Administering Authority and the Gold Coast Government. This, he claimed, was not so. The policy set forth in the "Most Secret" document, for instance, did not represent an established general policy of the British. Neither the Gold Coast Government nor the Administering Authority had sought or would seek to hamper the free expression of the people's wishes. But the British representative did not say whose policy these documents were supposed to express nor did he deny that Britain had prepared the papers.

Thus it was that the integration question was finally given full consideration by a United Nation's organization, much too late to halt a program which was rapidly bringing about a fait accompli. Moreover, even though a majority of the Fourth Committee members were impressed by unification arguments concerning the integration issue, no action was taken. Without actually condemning British and Gold Coast activities, which on the surface were humane efforts to assist British Togoland, there was nothing the Committee could do. A condemnation of the British, who had cooperated more closely with the United Nations on trusteeship affairs than the French, would only create resentment. Little could be gained by alienating Britain or indirectly the Gold Coast Government. Under the circumstances the only possible policy for the Fourth Committee was to continue working for unification, which it did by asking the

Trusteeship Council to urge adoption by the Administering Authorities of measures for promoting common policies on political, economic and social matters through the medium of the Joint Council.36

The Fourth Committee also drafted other directives for the Trusteeship Council. It requested that the Council reexamine all aspects of the Togoland problem concerned with the progressive development of the inhabitants toward self-government or independence, particularly those having to do with the special circumstances created by the constitutional and political situation faced by the Gold Coast and British Togoland.37 The Committee drafts were passed by the General Assembly without alteration.38

During its first session in 1954, which began in March, the Trusteeship Council discussed the particular phases of the Togoland problem referred to it by the Fourth Committee directives, including integration, but came to no decisions. The Council instead accepted a suggestion by the British that consideration of the whole problem of unification, integration and reestablishment of the Joint Council should be postponed until after the general elections in the Gold Coast and British Togoland during May. The British thought the Trusteeship Council would be able to judge the Togoland situation better after they saw how unification


37 Ibid., p. 29.

candidates fared in the election to select members to the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly.\textsuperscript{39}

However, although no decisions were made by the Trusteeship Council in the spring of 1954, it definitely considered integration as one of the possible solutions to the British Togoland problem. Unification was no longer the sole, or even necessarily the most attractive solution in the minds of those United Nations' members who were convinced that the status quo must be altered. One reason for the lessening interest in unification was undoubtedly the fact that once again in the thirteenth session of the Trusteeship Council the unification parties failed to make an appearance, while several pro-integration groups were present to impress upon the Council both the practicality of and the widespread demand for integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast.

The Convention People's Party, referring to southern British Togoland, claimed that integration would unify 300,000 Ewes in the Gold Coast with 137,000 in British Togoland, that is, about three-fourths of the total Ewe population.\textsuperscript{40} If the French figure of 174,400 natives for French Togoland were accurate, the claim that integration would unify three-fourths of the Ewes would be true. However, since 1947 when they had estimated that there were 290,000 Ewes in French Togoland, the French had gradually been reducing the estimated size of the French Ewe


\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 506th Meeting, 2 March 1954, no. 11, p. 192.
population, claiming 174,400 in 1951. As the French, unlike the
British, had taken no census during these years, the decrease in popu-
lation seems to have been a result of France's desire to reduce the ap-
parent importance of the Ewe population in the French Territory. In
contrast to the French figures the All-Ewe Conference claimed there were
500,000 Ewes in French Togoland. It based its estimation on old German
figures, which included the related Mina and Fon tribes. This would
mean that integration would unite less than half of the Ewes, whereas
Togoland or Ewe unification would unite a little over two-thirds of the
Ewes. Without a census, population figures could be juggled to support
either integration or unification and the United Nations had no way of
knowing which statistics were more valid.

A representative of the Dagomba District Council, claiming to
speak for the chiefs and peoples of the Dagomba, Nanumba, Mamprusi and
Gonja tribes of the North, said the name "Togoland" no longer had any
meaning for the people he represented. They wished to become a part of
the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast and were determined not to
be separated from their kinsmen in that country in order that the Ewes
might be unified. His assertion had a foundation since it was true
that a majority of the northern people belonged to tribes divided by

41 Coleman, op. cit., p. 13.
42 "Consideration of Petitions Presented," Trusteeship Council,
Official Records, Second Session: First Part, 10th and 11th Meetings,
8 and 9 December 1947, nos. 33 and 34, pp. 333 and 342.
43 "General Assembly Resolution 550 (VIII): The Togoland Uni-
187-88.
the British Togoland-Gold Coast border.

A representative of the Buem-Krachi District of upper southern British Togoland also spoke.\(^{44}\) He claimed that the Buem and Krachi tribes favored integration with the Gold Coast and that supporters of the Togoland Congress Party were few.\(^{45}\) His statement was not entirely true, for while it appears that a majority of people in the area were against the Togoland unification platform of the Congress, the third Visiting Mission in 1955 found the region almost evenly divided on the question of integration versus unification.\(^{46}\)

Though the integration groups did not convince the Trusteeship Council that their movement was supported by a majority of British Togolanders, they did persuade the Council that a strong movement for integration was in existence. Even the Syrian delegate, who was strongly in favor of unification, admitted that the Togoland problem was no longer just a question of unification versus the status quo, but that integration had to be considered as an additional alternative.\(^{47}\)

More uncertain of its course now that integration also seemed a possible solution, the Trusteeship Council passed no resolution on the Togoland question in its first session of 1954, but decided to postpone

\(^{44}\)See Political Map, p. 9.

\(^{45}\)"General Assembly Resolution 550 (VIII): The Togoland Unification Problem," \textit{op. cit.}, 505th Meeting, 1 March 1954, no. 11, p. 188.

\(^{46}\)"Special Report on the Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 32.

any action until after the May general elections in the Gold Coast and British Togoland in the hopes that voting results would clarify the views of the native population. Therefore, when the Trusteeship Council reopened in June, the Togoland problem was the major item on its agenda.

Discussion centered on the results of the general election held in the Gold Coast and British Togoland. The election rendered the most destructive blow yet suffered by unificationists. At the same time it elevated the doctrine of integration to a position within the United Nations equal to that of unification.

The British delegate to the Trusteeship Council noted that the integrationists had won a majority of the seats for British Togoland in the elections just completed, and said this indicated that unification was not warranted. He proposed that the Trust Territory should instead become a part of the Gold Coast when that colony became independent, since the election results amounted to a rejection of unification by the majority of British Togoland people. As a result, Britain was now prepared to negotiate the termination of British Togoland as a trusteeship after it had assisted the General Assembly in ascertaining the views of the inhabitants to be absolutely certain they wanted integration.48

Britain had a good reason for suggesting that there should be a further determination of the people's wishes. Although Britain was fairly sure that integration now had more popular appeal than unification, it realized that the United Nations could not be convinced of this

fact easily, in view of the Fourth Committee's sympathy for the unification movement. Further, any step by the United Nations which determined the fate of a trusteeship was likely to be taken only after the member nations of the United Nations were sure that such a step was in accordance with the will of the majority of people within the trust territory involved. Therefore, Britain suggested that some way should be worked out to determine absolutely the wishes of the people. This implied a plebiscite, or vote by the people.

Britain's suggestion was ironical. In 1951, when the movement for unification was very popular, both Britain and France had rejected a plebiscite, asserting that no single solution could be presented to the people as a question answerable by a simple yes or no, and that furthermore it would be impossible to place the unification matter before the voters in a way which would not be misunderstood by them. Now that it appeared integration was more popular, Britain reversed its stand. Having prevented the implementation of a revised Joint Council and having successfully assisted the integration movement, Britain was willing to let the people express their opinion on a solution to the British Togoland situation. Its earlier objections to a plebiscite were no longer voiced.

The Trusteeship Council found the British proposal very tempting. Some arrangement such as a plebiscite would give the Council definite information as to the relative popularity of integration and unification,

and might lead at last to a solution of the British Togoland situation. If a majority of the people opposed integration then it would be possible to continue efforts for unification. If they voted for integration, the way would be open for the United Nations to dissolve the trusteeship and make British Togoland a part of the Gold Coast when the latter became independent. Indirectly, therefore, they would have freed one of their trust territories from foreign rule.

Not all factors, however, favored a plebiscite or some similar plan. While a plebiscite would give the people in the British Territory a chance to express themselves, it would leave French Togoland's future dependent upon what happened in British Togoland. If that Territory's people voted in favor of integration, French Togolanders would be left with no choice other than to accept their separate status or agitate also for integration with the Gold Coast.

The Trusteeship Council evaded the issues prompted by the British representative's speech, possibly because of the problem outlined in the previous paragraph. They threw the whole question into the Fourth Committee, with the recommendation that the Committee should place the United Kingdom proposal on its agenda along with the Togoland unification problem.50

Though the Trusteeship Council evaded the plebiscite issue, it is significant that the Council referred both the British request for a plan to determine the British Togolanders' wishes concerning integration

and its request for dissolution of the Territory's trusteeship status to the Fourth Committee. This action meant that three short years of activity by the pro-integration forces had increased the popularity of integration so much that Britain could suggest a consultation of the British Togoland people with the assurance that a majority would favor integration. A consultation would be the most important step thus far considered by the United Nations in seeking a solution to the Togoland problem. Should the General Assembly find a plebiscite acceptable, the resultant vote could well mean the first relinquishment of a trusteeship territory and the first fulfillment of the trusteeship system's goals of self-government or independence for trusteeship territories.
CHAPTER VIII

PLEBISCITE CONSIDERATION

After three years of vigorous activity by the United Kingdom and native groups from the Gold Coast, the movement for integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast had gained by 1954 such popularity in British Togoland that it had become the primary deterrent to the unification of British and French Togolands.

Once the British felt that a majority of the Territory’s people favored integration, they offered to relinquish control over the area after assisting the United Nations in determining the wishes of the people as to their future. With the coming independence of the Gold Coast, Britain could no longer rule British Togoland as part of that colony and British leaders felt that it was not economically feasible to rule the Territory as an independent unit.

This being the case, Britain favored integration rather than a unified Togoland for several reasons. It preferred to see British Togoland as part of an area which would probably remain within the British sphere of influence, rather than united with French Togoland whose future status was impossible to predict. Integration would also guarantee the Gold Coast the use of the Volta River should it decide to construct the high dam visualized by the British. Further, the British thought it
was more feasible to maintain the economic, social and cultural ties, which had developed between the Gold Coast and British Togoland during the thirty years they had been administered as joint possessions, than to sever these ties and reestablish the old bonds between French and British Togolands.

Britain's offer to relinquish the Territory after determining the people's wishes markedly altered the Togoland problem. Unification steps had thus far failed and although it left the situation in the French Territory unsettled, Britain's proposal gave the United Nations an opportunity to solve the problem of British Togoland.

Those groups interested in the future of Togoland realized the significance of the British offer. They flocked to the Fourth Committee to express their views on the proposed consultation of the people and particularly on integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast, for undoubtedly any consultation would include a query on the popularity of integration.

Discussion of the British proposal in the Fourth Committee developed into four areas of consideration: should there be a plebiscite; if so, what areas should it include and in what manner should it be carried out; and what question or questions should be submitted to the people for their decision? Consideration of whether or not there should be a plebiscite began in earnest at the 449th meeting of the ninth session of the Fourth Committee held during the fall and winter of 1954 and continued through the 468th meeting when a plebiscite for British
Togoland was accepted.¹

Eleven separate native organizations, some relatively obscure, were present to represent the three major views on the Togoland problem: unification, integration and the status quo. The pro-unification groups were the Togoland Congress of the British Territory, the Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise and the Mouvement Populaire Togolaise of the French Territory, and the All-Ewe Conference with membership in both Territories and the Gold Coast. The two parties from French Togoland were relatively new organizations. The Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise was a radical offshoot of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise,² the major party opposed to the French in French Togoland. The Mouvement Populaire Togolaise was a new organization consisting of former members of the Parti Togolaise du Progrès who had switched from a status quo to a unificationist position.³

The pro-unification groups differed in their opinions on a plebiscite. The Togoland Congress was willing to accept the proposal, but thought both Togoland Territories should be consulted. Its representative visualized an all-Togoland plebiscite under the supervision of the


³Ibid.
United Nations and free from any direction by the British and French. He argued that the problems of unification and integration affected both Territories, therefore, both should vote on them. The All-Ewe Conference agreed with the Togoland Congress. The Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise (the Juvento) disagreed with the Togoland Congress and the All-Ewe Conference. It believed that all of Togoland should be united as an independent state before a plebiscite was held, when it would be determined by a vote whether or not Togoland wished to be part of the French Union, remain completely free, or be federated with the Gold Coast. In the view of the Juvento, unification should not be an issue in the plebiscite, only the future of a unified Togoland. The Mouvement Populaire Togolaise expressed no opinion on the plebiscite. As in the past, the unification groups worked at cross currents, continuing to weaken their common objective.

Representatives from five organizations which favored the integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast were present at the Fourth Committee to submit their views. Four of these, the Dagomba District Council, the Mamprusi District Council, the Buem-Krachi District Council and the Natural Rulers of the Buem-Krachi District represented

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5Ibid., 547th Meeting, 6 December 1954, nos. 35 and 52, p. 391.

6Ibid., p. 394.

7Ibid.
natives in the middle and northern sections of British Togoland. The fifth was the Convention People's Party which had its major headquarters in the Gold Coast.

Unlike the unification groups, the integrationists were able to present a united front on the subject of a plebiscite. They favored a consultation of the people in British Togoland only, not of all Togoland. For example, the Convention People's Party noted that certain factions in French Togoland were against unification with British Togoland. People in British Togoland were not prepared to allow such feelings to hold them back from the integration they sought with the people in the Gold Coast. Any form of plebiscite should therefore be confined to British Togoland. This was a vague argument, but it was clear that the Convention People's Party would support a plebiscite, but only if it were held in the British Territory alone.

Two organizations, the Parti Togolaise du Progrès and the Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo, continued to favor the status quo for French Togoland. Neither of them had any influence upon the Fourth Committee's decision on a plebiscite. The Parti Togolaise du Progrès expressed no opinion on the subject; and the Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo, continued to favor the status quo for French Togoland.

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8See Political Map, p. 9.


10Ibid., 457th Meeting, 6 December 1954, nos. 35 and 52, p. 390.

11Ibid., 453rd Meeting, 2 December 1954, nos. 35 and 52, pp. 364-66.
des Populations du Nord Togo spoke neither for nor against a plebiscite, saying only that if there were to be one, French Togoland should also be consulted.  

Certain similarities emerged from the speeches of the various native groups. None of them found serious fault with the plebiscite proposal. Their major disagreements centered on the area to be included in the polling, its timing and administration.

France supported the integrationists of British Togoland. It was determined that a plebiscite should be held only in the British Territory. The French delegate stated that one plebiscite for both Territories would tend to tie the future of French Togoland to British Togoland. Moreover, a plebiscite in the French Territory would disturb the Territory's peace and equilibrium and would delay its political progress at a time when reforms had been adopted to speed its advancement toward self-government. A premature plebiscite would sabotage the reforms, which, according to the French delegate, allowed the four largest towns in the Territory to elect their own mayors and which established a French Togoland Government Council.

The most enthusiastic supporter of a plebiscite for British Togoland was Britain. Yet the British spoke mostly about their own role in the integration movement. Britain was concerned lest the Fourth Committee feel it had ulterior reasons for supporting integration. The

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12 Ibid., 457th Meeting, 6 December 1954, nos. 35 and 52, p. 391.
13 Ibid., 459th Meeting, 7 December 1954, nos. 35 and 52, pp. 408-09.
British representative assured the Committee that Britain's offer of a plebiscite was an honest effort to discern what the people wanted. While his country honestly believed that integration was the best solution for British Togoland, the fact that it forwarded a proposal for a consultation of the people proved that Britain was willing to let the natives make their own decision. There was no truth to the accusation that Britain had inspired the integration movement as a "Machiavellian design" to keep British Togoland within the British Commonwealth. The Gold Coast, of which British Togoland would be a part, would have the freedom to remain within the Commonwealth or to leave the association at the time it became independent. Besides, the representative continued, the British Commonwealth was not a closed trade system that operated for the narrow benefit of the United Kingdom.\(^\text{14}\)

A majority of the Committee accepted the proposal for a plebiscite in British Togoland. British assurances played a part in this decision, but other factors were equally important. No major native organizations spoke against a plebiscite for the British Territory, though some thought the entire Togoland population should be consulted. Moreover, a plebiscite appealed to the United Nations because it offered the British Togoland people a voice in their own future. Lastly, a consultation of the people would assist the international body in determining the exact strengths of unification and integration, knowledge which was essential for future planning.

An all-Togoland plebiscite was rejected because it was felt that

\(^\text{14}\)Ibid., 458th Meeting, 6 December 1954, nos. 35 and 52, p. 401.
the two Territories faced different problems. People in British Togo­land were concerned with a choice between integration and unification. People in French Togoland were involved in a decision between a continued close relationship with France or unification. Therefore, a single plebiscite would not apply to all of Togoland. However, this did not preclude the possibility of a separate vote for French Togoland in the future.

Various speeches point out the distinction made by Fourth Com­mittee members between the British and French Togoland situations. For instance, the New Zealand delegate believed it was necessary to have a vote in British Togoland because the impending independence of the Gold Coast necessitated a decision in British Togoland on integration. As no integration issue confronted the French Togoland population, there was no need to have them participate in the plebiscite.15

While the majority of the Fourth Committee felt the problems of the two Territories were too different to be encompassed in one plebi­scite, a strong minority disagreed, feeling that no steps should be taken in either Territory which might lead to a separate future. When India drafted a resolution which restricted the present consultation of the people to the British Territory there was a widely supported move to amend this draft. Paragraph four of the preamble to the Indian draft resolution stated:

The future status of the Territory [British Togoland] should be de­termined in the light of its particular circumstances and of the

15Ibid., 461st Meeting, 8 December 1954, nos. 35 and 52, p. 423.
freely expressed wishes of its peoples.\textsuperscript{16} Poland submitted an amendment which would have altered the paragraph to read:

The future status of the Territories of Togoland under British administration as well as Togoland under French administration should be determined in light of their particular circumstances and of the freely expressed wishes of the people.\textsuperscript{17}

This amendment was rejected by the narrow margin of twenty-three to twenty-one with nine abstentions. A roll call vote was taken on this important issue. Those in favor of the proposal that there should be a single plebiscite for both Territories were Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Iran, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen and Yugoslavia. Those opposed were Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Columbia, Cuba, Denmark, France, Iraq, Israel, Liberia, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Sweden, Thailand, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States. China, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Lebanon, Pakistan and Peru abstained.\textsuperscript{18} So evenly was the Fourth Committee divided that had the unificationists been able to present a stronger case, or had other variables changed slightly, the separate plebiscite for British Togoland would probably never have taken


\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{18}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 16.
The Polish amendment was the most serious challenge to the Indian draft resolution. Shortly after its defeat, the Indian draft was passed by the Fourth Committee and adopted without change by the General Assembly. The resolution said that in view of the eventual revision or termination of the trusteeship agreement, steps should be taken to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of British Togoland as to their future. The Trusteeship Council was requested to consider what arrangements should be made in pursuance of the above decision and was further requested to dispatch a special mission to the British and French Togolands to make a study of their problems.

During its fifteenth session in the early part of 1955 the Trusteeship Council discussed methods of carrying out the instructions of the General Assembly. France, charging that such a move would cause local repercussions, frustrated the efforts of the Council by bluntly rejecting the appointment of a special mission as requested by the Fourth Committee to visit French Togoland. Not only would such a mission agitate the local situation, the French representative said, but its very appointment would run counter to the provisions of the Charter.


the trusteeship agreement and the Council's rules of procedure. France's refusal forced the Trusteeship Council to revert to the use of a regular mission. Actually a regular mission could do the same work as the special mission, but it would be more limited in time, as the regular missions to Togoland also visited the other trusteeships in West Africa.

Without dissent on the part of any member nation, except Russia, the Council decided that Australia, the United States, India and Syria would constitute the membership of the third Visiting Mission. It was a heterogeneous group. Both Australia and the United States were trust-administering countries which more often than not had favored British and French proposals concerning Togoland. Yet they were not as inherently conservative on colonial matters as France and Belgium. India was quite liberal, but sided with Britain on the question of integrating British Togoland into the Gold Coast. Perhaps its representatives thought of its own case, in which Pakistan had split off from the Indian state when independence from the Empire had been accomplished. In contrast to Australia, the United States and India, the radical anti-colonialist Syria was a very strong supporter of unification. The


Mission's composition inevitably brought conflict within the body and resulted in a split between Syria and the others on some issues.

The Mission was instructed by the Trusteeship Council to determine what arrangements should be made to ascertain the freely expressed wishes of the people of British Togoland and to study problems in French Togoland. The importance of the Mission's conclusions cannot be overstressed, particularly those concerning British Togoland. They formed the basis for the discussion of the manner in which a plebiscite should be instituted and during December of 1955 provoked extended debates in the Fourth Committee.

There were five main areas around which these debates centered. The first of these concerned the question of whether or not British Togoland should be politically separated from the Gold Coast before a plebiscite was held. The Syrian member of the Mission supported a demand by the Togoland Congress that British Togoland should be formally separated from the Gold Coast and a separate legislature established before a plebiscite was held. He felt that a political separation of British Togoland from the Gold Coast was necessary to insure the Territory's status as a trusteeship during the period of the plebiscite and to avoid any interference by political organizations from the Gold Coast. The three more conservative members considered the creation of a temporary legislature prior to a plebiscite as unnecessary, serving

only to delay the consultation.\(^{25}\)

This disagreement was considered by the Fourth Committee and resolved in favor of the more conservative mission members. A large majority of Fourth Committee members agreed that the establishment of a separate legislature for the British Territory was not necessary and would only delay the plebiscite. Saudi Arabia's representative, for example, favored separate political institutions, but felt their creation was impractical because independence of the area would be delayed.\(^{26}\) Even the anti-colonial Iraqi delegate was against separating British Togoland from the Gold Coast before the plebiscite. He thought it was useless because the northern people had said they would not participate in a separate legislative body.\(^{27}\) The rejection of the Syrian recommendation was a direct defeat for the unificationists of British Togoland, who had suggested the idea originally.

Another part of the Fourth Committee's discussion concerned the administration of the plebiscite. The third Visiting Mission had suggested that a United Nations plebiscite commissioner should be appointed to coordinate the work of observers who would be stationed at various


\(^{27}\) Ibid., 539th Meeting, 8 December 1955, no. 35, p. 405.
points throughout the Territory. The main task of implementing the plebiscite, however, would be left to Britain. The Togoland Congress, representing the Togoland unificationists, could not agree to this.

The Congress thought the plebiscite should be administered by the United Nations. Its representative told the Fourth Committee that the United Kingdom had gone to considerable lengths to destroy the movement for unification and to replace it with an artificially created demand for integration. The British had worked with the Gold Coast Government to conduct an unprecedented propaganda campaign in British Togoland to convince the people of the desirability of integration. Under the circumstances, the Togoland Congress representative stated, it would be absurd to give Britain the responsibility for administering the plebiscite. Could the British be expected to conduct it with any degree of impartiality?

For two reasons the Fourth Committee did not respond to the demand that the plebiscite be administered by the United Nations. First, United Nations administration would require a huge staff and would put a heavy strain on the organization's budget. Secondly, it would be a direct insult to the British, who had initiated the proposal for a plebiscite.

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However, several Committee members were clearly conscious that Britain might show partiality. The Mexican delegate wanted assurances that the plebiscite would be conducted fairly so that the results would be valid. The Philippine representative felt the same way. It was generally agreed that the best way to insure impartiality was through effective observation during the stages leading to the plebiscite and throughout the plebiscite itself.

This decision was the second rebuff for the unificationists. While it was gratifying for them to know that the Fourth Committee was concerned about insuring an impartially conducted plebiscite, observation was quite different from actual administration. The Togoland Congress was not pleased, but accepted the decision.

A third area of discussion evolving from the report of the Mission concerned the manner in which the United Nations observation team should be directed. The third Visiting Mission suggested that it should be headed by a single commissioner, feeling that a commissioner would be more efficient than a commission. Members of the Committee were inclined to agree. The New Zealand representative thought disputes could be settled by a single commissioner more efficiently than by representatives selected by the Fourth Committee from among the nations belonging

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30 Ibid., 538th Meeting, 8 December 1955, no. 35, p. 404.

31 Ibid., p. 407.


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to the Committee.  The Australian delegate, who had been a member of the third Visiting Mission, felt that a commission would have limited efficiency since authority would be divided. Furthermore, the direct personal relationship that should exist between the leadership of the United Nations observers and the British Plebiscite Administrator would be affected in that the British administrator would have to cooperate with a group rather than an individual. Moreover, a commission was not justified either by the size of the population or the area of the Territory. It was possible, too, that the use of a commission might lead to a dissenting opinion within the commission which could cause the General Assembly to question the validity of the plebiscite. This would place the Administering Authority in an intolerable position.

Those members who favored a commission did so in deference to public opinion. The Guatemalan delegate, for one, asserted that a commission would create an atmosphere of calm and confidence among the entire population. Apparently he believed that the people would feel that a commission had less chance of being influenced by the British than a single commissioner.

The Fourth Committee rejected the commission proposal in favor of the proposal for a single commissioner by the very narrow margin of

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34Ibid., 544th Meeting, 10 December 1955, no. 35, p. 447.

35Ibid., p. 442.
twenty-six to twenty-two with five abstentions. The commission plan was defeated by the weight given to the Mission's recommendations for a commissioner and by the arguments that such an arrangement would bring greater efficiency.

This decision contrasted with the position taken by the Togoland Congress, which rejected either a commission or a commissioner in favor of direct control of the plebiscite by a United Nations' force. It thought that neither Britain nor France should be responsible for a plebiscite since they both had a vital interest in the plebiscite's outcome.

In the Mission's report, there was a suggestion that British Togoland should be divided into four major areas for voting purposes. Each area would vote upon and decide its future separately. This suggestion was the fourth important topic of discussion within the Fourth Committee.

The Mission had found British Togoland severely divided on the issue of integration. The northern section of British Togoland overwhelmingly favored it. The Buem-Krachi District of upper southern Togoland was split on the issue, the northern half favored integration and the southern half opposed it. In the South, the districts of Ho and


Kpandu were strongly against integration. As it seemed apparent that integration would be one of the alternatives submitted to the people, the Mission felt that to be fair each of these four areas should decide its own future. No one area should be forced to accept a solution to which it was violently opposed, just because a majority in the Territory favored it. Further, the Mission suggested that if any of the four areas preferred separation from the Gold Coast, there should be a continuation of the trusteeship over that area, pending the ultimate determination of its future.38

The third Visiting Mission's suggestion immediately became a point of controversy. Late in November of 1955 the Trusteeship Council had held a special session to give some consideration to the Mission's findings before they were discussed by the Fourth Committee. At the session the British representative stated that his country was loath to accept the Mission's suggestion that British Togoland should be divided for plebiscite purposes. He said that the will of the majority should rule over all the Territory. Furthermore, voting by sectors would possibly result in fragmentation of British Togoland, a dangerous precedent.39

Later, in the Fourth Committee, the Togoland Congress


representative opposed the British position. He told the Committee he was surprised that Britain should make such a protest about the division of British Togoland for purposes of consulting the people. They had repeatedly justified the cleavage between northern and southern British Togoland for administrative purposes, administering the two areas separately. The northern area was ruled as part of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, while the southern sector was ruled as part of the southern Gold Coast.

Branches of the Convention People's Party were split on the issue of electoral division. The parent body, which was the major party in the Gold Coast, had gradually formed affiliates in British Togoland. Two of these branches were present at the Fourth Committee debates where they expressed differing views on the proposal to divide the Territory into four parts for plebiscite purposes. The leader of the Akan-Krachi branch said his group was willing to accept the Visiting Mission's recommendation that their district be divided. They thought it unwarranted, but would not protest, as they had no doubts about the results of the plebiscite. However, the Convention People's Party in the Kpandu District opposed the idea of division. Like the British, it asserted that a plebiscite should adhere to the principle of majority vote. Apart from the question of principle, its representative said, serious

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41 Ibid., 529th Meeting, 1 December 1955, no. 35, p. 345.
difficulties might result from the adoption of area voting. For example, if the Akan-Krachi and Buem districts voted for integration and the southern districts of Ho and Kpandu against it, many people in the latter districts would find themselves separated from their farms.\(^4\)

The conflict between the two branches of the Convention People's Party nullified the party's effectiveness on this issue. It also revealed a difference in attitude between the two branches based on their relative strengths. Integrationists in the Akan-Krachi area, feeling they were in the majority, were willing to have British Togoland's future determined by separate decisions for each of four areas by the people within these areas; but the integrationists in the Kpandu District were quite sure they were in the minority and therefore wanted a plebiscite deciding the future of British Togoland as a unit.

The Fourth Committee had considerable difficulty resolving the question of how the plebiscite should be implemented. Britain, assisted by the Gold Coast Government, which was represented on the British delegation, led the opposition to the third Visiting Mission's proposal. British representatives' argued as they had in the Trusteeship Council, that dividing the Territory might lead to the fragmentation of the small area. This in turn could impede the attainment of independence.\(^3\)

Among those who supported Britain were India, New Zealand, the Netherlands and Pakistan. While India, which had been a member of the third Visiting Mission, had not dissented from the majority in the

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 348.

\(^3\)Ibid., 536th Meeting, 6 December 1955, no. 35, p. 392.
Mission's report on this issue, it stated in the Fourth Committee that division of the Territory was not desirable. Its representative asserted that the trusteeship agreement had established British Togoland as one unit and the plebiscite should be conducted accordingly.\textsuperscript{44} The delegate from New Zealand agreed that the fate of the Territory should be determined as a whole. The Administering Authority favored this and he placed great importance on its views.\textsuperscript{45} The Netherlands felt that dividing the Trusteeship into four areas prejudged the results of the voting and this was not proper.\textsuperscript{46} Pakistan thought the division into four parts might bring subsequent difficulties. If one area took a different view from the others, it might be forced to accept the majority opinion of the other three. This would create more dissension than if the people had voted as a group with the knowledge that they would be expected to abide by the opinion of the majority in the Territory.\textsuperscript{47}

The arguments of those against division were valid enough, but there were valid arguments for division too, and a large number of delegates supported it. Venezuela did not think the majority should enforce its will upon a minority. It had in mind, particularly, the effect of a large northern vote upon the fate of the southern section.\textsuperscript{48} The delegate from Yemen believed that there should, at least, be a division

\textsuperscript{44}Ibid., 538th Meeting, 8 December 1955, no. 35, p. 402.
\textsuperscript{45}Ibid., 540th Meeting, 8 December 1955, no. 35, p. 416.
\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., p. 418.
\textsuperscript{47}Ibid., 541st Meeting, 9 December 1955, no. 35, p. 422.
\textsuperscript{48}Ibid., 537th Meeting, 6 December 1955, no. 35, p. 397.
between North and South. The holding of separate plebiscites for the two sections was the best way to insure satisfaction of the true desires of the people in each area.\(^\text{49}\) Saudi Arabia argued that dividing the Territory was the only practical way to administer the plebiscite in view of the differences between the northern and southern areas.\(^\text{50}\) The validity of these arguments as well as those against division made it very difficult for the Committee to decide between the two positions.

The conflict among members of the Fourth Committee was finally resolved when Liberia submitted a provision to divide the British Territory into four parts for purposes of the plebiscite. The proposal was rejected by the slim margin of fifteen votes to thirteen with twenty-four abstentions.\(^\text{51}\) This left the British free to administer the plebiscite for the Territory as a single unit.

The Committee's decision rendered a further defeat to the unificationists. Indications were that the solidly pro-integration North would muster enough votes to defeat the less entrenched unification elements of the South.

It cannot be said with certainty why a majority of the Fourth Committee rejected the recommendation of the Visiting Mission and the position of the Togoland Congress in deference to the viewpoint of the United Kingdom and the Gold Coast. The large number of abstentions

\(^\text{49}\)Ibid., 539th Meeting, 8 December 1955, no. 35, p. 413.

\(^\text{50}\)Ibid., 541st Meeting, 9 December 1955, no. 35, p. 421.

\(^\text{51}\)Ibid., 547th Meeting, 12 December 1955, no. 35, p. 462. See rejection of Liberian amendment number seven.
indicated that it was a difficult choice to make. Probably the primary factor which tipped the scales in favor of a plebiscite for the Territory as a single unit was its greater simplicity. Either the Territory voted in favor of integration or it did not. There would be no fragmentation and no possibility of an isolated area voting differently from the rest.

The fifth and last major area of discussion within the Fourth Committee at its December 1955 considerations of a plebiscite for British Togoland was the choices which should be offered the natives. This was a problem that had bothered the United Nations since Britain's proposal for a consultation of the people had first been introduced. It was fairly well accepted that one of the alternatives would be integration, but there was much disagreement on what other choices should be offered. The Mission thought the people should be given alternatives in the form of questions:

(1) Do you want the integration of Togoland under British administration with an independent Gold Coast? (2) Do you want the separation of Togoland under British administration from the Gold Coast and its continuance under trusteeship, pending the ultimate determination of its political future?  

In other words, the Mission felt that the British Togoland people should be offered the alternatives of integration with the Gold Coast or administrative separation from the Gold Coast and continued British control until such a time that a solution could be decided upon for the Territory. The second choice, the Mission said, arose from the request of

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the Togoland Congress for such a question. 53

The Mission's proposal did not offer the people much of an alternative to integration, but the Mission felt the second question answered the demands of unificationists in British Togoland. The Mission found that the majority of leaders wanted to establish the identity of British Togoland as separate from the Gold Coast as a preliminary to choosing between federation with the Gold Coast or unification with an independent French Togoland and eventual federation of both Territories with the Gold Coast. 54

If the third Visiting Mission's findings were a correct ascertainment of the unification leaders' position, they indicated that a sharp change had occurred. There is no reason to question the validity of the Mission's findings, since, unlike the first mission which spent only twenty days in both Togolands, this mission had made a six week tour of the Territories. 55 But the unificationists' apparent new stand on integration and unification was not as complete a reversal in position as it appeared on the surface. Discussions after the plebiscite was completed indicate that most unificationists continued to favor Togoland unification. True, there was a certain drawing power to integration with an independent Gold Coast, and British Togoland unificationists were not necessarily against some type of association with that

53 Ibid.
55 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
colony if they could be guaranteed protection from domination by the much larger country. They felt that a federal relationship would give them this. However, most unificationists in the British Territory clung to the hope of obtaining Togoland unification first, then possibly federation. Before either unification or federation took place, though, integration had to be stopped. The Gold Coast had a unitary government and the word "integration" itself implied the dissolution of the British Territory into the Gold Coast.

There was immediate dissension in the Fourth Committee over the Mission's suggested alternatives for the people to vote upon. The Togoland Congress, which the Mission said had originally requested the second alternative, now rejected it. The party's representative stated that his organization thought the people should be allowed to choose between independence and integration, rather than integration and continued trusteeship.56

This speech of the representative did not explain his party's second shift in policy. A second representative hinted at the answer when he noted that at the moment there was a serious political crisis in the Gold Coast between the national liberation movement, evidently meaning the Northern People's Party, and the Convention People's Party. He stated that the Ashantis and the northern people who belonged to the liberation movement were demanding a federal form of government, while


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the Gold Coast Government which the Convention People's Party controlled favored a unitary form of government. Apparently under these conditions unificationists of British Togoland, who also favored a federal government, were unwilling to chance any type of association with the Gold Coast Government. Independence would guarantee that none took place except under the Territory's terms. Further, independence had more drawing power as a slogan than the shopworn slogan "unification" or the vague idea of continued trusteeship pending the ultimate determination of the British Territory's future.

In contrast to the Togoland Congress, the Convention People's Party of the Ho District thought only one question should be asked, "Do you want integration of Togoland under British administration with the Gold Coast?" Seemingly working as one with the Convention People's Party, the British also advocated only the one question. They explained that they were reluctant to offer the inhabitants the alternative of continued trusteeship pending the ultimate determination of British Togoland's future. Trusteeship was fraught with difficulties and was not in the best interests of the native people. As Britain had said before, the administration of British Togoland as a separate

[57] Ibid., p. 340.
[58] See Political Map, p. 9.


[60] Ibid., 528th Meeting, 1 December 1955, no. 35, p. 334.
unit was not economically feasible.

Members of the Fourth Committee were divided on the number of questions that the natives should vote on and the type of question. Most favored either one or two questions. Those who favored a single question generally supported the British-Gold Coast position that the natives should be asked if they wanted integration of British Togoland with the Gold Coast. They felt this was the most important single issue in the Territory.

These members thought a single question was better because it would be easier for the natives to understand and simpler to administer. The Netherlands asserted that one simple question requiring an unambiguous reply would enable the General Assembly to appraise the plebiscite results objectively before making a decision.61 The Israeli delegation thought a single question would be simpler,62 and Canada's representative agreed, saying that the second question suggested by the third Visiting Mission would invite difficulty and doubts. It would confuse people who had only recently been introduced to the intricacies of democracy.63

Most members who favored two questions supported the suggestion of the Visiting Mission. They felt that a question on integration was warranted, but an alternative should also be offered. The delegation from Liberia believed it was important for the people of British Togoland

61Ibid., 540th Meeting, 8 December 1955, no. 35, p. 418.
63Ibid., 542nd Meeting, 9 December 1955, no. 35, p. 428.

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to have freedom of choice and Iraq's representative agreed. The United States was of the same opinion, though its delegation thought one clear question might suffice. These countries believed that the continuation of the Territory's trusteeship status was the most valid alternative to integration since it was impossible to promise unification without being sure of what the people in French Togoland wanted, and the independence of British Togoland was out of the question due to the Territory's weak economic position.

A few countries took positions somewhat akin to the Togoland Congress when it demanded the choices of independence or integration. Lebanon felt the plebiscite should be for both Territories and the Togolanders should be asked at least two questions, including whether or not they wanted the independence and unification of the two Togolands. Pakistan believed that the British Togoland people ought to be asked if they wanted complete independence. If not, they could vote on the further alternatives of integration or unification. Syria presented a plan whereby British Togoland would be given a separate government; then a plebiscite would be held for the area, offering the choices of independence, unification or integration. These proposals, which gave

64 Ibid., 544th Meeting, 10 December 1955, no. 35, p. 445.
65 Ibid., 539th Meeting, 9 December 1955, no. 35, p. 405.
66 Ibid., p. 411.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., 542nd Meeting, 9 December 1955, no. 35, p. 429.
some recognition to Togoland Congress demands, were varied in form and received only negligible support.

The two suggestions for questions which had the best chance of being implemented were those by the British and by the Visiting Mission. The Indian delegation drafted a resolution to incorporate the first stand, submitting to the British Togoland people only the question of integration.\(^70\) Liberia proposed an amendment to include the Mission's second question which would give the natives a further choice of continued trusteeship pending the ultimate determination of the Territory's future.\(^71\)

With the introduction of the Indian draft resolution and the Liberian amendment, the possible plebiscite questions were narrowed to two. For lack of support other proposals failed to be formally introduced. Thus the Togoland Congress' request for the alternatives of integration or independence were not even voted upon.

The Fourth Committee passed the Liberian amendment by a slim majority of twenty to seventeen with sixteen abstentions.\(^72\) This settled the problem of questions to be submitted to the people and gave them a choice of integration or continued trusteeship.

For the Togoland Congress, which represented most unificationists

\(^70\)"Report of the Fourth Committee," op. cit., p. 11.

\(^71\)Ibid., p. 13.

in British Togoland and many in French Togoland, the Fourth Committee's
decision was another defeat. Their proposal for independence as an al-
ternative to integration had had little chance from the beginning. The
party's sudden switch from support of separation from the Gold Coast and
continued trusteeship to the demand for independence was too obvious a
political maneuver. Further, there was a general feeling that Britain
was correct in saying that the Trust Territory was too small to exist
well as a separate entity. Worse, it did not even have an exit to the
sea.

All in all, British Togoland unificationists fared poorly. The
Togoland Congress had been defeated on every major issue. It had sug-
gested separate institutions before a plebiscite was applied. This was
rejected. It had agreed with the third Visiting Mission that British
Togoland should be divided into four parts for the purpose of determin-
ing each area's future separately, but the Mission's proposal was de-
feated. The party thought the United Nations should conduct the plebi-
scite. Instead, Britain was given the task. Lastly, it requested the
alternatives of integration or independence in the plebiscite. The lat-
ter alternative was ignored.

Conversely, the Convention People's Party and the British had
fared very well. Their only failure was minor: the use of two questions
for the plebiscite, rather than one.

It seemed an enigma that the integrationists should have been so
successful and the unificationists should have done so poorly. Ever
since the Fourth Committee had taken an active role in Togoland affairs,
it had shown a marked sympathy for the unification groups. Yet when the Committee members laid down the outline for a plebiscite they turned against the unificationists of British Togoland and initiated major programs which were favored by the integrationists. Why?

Some tentative reasons can be given, but these are probably not all the reasons nor necessarily the most important ones. The Fourth Committee would naturally put some stock in the suggestions of the Visiting Mission as the body which directly examined conditions in British Togoland. The proposals of the Mission, a body dominated by pro-integrationists, were counter to most of the demands of the Togoland Congress Party. Secondly, the strength of integration had grown steadily since 1951. Thirdly, the esteem held for Britain had increased considerably with its decision to release control of both the Gold Coast Colony and British Togoland. Lastly, there is some indication that at the time the plebiscite decision was made, many of the nations were courting the Gold Coast. In a world of political blocs and cold war activity they found it important to maintain an attitude of friendship and benevolence toward the newly emerging state, the first West African state to receive independence since the war.

The decision to have a plebiscite for British Togoland apart from French Togoland left the latter Territory in an uncertain status. The United Nations had hoped to send a special mission to the French Territory, but the French rejected this. However, the regular Visiting Mission performed essentially the same function that a special mission would have undertaken. It thoroughly investigated conditions in the
area and issued recommendations for the Fourth Committee to consider. This was the same mission which had made the recommendations concerning the plebiscite for British Togoland.

Because of the uncertainty as to what the people of that Territory wanted, members of the third Visiting Mission suggested a plebiscite for French Togoland. They envisaged it as a plebiscite entirely separate from the plebiscite planned for British Togoland. Its purpose would be to determine the relative strength of opposing groups within the Territory. The Mission claimed it was impossible to ascertain party strength and the relative popularity of such programs as unification and continuation of the status quo merely by visiting the area. A plebiscite would help to do this.73

The Mission thought the plebiscite should offer the choice of self-government within the French Union or the termination of French Togoland's connection with the French Union and independence. It recommended that the plebiscite be held under the observation of United Nations personnel.74

At the same time that the Mission recommended a plebiscite it took note of political discrimination by the French. It said, "The Mission has to note with regret that opposition parties in Togoland under French Administration do not have quite the same facilities for carrying


74Ibid., p. 18.
on their political activities as is the case in Togoland under British Administration. . . . "75 Also, in the Mission's record of its trip through French Togoland there were numerous accounts of disturbances and rioting.76

The French Togoland organizations and parties viewed the Mission's suggestion for a consultation of the people with mixed emotions. The All-Ewe Conference, which had originally called the United Nation's attention to the question of Ewe unification, thought any plebiscite should be for both Togoland Territories. The issues were integration versus unification and federation with the Gold Coast. The questions should be stated: "Do you want integration? Do you want unification with eventual federation with the Gold Coast?"77

The Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, which had been the major party in French Togoland and now formed the major opposition to the French, also asked for a plebiscite for all of Togoland. It suggested the alternatives of "independence preceding the unification of the two Territories" and the "independence of one Territory [British Togoland] forming an integral part of another sovereign State or association of States."78

A splinter group of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, the Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise, ignored plebiscite considerations and

75Ibid., p. 17.
76Ibid., pp. 36-42.
77Ibid., p. 51.
78Ibid., p. 56.
suggested instead the immediate independence of all of Togoland.\footnote{Ibid., p. 58.} This small militant group felt that the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise was not working hard enough for the freedom of French Togoland from French domination.

The pro-French parties were not completely against a plebiscite, but were opposed to the forms proposed by the All-Ewe Conference and the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise. The southern Parti Togolaise du Progrès stated that it was willing to accept some kind of consultation in French Togoland to put an end to French Togoland's trusteeship status.\footnote{Ibid., p. 53.} The Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo took the same position.\footnote{Ibid., p. 54.}

There was a wide variety of statements by the different French Togoland groups concerning the Mission's reports of discrimination and rioting in the Territory. The All-Ewe Conference claimed that France was trying to swallow French Togoland into the French Union. It said French Togoland was being drawn in step by step without consultation of the people. At present the French were administering the Territory as if it were part of the French Republic. The All-Ewe Conference recognized that reforms giving further power to the people had been made, but it felt these were only minor concessions to divert the people's attention from reforms in the Gold Coast, to strengthen the power of the pro-French groups, and to weaken the independence and unification movement. The primary goal of the French, the organization declared, was to remove
French Togoland from trusteeship status and completely absorb it into the French Republic. 82

The Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo and the Parti Togolaise du Progrès of the South, both status quo and pro-French parties, defended French policies and blamed the United Nations and minority parties for difficulties in French Togoland. The Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo claimed that the French authorities were not to blame for rioting and other actions noted in the Mission's report. Agitation of minorities stimulated by the upsetting influence of the visiting missions created the difficulties. 83 The Parti Togolaise du Progrès praised the French for the financial assistance it was giving the Territory and for the increase of governmental powers delegated to the people. Like the Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo, it blamed minorities and the United Nations for the agitation in its country. The party said that United Nations' supervision over the area gave minorities an opportunity to stir up disorders. 84

The radically pro-Togoland unification Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise, a splinter organization of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, made a strong allegation against France. It accused that country of instigating anti-United Nations sentiment in French Togoland. The party's


83 Ibid., 530th Meeting, 1 December 1955, no. 35, p. 353.

84 Ibid., 532nd Meeting, 2 December 1955, no. 35, pp. 367 and 369-70.
representative asserted that the French had harshly criticized the United Nations and various United Nations officials in an article published in the official French Togoland newspaper, *Togo Français*. Further, the French authorities had prevented any United Nations anniversary celebrations.  

The Fourth Committee took note of each organization's comments on discrimination, rioting and other local disturbances, but was most concerned with the accusations of the Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise. It investigated these assertions, particularly those concerning the article alleged to have been written in the official newspaper. The Committee found that the article existed and had been written by a member of the French delegation to the Trusteeship Council in an attempt to discredit certain member countries and the entire United Nations organization.  

The existence of this article, the third Visiting Mission's implication that there was suppression of opposition parties, and the unification parties' accusations that France was trying to dissolve the French Togoland Territory into the French Union, made the Fourth Committee very skeptical of French intentions. Therefore, it was not willing to relinquish control over the Territory, as France suggested. On the other hand, it was not ready to unify British and French Togolands and give them independence, as the Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise had requested. There were French opinion, French Togoland native opinion

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and the British Togoland integration question to be considered. The best answer seemed to be a separate plebiscite for French Togoland.

Various groups had expressed their opinion on the type of plebiscite which should take place, if it were decided one was feasible for French Togoland. The Fourth Committee rejected all recommendations except that part of the Visiting Mission's report which suggested that some type of plebiscite should be held as soon as political reforms, contemplated by the Administering Authority, were in force, including elections by universal adult suffrage and secret ballot. The Fourth Committee felt that the implementation of the contemplated reforms would play a helpful role in the ascertainment of the inhabitants' wishes at an early date by direct and democratic methods.

The struggle of the various groups for approval of their views on the French Togoland situation was in the most part fruitless. The French and pro-French native elements had been rebuked. The Committee was not ready to turn over control of French Togoland completely to the French, for it was not convinced that this would be in keeping with the will of the majority. In a sense, this was victory for the anti-French, pro-unification groups, who saw in the dissolution of French Togoland's trusteeship status, domination by the French and the destruction of all

hopes for unification or independence. But at the same time, the pro-
unification demands, among which were unification and independence, had
been refused. Instead, the Fourth Committee suggested that a plebiscite
should be held under direct and democratic means, leaving France with
the task of suggesting the date for a consultation, the type of consul-
tation and the alternatives to be offered. The major demands of both
sides had been rejected and neither was enthusiastic about the sugges-
tion of a French Togoland plebiscite.

The reasoning behind the Fourth Committee's position is evident.
The situation in French Togoland was so confused that the third Visiting
Mission was unwilling to suggest any solution other than a consultation
which would help determine what the people wanted. The Mission empha-
sized that the plebiscite should be conducted under guaranteed democratic
means and therefore it suggested that it would be desirable to wait
until France had established truly democratic voting procedures before
consulting the population. The Fourth Committee felt that this reason-
ing was very sound and as a consequence incorporated the Mission's sug-
gestions in its resolution concerning French Togoland.

While the future of French Togoland was uncertain, Britain made
preparations for the plebiscite in British Togoland. Once the prepara-
tions were completed, the future of British Togoland, integration into
the Gold Coast or continued trusteeship, would depend in part upon the
decision of the people. The final decision on the Territory's future

89 Ibid.
depended, however, upon the General Assembly, which would rely on the Fourth Committee's analysis of the plebiscite results.
CHAPTER IX

THE BRITISH TOGOLAND PLEBISCITE AND ITS RESULTS

In December of 1955, the Fourth Committee completed the general framework for a plebiscite in British Togoland. After having been troubled for over eight years by the Togoland problem, the United Nations now had an opportunity to resolve at least part of it.

The Fourth Committee had decided that the alternatives offered to the British Togoland people should be integration into the Gold Coast, or continued trusteeship pending the ultimate determination of the Territory's future. These alternatives marked a real victory for the integrationist movement, which had only become active in 1951 with the realization by Britain and certain elements in the Gold Coast that the pending independence of the Gold Coast would separate British Togoland from the colony unless a demand for integration could be created. Integrationists now had their platform on the ballot as one of the choices for British Togoland's future, directly challenging the hopes of unificationists.

The plebiscite alternatives as formulated were very unsatisfactory to unificationists, for continued trusteeship lacked the appeal needed to meet the challenge of integration with a new state at the time of that state's independence. Continued trusteeship offered the people
only the status quo until such a time as a decision could be made on other possible alternatives.

The Fourth Committee had its reasons for offering continued trusteeship as one of the two choices. If felt that the people should be allowed some selection in voting on their future, and continued trusteeship seemed the only alternative to integration at the moment. An immediate vote on unification was impossible because of the need for determining the wishes of the French Togoland people. The Fourth Committee did not want to take any steps in this direction until France initiated new voting reforms. Independence, a choice suggested by unificationists because it had immediate appeal and would leave British Togoland free to decide its own future, was out of the question as far as the Committee was concerned. The British Territory was not economically able to support itself as a separate unit.

Whether the alternatives offered in the plebiscite were completely satisfactory or not, it was an inescapable fact that the future of Togoland, which the various groups had fought so hard to direct through appeals to the United Nations and by activities within the Territories, now depended upon the outcome of the plebiscite in British Togoland.

In itself, the plebiscite was of great significance as a milestone in trusteeship history. It represented the first opportunity for a Trust Territory to vote upon its own future. This did not mean, however, that British Togoland would immediately receive whichever of the two alternatives the people selected. The United Nations reserved for itself the right to consider the plebiscite results and decide whether
the British Trusteeship should continue or the Territory should become a part of the Gold Coast when that colony gained its independence.

The importance of the United Nations in the ultimate determination of British Togoland's future was well-recognized by Britain, the Gold Coast and the political parties of British Togoland. After the plebiscite they did their utmost to influence the final verdict of the United Nations.

For its part, the United Nations had many factors to consider before reaching a final verdict, of which British, Gold Coast and the British Togoland party viewpoints were only one. The most important considerations would be the results of the plebiscite as analyzed by the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner and the British Plebiscite Administrator, the unsettled constitutional situation in the Gold Coast, and the Gold Coast and British Togoland general elections which were scheduled to take place after the plebiscite.

The plebiscite was held on the ninth of May 1956, with the blessings of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner, Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto of Mexico. Fifty-eight percent of the people voted in favor of integration (now called union) and forty-two percent in favor of separation. These figures seemed to indicate clearly that the United Nations should release British Togoland from trusteeship control and turn the Territory over to the Gold Coast; however, other factors

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2Ibid., p. 183.
complicated the situation. A deeper analysis of the voting results revealed that while a majority of the people had given their approval to union, the Ewes had voted overwhelmingly against such a step. Thirty-six thousand natives in the Ewe-dominated districts of Kpandu and Ho rejected union and only 15,800 had accepted it. Furthermore, there were accusations of discrimination against the people of the South during registration for voting and accusations of infiltration from the Gold Coast and French Togoland. The infiltration supposedly consisted of natives who hoped to get on the list of registered voters, and of political agitators. A more important factor which complicated a decision to relinquish British Togoland as a result of the plebiscite was the regular general elections scheduled for the Gold Coast and British Togoland immediately after the plebiscite. If the integrationist parties in British Togoland were defeated, the results of the plebiscite would be open to question. Lastly, a new constitution was being considered for the Gold Coast in preparation for its emergence as an independent state. The United Nations needed to know its content before the organization relinquished control of British Togoland to the Gold Coast Government. All of these factors prevented a simple decision based upon the natives' majority expression in favor of integration.

The accusations of discrimination and infiltration were the least troublesome of those elements that complicated consideration of plebiscite results. The Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee 

were not particularly concerned about them. The United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner assured both organs that discrimination and infiltration had not been serious enough to alter the results of the plebiscite.  

Yet infiltration from the Gold Coast had been serious enough to result in a dispute between the Plebiscite Commissioner and the Governor of the Gold Coast. Leading personalities from both the Gold Coast and French Togoland visited the British Territory during preliminary stages of the plebiscite and made speeches. Those from the Gold Coast had included ministers of government. The British did not consider this illegal as long as such government officials represented constituencies in British Togoland, but the Plebiscite Commissioner felt that all ministers should disassociate themselves completely from any activity concerning the plebiscite. This matter was settled to the satisfaction of the Plebiscite Commissioner, though unification groups continued to complain. After the plebiscite was completed he stated that neither infiltration from the Gold Coast nor French Togoland had been serious.

While it is impossible to discern whether the Plebiscite Commissioner was justified in minimizing the amount of infiltration, there were indications that he was not altogether justified in downgrading complaints of discrimination against southern natives which centered on the use of tax receipts for voting registration. In preparation for the

plebiscite, new registration rolls were prepared for all of British Togoland. Registrants were required to be twenty-one years old and residents in British Togoland for an aggregate of twelve months in the past two years. The British decided that tax receipts should be used as the primary means of establishing whether a native had been a resident, though the receipts were supposed to be regarded by registration administrators as contributory and not conclusive evidence. The southern natives stated that the administrators insisted too much on the presentation of tax receipts as proof of residence and that two years' tax receipts were being required. If true, these accusations were quite serious. Southern natives were less inclined to pay their taxes and therefore many were without tax receipts. To register they would have to pay their taxes in order to be able to present the receipt needed as proof of residence.

In the British Plebiscite Administrator's report to the Trusteeship Council, the British denied that there had been an overemphasis on the use of tax receipts. They said that the presentation of tax receipts as proof of citizenship for registration had not been compulsory. An examination of twenty wards in the Ewe district of Kpandu had revealed that thirty-five percent of the registrants had been able to register without the presentation of tax receipts and another forty-two

percent had presented tax receipts for only one year.\textsuperscript{8} The British said this was indicative of the fact that natives had been able to register in the South without tax receipts, particularly two years' receipts. However, they failed to comment on the fact that twenty-three percent of the natives who registered in the Kpandu District had presented tax receipts for two years.\textsuperscript{9}

The United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner recognized the tax receipt problem in his report to the United Nations, but regarded discrimination as inconsequential. He noted that Britain had rather strictly enforced the use of two years' tax receipts as proof of citizenship, but in the North as well as in the South. Furthermore, such practices had only occurred during the early stages of registration. He agreed that this enforcement had had the effect of forcing the natives to pay their taxes in order to become registered voters, and he acknowledged that the requirement of receipts would have a more adverse effect in the South where the people were less inclined to pay their taxes. But he felt that the tax problem had been solved by later stressing that there were other means of proving residence when a person could not or was not willing to produce tax receipts.\textsuperscript{10} So far as he could tell, all eligible voters had had a chance to register.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{8}\textit{"Report of the Plebiscite Administrator on the Plebiscite held in Togoland under British Administration on 9 May 1956," loc. cit.}
\textsuperscript{9}\textit{Ibid.,} p. 8.
\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid.,} p. 467.
The Plebiscite Commissioner's conclusion was questionable, though there is no doubt that he honestly believed all eligible voters had been given an opportunity to register. The United Nations was mistaken in accepting his observations at face value, for a study of the registration and voting statistics reveals a strange contradiction. Though the natives of the southern areas of British Togoland were politically more mature than the northern people and were very concerned about the integration question, only fifty-six percent were on the registration lists compared to seventy-four percent in the North. This could be taken to indicate a deeper interest in the plebiscite among the northern people. But if so, why did a larger percentage of southern registered voters cast their ballots than northern registered voters—eighty-five percent as compared to seventy-eight percent? This contradiction may not mean that there was discrimination in the South during registration, but it was significant enough to warrant consideration.

The first of the complicating factors to have a direct effect upon the United Nations' consideration of the plebiscite results was the voting pattern of the plebiscite. The Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee ignored infiltration and discrimination, feeling they had little consequence in the voting results and therefore were unimportant in the question of integrating British Togoland into the Gold Coast:


14 Ibid.
but they found the voting pattern in the plebiscite more significant. Though most of the Territory had voted in favor of integration, that is, union, the southernmost districts rejected it. Sixty-nine percent of the natives in the Ewe-dominated Ho and Kpandu districts were against integration.\textsuperscript{15}

The Plebiscite Commissioner was very impressed by the anti-integrationist Togoland Congress Party's showing in these two districts. He said about the party, "Seeing the enthusiasm and faith with which their people flocked to the polls on the ninth of May, it was not difficult to recognize in the greater part of their voters the live flame of a prospect that had failed to make headway at the General Assembly, Ewe and Togoland unification." He believed that the recommendation of the third Visiting Mission for a division of British Togoland might be proposed again to give these southern people satisfaction.\textsuperscript{16} The Commissioner was speaking of the proposal whereby British Togoland would be divided into sections, allowing each section to decide whether it wanted to integrate with the Gold Coast or remain a British Trusteeship until such a time that its future could be decided. United Nations members who had originally favored the defeated proposal for division were now loath to ignore the pattern of voting or the tentative proposal of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner.

The Togoland Congress made an effort to win the support of these and other members who favored British Togoland division. Speaking

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 5.

before the Fourth Committee in November of 1956, its representative noted that although the northern part of British Togoland favored integration, the South was against it. He could not see how this justified the integration of the entire Territory.\footnote{17}

This argument did not receive the support hoped for. Britain was adamant in its rejection of division,\footnote{18} in contrast to its rather conciliatory tone on other matters. Members of the Committee were not anxious to risk its ire on such an issue. Moreover, many members were already in agreement with Britain. Perhaps most important, the Fourth Committee members were concerned with winning the good will of the Gold Coast, which maintained the same viewpoint as Britain. As one of the first black African colonies to receive independence, the Gold Coast would probably wield a powerful influence on the other colonial areas of Negro Africa and ultimately in world affairs.

The Fourth Committee had two other matters to consider before reaching a conclusion on British Togoland's future, the general elections in British Togoland and the Gold Coast, and the formulation of a constitution for the Gold Coast. The United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner brought the elections to the attention of the United Nations. He reported that the political coalition which won the Gold Coast and


\footnote{18}{"Memorandum by the Administering Authority," \textit{loc. cit}.}
British Togoland election would be in a legal position to formulate a constitution for the Gold Coast. It seemed strange that British Togoland should take part in Gold Coast elections when the decision on its integration with the Gold Coast was still pending, but Britain administered the Territory as part of the colony and as a consequence British Togoland sent representatives to the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly.

The Plebiscite Commissioner believed that the election returns might alter the plebiscite results. At the present time there was a dispute between adherents of the federal and unitary forms of government. The Convention People's Party, which controlled the Gold Coast Government, favored a constitution which would formulate a central, unitary form of democratic government. A coalition of British Togoland parties and northern groups in the Gold Coast opposed unitary government. They felt that a new constitution should create a federal form of government, which would give some autonomy to British Togoland and the northern Gold Coast. If the coalition forces, of which the Togoland Congress was a part, won, the Plebiscite Commissioner thought the results of the plebiscite might be reversed. The architects of the plebiscite had foreseen integration to mean union under a unitary form of government. Federalists would probably devise a constitution whereby the Gold Coast, including British Togoland, would be a loose federation of states.

It was a paradox that the Togoland Congress of southern British


20Ibid.
Togoland united with natives of the North on the issue of federation, when only recently the two areas had been at odds on integration. It was even more paradoxical that natives of northern British Togoland should begin to look askance at integration. The Togoland Congress' reason for joining with the northern groups was simple enough. While a majority of its members were still against integration, the results of the plebiscite made them realize that integration might be imminent. They felt that a federation would at least guarantee some autonomy to British Togoland. They would have preferred Togoland unification first and then possible federation with the Gold Coast, but the results of the plebiscite had destroyed that hope. Therefore, the Togoland Congress joined with the northern groups, which already favored federation, to secure added support.

Why the natives of the northern areas of the Gold Coast and British Togoland favored a federal form of government and why those in British Togoland had become wary of integration were more complicated questions. The answers lay in the Gold Coast. There the more highly advanced natives of the South dominated the colony. Through the Convention People's Party they governed the Gold Coast, except in fields where Britain maintained control. The northerners of both the Gold Coast and British Togoland feared the political strength of the southern Gold Coast natives. While natives in northern British Togoland still wanted integration with their brothers in the Gold Coast Northern Territories, they were unwilling to accept integration with all of the colony unless they had some assurances that integration did not mean domination by the
southern Gold Coast people. Therefore, they united with tribes in southern British Togoland and the northern Gold Coast to demand a federal form of government and to defeat the Convention People's Party.\textsuperscript{21}

The British Togoland-Gold Coast election was held in July of 1956 during the Trusteeship Council's eighteenth session. Despite heavy opposition, the Convention People's Party won a majority of the seats. This meant that the Plebiscite Commissioner's apprehensions had not been fulfilled and the results of the plebiscite were not reversed. In the eyes of the Trusteeship Council the election results warranted immediate integration. It recommended that the General Assembly take appropriate steps to terminate the trusteeship agreement for the Territory, effective when the Gold Coast attained independence.\textsuperscript{22}

The Fourth Committee of the General Assembly was of a more skeptical temperament and was not willing to accept the election returns at face value. Furthermore, they were lobbied by anti-integrationists, who had ignored the Trusteeship Council completely, viewing its membership as hopelessly reactionary.

The Togoland Congress was not willing to give up the fight, even though it had been defeated in the plebiscite and the general election. After all, the Togoland Congress' platform against integration had won


a majority of votes in the Ewe-dominated districts of the South in the plebiscite. And while the Convention People's Party had captured a large majority of the seats in the general election that followed the plebiscite, there was some question as to whether or not it had received a majority of the vote in British Togoland.

Britain had cut up the voting districts in such a way that some districts included natives from both British Togoland and the Gold Coast. These voters were handled as if they all came from the same country and no effort was made to separate their ballots. To complicate the situation further, no official tabulation was available on the voting, even in constituencies that were entirely within British Togoland. It was impossible to know the exact percentage of British Togolanders who had voted for the Convention People's Party candidates, though guesses could be made by considering the number of constituencies that had been won by the Convention People's Party and by its opposition, of which the Togoland Congress was a part. In those voting districts lying entirely within British Togoland, the Convention People's Party seated four candidates and the opposition seated three. Of the seven districts that included both Gold Coast and British Togoland territory, the Convention People's Party seated two candidates and the opposition five.\(^\text{23}\)

The division of seats indicated a fairly even split of voting among the British Togoland people and left the Togoland Congress with

some basis for arguing that the majority of the Territory's people were against the Convention People's Party and its belief in a unitary form of government. The Togoland Congress still had a fighting chance to prevent the integration of the southern part of British Togoland into the Gold Coast; or if this was not possible, it had a chance of preventing the integration of British Togoland under a unitary form of government. It was not willing to concede defeat as long as it had these possibilities.

It appears that the Togoland Congress Party was interested primarily in defeating the integration of the South, but it did not hold to this position consistently. Each of its three representatives appearing before the Fourth Committee had somewhat differing views and arguments. The first of the Togoland Congress' representatives spoke directly against integrating the South into the Gold Coast. He said that the area should not be forced to unite with the Gold Coast when fifty-eight percent of the southern natives participating in the plebiscite had voted against integration.24

The second of the representatives also spoke against integrating British Togoland. She thought no decision should be based on a simple majority, but on a two-thirds majority. She seemed to accept the fact that integration was inevitable, however, and insisted that it should not take place until the constitutional proposals presented by the Gold Coast and the United Kingdom governments were adequate to insure the

24Ibid., 554th Meeting, 26 November 1956, no. 39, p. 18.
people of the Trust Territory self-government or independence.\textsuperscript{25}

The third Togoland Congress representative thought that integration was wrong because its validity was based on the results of a plebiscite that had not offered the people a decent alternative to integration. But as integration seemed likely, he further argued that the trusteeship agreement should not be terminated until the United Nations could be certain that the constitutional proposals devised by the Gold Coast and United Kingdom governments were adequate to insure the peoples of the Trust Territory either self-government or independence. Under the unitary system of government proposed by the Convention People's Party, power lay with the central government, in which British Togoland representatives would only be a small minority dependent upon the decisions of the Gold Coast. Furthermore, the Togoland Congress representative argued, there were basic weaknesses in the present proposals for a constitution, such as the failure to incorporate a declaration of human rights and necessary checks and balances.\textsuperscript{26}

Each of the Togoland Congress Party's speakers used somewhat different arguments, but about one thing they were in accord: the trusteeship agreement should not be terminated until the constitutional proposals for the Gold Coast and British Togoland guaranteed the Territory either self-government or independence.

Representatives of the Convention People's Party spoke immediately after the Togoland Congress representatives finished. They tried to

\textsuperscript{25}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 18-21.
\textsuperscript{26}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 21-22.
convince the Fourth Committee that no one was really against integration. They declared that their major opponent, the Togoland Congress, actually favored integration, if it were under a federal form of government. Because the Convention People's Party, which controlled the government under the Gold Coast's parliamentary system, favored a unitary constitution, the supporters of the Togoland Congress had voted against integration at the time of the plebiscite. Now they were trying to persuade the United Nations to establish a federal constitution, a type of government rejected by the populations of the Gold Coast and British Togoland during the general election following the plebiscite.²⁷

These assertions were not true. A majority of Togoland Congress members still wanted unification over anything else. It was true that the party supported federation, but only because its members realized that union of British Togoland with the Gold Coast was now almost inevitable and they wanted to assure some autonomy for the Territory.

The Convention People's Party argued further that since the majority of people at the general elections had voted for candidates who favored a unitary government, any demands for a federal constitution should be rejected. Moreover, as the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly had decided in favor of the unitary system of government and had authorized the Gold Coast Government to enact a constitution embodying it, the question of a unitary or federal government was settled.²⁸

The Convention People's Party may have felt the question was

²⁷Ibid., p. 24.

²⁸Ibid., 557th Meeting, 27 November 1956, no. 39, p. 31.
settled, but Britain knew it was not. The British realized that the Togoland Congress had raised doubts in the minds of Fourth Committee members as to the desirability of a unitary system of government. Any hesitation on the part of members could delay and possibly threaten integration.

Representing Britain were Maclay and Gbedemah. Maclay was from Great Britain, but Gbedemah was a native of the Gold Coast and Minister of Finance in the Gold Coast Government. However, since the Gold Coast was still a colony he was officially listed as a representative of the United Kingdom. Both men were effective speakers. Using moderate and diplomatic language, the two representatives urged the acceptance of the unitary form of government. They explained that the general elections had been based on the issue of a federal constitution versus a unitary constitution. The Convention People's Party, backing a unitary system of government, had defeated its opposition, capturing seventy-two seats out of 104, and had won four out of seven seats in constituencies wholly in the Trust Territory. It was true, the representatives agreed, that the opposition had captured five out of seven seats in constituencies which included territory of both the Gold Coast and British Togoland, but three of these had a much greater percentage of their area in the Gold Coast. This, the British and Gold Coast representatives asserted, indicated that a majority of the British Togoland people had voted for the Convention People's Party and a unitary form of constitution. As a majority of the Territory's voters had rejected

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29 Ibid., 559th Meeting, 28 November 1956, no. 39, p. 41.
the demand for a federal constitution, the Fourth Committee should agree to the formation of a unitary constitution. Whatever merits members of the Committee might see in federal constitutions, they must concede that the people of the Gold Coast and British Togoland have the right to determine the constitution most appropriate to their own needs and circumstances.  

After urging the acceptance of a unitary constitution, Maclay and Gbedemah urged an immediate decision to release the British Territory from its trusteeship status and permit it to become a part of the Gold Coast when the Gold Coast received independence. They assured the Fourth Committee that it need feel no hesitation about releasing the British Territory from trusteeship, just because the constitution was not yet formulated. The speakers claimed that when the constitution was completed it would guarantee "true" independence. It would give the Gold Coast, to be known as Ghana, control of its own affairs and a status equal to that of Canada, Australia and the other Commonwealth nations. Within Ghana all of the natives would enjoy equal rights and have equal obligations, with no discrimination between former Gold Coast people and British Togoland people. The British and Gold Coast representatives stated further that the constitution would be a democratic document.  

There was no need to hesitate in releasing British Togoland to the Gold Coast when the colony became independent, simply because the constitution was not yet completed.

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30 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
31 Ibid., p. 42.
The arguments and assurances of the British and Gold Coast governments effectively dispelled the doubts of a large majority of members within the Fourth Committee. The Committee was convinced that it was feasible to make an immediate decision in favor of integration and passed a resolution to this effect.32

Many of the Committee members acknowledged that their present position in favor of integration resulted from the speeches presented by Britain and the Gold Coast. The Israeli delegate said he had listened with interest to the representative of the Gold Coast and thought the Gold Coast and British Togoland should be free to make any decisions regarding their future once they became united and independent.33

The Belgian delegate was satisfied by British indications of the manner in which independence would be granted to the Gold Coast and how the constitution for the new state would be established. Therefore he would support union of the Trust Territory with the Gold Coast.34

The Canadian representative expressed his satisfaction with the constitutional proposals and believed that British Togoland should be released from trust status as soon as the Gold Coast received its independence. He based his assurance that the constitution would be satisfactory on the pledge of the Gold Coast Government that the people of the Trust Territory would enjoy equal rights with and have the same

32Ibid., 567th Meeting, 5 December 1956, no. 39, p. 90.
33Ibid., 562nd Meeting, 3 December 1956, no. 39, p. 59.
34Ibid., 560th Meeting, 29 November 1956, no. 39, p. 48.
Yassein of the Sudan thought it was time to make a decision. He believed that British Togoland should be united with the Gold Coast, since the British Togoland minority in the future state of Ghana had been guaranteed equal rights by the Gold Coast Government.

The influence of the British and Gold Coast's assurances was apparent in each of these delegate's comments and exemplified the effect the two governments made upon the Fourth Committee. Yet, ironically, the Togoland Congress Party had to accept a certain amount of credit for the success of Britain and France. Some of the Committee members said in effect that they appreciated the party's position, but had not found its arguments convincing. Canada declared that despite the Togoland Congress' skillful presentation it had failed to make a valid case.

The Ceylon delegate felt that the importance of safeguards for inhabitants of southern British Togoland had been exaggerated, though he congratulated the Togoland Congress on the considerable skill with which it had submitted its views. Apparently the Togoland Congress could not blame the opposition alone for the defeat of its position on the constitution.

However, the party did have some influence. Several of the Fourth Committee members echoed Togoland Congress' contentions that

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36 Ibid., p. 61.
37 Ibid., p. 59.
38 Ibid., p. 60.
British Togoland should not be turned over to the Gold Coast, either because of the general election results or because the constitution had not yet been formulated. Venezuela felt that the federal form of government had received more favor in British Togoland than the unitary form. The area should not be forced to accept the unitary government favored by the Gold Coast. Furthermore, there was no constitution. Under these circumstances, Venezuela's delegate wondered if the General Assembly should renounce its right of supervision over the Territory.\textsuperscript{39} The delegate from El Salvador was convinced that the majority of the people in British Togoland were against a unitary government and thought this should be recognized before any decision was made.\textsuperscript{40} Uruguay's representative believed it was clear from the documents before the Committee that the South desired a federal form of government.\textsuperscript{41} While the Committee members who joined with the Togoland Congress against integration in a unitary form were in the minority, their position indicated that the Togoland Congress' viewpoint was not without support.

On the fifth of December 1956, the Fourth Committee voted on the draft resolution to end trusteeship control of British Togoland at the moment the Gold Coast became independent, scheduled for March 6, 1957. The resolution was accepted by an overwhelming majority of fifty-eight to none, with eleven abstentions.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{39}Ibid., 561st Meeting, 30 November 1956, no. 39, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., 564th Meeting, 4 December 1956, no. 39, p. 73.
\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., 565th Meeting, 4 December 1956, no. 39, p. 75.
\textsuperscript{42}Ibid., 567th Meeting, 5 December 1956, no. 39, p. 90.
This was a bitter moment for the Togoland Congress and unification groups in French Togoland. Because the same countries were in the General Assembly as were in the Fourth Committee, it was a foregone conclusion that the General Assembly would accept the Fourth Committee's recommendations; for all practical purposes the issue of integration was settled and British Togoland would become a part of the Gold Coast when it became independent. The Togoland Congress said nothing after the vote was taken, but immediately before the vote one of their representatives asserted that if the Fourth Committee adopted a resolution automatically attaching the southern part of the Territory to the Gold Coast through integration the southern people would resist. None of the laws enacted under such conditions would be recognized by the Togolanders as binding, now or in the future. Southern British Togoland would never of its own free will agree to integration, and would take steps to repudiate the union at any moment that it was in a position to do so. The Togoland Congress' representative further said that states which intended to sign agreements with the Gold Coast affecting any part of British Togoland were therefore given due notice.\(^4^3\) There was deep resentment on the part of Togoland Congress' officials who had fought so hard for what they believed. Only time could heal this very real resentment felt by them and by their supporters.

The settlement of British Togoland's future in the form of integration was the result of many factors. From the first consideration of the Ewe problem by the Trusteeship Council until 1951 the unificationists

\(^{43}\text{Ibid., 566th Meeting, 5 December 1956, no. 39, p. 83.}\)
had been in a good position. Their movement was by far the most popular among the politically articulate people of southern French and British Togolands. Moreover, they held the sympathies of the United Nations. Had the unificationists been able to agree on one form of unification they probably would have been successful in their efforts.

From 1951 on the strength of the integrationists grew rapidly and the unification position weakened. The evolution of the Gold Coast toward independence was important in this alteration of relative strength. Significant constitutional reforms in the Gold Coast made it possible for the Convention People's Party to divert part of its attention from the Gold Coast to British Togoland. Through the extension of its party organization and through the Gold Coast Government in which it was the majority party, the Convention People's Party promoted the idea of integration, emphasizing that it would make British Togoland part of an independent African state. This argument was enhanced by economic aid from the United Kingdom through the Gold Coast Government and by constitutional amendments which allowed British Togoland people to participate in the government of the Trust Territory and the Gold Coast. By 1954, the integration movement was so strong that it was able to capture a majority of British Togoland seats in the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly.

The integrationist victory in the 1954 elections left the gates open to substantive demands for integration. Britain was able to promote a plebiscite in which integration was one of the main choices on the ballot. The plebiscite was held in June of 1956. Returns indicated
that a majority of the natives favored integration, except in the South where the majority still wanted unification with French Togoland.

Even after the plebiscite these southern people clung to the hope of unification. They contended that the South should be allowed to decide its future separately from the rest of British Togoland. When the Fourth Committee rejected this contention, unificationists sided with forces which feared domination by the southern Gold Coast to demand a federal constitution as the prerequisite of union with the Gold Coast. Unfortunately for unificationists, their bid for a federal state failed when the Togoland Congress and its allies were unable to capture a majority of seats during the general elections of 1956.

The only alternative left to unification groups in British Togoland was to present the Fourth Committee with a strong case for a federal government. They failed when the Togoland Congress arguments were countered by British and Gold Coast assurances, augmented by the feeling of many countries that it was important to court the Gold Coast. The significant position it would hold as a newly independent Negro state amidst colonies was not lost on United Nations members.

The decision to integrate British Togoland left French Togoland unificationists without a cause, unless they wanted to promote French Togoland unification with the Gold Coast or independence. The momentary confusion among unificationists made it an opportune time for France to initiate a plebiscite in French Togoland, an action considered desirable by the General Assembly once France initiated election and other reforms. France realized that this was the timely moment for a consultation of
the French Togoland people and informed the Trusteeship Council that it would hold a referendum in October of that year, 1956. This led to further plebiscite considerations in the United Nations.
At the same time that the United Nations was working toward a solution of the British Togoland problem, it continued to be troubled by problems concerning French Togoland. The move toward a separate solution for British Togoland left the French Territory to solve its fate as a separate unit. Having failed to bring about a closer relationship between British and French Togolands, the United Nations had suggested in December of 1955 a plebiscite for the French Territory in the near future.

The French accepted the plebiscite suggestion of the United Nations, but without introducing universal adult suffrage and other reforms also suggested. It was an opportune time for a plebiscite from France's viewpoint. The decision to integrate British Togoland left French Togoland unificationists without a platform with which to appeal to the people and counter French moves to make the Trust Territory part of the French Overseas Territories. France arbitrarily informed the Trusteeship Council that it was planning a referendum for October of 1956 and asked that United Nations observers be sent to witness the referendum or plebiscite.¹

¹ "The Future of Togoland under French Administration," Trusteeship

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The French told the Trusteeship Council that the Territorial Assembly of French Togoland had unanimously decided that it was time to terminate the trusteeship agreement for French Togoland. Their representative said that as France was anxious to satisfy the will of the people, it thought there should be an inquiry of the people to determine if the Territorial Assembly mirrored the people's opinion. The French stated that the inquiry would take the form of a choice between the continuation of the trusteeship system and a new statute for the Territory. The statute would permit the Togolanders to govern themselves and to manage their own affairs democratically. It guaranteed, the French said, administrative, territorial and financial autonomy.

The Trusteeship Council did not receive the French proposals with much enthusiasm. The Council members were not sure that the statute offered the autonomy that France asserted it did. France spoke in generalities. Moreover, France conceived of French Togoland's continued representation in the French Parliament and the Assembly of the French Union. If the people voted for the statute and against continued trusteeship they might ultimately find themselves as other French colonies, part of overseas France. The Trusteeship Council's lack of enthusiasm also stemmed from its poor regard for France as a colonial power.

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Ibid.

The skepticism of the Trusteeship Council members was expressed in many different ways. The Guatemalan delegate said he was not surprised that the Territorial Assembly of French Togoland had voted unanimously in favor of ending trusteeship control. He was speaking of an earlier assertion made by France that trusteeship over French Togoland should be ended, partly because all members of the Territorial Assembly were in favor of such action. The representative from Guatemala stated that both the pro-unification Comité de l'Unité Togolaise and the radical Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise (Juvento) had boycotted the 1955 election in protest against electoral manipulation and therefore the Territorial Assembly consisted only of pro-French elements. The delegate was not impressed by France's statute of reforms, either. He felt that they were inadequate to justify the termination of the trusteeship agreement, and it would be inadvisable to associate the Council with a step towards termination by sending observers to follow the operation of the referendum.4

The United States was also skeptical. It was disappointed with the choices offered to the people, continued trusteeship or self-government under France. It felt that the people should be offered the alternatives of independence outside the French Union or self-government within it.5

Syria was completely disillusioned with France's proposals. Its

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5 Ibid., p. 328.
representative thought the French formula was unfortunate in its timing, conception and presentation. The restrictions placed upon the autonomy to be granted to the Togolese under the statute might undermine the very foundations of that autonomy and turn it into a fiction. The Syrian delegate said the statute was to comply with the principles of the French Constitution, which linked French Togoland with the future of the French Overseas Territories. It seemed that the final introduction of the reforms contemplated by France was contingent upon the integration of the Territory into the French Union. Moreover, the long list of powers reserved to the French Government and the French Commissioner in Togoland made the promises of self-government and reforms illusory. Lastly, the representation of French Togoland in the French Parliament and the Assembly of the French Union would limit the powers of the Togolese institutions. Because Syria felt these weaknesses existed in the statute, it would not condone the French decision to give the natives a choice of continued trusteeship or severance from trusteeship status and government under the new statute.

So many of the Trusteeship Council members were dissatisfied with the French proposals for a plebiscite, that a resolution to send observers was defeated by a tie vote. Those who voted against the resolution felt that to send observers would be to sanction the plebiscite, when they were not sure that such a referendum offered the natives a fair choice or could be effectively carried out under the confused

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6 Ibid., 744th Meeting, 13 August 1956, no. 12(b), p. 335.
7 Ibid., p. 342.
circumstances that existed within French Togoland.

The French angrily informed the Trusteeship Council that the referendum would take place even though United Nations observers would not be present. Their representative said that the French government explicitly reserved the right to determine its future course of action in light of the results of the native consultation.\(^8\)

The referendum was held during the fall of 1956 in time for discussion within the Fourth Committee's winter session. The results indicated that 71.51\% of the French Togoland people favored the termination of the trusteeship agreement and establishment of the statute.\(^9\)

This was an overwhelming majority, but the All-Ewe Conference, which had fought so hard for Ewe unification and later Togoland unification, told the Fourth Committee in November of 1956 that the vote could be attributed to irregularities and to discrimination by the French. Its representative quoted a Nigerian reporter as saying that the plebiscite had been a sham, glaringly irregular in some areas and rowdy beyond conception in others.\(^10\)

The Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise (Juvento), which was radically anti-French, tried to explain the voting by saying that

\(^8\)Ibid., p. 343.


\(^10\)Ibid., pp. 25-27.
undoubtedly a certain number of voters had been compelled to vote for France, others had been deliberately deceived and some had been guided in expressing their views. The party claimed that every possible means had been used by the French to bring about the annexation of French Togoland. This included the old colonial methods of corruption, pressure, ambiguity, deprivation of freedom, intimidation, the manipulation of electoral lists and repression.¹¹

The pro-French parties, Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo and Parti Togolaise du Progrès, spoke in opposition to the All-Ewe Conference and the Juvento. They said that they were pleased with the splendid work France had done in French Togoland.¹² Part of the reason why the two parties supported the French stems from their leadership. Many of the leaders were civil servants and members of the government who benefited from continued French control and who would undoubtedly lose their position if they spoke against the French. Apparently, however, many were convinced of the need and desirability of French assistance, which a continued relationship with France would probably bring. Further, they felt that French reforms were a definite step towards self-government.

It is surprising, however, that these two parties, with the assistance of the French, were apparently able to secure the support of the masses in the vote for the dissolution of French Togoland as a trusteeship. At least certain factors were significant, though they do not

¹¹Ibid., pp. 28-29.

¹²Ibid., 585th Meeting, 3 January 1957, no. 39, pp. 177-78.
entirely explain the tremendous support given the proposal for trusteeship dissolution and the initiation of a statute of reforms. There was considerable appeal to the idea of instituting an "autonomous state," which the French asserted would be established under the reform statute. Credit could also be given to France's campaign to brand the United Nations as bunglers and interventionists in French Togoland affairs. Further, the French had chosen a moment for the plebiscite when anti-French party strength was at its lowest ebb, lacking any platform with which to counteract French efforts. Lastly, there was some indication that France had made an effort to affect the outcome of the plebiscite by direct discrimination against the opposition parties.

The plebiscite vote, nevertheless, indicated that France's plan for an "autonomous state" was fairly popular among the native people. The vote, plus the support of the majority parties in French Togoland, enabled France to make a very strong bid for release of the Territory from its trusteeship position by the United Nations and for its establishment as an "autonomous state." France told the Fourth Committee that the statute which the people had accepted would allow them to administer their own affairs; therefore the French had achieved the goals of the trusteeship system, self-government or independence, and all that remained to be done was for the General Assembly to release the Territory. It would be strange, said the French representative, if the French Government were accused of having hastened political development in French Togoland too much. The trust of the people in the General Assembly should not be disappointed by thwarting their desire for
Once France had made its plea based on the plebiscite results, it rejected arguments against a change in French Togoland's status. Its representative said there should be no hesitation about releasing French Togoland from its trusteeship status. The accusation that France had discriminated against the opposition parties and had suppressed voting was false. The people had voted in complete freedom. Of course, it had been necessary to maintain order, but this had not led to illegal acts by the government. France hoped to dispel any doubt among Fourth Committee members with these assurances, but it was not entirely successful.

The Fourth Committee was impressed by the referendum results, and listened intently to arguments submitted by the French. However, the Committee was not ready to commit itself until it had become thoroughly acquainted with the actual conditions in French Togoland. This reluctance forced the French to rescind their own request that the United Nations immediately relinquish control over the Territory. The French delegation said that France was willing to abandon its request for termination of the trusteeship agreement in 1957, if the further course of discussion and the substance of the resolutions were acceptable to it.

With the withdrawal of French demands for immediate relinquishment of all United Nations control, the considerations of the Fourth Committee altered. The Committee turned to a discussion of the means

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13 Ibid., 584th Meeting, 2 January 1957, no. 39, pp. 173-75.
14 Ibid., p. 176.
15 Ibid., 592nd Meeting, 9 January 1957, no. 39, p. 213.
whereby a more thorough knowledge of the French Togoland situation could be acquired. Within a few days agreement was reached on a draft resolution to be forwarded to the General Assembly. The draft recommended that the General Assembly dispatch a commission of five members to French Togoland to examine the entire situation in the Territory resulting from the application of French reforms, which had been enforced by the French without waiting for the United Nations decision on the release of French Togoland from its trusteeship status. This commission would submit its observations and suggestions to the Trusteeship Council for the Council's consideration. In turn, the Trusteeship Council would study the French question, using the report of the commission. It would submit the results of this study to the General Assembly.

The General Assembly accepted the resolution with slight alterations and decided to send a commission of six members rather than five to the Territory in order to achieve a more balanced geographic representation. This is where the French Togoland problem stood as of February 1957.

The French had not been nearly so successful in their demands for the dissolution of French Togoland's trusteeship status as the

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16 Ibid., 599th Meeting, 14 January 1957, no. 39, pp. 253-54.


British had been in similar demands concerning British Togoland. The refusal of the Trusteeship Council to send observers to the French referendum was a most important obstacle to achievement of French aspirations. It left France without the sanction it desired in order to press the Fourth Committee for immediate dissolution of the Territory's trusteeship status.

The failure of the Trusteeship Council to support French intentions cannot be attributed so much to the nationalistic groups in French Togoland who made allegations against the French as it can be attributed to France's own colonial reputation. Particularly among those nations which only recently had become independent, there was a deep suspicion of France's intentions. This attitude, coupled with reports from nationalistic groups, prevented France from receiving the Trusteeship Council's support.

If France had been successful in attaining some sanction from the Council to carry out the referendum in French Togoland, it is possible that the Fourth Committee would have accepted the referendum results as a valid reason for releasing the Territory from its trusteeship status. While many members of the Fourth Committee looked upon the Trusteeship Council as somewhat pro-colonialism because one-half its membership was trusteeship-controlling nations, they felt bound to give some recognition to Council actions. When the Council refused to sanction the referendum, its action worked as a detriment to French aspirations. If the Council were not willing to support France, the Committee members felt there was good reason for the Fourth Committee to hesitate before
accepting the referendum results.

Of course, the importance of the Trusteeship Council's refusal should not be overestimated. Even if the Council had given its blessing to the consultation of the people, a number of Fourth Committee members would have been skeptical about dissolving the trusteeship agreement. They were uncertain what France meant by "autonomy" for French Togoland, and whether the referendum results were a true indication of native opinion. Their misgivings were fed by accusations of native organizations such as the All-Ewe Conference, which exploited France's reputation of being conservative in colonial matters.

It was humiliating to French pride, when for the sake of diplomatic prudence, France was forced to withdraw its demand for French Togoland's autonomous status independent of the United Nations. Yet, because of the critical tone of the Fourth Committee discussion, France could not with good judgement do anything else. However, the withdrawal of French demands for immediate dissolution of French Togoland's trusteeship status, while painful to France, did not signify a lasting defeat. The resolution drawn up and accepted by the Fourth Committee was moderate, and it left open the possibility of disposing of French Togoland's trusteeship status in the near future.¹⁹

French Togoland's future was now partly dependent upon the findings of the United Nations Commission scheduled to visit the Territory sometime in the near future. It was also dependent upon the activities

of France and upon the ability of the various groups in the Territory to influence the United Nations.

The Commission visited French Togoland in June of 1957. It was composed of representatives from Liberia, Canada, Denmark, Guatemala, the Philippines and Yugoslavia. After a four week tour of the Territory, the Commission, under the chairmanship of C. T. King of Liberia, presented its report to a special session of the Trusteeship Council in September of 1957. In its conclusions, the Commission stated that French Togoland possessed a large measure of internal autonomy as a result of the French statute. While the Administering Authority retained certain reserve powers, the Commission found that the statute represented a significant step toward the independence of the country.20

The Trusteeship Council decided to transmit the Commission's report to the General Assembly, "in order to set in motion an appropriate procedure for the early attainment of the final objective of the trusteeship system,"21 that is, self-government or independence.

The French and various other groups interested in French Togoland's future were represented at the Fourth Committee during its consideration of the French Togoland problem late in 1957. France presented its arguments first. Its representative urged the conclusion of French Togoland's trusteeship status.22 He argued from a position of strength.


The French Togoland Legislative Assembly's unanimous approval of the cessation of the trusteeship agreement for French Togoland carried some weight, though the present representation was generally discredited. Anti-French forces had refused to participate in the election of representatives to the body, accusing the French of persecution and discrimination; therefore, all seats had been filled by pro-French forces. More important was the support of the French position from the United Nations Commission, which had visited the Territory in the summer of 1957, and from the Trusteeship Council. The Commission found that French Togoland possessed a large measure of internal autonomy as a result of the French statute. The Trusteeship Council felt that the Commission's report, as well as the statements made before the Council by the French and Togolese representatives, provided a useful and constructive basis for consideration and action by the General Assembly toward a satisfactory solution for the Trust Territory.23

The French representative took note of the strong support given to the statute which made many governmental changes in French Togoland. Since the statute had been well received in the Territory and by the Commission and the Trusteeship Council, he felt there were now only three points in dispute and preventing the Territory's release from its trusteeship status: the renewal of the Togolese Legislative Assembly by universal adult suffrage, the transference of new powers to the French Togoland Legislative Assembly through a revised statute, and the relinquishment of residual powers by the French. Speaking of universal

suffrage first, the French delegate said that its application in the coming election of members to the Legislative Assembly was now in the hands of that legislative body and France could not interfere in the matter. The transfer of new powers to the Togolese Legislative Assembly, offered in a modified statute, would occur immediately upon the termination of the trusteeship agreement. The French delegate stated that this step was agreed upon by the Togolese Government. Turning to what he considered the last of the three points still in dispute, residual powers, the French representative assured the Fourth Committee that those powers which he called residual were the ones needed by France to carry out its responsibility as a trust-administering nation and would also be relinquished with the termination of the trusteeship.24

The French representative was not clear in his discussion of the powers which would be turned over to the French Togoland Government at the time the Territory was released from its trusteeship status. He defined the new powers, which would be given under a revised statute, as those in the fields of public freedoms, the judiciary, and constitutional revision.25 But the representative did not define the residual powers needed for maintaining its trusteeship control. Other nations felt that France had been vague on several issues concerning transference of power. This led to further explanations by the French delegate.

Without defining residual powers, Jacquet told the Fourth Committee that all internal powers, new and residual, would be given to the

24"A Formula for Togoland," op. cit., p. 43.
25Ibid.
French Togoland Government at the time the trusteeship agreement was dissolved. France would reserve for itself only those concerning external affairs, defense, currency and foreign exchange.  

The Fourth Committee also heard the views of Robert Ajavon, President of the Legislative Assembly in French Togoland and a member of the French delegation. The Togolese minister supported the termination of French Togoland as a trust territory. He asserted that self-government was now an undisputable fact in the Territory. After a year under the new statute the people of French Togoland thought it was time to complete their self-government by asking for the dissolution of the trusteeship agreement so that the French Government could transfer remaining powers to the Togoland Government.

The minister added that, in a spirit of conciliation with its opposition, the French Togoland Government had decided four operations should be effected consecutively in order to facilitate the termination of the trusteeship. These were consideration and acceptance of the modified statute, new elections for the Legislative Assembly on the basis of universal adult suffrage, application of the modified statute and, lastly, the automatic termination of the trusteeship agreement as soon as the new Legislative Assembly met for the first time.

After these speakers finished, the Committee devoted several meetings to listening to the views of representatives from the three

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26 Ibid., p. 48.
27 Ibid., p. 44.
28 Ibid.
opposition parties in French Togoland. The first to speak was Sylvanus Olympio, representing the All-Ewe Conference, which had worked so hard for Ewe and later Togoland unification. He agreed that the French statute had been a step forward, but did not think that the other plans submitted by the French and Togoland governments were suitable. He felt that the first thing to do was to hold regular elections for the Legislative Assembly in an atmosphere of complete freedom, with each stage supervised by the United Nations. Once the elections were held and a truly representative assembly elected, the French Togolanders should insure the workability of the present institutions. After this, the new Assembly, or a commission of inquiry established by it, should examine the present statute thoroughly and make recommendations for amending it into a constitution which would allow the people to achieve independence by whatever means they chose. Olympio felt that many of the provisions in the statute could only be retained on a provisional basis. For example, should French Togoland continue to be represented in the French Parliament and should the Territory's people continue to have a citizenship tantamount to French citizenship?29

Similar sentiments were expressed by the two other anti-French parties, the Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise and the Mouvement Populaire Togolaise. The Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise, a radical organization vigorously promoting independence, was adamant against France's move, through the restrictive application of democratic principles, to substitute a system of internal self-government for the right

29 Ibid.
of all peoples to have independence.\textsuperscript{30}

During the question and answer period following the speeches, Olympio of the All-Ewe Conference stressed that participation of the opposition parties in the new election would depend upon assurance that the French Government would not interfere in any way and that the election would be held under United Nations supervision. He declared that the importance of United Nations supervision could not be overemphasized, as the administration had interfered so flagrantly in all past elections that nobody in the Territory believed an election conducted exclusively under its auspices would be truly free.\textsuperscript{31}

Various delegates expressed opinions on the speeches by the French delegate, by the President of the French Togoland Legislative Assembly and by the various parties. D. Chapman of Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast) felt it was preferable to exclude the question of terminating the trusteeship agreement from the election campaign. Rather, it should be the subject of a White Paper to be published by the new government. The election itself should be held under the supervision of the United Nations to avoid any complaints.\textsuperscript{32}

Syria agreed that general elections should take place under United Nations scrutiny and without any consideration of terminating the trusteeship. When reforms had been introduced by the Legislative Assembly, the French Togoland people could be consulted on the future

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\item \textsuperscript{30}Ibid., p. 45.
\item \textsuperscript{31}Ibid., p. 46.
\item \textsuperscript{32}Ibid., p. 47.
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status of the Territory.\textsuperscript{33}

The British supported France. Sir Andrew Cohen thought it was clear from the statements of France and from the Commission's report that Togoland would have effective autonomy in internal affairs with the powers France intended to transfer under the revised statute. Further, if certain powers were retained by France for the moment, it would be with the agreement of the Togoland Legislative Assembly. The transfer of powers which had already taken place, together with those proposed upon the termination of the trusteeship agreement, would fulfill the objective of self-government mentioned in the Charter.\textsuperscript{34}

The final resolution by the Fourth Committee was hammered out only after protracted negotiation and compromise on the part of the different groups. General agreement was reached on the advisability of United Nations supervision of the election of representatives to the Legislative Assembly, an All-Ewe request. The resolution sidestepped the issues of how and when the transfer of powers from the French to the Togoland Government would take place. It merely invited the Administering Authority to inform the Trusteeship Council on the action taken concerning these powers, the results of the election and other matters. The resolution did not reject the dissolution of the trusteeship agreement, but left it up to the new Legislative Assembly soon to be elected.\textsuperscript{35} This was a compromise between the position of the French and

\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 49.
French Togoland governments and that of the anti-French forces. The resolution rejected the anti-French demands for a decision on independence by the forthcoming Legislative Assembly and demands by France and the French Togoland Government for automatic dissolution of the trusteeship agreement with the first meeting of the new Legislative Assembly. The Fourth Committee deserved a good deal of credit for its success in devising a compromise resolution acceptable to the hostile forces involved in this struggle to determine French Togoland's future.

The election of representatives to the French Togoland Assembly occurred in April of 1958. It was under the supervision of the United Nations Commissioner, Max Dorsinville of Haiti, and a team of United Nations observers. This election, the first in French Togoland to employ universal adult suffrage, was directed by the French Togoland Government, in consultation with the United Nations Commissioner.36

The election was a tremendous upset, a complete reversal of the elections in 1955, when the opposition parties had refused to take part and only pro-French members were elected to the Assembly. Of the forty-six seats in the Legislative Assembly, twenty-nine were won by the anti-French, pro-unification Comité de l'Unité Togolaise. Pro-government, status-quo parties received thirteen seats: the Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo, ten, and the southern Parti Togolaise du Progrès, three. In addition, four seats were won by independent candidates.37

37 Ibid., p. 43.
These results were very significant, with far-reaching ramifications. They portended a sharp change in the attitude of French Togoland's Government. The anti-French organizations which only recently had spoken against French plans for self-government and strongly in favor of independence now controlled the Legislative Assembly. Immediately after the election, Sylvanus Olympio, presently the leader of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, proclaimed that the Togolese people were now masters of their own house, indicating that he had independence in mind.

The election results forced the status quo parties to face one bare fact: to remain among the major parties they would have to revise their stand. They had received a stunning defeat when they were confident of victory in an election which one United Nations observer was quoted as having said was "so crooked you could walk along it without going in the same direction twice." The status quo position must have been very unpopular for the status quo parties to lose after being given assistance through questionable activities of the French and Togoland governments before and during the election.

The French reversals in the election put France in an awkward position. To concede to the demands of the new anti-French majority for independence would mean the defeat of all French plans for the Territory and might cause further dissatisfaction in French colonial areas.

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where large elements of the population wanted freedom. Yet for France to reject the will of the Togolese majority would bring the wrath of the United Nations and native people down upon it. France's solution to this dilemma was a great concession on its part, but at least prevented the Togoland situation from having an immediate effect upon sensitive areas elsewhere in the French colonial empire. The De Gaulle Government told Sylvanus Olympio, after considerable discussion, that the French would train the Territory's people to take full control of currency, defense and diplomacy by 1960, those areas in which France had not yet relinquished control. In return, Olympio was asked not to reveal these terms until France and all its overseas territories had voted on the new constitution for France and the overseas territories. Thus, after the colonies had made a decision for or against the constitution, in effect voting against or for independence, Olympio told his people that they would be free in 1960.40

What had begun in 1947 as a simple demand for Ewe unification under one administration, in ten short years ended in dissolution of British Togoland's trusteeship agreement and the Territory's inclusion in the new state of Ghana, and also resulted in the promise of independence for French Togoland in 1960. None of the native groups had foreseen this future for the Togoland Territories and indeed none had originally agitated for such goals. But because of the various activities within the Territories and because of the conflicting demands made upon the United Nations by the native groups and Administering Authorities,

the future of British and French Togolands was resolved in this fashion. Without the power of the United Nations to receive and discuss petitions and without its defined ultimate goals of self-government or independence for the trust territories, the position of British and French Togolands would undoubtedly be much different today.

With the present status of British and French Togolands, is the shop-worn goal of unification now doomed? Without a doubt it is in the forms of a Togoland or an Eweland. However, a possible federation between Ghana and French Togoland could occur. Nkrumah, who is prime-minister of Ghana, has spoken of a West African federation since the recent voting on September 28, 1958 on the new constitution for France and its overseas territories, in which French Guinea rejected the constitution and in effect voted for independence.41 At the same time, Sylvanus Olympio, who now heads the French Togoland Government, has also spoken of Ewe unification "in some form of West African federation."42

But even if unification does not occur, unificationists can take pride in the fact that their efforts had a part in speeding the evolution of the two Territories. Particularly important had been the role of the All-Ewe Conference, which first brought some of the problems of British and French Togolands to the attention of the United Nations.

42 Howe, op. cit., p. 21.
CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSION

Through the efforts of the various opposing forces concerned with the Togolands' future to impress their views upon the United Nations, the Togoland Territories have progressed rapidly toward independence. The evolution of the Togolands would assuredly have been much slower if it had not been for the nature of the trusteeship system. The trusteeship system is not a new concept in the history of the relationship between the ruled and the rulers. It was preceded by the mandates system, established by the League of Nations Covenant. However, the trusteeship system is distinctly different from the mandates system in its powers of surveillance, avenues of protest by natives, and its goals.

The mandates system allowed the Permanent Mandates Commission only two primary means whereby it could determine conditions in the non-self-governing countries under its surveillance. These were the annual reports of the Administering Authorities\(^1\) and petitions from the natives, which were conveyed to the League of Nations by the Administering Authorities at their discretion.\(^2\) In contrast to this, the trusteeship


system allows the United Nations to secure information from annual reports, petitions sent by the natives directly to the Secretary General, periodic visiting missions which are sent at times agreed upon with the Administering Authorities, and by special commissions which may investigate conditions in the Trust Territory with permission of the Administering Authority.3

Under the mandates system, the only means by which the native people could protest to the League of Nations or bring matters to the organization's attention was through petitions which were forwarded to the League by the administering countries. Presently, the natives have three methods through which they may present grievances to the United Nations: by written petitions sent directly to the United Nations, by oral petitions to either the Trusteeship Council or the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, or by communications and speeches to the Visiting Missions or any commissions which may be sent from time to time.

The trusteeship system also differs from the mandates system in its goals. The mandates system emphasized "just treatment"4 of the dependent peoples involved, whereas the goals of the trusteeship system are "self-government or independence."5 Thus while the League of Nations was concerned mainly with insuring that natives in the mandates were treated decently by the mandatory countries, the United Nations has


been primarily concerned with the progressive development of the trusteeship countries toward either self-government or independence.

Natives of British and French Togolands have been particularly active in taking advantage of the lines of communication open for them to communicate with the United Nations, and it is their interaction with the Administering Authorities upon the United Nations which has helped to bring about the independence of British Togoland as part of Ghana and the promise of independence for French Togoland in 1960.

The Togoland natives have used extensively all three channels of approach to the United Nations: written petitions, oral petitions, and attempts to influence the visiting missions to the Trust Territories. In the Togoland situation written and oral petitions lost much of their significance with the advent of the first Visiting Mission to the Togolands in 1949, and had their strongest influence upon the United Nations from 1947 through most of 1949. During these first three years of United Nations consideration of the Togoland problem, the unificationists and particularly the All-Ewe Conference used petitions effectively. The unification groups were without effective native opposition and sent a preponderance of the petitions which the United Nations depended upon for information. But with the advent of the first Mission the United Nations found less need to depend upon the petitions for information. Generally, too, the petitions lost some significance as the United Nations became aware that both unificationists and their opposition tended to exaggerate in the petitions in order to strengthen their arguments, and in some instances presented arguments that appeared to be outright
fabrications. However, the petitions still served to call the United Nations' attention to pressing problems on which some action should be taken. In this sense, the unificationists were able to use petitions more effectively than their opponents, as they continually brought problems to the attention of the United Nations, whereas the other native groups were more concerned with denying the existence of such problems.

In their efforts to influence the United Nations through oral and written petitions, the unificationists were assisted by the attitudes of United Nations members. Until part of the non-permanent membership of the Trusteeship Council changed in 1950, the Council contained a large liberal minority which greatly influenced the supervisory organ's attitude toward the unification demands. After 1950, with continual changes in the non-permanent membership as the three-year terms were completed, the organ gradually acquired a more conservative membership. But almost simultaneous with this change, the Fourth Committee, little by little, became the center of United Nations action on the Togoland problem. This seems to have been partly due to the attitude of the majority in the Fourth Committee, who came to feel that the Trusteeship Council was dominated by the trust-administering nations. The expanding role of the Fourth Committee was to the advantage of the unificationists since the Committee, which consisted of all United Nations members who wished to participate, showed a stubborn insistence on some form of unification even when it became apparent that integration was

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6"Place of Meeting of the Sixth Session of the Council (T/386)," Trusteeship Council, Official Records, Fifth Session, 29th Meeting, 22 July 1949, no. 62, p. 366.
strongly supported in British Togoland. The Committee's position was apparently an outgrowth of its fairly large anti-colonialist membership, which had an innate distrust of any movements, that is, integration and the status quo, supported by either the British or the French.

Generally, oral petitions were more effective than written petitions in influencing the United Nations organs because of the psychological effect of personal contact and also because the native groups had flooded the United Nations with so many written petitions that they had become somewhat meaningless. However, even oral petitions were used so extensively that they too gradually lost much of their effectiveness.

Though the oral and written petitions, as means of communication with the United Nations, have been vastly overused, they have had a very important part in bringing about the drastic changes in the political position of British and French Togolands and in stimulating political activity within the Territories. The third means of communication between the native groups and the United Nations, the Visiting Missions, has had a similar effect.

The Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee have been very dependent upon the findings of the three Missions that have visited the Togolands in the years between 1947 and 1958. Realizing the significance of the Visiting Missions, the native organizations have made strong efforts to influence the findings of these bodies. From 1947 to 1954 the unificationists were the most militant and articulate of all groups in the Togolands. Facing two fairly sympathetic Missions, they were quite successful in convincing their members that unification had the support
of the majority of Togolanders. However, after 1953, when the integration movement became so strong that it could dispute this contention, attitudes changed, and the third Visiting Mission in its conclusions and recommendations served to enhance the prospects of integration. The third Visiting Mission was also somewhat more conservative in composition than the preceding two Missions.

Status quo groups were never able to make a favorable impression on the Missions. Even after the status quo parties controlled the French Togoland Legislative Assembly, the Missions were not convinced that these parties' platforms represented the desires of the majority of people. The French were regarded with suspicion by the United Nations, and their close association with the status quo parties only served to weaken the status quo position.

The British and French have had access to the United Nations through four channels. These are the annual reports, membership in the United Nations, proposals submitted in the form of documents and attempts to influence the Visiting Missions. The annual reports apparently had little effect upon the decisions of the United Nations on the future of the Togolands, for they have dealt more with the economic and social problems of the Territories than directly with the problems of integration, unification and a closer relationship between French Togoland and France.

However, the British and French found that proposals submitted in the form of joint observations and joint memorandums were very effective methods of promoting their views. The repeated referral of
Togoland problems to the Administering Authorities for solutions gave them an opportunity to express their opinions and at the same time present tentative solutions which tended to check the activities of the unificationists.

The membership of Britain and France in the Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee has given these countries a most opportune position from which to guide decisions of the two United Nations organs on the Togolands. They have been particularly successful in the Trusteeship Council where there are only twelve members, of which four others are also trust-administering countries. Britain has been able to use its position on the Council and the Fourth Committee more effectively than France, which has been hindered by its dubious reputation as a colonial power.

Neither Britain nor France made much impression upon the Visiting Missions, which were the fourth means of access the Administering Authorities had to the United Nations. But indirectly, through active promotion of the integration movement, Britain was able to make its position felt, and the third Visiting Mission came to the conclusion that there was a strong desire among many British Togolanders for the integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast.

The integrationists' eventual success in gaining the United Nations approval of British Togoland integration and the unificationists' ability to sustain the support of the United Nations until 1956 must be attributed in part to the trusteeship system's goals of self-government or independence. Further, the present status of French Togoland is
partially a result of these goals. United Nations members are well aware of the ultimate aims of the trusteeship system, and most of them have been concerned with finding the best methods whereby independence or self-government might be achieved. It is for this reason, to a large degree, that they gave such earnest consideration to unification and, nevertheless, finally found it desirable to accept integration which made British Togoland part of a free African state. The goals of the trusteeship system are also an important reason why the Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee were unwilling to relinquish French Togoland to France until they could be sure that French Togoland would have genuine self-government once the trusteeship agreement was dissolved.

While the United Nations has played a major part in the evolution of the Togolands, the Togoland problem has also had its effect upon the trusteeship system, either temporarily or permanently. The ill-defined roles of the Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee have altered slightly. The Fourth Committee has played an increasing part in considerations of the Togoland problem since 1950. Without studying Trusteeship Council and Fourth Committee considerations of difficulties in other trust territories, it is difficult to say whether this phenomenon has carried over into other fields of discussion, but some members of the Fourth Committee have been quite concerned about the decreased role of the Trusteeship Council and have hoped that it will only be temporary.

Also, the Togoland problem has apparently made the United Nations
more cautious about accepting petitions at face value and more inclined to depend upon the findings of the Visiting Missions. Lastly, the United Nations considerations of the Togoland problem have resulted in an increasing role for the oral petitioners. Originally, oral petitioners only presented speeches and answered questions which were directed to them. In later sessions of both the Fourth Committee and the Trusteeship Council, the Togoland petitioners have actually taken part in the organs' discussions for short periods of time.

Though the organs of the trusteeship system have on the one hand been accused by the French and British of perpetuating the Togoland problem by giving too much attention to arguments and claims by dissident minorities, and have been accused by unificationists on the other hand of being too willing to accept British and French proposals, they seem to have handled a very difficult situation fairly well. It is quite true, however, that the Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee allowed the Administering Authorities to stall for almost three years on re-implementation of the Joint Council, until such a time as integration appeared more popular than unification and re-implementation of the Joint Council was no longer feasible. This incident points out the weakest link in the trusteeship system, the inability of its organs to do more than suggest steps that should be taken. However, there is no definite proof that Togoland or Ewe unification would have been more desirable than British Togoland's integration, and self-government for French Togoland with the promise of independence in 1960. In fact, Ewe unification would have had some adverse effects, leaving all of northern
French and British Togolands without a seacoast, and without the rich taxable areas of the South. As it is, the Togoland Trust Territories have quickly reached the goals of self-government or independence, with the possibility of a West African federation looming in the future. This could eventually bring former British Togoland and the semi-self-governing French Togoland together. Heads of both the Gold Coast and French Togoland governments have tentatively proposed a federation of West African countries. Indeed, the trusteeship system may have brought about the evolution of these Territories too quickly, leaving them without the training, traditions and economic development needed for a stable government.

The methods of investigation under the trusteeship system have been moderately successful in dealing with the Togoland problem. The Visiting Missions usually have analyzed situations correctly, but the first two Missions were given too little time to make a thorough survey of conditions and were too dependent upon materials, such as statistics on the relative strength of party groups, provided by the Administering Authorities. Moreover, the Missions were quite susceptible to influence by well-planned, well-organized native demonstrations. Further, on one occasion the United Nations found itself temporarily blocked from investigation when France refused to allow the establishment of a special commission to make a study of conditions in the French Territory. This again points out the inability of the organs of the trusteeship system to compel the trust-administering countries to adhere to decisions made by organs of the United Nations.
The Trusteeship Council may be another weak link in the trusteeship system. In the Togoland situation at least, it has been highly susceptible to influence by the various trust-administering countries and to changes in the nonpermanent membership. These administering nations naturally unite on many issues. In such instances with the assistance of one other nation they can control the Council, as the administering countries comprise half of the membership. The non-trust-administering nations are only members for three years, except for Russia and China who, as permanent members of the Security Council, are also permanent members of the Trusteeship Council. The attitude of the non-permanent membership varies of course as terms are completed and new members are selected by the General Assembly. The character and changing membership of the Council can and has affected its policies, as they did in 1950 when a change in the nonpermanent membership upset the liberal-conservative relationship, resulting in a less friendly attitude toward either Ewe or Togoland unification.

Of the various Charter provisions regarding trusteeships, the most successful have been those giving the natives an opportunity to express themselves. These have been almost too successful, for the second Visiting Mission to the Togolands alone received 2899 communications. However, it was through the channels provided under the trusteeship system that the native groups of the Togoland Trust Territories

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were able to call attention to their problems and, as the result of their interaction with the Administering Authorities upon the United Nations, to bring forth the independence of British Togoland, albeit as a part of Ghana, and the pending independence of French Togoland, both milestones in trusteeship history.
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