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All That Jazz: Federal Cultural Exchanges and Jazz Diplomacy, 1956-1964

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ALL THAT JAZZ: FEDERAL CULTURAL EXCHANGES AND JAZZ DIPLOMACY,
1956-1964

By

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Contents

Introduction 1

Chapter 1 Public Diplomacy, Media Portrayals, and Jazz 13

Chapter 2 Jazz as Official Diplomacy: Funding and Regional Targeting 36

Chapter 3 Louis Armstrong in Decolonizing West Africa 58

Chapter 4 Benny Goodman in the USSR: First Official Encounter with Jazz 71

Conclusion Case Study Comparisons and the Lessons of Public Diplomacy 95

Bibliography 107
Introduction

The beginning of the Cold War saw many shifts in American culture and political life. The federal government expanded in size and scope. It expanded into more areas of American life than ever before, and did so on a permanent basis. The United States readily adopted its place at the helm of the capitalist nations in the world. The superpower now possessed the largest and most powerful economy on the planet. Even when the Soviet Union developed nuclear weapons of its own, the United States remained the dominant power.

By the 1950s, mass contentment and prosperity obscured lingering social problems and divisions. Large bureaucracies dominated the economic, political, and cultural landscape. Big bureaucratic institutions, such as advertising agencies and large corporations, played a role in the normalization of cultural mores and values once considered taboo as they coopted cultural output into their profit-oriented strategies. Jazz music, for instance, no longer represented an artistic form associated solely with illegitimate spaces such as speakeasies or brothels.

The federal government, the largest bureaucratic institution of the post war period, coopted culture in ways it had never attempted before. Unlike corporate bureaucracies, the government was not primarily concerned with monetary profit. Rather, it used culture as a diplomatic tool. As the government funded musical groups, artists, and athletes who went abroad, American officials expected that these individuals would act as “cultural ambassadors” to promote the interests of the United States among the peoples of the rest of the world. The government also implemented less personal initiatives in public diplomacy such as radio broadcasts. Policy-makers adopted these programs of “public diplomacy” in an effort to combat the influence of Soviet culture and ideology throughout the world. If the United States and the Soviet Union fought several major “proxy wars” throughout the course of the Cold War that used military power, then the two superpowers fought many more “cultural proxy wars” that spanned
locations across the globe. In addition, while the Soviet Union primarily sought to gain access to America’s technical expertise through cultural exchanges, the United States wanted to open the Soviet Union to the West and undermine the cultural authority of the Soviet Union. Unlike military ventures, these cultural wars occurred on the home soil of each nation as much as they did in other parts of the world. Public diplomacy was certainly nothing new in the history of the United States and the world. However, new forms of public diplomacy now comingle with traditional diplomatic missions to form an integral part of America’s foreign policy.

The State Department and the United States Information Agency (USIA) coordinated and executed initiatives in public diplomacy. Jazz music represented a central fixture of American public diplomacy from the very beginning of the Cold War. Radio broadcasts by the Voice of America (VOA) blasted jazz across the iron curtain from the earliest days of the Cold War. In 1956 the State Department funded and organized the first international jazz tour. Agency officials found that American “hot jazz” and swing were still popular among international audiences, and these forms were often played by “safe” aging professionals who would act appropriately while on tour. The tours revitalized the careers of musicians whose style of music was being replaced by Cool Jazz and Rock at home in the United States.

Public diplomacy programs of the Cold War represented an important, yet relatively unstudied, outgrowth of the expanded post-war federal government. The discussion of government-sponsored jazz tours abroad by America’s major media outlets contributed to the

2 Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), xiv, xvi. Cull states that the term “public diplomacy” was coined in 1956 to describe a system of international communication and intercultural relations that become the subject of an international actor’s policy. Although Cull states that examples of public diplomacy can be seen as far back in time as the writings of Sun Tzu and Herodotus, America pioneered its own new forms of public diplomacy in the twentieth century like student exchanges and government funded jazz tours.
domestic consensus that surrounded big government in American society. As C. Wright Mills observed in 1951, media representations gave insight into the state of society at large. In his classic book *White Collar*, he wrote that “there is a close interplay between media and public, as wants are inculcated as well as satisfied.” Many in the nation’s media supported cultural exchanges and conveyed their views to a domestic audience. Writers in the media viewed cultural exchanges through both idealistic and strategic lenses. Although jazz tours represented an important form of exchange, media writers often tended to lump all exchanges together in their support for them.

While the government sought out jazz artists for their ability to represent the United States abroad and fulfill strategic aims, the musicians also benefitted from the tours. As an art form that found its roots and substantive creative energy within black culture, Americans and foreigners alike often associated jazz with black Americans. The government only reluctantly co-opted jazz artists into its overall strategic framework for the Cold War. Reinhold Wagnleitner, a historian of international cultural exchanges, has stated that “much to the surprise of America's cultural diplomats, jazz developed into one of America's most exportable commodities, second perhaps only to the dollar.” Jazz musicians who played in older styles ultimately reciprocated by using cultural exchanges to gain renewed legitimacy in the popular American psyche through

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3 Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1989), xii. Habermas argued in 1969 that the death of the liberal public sphere in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries coincided with the rise of more centralized governance and contributed to the growth of the press whose role was merely to manage consensus. Less important when considering cultural exchanges, Habermas also argued that the new style of press functioned to promote consumer culture. See also Mark Lytle, *America’s Uncivil Wars: The Sixties Era from Elvis to the Fall of Richard Nixon* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 7. Lytle argues that consensus centered on the commitment to contain communism domestically and internationally.


press coverage of the tours, and new legitimacy for their music as “high art” due to its association with diplomatic ventures. While the jazz artists sought to further their own careers, some also advanced their aims for racial equality, generating a system of mutual co-optation. Penny Von Eschen, a historian of international jazz tours that occurred during the early period of the Cold War, has argued that musicians sometimes extended their agency as players on international tours by asserting “their right to ‘play for the people’” and by openly criticizing the American government and its policies. While jazz musicians often sought out funding from the government for tours as a highly valued commodity, they occasionally used the government’s desire to send them abroad as political leverage. For example, Louis Armstrong’s anger over the Little Rock crisis in 1957 repeatedly led him to refuse offers from the State Department for tours abroad.

Black jazz artists gained new power to negotiate their position in society through their “legitimate” activities as invaluable cultural Cold Warriors who represented the United States abroad in their traditionally “cool” way. The disparate strategic aims of black jazz musicians and the government found unity through the common liberal idealism that sought to further cultural understanding. Support for all cultural exchanges translated into support for jazz exchanges specifically. Support for jazz exchanges ultimately contributed to support for jazz itself and for the black Americans who played it. Sending jazz musicians abroad provided a common framework of understanding between blacks and whites that represented a form of implicit racial consensus that pervaded large swaths of the nation’s media amidst the racial turmoil of the post war period. Jazz players who had new cultural outlets through federal cultural exchanges gained legitimacy.

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The use of jazz as diplomacy existed within a larger program of musical exchange that also included classical groups. While classical groups received more funding from the government than jazz groups, the gap between them diminished from 1956-1964. Furthermore, the government spent more money per jazz artist than it did per classical artist, suggesting that jazz groups were considered about as important as classical groups, albeit in a different way. Racial thinking also coexisted with strategic considerations when officials decided which groups to fund and where to send them. Predominantly white classical groups usually toured in Europe, while jazz groups that featured high proportions of blacks and ethnic minorities played more often in other parts of the world. Furthermore, some cultural affairs officers stationed in other countries, particularly African nations, argued that their nations possessed no viable groups for export abroad due to the cultural primitivism of those nations. While racist thinking may have existed within official circles, racial attitudes were subsumed beneath strategic considerations. Eurocentrism played a lesser role than Eisenhower’s overarching strategic commitment to bolster Western Europe against communist advances. Moreover, officials in the State Department believed that minority artists who played jazz appealed more to people in non-European areas than groups populated largely with white musicians did. While strategic thinking provided the drive behind strategically-placed musical groups, racial thinking characterized that strategy. More racial minorities, not fewer, were included in musical exchanges, without the implementation of quotas, as a result of strategic considerations.

Jazz tours, and the whole system of public diplomacy of which they were a part, also represented one way that official and unofficial, public and private worlds interacted during the Cold War. The American National Theater and Academy (ANTA), the organization used by the

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State Department to organize international musical tours and provide expert advice about the viability of musicians as cultural ambassadors, owed its existence to a congressional charter and received government funds. However, much of its funding came from private donors, and it operated independently of government control or oversight.

Cooperation between official and private spheres and the cooptation of certain elements of American culture by the federal government represented elements of the expanded post-war state. The government possessed the resources that came from a booming economy to provide funds for cultural programs. Furthermore, Cold War strategic necessity drove the urge to try a new form of warfare that promised to destabilize the enemy’s cultural base over a long stretch of time. As Americans grew weary of the deployment of hard power after World War II and the Korean War, soft power tactics emerged as the dominant expression of conflict on the world stage.  

Historical scholarship has only recently begun to examine the role played by public diplomacy in the Cold War. Political scientists have highlighted public diplomacy since the 1960s. While Alan Ball has recently argued that Americans initiated the early “propaganda wars” and cultural proxy battles that took place between the United States and the Soviet Union, political scientists from the era viewed the Soviets as the aggressors and as the earliest users of psychological tactics. Other recent historical scholarship has dealt with initiatives in public diplomacy as a broad program of persuasion and government action. Only one book, American-

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9 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Relations, 2004). Nye argued that “soft power” methods of international diplomacy, such as the export of a nation’s culture or the allure of its ideals, represented a more effective means of furthering America’s interests abroad than did the sole use of “hard power” tactics, or the use of the military. He argued that the military had its place, but it would be truly effective only when scaled back and coupled with soft power.


Soviet Cultural Diplomacy: The Bolshoi Ballet's American Premiere, published by Cadra Peterson McDaniel in 2015, has fully situated a specific expression of official cultural exchange within the larger framework of public diplomacy. Her book focused on the tour of the Soviet Bolshoi Ballet in the United States in 1959. This thesis uses a similar conceptualization as the one used in McDaniel’s book and applies it to jazz tours the United States sent abroad. A few works within the last twenty years have covered the nature of jazz as an international force during the Cold War.

Recent works on diplomacy have examined the role played by cultural exchanges as a part of America’s larger strategic framework during the Cold War. The primary musical emphasis of this literature focuses on the role of the Voice of America (VOA) and its transition to more subtle forms of propaganda after World War II. Powerful and idealistic desires for peace and unity among the world’s peoples, strengthened by the looming threat of nuclear war, combined with the ideological belief in the inherently dualistic nature of the Cold War and the necessity for effective strategic measures to counter the Soviet threat abroad. While the American government used cultural diplomacy as a weapon in the Cold War, cultural exchanges derived their energy and creative talent among idealistic individuals.

Literature that deals specifically with jazz exchanges represents a new historiographical line of enquiry. The primary focus of this research rests with the tours themselves and how they were perceived abroad and by those who participated in them. The literature also acknowledges that jazz tours occurred during a time filled with domestic racial discord. This thesis expands

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13 Von Eschen, Satchmo, Lisa Davenport, Jazz Diplomacy: Promoting America in the Cold War (Jackson, MS: University of Mississippi Press, 2009).
upon prior scholarship by marrying public diplomacy with culture and jazz. Personal experiences of the jazz musicians, while important, are subsumed underneath broad perceptions perpetrated by American media outlets. Furthermore, domestic perception plays a larger role than international views. This thesis demonstrates how idealistic writers in the media supported jazz exchanges, sometimes basing their arguments on strategic considerations. Furthermore, it uses statistical comparisons to analyze perceived importance of jazz among government officials and regional variances. These considerations shed light on strategic considerations among those in the government and the place that race played in their thinking.

Jazz historiography informs the study of jazz exchange by emphasizing domestic perceptions of jazz and its racial underpinnings. Americans and foreigners alike often associated jazz, an art form that found its roots and substantive creative energy within black culture, with black Americans. While white jazz artist certainly played a prominent role within mainstream American culture, jazz remained tied to its roots in black culture. When the government chose jazz musicians who toured abroad, race played a role in these decisions and black artists were generally chosen over white musicians.

The first chapter provides political and social context for initiatives in public diplomacy during the Cold War. The chapter discusses media reactions to initiatives in public diplomacy. It examines the role of the American National Theater and Academy (ANTA) and uses that organization to show how government interests meshed with American society. The second chapter looks at the regions targeted by the State Department for musical tours and compares

\[14\] John Leland, *Hip: The History* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2004). Leland attempts to define historically the vague notion of “hip,” looking as far back in time as the period of American slavery for the black roots of hip and following the path all the way to the present day. The temporal scope of this essay broadly follows Leland’s post-war time frame lasting until the end of the 1960s as the most appropriate framework for understanding the development of international jazz exchanges and their heyday. See also Alyn Shipton, *A New History of Jazz* (New York and London: The Continuum International Publishing Group Inc., 2007).
classical tours with jazz tours in terms of money spent and the number of tours undertaken by groups in each category. Chapter two analyzes the perceived importance of jazz within the larger program of public diplomacy and draws conclusions about the presence and impact of racial attitudes among those in the department who handled the tours. The final two chapters examine two tours as case studies for the larger program of jazz exchanges. The first tour, conducted by Louis Armstrong in 1960, happened in West Africa and occurred during a moment of transition in that region as several nations gained their independence. Armstrong’s tour represented a battle for the allegiances of these new nations and a cultural intervention into a turbulent environment. Benny Goodman conducted the other tour in 1962 to the Soviet Union. His tour marked the first time Soviet authorities allowed jazz to enter their country as a part of an official cultural exchange program. These chapters show how jazz musicians coopted the tours for their own aims, and sometimes these goals were political. However, these last two chapters also show how “international jazz provided a space of interaction that was appealing precisely because it seemed to be removed from politics.”

Americans knew about these tours through media coverage by American news outlets. Ultimately the jazz world met the Cold War in these tours, and the media portrayed them in a positive light. Yet they did so because the tours represented broader strategic gains and idealistic goals. The State Department chose Goodman and Armstrong, at least in part, because their older styles of jazz differed from newer forms. Driving four-four beats and loud improvisational lines based in the primary melodic root provided easy dance material for foreign audiences. However, when American media outlets portrayed the tours, the musical aspects were subsumed beneath broader considerations that surrounded the Cold War.

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Several themes permeate and unite these chapters. Race weaves its way through the analysis as an ever-present consideration. Media support for public diplomacy indicated social unity, at least when people thought about official jazz tours. Positive coverage of the two tours featuring Armstrong, a black musician, and Goodman’s racially integrated band, demonstrated racial tolerance. The fact that Armstrong’s tour received less coverage than Goodman’s in the media suggested preference for the band led by the white musician. However, other factors, such as the perceived strategic importance of the first official jazz tour to the Soviet Union relative to a tour of decolonizing Africa, certainly played into the disparity. Racial considerations also influenced decisions made by agency officials about which regions to target as some officials suggested in their memoranda that certain cultures, especially African ones, were inferior to European cultures. However, strategic determinations and the impulse to choose “safe” groups over “risky” ones overshadowed racialized thinking. In other words, perceived strategic necessity often trumped racial bias regarding decisions about who to fund.

The relationship between official and private spheres in the ways that programs in public diplomacy were organized, carried out, and conceptualized also permeates the chapters, especially chapters one, three, and four. Chapter one examines the role that ANTA played in public diplomacy and musical tours, and the nature of that organization as one that had ties with the government as well as the private sector. Chapters three and four examine how public media covered the ways that musicians used government support and funding to achieve their own private ends.

Ultimately, this thesis seeks to answer “three of the most tantalizing questions of cultural propaganda: the inner workings of the information machine, the politics of identity, and the
unforeseen tensions between audiences, organizers, and US officials.”

The statistical analysis in chapter two looks at these “inner workings” and shows how funds were spent and on what kinds of groups. Furthermore, chapter two examines correspondence among agency officials in order to analyze their regional targeting. Discussion of the “politics of identity” is woven throughout the thesis through analysis of the role played by racial perceptions and struggles. Discussion of the ways that strategic thinking and idealism meshed together, particularly in chapter one, also analyzes political identities and the ways that people found unity through cultural exchanges. “Unforeseen tensions between audiences, organizers, and US officials” are primarily examined in the case studies in chapters three and four.

Official jazz tours of the early Cold War constituted one portion of the larger program of public diplomacy and “people-to-people” exchanges. While traditional diplomatic endeavors retained their position as the central component of diplomacy, initiatives in public diplomacy represented a new avenue of international persuasion. Ultimately, expenditures for jazz tours undertaken as part of a program in public diplomacy created new costs associated with the post-war leviathan government. A bigger government with a larger tax base that owed much of its presence to the booming economy possessed, for the first time, the resources to undertake such a large scale experiment in international diplomacy. The pervasive and seemingly insidious spread of international communism also provided strong motivation to counteract the cultural inroads made by international communism.

Official jazz tours also relied on increased demand for expressions of soft power, as opposed to the naked hard power used during World War II and the Korean conflict. While propaganda and psychological warfare dominated the early 1950s, soft power seduction gained ground against trickery and coercion by the late 1950s. Jazz, past its popular prime in American

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culture and nearing replacement by rock n’ roll internationally, thrived as a strategic device of
the federal government and found new life in the collective mind of the nation as a useful and
“hip” form of diplomacy.
Chapter 1
Public Diplomacy, Media Portrayals, and Jazz

After World War II, the United States exercised more influence on the international scene as it sought to counter Soviet influence, and the American "leviathan state" also expanded at home. World War II saw the expansion of federal programs and the creation of new programs and agencies. The end of the war brought a larger international role for the United States. Most notably, the United States sent funds through the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe. Government expansion at home occurred within an environment defined by the nascent Cold War and international competition between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Initiatives in public diplomacy during the Cold War embodied strategic thinking that grew out of America’s competition with the Soviet Union. The United States reacted to the advance of Soviet diplomatic missions and cultural influence throughout the world by developing its own programs.\(^\text{17}\) While disparate ideologies and strategic desires divided the United States and the Soviet Union, their methods for achieving international aims were very similar. Although initiatives in public diplomacy sought to bring peoples together, Charles Frankel observed in 1966 that "tensions exist within nations and between nations that never would have existed were these nations not in such intense cultural communication with one another."\(^\text{18}\) As people from different cultures encountered one another for the first time, they simultaneously learned from one another and found things to criticize. Nevertheless, while nuclear proliferation brought instability and increased uncertainty to an already tense world stage, cultural diplomacy between nations through sports contacts, musical tours, and educational exchanges re-humanized disparate populations riven by propaganda wars and set the tone for


thaw and détente.\footnote{19\ patterson, on every front, 37.} the united states embraced a system that emphasized “dominance” over “hegemony” through cultural exchanges as it publicly engaged in supposedly bilateral cultural relations with other players on the world stage that made the country appear more tolerant and accepting.\footnote{20\ patterson, on every front, 44. patterson defines a dominant power as one that enacts policies that benefit all sphere members to reduce tension, while the hegemon serves primarily its own national security and strategic interests.} like american policies, cultural exchanges catered to broad coalitions that included those concerned about security and strategic considerations on one hand and those driven by idealistic hopes and visions on the other. james t. sparrow has called this the “fusion between liberalism and nationalism.”\footnote{21\ james t. sparrow, warfare state: world war ii americans and the age of big government (new york: oxford university press, 2011), 12.} liberals and conservatives involved with cultural exchanges ultimately united around the goal of victory in the cold war against the soviet union.\footnote{22\ music and international history in the twentieth century, ed. jessica c.e. gienow-hecht (new york and oxford: berghahn press, 2015), 11.} as the government built upon this coalition to expand its power, the line between official and private realms often blurred. the american national theater and academy (anta), an organization that supported the state department as the agency coordinated cultural exchanges, embodied this marriage between public and private spheres.

while anta officially supported public diplomacy as an organization that blended public and private influences, american media as an institution dedicated to public awareness and reliant upon popular goodwill also supported official programs in public diplomacy. idealism regarding the use of soft power as a way to “bring people together” and promote peace permeated many of the articles that journalists wrote. some also argued from a more strategic stance. writers in the media discussed government-sponsored jazz tours within the context of the larger program of cultural exchanges. domestic perceptions of jazz tours cannot be examined
properly without this context. A great deal of the hype that surrounded the jazz tours existed because of government sponsorship. As a form of public diplomacy, jazz tours united disparate ideologies that emphasized both strategic advantage and idealistic fervor.

Racial considerations existed alongside common goals associated with the government and perceived strategic necessity, at least amidst discussions among journalists about cultural exchanges and jazz tours. It was obvious to most that every jazz group sent abroad was at least racially integrated, if not led by a black musician.

The deployment of musical public diplomacy reflected a broad alliance that often existed between official and private spheres during the Cold War. Independent musicians represented the federal government as paid contractors. At the same time, they toured under the supervision and direction of government employees. Artists and sponsors involved in international tours often comingled government time and money with personal endeavors and private funding. ANTA was the single largest example of this marriage between officialdom and private auspices. Congress chartered ANTA in 1935 for the vague purpose of “[extending] the living theater beyond its present limitations.” While the federal government created ANTA and the organization operated “with the blessings of the State Department,” the organization survived solely on private sources and without government funds in 1935. In the early 1950s, ANTA helped the State Department arrange and administer American participation in several overseas music festivals. In 1954 ANTA signed an official contract with the State Department to administer President Eisenhower’s program for international cultural exchange. From that time

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23 Report titled “The International Cultural Exchange Service of the American National Theater and Academy (ANTA) and its Relationship to the President’s Special International Program for Cultural Presentations,” Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 95, folder 31. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville, 1.
24 Ibid.
on, ANTA played an integral role in the administration and coordination of international cultural exchanges, and, eventually, jazz tours. The organization began to receive some government funding in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{26}

After 1954 the State Department did not consider an artist or group for export abroad unless ANTA had previously deemed them sufficiently talented and fit.\textsuperscript{27} ANTA’s panels, composed of leading experts from around the country, convened frequently during the course of the year and analyzed the nation’s major performing artists. The State Department also frequently consulted ANTA regarding particular musicians or groups and asked for analysis of their quality.\textsuperscript{28}

ANTA graded musicians that toured abroad under private auspices. The groups received letter grades like those given to students in school. While many musicians in the late 1950s received “A” or “A-“ grades, some received “B” grades. However, by 1964 ANTA had expanded its grading, and several musicians received “C” and “D” grades, particularly “pop” vocalists and rock groups.\textsuperscript{29} While ANTA often lowered grades for certain jazz groups because their members were “unruly” or tended to “misbehave,” the grades given to rock groups represented early attitudes toward rock. Rock music, a new and rebellious form, certainly piqued both their fears and disdain. Indeed, some agency officials and some of those associated with government-sponsored cultural exchanges still chaffed at government sponsorship of jazz as a diplomatic endeavor. ANTA essentially kept tabs on certain musicians, likely without their knowledge, and reported their findings to the State Department.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid, 5.
\textsuperscript{28} Music Advisory Panel Meetings, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 100. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
\textsuperscript{29} Report titled “Artists Going Abroad Under Private Sponsorship,” Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 100, folder 2. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
In the mid-1950s, official and private spheres truly became meshed in the most tangible way possible: through funding. After 1954 the government provided funds for ANTA. These funds covered administrative costs, office space, operating costs, and travel expenses for ANTA members who needed to attend meetings.\(^{30}\) During the time when jazz tours represented a major part of America’s public diplomacy, the organization provided administrative assistance and musical guidance. Moreover, it operated with funds provided from the government as well as private sources. Its experts were private individuals who operated within an organization originally chartered by congress and funded by the federal government, yet that organization was under its own autonomous control. While charted before World War II, ANTA thrived in the post-war period despite the loss of some autonomy in the 1950s.

Members of ANTA spent a great deal of their time making recommendations to the State Department regarding ways to use cultural exchanges to reach foreign audiences more effectively. When ANTA made these recommendations, it blended private expertise with the interests of the government. In 1956, members of ANTA expressed the broader desire of those in the government to use cultural programs to appeal to popular audiences abroad. One member proposed lower ticket prices for international concerts funded by the American government. He also proposed “factory concerts” to supplement concerts that took place in normal concert halls. These, he believed, would appeal to workingmen and the masses. However, another member of the ANTA panel cited “local managements” in many host countries as the main reason that prices remained high. These managers, he argued, wanted to keep attractions “as a manifestations of [the] upper bourgeoisie, and above the level of the common people.” He also

\(^{30}\) Report titled “The International Cultural Exchange Service of the American National Theater and Academy (ANTA) and its Relationship to the President’s Special International Program for Cultural Presentations,” Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 95, folder 31. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville, 9.
cited red tape from local unions as the reason that factory concerts would not be viable.\textsuperscript{31} Certain members of the ANTA panel saw the strategic value in the types of programs that would counteract Soviet propaganda that lambasted the United States as a capitalist cesspool. They wanted to fight fire with fire by using tactics traditionally associated with communist propaganda to appeal to mass audiences. In doing so, the United States would appear not as the enemy of the poor and dispossessed, but as their friend.

In 1957, ANTA members also recommended increases in tours by youth groups and amateur performing groups in order to present “a complete picture of America’s cultural achievements.”\textsuperscript{32} When considered as a whole, young people played an important role in cultural exchanges. Student exchanges constituted a large portion of the cultural exchange program, as did sports teams. Indeed cultural exchanges tended to emphasize activities that encouraged youthful participation and garnered the interest of young people. Exchanges of students constituted youthful activities by default.

Jazz tours fit within a larger culture of cultural exchange by appealing to young people, not just within the United States, but abroad as well. In quoting a report compiled by USIA from 1958 titled “Report on Activities of the Cultural Presentation Committee,” Nicholas J. Cull, a historian of public diplomacy, has shown that jazz was “without equal… in appealing to youth groups abroad.”\textsuperscript{33} Timothy Ryback, a historian who has examined Soviet rock music, has argued that “a wailing sax or a thumping jazz beat could transform youth and elevate them” like no

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\textsuperscript{31} Minutes of the Music Advisory Panel Meeting of ANTA, November 21, 1956. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 100, folder 1. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville, 2.
\textsuperscript{32} Minutes of the Music Advisory Panel Meeting of ANTA, November 19, 1957. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 100, folder 3. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville, 2.
\textsuperscript{33} Cull, \textit{Cold War}, 155.
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other cultural experience could.\textsuperscript{34} As a form of music often frowned upon by communist
governing elites, jazz represented a dangerously exciting form of entertainment for youth under
their rule. The music created a fun and casual atmosphere with its rhythms that were set behind
the beat and its sensual diminished sevenths.\textsuperscript{35} In short, jazz was globally “cool” and “hip”
among youth, even though it was being replaced by rock music in the United States by the 1950s
and 1960s. Officials in the American government and members of ANTA saw the value in
appealing to youth who would one day grow up to lead their nations as a long term strategy in
winning the cultural war with the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, youth gravitated toward jazz artists sponsored by the American government
despite the fact that these musicians tended to hail from an older generation of performers. The
perception that these older musicians were more professional than their younger counterparts
certainly played a role in decisions made by the State Department to employ them. Their
popularity and fame garnered through a lifetime of success also propelled them into the role of
cultural ambassadors. However, ANTA members worried that the domination of old giants
alienated the musically illiterate and many young fans in other countries who would not be able
to relate to the stars on a personal basis.

Musical groups from American universities, populated almost entirely by young people,
promised to solve the problem of “youth appeal.” While tours by groups from universities were
not unheard-of in the years after 1957, not until 1961 did the State Department officially decide

\textsuperscript{34} Timothy Ryback, \textit{Rock around the Bloc: A History of Rock Music in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union} (New
\textsuperscript{35} Wagnleitner, \textit{Coca-Colonization}, 209. While Wagnleitner points out that Soviet officials occasionally found
ideological value in jazz as an art form created by an oppressed group, they generally viewed it as decadent and saw
it as a tool in America’s strategy of cultural imperialism.
to incorporate more college groups into its program.\textsuperscript{36} During this time, the government began to sponsor classical groups from prominent colleges and universities. In addition, these groups cost less because their performers did not demand wages.\textsuperscript{37} Young jazz groups, however, did not receive sponsorship until much later. While some members of ANTA argued that these groups would not present the kind of quality performances exhibited by professional groups, others supported the State Department in its decision. Supporters of using young jazz artists argued that the malleable youth in other countries could be reached more easily through young artists. As youth movements gained momentum in the early 1960s, members of ANTA and the officials in the State Department increasingly saw the need to appeal to youth as a powerful segment of society. The drive within the State Department to influence youth in other countries intensified in 1963 as officials pressed the Soviets to accept instrumental groups from American universities. The Soviets had resisted these pressures for several years, but one member of the State Department was “anxious for more student-student contact.”\textsuperscript{38}

While the conversation among ANTA members and officials in the State Department had been dominated by considerations of classical groups, the scene began to shift in 1964. That year, officials in the state Department discussed the creation of a new panel whose sole function would be to handle jazz and folk groups.\textsuperscript{39} Some members attacked the proposal, and one stated


\textsuperscript{37} Memorandum from Gordon Arneson to Alfred Boerner, December 18, 1961. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 47, folder 21. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville, 1-12.

\textsuperscript{38} Minutes of the meeting of the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Office of Cultural Presentations, July 24, 1963. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 99, folder 25. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville, 3.

\textsuperscript{39} Minutes of the meeting of the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Office of Cultural Presentations, December 2, 1964. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 99, folder 19. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville, 2. They lumped these two groups into the same category.
that “this seems to be a proposal to bypass all of the serious panels.”

Even in 1964, some officials still viewed jazz as a lesser form of art when compared to classical music. Another member responded that jazz should not be discounted just because of its commercial nature and the fact that band leaders tended to make substantial sums of money on the tours. Increased demand for jazz and “popular” music led to debates within ANTA and the State Department. Those who argued for popular, commercialized music butted heads with those who favored “high” art with less appeal to the masses.

The course of the discussion in these meetings from 1956-1964 always centered on ways to improve America’s appeal to popular international audiences. In 1956 the debate focused on the best way to gain access to the international proletariat. This quickly shifted to a sustained discussion that sought ways to gain greater access to youth in other countries, although those discussions took place within a context still largely dominated by classical music. By 1964, the classicists were embattled in their attempts to retain dominance in the program of cultural

40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Minutes of the Music Advisory Panel Meeting of ANTA, November 21, 1956. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 100, folder 1. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville, 2.
Jazz, and the popular excitement it represented, gained ground against those programs designed to appeal to an international cadre of elite individuals.

These discussions among ANTA members, who operated as part of an organization that contracted with the State Department, ultimately reflected the desires and changing needs of the State Department. The State Department increasingly shifted its focus toward jazz and the popular art it represented in order to respond to a changing cultural climate around the world. Officials within the State Department also operated according to a cultural understanding that arose out of their own personal experiences.

As they came increasingly to favor jazz over classical music, they reflected a growing acceptance for “black music” and a growing appreciation for the contributions of black musicians. While they reflected growing acceptance, they also contributed to it as they effectively legitimized jazz music and the musicians who played it. This process became known as “classicization,” or the movement of jazz into a cultural realm of acceptance by those who favored “classical” music and disdained anything “popular.” Government cooptation of jazz music further helped to legitimate the musicians who played jazz as they became associated with the strategic aims of the government.

Political trends and the tone of discourse amongst agency officials and organizations like ANTA followed cultural developments in American society. From the mid-1950s through the 1960s, consensus supported the idea that the nation needed to contain communism at home and abroad. By the 1960s, members of the political left and the right, sustained atop a bedrock of

affluence inherited from the 1950s, were united by common ideas.⁴⁶ Theoretically, both sides opposed bigger government, although in different ways.⁴⁷ These fears represented a larger discourse concerned about the social effects of a mass society dominated by a powerful managerial class and by media with newfound cultural influence.⁴⁸

That media overwhelmingly supported the idea of cultural exchanges. The *Washington Post* ran two articles in 1957 that supported international cultural exchange. One article, written by Chester Bowles, who would become the Undersecretary of State under President Kennedy, dealt primarily with the cultural situation as a whole in Russia. He stated that official barriers to arranging “cultural contacts” on the Soviet side prevented the growth of free thought.⁴⁹ Two months later Drew Pearson, whom Wendy Wall has described as a “muckraking columnist and liberal anticommunist,” blasted Senator Lyndon Johnson (D-Texas) for pushing a bill through Congress that slashed funding for USIA.⁵⁰ Pearson’s argument, like those promoted by some government analysts and agency workers, exemplified strategic concerns. He stated that “with Johnson’s cut-down… some of the most important United States propaganda in the Cold War will be eliminated just as Russia is stepping up its Cold War budget.”⁵¹ In early 1958, Pearson advocated the recently established Lacy-Zaroubin agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union that allowed for mutual cultural exchanges between the two nations for the first time. Using the words of an American violinist, Pearson stated that “the United States has the

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opportunity to win the friendship of the Russian people through the new people-people cultural exchange just signed between Russia and the United States.”

Finally, an article by Richard Coe in 1960 portrayed cultural exchange as a powerful tempering agent amidst the international furor caused by the downing of Gary Powers’ U-2 spy plane. The Post featured no articles written during the time period surrounding 1958 that attacked the idea of cultural exchange. Indeed, its portrayal of exchanges depicted them as a vital set of programs integral to America’s future victory in the Cold War.

The American media reported that the Soviets were responsible for the late arrival of jazz into the realm of official exchanges between the two superpowers after 1958. In 1959 the State Department revealed that it had repeatedly attempted to include jazz in the exchanges with the Soviet Union, but to no avail. The Department had “been under high-pitched attack from America’s cool cats over the absence of jazz at the summer’s United States fair in Moscow” and had chosen not to reveal the reason why jazz was excluded.

Having the chance to play in international venues as representatives of the US government constituted a major opportunity for jazz musicians to establish cultural legitimacy within a society that viewed international tours through strategically and ideally positive lenses. The chance to tour abroad with government funds also provided individual artists with the opportunity to further their careers. Jazz musicians complained adamantly when they perceived that they were being excluded.

In 1961, the Los Angeles Times celebrated Louis Armstrong’s jazz tour to the Congo a year earlier and lauded cultural exchange as a strategic means by which the United States could

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54 Herald Tribune News Service, “Russ Veto U.S. Jazz as Culturally Offbeat: America Tried Selling Reds on Hot Licks at Moscow Fair but Received only ‘Nyets,’” Los Angeles Times, June 4, 1959, 22.
55 Ibid.
make valuable friends in the world. The article referred to cultural exchanges as part of a “new chapter in diplomatic history.” In a reference to Khrushchev’s tirades over the U-2 affair, the article noted that “at the very moment Americans were being vilified and screamed at in Paris, other Americans were being accorded rapturous applause in the theater and happy handclasps and friendly backslappings in the streets of Leningrad itself.”

Certainly, strong tensions persisted between the superpowers despite cultural exchanges. Frankel even asserted that some new problems arose between nations because of the exchanges. For example, the Soviet Union sought to exclude the influence of jazz from its shores. Nevertheless, the media tended to present cultural exchanges through the ideological lenses of harmony and optimism for the future. Newspapers reported that “our music, our theater, our humor, our entertainment tell them something about what we are like. After all, it is not facts that influence people so much as ideas and ideals. And these we have sent—from our hearts.” The righteousness of America’s cause to democratize the world and roll back communism figured prominently in the media’s assessments of cultural exchanges. Whenever problems surrounding cultural exchanges became public knowledge, the media blamed the Soviets, not the Americans.

In 1963 the Soviet government forbade Duke Ellington and Count Basie from touring the USSR, despite having allowed Benny Goodman to tour the year before. Again, the Times blamed the Soviets and stated that they had given no official reason why. Frederick C. Barghoorn, a professor of political science at Yale University, made a similar point in his book, The Soviet

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57 Ibid.
58 Frankel, Neglected Aspect, 1.
Cultural Offensive (1960), wherein he stated that “because they fear uncontrolled, spontaneous, people-to-people communication, particularly when it involves contact with a rich, free society like that of the United States, the Russian leaders have devoted impressive effort and skill to outwitting their American opponents in the battle of wits involved in cultural exchanges.” Barghoorn elaborated on his ideas four years later in Soviet Foreign Propaganda, which also assumed that the Soviets had an inferiority complex. The book essentially argued that Soviet officials knew that their citizens could not resist the enticements American culture had to offer. Therefore, if America desired to turn those citizens against their government to weaken its hold, then cultural exchanges, which would expose Soviet citizens to American culture, represented the ideal method.

Journals of opinion also weighed in on cultural exchanges. Writers for these magazines often supported cultural diplomacy. However, they also levied criticisms, although even these generally did not indict all cultural exchanges as useless endeavors. In 1957, the Nation, a liberal magazine, published an article that questioned the validity of certain programs sponsored by USIA that included anticommunist propaganda movies that had a very limited audience and other “silly projects.” None of the projects discussed included anything that dealt with jazz music or other major cultural exchange programs. Rather, the article lambasted expenditures on seemingly superfluous programs with little strategic value or popular appeal. While strategy reigned supreme when government officials considered which programs they would sponsor, it also often made the difference between support and derision in the media. This article lambasted programs that the author perceived had little strategic value as wasteful and silly. However, it said nothing about major initiatives in public diplomacy.

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61 Barghoorn, Soviet Cultural Offensive, 268.
However, an article published in 1958 in *The New Republic* decried the dominant role played by strategic aims when American officials considered where they would place their support. It contrasted the United States with other countries where “support of the creative arts [had] long been a normal item in the national budget” and where the arts were supported for their own sake, not for strategic gain.\(^{64}\) The author furthermore decried paltry budgets for cultural exchanges in the United States.\(^{65}\) The author believed that cultural exchanges needed to be expanded and that they simply needed to be conceptualized in a way that emphasized culture for its own sake rather than as a means to achieve strategic ends.

Several articles in the liberal magazine *Newsweek* concurred with *The New Republic*. In 1957 Ernest Lindley argued that the United States needed to spend more money on cultural exchanges and bring more foreigners to America. He decried as a poor tactic the abatement of exchanges initiated by the United States after the Hungarian uprising in order to punish the Russians. Rather, he stated that “Our hope of achieving a reliable peace with the Soviet Union rests largely on a gradual evolution of the Soviet political system. Such an evolution is likely to be stimulated by maximum exposure of the Soviet people to contacts with the rest of the world.”\(^{66}\) In 1959 an article in *Newsweek* proclaimed that the Lacy-Zaroubin Agreement with the Soviet Union in 1958 constituted “an essential part of the struggle to keep [the] peace.”\(^{67}\) When writers in journals of opinion critiqued government strategies that applied to the administration of cultural exchanges, they generally argued that more needed to happen with the exchanges, not less. They also argued for the exchanges as a means to “keep the peace” while simultaneously winning the Cold War against the Soviet Union.


\(^{65}\) Ibid.


\(^{67}\) Unknown Author, “Americans in Russia,” *Newsweek*, April 13, 1959, 116-117.
Religious magazines also weighed in on cultural exchanges. One writer in *Commonweal*, a Catholic magazine, stated in 1958 that exchanges would “work to remove the ignorance and mystery that surround the customs and the attitudes of the peoples in both countries [Soviet Union and United States]. It is difficult to see how anyone would oppose this end.”  

Another article in *Commonweal* during 1958 discussed the Lacy-Zaroubin Agreement with great detail and complexity. While the article concluded that certain aspects of the agreement were flawed, it argued from the premise that cultural exchanges were essentially beneficial. At the end, the author wrote that “we can hardly expect that the Soviets will not use their representatives for strenuous propaganda purposes, and our natural national gullibility may mislead us even with the real thing before us. But the danger is less than the danger of ignorance, which is the obstacle we now face.”  

Another article in *Commonweal*, this one from 1959, argued that cultural exchanges created “a measure of understanding between the two countries [without which] that armed conflict which all must dread becomes more possible.”  

An article written in 1960 presented the exchanges as a viable alternative to a tense and potentially violent international setting. While these articles from *Commonweal* often discussed cultural exchanges with a more balanced and informed approach than many writers for newspapers and other popular journals did, the underlying assumption and ultimate conclusion remained the same. Cultural exchanges benefitted both countries involved, provided a viable alternative to armed combat, and could potentially win the Cold War for the United States without armed conflict.

An article by Nat Hentoff, written in the *Nation* in 1958, described the experiences of several jazz artists who toured in Africa amidst calls for decolonization. A black jazz trumpeter,  

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Wilbur de Paris, made a lasting impression upon the peoples of decolonizing African regions. Hentoff stated that “racial identification with the de Paris Band… was assertive everywhere, particularly in places where there was segregation.”\textsuperscript{72} The government of the United States funded his tour, which lasted from March-May in 1957, as a strategic mission to woo these peoples into the American fold. This portrayal in \textit{Nation} magazine of a jazz tour related the appeal of black jazz to Africans as a symbol of racial liberation to the furtherance of strategic aims. When the government sponsored jazz, strategy comingled with idealism in the nation’s media.

This concept reigned true when \textit{Time} magazine discussed a tour of Africa, conducted by Herbie Mann, a prominent American jazz flautist, that lasted from December of 1959 to April of 1960. The article said that the band played for “sold-out houses, jammed with both European jazz enthusiasts and native tribesmen who recognize in Mann’s percussive style the distant echoes of their own primitive jungle beat.”\textsuperscript{73} While this article contained wording that suggested the possibility of racist thinking, it nevertheless glorified the African tour for its ability to woo Africans while it furthered American interests in the region. Furthermore, the band got together with Haile Selassie’s Imperial Guard Band and reportedly “brought down the house.”\textsuperscript{74}

However, the article described excitement among the “natives” only as long as they heard older styles of jazz to which they could relate. When they heard modern jazz, the article reported that they seemed “lost.”\textsuperscript{75}

Not all forms of jazz were equal in terms of their perceived strategic merit. By 1960, newer forms of jazz celebrated technical proficiency over a memorable melody, and artistic

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
creation over popular appeal. When the media lauded jazz as an important strategic tool, it did so only for traditional styles like swing and Dixieland. This article from *Time* stated that Africans responded only to the older forms. This argument was grounded more in culture than in race. Older forms of jazz retained more obvious elements of their African roots and had beats that would have been more recognizable to an African audience. Older “Hot Jazz” also provided a better beat for dancing than newer forms like “Cool Jazz,” which relied more heavily on technical expertise and academic training.

Black Americans also weighed in on cultural exchange, and their views on jazz exchange were intrinsically mixed with racial perceptions. During the same time period the *Washington Post*, the *Los Angeles Times*, the *New York Times*, and several journals of opinion ran many articles dealing with cultural exchanges broadly, the *Chicago Defender* featured several articles centered on jazz exchanges and tours by black musicians to Africa. In 1957 the *Defender* discussed the same budget cuts that Pearson lamented. From its perspective, however, the primary loss came not in the strategic realm, but in the inability of musicians like Louis Armstrong and Dizzy Gillespie to tour abroad with sponsorship from the government. Idealism surrounding international unity also figured prominently for black journalists who wrote for the *Defender*, one of whom stated that “for those who observe what is going on in the world arena there is evidence that music is playing an increasingly important part and is doing a great deal in cementing the bonds of friendship and bringing all races into closer harmony and sympathetic relationship.” In 1960, the *Defender* further punctuated this point by quoting a State Department official who stated that “trumpets and ice skates have already proved they are the

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76 Chapters three and four rely heavily on the *New York Times*.
most effective weapons of the cold war.”79 In contrast with Senator Lyndon Johnson’s proposed cuts in funding for cultural exchanges a few years earlier, this article portrayed an optimistic government official who anticipated “three or four times” the funding currently being received for cultural exchanges. Jazz tours and the portrayal of their popular reception abroad assuaged many skeptical voices in the government as jazz musicians consistently “exceeded expectations as ambassadors.”80 Journalists picked up on this feeling and reported it in a way that portrayed cultural exchanges as a rising and triumphant force in American diplomacy.

Finally, in 1963 the Defender confidently proclaimed that jazz was America’s “Best Export.”81 It exclaimed, “Of all the exports departing from America’s shores, none has attained more political goodwill for this country than U.S. jazz.” Citizens in countries that protested with shouts of “Yankee, go home” simultaneously danced to America’s jazz music. Indeed, many foreign audiences fell in love with American jazz while remaining ambivalent toward or opposing American foreign policy.82

American media portrayed the export of jazz as the latest way that the US government promoted American society in an appealing way to a receptive world. One Washington columnist, Peter Edson, praised Dizzie Gillespie’s tour of the Middle East in 1956 as the State Department’s “first successful experiment” with jazz.83 While Gillespie’s tour began slowly, by the end “performances were packed. And wild… one letter said, ‘this is the best American propaganda I ever tasted.’”84 Edson presented jazz exchanges as a vital strategic means by which the United States could contain the Communist threat and roll back the Kremlin’s ideological

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80 Von Eschen, Satchmo, 56.
82 Von Eschen, Satchmo, 257.
84 Ibid.
influence throughout the world. While America’s hot proxy wars achieved limited results and debatable success, Edson portrayed jazz tours as a type of culture that foreigners enjoyed and respected.

While foreign audiences tended to dissociate their love of jazz from their attitudes toward US foreign policy, real foreign perceptions mattered little for popular American attitudes. Rather, Americans largely perceived cultural exchanges and jazz tours through the filtered lens provided by their media outlets. Most Americans had no basis on which to evaluate a government program with limited funding dedicated to international understanding apart from the occasional newspaper article. Post war America saw the death of isolationism, and cultural exchanges represented one outgrowth of America’s increased international engagement.

American media outlets overwhelmingly supported cultural diplomacy and the use of jazz as a strategic device for the expansion of America’s influence in the world. Even a misinterpreted lack of support for cultural exchanges and jazz could generate criticism from the media. Dizzie Gillespie played before President Eisenhower in 1958, who, according to Edson, apparently “overlooked a political pitch for the Negro vote by not mentioning either Gillespie or Nat King Cole, who also performed.” Furthermore, Edson stated that Eisenhower “didn’t seem to appreciate” the performance because of the president’s apparent lack of support for voting rights.

While Eisenhower’s ambiguous style of leadership sometimes led to criticism from the media, Edson certainly misinterpreted the President’s intentions. However, Edson portrayed

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85 Von Eschen, *Satchmo*, 255
86 Robert E. Elder, *Information Machine: The United States Information Agency and American Foreign Policy* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1968), X, 6. Elder argued in 1968 that many Americans had little concept of what USIA did because most of its operations happened overseas. He states that the VOA (with its regular jazz music broadcasts) was the most publicized operation of the USIA in the United States.
88 Ibid.
89 Several historians of the Eisenhower administration have concluded that his ambiguous style of leadership often obscured his talents as president and led to attacks from American critics. See Fred Greenstein, “Eisenhower as
Eisenhower’s apparent indifference as well as his lack of appreciation for jazz within the supportive context of jazz and its export abroad. While a blunt statement concerning civil rights would surely infuriate one group or another, a seeming lack of Presidential support for jazz received criticism from media outlets that operated within a context where jazz was viewed as a strategic export and cultural exchange as a moral and ideological crusade.\textsuperscript{90}

Jazz exchanges continued to find support in the press throughout the 1960s. The Associated Press ran one article titled “Soviet Musicians Lean to Cool Jazz,” which explained that many Soviets “want jazz—the American kind, hot and searing, or moody and blue.”\textsuperscript{91} Strategic aims continued to form a strong argument for cultural exchange. The article also stated that while Soviet jazz enthusiasts appreciated a recent tour by Benny Goodman, they considered his music “far too old-fashioned.”\textsuperscript{92} In contrast, Louis Armstrong’s revamped version of Kurt Weill’s “Mack the Knife” warranted the label “hot.” The article portrayed Armstrong’s music as more relevant and useful for the Cold War struggle than Goodman’s. As public diplomacy received ample support from the media, jazz tours sponsored by the federal government also gained support and the black artists who were usually chosen for these tours benefitted as they gained public exposure in a way that highlighted their service to the nation.

While the bulk of evidence suggested that this trend existed broadly, not all articles touted support for cultural exchanges. In 1962 Peter Edson wrote that diverse exchanges

\textsuperscript{90}Ira Katznelson, \textit{Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of our Time} (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013). Katznelson develops the idea of the crusader state that developed during and after WWII, wherein the federal government expanded its perceived role in the world and contextualized that role within idealistic constructs pertaining to the greater good of humanity. Cultural exchanges fit neatly within the larger operations of the crusader state and the broader societal consensus that supported it.

\textsuperscript{91}Moscow Associated Press, “Soviet Musicians Lean to Cool Jazz,” \textit{The Sunday News and Tribune}, March 17, 1963, 4-A.

\textsuperscript{92}Ibid.
encompassing everything from “art and athletics to jazz, every science, from agriculture to zoology” created a “paradox” in that the United States government spent money to engage in an endeavor that ultimately benefitted the Soviets more than the Americans.93 Edson had clearly changed his mind since 1958. Although this article lambasted cultural exchanges as useless endeavors, it existed as a negative article among many that supported exchange and implicitly promoted racial equality. Cultural exchanges, jazz, and race comingled, whether one supported or argued against the exchanges. Ultimately, the overwhelming majority of media coverage of cultural exchanges supported the American government in its endeavor.

Writers for the Defender continued to support international musical tours into the 1960s. An article written in 1964 discussed a performance by the Oberlin College choir in Moscow that heralded the beginning of a new round of exchanges for that year. It highlighted the performance of a song from the negro spiritual genre, a musical form developed by slaves in the American South that represented an important precursor to jazz. At the US embassy, an official described that particular song, performed in a program that included classical music and American folk songs, as the “‘stopper’ of the show.”94

While Soviet officials found no ideological problems with folk forms of music, and often used local folk music to promote pride in the Soviet Union, Jazz performed by black musicians represented a major conundrum. Soviet propaganda after WWII blasted the United States for its endemic racism. This prompted the American government to use jazz tours to present a more egalitarian and tolerant face to the world.95 Black jazz represented an effective counter to Soviet propaganda, in that it answered Soviet indictments of American racial prejudices. Ironically,

95 Davenport, Jazz Diplomacy, 7.
Soviet officials tended to view jazz as “decadent music” that would discourage serious ideological thinking among Soviet youth. On the other hand, because of the unique and diffuse structure of a jazz band which often lacked a definitive leader, jazz also appealed to the Communists in ways that a classical performance could not. This undermined Soviet propaganda that portrayed capitalist culture as hopelessly decadent and lost.

Consensus within the media lent powerful support to cultural exchanges and government sponsored jazz tours. Support from the media reflected the broader belief in American society that big government, with its increased expenditures, meant a more effective government. Idealism within the media also reflected a broad desire to use more soft power tactics on the international scene. Cultural exchanges featuring black jazz served these interests. On the other hand, black jazz gained respectability through its association with cultural exchanges as a strategically important weapon in the Cold War crusade to contain and defeat communism. This development represented one way that jazz musicians and, by extension, black Americans as a whole, earned respectability in the eyes of many white Americans. That, in turn, gave weight to black demands for equal treatment.

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96 Moscow Associated Press, “Soviet Youth Urged to Turn Out Own Jazz,” Monroe News-Star, Dec. 26, 1960, 8-A. See S. Frederick Starr, *The Fate of Jazz in the Soviet Union, 1917-1980* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 318. Starr argues that repression was a constant factor of life for Soviet jazz musicians, even when rock n’ roll had displaced jazz as the dominant countercultural form. See also Ryback, *Rock around the Bloc*, 11. Ryback argues that by the early 1950s the Soviets decried jazz from the west not just as decadent music, but also as a form of cultural imperialism.
Chapter 2

Jazz as Official Diplomacy: Funding and Regional Targeting

While the press reflected broader trends in American thought, the actions conducted in secret by those in charge of cultural exchanges displayed the rationale behind these cultural endeavors. The government spent about $2.4 million a year on international cultural tours, and about half of that amount was dedicated solely to musical groups.\footnote{Remarks Prepared for Meeting of U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational and Cultural Affairs. February 26, 1974. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 97, folder 25. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville, 1.} While the government generally spent more money on classical music groups than on jazz combos, the gap narrowed steadily, if unevenly, from 1956-1963. Although more dollars were spent on classical music, more money was spent per person on jazz. This suggests that the officials in the government placed greater strategic weight on individual jazz artists, despite the copious sums spent to send large symphony orchestras abroad. Agency officials also targeted certain regions with certain types of music, and cultural affairs officers in the developing world generally decried the lack of viable artists in their respective countries who could successfully complete an international tour to the west. While some of these trends suggested racialized thought processes, any racism that existed was subsumed under perceived strategic need and the idea that peoples needed to be brought together.

Jazz Versus Classical: The Divide

Analysts in the State Department generally praised the contributions that jazz artists made to America’s public diplomacy campaign and hailed their tours as a vital part of that mission. However, analysis of expenditures and tour-specific allocations creates a more complicated picture. From 1956-1964, the federal government always spent more money to send classical
musicians abroad than they did for jazz musicians. In 1956, the government spent about $1,010,900 for tours conducted by classical groups, while it only spent $258,200 on jazz tours.

The government spent only about 26% of the amount spent on classical tours on jazz tours (a 26% relative expenditure). In 1957 the amount spent on jazz relative to classical was slightly less. $1,056,500 was spent on classical tours, while $166,434 was spent on jazz to yield about 16% spent on jazz relative to classical. However, by 1960 the gap was closing. In that year the government spent approximately $781,200 on classical tours and $293,300 on jazz tours to

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98 “Classical” refers here to groups such as philharmonic orchestras, small chamber ensembles, university symphonic bands and orchestras, choral groups, and solo operatic singers with their accompaniment. For the purpose of statistical figuring, this designation excludes ballet groups, any theater production, and any other group primarily dedicated to dance. “Jazz” refers to Big Band orchestras and their smaller modern derivatives. This designation also includes folk singers and groups dedicated to Negro Spirituals. Negro Spirituals share a common heritage with jazz, and folk music, while typically less popular than jazz, shared cultural ground with jazz music, particularly in the 1960s as jazz became more esoteric and less popular. Folk groups cost comparatively little relative to jazz groups.

99 Contracts, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 6. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Project Overviews, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 98, folder 20. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Program Proposals, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 48, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Performance Records, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 97, folder 10. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Cultural Advisory Panel Meeting Minutes, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 3. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Contracts, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 9. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Performance Records, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 97, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.

100 Contracts, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 4. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Program Proposals, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 48, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Project Proposals, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 48, folder 5. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Project Overviews, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 98, folder 20. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Contracts, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 6. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Performance Records, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 97, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
create a split of approximately 60/40 respectively.\footnote{Project Proposals, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 48, folder 7. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Contracts, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 1. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.} In 1961 this trend rebounded drastically when the government spent $963,200 on classical tours compared to $104,600 on jazz tours, an 11\% relative expenditure.\footnote{Project Proposals, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 48, folder 7. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Performance Records, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 97, folder 9. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Contracts, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 3. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Contracts, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 1. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Reports, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 97, folder 9. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.} By 1963 the split was nearly equal, with $291,200 spent on seven classical tours and $258,500 spent for a single jazz tour undertaken by Duke Ellington, for an 89\% relative expenditure.\footnote{Contracts, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 10. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Evaluation Reports, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 12. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Evaluation Reports, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 13. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Program Reports, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Program Reports, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 13. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.}

The upward path traced by jazz expenditures was not neat or perfect. The lowest relative expenditure of the period happened in 1961, while 1963 saw the highest. However, the money spent on classical tours in 1961 was drastically inflated by a single tour conducted by the American Repertory Company from March through June that cost $610,000.\footnote{“Project Proposal for the American Repertory Company,” Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 48, folder 7. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.} There were also unusually low jazz expenditures for jazz tours in 1961. This type of classical expenditure “inflation” occurred several times throughout the period. Large professional symphony orchestras naturally cost more money because of the large number of paid performers, higher
transportation costs, larger costs per diem for lodging and food, and higher incidentals. In 1956, expenditures for the Los Angeles Symphony alone, among sixteen tours, represented about 40% of the total allocation spent that year for classical tours at a cost of $407,000.105 Two other tours by the Robert Shaw Chorale and the Boston Symphony Orchestra totaled $354,800. These three tours combined represented about three quarters of the total classical expenditures that year. In 1957 the Cleveland Orchestra and the Minneapolis Symphony Orchestra cost $194,900 and $381,800 respectively to send abroad for a combined 10.5 weeks.106 These two tours, out of eleven total classical tours for that year, represented about 55% of the total classical expenditures. In 1960 an eight week tour by the Boston Symphony alone cost $505,400, or about 65% of total classical costs in a year with six classical tours.107 The tour conducted by the American Repertory Company in 1961 accounted for about two-thirds of classical costs in a year with ten tours total. In 1963 a tour conducted by the Clarion Concerts Chamber Orchestra cost $104,300, or about 36% of total classical expenditures in a year with seven classical tours.108

The federal government placed high value on the export of America’s classical talent, and gave more money to those who played that style of music. One or two very expensive tours conducted each year by large groups tended to dominate these expenditures. However, classical groups always outnumbered jazz groups. In 1956, sixteen classical groups toured as opposed to five jazz groups (16:5). In 1957 the ratio was 11:3; in 1960 6:4, in 1961 10:4, and in 1963 it was

105 Contract between American National Theater and Academy and the Los Angeles Symphony, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 6. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
107 Project Proposal for Boston Symphony. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 48, folder 7. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
7:1. If level of expenditure designated level of perceived importance, then officials in the State Department ascribed greater importance to classical programs than to those dedicated to jazz over most of the period from the late 1950s until the mid-1960s.

Eventually, however, jazz tours gained serious ground against classical tours. By 1963, they achieved relative equality, at least in the amount of money spent. All of the funds for jazz that year were spent on one tour undertaken by Duke Ellington. At thirteen weeks in length, Ellington’s tour cost on average about $19,900 per week. That money supported only 16 people.\textsuperscript{109} In other words, the tour cost an average of approximately $1200 per person, per week (pppw). In contrast, the Clarion tour that same year cost about $500 pppw.\textsuperscript{110} Therefore, 1963 saw a pppw cost ratio of approximately 2.5 jazz to 1 classical (1:2.5) between the top groups. The pppw cost ratio in 1956 for the most expensive groups from each category was about 3:1, in 1960 it was about 4:1, in 1961 about 1.5:1.\textsuperscript{111}

The government spent more money on classical groups because of the huge costs associated with an international tour conducted by symphonies or choirs that often contained over one hundred professional musicians. However, it tended to spend more money per individual on jazz groups. The leader of a touring jazz band tended to have a famous name and a popular reputation. Thus, he made more money in relation to his band members than a symphony conductor made in relation to the members of the symphony. However, the larger salary of one famous individual cannot account for such disparity between the overall ratios between classical and jazz groups. Furthermore, jazz orchestras usually toured with higher ratios of administrative staff and personnel than did the classical groups. These personnel tended to be paid significantly

\textsuperscript{109} Report on tour by Duke Ellington Orchestra. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 2, subseries 1, box 61, folder 5. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.

\textsuperscript{110} Report on tour by Clarion Concerts Chamber Orchestra. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 13. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.

\textsuperscript{111} There is not sufficient data to calculate the pppw ratio for 1957.
less than the performers. For example, Louis Armstrong’s tour of West Africa from 1960-1961 included seven performers, Armstrong himself, and five staff. The ratio between performers (including Armstrong) and staff was 8:5, respectively. In contrast, the tour conducted by the Pittsburgh Symphony in 1964 featured 113 performers (including the conductor) but only seven staff, for a ratio of about 16:1. Other jazz groups, such as the Dave Brubeck Quartet that toured in 1961, made due with only one staff member. But even then, the ratio between performers and staff was still 4:1. Staff personnel, the lowest-paid members of a touring group, represented a counter that offset star musicians such as Louis Armstrong or Dave Brubeck, who were paid disproportionately more than their musicians, as opposed to classical groups that did not see such a large disparity.

Therefore, statistical data that show individual members of the jazz groups earned more per week than individual members of the largest classical groups that toured reveal a system that placed greater value upon the work of individual jazz artists beyond the band leader, despite the leader’s disproportionate salary. In many cases, the individual jazz artists carried more fame with them than did their classical counterparts, despite the overarching shadow of the band leader. During Benny Goodman’s tour of the Soviet Union in 1962, young fans in the audience often knew musicians in the band by name and called out to them. The same could hardly be said to be true for the Los Angeles Symphony or the Boston Philharmonic. Perhaps an esoteric cabal of classical literati in the United States might have known the names of all the principal players in these groups, but certainly not third, or even second, chair positions. Outside the United States,

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112 Report on tour conducted by the Louis Armstrong Band. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 48, folder 7. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
113 Report on tour conducted by the Dave Brubeck Quartet. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 48, folder 7. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
even those few likely did not exist. Large classical groups brought numerical weight, the august air of cultural supremacy, and professionalism to the venues they played in while on tour. However, jazz groups found popular recognition, especially among youth. The American government was willing to pay more per individual for the goodwill this recognition supposedly fostered than for the grand presentation of centuries-old masterpieces.

The State Department valued tours that offered a vision of American society and culture as racially tolerant and diverse. All of the jazz bands that received funding featured either a black leader or a racially integrated band. While the large symphony orchestras tended to feature mainly white performers, the department funded several individual classical black musicians. In 1956, two out of nine of the individual classical artists were black. One of these, William Warfield, an opera singer, toured for ten weeks through Africa and southeastern Europe at a cost to the government of $29,000.\textsuperscript{115} In 1957, only one out of six individual artists, contralto Marian Anderson, was black. Anderson’s tour cost the government $55,000.\textsuperscript{116} In 1960, one out of three individual classical artists, Betty Allen, was black. However, her tour only lasted a week.\textsuperscript{117} In 1961, one out of only two individual artists were black, but that tour, too, lasted a very short time


\textsuperscript{116}Contract between ANTA and Getta Strok, representative for Marian Anderson. August 12, 1957. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 4. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Final Itinerary for Tour Conducted by Marian Anderson. 1957. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 97, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.

\textsuperscript{117}Final Itinerary for Betty Allen. 1960. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 97, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
and only cost $500.\textsuperscript{118} In 1962 both of the individual artists, operatic soprano Camilla Williams and Betty Allen, sponsored by the government were black. These two tours combined spanned four weeks and cost the government $8,800.\textsuperscript{119} In 1963, none of the individual classical artists was black, and in 1964 the government did not sponsor any individual artists.

This data certainly does not suggest an overwhelming black presence within the world of government-sponsored classical tours. At no time did individual black performers outnumber white ones, and the large expensive groups lacked significant numbers of blacks. The State Department also frequently chose the same musicians to tour in successive years, and, the classical music world at this time was heavily dominated by white performers. Government funding for black opera singers, especially the large amounts spent in the 1950s, represented a major recognition not only of talent but also of strategic advantage in light of a world influenced by Soviet propaganda that highlighted American racism.

\section*{Area Comparisons}

While classical groups tended to undertake more tours in Europe than jazz groups, jazz tours more often took place in the third world and in decolonizing regions.\textsuperscript{120} In 1956, the government sent six out of sixteen classical tours to Europe. Five went to Asia, four to Latin

\textsuperscript{118} Correspondence between Gertrude Macy, General Manager of ANTA, and Josephine Shuylar. February 10, 1961. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 1. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.


\textsuperscript{120} This analysis will examine five main regions: Europe, east Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. Europe is defined as western and eastern Europe, including Russia. East Asia is defined as those regions east and south of Afghanistan, and includes Oceana. Latin America includes central and south America. The Middle East includes Turkey in the north, the Arabian Peninsula in the south, and Afghanistan in the east. Several tours covered more than one of these regions. For statistical purposes, the tour is said to have occurred in the region where it spent the most time and visited the most countries. Sufficient data exists to discuss where tours took place for every year from 1956-1963.
America, and one to Africa. The ratio of European to non-European tours was six to ten (6:10).

No jazz tours were sent to Europe. Two jazz groups were sent to east Asia, one to Latin America, and one to the Middle East (0:4). In 1957, the dynamic shifted more toward East Asia. While only two classical tours went to Europe, four went to East Asia while two travelled in the Middle East and two went to Latin America (2:8). In contrast, two jazz tours were sent to Europe to fill in the gap, and only one toured in Africa (2:1). In 1958, Europe dominated the scene on all fronts. Five classical tours went to that region, two went to Latin America, and one to East Asia (5:3).

Two jazz tours went to Europe, while only one went to East Asia, one to Latin America,
and one to the Middle East (2:3). In 1959, four classical tours went to Europe, four went to Latin America, two went to Africa, and one went to East Asia (4:7). In that same year, two jazz groups went to East Asia and one went to Africa (0:3). In 1960, two classical groups went to Europe, two to East Asia, one to Latin America, and one to the Middle East (2:4). Two jazz groups went to Africa, one to East Asia, and one to the Middle East (0:4). In 1961 four classical groups went to Europe, one to East Asia, one to Latin America, one to Africa, and one to the Middle East (4:4). Three jazz groups went to East Asia and one to Latin America.
In 1962 three classical groups went to East Asia, one to Europe, and one to the Middle East (1:4). Three jazz groups went to Latin America, two to Africa, and one to Europe (1:5).

In 1963, four classical groups went to Europe, one to Latin America, one to Africa, and one to the Middle East (4:3). One jazz tour, by Duke Ellington, went to the Middle East (0:1).

Over this period, classical groups tended to travel more in Europe than jazz groups. However, more groups from both categories travelled outside Europe as colonies around the world gained their independence from European powers. In 1956, about one quarter of all tours went to Europe, and in 1958 over half were sent there. In 1959 the number was still over one quarter, but in 1960 it was only one-fifth. In 1961 the number of classical tours rebounded slightly to around one-third, but in 1962 only two out of eleven tours were to Europe. But, in 1963, half of all tours

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132 Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 97, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Contracts. 1961. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 1. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.


136 Reports on Tour Conducted by Duke Ellington. 1963. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 2, subseries 1, box 61, folder 5. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
were again sent to Europe. While the trajectory was not perfect or smooth, the number of tours sent to Europe declined significantly beginning around 1960. That year marked a sea change in Africa; several countries declared their independence. Other countries such as Malaysia and Jamaica also gained independence within the few years that surrounded 1960. State Department officials sensed the trend as nationalism rose throughout the world, and they sought to gain the allegiance of these newly independent peoples.

The State Department tended to send more classical groups to Europe, and the high costs often associated with these tours provided an indication of the importance placed upon European tours. In 1956 European tours cost the government about $332,000. This amount constituted about 28% of the total expenditures for that year in music tours, and about 36% of the total expenditures for classical tours. Most of these costs went to fund the Robert Shaw Chorale and the Boston Symphony Orchestra. Most of the rest of the money spent on classical tours that year funded the tour by Los Angeles Symphony that went to Southeast Asia. In 1957, 24% of classical expenditures went toward European tours, with the bulk of that money spent on the Cleveland Orchestra. European tours represented 29% of the total expenditures for 1957 with the added costs associated with the Glen Miller Orchestra and Jeanne Mitchell, for a total of $329,000.

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139 Contracts. 1957. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 6. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Project Proposals. 1957. Bureau of Educational
In 1960, during the height of decolonization movements around the world, the amount spent on European tours declined drastically. Only about $2000 was spent on classical tours to Iceland and Romania.\textsuperscript{140} This figure represented only about .2\% of total expenditures for that year. Meanwhile, the department spent about $505,000 to send the Boston Symphony to East Asia, $251,000 to send the Howard University Choir to Latin America, and $227,000 to send the Louis Armstrong and Dave Brubeck bands to Africa.\textsuperscript{141}

In 1961 the department restored its former funding for European tours and also accounted for the lack of funding in that area in 1960. About $917,000 was spent on tours to European countries, which accounted for 94\% of classical expenditures and 85\% of total expenditures for that year.\textsuperscript{142} While these numbers seem overwhelming, the most expensive tours also spent time in the Middle East in addition to their European performances. However, European venues represented the bulk of their travel, and therefore the majority of their expenditures.

In 1963 the amounts spent on tours to Europe were returning back to their pre-1960 levels as the Cold War heated up with the Cuban Missile Crisis and the new wall that divided Berlin. The government spent about $235,000 on classical tours to Europe, with none spent on jazz tours to

\textsuperscript{140}Project Proposals. 1960. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 48, folder 7. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Performance Records. 1960. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 97, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.


Europe.\footnote{Contracts. 1963. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 10. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Evaluation Reports. 1963. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 12. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Evaluation Reports. 1964. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 13. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.} That figure represented about 78\% of classical expenditures and about 41\% of total expenditures. These figures were still higher than the percentages before 1960, and represented a redoubled effort to woo Europeans. They also represented easing tensions in Eastern Europe. The government spent about $108,000 to send the Clarion Concerts Chamber Orchestra to Romania and the USSR, and it also sent Eugene List to Poland and Romania.\footnote{Evaluation Reports. 1963. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 12. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Evaluation Reports. 1963. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 13. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.} In 1956 no American groups toured in the USSR, and only two groups out of twenty-one ventured into communist-controlled Yugoslavia.\footnote{Contracts. 1956. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 3. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Performance Records. 1956. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 9. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.} In 1958 three groups out of fourteen ventured into Poland and Yugoslavia.\footnote{Performance Records. 1958. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 97, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Performance Records. 1958. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 97, folder 9. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Contracts. 1957. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 6. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.} In 1960 only Blanche Thebom toured in Eastern Europe when she went to Romania.\footnote{Project Proposals. 1960. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 48, folder 7. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.} In 1961, however, several groups toured in communist countries and in Russia itself. Four groups out of fourteen, or over one quarter, toured the region, and two of these went to Russia itself.\footnote{Project Proposals. 1961. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 48, folder 7. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Contracts. 1961. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 1. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.} By 1963 four groups out of eight, or one-half, toured in communist countries,
and one of these went to Russia.\textsuperscript{149} These statistics indicate the growing openness of the Soviet Union and its satellites under Nikita Khrushchev.

Funding for certain tours in certain locations tended to follow global events. When independence movements broke out in Africa, the government diverted funds away from Europe and toward other parts of the world. When events in Europe and the Cuban Missile Crisis stole the spotlight away from Africa, funds were diverted away from tours in other parts of the world and back Europe. Race drove these decisions insofar as it was deemed strategically pertinent. However, the perception of the cultural inferiority of peoples in nations around the world did sometimes characterize officials’ thinking, particularly as cultural affairs officers stationed abroad considered the possibility that their host nations might reciprocate the cultural inroads made by American groups in those countries.

\textbf{Reverse Flow: 1962}

In 1962 the State Department undertook a mission to study the viability of “reverse flow” or the facilitation of cultural presentations that originated with the peoples of other nations rather than with the United States. The Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 made such considerations possible. Before that time, the State Department was restricted to the facilitation of American tours. Reciprocity in exchange was contingent upon the willingness and ability of the other nation to send performers, the ability of its private sector to facilitate exchanges, or both. The Department asked the cultural affairs officers in American consulates throughout the world to report on the

feasibility of reverse flow in their respective nations. The responses these officers reflected the Eurocentrism that prevailed in the department’s musical spending habits, particularly after 1962.

While several foreign officers provided short replies that indicated no reverse flow would be possible, some provided longer responses and justifications behind their reasoning. A dispatch from the African nation Chad argued that reverse flow would was not viable in the short term. While the official held the performance of the more “primitive” backcountry dancers as more authentic than similar artistic expressions from urbanized groups, he also did not believe these people could successfully operate within the festival setting in a modern industrialized state. The officer stated that performers from the backcountry “perform some striking and wild dances.” But, he remained pessimistic about the ability of these “primitive” groups to operate within a festival setting, and stated that “perhaps more sophisticated or ‘Europeanized’ persons from the Fort Lamy area could be found at the expense of artistic achievement but having only recently evolved from a very primitive society, even they would require much special treatment in the completely different atmosphere of twentieth century America.” Such views did not necessarily connote a racist attitude, but they probably indicated perceived cultural inferiority.

The officers in Central Africa, Libya, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Cameroon, and Somalia also believed in the cultural inferiority of their host nations. They often used terminology that suggested that these countries were not sufficiently culturally evolved. Some officers in other African nations, however, expressed optimism about the ability of their nations to present their cultural expertise to the rest of the world. The officer from Congo explained that some

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150 Correspondence between foreign service officer in Chad and the State Department. January 31, 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 49, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
151 Ibid.
152 Correspondence on Reverse Flow Activities. 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 49, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
Congolese classical and folk music groups, along with a dance troupe, “would have great success in the United States which in turn would have impact on the Congo.” The government did not intend reverse flow merely to provide a more equitable and mutually beneficial cultural exchange, but also indirectly to influence local cultures to react favorably to the United States through the perception of equitability and mutual exchange. The officers from other countries that included Ghana, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Tunisia, and Egypt expressed at least mild optimism for future cultural exports, although most of the recommendations they made dealt with dancers, art, and sports groups, not music.

Far more American officials from the Middle East and East Asia responded in the affirmative. Those from Kuwait, Yemen, and Malaya indicated that their countries did not possess the ability to send groups to the United States. Only the officer in Malaya hinted at the cultural inferiority of the region when he stated that “the performing and graphic arts in Malaya are not now and are unlikely to reach in the future a standard which would warrant ‘reverse flow’ of cultural activities.” None of the other officials from these countries justified their decisions based on regional cultural inferiority. Rather, they argued that their countries lacked the finances or the transportation infrastructure to send tours abroad. Officials in larger (and more westernized) economies such as Japan and India offered several groups. Japan offered the Osaka Classical Puppet Theater and the Toho Academy String Orchestra. The officer in India stated “all

\[153\] Correspondence between cultural affairs officer to Congo and the State Department. February 7, 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 49, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
154 Correspondence on Reverse Flow Activities. 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 49, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
155 Correspondence between cultural affairs officer to Malaya and the State Department. February 10, 1962. 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 49, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
156 Correspondence on Reverse Flow Activities. 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 49, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
kinds of cultural programs” were available and that the Indian government had agreed to provide funds to send them abroad.\textsuperscript{157} In the Middle East, the officer in Turkey stated that the Turkish Ballet could tour, as well as several other groups.\textsuperscript{158} The officer in Israel offered the Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra and the Inbal Dancers. While the ballet and the Philharmonic Orchestra represented major potential expenditures for these countries, other groups would have been much cheaper to send abroad. Other countries from these regions offered art exhibits, small dance troupes, and individual folk artists, but, like the African nations, most did not offer large musical groups.\textsuperscript{159}

In the Americas only the officials from Nicaragua and Ecuador indicated that their countries would not be able to send groups abroad. Neither of these implied cultural inferiority. Rather, they cited political instability and economic deficiency.\textsuperscript{160} Officers from several other countries also cited the lack of funds in their respective countries as a main problem, but they still offered several proposals for cultural groups. Several of these groups constituted major potential expenditures, such as a ballet group from Mexico and the National Symphony from El Salvador.\textsuperscript{161} Most others, including artist exhibitions and folk groups, would have been much smaller and cheaper. In Panama, the officer stated that groups had approached the embassy in the

\textsuperscript{157} Correspondence between cultural affairs officer to Japan and the State Department. February 20, 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 49, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville; Correspondence between cultural affairs officer to India and the State Department. February 17, 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 49, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.

\textsuperscript{158} Correspondence between cultural affairs officer in Turkey and the State Department. January 31, 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 49, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.

\textsuperscript{159} Correspondence on reverse flow activities. 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 49, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.

\textsuperscript{160} Correspondence on reverse flow activities. 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 49, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.

\textsuperscript{161} Correspondence on reverse flow activities. 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 49, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
past regarding foreign tours, but they typically “scoffed” at the notion that their own government should pay for the tour expenses. Rather, they believed the United States should pay for the trips out of the profits made from the Panama Canal.162

The officer in Canada indicated that an opportunity existed to use reverse flow to show Canadians that the United States viewed Canada as an equal partner and as a culturally unique people.163 He expressed the idea, harbored by many in Canada, that Americans often viewed Canadians as silly or weak. He further argued that reverse flow would provide Canadians with a chance to exhibit their culture in the United States and empower them to tear away at any misconceptions about Canadians, perceived or real.164 Unlike American officers in many Latin American nations, the officer in Canada did not express any concerns about funding.

A much different scenario existed in Western Europe. Many officers recommended against the implementation of reverse flow in several of these countries, but not because they did not possess sufficient funds. Rather, many of these nations already exported their culture through private means, or their governments already had programs in place that constituted reverse flow to the United States. The officer in Britain stated that “the majority of British artistic performing groups, exhibitions, athletes, etc., arrange visits to the United States successfully through normal commercial and other channels,” and the officer from Denmark stated that “in the last two years Denmark- with its large ‘Denmark in USA’ program… has on balance devoted more effort to publicizing cultural attainments in the United States than has the United States in Denmark.”165

162 Correspondence between cultural affairs office in Panama and the State Department. January 29, 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 49, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
163 Correspondence between cultural affairs officer in Canada and the State Department. February 8, 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 49, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
164 Ibid.
165 Correspondence between cultural affairs officer in Britain and the State Department. February 7, 1962. Correspondence on reverse flow activities. 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection,
Most other officers in Western European countries responded with similar arguments. Only those in Ireland and Spain stated that no reverse flow would be possible in the short term. The officer in Ireland argued that there were insufficient funds, and the officer from Spain cited local political tensions.\footnote{Correspondence between cultural affairs officer in Denmark and the State Department. February 2, 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 49, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.}

In Eastern Europe, only the officer from Bulgaria stated that his country had no cultural attractions to offer and no chance to engage in reverse flow activities due to financial issues.\footnote{Correspondence between cultural affairs officer in Bulgaria and the State Department. February 28, 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 49, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.} Officers from several other countries indicated that their respective governments were very eager to begin a program of reverse flow. The officer in Poland stated that “the Poles are very much interested in ‘reverse flow’ type programs and are pushing increasingly hard for reciprocity and for a formal cultural exchange agreement.”\footnote{Correspondence between cultural affairs officer in Poland and the State Department. January 22, 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 49, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.} The officer in Romania cited bureaucratic difficulties with the Romanian government experienced by various artists as they tried to coordinate tours with private American booking companies.\footnote{Correspondence between cultural affairs officer in Romania and the State Department. February 28, 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 49, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.} The official in Hungary argued that the Hungarian government eagerly desired reverse flow activities with the United States because of the American government’s commitment to its stance against the way the Hungarian government rose to power.\footnote{Correspondence between cultural affairs officer in Hungary to the State Department. March 8, 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 49, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.} The Hungarians sought to counter negative attitudes in the west
toward their government with reciprocal cultural exchange. Only one country, Yugoslavia, was able to offer a jazz group.171

While officials in the government made their decisions about funding and regional targeting away from the public eye, their decisions reflected broader truths about the state of American society and the perception of strategic need. They tended to provide more funds for the “safe” classical groups, yet more money was spent per musician among the jazz groups with their popular names and leaders. Officials often perceived that the citizens of many countries in the developing world, particularly in Africa, would not be able to understand “high” art that included classical music or more modern forms of jazz. Eisenhower’s strategic focus upon Western Europe also contributed to choices to send more classical groups to Europe than to other regions. These groups cost more money to sponsor and theoretically communicated more effectively with European audiences than with people in other parts of the globe.

While racial prejudice seems to have lingered as a subconscious consideration for some officials, racial thinking served to include more ethnic minorities, not fewer, within the exchange program as the government tried to present a tolerant and diverse face to the world. It also influenced decisions regarding which groups would tour, and in what locations. Those jazz groups sent to Africa tended to be led by black Americans. The classical groups that frequented Europe tended to feature musicians who were mostly white. Officials in the government chose groups they thought would appeal to people in certain regions of the world, and race played a role in these considerations. While cultural exchanges remained primarily a one-way path from the United States to the rest of the world, officials contemplated the notion of reverse flow in the

171 Correspondence between the cultural affairs officer to Yugoslavia and the State Department. February 13, 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseries 1, box 49, folder 8. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
early 1960s as a way to create a more “mutual” atmosphere in public diplomacy. Officials who advocated reverse flow desired for people to come to the United States, to gain a new appreciation for American culture, and then return to their home countries ready to tell others about the glories of American life. While discussions about reverse flow among agency officials had no immediate results, they were indicative of the broader trend within the State Department away from wrote propaganda and toward more subtle forms of persuasion.
Chapter 3

Louis Armstrong in Decolonizing West Africa

In 1960 Louis Armstrong arrived in the capital of Leopoldville, Congo atop a throne carried by strained men to the tune of a raucously cheering crowd. His raspy greetings to the crowd amidst this carefully choreographed scene fell on deaf ears as they anticipated the sounds of Armstrong live in concert. Many of his fans had heard him only on crackling analogue recordings. No doubt some also saw him as a symbol of rising black independence, not only in Africa but in America as well. When Armstrong played his first solid note, American media outlets reported that the crowd went wild. Louis Armstrong played throughout Africa and Europe in 1960, with his time split between concerts for the government and those played on behalf of private entities. The tour generated excitement not only in the regions where Armstrong played, but also in America. American media highlighted this tour that coopted jazz into a broader strategic framework used by the United States to fight the spread of communism abroad. For many Americans, the real importance lay not in the quality of the jazz played but in the responses of foreign audiences. They also ascribed significance to the nature of the individuals chosen by the government as cultural ambassadors. Generally not political or intensely focused on issues that pertained to race, Armstrong advanced the cause of racial equality with his integrated band. The government sought to use that integration as a form of propaganda, targeted at foreign peoples, to portray America’s newfound racial tolerance. Musical aspects of the tour supported strategic and idealistic considerations that characterized attitudes and mindsets during the early phase of the Cold War.

Prior public statements made by Armstrong himself influenced the coverage of Armstrong’s tour in the American media. In anticipation of the agreement that would ultimately
be signed in 1958, the US State Department requested in late 1957 that Louis Armstrong play in
the Soviet Union on behalf of America. In response to this request, Armstrong replied publicly
that the American government could “go to hell.” This strong language came after weeks of
tension surrounding the desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, where
President Eisenhower eventually dispatched federal troops on September 24 to enforce a court
order that desegregated Central High School. While Eisenhower supported desegregation and the
enforcement of the Supreme Court’s decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954), he had not
done so publicly. Armstrong criticized him along with Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus, who
attempted to block integration. Other black musicians, like singer Lena Horne, condemned both
Faubus’s actions and Eisenhower’s perceived lack of leadership preceding his dispatch of troops.
The black singer, Eartha Kitt, followed Armstrong’s scathing language and declared Eisenhower
a “man without a soul.” Armstrong later backtracked on his damning statement, saying that he
“blew his top” and was “hot” over the issue.

Despite the fact that they were not published in the *Defender* until September 28,
Armstrong and others who expressed deep concern over Little Rock may well have made their
statements before Eisenhower dispatched federal troops on September 24. In a calmer response
to a State Department request that he reconsider, Armstrong replied, “maybe I will—if they do
something to straighten out that Arkansas mess. After all, America is my country, too, and I’ve
always tried to do anything I could to help it.” Armstrong implied that Eisenhower had not yet
taken any action. It took the State Department another three years to convince Armstrong to tour,

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173 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
partly because of his anger over these events. While this one incident represented a very public political statement tied to race, it was Armstrong’s only real fling into the world of “hot” politics. He still represented a “safe” choice for the State Department.

As the American government sought to bolster its own image and strategic goals by using black jazz, black musicians used their political experience abroad and leverage with the government in order to campaign for their rights. Armstrong’s comments were not isolated from the broader culture that surrounded jazz exchanges. Jazz artists regularly used their extensive cultural capital and the power they gained from the American government’s desire in order to promote liberal racial visions images abroad while on tour. They also preferred to think of their talents as being used as instruments of peace rather than weapons in the Cold War. While their interactions with peoples of other nations in this way represented the goal of cultural exchange to build relationships, the events surrounding Little Rock engendered a heightened sense of power and authority among jazz artists like Armstrong. He put his career as a “safe” black musician on the line with his rare public comments on the matter. This newfound influence represented an unintended consequence of government sponsored jazz exchanges.

Armstrong’s trip represented the State Department’s acceptance of Armstrong after a forced hiatus of four years from officially sponsored tours after his statements about the Little Rock Crisis. The other members of his band included Tummy Young on Trombone, Barney Bigard on clarinet, Billy Kyle on piano, Mort Herbert on string bass, Danny Barcelona on drums, and Velma Middleton as the singer. These musicians represented various ethnic groups.

176 Von Eschen, Satchmo, 58.
177 Von Eschen, Satchmo, 255.
Armstrong typically began each concert with his signature number, “When the Saints go Marching In.” Armstrong’s All Stars represented a style of jazz reminiscent of a time before the advent of modernist forms that featured little intentional use of positive negative space and retained the baseline melody during improvisation.\textsuperscript{181} The small group also represented a modern break from the classical Big Band instrumentation that featured around fifteen players. When he was not singing a ballad or scatting, Armstrong preferred to play fast and loud and to make heavy use of lip bends and difficult shakes in order to “spice” up the tune. He preferred a strong, clarion timbre with clearly defined notes over the fuzzier, softer sounds that emanated from more experimental players of the day. Armstrong was well advanced in age; he was sixty years old by the time of this tour. However, he had pioneered new ideas in jazz in his own right despite his more traditional tastes.

Armstrong’s band was racially integrated, with Bigard, a white clarinetist, and Barcelona, a Filipino-American drummer. Armstrong’s life also represented an array of colorful experiences. The experiences of his earlier years included red light districts and slums, cannabis, and alcohol. At sixty he cursed with a mouth tempered by years of hardship and poverty. Armstrong’s lifestyle did not appeal to Soviet officials; he would not tour in Russia until later in the 1960s.

Armstrong’s tour in West Africa demonstrated how easily public and private sponsorships could comingle with a musician’s own funds and plans during a single tour. He spent a total of eight months abroad. The first two weeks were funded by Pepsi-Cola in order to drum up support for five new bottling plants owned and operated by West Africans under license.

\textsuperscript{181} The use of positive negative space in jazz occurred when the player, especially a soloist, utilized rests (silence) not merely as a space to catch a breath but as a part of the performance. In other words, silence was used not only as a complement to notes but also as art on an equal plane with the notes. Positive negative space was created when the musician “played through the rest.”
from the Pepsi Company. According to the *New York Times*, the plants were estimated to be worth about $6,000,000, with a bottling capacity of 8,000,000 bottles per year, and Pepsi spent $300,000 to fund Armstrong’s tour for two weeks. Sales of Pepsi products in Ghana rose by over 50% in response to the tour.\(^{182}\) Businesses often profited when America exported its jazz. The US government funded the next nine weeks of the tour for a cost of about $137,000.\(^{183}\) After that time, Armstrong travelled to Europe to undertake his own ventures, and resumed his official tour in Africa thereafter.

American media covered very little of the portion of Armstrong’s tour that was sponsored by private entities. They chose to save their valuable space for the portion of the tour undertaken for the government. Pepsi-Cola sent Armstrong to the West African countries of Ghana and Nigeria, where he played in the capitals of both countries as well as provincial centers such as Kano, Ibadan, Kumasi, and Enugu. While the tour as a whole received a warm reception, the *Chicago Defender* reported that many members of a crowd of 15,000 walked out of Armstrong’s concert in Lagos, Nigeria when he failed to play in the “high life” style they liked the best.\(^{184}\)

West African highlife music blended traditional African and Western musical styles. Its development began in the nineteenth century as African musicians learned Western marches, polkas, ballads, sea chanties, and church hymns.\(^{185}\) After World War II, American soldiers brought swing into the highlife mix. Instrumentation for the dance groups that developed included trap drums, doublebass, guitar, and the staples of a western jazz horn section. Calypso styles that developed in the 1950s also included bongo drums, congas, and maraccas in the

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\(^{183}\) Project Proposal for Louis Armstrong Band. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 1, subseryes 1, box 48, folder 7. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.


percussion section.\textsuperscript{186} With decolonization came decreased contacts with white westerners and increased “feedback” or mutual exchange between black Americans and West Africans.\textsuperscript{187} Four-four beats prevalent in earlier times now increasingly shared space with upbeat six-eight tempos that supported energetic dances. The music would not have been unrecognizable to American jazz fans, but the use of maracas, bongos, and congo drums instead of the standard western jazz drum set created a distinctly “African” feel in the music. Pizzicato playing on the guitar reflected coastal sounds reminiscent of the tropics. Occasional use of call and response with horn solos atop the vocal riffs also generated a distinctly African feel that blended with western improvisation.

Kings and political officials greeted Armstrong upon his arrival. These greetings often expressed traditional local customs. One ceremony featured the dumping of whiskey on the ground as a libation to animist gods by a municipal chairman, and Armstrong followed his lead. During these two weeks Armstrong vacillated styles in his concerts between traditional Dixieland and more highlife and modern calypso melodies popular in West Africa at that time in order to cater to audiences that threatened to walk out on a concert with no highlife.\textsuperscript{188} While Armstrong needed to make some shifts in instrumentation to accommodate West African desires for highlife, these changes represented only minor deviations that his band easily accommodated. They also show how Armstrong toured at a moment when West African music followed West African politics. During the struggles for independence that produced politically sovereign nations that lacked significant economic or cultural independence, highlife still

\textsuperscript{186} Collins, \textit{Musicmakers}, 2-3.
\textsuperscript{187} Collins, \textit{Musicmakers}, 4.
\textsuperscript{188} Author Unknown, “Akwaaba,” \textit{Time}, 79-80.
sounded very similar to western jazz. However, it soon departed from western jazz traditions and made increasing use of rhythm, guitar, and distinctly African vocals, while horn instrumentation decreased.

In late October, Armstrong arrived in Leopoldville, the capital of Congo, and received a royal reception. Tribal dancers and drummers performed while men carried him on a red throne into the outdoor stadium; Armstrong called out to a crowd of about 10,000 in broken French. A Congolese official hailed him as the “ambassador extraordinary of the United States” and expressed national and black racial pride in Armstrong’s accomplishments. The New York Times reported that local workers and mothers with babies intermingled with soldiers from several nations and a few diplomats to form an audience that understood little of the sophistication of “Mr. Armstrong’s music.” They cheered nevertheless. The most enthusiastic response came from local teens and soldiers. Armstrong’s band brought each of these disparate groups together in one place because it held special significance for all of them. Jazz and highlife appealed to Africa’s youth and drew in teens and soldiers. Armstrong’s multiethnic band made soldiers from different parts of the world and local Africans feel right at home. Velma Middleton, Armstrong’s aged singer, provided a motherly presence that drew in African mothers and created a safe space for their children. Armstrong’s band held great appeal across generational, racial, and national lines, and Americans saw all of it as their media outlets covered the tour.

This concert in Leopoldville came just a few months after Congo gained its independence from Belgium. The drive for independence started in 1959 with riots in Leopoldville, some of them motivated by racial tension, in what Alicia Campos has called the “metropolitan” factor in

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the decolonization of West Africa. United Nations peacekeepers, mostly Indian soldiers, attended the concert alongside Congolese soldiers and civilians. Amidst the throes of civil war, both sides declared a truce in order to honor Armstrong’s visit and enable rival soldiers to attend the same concert. When Armstrong was hailed as a successful member of the black race, the significance of such an official statement would not have been lost on an audience that contained people who had fought to overthrow those they perceived as their white oppressors. As the United States reached out to this new nation, it presented not white America but one of its most talented black musicians whose popularity already pervaded the region, especially its youth. America sought to contrast itself with Congo’s former white overlords and present itself as Congo’s hip older friend who wanted to admit this parvenu kid into the cool club.

In early November, Armstrong and his band flew to Nairobi, the capital of Kenya. They performed three concerts in the city. His arrival sparked tension in the streets of the capital when colonial police broke up groups of people who began to sing a freedom song. Unlike some of the other areas Armstrong visited, Kenya had not yet gained its independence, and Armstrong’s presence stirred tensions that had already been simmering. Much like in Leopoldville, people from various regions and ethnic backgrounds flocked to hear Armstrong play. When asked about his feelings on political matters, Armstrong adopted his usual noncommittal stance and refrained from expressing his views. Unlike some black American musicians, he usually preferred to steer clear of such discussions. This made him a safe and ideal candidate for both public and private sponsorship on an international tour. Leaders in both realms did not feel threatened by

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him. Foreign audiences were free to transpose their own positive feelings onto his person. The *New York Times* reported that a newspaper based in Nairobi stated that “through his superb musicianship Satchmo has given expression to the often inarticulate feelings of his people, once oppressed, but now, although there are blots on the record, moving rapidly towards full and equal citizenship of the great country he represents. For this advance [he may be] in some small measure responsible.”¹⁹⁵ West Africans hailed Armstrong not just as a great musician, but also for their perception of the role he played to advance the cause of blacks in the United States. If Armstrong refused to comment on relevant political issues of the day, he did suggest that he was proud to undertake the tour to improve the image of the United States abroad. When asked if he thought that his tour bolstered the US image he responded that “It wouldn’t be just a deliberate thought, but if everybody feels that way, let it stay, and don’t say anything about it. I wouldn’t say it because it looks too much like patting myself on the back. But just look at the crowds at the airports, the bands playing ‘Saints’ and ‘Mack the Knife,’-- it got to be of some good.” At around the same time, Moscow Radio reportedly denounced the tour as a “capitalist distraction.”¹⁹⁶ Armstrong saw himself as an important part of America’s crusade to democratize the world and promote its image, and he viewed the tour as an expression of his own patriotism. He dissociated continued racial tensions in the United States from his broader patriotic feelings. This, coupled with his fame and skin color, also led the US government to regard him as the ideal jazz artist to sponsor on an African tour. American media portrayals that depicted him as a patriotic, apolitical musician also endeared him to the mainstream public. Two years later, the State Department offered Armstrong to the Soviets alongside Benny Goodman. The offer

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.
demonstrated that the government regarded his African tour as a success and Armstrong as a safe cultural ambassador.

On November 20, Armstrong arrived in secessionist Katanga Province in Congo. Just a few months earlier, Katanga had declared independence from Congo with nominal support from Belgium. In November, the future independence of the secessionist state remained uncertain. Armstrong’s visit coincided with a visit by Loy Henderson, a representative from the US State Department who toured Africa to inspect the US embassies in newly formed African nations. President Moise Tshombe of Katanga greeted Armstrong, who presented the grateful leader with a phonograph and some records with Armstrong’s music. When presented with the gifts, Tshombe responded that “the reason that I sat here not speaking for so long was because I am so filled with emotion I can’t.” Armstrong remained in Katanga for three days and played several concerts. These media portrayals further endeared him to Americans because they provided substantive evidence of the impact he had in winning friends for the United States.

Armstrong’s visits to Congo and secessionist Katanga revealed the importance of the timing of his tour. In 1960, decolonization around the world broke with a past dominated by European imperial powers. Many nations declared their independence. Their next logical choice, at least from the standpoint of the two major superpowers, involved decisions about alignment. Would the new states ally themselves with The United States, the Soviet Union, or neither? Obviously, each superpower wanted to claim these nations within its own sphere in order to bolster its power and influence in the world. Officials within the government of the United States realized the importance of public opinion in these new African states, and sent Armstrong during a time of momentous transformation and great flux in the region. As political turmoil enveloped

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Africa, Armstrong’s clarion horn brought people together and encouraged harmony. His unpolticized demeanor represented a neutral presence amidst a society riven with internal division.

On December 1, Armstrong arrived in Lome, Togo. Like Congo, Togo had achieved its independence from France just a few months earlier. Armstrong played concerts in Togo for three days. On the day after he arrived, the New York Times reported that he played for “3,000 stomping fans.” After Togo, Armstrong travelled to Abidjan in the Republic of the Ivory Coast, where he played three concerts. While in Sierra Leone, Velma Middleton, Armstrong’s singer, suffered a stroke while on stage and died a few weeks later. Middleton had been with Armstrong’s band for over ten years. The article in the Chicago Defender that described the event exuded sympathy for the band as its members grieved the loss. These reports in the media generated sympathy for Armstrong’s band through Middleton’s death while also depicting the band as a triumphant force.

Once Armstrong finished his tour in Ivory Coast, he travelled to Paris on December 5 to make a movie entitled “Paris Blues” that featured Armstrong, Paul Newman, and Joanne Woodward. He also played several concerts while in Europe, including one in Vienna for 19,000 fans in early February and another attended by the King of Thailand. The New York Times reported that Armstrong arrived extremely fatigued and burdened with a head cold, which caused him to cancel a press conference scheduled for later in the day. Travel fatigue and concerts performed in outdoor venues wherein Armstrong strained to make his high C heard loud and

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202 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
clear for audiences of thousands took their toll on his sixty year old body. *Newsweek* reported that the band had to wake up at 4 am in order to leave Leopoldville and fly to Nairobi. A schedule that required the trumpet player to wake up early would have decreased the swelling in his lips that accompanied lying down and sleep, which improved his playing. However, the rest of his body experienced perpetual fatigue, which invariably posed problems for diaphragm support and mental clarity. The *New York Times* quoted Armstrong as a man who strove to perform at his peak no matter the composition of an audience. For Armstrong, quality often meant loud, high notes that required more physical exertion than soft and low notes. As he worked to maintain the quality of each performance, his body grew successively weaker.

After he spent some time in Europe, Armstrong travelled back to Africa for the second leg of the tour sponsored by the US State Department. He first played in Dakar, Senegal. This tour was slated to last for three weeks. After Senegal, Armstrong travelled to Egypt, Abyssinia, Cameroon, Ghana, Senegal, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Mali. After such a lengthy tour, Armstrong and his band experienced extreme fatigue. On March 2, 1962 Armstrong arrived back in the United States after his time in Europe and Africa. Unlike media coverage of Goodman’s tour over a year later that portrayed perpetually increasing levels of grouchiness among the band members and various encounters with official snags that dampened the spirit of the tour, “nobody complained” on Armstrong’s tour and *Newsweek* reported that “they handled themselves like royalty.”

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205 Author Unknown, “Diplomat with a Horn,” *Newsweek*, 84, 87.
211 Author Unknown, “Diplomat with a Horn,” *Newsweek*, 87.
Positive media coverage of the tour indicated support for jazz played by interracial
groups. Yet writers within the American media covered Armstrong’s tour in 1960 to a lesser
extent than they did for Goodman’s tour to the Soviet Union in 1962. The first officially
sponsored jazz tour to the Soviet Union captured more attention than a tour to West Africa
during a crucial moment in decolonization. It is highly likely that the public simply cared more
about a groundbreaking tour into the heart of the Soviet Union. Armstrong’s tour epitomized the
experiences of other black jazz musicians who toured with the State Department and coincided
with an important moment in international relations during the Cold War. The tour also showed
ways in which Armstrong was able to renew his style of playing while he toured abroad and gain
new credence for jazz in the United States through press coverage of the tour.
Chapter 4
Benny Goodman in the USSR: First Official Jazz Encounter

Following in the footsteps of those like Louis Armstrong who toured for the American government, Benny Goodman took his clarinet in 1962 to the heart of America’s ideological enemy: the Soviet Union. Goodman was the first jazz musician sponsored by the American government to play in that country. He boldly mocked Soviet soldiers and tempted ideologues to tap their feet with his red hot licks, all in the same few weeks.

Like Armstrong’s tour, Goodman’s tour of the Soviet Union received wide acclaim in the American media. Goodman’s tour received more extensive coverage than Armstrong’s, and writers in the media discussed more details about the music his band played. Like the coverage of Armstrong’s tour, however, journalists ultimately portrayed a group that contributed to the idealistic principles of international unity and peaceful relations, and the strategic goal of winning the Cold War through the destabilization of the enemy’s cultural base. Musical details about the tour provided by writers for the media were subsumed beneath considerations for broader trends and goals.

When Benny Goodman toured in the Soviet Union under the auspice of the US State Department, it tour represented a major break with the Soviet policy that required jazz to remain underground. Soviet officials lambasted the music for its decadence. In 1962, the Soviet government laid out the welcome mat for jazz for the first time. As part of a renewed two-year cultural exchange agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Soviets chose Goodman over Louis Armstrong. In an era when newer, more incendiary forms of jazz like bebop subtly undercut concrete authority as they embraced abstraction, Soviet officials felt less threatened by Goodman’s conservative style that hearkened back to the Big Band era of the
1930s. Soviet officials told American record producer George Avakian that “We’d rather have Mr. Goodman. His music is more organized, and our people are more used to organized music.”\textsuperscript{212} They also saw the value in Goodman’s expansive classical repertoire on clarinet and his ability to play with Soviet orchestras while on tour.\textsuperscript{213}

At this early stage in official cultural relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, just four years after the Lacy-Zaroubin agreement of 1958 that established official cultural ties between the superpowers, classical music dominated the Soviet conception of a proper cultural exchange. The other two music groups slated to go forth to the Soviet Union were the New York City Ballet and the Robert Shaw Chorale, perhaps most famous in that era for its album “Christmas Hymns and Carols” released in November 1957. While Goodman’s tour generated a great deal of popular interest, the Chorale and the Ballet cost the American government far more to sponsor. Goodman’s tour cost about $96,000 for six weeks, while the Chorale cost about $126,800 for a tour that lasted eight and a half weeks.\textsuperscript{214} The Ballet cost significantly more as it tipped the scales at $432,000.\textsuperscript{215} The Ballet needed more money for transportation costs because they toted costumes, stage sets, and an enormous cast. Each member of that cast also required lodging and food. The Chorale also contained more members than


\textsuperscript{215} Gertrude Macy to Roy E. Larsen, October 31, 1962. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Collection, series 5, box 95, folder 27. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
Goodman’s band. It had about sixty people who performed as opposed to Goodman’s twenty four.\textsuperscript{216}

In response, the Soviets also sent three groups to the United States. They traded the Ukrainian Dance Ensemble for Goodman’s band and swapped the Bolshoi Theater Ballet and the Leningrad Philharmonia Symphony Orchestra for the other two groups.\textsuperscript{217} The Soviets viewed Goodman’s jazz not as an illustrative glimpse into modern American life, but as a “folk” relic, roughly on par with its own ideologically acceptable Ukrainian folk dancers. Yet they also viewed him as a safe protégé of the classical world. In the United States, Goodman maintained close ties to Juilliard. He taught at that renowned institution of high art after World War II, when Big Bands became passé. Many members of the Robert Shaw Chorale also hailed from Juilliard Conservatory.

Goodman also presented the Soviets with a safe candidate in other ways. He got his start playing clarinet early in life at Hull House in Chicago, a bastion of progressivism intended to provide aid for the working class amidst a sea of capitalist “decadence.” In addition, Goodman possessed prior experience in official international settings. He toured the Far East from 1956-1957 under the auspice of the State Department.\textsuperscript{218} He also played for the annual Staff Day party of the United Nations in September, 1957. At age 53, Goodman was a seasoned veteran of the musical world. Goodman promised to assemble a proper cohort, adhere to schedules, deal with fatigue while on tour and provide a sound level of professionalism. Yet his diverse experiences


\textsuperscript{217} E.W. Kenworthy, “Benny Goodman to Tour,” \textit{New York Times}, March 9, 1962, 1-2. It is most likely that the ballets were traded for one another, as were the chorale with the symphony orchestra.

as an international performer also gave him credence with Soviet officials and the ability, at least in theory, to tailor a repertoire for a foreign audience.

He presented professional preparedness coupled with a willingness to respond to the desires of the audience. About one month before he left for his tour, Goodman played a practice session and allowed the Ukrainian dancers to sit in. He kept the set confined largely to classic jazz hits, with which the Ukrainians would be familiar. He also played some Russian melodies, including the modulating and only slightly sassy “Midnight in Moscow” that conveyed a more upbeat interpretation of that city than the song’s famous counterpart, “Midnight in Paris,” did for the French capital. At first the dancers were shy yet respectful. However, they eventually tapped their heels and danced to Goodman’s music.\(^{219}\) Goodman knew that he needed to appeal to cultural sensibilities and tailor his repertoire accordingly.

Goodman represented the ideal choice for Soviet officials leery of American popular music and its pernicious ideological effects on the populace.\(^{220}\) He also deeply desired to play in the Soviet Union. He felt a special connection to Russia because both his parents were from that country, and he petitioned the State Department and Soviet officials throughout the 1950s to let him tour.\(^{221}\) In 1961 Goodman complained to Konstantin Sakva and Izrail Nestyev, musicologists with official positions in the Soviet Union, that he had auditioned to no avail to perform in the Soviet Union since 1953.\(^{222}\) Such remarks may have alienated some within the upper echelons of the Soviet government. However, certain officials invariably knew Goodman, sometimes on a personal level, and likely harbored some respect for his longstanding desire to


\(^{221}\) Firestone, \textit{Swing}, 405.

play in their country. When it came time to choose an American jazz performer, many in the Soviet government already knew Goodman.

Goodman also took special care when he selected the musicians for his band. Although there would be some controversy two years later when the Soviets accused the US of planting spies among the musicians, in 1962 Goodman aimed to feature well-known artists and to follow his tradition as a bandleader who had assembled one of the first racially integrated jazz bands. Some of his musicians, such as Zoot Sims on tenor saxophone and Mel Lewis on drums, were well known and popular in the Soviet Union before the tour. In many ways, this band represented the finest collection of musicians Goodman assembled in his career. In response to criticism that his music was anachronistic, Goodman chose many younger players. This decision ultimately caused friction between the leader and his band. While his musicians often wanted to perform new music, the band leader generally preferred traditional standards. Also, Goodman’s austere style of leadership tended to alienate the younger musicians. Goodman had asked Duke Ellington to join the tour for two weeks to provide a modernist flare, but Ellington stated that he had prior engagements.

As with any number of official Soviet decisions, paradox abounded. Goodman’s racially mixed band, while technically in line with Soviet ideology, blunted the effects of Soviet propaganda that lambasted the United States as a racially intolerant and bigoted cultural wasteland defined by white exclusion and capitalist domination. Soviet ideology also attacked American “bad jazz” as that which included any number of commercialized and loud forms of

224 Firestone, Swing, 409.
225 Firestone, Swing, 410.
227 Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 224.
jazz or rock. Soviet officials contrasted this music with “good jazz” played by modernists who developed new techniques in improvisation such as Duke Ellington and Miles Davis.\textsuperscript{228}

However, in 1958 the \textit{Saturday Review} characterized Goodman among America’s “popularizers,” the antithesis of its “innovators.”\textsuperscript{229} Goodman preferred to play his band loud and to follow simple, driving Big Band rhythms. These qualities should have pitted his music against Soviet ideology that decried “bad jazz.” Soviet officials looked less at the musical qualities of Goodman’s performance and more at the man and those who followed him. By 1962, despite his popularity, even some jazz fans and youth in the Soviet Union viewed Goodman as an antiquated relic of the past.\textsuperscript{230} More father-figure than firebrand, more entertainer than social critic, Goodman seemed to pose little threat to the Soviet establishment.

In May, with all preparations completed, Goodman and his band flew in to Moscow as the first officially sanctioned foreign jazz group to perform in that country. On May 30, 1962, Goodman and his band played the first concert of their tour of six weeks in the Soviet Union. For that concert, 4,600 people crammed into the Central Army Sports Arena, a venue without serious acoustic refinement yet large enough to house the crowd.\textsuperscript{231} Tickets to the concert cost the equivalent of $6.60, and most of the audience consisted of middle-aged Soviet elites. About 1,000 youth crowded outside as they attempted to capture a glimpse of the performance.\textsuperscript{232} This led some to later conclude that several early performances on the tour had been bought out by the Soviet government and then sold to devout Communist party members and ambivalent citizens.


whose reactions to the show would be guaranteed to be sedate and calm.\textsuperscript{233} The crowd’s response was limited at first, and “more respectful than enthusiastic.”\textsuperscript{234} By the end of the show, however, American media reported that the audience clapped along and called for two encores. The band first responded with the tune “Meadowland” that featured Goodman’s wailing solo clarinet mixed with drum riffs reminiscent of some Soviet military cadence, minor 6th leaps that conjured the frost during the dark Russian winter, and heavy chordal horn backgrounds that made that winter seem just a little bit darker. The second encore, “Stealing Apples,” relieved the tension generated by the first with an upbeat, catchy dance tune that could sell America in a heartbeat. Joya Sherrill’s solo over the classic “I’m Beginning to See the Light” also caused the audience to call for an encore, although the main commonality among American media portrayals of her performance dealt with the white strapless gown she wore. Other upbeat songs performed during the concert included “Stompin’ at the Savoy,” “Avalon,” and perhaps the most esoteric song of the night for a popular audience was the nimble “China Boy.” Slower tunes included “Body and Soul” and “Rose Room.” The performance also featured an “anthology of jazz” that depicted representative works by several different American jazz artists. The audience reportedly cheered the loudest for presentations on the work of Louis Armstrong and Duke Ellington.\textsuperscript{235}

Premier Nikita Khrushchev also made an amiable appearance at the concert, along with several top Soviet officials. He was “very pleased and delighted to be at the concert” and showed mild affection for the music despite some signs of “confusion” over the music at first. However, Khrushchev “appreciated the show,” and his appearance was widely acknowledged as an official

blessing for jazz in the Soviet Union. Yakaterina Furtseyava, the Soviet Minister of Culture, reportedly sat through the first portion of the concert wearing a “frown that reflected her official reservations about jazz” but by the latter half she smiled and seemed to appreciate the music. American journalists reported these reactions, and their readers garnered a sense of the impact that Goodman’s performance had upon the very highest levels of the Soviet government.

After the official concert, Goodman and his band went to Spasso House, the residence of American ambassador Llewellyn Thompson. Officials and band members celebrated Goodman’s 53rd birthday, and the band played for several hundred guests. Goodman’s enigmatic demeanor throughout the tour expressed itself early at this small event. Initially he requested that the audience refrain from dancing to provide the evening with an air of respectability. However, once he got the jam session started, he proceeded to grab a dignitary and began dancing. An official report by the State Department said that the dancing lasted until around three in the morning. Goodman’s erratic behavior became more pronounced as the tour progressed.

Soviet cultural authorities largely praised Goodman’s performance in Moscow. American media reported that Soviet critics hailed him as a “genuine poet of the clarinet” and a “wizard of the clarinet.” They also rebuffed those in the Soviet Union who decried Goodman’s tour as an anachronism to be valued primarily as a glimpse into the fashions of yesteryear. Soviet authorities appreciated Goodman’s commitment to traditional tonal jazz in an era increasingly dominated by atonal improvisation and the embrace of modernist discord. Yet modernist forms of jazz like bebop arose in direct response to the commercialization of the Big Bands such as

Goodman’s commercialization Soviet ideology supposedly abhorred.\textsuperscript{240} Politics clearly trumped ideology for those within the Soviet government as they catered to the progressive zeitgeist released by Khrushchev’s anti-Stalinist measures. Soviet citizens clamored for more jazz played openly. They won a concession in the form of Goodman’s admittedly dated tour. Many American observers looked on with glee and praised Goodman’s trip as a cultural victory for the United States in the Cold War.

While Goodman’s band played in venues for large crowds and entertained dignitaries, they also met with young Soviets who aspired to become professional jazz musicians. The fact that Soviet authorities allowed the American band into the country on official terms bespoke changing political realities that the government allowed the public to see, but other less obvious developments accompanied the widely acclaimed tour. After three concerts in Moscow, of which only the second achieved any serious level of applause, Goodman met with members of the state Composer’s Union at the House of Soviet Composers. Top classical composers attended the meeting, as well as a dozen young Soviet jazz composers. These jazz composers had been admitted to the union only a week before, most likely in response to the upcoming tour by Goodman. According to composer Tikhon Krennikov, represented “a significant step signifying official Soviet recognition of jazz as a respectable musical form.”\textsuperscript{241}

Three days after that first concert, on June 2, Goodman went to Red Square in Moscow, the home of Vladimir Lenin’s crystal tomb, the Bolshoi Theater, and the iconic colored domes of St. Basil’s Cathedral. He stopped near the Kremlin and pulled out his clarinet. Feeling cheery and a tad patriotic, he decided to play “Yankee Doodle Dandee.” The Soviet guardians of


ideological sanctity were off duty that day, and this song of American patriotism drew children to listen within the symbolic heart of communism. Over 200 people crowded around Goodman to hear him play. As a squad of Red Army soldiers marched by, Goodman broke out with “Pop Goes the Weasel.” He eventually caught the tempo of the clacking boots and kept time with the soldiers, much to the amusement of the Soviet bystanders. This quirky cultural invader who carried a clarinet instead of a gun charmed his captive audience and laid low the enemy soldiers through the universal language of music. It may be true that the pen is mightier than the sword, but perhaps it takes a clarinet to conquer a gun. American media latched on to this event, and the symbolism was not hard for readers to discern. That night Goodman played his third and final concert in Moscow. All three were packed.242

Goodman and his band then flew to Sochi, the provincial resort community on the Black Sea that served as a favorite vacation destination for Russia’s elites. The band gave three performances during its stay in Sochi.243 Trumpeter Joe Newman also played for the guests at a restaurant with a sextet formed from Goodman’s band.244 Each of the major performances filled the outdoor auditorium where Goodman played to about 1,600 people.245 Moscow’s sports arena presented serious acoustic challenges for the big band; an outdoor arena threatened to rob the performance of any real excitement. Although a government report stated that the venue had “excellent acoustics,” outdoor environments generally posed the greatest acoustical challenge for wind players.246 Lacking walls to reverberate sound back into the listener’s ear and keep it contained, vibrations from the players’ horns became absorbed in the air and lost sonority over

244 Whitman Bassow, “Benny Goodman in Russia—The Band Blew Hot and Cold,” Newsweek, July 2, 1962, 43.
relatively short distances. Directional instruments, especially the trumpets with their piercing timbre, had little difficulty accommodating long distances by themselves. Non-directional instruments, particularly Goodman’s clarinet with its softer timbre, had far more difficulty. The trumpets therefore needed to play softer on their naturally loud instruments, and the woodwinds to play louder, in order to compensate for the lack of the resonance of a concert hall. Increased fatigue resulted for both sets of players as they exerted greater effort to control their performance.

Goodman reported some minor difficulties with Soviet officials in Sochi. He fought unsuccessfully to replace the Soviet translator for his commentary with an American one. He likely feared that a Soviet citizen would inflect his words with different meaning than he intended. He also campaigned, with more success, for Soviet officials to allow his performances in Sochi to be recorded. Police arrested the head of the local jazz club as he fraternized with trumpeter Joe Newman from Goodman’s band and confiscated literature on jazz that the Americans had disseminated. Many at the time thought that Soviet officials engineered some of these setbacks in an attempt to restrain the excitement that they perceived surrounded the tour.

Although these problems certainly annoyed Goodman and dampened the experience of his band while on tour, they represented minor setbacks and could have been far worse. In 1963 Frederick C. Barghoorn, professor of political science at Yale, was arrested by Soviet police who suspected him of spying for the American government. The event occurred during the tense

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249 Firestone, *Swing*, 413. Archive (64-24)  
era after the Cuban missile crisis. While this event caused a stir in American media and a backlash against the Soviet Union from the American public, the diplomatic consequences for the Soviets in that instance paled with the potential outcome had Goodman been arrested. Few Americans knew Barghoorn’s name before his fateful arrest; almost all knew Goodman’s. Goodman’s widespread popularity and fame provided him with a degree of security from official interference while on tour and limited his troubles to mere nuisances. His fame also raised the diplomatic stakes of the tour. Barghoorn’s arrest generated a certain level of outrage among Americans, but nothing more. Had the Soviets detained Goodman or any members of his band, it would have had more dire ramifications; Goodman was a high profile, popular, and funded representative of the government of the United States. Soviet officials knew this, and acted accordingly.

While in Sochi, Goodman’s band also learned that many Soviet youth possessed advanced knowledge of jazz. Many young fans in the audience cried out to members of the band by name during performances. Conversations developed on the beach between band members, bikini babes, and burly hunks about the relevance of big band swing in an era increasingly dominated by bebop and cool jazz.251 The American jazz musicians were surprised to find so much knowledge about jazz among Soviet youth. One of Goodman’s musicians exclaimed that “these cats know more about us than we do!” 252 In fact, the Soviet populace had a long history with jazz. They acquired it through underground networks, the VOA, and some state-sanctioned groups.253 Moreover, while Big Bands faded from popularity in the United States in the 1950s,

they remained popular in the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{254} Residual popularity from the 1950s explains the cheering crowds at Goodman’s concerts. By 1962, however, people in the Soviet Union, especially youth, challenged the old style in favor of newer modernist forms. Despite the nature of the conversations that developed between the band and Soviet youth, American media portrayed the band as hip and modern, able to play before dignitaries and converse on the beach with Soviet youth all on the same tour.

Most of Goodman’s band became disgruntled with his conservative style after these conversations, and tensions escalated as various parties threatened to quit. Goodman threatened to fire trombonist Jimmy Knepper after he improvised a solo with a modernist tinge and then supposedly made a rude face at the conductor during the concert. Saxophonist Phil Woods threatened to quit the band when Goodman criticized his playing. After a raucous party held by the musicians wherein they made disparaging comments about Goodman within his hearing, Goodman threatened to send most of them home.\textsuperscript{255} However, most of these events remained outside the knowledge of the general public in America.

After playing their concerts in Sochi, Goodman and his band flew to Tiflis, the capital of Georgia. Appollon Kipiani, director of the local Philharmonic Society, greeted the band at the airport and provided a more inviting atmosphere than they had received previously. Before the concerts, he appeared on television, played Goodman’s music, and discussed his previous career. He also hosted the band for a special dinner. He requested that Goodman play more modern hits during his concerts, and even went so far as to state that “twist” and “rock n’ roll” would be


appropriate. While many Soviet officials still struggled to accommodate the idea that swing received official state acceptance, Kipiani encouraged music that still divided generations and tastes in the west. According to a State Department report, he likely desired to find a way to fill seats in Tiflis’s large stadium with youth and pop music enthusiasts.

The band played five concerts in the city’s sports arena, which held 7,000 people. No concert in Tiflis sold all the tickets, although the stadium likely held more seats than the local populace could fill. In Tiflis, Goodman encountered the toughest crowd to that point on his tour of the Soviet Union. On June 9, Goodman gave a concert and his female vocalist, Joya Sherrill, sang a rendition of the song “Katyusha” in Russian. In response to this performance, the audience reportedly “hooted her down” and displayed their disapproval openly. The next day Soviet officials attempted to assuage the situation. They explained that the audience was perturbed over bad acoustics. Sherrill and Goodman were not convinced. Sherrill asked, “If the acoustics were so bad, why did the songs I sang in English get such a good reception?”

The New York Times reported that nationalistic Georgians disapproved of the song being sung in Russian, a language they spoke only out of necessity. Written in 1938 about a girl’s lover who went to defend the motherland in war, the song became a popular anthem during World War II among Soviet Russians affected by that war. Although Soviet ideology had technically argued against nationalism and the primacy of ethnic identity, World War II bought a

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257 Ibid.
return of nationalist fervor driven by Russian identity and hegemony within the Soviet Union. Georgians in Tiflis resented not only the use of the Russian language but also Russian hegemony in the Soviet Union. Despite the crowd’s disturbance of the performance, *Life* magazine nevertheless portrayed the concert as a smashing success, with a large photo that depicted cheering crowds in Tiflis. *Life* briefly mentioned the incident but quickly qualified it by saying that the crowd soon cheered again once Sherrill stopped singing the song.262 Writers for *Life* magazine sought to portray the tour in a positive light. While they needed to acknowledge the fact that the audience booed the band, they dwelled on more positive aspects of the band’s time in Tiflis. The *New York Times* also reported on the negative reception to the song, but it portrayed the event as a minor cultural misunderstanding, not a major setback.

Goodman’s performers received their worst reception in Tiflis. Sherrill performed Katyusha at every major venue along the tour before Tiflis. The American media acclaimed her for her white strapless gown that pushed Soviet clothing norms, more than for the quality of her performance.

Although Goodman had many international experiences that qualified him to perform on behalf of the United States in the Soviet Union, it is true that he made a serious cultural blunder in his decision to perform Katyusha in Tiflis. The Soviet newspaper *Izvestia* reported that the audience disapproved because Sherrill performed the piece poorly, not because of cultural tensions.263 While she may have botched the performance, that was highly unlikely since Sherrill’s ability and professionalism ranked among the top singers of the day. As a public diplomat for the American government, Goodman was not warned ahead of time about the song.

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In 1962 Americans knew little about Soviet culture. While the State Department was obviously more informed than the populace, the cultural understanding of minor Soviet republics was limited; hence the perceived need for cultural exchanges to learn more about them. The American government representative who accompanied the band was surprised to learn from a Soviet music critic that “Georgians simply don’t like Russian songs.” Such blunders represented hard learned but valuable lessons about the cultures of other nations that served to inform future battles in the cultural Cold War.

After Tiflis, Goodman and his band flew to Tashkent, the capital of the inner-Asian Soviet republic Uzbekistan. *Newsweek* reported that by this time the band members were “short-tempered,” and *Life* stated that the audiences in Tashkent reacted in a “tepid” fashion. The government report stated that Tashkent was the “low point of the tour,” not least because of an unanticipated air raid alert. *Newsweek* blamed short tempers in the band on the hot weather in Tashkent and long flights on turboprop airplanes throughout the tour that would have been both bumpy and loud. *Newsweek* did not blame the difficulties on inherent tension within with band or on problems with management. Members also complained when they felt that Goodman cut their solos short and about the seemingly arbitrary selection of older standard tunes when they wanted to play newer ones. Certainly the band felt edgy after they were booed in Tiflis. Goodman also reportedly doped himself on sleeping pills to ease his tension about the tour. His erratic behavior

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throughout the tour isolated young band members already miffed about Goodman’s seemingly harsh personality and anachronistic sets.\(^{267}\)

At the last concert in Tashkent, Goodman announced the end after a mere 65 minute performance. That was the second concert performed that day. While Goodman himself was likely weary, he also considered the needs of his brass sections. Woodwind and percussion players could theoretically keep playing as long as they were cognizant. Brass, however, especially the trumpets in a jazz band, had limits. The trumpet embouchure could play only so much before the muscles began to fail. This led to decreased musical quality, more cracked notes, and eventually failed tones if playing persisted. While external heat would have affected every instrument to some extent, causing them to go sharp, the brass sections were more affected, because their instruments and mouthpieces were made of metal with a low specific heat capacity. While they could mechanically compensate for temperature by pulling out their primary tuning slides, the brass players also needed to compensate with a wider embouchure to flatten the tone. This further contributed to fatigue.

After Tashkent, Goodman and his band flew to Leningrad. On the evening of June 20 they played for an audience of more than 5,000 at the city’s Winter Stadium, a venue with a glass roof normally used for indoor track meets and obviously not intended for musical performances. The *New York Times* reported that this concert was the greatest success of the tour, and the exhausted band played encores for forty minutes. The State Department report stated that all of the concerts in Leningrad were practically sold out, and that Leningrad represented the “high point of the tour.”\(^{268}\) Although Soviet authorities conducted their usual arrests and discouraged

\(^{267}\) Firestone, *Swing*, 412.

excessive fraternization between Soviet fans and the band, Soviet youth still flocked to the hotel where the band stayed, and people cheered wildly at the concerts.\footnote{Ibid.} Sherrill performed “Katyusha” for the first time since Tiflis and sang three encores. Other songs performed included the classics “Sing, Sing, Sing” with its simple, upbeat rhythm, the exotic “Caravan” that gave Goodman extensive opportunities to show off his wailing clarinet, and the slower ballad “The Man I Love.” Goodman believed that the audience was more responsive and wild because Soviet officials finally allowed tickets to the concert to be sold on the open market.\footnote{Associated Press, “Leningrad Hails Benny Goodman,” \textit{New York Times}, June 21, 1962, 25.} While the best tickets in the Bolshoi Theater never exceeded 3.5 rubles, tickets to see Benny Goodman officially sold for four to six rubles. Scalpers sold tickets for as much as twenty rubles apiece.\footnote{Ralph Blum, “Letter from Leningrad,” \textit{New Yorker}, June 27, 1962, 81.} Ernest jazz fans in Leningrad spent considerable sums to attend Goodman’s anticipated concert.

The next night Goodman’s band played again. The concert featured Byron Janis, a classical pianist, for a special rendition of “Rhapsody in Blue.” Janis joined the Goodman band after the pianist’s tour in the Soviet Union. The concert began with the standard upbeat tunes “Let’s Dance” and “Bugle Call Rag” with the usual solos by Goodman, Newman, and Zoot Sims. These were followed by the swelling ballad “I got it bad and that Ain’t Good” with Sherrill as the vocal soloist.\footnote{Blum, “Letter,” \textit{New Yorker}, 82.} When it came time to play the original jazzed up version of “Rhapsody in Blue” used by George Gershwin and Paul Whitman in 1924, the performers encountered a technical difficulty. Janis’s piano had been placed in a spot that did not allow him to see the conductor.\footnote{Blum, “Letter,” \textit{New Yorker}, 83.} As the carrier of the melody and primary source of rhythm, Janis had to guide the band rhythmically and dynamically in the absence of a visible conductor. Goodman also
interrupted the crucial opening glissando for the piece twice to restart.\textsuperscript{274} Janis left the concert unhappy because he felt that Goodman had attempted to dominate the performance, and the State Department report also contended that Goodman had botched the concert.\textsuperscript{275} Nevertheless, American media outlets reported that once “Rhapsody in Blue” was finished the audience “broke into rhythmic clapping, a sign of the highest approval.” Other songs popular with the audience that featured Sherrill as solo vocalist included the sultry “The Thrill is Gone,” and the melancholy tune “Summertime.” The concert finished with the upbeat dance tune “One O’clock Jump” and forty minutes of encore that featured mostly improvised Dixieland.\textsuperscript{276}

After they played in Leningrad, the band flew to Kiev. They played four concerts that filled most of the seats in a stadium with a capacity of 10,000. The crowds in Kiev were not as enthusiastic as those in Leningrad, but their responses still pleased American officials. However, the constant presence of Soviet media workers and the engineered social situations designed to please them wore heavily on the morale of the band.\textsuperscript{277}

After they played in Kiev, the band returned to Moscow on July 1 to finish the tour. American media reported that the crowds cheered vociferously for most of the concert. The band played six concerts in a stadium that held 9,000 people, and generally received a reception on par with Kiev.\textsuperscript{278} Once the concert was over, they forced the management to raise the curtain again for another encore. However, some youth in the back of the stadium booed Sherrill’s Russian rendition of “Katyusha,” much like the audience in Tiflis. The \textit{New York Times} reported that the

\textsuperscript{275} Author Unknown, “Rhapsody in Russia,” \textit{Time}, June 29, 1962, 49.
\textsuperscript{278} Ibid.
naysayers thought the song was “too old fashioned for a jazz concert.” Throughout the tour, particularly in Sochi, Goodman’s band encountered youth who thought his music dated. However, they also encountered crowds that consumed their music with passionate zeal, including the youth. In general, American media presented a tour cheered by crowds and shouted down only by a few unruly individuals.

On July 4 the band did not schedule any concerts in observance of Independence Day. Goodman visited the US embassy in Moscow, and Khrushchev also paid the embassy a surprise visit. The two men sparred in a fashion reminiscent of the Nixon-Khrushchev Kitchen Debates about three years earlier. Khrushchev stated bluntly that he did not “like jazz…I don’t understand jazz. I don’t mean just yours, I don’t even understand our own.” Goodman said that jazz grew on the artistic palate as an acquired taste, but Khrushchev responded that “good music should appeal at once—it shouldn’t take time.” The Soviet Premier taunted Goodman’s jazz through a mock impression of the jig on the lawn of the embassy. He indicated that he respected Goodman as a classical player of “good” music, but he could not discern Goodman’s motives as he performed jazz. Ever the enigmatic figure, Khrushchev countered his tirade against jazz and experimental modern art with well wishes for the American people and continued peace between the two superpowers. This more “private” conversation between the two men contrasted with Khrushchev’s statements after Goodman’s performance in Moscow at the beginning of the tour, when he lauded Goodman’s jazz despite his obvious inability to understand the music. Khrushchev’s opinion likely had not changed in the previous six weeks. Rather, he saw the value in the tour early on as a chance to publicly encourage goodwill between the two countries, and did not wish to sour those relations publicly, despite his true feelings about the music.

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That same evening the band members wandered in to the Molodezhnoye café, a popular gathering place for Moscow’s youth, as a local jazz group played the scene. They joined in the jam session amidst enthusiastic welcomes and greetings, and imparted their jazz wisdom to the local group as they had in the other cities on the tour. While jazz fans certainly appreciated staged performances in large auditoriums, these seemingly impromptu gatherings represented the real spirit of people-to-people cultural exchanges and aligned with the improvisational, intimate tradition of jazz. They personalized the band members and allowed the locals to place names with faces and professional sounds with real human personalities.

On Sunday, July 8 the band performed one of the last concerts of the tour. Goodman had broken out some modern charts for the last leg of the tour, but many of the band members felt too scorned to appreciate the gesture. Displeasure with the bandleader had steadily accumulated since before the tour even started. Now, it threatened to end the last major performance of the tour when band members boycotted the stage while they pressed for their paychecks. They refused to sign a contract that granted Goodman access to their work for months after the tour. In response, Goodman’s chief of staff threatened to withhold their payment. After twenty minutes, they received their checks and went on stage. The night’s events disrupted an already soiled musical conversation among the musicians. One song reportedly began so pathetically that Goodman had to restart. This generated tension with the audience and angst among the musicians. However, the government report stated that this mishap occurred amidst a largely happy and successful end to the tour.

281 Ibid.
282 Firestone, Swing, 416.
283 Ibid.
Despite these difficulties, American media reported that fans rushed into the aisles and demanded an encore. Sherill’s “Katyusha” inspired some boos from the back, yet one fan wrote a letter that apologized for the disturbance and explained that the jeers emanated from a group of “hired goons.”\footnote{New York Times Special, “Goodman’s Band Ends Soviet Tour,” \textit{New York Times}, July 9, 1962, 10.} The exact nature of the composition of those who continued to jeer at “Katyusha” can, of course, never be known for sure. However, even if those who jeered did so out of sincere disdain for the song, they still represented a discontented minority among a sea of ebullient fans who took little note of the inharmonious relations among the Americans.

On July 9 the band packed its belongings and departed for the United States. Goodman travelled to Geneva for a side trip before he returned to America.\footnote{Gay Talese, “Goodman’s Band Assesses Its Trip,” \textit{New York Times}, July 10, 1962, 30.} This extra trip and Janis’s private tour before he joined Goodman’s band in concert show the dynamic nature of the government tours. Officialdom and private life often meshed together, both in how the tours were funded and organized as well as in how they were conducted.

Despite tensions among the musicians while on tour that arose from fatigue and disdain for Goodman’s style of leadership, upon returning to the United States Goodman reported that the tour had been a success and that Soviet audiences had been “very receptive and discerning.” He also downplayed any frictions that had existed among band members.\footnote{Unknown Author, “Goodman Returns After Soviet Tour,” \textit{New York Times}, July 19, 1962, 19.} A broad government evaluation of the tour after it finished also downplayed tensions among band members, stating they had been well-behaved, and praised the success of the tour.\footnote{U.S. Department of State, “Report on the Benny Goodman Tour,” 16. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Collection, series 2, subseries 1, box 64, folder 24. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.} Approximately 176,000 Soviet citizens heard the band live.\footnote{Ibid.} The tour grossed around $500,000 for the Soviet Union in ticket sales, even after the advertising and travel expenses paid by the Soviet agency...
Goskoncert. Furthermore, Sherrill reportedly saw her income double as a direct result of the publicity she garnered while on tour. She also received numerous offers for employment upon her return home. However, Goodman refused to include any songs that featured her vocal performances on an album of the tour. Her performances usually generated the loudest applause, and Avakian cited Goodman’s jealousy as the reason behind this decision to exclude her. While government sponsored jazz tours technically existed in order to bring greater understanding between peoples and international unity, they were also good business, at least for all those involved, except the US government which paid the bill. While the tours did not generally make money for the US government, officials perceived their benefit in other ways. They viewed Goodman’s tour as a massive cultural inroad into the heart of international communism and a win for the United States in its crusade against communism. However, in 1963, after the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev backtracked on his former acceptance of jazz and drew a hard line against future US government sponsored jazz tours in his country. S. Frederick Starr has argued that the perceived success of Goodman’s tour led Khrushchev to revert to his former intolerance of jazz as soon as the tour was over.

The tour proved to be a high profile, well-known event in American society that generated a significant amount of attention. President Kennedy thought the tour had been important enough to take the time to meet with Goodman afterward. Overall, media outlets portrayed the tour as a resounding success; most setbacks came as a result of bureaucratic obstacles caused by the Soviets, and the band generally maintained a professional public.

292 Firestone, Swing, 417.
293 Firestone, Swing, 418.
294 Starr, Red and Hot, 270.
demeanor despite their squabbles backstage. The media also covered the tour extensively and highlighted minute details, often down to the songs that were played and the structural aspects of each stadium. The tour also expressed a different way that public and private spheres blended compared to Armstrong’s tour. Goodman’s enforced reliance upon State Department officials proved detrimental to his public image as officials failed to censor his performance set for cultural insensitivities in Georgia. Nevertheless, Goodman’s career received a major boost from media coverage of the tour that remained largely supportive. The integrated nature of Goodman’s band also furthered racial equality through media portrayals as Goodman’s professional attitude that lacked political content normalized racial integration.
Conclusion

Case Study Comparisons and the Broader Lessons of Public Diplomacy

For many Americans, the real importance in government sponsored jazz tours lay not in the quality of the jazz played but in the responses of foreign audiences. They also ascribed significance to the nature of the individuals chosen by the government as cultural ambassadors. Neither overtly political nor intensely focused on issues that pertained to race, Louis Armstrong and Benny Goodman advanced the cause of racial equality with their integrated bands. The government sought to use that integration as a form of propaganda, targeted at foreign peoples, that portrayed America’s newfound racial tolerance.

Most foreigners had never heard Goodman or Armstrong play in person. Rather, recordings broadcast over the Voice of America (VOA) or sold on legitimate and illegitimate markets constituted many individuals’ sole experience with their music before the live tours. Cultural simultaneity exerted itself perfectly through radio broadcasts and imperfectly through record distribution.296 Telephones dispersed private spaces and radio communication linked disparate events in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Radio broadcasts of jazz, sponsored by the government of the United States, infiltrated foreign private spaces and linked disparate cultures in the middle of the twentieth century. If these developments exuded modernity, then jazz tours that focused on discrete locations in time and space reverted the experience of jazz to a prior age. Away from the recording studio, the imperfect humanity of the musicians exerted itself as they made mistakes and grew weary. Yet people loved these “archaic”

296 Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1918 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1983), xv, 68, 86. Kern describes simultaneity as the phenomenon that arose with new technologies like radio communication and telephones that allowed people to experience multiple events at once. Simultaneity broke down traditionally conceived private time in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as public space and time increasingly pressed upon the private.
events and viewed them as the capstone that rested upon a host of culturally inferior, if technologically superior, recorded experiences.

Goodman and Armstrong created new meaning for jazz in early 1960s American culture that tied a dated popular art form with government strategies and direction. This development occurred while domestic jazz remade its image as it embraced atonality, ethereal forms, an increased use of positive negative space that emphasized silence as musical expression, and softer tones. Jazz now meant more than just artistic creation and racial identity. It also meant apoliticism comingled with government sponsorship and direction; American patriotism was implied beneath an aura of “cool.” Furthermore, the tours meant new monetary profits for individuals and entities that had previously benefitted less from jazz. The tours also created new meaning for many of the foreign audiences that heard the music of these particular musicians live for the first time. They experienced the performances in conjunction with an implied message given by the US government: “love me like you love jazz.”

Armstrong’s All Stars played in a style of jazz reminiscent of a time before the advent of modernist forms that featured little intentional use of positive negative space and retained the baseline melody during improvisation. The small group also represented a modern break from the classical Big Band instrumentation, such as the style used by Goodman, which featured around fifteen players. When he was not singing a ballad or scatting, Armstrong played fast and loud and to made heavy use of lip bends and difficult shakes in order to “spice” up the tune. He preferred a strong, clarion timbre with clearly defined notes over the fuzzier, softer sounds that

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297 Sydney Mintz, *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History* (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), 6-8. Mintz argues that uses imply meanings, and that uses change as meanings change. While Mintz discusses a solid commodity (sugar), his argument about meaning can also be applied to an artform, particularly one as commodified as jazz.

298 The use of positive negative space in jazz occurred when the player, especially a soloist, utilized rests (silence) not merely as a space to catch a breath but as a part of the performance. In other words, silence was used not only as a complement to notes but also as art on an equal plane with the notes. Positive negative space was created when the musician “played through the rest.”
emanated from more experimental players of the day. Like Goodman, Armstrong was well advanced in age; he was sixty years old by the time of his tour in 1960. However, he had pioneered new ideas in jazz in his own right, and he expressed a sophisticated and modern understanding of sound, despite his more traditional tastes.

Like Goodman’s band, Armstrong’s group was racially integrated. It featured Barney Bigard, a white clarinetist, and Danny Barcelona, a Filipino-American drummer. Unlike Goodman, Armstrong’s life represented an array of colorful experiences that made Goodman look square. He spent his earlier years in red light districts and slums, using cannabis and alcohol. At sixty, he used profanity freely and fluently. Goodman’s sleeping pills represented his first real fling into substance abuse, and his social interactions were generally cordial, if sometimes terse. Armstrong’s lifestyle alienated Soviet officials; he would not tour Russia again until later in the 1960s.

American media covered Armstrong’s tour to a far lesser degree than Goodman’s. While the media certainly seemed more interested in the government sponsored portion of the tour than the private endeavors, articles nevertheless provided fewer details for each stage in Armstrong’s journey than they did for Goodman’s. Further, reporters merely glossed over several stops that Armstrong made, while the media covered each stop in Goodman’s tour extensively. The most extensive coverage of both tours consisted of articles in the *New York Times*. Articles from other outlets provided either expanded or repeated elements of the coverage in the *Times*. This was especially true of the Armstrong tour. *Newsweek* and *Time* each provided an article that overviewed certain portions of the tour. For Goodman, *Life* provided over ten pages of written material accompanied by a photo essay that spanned the entire tour. The *New Yorker, Newsweek,*
and the Reporter also commented extensively on the Goodman tour. Saturday Review, Time, US News and World Report, and Commonweal provided additional material.

It is safe to say, then, that Goodman’s tour generated more media attention than Armstrong’s. Journalists lauded both musicians as masters on their instruments, professional cultural ambassadors, and friendly individuals. Both men sporadically received the title “king.” Goodman’s traditional designation as the “King of Swing” qualified him in the eyes of many for this title, and Armstrong’s triumphal entry into Leopoldville atop a throne carried by several men spoke for itself. However, the sheer quantity of articles that covered Goodman’s tour suggests that journalists gauged his tour as more important than Armstrong’s. Americans paid attention to decolonization, a series of events that dismantled a system that had effectively dominated the globe. Many in the government viewed Armstrong’s tour as an excellent opportunity to gain influence in the developing world, despite official complaints about his failure to report to the agency in the proper way about his contract with Pepsi-Cola. However, Armstrong’s tour was not the first of its kind. Dizzy Gillespie had toured the Middle East for the State Department in 1956, and Armstrong himself had played in various other regions of the world before 1960.

While jazz artists such as Byron Janis had toured the Soviet Union under private auspices before Goodman’s tour, Goodman was the first jazz musician to play in that country as a representative of the American government. As the heart of international communism, the Soviet Union represented a more valuable target for America’s cultural weaponry than decolonized regions, at least in the eyes of the media. Nevertheless, American journalists attached immense importance to government involvement in both tours that elevated the status of jazz and gave the musicians, who served as cultural ambassadors, more cultural capital than they previously possessed. The

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299 Letter from Heath Bowman to Gertrude. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, series 5, box 96, folder 1. Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville.
acquisition of this capital transcended actions taken while on tour and difficulties experienced. The media tended to overlook Goodman’s harsh treatment of his musicians and both men’s fatigue. Rather, media writers focused on the positive aspects of the tours and how the musicians overcame hardships. Journalists meshed laudatory treatment of a topic filled with idealistic hope and belief in the goodness of humanity with support for strategic endeavors intended to advance the cause of American influence.

If Goodman’s tour purported mutual and supposedly equal exchange between superpowers, Armstrong’s represented officially unilateral but culturally porous exchange. Armstrong’s tour for the government generated some credibility for black jazz in the United States. Both tours generated considerable credibility for integrated jazz. Other high profile artists such as Dave Brubeck not only featured integrated bands but specifically promoted integration in jazz as a moral obligation. Goodman and Armstrong both emphasized a high level of musicianship over race and politics. In doing so, they endeared themselves to white critics within the mainstream American discourse. This likely generated far more sympathy for causes that focused on a particular conceptualization of racial justice, such as integration, than those musicians who positioned themselves along political lines. Such sympathy perhaps expressed itself best when media writers highlighted physical difficulties experienced by each aged musician, yet painted the men in a sympathetic and human way rather than a weak or grouchy one.

While several black jazz artists contributed to shifts in American perceptions of race, none had more influence than Louis Armstrong. By 1968 he was hailed as the “greatest of all-time jazz stars” and the “greatest of all-time jazz virtuosos” in a glittering opinion piece by Jack
O’Brian that glorified Armstrong and his career.\(^{300}\) Furthermore, the article depicted Armstrong as “one of the most extraordinary creative geniuses that all music has ever known.”\(^{301}\) By the end of the 1960s, Armstrong achieved a high level of respectability, not only among those within the confines of the music world, but in American society at large. His international involvement bolstered his respectability in incalculable ways. The article further stated that Armstrong, as the “real King of jazz,” had “personally polished the rust of most of the iron curtain countries.”\(^{302}\) Armstrong’s involvement in international tours after WWII as a part of the government’s strategic propaganda mission to the world lent him a higher degree of respectability and legitimacy than he previously possessed. That legitimacy, attached to a black jazz musician, played a small part in the legitimization of black Americans as a whole.

Armstrong’s death in 1971 represented a major event that received ample media coverage. The Associated Press featured two full-length articles that praised Armstrong’s life and celebrated his legacy. One highlighted his widespread international fan base, stating that he “went from one-night stands in little towns all across the country to jazz concerts in most of the world’s capitals.”\(^{303}\) The other emphasized that Armstrong’s successors, despite their devotion to his style and their respectable level of musicianship, would never be able to match Armstrong’s creative genius.\(^{304}\) He arose from humble “bawdyhouse” origins to create the “ultimate refinement of the cruder, spiritual jazz he had left downriver when he came north to Chicago.”\(^{305}\) Government-sponsored cultural exchanges provided Armstrong with the means to play in select venues across the globe and the legitimacy to claim the international spotlight. Jazz no longer

\(^{301}\) Ibid.
\(^{302}\) Ibid.
\(^{305}\) Ibid. This article likely referenced Armstrong’s Dixieland roots when it discussed his “bawdyhouse” origins.
occupied a place of distaste in American society. Rather, it gained honor and respect and was played before kings and world leaders. In at least one case, a world leader was so taken with jazz that he learned to play it himself.\footnote{Alyn Shipton, \textit{A New History of Jazz} (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group, Inc., 2007), 291. Shipton tells here of Adulyadej Bhumibol (b. 1927), the King of Thailand, who played his own jazz in the style pioneered by Benny Goodman.}

Benny Goodman also furthered the cause of racial equality in his own way. His integrated band constantly served as a reminder that musical excellence did not preclude racial tolerance or integration. Like Armstrong, the publicity that Goodman received due to his tours for the government, especially the tour to the Soviet Union in 1962, served to further his own fame and career. The publicity also underscored the integrated nature of Goodman’s music. While Armstrong’s relative lack of political involvement endeared him to mainstream culture and elites alike, this was doubly true for Goodman whose energies remained strictly professional. Goodman successfully furthered the cause of racial equality in a more powerful way than if he had emphasized racial equality for its own sake within his band or touted a political platform. When he stated that he chose his musicians strictly for their ability rather than their skin color, he normalized the way the media necessarily portrayed relations within his band. When he downplayed the issue, he created the image of a pervasive, non-threatening norm that could appeal to broad swaths of the public. While Armstrong also did this to some degree, his highly publicized criticisms about the Little Rock crisis blurred his soft image and politicized to some degree the integrated nature of his band. His contribution to racial equality lay more in his own personal success as a black musician and in his ability to serve as a cultural ambassador against communist influence.

Jazz tours during the Cold War represented an important expression of America’s soft power that presented a more amiable face to the rest of the world than did military proxy wars
and the development of extensive nuclear capabilities.\(^{307}\) The $2.4 million spent per year on cultural tours paled compared to the approximately $170 million spent per year that funded the information activities of the United States Information Agency (USIA).\(^{308}\) However, musical tours were relatively immune to the charges that radio programs produced by the USIA and the dissemination of information merely represented modern forms of ideological propaganda. Musical tours, and especially jazz tours, comingle official influence with private sponsorship, blended scripted behavior with live humanity, and gave significant power to the musicians who promoted their causes through infrapolitical conversations and encounters while on tour.\(^{309}\) The exact nature of the influence of jazz tours and the larger system of public diplomacy is, of course impossible to gauge. American newspapers reported on the level of applause at concerts throughout the globe, and internal reports generated by employees of the State Department provided approximate numbers of audience attendees. Perception in these cases probably distorted reality to some degree, at least in terms of applause levels and crowd reaction. While cultural diplomacy did not generally achieve immediate diplomatic results or directly influence the direction of policy, it set the tone for traditional diplomatic engagement and created a more amiable environment wherein international talks could take place.\(^{310}\) Cultural diplomacy also represented a topic that unified disparate political ideologies through its emphases on strategic maneuvering and idealistic hopes. Liberals and conservatives both agreed with certain elements of the cultural exchange program. Cultural exchanges


\(^{309}\) Robin D.G. Kelley, “‘We are not what We Seem’: Rethinking Black Working-Class Opposition in the Jim Crow South,” *The Journal of American History* 80, no. 1 (June, 1993), 77. Kelley cites sociologist James C. Scott, who defines infrapolitics as the ways in which dissident cultures use “daily conversations, folklore, jokes, songs, and other cultural practices” in a way that emerges “on stage in spaces controlled by the powerful.”

represented a stabilizing political and cultural force during an era when social tensions began to fracture a once unified society.

Furthermore, while cultural diplomacy had no effect on domestic legislation that pertained to race, jazz tours generated cultural capital for black Americans that they did not previously possess. The musicians themselves earned the wages, media writers who covered the tours grew these cultural funds exponentially as they supported cultural exchanges through mass media, and officials within the State Department, that American National Theater and Academy (ANTA), and USIA reflected the growth of this capital when they increased monetary funds for jazz tours relative to classical ones. While the American government co-opted jazz and the musicians who performed it to suit its own strategic purposes, the idealism these musicians often carried created sympathy for racial issues domestically. Strategic use of jazz tours legitimized racial idealism and the ideology of tolerance created new meaning for jazz that hearkened to a tradition of black rebellion while it simultaneously embraced patriotism, anticommunism, and substantial government funds.

Initiatives in public diplomacy like these jazz tours were symbolic of the era that gave birth to them. After World War II and the Korean War, many Americans were tired of the fighting and ready for the ideas of mutual tolerance and understanding. While they embraced this idealistic thinking, most Americans also remained staunch in their commitment to anticommunism and the strategic deployment of resources to counter its influence. The Eisenhower era represents one of the longest periods in modern American history that saw no war and several balanced budgets. Economic prosperity created excess funds that could be used to fund nonessential and experimental programs such as publicly funded jazz tours. While Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev certainly had his bombastic and anti-western moments, his general
program of destalinization created genuine thaw and hope in the west for better relations. International jazz tours thrived on government funds in this environment. With John Kennedy’s short term in office, idealism became more prevalent, just as strategy had been under Eisenhower. While Eisenhower probably accomplished more to further racial equality than Kennedy, Kennedy’s presidency did see increased allocations for jazz tours, which translated into support for black Americans.

The end of the Cold War brought a period of peace and stability to the world, a short pax Americana where the United States reigned absolutely supreme on the world stage economically, politically, militarily, and culturally. Photographers captured images of the people who tore down the Berlin Wall—many young people who wore the blue jeans associated with western rock music and called out for the kind of freedom that they envisioned Americans possessed. While the United States certainly outspent the Soviet Union on the Cold War, the people who had agitated for independence and rights often drew cultural inspiration from the principles and culture of the United States. Social agitation and the permissive spread of western values, long feared by Soviet authorities, likely played a very important role in the demise of the Soviet Union.

What can the history of early Cold War public diplomacy initiatives and jazz tours teach us about our current situation? USIA has been absorbed into the State Department, and the government still spends a tiny fraction of total expenditures for international diplomacy on public diplomacy. As during the Cold War, the money spent on these programs pales in

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313 Nye, *Soft Power*, 123.
comparison to expenditures on hard power. After 1964, the amount of money spent on cultural presentation programs declined steadily.\textsuperscript{314} Also, the United States has continued to channel these funds into programs that target nation states in an era when extra-territorial groups and non-statist actors such as ISIS and Al Qaeda play a dominant role in the nation’s media coverage and in its strategic plan. Due in part to this anachronistic policy, public diplomacy has virtually disappeared from the public consciousness. Exercises in hard power and military operations now dominate the headlines; these headlines often bring more division to American society than unity.

It is obvious that the era of jazz tours as effective public diplomacy with the potential to represent the heart of American culture is long-past. However, international voices have not ceased to charge American society with endemic intolerance and even racism. While the case made by some that music can be a “cure for international ills” is unrealistic and overblown, cultural exchanges can certainly be used as one tool among many to set a positive tone for international discourse and alleviate tensions.\textsuperscript{315} The execution of cultural diplomacy has also historically been far cheaper for the government than the exercise of hard power. While American cultural diplomacy developed during an era that saw the rise of big government, they also flourished amidst several balanced federal budgets and a booming postwar economy. While cultural diplomacy represented an extra expenditure, they arose during an era when Americans preferred cheap defense strategies, and they may have actually reduced overall costs to the government by reducing the need for expensive military expenditures.\textsuperscript{316}

America continues to offer ideals that appeal to peoples across the world and an attractive culture. It is true that initiatives in public diplomacy do not represent a viable alternative to the continued development of military might and the occasional use of hard power. Public diplomacy and musical tours do, however, continue to offer themselves to the creation of viable long-term strategies that promise to eventually supplant the need for continuous exercises in hard power relations.
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