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Postwar Japanese-U.S. security relations

Masaki Sakai

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POSTWAR JAPANESE-U.S.
SECURITY RELATIONS

By
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B.A., Rocky Mountain College, 1983
Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts
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The most important feature of the military alliance is the pressure from the U.S. for greater Japanese participation. The purpose of this study is to explain why the Japanese defense has become important in the alliance and to analyze the defense problems facing Japan. The focus of this thesis is centered on the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance during the last three decades of the century and the implications of the increased Soviet-Far East military presence for Japan and the U.S. The study covers the framework of the Japan-U.S. alliance and the evolution of the Japanese perceptions to defense in the period between 1946 to 1983.

After her defeat in the Pacific War in 1945, Japan decided to abolish her military institution in the Constitution. However, it is increasingly evident that Japan can no longer indulge herself in the pursuit of such ideals under the changing international circumstances. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1951 led Japan to establish the Police Reserve Force, which later became the Self Defense Force. Japan then opted for Japanese-U.S. military alliance in view of the prevailing Cold War. However, between 1950 and 1970, this defense alliance had become a controversial public debate.

Prior to 1970, Japan had maintained a cordial relationship with the Soviet Union despite the fact that the Soviet Union occupied the Japanese northern islands in 1945. It is in this light that Japan is not interested in direct military confrontation with the U.S.S.R. But during the 1970s, the Soviet military capability in the Pacific region dramatically increased, and this gave rise to serious concern about the defense of Japan. In particular, after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, the Soviet Union began to deploy a new generation of offensive weapons to the region, and stationed 10,000 soldiers on the Japanese northern islands. The Soviet attitudes may have been derived from the anxiety that she was becoming contained by what she perceived as an emerging Washington-Tokyo-Beijing triangle against her.

This Soviet military pressure set the stage for a transformation of Japanese security policy towards the end of the 1970s. In 1976, for the first time in Japan's postwar history, the two governments agreed to initiate a joint study on aspects of defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S. The significance of the joint defense studies to Japan is that she can now have a clear image of what she can do on her own, and what she expects from the U.S. More concrete planning for Japanese defense may therefore follow.
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I. INTRODUCTION

How far and how fast should Japan increase its defense efforts? Since the middle of the 1970s, Japan's defense has drawn attention from the West. Japan has been regarded as a free rider in the Japan-U.S. alliance. The U.S. expects Japan to increase defense capabilities and contribute to the defense of the Western Pacific. In fact, Japan has begun to step up its defense efforts with increased public support and external changes in international situations. But these efforts are still regarded as too slow and too little by the U.S.

After defeat in World War II, the Japanese sought a moral and peaceful base for securing their future. With the announcement of the Peace Constitution in 1946, Japan forever renounced war as a sovereign right of the nation. The spirit of the constitution has had a significant influence on Japanese minds, and it has shaped their postwar culture.

However, it has become increasingly evident that Japan can no longer commit herself to the pursuit of such ideals under the reality of other nations' power games. On March 12, 1947, President Truman delivered a message to Congress regarding the principle of postwar American foreign policy. It was called the "Truman Doctrine." The principle of American foreign policy became the worldwide containment of communism. By the end of 1949 the communists took over mainland China. Like West Germany, Japan had been transformed by the Cold War from an enemy to a friend and proven her worth during the Korean War. Japan started to rearm by establishing a Police Reserve Force. She became a United States ally by signing the 1951 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Tokyo decided to take responsibility for defending Japan's territories from outside aggression.
In 1960 Tokyo and Washington signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, and the obligation of the U.S. to come to defend Japan was clearly stated without Japan's commitment to defend the U.S. in the Western Pacific. For this reason, this treaty has been criticized as one-sided and unfair. It also laid down the framework for Japanese-American defense relations in the alliance. During the period from American occupation of Japan to the early 1970s, the Japanese defense posture had been determined by a strong sense of pacifism and public aversion to militarism. Defeat in World War II inflicted great psychological and physical damage on the Japanese people. Leftists regarded the Japanese Self Defense Force and Japan's security ties with the U.S. as causes of both war and the new militarism. Defense debates became almost taboo in public.

Throughout the 1970s, Japan acquired economic power second only to the U.S. among the free nations. While Soviet-American relations had rapidly declined, the American public and U.S. allies were still dreaming of sweet détente. Japan was one of the dreamers, and she never doubted her basis of peace. A series of external changes—the U.S. withdrawal from southeast Asia, the rapid increase of Soviet military capabilities in east Asia, the decline of Japan-Soviet relations, the decline of Soviet-American relations, and the U.S. defense expectation of Japan—have had a significant influence on the transformation of Japanese perceptions of defense. Particularly, after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in 1977, the Soviet Union has begun to take even tougher positions toward Japan. Since 1979, the deployment of 10,000 Soviet troops on the Etorofu and Kunashiri islands (the formerly Japanese
northern islands) has contributed to awakening the Japanese about their security. Also the deployment of SS-20 IRBMs in Siberia and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have destroyed the theory that Soviet military power constitutes no threat to Japan.

With the growth of Japanese awareness toward defense, the Reagan administration has asked Tokyo to acquire the naval capabilities to secure 1,000 nautical miles of sea lanes, measured from Tokyo, and to control three strategic straits. Washington thus chose to emphasize roles and missions which the Japanese navy could conceivably implement by 1987. Since the middle of the 1970s, Tokyo has gradually begun to step up its defense posture with increased public support.

This paper is intended to analyze, from a Japanese point of view, defense problems which Japan is facing now. The paper will deal with the framework of the Japan-U.S. alliance during the last three decades and the implications of increased Soviet Far Eastern military presence for Japanese-U.S. defense cooperation. Attention will be paid to the evolution of Japanese perceptions of defense in the postwar era. At present, the issues of Japan's defense are a major subject of Japan-U.S. alliance politics. Under these circumstances, Japanese defense capability is kept to a bare minimum, still leaving many shortcomings in its structure.
II. THE FRAMEWORK OF JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONS

The Impact of the Cold War on the Demilitarization of Japan

When General Douglas MacArthur accepted the surrender of Japan on board the battleship Missouri, the war's end came for Japan and the United States. At that time, nobody knew what was going to happen between the Japanese and Americans. The Japanese had been told that the conquerors would kill, rape, and ravage. On the other hand, the Americans knew well of the flaming death crashes of Kamikaze pilots, and the glorification of sword and suicide in Japanese tradition.

However, the expected tragedy did not occur. The Japanese people were ready to accept the defeat since the Emperor told them to "bear the unbearable"—and to "endure the unendurable." Of course, there had been plots to stop the surrender, but all of them finally failed. Some proud soldiers committed suicide to avoid the shame of defeat. But once the Emperor's voice had been heard, the unbearable defeat was accepted.

In the summer of 1945 the first objective of the occupation policy was to ensure that Japan would not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world. The vast American Occupation Army was focused on the demilitarization and democratization of Japan.

At that time, the Japanese people had their strength completely spent and their self confidence destroyed, which cast them into a kind of spiritual vacuum. They accepted the Occupation Army's so-called 5-D Policy (Disarmament, Demilitarization, Disindustrialization, Decentralization, and Democratization) without resistance. Disarmament of
Japan was the primary task of the military occupation. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, the General Staff, Japan's ground, air, naval forces and all secret police organizations were dissolved by the Supreme Commander, General MacArthur.

Also, all persons who supported militarism and militant nationalism were excluded from public office and from any other substantial private positions. In the education system militarism and nationalism, including paramilitary training, were eliminated. Former military officers and all other exponents of militarism were excluded from teaching positions. Martial arts such as Judo, Karate, and Kendo were eliminated from the school curriculum.¹

The spirit of Japan's disarmament reflected on the formation of the 1946 MacArthur constitution. Any armed forces in Japan were prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based upon justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerancy of the state will never be recognized.²

On March 6, 1946 when the draft Constitution was made public by the Japanese government, MacArthur stated, "By this undertaking and commitment Japan surrenders rights inherent in her own sovereignty and renders her future security and very survival subject to the good faith and justice of the peace-loving peoples of the world."³

Politically and psychologically, Japan was totally disarmed by the Supreme Commander, General MacArthur. This messianic idealism of
General Douglas MacArthur dominated policy making in the first years of the Occupation. The renunciation of war gave symbolic dignity to pacifism in Japan. This no-war clause moved Japan from the European diplomatic tradition—a balance of power—into the idealism of American isolationism.

On the first anniversary of Japan's surrender, Prime Minister Yoshida demonstrated his interpretation of the 1946 Constitution in a radio broadcast to the nation:

The new constitution provides for renunciation of war, in which regard Japan leads the rest of the world. "But you are," some may say, "a beaten nation without a single soldier and without the power to wage wars." The truth is we do not want to repeat the calamitous experience of war even after we have become an independent nation in name and in fact. Now that we have been beaten, and we haven't got a single soldier left on our hands, it is a fine opportunity for renouncing war for all time.4

However, despite the birth of Japan's new idealism, the rest of the world was rapidly moving toward the Cold War with the expansion of communism. On March 12, 1947, U.S. President Truman delivered a message to Congress about the basis of postwar American foreign policy. It was called the "Truman Doctrine." A primary purpose of this doctrine was to support nations resisting communist penetration. A dominant principle of American foreign policy became the world-wide containment of communism. In February 1948, Czechoslovakia fell to communism. In June 1948, the Berlin airlift was started to support free Berlin. In April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was organized to defend western Europe from communist aggression.

By the end of 1949, the Chinese communists had taken over Mainland China. The State Department strongly warned China that the U.S. would
resist any attack upon the small countries of Southeast Asia. In 1950 a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance was signed between the Soviet Union and Communist China. The Sino-Soviet alliance became a symbol of strong unity in the Communist Bloc. It promised resistance against aggression from Japan, or countries directly or indirectly associated with Japan in such aggression.

The Japanese communists emerged from prison in the early days of the Occupation. In the 1949 general elections, the Communist Party won 10 percent of the vote and 35 seats in the House of Representatives. Under this situation, Occupation authorities began to worry more about global communist expansion. Gradually, the image of a strong Japan had appeared on the scene against communism in Asia. In January, 1950, General MacArthur stated that he would no longer talk about the demilitarization of Japan in public.

Traditionally, U.S. policy has been aimed to prevent any anti-American power from gaining a foothold in East Asia. At the end of the 19th century, Secretary of State John Hay advocated the Open Door Policy for China. Its aim was a balance of power in East Asia, for example, America's support toward Japan in the Russo-Japanese War, and its support toward China in the Pacific War. These facts tell us that the U.S. has been concerned about the Open Door Policy and the balance of power in the Far East. During the Cold War, this power balance became more favorable to the communist powers by the communization of China and North Korea. At the end of the 1940s, the U.S. had gradually switched the position of Japan from ex-enemy to partner.
At that time, American policymakers came to the conclusion that not only was communism an expansionistic political philosophy, but the Kremlin was a leader of the movement. According to George Kennan, Soviet leaders always feel insecure about their political ability to keep power within Soviet society and the outside world. Also, they are obligated to expand Soviet communism to the rest of the world. Therefore, Soviet foreign policy often becomes hostile to outside forces. Kennan argued, under this circumstance, that the U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union should be a long-term containment of Russian expansion. President Truman made Kennan's idea the cornerstone of American postwar foreign policy. At the beginning of 1950, a small ad hoc committee of State and Defense Department, headed by Paul Nitze, drafted NSC 68 to systematize containment. NSC 68 envisioned a world in which gains for communism anywhere produced losses for the U.S. and its allies. With the outbreak of the Korean War, this became the definitive statement of American security policy. Thus, the U.S. emerged in the international community as a grand crusade against communist expansion. \(^5\) At the beginning of the 1950s, the U.S. began to expect Japan to be a part of the containment network against communism in East Asia.

On June 22, 1950, John Foster Dulles, General Bradley, and Defense Secretary Johnson arrived in Tokyo to discuss the Japanese issues. For the first time Dulles met with Yoshida and tried to bring up Japan's rearmament on the diplomatic table. Dulles expected that Yoshida would accept his plan of Japan's rearmament. But Yoshida rejected Dulles's proposal. Yoshida's argument was as follows: economically Japan could not afford it. Some Asian countries and Japan's public opinion would
never accept Japan's rearmament, and possibly they would take it as a revival of Japan's militarism. At that meeting, Yoshida suggested that the issue should be brought directly to General MacArthur, to which Dulles agreed. The Supreme Commander MacArthur expressed full sympathy for Yoshida's concerns and supported Yoshida's proposal. Yoshida believed Japan's rearmament was politically impossible and that Japan needed U.S. armed forces. In his plan, Japan was to sign the security treaty with the U.S. in order to get American protection of Japan. Then Japan was to get independence from the U.S. Occupation, and was to join the United Nations as an independent nation. The Cold War gave Japan a good opportunity to achieve this goal. In order to achieve early independence, Yoshida needed to avoid any domestic political crisis which could be created by Japan's rearmament issue.

In June 1950 the North Koreans suddenly attacked South Korea across the 38th parallel. On June 30, General MacArthur was given authority to send U.S. ground troops to South Korea. At the same time, Washington directed him to take necessary measures for the security of Japan. In the shock of the sudden attack in Korea, communist menaces were expected from all directions at any time. The U.S. government realized that a well organized defense mechanism was urgently needed to protect U.S. allies. Particularly, as Japan had been totally disarmed since 1945, Japan and the U.S. needed some kind of defense system to protect Japan from the communist aggression. As a result, the commander of allied occupation troops, General MacArthur, ordered the Japanese government to create a 75,000 man National Police Reserve Force. The main purpose
of this force was to prevent any internal communist rebellion when American troops were out of Japan.

However, the creation of National Police Reserve (NPR) was carried out in secrecy because of Article 9 of the 1946 Peace Constitution. For example, recruits to the NPR were not informed of the real nature of the new military organization. For example, tanks were euphemistically called "special vehicles." The NPR was stationed in 37 camps throughout Japan. Later in October 1951, Japan's government got rid of previous barriers against the recruitment of former officers of the Imperial Army and Navy. Finally, 243 graduates of the Imperial Army and Navy academies were enrolled in the list of the first officer corps.

Prime Minister Yoshida did not take a position that the creation of the National Police Reserve Force would constitute a step in the direction of rearmament. He simply believed that the new force was designed purely for the purpose of maintaining order within Japanese territory and bore no relation to anything in the nature of rearmament. He realized that communist activity within Japan had begun an attempt to bring about a revolution by force. American imperialism became the declared enemy of the Japanese Communist Party and American policy was attacked at every turn. At that time, the Japanese Communist Party had received directions from Moscow as a part of the international communist movement. Moscow came to a conclusion that the Japanese communists could interrupt American military activities in Japan, and possibly could overthrow the pro-American Yoshida government. With the outbreak of the Korean War, General MacArthur raised fears that communist activity in Japan would increase and would be more radical. The result of the outbreak of the
Korean War and communist activities in Japan contributed to the creation of the NPR. General MacArthur believed that the development of defensive forces in Japan would not indicate a revival of militarism with the success of his democratization program. The creation of a Japanese army was regarded as the final link in the Japan-U.S. alliance against the Soviet Union and communist China.

The 1951 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Establishment of the Self Defence Force

With the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. government decided to set up a collective security network in the Western Pacific. But this idea quietly disappeared, because a mix of "Asian weaklings" and "all white powers" could never be mutually formed. For this reason, the U.S. government decided to sign separate security treaties with Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and Australia. These treaties still exist today.

In 1947 Prime Minister Yoshida and his successor Katayama asked the U.S. to provide protection for Japan against its traditional enemy, the Soviet Union. After a short while, the U.S. promised to provide temporary protection to Japan. In 1951 Japan and the U.S. signed the Security Treaty as a part of an anti-communism network in East Asia. This treaty promised to provide American protection to Japan. But its protection was temporary until Japan could build its own defense forces.

Yoshida believed that Japan had no realistic option other than to rely upon a bilateral military agreement with the United States. His decision stemmed from his own traditional view of balance of power and his belief of the era of the Anglo-Japanese alliance—the Pax Britanica.
was replaced with the Pax Americana. Yoshida believed alliance with the U.S. was the best way to secure Japan. By April 1950 Yoshida came to the conclusion that it would be emotionally difficult for the Japanese to endure a continuation of the occupation until an overall peace was settled. Yoshida's personal belief in an era of Pax Americana, and his concerns about a continuation of the U.S. occupation finally got him to sign the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. By signing this treaty, Japan got independence from the U.S. occupation:

Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan. The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.8

The Korean War dramatically heightened Japan's importance in U.S. military strategy. It showed the Japanese conservatives that continued U.S. military presence in Japan was favorable to ensure Japan's security against Soviet expansion. Also, a new Japanese military industrial complex was given birth by the Korean War. The loss of weapon procurement for U.S. troops in Korea finally forced Japan to continue rearming.

Since the signing of the first Security Treaty in 1951, several security issues had been discussed in Japan's domestic politics. First, the Japanese Diet discussed Japan's inherent right of self defense and right to enter collective security. Second, socialists said Article I of the Security Treaty touched the sensitive question of Japan's sovereignty:
...including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese government to put down large scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside Power or Powers.9

In fact, the socialists felt that Japan had become an American colony. Third, the U.S. promised to maintain armed forces in Japan, in the expectation that Japan would increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense. These three references to collective security, stationing of U.S. forces in Japan, and Japan's defense efforts drew charges of conflict with Article 9 of the 1946 Japanese Constitution.

Japan's Socialist Party particularly opposed the 1951 Security Treaty. The Socialist Party formulated three policies to maintain for Japan's security: (1) conclude one peace treaty with all its former enemies, (2) maintain neutrality, and (3) neither conclude military pacts with any one country nor give military bases in Japan to any foreign countries. These three policies were massively supported by labor unions such as Sohyo (leftist labor union), the Teachers' Union, and the National Railway Workers Union. They believed that peaceful coexistence was possible between the free world and the Communist Bloc. Therefore, alliance with the West would only jeopardize Japan's position of neutrality. Their policy was based upon an assumption that the Eastern Bloc wanted peace with the West.

On the other hand, the conservatives claimed that as long as Japan sided with the West, neutrality was impossible. Communist aggression must be countered by self defense power. On October 23, 1951, the treaties (the Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty) were already in the Diet's session. Just before final votes, the socialist convention split into two. Left wing socialists voted against those treaties and right
wing socialists voted for the Peace Treaty and against the Security Treaty.

However, most Japanese people supported the 1951 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty regardless of the left wing opposition. In September, 1950, a Mainichi poll indicated 70 percent in favor of preparations for defense, while only 20 percent wanted defense in cooperation with the U.S. By December, 1950, 41.2 percent were in favor of maintaining American troops in Japan. In February 1951, 77.2 percent of the people polled approved American troops only temporarily. The Japanese government and the Japanese people accepted the security treaty as a necessary part of peace maintenance.10

The strategic meaning of the 1951 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was very significant for the U.S. military strategy. Geographically and strategically, Japan was situated directly on the Far East's Cold War frontier and its four main islands could be used for offensive or defensive purposes. In fact, Japan is like an unsinkable aircraft carrier. For example, Yokosuka Naval Base near Yokohama was particularly important to American defense strategy. Since the end of World War II, it has been the Far East pivot of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, and it had the only facilities in the Far East capable of drydocking aircraft carriers. If the base were denied to American arms, the Seventh Fleet would have to shift repair operations thousands of miles across the Pacific to Pearl Harbor.

Under this treaty, Japan offered the Ogasawara Islands (the southern islands) and the Okinawa (the southwestern islands) for American troops. For the Japanese leaders, the treaty's purpose was to gain American protection. For the American leaders, its purpose was to gain
strategic dominance of East Asia by utilizing bases in Japan. In the American defense plan, Japanese forces and bases could be used for a regional defense role.

From Siberia to North Vietnam, the communists had maintained massive forces, and most of them were facing the Western Pacific Ocean. They wanted to control and set up a buffer zone against invasion from the West. From the northern anchor of Japan to South Korea, Taiwan, and South Vietnam, this area had been heavily defended by U.S. air and naval power. The Soviet Union has constituted three kinds of threats to the security of the U.S. and its allies. First, it is the threat of vast military power. Second, there is the threat of a very highly organized system of espionage. It is a fact that communism is a universal faith for some people who are willing to cooperate with the international communist activities. Third, there is the threat of communism as an idea that leads to the destruction of the accepted values held by both western and eastern civilizations. To protect free nations, Japan became a cornerstone of American defense strategy with the signing of the security treaty.

Historically, the Soviet Union has deployed massive military power in the Far East. There is a major Soviet base at Vladivostok and others along the lower Kamchatka Peninsula and in southern Siberia. By the middle of the 1950s, the Soviet Union had an estimated 400,000 man army, 4,000 plane air force, and a navy that included 6 cruisers and 110 submarines. China was reported to have a ground force of 3 million men, an air force of 3,000 planes and a 170,000 ton navy. North Korea had a
400,000 man army, 800 combat planes, and a small navy. North Vietnam had a guerilla trained army of 300,000.11

Arrayed against these forces, South Korea had a 580,000 man army, the U.S. had the Eighth Army, including the First Calvary and Seventh Infantry Divisions, and the U.S. Fifth Air Force in South Korea and Japan. Japan had a 160,000 man ground force, a navy of 140,000 tons and 500 planes. Taiwan and 560,000 men in the army and 300 planes. Okinawa had 9 U.S. air squadrons, 2 regiments of a marine division, and 2 Nike Hercules missile battalions. The Philippines had a 50,000 man army. Backing up all of those forces was the very powerful U.S. Seventh Fleet.12

The deployment of the Seventh Fleet has been sustained by a naval base in Yokosuka, Japan. It was the significant meaning of the 1951 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty for the U.S. defense strategy in East Asia.

Japan, strategically located, possessed a mature industrial economy, abundant labor supply, and a strong military potential. Like West Germany, Japan had been transformed by the development of the Cold War from an enemy to a friend and had proved its worth during the Korean War. By the time Eisenhower took office, the original plan to neutralize and disarm Japan had given way to a decision to incorporate it in a defense system. In the meantime, the Soviet Union and China have tried using many methods to divide Japan from the West. However, Japan had stayed in the middle of East-West tensions since 1950 to 1970.

During the Korean War, Japan and the U.S. had promoted the three constituent aspects of Japan's subsequent participation in cold war military activities: first, both countries maintained U.S. bases in Japan; second, they developed Japan's rearmament; third, Japan made a
move towards industrialization. In 1951 the National Police Reserve developed into a larger National Safety Force. The ground and maritime forces were organized under a new defense establishment. In the meantime, the Japanese government never admitted that the new armed forces were a violation of the peace constitution. Therefore, Japan could engage in military action against an aggressor for defense purposes.

Yoshida had a good sense of diplomacy. He strongly believed that there was little to be gained either domestically or internationally by an open affirmation of Japanese rearmament until Japanese sovereignty was restored.

On March 6, 1952, Yoshida declared his opinion about Japan's defense. He stated that "when Japan gains strength, acquires enough economic assets, and foreign powers acknowledge Japan's right to self-defense, we may then resort to a referendum for constitutional revision in order to possess fighting potential." Yoshida's speech was encouraged by a visit from Vice President Richard Nixon in 1953. Nixon stated that Article 9 of the Japanese constitution was a mistake and should be revised to meet the Soviet challenge in East Asia.

In March of 1954, Japan and the U.S. signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. In this agreement, Japan was required to fulfill its own defense responsibility, and to control trade with the Communist Bloc as one of the U.S. allies. On the other hand, Japan gained several concessions: first, Japan's promotion of the defense industry based upon the precondition of economic stability. The U.S. indirectly accepted Japan's defense buildup parallel to economic recovery; second, Japan's defense expansion must be within the constitution (Japan's
armament is for only self defense); third, Japan was allowed to receive
aid from a third country. Thus, Japan was allowed to receive aid from
Europe. U.S. Ambassador Allison stated, "this agreement takes us one
step nearer the time, when the United States can withdraw its forces
from Japan." 15

In July 1954, Japanese forces were given a mission by the Self
Defense Force Law. The mission of the Self Defense Force was to defend
Japan against both direct and indirect aggression. The year 1954 was a
defense year for Japan. The cabinet's final draft of the Defense Agency
Laws and Self Defense Forces Law were submitted to the Diet and subse­
quently passed without amendment. Under these defense laws, the organi­
zational structure was designated, and a separate air force was estab­
lished. In creating an air force, Japan assumed responsibility for
participating in defense of its air space. Japan basically has concen­
trated upon the creation of a relatively small but sophisticated military
organization since that time.

In December, 1954, the Japanese government created a new interpre­
tation of the 9th article of the Constitution. Before that time, the
Japanese government had taken a position that "war potential was a
capacity to wage modern war." Since December 1954, the government has
taken a position that "war potential is military power beyond the
minimum that is necessary for self defense." 16 All these statements
indicated that Japan's economic as well as military commitment is for
containment of communism and counterrevolution in East Asia. The
Japanese conservatives realized that Japan's commitment was to contain­
ment with the assumption that at some time in the future this commitment
would necessarily require constitutional revision.
Since 1955, defense issues in Japan have been defined in the narrow sense of maintaining national territorial integrity, and not defined in a broad strategic sense. Despite the fact that Self Defense Forces are structured around a five-year defense plan, they display two main characteristics. First, each five-year defense plan has never shown long-term clear goals. Second, five-year defense plans have developed more in a budgetary direction than a strategic one. This tendency remains even today.

In 1956 a National Defense Council was organized to discuss general national security issues. Critics argued that this council has never discussed security issues seriously, regardless of its name. This council is composed of the Prime Minister and the other ministers. In 1957, a National Defense Council (NDC) publicized a Basic National Defense Policy and the First Defense Buildup Plan. The Basic National Defense Policy read:

The goal of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression in the future; and if by chance aggression occurs, to repel it; and thereby to preserve our country's independence and peace which takes as its basis the principles of democracy. To achieve this goal, the basic policy is as follows:

1. To support action of the United Nations, to promote international cooperation, and to achieve world peace.

2. To firmly establish the necessary basis to stabilize people's livelihood, increase their patriotism, and guarantee the security of the state.

3. To gradually build up effective forces to provide the minimum degree of defense necessary in accord with national strength and national sentiment.

4. Until the United Nations is able to acquire the ability to effectively stop external aggression, to deal with it on the basis of the security system with the United States.17
The First Defense Buildup Plan aimed at a Ground Self Defense Force of 180,000 men, a Maritime Self Defense Force of 124,000 tons of shipping and 200 aircraft, and an Air Self Defense Force of 1,300 aircraft. This plan provided a basis of Japan's postwar defense power.

However, Japan's rearmament and the 1951 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty created a serious division of its domestic politics. The conservatives believed that defense power is necessary to defend Japan, and aimed at amending the Constitution to authorize arming for defense. On the other hand, the socialists have insisted on no defense power and abolition of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Defense has been a central concern to all of the opposition parties (the Socialist Party and the Communist Party), and it has given their broad definition to Japanese public opinion. The two effects of the opposition parties' actions have been to fuel anti-American feelings and to give political identity to pacifism.

In fact, there was no consensus about defense in Japan. This political situation and postwar pacifism has made a social status of the Self Defense Force much lower than that of the Imperial Army and Navy. For example, there have been no Tokyo University graduates in the SDF. Since they wore American uniforms and generally used American equipment, soldiers were often sneered at on the streets as foreign mercenaries. Since no one was threatening Japan, the money spent on defense was wasted. Some high schools refused to participate in the Japan Athletic Festival when students found out that policemen and Self Defense Forces personnel had also entered. In some primary schools, some students thought of children of the SDF personnel as children of
killers. Throughout the 1950s, a great number of pacifists and leftists attacked the SDF under the name of justice of the Constitution.

During the period from 1950 to 1957, the Yoshida government and the U.S. Occupation Army had conducted remilitarization of Japan with results being the 1951 Security Treaty and the establishment of the Self Defense Forces. In 1957 the First Defense Buildup was passed by the Diet and it came into effect in 1958. The main purpose of the plan was to creat a basic defense power that could be expanded to a larger scale in case of an emergency. With the growth of Japanese desire for more independence and the global communist expansion, Japan began to rearm itself.

The 1960 Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security

In June 1957, Prime Minister Kishi went to Washington, D.C. to ask for a new security treaty. Kishi wanted a new treaty which reflected the fact that Japan was no longer defenseless as a result of the First Defense Buildup (1955-1960). Japan was ready to take on more of the burden of its defense with respect to its own homelands. Kishi also intended to check up on the deployment of American troops at the military bases in Japan. At that time, Kishi and Eisenhower signed a joint communique, which promised to establish a joint intergovernmental security consultative committee. In this committee achievement of two issues was promised: First, by the end of 1958, evacuation of all American ground troops from Japan; second, the return of Japan's jurisdiction over the Ogasawara (the southern islands) and Okinawa (the southwestern islands)/ Kishi sought much greater influence in the defense relations between Japan and the U.S.
In late 1958, the Socialist and the Communist Parties (the opposition political parties), militant labor unions and some leftist students had staged a successful protest campaign against the Kishi administration. They protested against a bill to increase police powers. The Socialist Party had successfully combined the police bill protest with the new security treaty protest. The socialists, the People's Council to Prevent Revision of the Security Treaty, and the National Federation of Student Self Government Associations had opposed the new treaty since its introduction into the Diet. On November 27, 1959, approximately 5,000 workers and students broke into the Diet.

In 1960 Japan experienced a serious political crisis between conservatives and leftists due to revision of the 1951 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In Tokyo, the largest scale riots were conducted by the students, and resulted in the death of a Tokyo University student. In January 1960, a student group at the Tokyo International Airport attempted to prevent Prime Minister Kishi's visit to Washington to sign the new security treaty. In May 1960, the Japanese government's passage of the treaty in the Diet produced critical problems such as strong opposition from the left. In protest, the socialists sat down in the corridor to prevent the speaker from opening the meeting. Finally, 500 policemen entered the Diet to get rid of them. The socialists refused to attend any other Diet meeting, and they attempted to dissolve the Diet. They expected that it would lead to a new election, which would stop ratification of the new security treaty. Prime Minister Kishi was surprised at the reaction of the left wing. Nearly all major newspapers blamed the Kishi government's tactic in pushing through the treaty.
Large scale demonstrations and strikes were organized by the left-wing to prevent the Diet from ratifying the treaty.

On June 10, 1960, Eisenhower's press secretary, James Hagerty, was attacked by a group of leftist students. He was rescued by an army helicopter. On June 15, 1960, ultra-leftist students attacked the Diet. On the same day, Prime Minister Kishi asked the U.S. government to postpone President Eisenhower's visit in Japan. These incidents caused the fall of the Kishi government and the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit to Japan. The Japanese leftists regarded the new security treaty as a betrayal of Japan's peace constitution, and as a factor in the buildup of imperialism. With leftist rebellion, the dissident factions of the Liberal Democratic Party (pro-American ruling party) demanded Kishi's resignation and blamed his method of ratifying the new security treaty. In June 1960, a revised treaty was approved by the Diet. Prime Minister Kishi resigned from his office, and President Eisenhower decided not to come to Japan.

On January 19, 1960, Japan and the U.S. signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The new treaty was valuable for Japan. The obligation of the U.S. was to come to defend Japan. This was clearly stipulated without Japan's commitment to defend the U.S. and American interests in the western Pacific:

Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.19

In public, the new treaty made a clear distinction between right and left wing factions concerning their world perception. The socialists
believed that U.S. bases in Japan would involve Japan in an American war with enemies of the U.S. On the other hand, Japanese leaders believed that the new treaty would deter an attack on Japan by the U.S.S.R.

However, the new treaty produced disputes about two articles. For example, Article IV of the new treaty became a controversial issue between conservatives and socialists:

The parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this treaty, and, at the request of either party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.20

The question was "What is the Far East?" On February 1960, the Japanese government announced that the area of the Far East was the vicinity of Japan, the area north of the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China and the northern islands. The chief of the Foreign Ministry Treaty Bureau, Kumao Nishimura, said the Japanese government could not prevent dispatch of U.S. troops from Japan to overseas areas when American operation could be regarded as necessary measures for the security of the Far East. The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee accepted the Japanese interpretation about the area of the Far East. The socialists said Japan might be involved in an American war when the U.S. bases in Japan are attacked from the outside. The fear gave rise to a controversy concerning the area of possible combat deployment by the U.S. forces stationed in Japan.21

In the new treaty, Japan got the right to check up on the deployment of the U.S. combat troops in Japan, and abolished Article I of the 1951 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. It meant that Japan approached greater independence from the U.S. In the exchange of notes about the 1960 Security Treaty, the Japanese and the U.S. governments promised to
maintain Japan's right of checking United States military operations in Japan:

Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article V of the said Treaty, shall be the subject of prior consultation with the Government of Japan.22

Japan's right of prior consultation was regarded as a primary method to protect her sovereignty. The U.S. government tried to tell the Japanese that the U.S. had no intention of violating Japan's sovereignty. According to the Japanese government, "major changes" in the deployment would mean the deployment of one army division, one navy task force, the introduction of nuclear weapons, and the construction of missile sites in Japan. But the Japanese government took the position that U.S. nuclear vessels could pass through Japan's territorial water and visit parts of Yokosuka without Japan's consent. When, in 1968, the Enterprise arrived at Yokosuka, the Japanese government claimed that it was not equipped with nuclear weapons, and was not engaging in military action.23

In March 1960, Prime Minister Kishi at the Japanese House of Representatives explained the meaning of the new treaty as follows:

It is true that under the present treaty American troops can use Japanese bases and that now the Japanese government cannot influence the operations of the United States military stationed here.... Under these circumstances there is a danger that Japan might be involved in a war without its prior knowledge. But if such a case should arise under the new Treaty, the American troops would have to get Japan's consent in prior consultations in order to move, and thus a limitation has been imposed. This is one of the points wherein the new Treaty had been improved over the old one with logical revision.24

Kishi exaggerated the degree of freedom which the U.S. forces had under the 1951 Security Treaty. Nevertheless, it was a fact that Japan had a
legal method to check up on the deployment of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan.

Japan's primary goal in signing the 1960 Security Treaty was to get American protection and gain more independence. The U.S. primary goal in signing the treaty was the defense of the Far East from communist expansion. The new treaty was still one sided compared with other alliances. Unlike NATO, Japan today is not obligated to defend the U.S. in the Western Pacific, while the U.S. is obligated to defend Japan.

With the conclusion of the 1960 Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty, China and the Soviet Union began to criticize the Japan-U.S. alliance severely. On January 14, 1960, the Foreign Ministry of the Chinese People's Republic sent a statement to Tokyo about China's position towards the new security treaty:

The Chinese people have always been concerned about the Japanese people's struggle for independence, democracy, peace, neutrality and against the revival of Japanese militarism. Since Nobusuke Kishi came to power, the Chinese government has moreover continually pointed out the danger of the Japanese reactionaries vigorously revising Japanese militarism and restoring to outward expansion with the support of the U.S. imperialists.... The signing of the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Military Alliance signifies the revival of Japanese militarism and Japan's open participation in the aggressive U.S. military bloc.25

On January 27, 1960, Soviet Foreign Ministry sent a memorandum to Tokyo:

...Article VI of the treaty grants the United States use by its ground, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. The treaty's reservations regarding consultations on its fulfillment cannot conceal the fact that Japan may be drawn into a military conflict against the will of the Japanese people.26

For China and the Soviet Union, the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty was a dangerous military alliance for preventing communization of
Asia. However, with the growth of Sino-Soviet tensions, China switched its policy toward the Japan-U.S. alliance, and currently, China supports the alliance as a counterpart to the Soviet expansion in East Asia. The Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960 offered not only a stable deterrent, but also a strong U.S. commitment in the defense of the Far East. As a result of the treaty, Japan depended upon American military protection including a nuclear umbrella. The 1960 treaty has been the framework of this alliance.

Japanese Attitudes Toward Defense

The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty became even more essential for the security of Japan. Today Japan still maintains a so-called three-point non-nuclear principle. The principle bans the possession, production and introduction of nuclear arms. Thus, the U.S. is committed to provide a nuclear umbrella to Japan against any threat with nuclear arms. There is a national consensus that Japan should never again become a major military power. Under the circumstances, Japan has built her limited defense power.

There seems to be reasons for Japan's inability to deal with defense affairs. First, it is an evident fact that the security treaty has produced the Japanese psychological dependence on the U.S. for their security. Even today the Japanese, with the influence of long time free defense, lack a capacity to see defense affairs rationally. In their minds, the U.S. is dependable as a protector and is always ready to come to defend Japan. This feeling is similar to a child's dependence on his mother. This psychological dependence also has prevented the growth of healthy nationalism and healthy defense intuition. Today most
Japanese public schools never put up their national flag, and many students do not even know the content of their national song. The Japanese seem to have forgotten the importance of defense for their survival. Under the circumstances, defense policy and debates are not realistic. Some Japanese proudly say, "If the Soviet Union invades Japan, we will just let them into Japan without resistance. If Soviet occupation is bad, then we will fight." Actually, they believe if such an aggression occurs, the U.S. will immediately come to help Japan without Japanese efforts.

Second, Japan's inability to deal with defense affairs comes from the shock of total defeat in the Pacific War. The defeat produced a strong sense of political passivity and pacifism. Of course, postwar pacifism has been justified by Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution. With their experiences in World War II, Americans and Europeans came to a conclusion that military unpreparedness would lead to aggression from a potential enemy against themselves. With their experiences in the Pacific War, the Japanese came to an opposite conclusion: that military preparedness would mean war and Japanese aggression against other Asian countries. In the Japanese view, in order to achieve peace, military preparedness and military alliance should be given up, and should be replaced with faith in pacifism. Japan's religious militarism was replaced with its religious pacifism. Before World War II, the Japanese had believed, as long as they had faith in Japan's final victory as a divine nation, they could always defeat evil enemies. They believed Kamikaze would stop American task forces like it stopped the Mongolian invasion of Japan. Since 1946, many Japanese have believed that as long
as they had faith in peace as a peace-loving nation, Japan could always win. They feel that Japan should do nothing for peace and its security; as long as the Japanese have faith in pacifism, nobody harms them. They do expect that other nations understand the sincerity of Japanese feelings. A large part of this change was brought by MacArthur's educational reform. MacArthur wished to make Japan an Asian Switzerland during the occupation.

Third, strong anti-militaristic atmosphere also stemmed from Article Nine of the Constitution. The Constitution forbids the right of belligerency of the state. The 1959 Sunagawa Case handed down by the Tokyo District Court required that the Constitution clearly outlaw all armaments including the Self Defense Force and the stationing of U.S. troops on its own soil under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Still many legal scholars regard the SDF and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as illegal and unconstitutional. Politically, the amendment of the constitution has been impossible because of left-wing opposition.

Fourth, the Japanese have been very cautious about military forces, and this aversion derived from the nation's experience of militarism in the 1930s and 1940s. It is widely believed that a military establishment could become the antithesis of democracy. The SDF had existed under skeptical eyes in the 1950s and 1960s.

Fifth, defense debates in Japan became a taboo under the tradition of Japanese consensualism. Japanese do expect to avoid discussion of controversial issues in order to maintain harmony with others—a tradition possibly derived from Confucius. Neither discussion nor argument are good manners in Japan.
Sixth, Japan's domestic political situations have prevented the growth of defense debates. Since 1951, the ruling party, the Liberal Democrats have argued for the necessity of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the qualitative improvements of the SDF. On the contrary, the Socialist and the Communist Parties have argued for immediate termination of the Security Treaty and the dissolution of the SDF. Their policy is disarmament neutrality. They label themselves as peace powers, but label the U.S. and the Liberal Democratic Party as war powers. Politically, there has been no atmosphere that could promote defense debates, but rather defense could have created a political crisis.

Seventh, since the Japanese islands are isolated from the Asian continent, historically, the Japanese have been less sensitive than Europeans about the safety of their border. In fact, from the seventeenth century to the middle of the nineteenth century, Japan chose non-defensive isolation as its foreign policy due to the absence of outside enemies. However, when Japan was faced with the European colonialism at the middle of the nineteenth century, this non-defense policy was quickly replaced with militaristic foreign policy. Geographically, Japan has been protected by the surrounding oceans.

Given these factors, defense debates in Japan became almost taboo during the period between the 1950s and 1960s. Under such an antimilitaristic atmosphere, the Japanese officials have never considered their SDF as an armed force. They have continuously said the SDF is SDF, regardless of their possession of tanks, jet fighters and destroyers. They have proudly emphasized the existence of a weak SDF in order to
impress people of their sincerity in following the spirit of the peace constitution. This tendency remains even today. Personnel of the SDF cannot attend universities because of leftists' opposition, and they often hesitate to walk on the streets in their uniforms.

At present, Japan is claimed to have increased its defense efforts. In 1960, the size of Japan's GNP was one-tenth that of the U.S., and it became a half that of the U.S. at the end of the 1970s. But the fundamentals of the Japanese-U.S. defense relations have not changed. Japan's defense is still based on American protection even in the field of conventional forces. Without U.S. assistance, the fighting capability of the SDF will quickly disappear within a matter of days in a case of aggression. Since Japan's reluctance to defend itself has been rooted in postwar pacifism, it is unlikely that Japan will increase defense capabilities as the U.S. requested. Even defense-minded Prime Minister Nakasone is unlikely to increase the defense budget beyond the self imposed one percent GNP defense barrier. Postwar Japan's political culture does not include the idea of military self defense.
III. PRESSURE FROM THE NORTH

The Northern Territorial Issues

Russia has a history of expansion in East Asia. When Tsarist Russia began its eastward drive in the seventeenth century, moving into eastern Siberia, Sakhalin, Kamchatka and the Kurile Islands, it finally came to Japan. In October 1852, Russia's Admiral Putyatin came to Japan to persuade the Japanese to sign a commercial treaty. In 1854 Putyatin put in at Osaka Bay, and broke into Japan's 300 years of isolation. In February 1955, Japan and Russia signed a treaty giving the northern Kurile Islands to the Romanov Dynasty. In the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, the two states fought, and Japan inflicted a humiliating defeat on the forces of the Tsar. In 1939, the Japanese Imperial Army troops crushed the Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet border. The Japanese have had enormous fear of Russian expansion for a long time. Masamichi Inoki, President of the Research Institute for Peace and Security, described the Russian threat as follows, "Imperial Russia was the first country which threatened our isolation, and we were very much afraid of the Russian threat from the north." 1

Most Japanese do not have friendly feelings toward the Soviet Union and their feelings stem from the history of Japanese-Russian relations such as the Soviet seizure of the Japanese northern islands in 1945 and Soviet violation of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact. Particularly, northern territorial issues have contributed to the decline of Japanese-Soviet relations. The Kurile Islands consist of island chains stretching from the Nemuro Peninsula of Hokkaido to the Kamchatka Peninsula. In this area, there are twenty-three small islands.
According to the Japanese records, treaties of 1855 and 1974 defined the Kurile as extending as far north as Uruppu, and to the Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands (southern islands) as being Japanese territory. There are historical grounds for Japan's claim over the return of the northern territories--Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu Islands. In 1754, the Matsumae local government in Hokkaido started trade on Kunashiri Island. In 1798, one Japanese erected a signpost on Etorofu Island as Japan's territory. With the signing of the 1855 Russo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce, Japan and Russia promised that the boundary line between Japan and Russia should be drawn between the Etorofu and Uruppu Islands. Northern Sakhalin had belonged to Russia, and south Sakhalin had belonged to Japan until the end of World War II.

On August 9, 1945, the Soviet Union suddenly violated the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact and declared war against Japan. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Roosevelt and Stalin reached an agreement that provided for the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan. In return, Stalin was assured of getting Mongolia, the Kurile Islands and the southern half of Sakhalin. Finally, Soviet forces took over south Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands (including the Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands) without meeting Japanese resistance. At that time, most Japanese forces on those islands had already been sent to the front lines in the Pacific. Since September 20, 1945, the Soviet Union has occupied Japan's northern islands illegally (Etorofu, Kunashiri, Habomai and Shikotan Islands), as Russian territory. At the end of the Pacific War, approximately 16,000 Japanese were involved in marine activities and were residents of these four islands. When the Soviet forces
launched an invasion of the four islands, some residents were killed and many residents left their home islands. Since that time, Japan has claimed Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai Islands as their islands on the international scene. (These islands also offer valuable marine resources.)

In 1951, Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty. By this treaty, Japan acquired sovereignty again, and in return, the Allied powers made Japan renounce all rights and claim to the Kurile Islands. But this treaty did not determine the final sovereignty of these islands because the Soviet delegate refused to sign the San Francisco Treaty. Therefore, the Soviet claim was based upon the Yalta Agreement, of which Japan was not a member. In the Japanese viewpoint, the Kurile Islands are islands claimed north of the Uruppu Island, and it never included Kunashiri and Etorofu. But the Soviet Union has never had the intention of returning the northern islands. Since the early 1950s, Japan and the Soviet Union have made no progress regarding the northern territorial issues, regardless of Japan's continuous protest.²

There seems to be some reasons for the Soviet rigid attitude regarding the northern territorial issues. Historically, Russia has never enjoyed natural geographical borders like Japan and the U.S. have. It is not an exaggeration that the history of Russia has been made by the borderless and defenseless geographical environments. The defenseless borders have invited foreign aggression against the motherland of Russia. The Russians have believed that their territories must expand, otherwise their security will be in danger of foreign invasion. Therefore, the
Russians have sought a buffer zone between the motherland of Russia and the outside world. Expansion is a way to survive.

Strategically and militarily the northern islands are very significant. Until the end of the Second World War, the Kurile Islands were of great strategic value to Japan. On the Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands, the Imperial Navy and Army had kept some bases. The Hitokappu Bay of Etorofu was the departure point for the First Air Fleet (a part of the Combined Fleet) when it attacked Pearl Harbor. After the Second World War, the Russians occupied the islands and built military bases to defend Sakhalin and the Soviet Far East from American attacks. There are three purposes for the Soviet military buildup on the northern islands. First, the Soviet Pacific Fleet stations in Vladivostok can be easily controlled from bases in Japan. As long as Japan had the security treaty with the U.S., attacks on the Soviet Far Eastern bases would come from bases in Japan. Attack forces such as task forces or submarines would have to pass through either the Sea of Okhotsk or the Strait of Tsushima. Bases in the Kurile Islands could deter such attacks. Second, the Kremlin wants Soviet control of the Sea of Okhotsk to defend its Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) which would improve the Soviet global strategic position vis-a-vis the U.S. In the Sea of Okhotsk, the Soviet Union has deployed nuclear submarines of the Delta class. They have the capability to attack the east coast of the U.S. from the sea near the Kamchatka Peninsula. Militarily, the Soviet Union is interested in control of the sea extending from Okhotsk to Petropavlovsk. The primary purpose of reinforcement of the defense line on the Kurile Islands is to secure Soviet sea control. The defense line on the Kurile Islands,
the east coast of Siberia, and Petropavlovsk is designed to secure the Sea of Okhotsk. Third, the Kremlin intends to put psychological pressure on Japan by its military presence on the northern islands. The Kremlin wants to demonstrate not only that the northern islands are Soviet territories, but that also anti-Soviet behavior would be dangerous to Japan. For these reasons, the northern islands such as Etorofu, Kunashiri, Habomai, and Shikotan are very significant for Moscow. The return of the northern islands to Japan is unlikely to happen in this century, unless Japan invades them militarily.

However, most Japanese have ignored the military and strategic aspects of the northern territorial issues. Since the end of the Second World War, the Japanese have never thought of military factors in their relations with foreign countries. The Japanese never understand why the Soviet Union is concerned about such tiny islands. Some Japanese further think that they have been fighting for the reversion of the northern territories for the sake of international justice. Unfortunately, highly moralistic attitudes toward the return of the northern islands are unlikely to persuade Moscow.

There are three reasons for the Japanese to claim the return of the northern islands. First, reversion of the northern islands can be a final symbol of the end of the war. Most Japanese want to wipe out the last reminder of the defeat. Former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato used to say that the postwar period will not end until the northern territories have been returned. Second, the Japanese seek a friendly sign from the Soviet Union. The return of the islands can be that sign. The Japanese would interpret the return of the islands as the universal
validity of their good will diplomacy, often called "omnidirectional diplomacy." Since the end of the Second World War, friendliness with all nations has been a supreme value in the Japanese people's minds. The third reason has to do with fishing. Former inhabitants of the islands have claimed the return of the islands in order to expand their fishing area. However, none of these reasons is either political, military, or strategic, but more psychological and even symbolic, which are reasons most unlikely to persuade the Kremlin.4

It is a historical fact that the northern territorial issues have prevented the development of friendly Japanese-Soviet relations. Many Japanese fishing boats have been captured by Soviet naval patrol boats while they are fishing around the northern islands. Some Japanese fishermen, in order to continue marine business in the region, have become spy ships for the Soviets. They (pro-Soviet fishermen) offer Japanese made TVs, stereos, watches and military information about the SDF and U.S. forces in Japan to Soviet KGB agents in the northern islands. In return, they get a guarantee of safe marine business in the area. It is also said that some fishermen were killed because of their refusal to become Soviet agents. The issues of the northern islands have had negative influence on bilateral relations.

Japanese-Soviet Political Relations in the 1970s

Throughout the 1970s, Japanese-Soviet relations deteriorated through a series of unfortunate events. At the end of the Second World War, Soviet abrogation of its neutrality with Soviet detention of Japanese war prisoners in Siberia, Soviet seizure of Japan's fishing boats and Soviet seizure of Japan's northern islands gave them a bad image to
many Japanese. Throughout the 1970s, the relationship became even worse. In 1976 a MIG-25 jet fighter landed at Hakodate Airport to seek refuge in the U.S. through Japan. The pilot was Lieutenant Belenko of the Soviet Far East Air Force and his aircraft was examined by both the Japanese and U.S. air forces. Moscow was angry at Tokyo's way of handling the issue. At first, the fighter pilot Belenko insisted that he was forced to land due to a fuel shortage. He demanded that the top secret aircraft be covered by a hood. Then when the Japanese police began an investigation of him, he revealed that he was planning to seek asylum in the U.S. Finally, he was sent to the U.S., and his aircraft was investigated in detail by both Japanese and Americans. Moscow blamed Tokyo as follows: he had landed in Hakodate because he had run out of fuel, and Japanese authorities, by violence and with dope, had jockeyed him into defection, much against his will.

On September 28, 1976, Japan's Foreign Minister Kosaka met with the Soviet's Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York. Gromyko gave a message to Kosaka: (1) Moscow is very much dissatisfied with Tokyo's treatment of the MIG-25 incident; (2) the Soviet Union will never return the northern islands to Japan; (3) there will be no acceptance of a Japanese invitation to Soviet officials until both countries develop better relations with one another. The meeting was conducted in a cool atmosphere. In September, 1976, Moscow informed Tokyo that Japanese visitors on the islands must have Soviet visas. Moscow officially declared that the northern islands were Soviet territories.\(^5\)

On the other hand, the Kremlin has observed Japan from their own viewpoint. In January, 1978, Japan's Defense Agency decided to purchase
100 F-15 fighters and 45 P-3C anti-submarine aircrafts from the U.S. Moscow believes that Washington has given impetus to Japan's military preparations. Moscow has blamed Japan, saying that Japan is stepping up the arms race. In the Soviet's view, the primary purpose of Japan's military buildup is to suppress the national liberation movement of Asiatic peoples and their social progress. According to the Soviets, the Japanese have become and American imperialists' strike force in Asia.6

The Soviets seem to lack the capacity to understand Japan and the Japanese people. They also have the tendency to underestimate Japan. Some reasons can be considered for this attitude. First, the Soviets underestimate Japan's power as a nation state. For instance, Japanologists in the Soviet Union, such as D.V. Petrov and I.A. Latyshev, overestimate the military deficiencies of Japan. This incorrect image of Japan reflects on the top-ranking Soviet politicians. Despite the fact that two Japanese prime ministers, Hatoyama and Tanaka, visited Moscow, no top-ranking Soviet officials have ever visited Tokyo. Also, in 1977, Zenko Suzuki, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, waited for almost two weeks at the Japanese embassy in Moscow to meet with his Soviet counterpart.

Second, the Kremlin wants Japan as a Soviet satellite state. In February, 1978, the Kremlin proposed the draft of the "Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Cooperation" between the Soviet Union and Japan. The draft required the abrogation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Moreover, the draft contained an article relating to security cooperation. It would mean, if Japan were attacked by the U.S., that the
Soviet Union could send its troops to Japan. Also, surprisingly enough, there was no article on termination of the treaty. The draft obviously aimed at the "neutralization of Japan." In their eyes Japan is ranked with Vietnam or Mongolia.

Third, the Kremlin regards military power as the most effective instrument to achieve its political goal. The Kremlin has attempted to impress the Japanese by a demonstration of its military strength. The "Ocean 75" demonstration (full scale naval exercises in the Indian and Pacific Oceans) of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, the MIG-25 incident, the deployment of a Minsk (30,000 tonnage aircraft carrier), TU-25 "Backfire" bombers, and of SS-20 IRBMs in the Far East, all work against Soviet goals in dealing with Japan. The Japanese people are not easily impressed by the deployment of military power. Finally, Moscow could not prevent Tokyo from signing a peace treaty with China by the demonstration of its military might. 7

With the growth of tensions in Japanese-Soviet relations, Tokyo gradually began to change its directional foreign policy to cope with increased soviet pressure. Before 1975, Tokyo had kept an equal diplomacy toward Moscow and Beijing. This policy had been justified by two main reasons. First, Tokyo has always wanted to maintain a good relationship with Moscow. Second, Tokyo was very cautious of being involved in a Sino-Soviet conflict. Both Beijing and Moscow regarded Japan as a potential partner in their struggle. Japan has tried to avoid pressure from both states. For example, when Prime Minister Tanaka visited Moscow in 1973, the Russians raised the collective security issue. The Russians tried to get the Japanese to accept the
concept of the Asian collective security system. The primary purpose of Asian collective security was to contain China by utilizing Japan. In Moscow's final communiqué, Japan refused to mention the issue to avoid pressure from China.

However, Japan's equally distant diplomacy toward China and the Soviet Union has been carefully removed since President Nixon's visit to Beijing in February 1972. The Chinese leaders indicated that Beijing accepted the existence of the 1960 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as a stable factor in the Western Pacific. In September 1972, when Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka visited Beijing for talks aimed at normalizing Japan-China relations, the Chinese leaders went even further to express their support for the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Moreover, with the termination of the Sino-Soviet alliance in 1980, Beijing openly began to support Japan's defense buildup.

There were some reasons for the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty. First, after the fall of the "Gang of Four" in China in October, 1976, Beijing's new commitment to economic modernization allowed Chinese economic cooperation with Japan. In February, 1978, Japan and China signed a long-term economic agreement, and Japan promised to provide her industrial plants and technological know-how. Second, Tokyo was influenced by the poor achievement in Japanese-Soviet relations. The MIG-25 incident, the "Ocean 75" demonstration of the Soviet navy, and the long, bitter 1977 Japanese-Soviet fishing negotiations had contributed to the decline of Japan-Soviet relations. Tokyo began to pay more attention to China in economic activities. Third, Japan and China were aware of the Soviet military buildup
in the Far East. Even today Moscow has feared that Beijing would be able to overcome its military backwardness through cooperation with the West. On the other hand, Tokyo and Beijing have been concerned about rapid Soviet military buildup and its increased presence. In 1976, the landing of a MIG-25 on Hakodate showed a weakness of Japan's defense system. In December 1977, two Badger bombers, equipped with AS-6 Kingfish missiles, approached Japan's air space to warn Tokyo about relationships with Beijing. In February, 1978, a Japanese defense analyst, Momoi Makoto warned that the Soviets were constructing new bases on the Sakhalin Islands and on the Kamchatka Peninsula. According to him, 90% of the Soviet submarines in the Pacific were stationed at Petropavlovsk, and were under the direct control of Moscow. With this strategic information, Tokyo decided to conclude the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty. In East Asia, a Beijing-Tokyo-Washington triangle was established to confront Moscow.

While Tokyo-Moscow weakened by the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, an unexpected event--Soviet invasion of Afghanistan--was conducted, which further damaged the ties. On December 27, 1979, Soviet troops suddenly invaded Afghanistan and occupied Kabul. The Japanese Prime Minister, Ohira, was angered at the invasion. Chinese and Japanese top officials felt that the Soviets must be punished, and the Soviets must be deterred from launching attacks against Iran or Pakistan. Ohira and his advisors sent a message of Tokyo's displeasure to Moscow. Ohira also felt Tokyo ties with Moscow must not collapse. A final policy toward the Soviet Union emerged as a mix of policies designed to diminish the Japan-Soviet relationship without destroying it. On January 7, 1980,
the Japanese government announced Japan's support of a Security Council resolution demanding the Soviet evacuation from Afghanistan. At the same time Ohira said the government had decided to stop the export of computers and other high technology items to the Soviet Union. Also, Japan's Import-Export Bank stopped credits to three joint ventures—forestry development, pulp production, and harbor expansion in Siberia. On February 2, 1980, Ohira decided on a Japanese boycott of the Summer Olympics in Moscow. On May 24, 1980, the Japanese Olympic Committee decided to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics.9

The way Japan responded to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was unique in postwar Japanese diplomatic history because, for the first time, Japan joined hands with the West to protect the common interests of the industrial nations. This was the first time that Japan had openly expressed its ties with the U.S. and its opposition to the Soviet Union. With Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Japan's participation in a Washington-Tokyo-Beijing triangle became even more obvious.

At present, Moscow is demanding that Tokyo should conclude a friendship treaty with the U.S.S.R. The concept of the treaty came from Brezhnev's 1969 Asian collective security proposal. This security network would embrace all countries from the Middle East to Japan. In other words, Moscow has tried to eliminate the significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty by utilizing the Japan-Soviet Peace Treaty. Moscow perceives that the U.S.S.R. is becoming encircled by the emergence of a U.S.-China-Japan alliance, while Japan, China and the U.S. are concerned about a rapid Soviet military buildup in East Asia. In the Japanese view, Moscow tends to
overestimate the significance of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. While it is true that the Japanese are concerned about Soviet military pressure, the Japan-China alliance does not immediately aim at an anti-Soviet purpose. Since Japan, with the spirit of the Peace Constitution, opposes any hegemonic behaviours, conducted by any powers, Soviet criticism of the Japan-China alliance is off the mark.

On the contrary, the Chinese aimed at the construction of anti-Soviet containment by the conclusion of a treaty with Japan. They seemed to understand that the growth of tensions in East-West relations would diminish Soviet pressure on China. The Chinese leaders have dared to say officially that the primary purpose of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty is to prevent Soviet hegemonism in East Asia.

**Increased Soviet Military Presence in East Asia**

Throughout the 1970s, the Soviet Union has built up its military might in East Asia. Today, the Soviet Union has military superiority over the U.S. in this region. From a purely military viewpoint, Japan and the U.S. are faced with a threat of increased Soviet military power. Strategic environments in East Asia became more complicated by the emergence of a new sea power, the Soviet Pacific Fleet, and a modernization-oriented China. The relationship, fuelled by mutual suspicion and distrust, is one of central importance in an area of the globe.10

Throughout the latter half of the 1970s, the Soviet Union put constant military pressure on Japan. In 1975, the Soviet Pacific Fleet conducted "Ocean 75" full scale naval exercises in the Indian and Pacific Oceans aiming at attacking the U.S. fleet and Japanese sea lanes.
In the exercises, they conducted landing operations against the mainland of Japan, and cut off operation of Japan's sea lanes by joint naval and air forces. In September 1976, when a Soviet MIG-25 landed on Hakodate, Moscow severely protested against Japan's way of handling the issue. A military headquarters in the Soviet Far East military district warned Japan's Defense Agency that the Soviet Far East forces were prepared to strike the Hakodate Airport to get rid of the MIG-25. The number of Japanese fishing boats seized by Soviet naval vessels increased approximately seven times. In mid-1978, the Soviet Pacific fleet conducted large-scale naval exercises in the sea area between Taiwan and the Philippines along Japanese sea lanes, and they moved north to Etorofu (one of four islands in territorial disputes between Japan and the U.S.S.R.). Naval exercises included firing exercises. Soviet airborne troops from Khabarovsk and a detachment of 4,500 Soviet marines stationed at Vladivostok joined the exercise in seizing Hokkaido. The Japanese took it as a warning against the possibility of the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship. In December 1977, two Soviet TU-95 bombers equipped with AS-6 air to surface missiles, approached the Noto Peninsula (west coast of Japan) and flew along the Japanese mainland. Defense Agency interpreted the mission as a warning against the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty.\textsuperscript{11}

After the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in August 1978, the Soviet 6th Airborne Division stationed at Khabarovsk was brought up to full strength. The numbers of MIG-23 fighters, MIG-27 ground attack aircraft, and Backfire bombers increased. In the Transbaikal and Siberian military districts, the Soviet Far East Rocket Force began
deploying SS-20 missiles, which have a capacity to strike China, Japan and U.S. bases in East Asia. In January 1979, the Japanese Defense Agency warned that since May, 1978, the U.S.S.R. had increased its garrisons on the Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands. First, two thousand troops were flown there by airborne operations. Then 2,500-ton landing boats carried ammunition toward Kunashiri Island through the Strait of Soya. In June, 1978, Soviet submarines launched two SSN-6 Saufly (Surface to surface missile) directed at the Kamchatka Peninsula from near Etorofu Island. In September, 1979, the Soviets began construction of a base on Shikotan Island (which is a part of Hokkaido). The Soviet forces on the northern islands were estimated at an army division of 10,000 men, tanks, APCs (armored personnel carriers), artillery, MIL-24 helicopters and SAMs (surface to air missiles). Japan's Defense Agency was not sure whether those troops had defensive or offensive purposes. In mid 1979, four Soviet warships conducted war games (surface to surface, surface to air, and anti-submarine warfare) closely watched by the Japanese destroyers in the area around Okinawa. The Soviet fleet exercised direct naval attack on Japan's sea lanes. Military sources in Tokyo also said that the Soviets built a fourth major military port at Korsakov (only 60 miles north of Hokkaido).12

According to Japan's Defense Agency, the Soviet Union deployed 12,000 men before 1983, equipped with tanks, heavy artillery and attack helicopters on Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. Moreover, the Soviets constructed an air base at Burevestnik on Etorofu and possessed 4,500 marines in the region. With the growth of Soviet lift capabilities, these forces have become a serious military threat to Hokkaido.
Since the Soviet Pacific Fleet possesses two Minsk type aircraft carriers (the Ivan Rogov landing ship and medium type landing ships), they have enough capacity to send troops to Hokkaido. The Soviet military buildup is rapidly destroying the theory that they constitute no threat to Japan. At present, the Soviet Union is deploying 51 army divisions, 144 SS-20 missiles, a 1.6 million tonnage Pacific fleet (the U.S. Seventh Fleet is only 0.65 million tonnage) and 2,400 combat aircraft in the Far East. Probably over half of them are primarily targeted against China. There are two major command headquarters at Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, and two divisions on Shakhain and several divisions on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Also, KGB maintains 75,000 heavily armed forces on the Japanese northern islands Etorofu, Kunashiri, Habomai and Shikotan.13

Also, the Soviets have enjoyed using Japanese spies within Japan to collect military information regarding the deployment of the U.S. troops and the fighting capabilities of Japan's Self Defense Forces. At the beginning of 1980, it was revealed that a retired general of the Ground Self Defense Force had been a Soviet spy, giving information to the Soviet military attache, Colonel Kuri Kozlov in Tokyo. The Japanese government was surprised at the fact that the Soviets had already penetrated the Self Defense Forces and conducted intelligence actions.14

According to Japan's Foreign Ministry, there are four possible reasons for the deployment of 10,000 soldiers on the Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands. First, it is a part of the Soviet global military strategy. Since Soviet submarines, Delta-III class and Victor-III class have enough range to attack most areas of the U.S. from the Sea of
Okhotsk, Soviet military planners intended to protect the Sea of Okhotsk by construction of a series of defense bases along the Kurile Islands. In case of a Soviet-U.S. war, the U.S. Seventh Fleet would attempt to break into the Sea of Okhotsk to destroy Soviet nuclear subs. In addition, Moscow intended to counter a Washington-Tokyo-Beijing triangle and expected a Japanese demand for reversion of the northern islands. Finally, Moscow decided to put psychological pressure on the Japanese. In February, 1979, Japan's Upper and Lower Diet Houses passed a resolution to protest the Soviet military buildup on the northern islands.

Politically, Japanese defense analysts believe that continued Soviet military buildup in the Far East and a Soviet penetration of Southeast Asia may accelerate neutralization of Japan, and eventually, the growing Soviet sphere of influence may draw Japan into the Soviet Bloc.

Militarily, massive Soviet military presence in the Far East poses three major threats to Japan. Those threats consist of threats of SS-20 missiles over Japan, submarine threats to the Japanese sea lanes, and conventional military threats to Hokkaido.

First, at the end of 1977, the Soviet Far East Rocket Force began to deploy SS-20 medium range missiles in the Siberian military district, and it is evident that some of them are primarily pointed at Japan. Each SS-20 has three nuclear warheads, each of which has a 150-kiloton warhead approximately 11-12 times as powerful as the Hiroshima type atomic bomb. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko told the western press that if the U.S. and U.S.S.R. reached a diplomatic agreement as to the deployment of SS-20s and Pershing missiles in Europe, some SS-20s
would be transferred to Siberia, out of range of Europe. Theoretically, it would be much easier for the Soviets to use SS-20s against Japan than for the Soviets to use their strategic nuclear missiles against the U.S. because the Soviets do not have to worry about retaliation from Japan. In the case of a U.S.-Soviet war, Moscow may use SS-20s in Siberia to persuade the Japanese that Japan's cooperation with the U.S. will be dangerous to Japan's national security. So far the U.S. government has informed Tokyo that it plans to deploy sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles in the Far East by 1984. But these missiles can only reach to the front line bases in Siberia, and they lack enough range to attack inland.

In January, 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone met with President Reagan in Washington, and asked for U.S. guarantees that they would deal with the problem of SS-20s globally. In addition, Nakasone asked the U.S. to prevent additional deployment of SS-20s to Siberia because of Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) talks at Geneva. However, Washington has failed to persuade Moscow to stop additional deployment of SS-20s in Siberia. At present, the Soviets can make bombs 4,000 times as powerful as those used in Hiroshima. Moscow has informed Tokyo that these missiles are needed to counter U.S. nuclear weapons in Asia and the Pacific.  

Also, submarines of the Soviet Pacific Fleet possess a capacity to cut off and destroy Japan's sea lanes. The Japanese and U.S. governments have agreed that "sea lines of communication" means the waters for several hundred nautical miles around Japan's mainland and for 1,000 nautical miles toward the southeast and the southwest sea lanes. Thanks
to the combined strength of the Maritime Self Defense Force and the U.S. Seventh Fleet, the stability of the sea lanes around Japan has been maintained without becoming a serious security problem. However, the tranquility of waters around Japan is in danger with the rapid growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and the decline of the U.S. naval presence in the region. It is a well known fact that when there is a crisis in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. Seventh Fleet would be dispatched there from the Western Pacific. The size of Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force is not large enough to cope with maritime operations of the Soviet Pacific Fleet without the assistance of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. As a result, some defense analysts say the window of vulnerability created by the swing strategy of the U.S. Seventh Fleet will be filled by the massive amount of Soviet naval vessels.

International trade is an important internal part of Japan's economy. An interruption of the flow of Japan's sea lanes constitutes the most serious threat to Japan's economy. Today Japan imports 99 percent of its total material requirements from abroad. At present, Japan's naval policy is faced with two problems. First, since the MSDF has been equipped with small scale defensive weapons under Japan's postwar unique political limitations, the Japanese navy seriously lacks offensive capability. Second, there is a widespread assumption that it is almost impossible for the MSDF to defend Japan's sea lanes in wartime. This estimation is based on an assumption that large numbers of Soviet submarines can cut off Japan's sea lanes easily. Also current access to Cam Rahn Bay in Vietnam should give the Soviet Pacific fleet greater flexibility in its strategic planning. During the Pacific war, 50
American submarines succeeded in cutting the Japanese sea lanes and put the Japanese in danger of starvation.\textsuperscript{18}

The Soviet Union has the potential capability to block Japan's sea lanes. China lacks such a capacity. There are two possible scenarios which can be applied to the defense of Japan's sea lanes. The first case is the extreme scenario—a major confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. With the outbreak of an East-West major confrontation, the Soviet Pacific fleet would engage in operations which are to prevent redeploying of the U.S. Seventh Fleet from the Pacific to the Atlantic. The burden of defending Japan's sea lanes in the Pacific might be a major obstacle for global U.S. strategy. Also, when Japan lacks the U.S. military support (for example, because of a widening gap from trade friction), the Soviet navy could easily threaten Japan's shipping.

Japan has one geographical advantage with which to handle operations of the Soviet Pacific Fleet; she can block the Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya Straits, which are the only entrances to the Pacific from the Sea of Japan for Soviet warships. Only Petropavlosk in Kamchatka faces the Pacific, but logistics problems would complicate Soviet maritime operations in the region. In wartime, if Japan blocks those strategic straits, the Soviets will attempt to break through by a combination of SS-20s and their conventional forces. At that time, the Soviets might attempt to seize the northern part of Hokkaido in order to secure freedom of passage in Soya Strait.\textsuperscript{19}

Third, the Soviet military threat to Japan is based upon the pressure of their conventional forces on Hokkaido. Hokkaido is called Japan's first line of defense because it is so close to the Soviet
military forces. It takes only forty minutes to travel from the Japanese northern islands to the east coast of Hokkaido by fishing boat. From the northern part of Hokkaido one can see Sakhalin Island where the Soviets shot down a Korean commercial airline in 1983. In order to defend Hokkaido, the Northern Army Command of the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) with headquarters at Sapporo, gives direct orders to four divisions: 2nd, 5th, 7th, and 11th Divisions in Hokkaido. They are strategically deployed to check any Soviet aggression and designed to prevent the establishment of a foothold in Hokkaido. The 7th Mechanized Infantry Division, in particular, is the most modernized division the GSDF has.

However, the defense of Hokkaido is a very difficult task for the poorly equipped GSDF. According to Hiroomi Kurisu, former Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, superior Soviet ground, air and naval forces could take over the northern part of Japan within a matter of days. It would take five to seven days for reinforcements to get to Hokkaido from the mainland of Japan, and another couple of days to get them in combat. Therefore, 50,000 Northern Army soldiers would have to fight without getting support from the mainland of Japan (at least for ten days). If the Soviets launch an invasion on Hokkaido, it would probably be led by three motorized rifle divisions (MRD) of about 11,000 men each. Since each Soviet division has about 266 tanks, the total would be about 1,000 tanks; 2.5 times as large as the GSDF tanks in Hokkaido. Most combat vehicles and personnel would be carried by two Minsk type aircraft carriers and the Ivan Rogov landing ship. Only surprise attack forces would be carried by airborne operations.
Right after World War II, Stalin demanded that the U.S. Occupation Army give the northern half of Hokkaido to Russia as a price for Soviet participation in the anti-Japanese war. Increased Soviet military presence in the Far East might influence the course of future political tendencies in East Asia. Already in Hokkaido the neutralization of Japan seems to proceed quietly without drawing attention. It is said that the Japanese Communist Party has drastically succeeded in expanding the number of sales for the weekly magazine "Red Flag."
IV. JAPAN-U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION

Japanese Awareness of Defense

This chapter starts with the introduction of a shocking current Japanese novel called "The Third World War" by a military research group. Credible American defense commitment is indeed vital to Japanese security. But, given the widely prevailing Japanese belief that the reliability of the Alliance has declined due to the decline of U.S. influence, this novel shows their anxiety regarding security.

October 2, 198? Tokyo
China and the Soviet Union have been at war for four months. The United States and its NATO allies remain neutral rather than risk a Soviet strike against Western Europe or a move by Moscow to block oil shipments from the Middle East where its hand has been strengthened by pro-Soviet regimes in Iraq, Afghanistan and (now) in Iran. The Pentagon has shifted the U.S. Seventh Fleet out of the Far East into the Indian Ocean, leaving Japan unprotected where an outburst of anti-Soviet, pro-Chinese sentiment leads to a break in diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Moscow.

Then--almost without warning--Japan's nationwide constellation of military air defense installations are destroyed in a matter of hours in a rain of hundreds of Soviet SS-12 tactical missiles. Scores of Soviet fighter-bombers come screaming in under the country's obsolete radar net to finish the job. Japan's equally antiquated Nike, Hercules and Hawk ground to air missiles are useless to thwart the attack and go unfired. Thousands of mushroom-like canopies billow out over the Kanto plain as two divisions of Soviet paratroopers group of the coup-de-grace: the occupation of Tokyo.

More anxious to contain the Soviets by preventing hostilities from spilling over into Europe or the Gulf than in coming to the rescue of a troublesome economic rival, Washington shrinks from its commitment to defend Japan under its mutual security treaty with Tokyo. Demoralized by this ultimate American shokku, badly outnumbered and poorly-equipped, Japanese soldiers throw down their arms without a fight.

During the latter half of the 1970s, the Japanese began to feel some anxieties about their security with the rapid growth of Soviet Far Eastern military power and instability in international situations.
Throughout the 1970s, changes in Japan's strategic environment have had a significant influence on Japanese attitudes about their security. In 1972, President Nixon suddenly visited China without warning Tokyo. The Japanese were shocked at the fact that Japan could no longer take U.S. support for granted. In 1973, Japan experienced an oil crisis and realized the strategic vulnerability of the Japanese economy. In 1975, the U.S. evacuated its forces from Vietnam, an action which was perceived by the Japanese as the decline of U.S. influence. After the fall of Vietnam, the Carter Administration informed Tokyo of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, and it raised a question about the reliability of the U.S. defense commitment. The Iranian Revolution of 1978 and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan produced a situation in which there were no naval vessels of the U.S. Seventh Fleet around Japan. The Seventh Fleet was sent to the Indian Ocean, leaving a window of vulnerability in the Western Pacific. These events contributed to a Japanese awakening regarding their security issues.²

In particular, a change in the U.S. defense strategy had great influence on Japanese considerations of their defense. Before 1969, the U.S. had pursued a "2 1/2 strategy" of maintaining military preparedness for coping with crisis in the two major regions of Europe and Asia, and with small scale crises in other regions. But his defense strategy was drastically changed by the Nixon Doctrine of 1969. With the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine, the U.S. began to pursue the so called "1 1/2 strategy" of maintaining military preparedness against a large scale war in Europe and a small scale crisis in other regions such as the Middle East. The U.S. decided to reduce its military
presence in Asia to a minimum level. The Nixon Doctrine insisted that both internal and external aggression, except nuclear threats, be dealt with by the Asians themselves.\(^3\) The Japanese could no longer take American protection for granted, and the age of free defense was brought to the end. The Japanese realized that Japan can never substitute for American military ability against the U.S.S.R. But, the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, the Iranian Revolution, and the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan symbolized the decline of U.S. influence on a global scale, so that the Japanese began to doubt the credibility of American defense commitment.

While external changes have influenced Japan, self-confidence among the Japanese due to economic success has grown gradually, and today, young Japanese are prepared to consider their defense more rationally. This economic nationalism has contributed to the growth of Japanese pride in coping with international affairs. The Japanese have become more serious when considering Japan's responsibilities in international communities, including defense of their country. The merits of the security relations with the U.S. came to be appreciated by a majority of Japanese.

Of course, Japanese officials and politicians realized these external and internal changes. In February 1978, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo, for the first time in postwar history, mentioned a defense policy in his speech to the Parliament. In the late 1970s, the Democratic Socialist Party (the fourth largest party) came to support the SDF and the Japanese-U.S. security arrangements. In 1981 the Clean Government Party, the third largest, came to accept the SDF and the Japanese-U.S.
security arrangements. In 1980, Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira established a Study Group on Comprehensive National Security as a primary organ. It was designed to conduct free discussions about national security. Today, over 80 percent of the Japanese accept the existence of the SDF and the Japanese-U.S. security arrangements.

Japan's Research Institute for Peace and Security (led by Masamichi Inoki and a strong group of officials, academics and defense experts), submitted a report on defense to Prime Minister Ohira in July 1980. The report emphasized growing uncertainty in new international situations; "the most fundamental change in the international situation which emerged in the 1970s was the end of American superiority both militarily and economically." Another report from the Inoki's Institute demanded a realistic manner of defense debates in the Diet:

Looking back on the past national security debate in Japan, we have to admit that no national environment has been fostered to take up this question in a realistic manner. The debate has been split into two extremes, one in favour of a military build-up aimed at autonomous defense and the other in favour of complete disarmament based on pacifism. In particular, we strongly call for reflection on the fact that the debate in important political flora, such as the Diet, has never moved beyond formalistic and empty legal contentions on mere ideological assertions and that the explanations of the government all too often have been no more than responses designed to pursue logical consistency with precedents and to deflect political difficulties by patchwork. We earnestly hope that the government will state its positions on security issues with more candour.

In March 1977, Mike Mansfield, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, announced that "the Japanese people's attitude to the security and military problems has undergone a dramatic change in recent years to become more realistic."

A series of external shocks such as U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia, the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine, and the deployment of SS-20...
missiles in Siberia, have affected the Japanese awareness of defense. However, it does not mean that the majority of Japanese accept the expansion of the SDF and further strengthening of the Japanese-U.S. military ties, despite the fact that they accept the legitimacy of the SDF and the Japanese-U.S. security arrangements. In other words, their perceptions have become more realistic, and less idealistic.

At the same time, Japanese awareness of defense is related to the resurgence of power politics in international relations since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Policy makers in many countries realized that power politics began to reassert themselves throughout the 1970s. In dynamic power politics, policy makers tend to equate demonstration of naked military power with a tool of effective diplomacy. Big powers sometimes dare to intervene militarily in small nations. Today, the Japanese elite realizes that it is very difficult for Japan to stay out of international crises. There are two factors contributing to this Japanese feeling. First, since the U.S.-Soviet tensions are heightening at the global level, Japan's economic power and its strategic location have a large influence on their power games in East Asia. Japan can be no longer innocent. Second, since defeat in the Cuban crisis, Moscow has increased its defense budget annually 4 to 5 percent, and today has established an effective war machine as a result of their bloody efforts. Japan can no longer ignore increased Soviet military presence in East Asia.

However, it is unlikely for Japan to be a major military power in East Asia, at least in the near future. Most Japanese have not found a reason yet to accept Japan's militarization. Also, the Japanese have
not come to a national consensus on defense. For instance, the peace-oriented view is argued by the Japan Socialist Party and the Communist Party. They say that a Soviet threat to Japan does not exist, but is created by the propaganda of Japanese-American reactionary groups. They support Article IX of the Japanese Constitution and oppose Japanese-U.S. security arrangements and the existence of the SDF. They also warn that Japan's defense buildup would create a new militarism.

The second view is argued by some Diet members such as Utsunomiya of the Liberal Democratic Party and Yohei Kono of the New Liberal Club. They say that the Soviet Union does not constitute a threat to Japan; the threat is created by the American military industrial complex. They passively accept the legitimacy of the SDF and the Japanese-U.S. security arrangements. They believe that omnidirectional peace diplomacy is the most effective defense for Japan.

The third view is argued by mainly business-related people. They say that the Soviet Union is a potential threat to Japan, and support the legitimacy of the SDF and the Japanese-U.S. security arrangements. They argue that the most serious threat for Japan is its vulnerability in depending upon materials from abroad. They believe Japan's defense program should be done to avoid political crisis in the Japan-U.S. alliance.

The fourth view is argued by some defense analysts, and is seen in the Inoki Research Institute for Peace and Security's reports. The Institute regards Soviet military power as a potential threat and argue that Japan should increase defense capabilities within the context of the present Japanese-U.S. security arrangements and the present constitution.
The fifth view, the most hawkish, is argued by some members of the Liberal Democratic Party and professional defense analysts. They regard Soviet deployment of SS-20s in Siberia, the presence of the Pacific Fleet and the deployment of 10,000 soldiers on the northern islands as a serious threat to Japan. They argue the necessity of a fast defense buildup and, if possible, the revision of the constitution to allow armed forces. They see new military situations in East Asia as an opportunity to develop a more autonomous defense.8

At present, most bureaucrats and political leaders support the third view, and are not interested in a defense buildup. They feel that Japan has already enough defense power to defend itself. According to a Yomiuri-Gallup poll, only 7 percent of the Japanese and 5 percent of the Americans think that a Japanese-Soviet conflict may possibly happen in the near future.9

The average Japanese have their own perception of Soviet military threat. Today, the majority of Japanese regard increased Soviet Far Eastern military presence as a potential danger. But they did not come to support the defense buildup immediately due to the fact that they do not equate Soviet military capabilities with Soviet intentions. On the contrary, the U.S. Defense Department deduces Soviet intentions from their capabilities. American defense experts came to the conclusion that they must equate the enemy's abilities with its intentions from the Korean and Vietnam War experiences. (In military textbooks, an enemy's capability cannot be separated from its intentions.) Since the enemy's intention can be changed quickly in a changing environment, strategic assessment usually is made by his capacity. Most Japanese have never known this principle.
Strategic Assessment of Soviet Military Power in the Far East and the U.S. Defense Expectations of Japan

Throughout the 1970s, the most serious factor for the damaged security situation was the continued Soviet military buildup and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The attempt by the Soviet Union was to translate military presence into political influence over strategically important areas. The Western Pacific is not excluded from Soviet attempts to put military pressure on American interests and allies of the U.S. Therefore, strategic assessment of Soviet Far Eastern military power became important for the Japan-U.S. alliance.

The apparent lack of a Japanese-American defense consensus stems from different strategic assessments of each other's defense policy makers. Politically, throughout the 1970s, U.S.-Soviet relations had rapidly declined with the expansion of Soviet influence in the Third World. Even during détente, thoughtful Americans were concerned over what was widely perceived as Soviet involvement in Angola and Ethiopia. In the final days of 1979, détente was seriously damaged by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Also in Asia, the Soviet Union was faced with the emergence of a Washington-Tokyo-Beijing triangle.

On the other hand, the U.S. military has a tendency to view Soviet military capabilities in order to determine the course of future affairs in East Asia. The U.S. strategists have equated Soviet military capabilities with intentions. In applying the U.S. strategic assessments to current military situations in East Asia, the U.S. emphasizes the emerging imbalance of power in the region. American strategic assessment of East Asia is constituted by the deployment of Soviet ground
troops on the Japanese northern islands, the establishment of a new military headquarters in Sakhalin, and the appearance of a new generation of Soviet weapon systems. Also, some defense analysts say that the Soviet Pacific Fleet will start deploying a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in the latter half of the 1980s. Dan Nang and Cam Rahn Bay in Vietnam offer good bases for the Soviets to monitor Japanese sea lanes in peacetime, and for them to launch possible attacks in wartime. U.S. policy makers assume that Tokyo cannot resist increased Soviet diplomatic-military pressure without Japan's defense buildup. American concern for the acceleration of neutralization of Japan comes from a mixed pressure of continued Soviet military buildup and Soviet penetration of Southeast Asia.

In contrast, Tokyo does not share American strategic assessment of Soviet military deployment of East Asia. Japanese policy makers and the Defense Agency regard Soviet military presence as a potential threat, although not a serious one. The Japanese Defense Agency has confidence that the Soviet Pacific Fleet has a serious weak point in its geostrategic position. Naval vessels stationed at Vladivostok must pass through one of three strategic straits such as Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya Straits to get in the Pacific. But these straits can be blocked or mined easily in wartime. Also, Soviet ground troops in Siberia and Japan are separated by the Sea of Japan. The sea is hard to bridge. Airborne capability of the Soviet Far Eastern forces is lacking. The Soviet Pacific Fleet has only eleven landing ships, and only 4,000 infantrymen can be carried from Siberia to Hokkaido. The Soviet ground attack aircraft such as the SU-17 and SU-19 can
hardly reach Japanese air bases with their combat radius of 340 nautical miles. Even jet fighters such as the MIG-23 and MIG-27 can hardly attack Tokyo with their combat radius of 500 nautical miles. The only exception is the deployment of 144 SS-20 missiles, which can reach all over Japan.¹⁰

In the Japanese view, Soviet military buildup has a defensive character, which tends to discourage Japan from improving its defense capabilities and further strengthening a Washington-Tokyo-Beijing triangle through military intimidation. Japanese defense analysts believe it seems most unlikely that the Soviet Union will start an invasion against Japan as long as the Japan-U.S. alliance functions effectively, and the Japanese defense posture appears effective.

Japan is surrounded by the sea, which is a strategic advantage for Japan's defense. If the Soviets seek to attack Japan, they have to consider serious logistics problems to sustain military operations. Furthermore, the two nations do not share a common land border, and the northern territorial disputes are not serious enough to create a military confrontation. It seems more likely that the Soviet Union will use political influence over Japan with its massive military presence. But if military confrontation broke out between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., Japan would be involved in the confrontation. In that case, American forces in the Far East would be sent to strategically vital points such as the Persian Gulf, and Japan would have to cope with the situation without American assistance.¹¹

The Japanese are not easily influenced by a demonstration of military power. Despite a massive Soviet military presence in East Asia, the Soviet Union has failed to prevent the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese
Peace Treaty and the development of the Japan-U.S. joint defense operations. Rather, Soviet military presence in the region seems to have accelerated the development of a Washington-Tokyo-Beijing triangle and the Japanese-American joint defense efforts. So far, the U.S. concern regarding neutralization of Japan seems to be off the mark. In other words, the Soviet Union has failed to translate its military power into political leverage over Japan. A major question is how much to consider military factors in the context of present international situations.

Throughout the latter half of the 1970s, several former U.S. ambassadors, scholars, congressmen and bureaucrats have criticized Japan's free ride in defense affairs. At the 1981 Shimoda Conference in Oiso, Robert Pranger of the American Enterprise Institute proposed the necessity of a new shock to push Japan toward greater defense efforts. He told Japanese delegates that Japan must make a move toward either becoming a regional military power or toward Finlandization (neutralization). In the U.S., Senator Helms encouraged Japan to develop more defense power by proposing a resolution which required Japan to pay 2 percent of its GNP to the U.S. as security tax. The Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Clement Zablocki, introduced another resolution which called for Japan to spend at least 1 percent of their GNP for defense. Senator William Roth argued that while allies such as Japan were decreasing their defense budget, it would be very difficult for the President to convince Congress to increase defense spending by cutting back on social welfare programs.12

Japan has been a passive partner in its alliance with the U.S. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. had guaranteed Japan's security
and refrained from pushing Japan too hard in defense affairs. American experts on Japan believed that too much pressure would be counterproductive. At present, Washington feels that Japan is getting a free ride on defense. While NATO members are spending 3 percent of their GNP for defense, Japan is spending less than 1 percent. According to the 1983 Pentagon Report on Allied Contributions to the common defense, Japan's current defense efforts are far less than it is capable of contributing. While the U.S. provides 53 percent of the total military budget of the allies, Japan provides less than four percent of the total.13

In August 1975, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger openly criticized the Japanese attitudes toward defense as too passive. In January 1980, the U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown in Tokyo asked Prime Minister Ohira to implement the content of the Japanese defense program, "Medium-Term Defense Buildup Plan (1980-84)" a year earlier than the schedule. Under the Reagan Administration, Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger visited Tokyo and asked for a coalition strategy and a buildup of allies' defense power to recover a balance of power vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R.14

Particularly, under the Reagan Administration, Washington's defense expectations of Japan are clearer. Washington, smartly enough, has stressed the roles and missions of the Japanese Self Defense Forces rather than defense spending. In peacetime, the role of the Japanese navy is mainly surveillance or interdiction over sea lines of communication (SLOC) defense. In wartime, Japan is expected to control SLOC limits of 1,000 nautical miles, measured from Tokyo and Osaka at
necessary moments. To fulfill this mission, the Japan Defense Agency decided to purchase 155 F-15 fighters and 72 P-3C maritime aircrafts.\textsuperscript{15}

Former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Robert Ingersoll, once said that Japan was expected to serve as a Far Eastern bulwark for the United States. His statement implied that Washington expected Japan to have blockade capabilities and to intercept Soviet Backfire bombers. In an interview with the \textit{Washington Post} during his visit to Washington in 1981, Prime Minister Nakasone said Japan's position should be like that of a big aircraft carrier protecting against Backfire bombers. In addition, he said Japan should have the ability to control three straits. Much of his statement reflected the U.S. expectation of Japan at this time.\textsuperscript{16}

There are two major positions constituting the U.S. defense expectations. First, throughout the 1970s, U.S. protection of Western interests has declined with the decline of the U.S. economic power. International conflicts have stretched U.S. resources to their limits in a circumstance where Soviet military power has dramatically increased. Despite Reagan's military buildup, the U.S. can no longer afford a strategy of "2 1/2 wars". Second, the U.S. feels strong dissatisfaction concerning trade with Japan. While the Japanese are making great profits in the U.S. market, Americans are suffering from the highest unemployment rate since 1933. Furthermore, the U.S. trade deficit with Japan has reached $20 billion a year. While the U.S. is spending 7 percent of GNP for defense, Japan is spending less than 1 percent of GNP for defense. This situation produced an American linkage strategy of trade and defense toward Japan.\textsuperscript{17} The former Assistant Secretary of
State Richard C. Holbrooke described the U.S. defense expectation of Japan as follows:

With a defense budget which has increased at almost 7 percent annually in real terms over the last decade and which now exceeds 10,000 million dollars:...that country (Japan) now has the seventh or eight largest defense budget in the world. But on a per capita basis the burden (82 dollars) is about one-seventh of what Americans pay (550 dollars); and over half the American public wants Japan to increase its defense efforts. There is no question that the quality of the so-called 'defense debate' in Japan has changed markedly in the last three years, even in the past 12 months...I think over time the combination of increased military spending and other contributions to our common security such as economic assistance will ease the concerns of most Americans about 'free ride'.

Current Japanese Self Defense Force

Nearly three decades after her defeat, Japan still continues to perceive herself as a peaceful non-military state. Japan's foreign and defense programs are still based upon principles of modesty, avoidance of conflicts, and close ties with the U.S. Japan and the U.S. have large common interests in their relations including defense affairs. With the growth of Japan's new attitudes toward defense, Japanese-U.S. defense cooperation may be even more possible.

There are two tendencies in Japan's current defense policy. First is the movement to speed up the implementation of defense programs. Second is the movement to study further cooperation between American and Japanese forces in emergency situations. Today the quality of the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) is a major subject in alliance politics. The Japanese SDF is designed to defend Japan within the framework of the Japanese-American defense cooperation and the peace constitution. Since the announcement of the Basic Policy for National Defense in

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May 1957, the primary purpose of the SDF has been to prevent direct and indirect aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. The SDF has been strengthened through four defense programs from 1958 to 1976 under the spirit of the Basic Policy for National Defense. The First Defense Buildup Plan (1958-1960) was made up for the rapid evacuation of U.S. troops, and it constituted the framework of the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) and the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF). The Second Defense Buildup Plan (1962-1966) was carried out for the purpose of coping with small scale aggression. Both the Third and the Fourth Plan could not achieve its goals under the inflation of the 1973 oil crisis.

In 1977 the Defense Agency announced a new defense framework, the "Standard Defense Forces Concept," which aimed more towards the qualitative improvement of the SDF than to quantitative expansion. The difficulty for increasing the defense budget under a period of low economic growth and the difficulty of recruiting enough youths for defense expansion had a decisive influence on the creation of this concept. Also, this concept was based upon five assumptions in international military situations: first, that Japan-U.S. security arrangements would be maintained; second, that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. would avoid large scale armed conflicts; third, that the Sino-Soviet conflicts would continue in East Asia; fourth, that the U.S. and China would continue to improve their relations; and fifth, that North and South Korea would avoid an armed conflict.

Under the influence of this framework, Tokyo decided to maintain the present level of the SDF. In November, 1976, the Defense Agency
announced the "National Defense Program Outline" under the concept of the Standard Defense Forces. It emphasized the maintenance of various functions for defense in peacetime, the establishment of a balance between the front equipment (tanks, destroyers and so on) and logistics, and surveillance capability. In the field of nuclear weapons, Tokyo will continuously rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent in the Pacific. The possession of long- or medium-range ballistic missiles, aircraft carriers, strategic bombers, and the dispatch of the SDF to a foreign territory have been regarded as exceeding constitutional limitations.19 Also, Japan has imposed these three non-nuclear principles: not to possess, not to make, and not to allow the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. This is the basis of her defense policy.

In July 1979 the Defense Agency planned the "Mid-term Service Estimate" as a guideline of weapon procurement during the five years from 1980 to 1984. The plan aimed at qualitative improvement of the SDF. According to the Estimate, the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) will procure 301 Type 74 tanks equipping 105-mm guns, 180 pieces of self-propelled artillery, 110 Type 73 APCs, and 111 helicopters. The GSDF's personnel ceiling is kept at 180,000, and the ratio of fulfillment will be raised from 86 to 89 percent by 1984. The 7th Division in Hokkaido will be mechanized.20

The Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) will procure sixteen ships, two guided missile destroyers, 10 general purpose destroyers, four escort destroyers, five new submarines (2,200 ton, mounted with Harpoon missiles), 37 P3-C anti-submarine patrol aircraft, and 51 HSS-2B helicopters. Six old destroyers will be equipped with sea Sparrow surface to air missiles and Harpoon surface to surface missiles.21
The Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) will procure 77 F-15 fighters and 4E-2C early warning aircrafts. The Automatic Air Defense Control System (BADGE) which was built in the Korean War by the U.S. Air Force, will be replaced with a new air defense control. The present BADGE could not cope with the penetration of a MIG-25 in 1977.22

This was a plan Washington asked Tokyo to accomplish the year ahead of its original schedule by 1983. So far the Defense Agency has failed to accomplish even the original schedule because of worsening financial situations and the one percent defense budget barrier.

In 1981, Japan spent $10.45 billion for defense, constituting 4.8 percent of government spending and 0.9 percent of GNP. The SDF has 245,000 troops which consist of 155,000 troop army, 45,000 troop navy and 45,00 troop air force. The GSDF has one armored division and twelve infantry division, one airborne brigade, one artillery brigade, two composite brigades, two air defense brigades, one signals brigade, five engineer brigades, and eight SAM groups. The GSDF is equipped with 550 tanks, 530 APCs, 230 anti-tank guided weapons, 1600 recoilless launchers, 780 howitzers of 105 mm, 1300 mortars, 27 aircraft and 372 helicopters. The MSDF possesses 33 destroyers, 16 frigates, 14 submarines, 31 coastal minesweepers and 29 other assist ships. The naval air fleet consists of 62 P-2Js, 28 S-2F-1, few P-3Cs, 14 PS-1s and 54 Hss-2B helicopters. It possesses no jet fighters and bombers. The ASDF possesses 314 aircraft, and is equipped with 130 F-4s, 90 F-104s, 10 F-15s, 30-CIs, 10 YS-11s, and 180 Nike SAMs. It possesses no bombers.23

However, the SDF has a number of shortcomings and deficiencies. Particularly in manpower, logistics, equipment, command structure and
its legal status, the SDF lacks proper structural abilities to conduct modern warfare. Today, about 50 percent of Japanese defense spending is spent for personnel costs and only 20 percent is spent for the acquisition of equipment. As for the GSDF, nearly 75 percent of its expenditures is spent for the acquisition of equipment. As a result, over 70 percent of the GSDF's tanks, artillery, and anti-tank weapons are out of date. Each infantry soldier has only 16 bullets in storage, which might force them to fight hand to hand in the event of depletion of bullets.

The MSDF lacks air defense capability and their operations will be limited within 200 miles measured from their homeland. It is widely believed by some defense experts that most vessels will be wiped out in the early stage of hostilities with the Soviet Union. The ASDF lacks ground attack capability, and no capability to support sea operations. The absence of hardened shelters for aircraft and early warning capabilities will crush the ASDF at the beginning of hostilities with the Soviet Union. Japanese military installations lack effective security ability. An enemy would only have to destroy a few radio stations to humiliate all military communications. Aircraft of the ASDF are drawn up in orderly lines on the air bases. In wartime an enemy could destroy all of them. According to Osamu Kaihara, the former Secretary General of the National Defense Council, in case of a Soviet all out attack on Japan, the ASDF would be destroyed within 10 minutes, the MSDF within a couple of days, and the GSDF within three or four days.24

There are a number of problems in the field of manpower. Since its establishment, the SDF has had a serious recruiting problem. For
instance, the GSDF has remained at 85.2 percent of the authorized recruiting rate and 85.2 percent means that each division of the GSDF lacks 30 percent of its necessary manpower. Moreover, the SDF lacks an effective recruiting or reserve system to replace casualties in wartime. For example, West Germany's armed forces have more than a million reserves. At present, the SDF have 40,000 reserves for the GSDF, 600 for the MSDF and none for the ASDF. It is evident that the SDF has been discriminated against, socially and politically. Also, the SDF has been constantly faced with shortage of ammunition, reserve fuel and training facilities since 1958. In the 1950s, the SDF's ammunition stock of 140,000 tons has fallen to 70,000 tons in 1980. Each interceptor of the ASDF is supplied with only four air-to-air missiles.25

A most important deficiency is that the SDF lacks a proper strategy for integrated operations among the three forces. The missions of the ASDF are intended to defend Japan's air space and do not include support of the MSDF. The MSDF lacks a strategy to maintain cooperation with the GSDF. The Chairman of the Joint Staff Council lacks the authority to command three forces in the manner of joint operations. It is a widespread rumor that in the event of emergency, the MSDF will act with the U.S. Seventh Fleet, and the ASDF will act with the U.S. Fifth Air Force while the GSDF acts independently.26

Under the postwar anti-military climate, the lack of a national consensus on defense has seriously weakened the morale of the SDF. The personnel of the SDF often feel that the SDF is nothing more than a "Paper Tiger." On July 25, 1978, the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, General Kuris was dismissed from his post. He pointed out that
the SDF lacks the legal basis to act in event of emergency. He said, "I have no choice but to train my men to engage in supra-legal action if they are to repel a surprise attack effectively...Local commands will have no choice but to act on their own." Under the present Self Defense Law, only the Prime Minister has the right to order a defense mobilization with approval of his cabinet and the Diet. Without the premier's order, the SDF can neither fight nor evacuate in an emergency. If the Diet does not approve a defense mobilization, the Prime Minister cannot issue a mobilization order. In a case of surprise attack, the SDF will be wiped out if they wait until they receive the premier's go ahead. This is the reason General Kuris said the SDF would engage in supra-legal action in a case of surprise attack. In the Diet's discussion, Deputy-Chief Murayama said that personnel of the SDF had no choice but to run. The SDF needs new legislation to act effectively in wartime, but it is assumed that such an attempt would face political opposition from left wing and peace movements.

At present, the SDF lacks such capabilities, but technically those capabilities can be acquired without changing the constitution. According to Masataka Kosaka, professor of International Relations at Kyoto University, Japan needs to implement some defense policies and the goal achievement would be 1.0-1.5 percent of GNP.

First, the SDF needs to have an effective surveillance system to monitor the overall movements of military forces, especially, the moves of Soviet aircraft and passages of Soviet warships through neighboring straits.
Second, Japan needs improvement of air defense of the homeland and establishment of wide-area air defense capabilities to neutralize the movements of Backfire bombers, which are a menace to the Seventh Fleet.

Third, Japan needs strengthening of the C3 system—the command, control, and communication system.

Fourth, Japan needs buildup of capabilities to prevent the landing of military forces, primarily through the deployment of a variety of guided missiles.\(^{28}\)

In addition, the SDF needs some kind of reserve system in order to fight continuously. In wartime, the SDF needs to get support from the rest of the population, otherwise the fighting capability of the SDF will quickly deteriorate. The SDF needs to acquire capabilities to resist aggression at least for several months until the U.S. forces come to help Japan. In case of an American-Soviet military confrontation, it is unlikely that the U.S. forces would come to help Japan during the first couple of weeks. In case of all-out attack on Japan, it is possible the SDF will be destroyed before the U.S. forces could arrive.

**Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation**

Joint exercises between the SDF and the U.S. forces just started at the latter half of the 1970s. This has been mainly due to pacifism and the political tensions in Japan. At present, defense cooperation is becoming firm, parallel to the qualitative improvement of the SDF.

In August 1975, the Japanese Defense Agency Director-General Sakata and U.S. Defense Secretary Schlesigner agreed to talk about defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S. In July 1975, the
Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation was established under the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee. The subcommittee is composed of soldiers from Japan's Joint Staff Office and U.S. Forces Command in Japan, and talks about joint operations, intelligence, and logistic support. In October 1978, the subcommittee submitted the "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation." The Guidelines deal with four defense operations: (1) penetration of aggression, (2), impending danger of military attack, (3) subjection to armed attack, (4) cooperation in coping with crisis in the Far East. As for the "prevention of aggression," they agreed to study joint Japan-U.S. military operations, joint military training, exchange of defense information, adjustment of Japanese-American communication systems, and mutual support of logistics. As for the second issue, when there is a danger of armed attack on Japan, the SDF and the U.S. forces would engage in preparations for joint operations.

In Japanese-American defense cooperation, the most important issue is the problem of joint operation. In January 1979, the Joint Staff Office of the SDF and the U.S. forces in Japan had conducted studies about joint operations in cases of Soviet invasion of Japan. In one scenario, they studied how the Ground, Maritime and Air Defense Forces prevent a Soviet landing on Hokkaido, and how the 1st Marine Air Wing (stationed at Iwakuni), the 5th Air Force (Yokota), the 7th Fleet (Yokosuka), and the 3rd Marine Division (Okinawa) would engage in the counter attack against a Soviet invasion.

In August 1977, the Defense Agency started its "Defense Study" in the event of an emergency. It was to be a basis for Japan-U.S.
military operations. The Defense Study consists of three components: the SDF's defense strategy, Japan-U.S. joint operations, and studies on legislation for emergency situations. Joint Staff Office experts conducted the study, and they primarily focused on air defense, coastal defense, the blockade of straits and the prevention of enemy force landings under the situation of a limited small scale invasion against Hokkaido. Results of this study were used in the 1979 Japan-U.S. joint defense study as basic defense data.

Also, throughout the 1970s, the Japanese and U.S. forces have made great progress in joint training. The MSDF and the 7th Fleet have been conducting joint anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercises at least a couple of times a year. In February 1980, the MSDF for the first time in Japan's postwar history, took part in the "Rimpac 80", joint training was conducted by the U.S., Canada, and Australia. In the field of air defense, the ASDF's F-104 and F-4 fighters, and the U.S. F-15 fighters have been conducting dogfight drills. At present, the GSDF is studying joint training with the 3rd Marine Division stationed in Okinawa. These joint exercises promote close operational cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. forces in Japan.

Particularly, since the SDF lacks offensive capability, the assistance of the U.S. forces has a significant meaning for Japan's defense strategy. Basically, the GSDF is designed to fight within Japan's territory. The MSDF is designed to conduct ASWs and it lacks offensive capability such as surface to surface and surface to air. The ASDF consists of interceptors, but it lacks the offensive capability to bomb without the U.S. Fifth Air Force. In the joint defense operations, the
SDF is to play a defensive role, but to rely on American offensive capabilities.

The forward deployment of the U.S. forces in the Far East is composed of the 7th Fleet and tactical air forces. The 5th Air Force maintains three fighter squadrons in Okinawa to support the forward defense of South Korea. The 7th Fleet consists of two aircraft carriers, some destroyers and ten subs. In addition to such forces, the U.S. Strategic Air Command has maintained one squadron of B52s in the Pacific as part of nuclear deterrence. In wartime, Japan does expect that the U.S. forces are to offer offensive capabilities, and without the U.S. assistance, the fighting capability of the SDF would deteriorate rapidly due to lack of sustainability.

At present, the Soviet Far Eastern forces constitute three major military threats to Japan. In order to counter these threats, Japan needs an American presence in the Western Pacific.

First, the most serious threat the Soviet Far Eastern military power is presenting is SS-20 medium range missiles in Siberia. Since the Japanese government has adopted three non-nuclear policies to its defense posture, this threat can only be met with American nuclear deterrence. According to Yatsuhiro Nakagawa, an assistant professor in Political Science at the Tsukuba National University, if Japan were armed with 60 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, having the same capacity as the Soviet SS-20s, Japan still would lack the strength to deter a Soviet attack in a Japan-Soviet nuclear war. The total population of the Soviet Far East is only 2.3 million, while Japan has 388 cities with a population of 50,000 or more. If the casualty rate were 50
percent, Japan would lose 40 million people while the Soviet Far East would lose just over a million. Also, while Japan could inflict little damage to industrial facilities in Siberia, the Soviet Union could destroy 50 percent of Japan's industrial facilities.\textsuperscript{30}

Professor Nakagawa says, if Japan had a strategic nuclear force to strike major Soviet cities including Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev, it would be a more attractive option. At that time, Japan would choose a strategic nuclear force centered on submarine launched ballistic missiles because of lack of area and landing ICBMs. The estimated development cost for Japan to have a realistic strategic nuclear force might be 2 trillion yen a year. Economically, this option is less attractive. The creation of Japan's independent nuclear force against the Soviet Union is more or less unreasonable politically, economically, and militarily. In order to get a trustworthy American nuclear umbrella for Japan, Professor Nakagawa recommends that the Japanese government should modify the three non-nuclear principles. The introduction of U.S. forces equipped with nuclear weapons to Japan might be less provocative to domestic politics and more effective against SS-20s in Siberia.\textsuperscript{31} However, the Japanese left wing insists that this is the time that Japan should terminate its security ties with the U.S. Their logic is based on an assumption that Soviet deployment of SS-20s in Siberia is a defensive measure against American nuclear weapons in the Pacific.

The primary reason for Japan's non-possession of nuclear weapons stems from the internal and external situations. If Japan attempts to acquire nuclear weapons, it will meet strong opposition from both
internal and external sources. Internally, it will create a political crisis, and externally, it will be met with opposition from Washington, Moscow and Asian neighbors. Under these circumstances, Japan seems to have no alternative but to depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

Second, Japan is faced with a threat represented by the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Japan imports 80 percent of its petroleum consumption from the Persian Gulf, 45 percent of its iron ore from Australia and 30 percent of its coal needs from the U.S. If the Soviet Union started an attack against Japanese sea lanes, the Japanese economy would suffer serious damages, and maybe collapse. In order to secure sea lanes, Japan needs to complete four defense measures: first, the Japanese government needs to find the safest shipping lanes to avoid Soviet submarines; second, Japan needs to have the ability of control choke points to prevent the deployment of Soviet submarines; third, the MSDF needs to improve the quality of ASW equipments; and fourth, Japan needs to undertake diplomatic efforts to ensure the assistance of the U.S. 7th Fleet in the event of an emergency.  

Third, Japan needs to ensure the security of Hokkaido. It has been said that the U.S. and the Soviet Union regard Hokkaido as a buffer zone between them. There is a high possibility that the U.S. will lose a war with the Soviet Union in Hokkaido due to its geographical closeness to the U.S.S.R. In September 1982, Washington announced that two squadrons of F-16 fighters would be stationed at the northern part of Japan (Misawa) to check the penetration of Backfire bombers. Some defense analysts in the government say Japan should ask Washington for the dispatch of the U.S. ground troops to Hokkaido as a symbol of defense commitment.

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A series of ground, air, and naval joint exercises will promise successful defense cooperation. Also the U.S. can influence the scope of Japan's defense buildup. In September 1983, when a Korean airline was shot down near the Sakhalin Island, the SDF had gathered military communications between the headquarters in Siberia and Soviet interceptors. Later, the U.S. demand for a Soviet apology was based on the information from the SDF intelligence activities.
Under U.S. protection, Japan has never seriously forced itself to study defense issues such as strategy and budget. Since the conclusion of the 1951 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan has achieved its security goals through its dependence on the U.S. Today, most Japanese realize that Japan's security has been maintained under the military protection of the U.S. At the same time, this fact has created an ambivalence in Japan's attitudes to defense. The Japanese believe that Japan has existed under the dominant influence of the U.S. due to her dependence on U.S. protection. It touches their pride. Also, there is widespread suspicion that the U.S. defense expectations of Japan serves American global strategy more than it serves Japan's security. Too much American pressure will lead to the opposite public reaction. The Japanese people are reluctant to see Japan accepting defense expansion under U.S. pressure.

The most essential goal of Japanese defense policy is to create a national consensus on the role of the SDF. Just ten years ago, with the influence of the Peace Constitution, the Japanese said Japan does not need any defense power. At present, the majority of Japanese support the legitimacy of the Japan-U.S. alliance and the SDF, but still resist Japan's defense buildup and the expansion of the SDF's role. Very slow progress in improving Japan's defense capabilities will continue to frustrate Washington. It is easily predicted that Americans will increase criticism of Japan's free defense ride, and it will strain relations between Tokyo and Washington.

In the near future, the constitution and pacifism must remain as the framework for the Japan-U.S. alliance. As a result, the SDF will
continue to rely on the presence of U.S. forces in the Western Pacific. For example, the protection of Japan's sea lanes will be left to the U.S. 7th Fleet. The current level of Tokyo's weapon procurement will never be able to fulfill this mission. In the 1980's, Japan's defense capability will remain a small non-nuclear force, intended to cope with a limited and small-scale invasion.

However, if Japan faces a grave threat from outside, history tells us that the Japanese will quickly adapt to changing situations and create a united front against aggression. If such a threat occurs, Tokyo will change its defense policy drastically. (Economically, it is said that Japan has the potential to create conventional military capabilities equal to the combined forces of France and Britain within a couple of years.) Without such a threat, a rapid defense buildup is unlikely to take place, despite American expectations and increased Soviet military presence.

Japan has an interest in maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union. Despite northern territorial issues and Soviet military pressure, Japan has economic interests in the development of the Soviet Far East. Also, most Japanese wish to avoid a direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union. Tokyo officially defines the Soviet military presence as a potential danger, but still hesitates to define it as a threat. Japanese officials are not persuaded of the wisdom of a rigid approach to the Soviet Union. Of course, they realize that the completion of the second Siberian railway will help the logistical supply of Soviet forces in the Far East and that the SS-20 will increase the threat to Japan. Today, Japanese officials believe that the Soviet goal is neutralization of Japan.
In order to meet Soviet challenges, Japan's security policy has three aims: (1) The strengthening of a Beijing-Tokyo-Washington triangle. (If the Soviets continue to increase military pressure on Japan, it will force Japan into a direction of a Beijing-Tokyo-Washington alliance. Already there has been an exchange of strategic information between Tokyo and Beijing.) (2) The qualitative improvement of the SDF based on the "National Defense Program Outline." (The expansion of the SDF and its role is unlikely to take place despite the fact that military balance is more favorable to the Soviet Union. Pacifism in Japan is still strong.) (3) The strengthening of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation based on the "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation." The creation of a totally independent defense power is unthinkable in the 1980s. The defense cooperation would promote the modernization of the SDF to make joint operations effectively, so that imbalance between operational troops of the SDF and logistic support will be diminished. By the end of the 1980s, Japan's defense power will be more responsive and modernized despite its small size.

Japanese defense forces will progress very slowly, but this is better than no progress at all. Even Prime Minister Nakasone is unlikely to bring any change in defense policy in spite of his public image of being defense minded. If Japan should make a turn toward a rapid defense buildup, its intentions might be misinterpreted by neighboring countries. Furthermore, it might create a serious domestic crisis between the right and the left. The growing interest in defense policy among the Japanese is not serious because they do not feel Japan is
exposed to a direct threat. Changes in their attitudes toward defense come from a result of a change in the strategic environment.

Despite the existence of mutual understanding between Tokyo and Washington, a political crisis in the alliance could occur from Japan's lack of defense efforts. It is natural that Japanese security policy is inevitably different from American security policy and those of NATO. The difference is attributable to historical, geopolitical, and cultural backgrounds. For example, Japan, unlike the U.S., does not regard the Soviet Union as a primary enemy due to Japan's geographical closeness and military deficiency. The crisis is that such differences might come to be overemphasized either by Japan or by the U.S. The year 1990, the 30th anniversary of the present Security Treaty, might be a turning point of the Japan-U.S. alliance. There are three scenarios which can possibly be drawn at that time. First, in the absence of Japan's defense buildup, the alliance might become a weaker political association like Sino-U.S. relations. (This is unlikely to happen because as Japan needs the U.S., the U.S. needs Japan as an ally to secure its national interests in the Far East.) Second, with Japan's defense buildup, the alliance might develop a character like NATO. (This is also unlikely to happen because Japan and the U.S. do not share common ethnical and historical backgrounds as do the U.S. and Europe.) Third, with Japan's small defense buildup, the alliance might continue to have the same character but be less unilateral. It is highly possible that the reality might proceed on the third scenario.
FOOTNOTES

Chapter II


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14 Ibid., p. 385.


17 Langdon, op.cit., p. 37.
Chapter III


3 Ibid., pp. 710-713.

4 Ibid.


Chapter IV

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24 Sakanaka, Asian Survey 120, op. cit., p. 768.
26 Satoh, op. cit., p. 19
28 Sato, _op. cit._, p. 5.

29 Sakanaka, _Japan Quarterly_ 18, _op. cit._, p. 467.


31 _Ibid._


33 Jenkins, _op. cit._, pp. 28-30.


